EN BANC

[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998]

TERESITA G. FABIAN petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F.
GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J:
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public
respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private
respondents from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director,
Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
I
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major
stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction
business. Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed
the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman.
Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the FMED, and private respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time,
in the course of which private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning
the same in his office.
Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their
relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24,
1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive
suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and
disgraceful or immoral conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of
Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by
finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private
respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate
and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who,
in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated
private respondents from the administrative charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) [1] pertinently
provides that In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the
Ombudsman),[2] when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final
and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the
manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this
Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative
recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution
and the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that

the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure question on law.
xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules of procedure for the effective exercise
or performance of its powers, functions, and duties.
xxx
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules
of procedure and consistent with the due process. x x x
xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after
receipt of written notice shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or
decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and
unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion forreconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the
validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceeding before it, including
those with respect to the availabity or non-avalability of appeal in administrative cases. Such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No.07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she definitely prefaced her petition by
categorizing the same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent
statement which in effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an
original action for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the differences between a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decision of this Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
vis--vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly pointed out by public respondents, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman,
et al.[3] and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. [4] were original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al.[5] was commenced by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al.,
[6]
Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., [7]Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[8] and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez,[9] which were
for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et al.[10] was initiated by a pleading unlikely
denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by
Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al.[11] which was a special civil action for certiorari.
Considering, however the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues therein which will shortly be
explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of
application of the writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original action, and whether or not they
may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter
statements in Yabuts and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this
juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a
decision in an administrative diciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is
resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.
III
After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does appear to have been
seriously considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service

Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both Section
19 of Republic Act. No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of section 9, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were
made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this
Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the proceedings against one could
eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is
sought to be brought to this Court.Yet systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in
the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed
increasing the appellate indiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that
Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional
grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall
explain.
Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges
are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions
thereof. When it is clear that a statute trangresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that
the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgement. [12]
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, [13] the rule has
been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to
enter a judgement that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is
unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. [14]
Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction
of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion.
[15]
The Court ex mero motumay take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where the fact is developed. [16] The
court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.[17]
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be further heard on this
constitutional question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:
The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court from the 'Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita G. Fabian
vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,' which absolved the latter from the administrative
charges for grave misconduct, among other."
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No.
6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in
this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently
providing that all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took into account or discussed the validity of the
aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall
be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advise and consent."
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals , et al.
(G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former Circular No. 1-95,as now substantially reproduced
in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved and in this case, and the foregoing legal
consideration appear to impugn the constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it
necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be first resolved before conducting further proceedings in this appellate
review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Submit their position and arguments on the matter subject of this
resolution by filing their corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such requirement, hence the Court dispenses
with any submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Ombudsman
is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of law "increasing" the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only
an error or question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgement or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court may provide," said section 27 does not increase this Court's appellate
jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised
therein are only questions of law of which this Court already has of which this Court already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has
allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly
involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court. [18] Also, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate

jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgements and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature
intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special
statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because
they are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure[19] preclude
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states:
SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgement or final order or
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever authorized by law, may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only question of law which must be
distinctly set forth. (Italics ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be
adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose
was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed,
was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasijudicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final
orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies [20] are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies . [21]
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the
Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be
a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service
Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a
constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover
questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually
involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as
a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by
Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is
limited to jurisdictional questions.*
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact
may be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately
too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law.
Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have
pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and
when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question, especially when the
case can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of
judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there
was even no need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The
constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue
confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present
case. [22]
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of passing upon; the constitutional
question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we must reject the same. That private respondent
could be absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is final and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere
with the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as earlier
explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is
precisely under review here because of some statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court
on the same issues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg the question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot
validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the
Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, el al. [23] was intended
to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court [24]

We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics and some statements in
Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut
and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken
by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of
this Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative background of Republic
Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new
version of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by the House of Representatives. [25] The
Senate was informed of the approval of the final version of the Act on October 2, 1989 [26] and the same was thereafter enacted into
law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from
the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that
Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this
Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI
xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section
30, Article VI of the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara
informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that they should be appeals on certiorari.
[27]
There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent
.[28]
VI
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in
line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals
under the provisions of Rule 43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in
nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or
modification of substantive rights.Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing
consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the
question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the
scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context
and substantive in another.[29] It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.
[30]
It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own
procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges,
enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them.[31] If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it
may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means o implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.[32]
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases
involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which
shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. [33] This is so because it is not the right to
appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is
to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may
be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.
[34]

Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a
new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a
procedural and not a substantive power.Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have
still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy. [35]
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural
and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect [36] or, in the
case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the
transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the

aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be
considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to
submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero,
Quisumbing, and Purisima JJ., concur.

Bellosillo,

Melo,

Puno,

Vitug,

Kapunan,

Mendoza,

Panganiban,

Martinez,

IRST DIVISION
SPS. ERNESTO V. YU AND G.R. No. 172172
ELSIE ONG YU,
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BALTAZAR N. PACLEB, BRION, JJ.
(Substituted by ANTONIETA S.
PACLEB, LORNA PACLEB- Promulgated :
GUERRERO, FLORENCIO C.
PACLEB, and MYRLA C. PACLEB),
Respondents. February 24, 2009
x------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing: (i) the Decision [1] dated August 31, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78629 setting aside the Decision [2] dated December 27, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
1325-96; and (ii) the Resolution[3] dated April 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals denying reconsideration of the said decision.
The facts are well established.
Respondent Baltazar N. Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are the registered owners of an 18,000-square meter
parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan, Dasmarias, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-118375 [4](Langcaan Property).
In 1992, the Langcaan Property became the subject of three (3) documents purporting to transfer its ownership. On February 27,
1992, a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] was entered into between Spouses Baltazar N. Pacleb and Angelita Chan and Rebecca Del Rosario.
On May 7, 1992, a Deed of Absolute Sale [6] was entered into between Rebecca Del Rosario and Ruperto L. Javier (Javier). On
November 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell [7] was entered into between Javier and petitioner spouses Ernesto V. Yu and Elsie Ong Yu. In
their contract, petitioner spouses Yu agreed to pay Javier a total consideration of P900,000. Six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000)
(consisting of P200,000 as previous payment and P400,000 to be paid upon execution of the contract) was acknowledged as received
by Javier and P300,000 remained as balance. Javier undertook to deliver possession of the Langcaan Property and to sign a deed of
absolute sale within thirty (30) days from execution of the contract.
All the aforementioned sales were not registered.
On April 23, 1993, petitioner spouses Yu filed with the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, a Complaint [8] for specific performance and
damages against Javier, docketed as Civil Case No. 741-93, to compel the latter to deliver to them ownership and possession, as well
as title to the Langcaan Property. In their Complaint, they alleged that Javier represented to them that the Langcaan Property was not
tenanted. However, after they already paid P200,000 as initial payment and entered into an Agreement dated September 11, 1992
for the sale of the Langcaan Property, they discovered it was tenanted by Ramon C. Pacleb (Ramon). [9] Petitioner spouses demanded
the cancellation of their agreement and the return of their initial payment.Thereafter, petitioner spouses and Javier verified from
Ramon if he was willing to vacate the property and the latter was agreeable. Javier then promised to make arrangements with Ramon
to vacate the property and to pay the latter his disturbance compensation. Hence, they proceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell
canceling the Agreement mentioned. However, Javier failed to comply with his obligations.
Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared in default. On September 8, 1994, the trial court rendered a Decision,
[10]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendant based on the sale of subject
parcel of land to the former who is entitled thereby to the ownership and possession thereof from the said
defendant who is further directed to pay damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) including attorneys fees
and expenses incurred by the plaintiff in this case as a consequence.
The defendant is further directed to deliver the certificate of title of the land to the plaintiff who is entitled
to it as transferee and new owner thereof upon payment by the plaintiff of his balance of the purchase price in the
sum of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) with legal interest from date.
SO ORDERED.

The said Decision and its Certificate of Finality [11] were annotated on TCT No. T-118375 as Entry No. 2676-75 [12] and Entry No. 2677-75,
[13]
respectively.
On March 10, 1995, petitioner spouses and Ramon and the latters wife, Corazon Bodino, executed a Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng
Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan.[14] Under the said agreement, petitioner spouses paid Ramon the
amount of P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the Langcaan Property.
On October 12, 1995, respondent filed a Complaint [15] for annulment of deed of sale and other documents arising from it, docketed as
Civil Case No. 1199-95. He alleged that the deed of sale purportedly executed between him and his late first wife and Rebecca Del
Rosario was spurious as their signatures thereon were forgeries. Respondent moved to have summons served upon Rebecca Del
Rosario by publication since the latters address could not be found. The trial court, however, denied his motion. [16] Respondent then
moved to dismiss the case, and the trial court granted the motion in its Order [17] dated April 11, 1996, dismissing the case without
prejudice.
Meanwhile, on November 23, 1995, petitioner spouses filed an action for forcible entry against respondent with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC). They alleged that they had prior physical possession of the Langcaan Property through their trustee, Ramon, until
the latter was ousted by respondent in September 1995. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner spouses, which decision was affirmed by
the Regional Trial Court.[18] However, the Court of Appeals set aside the decisions of the lower courts and found that it was respondent
who had prior physical possession of the property as shown by his payment of real estate taxes thereon. [19]
On May 29, 1996, respondent filed the instant case for removal of cloud from title with damages to cancel Entry No. 2676-75
and Entry No. 2677-75, the annotated Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 and its Certificate of Finality, from the title of the Langcaan
Property.[20] Respondent alleged that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife and Rebecca Del Rosario, who is not known
to them, could not have been possibly executed on February 27, 1992, the date appearing thereon. He alleged that on said date, he
was residing in the United States[21] and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, died twenty (20) years ago. [22]
On May 28, 1997, during the pendency of the instant case before the trial court, respondent died without having testified on the
merits of his case. Hence, he was substituted by his surviving spouse, Antonieta S. Pacleb, and Lorna Pacleb-Guerrero, Florencio C.
Pacleb and Myrla C. Pacleb representing the children with the first wife. [23]
On December 27, 2002, the trial court dismissed respondents case and held that petitioner spouses are purchasers in good faith.
[24]
The trial court ratiocinated that the dismissal of respondents complaint for annulment of the successive sales at his instance
sealed the regularity of the purchase[25] by petitioner spouses and that he in effect admits that the said salewas valid and in order.
[26]
Further, the trial court held that the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 on petitioner spouses action for specific performance against
Javier is already final and can no longer be altered. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-118375 in the
name of respondent and the issuance of a new title in the name of petitioner spouses. The trial court also ordered the heirs of
respondent and all persons claiming under them to surrender possession of the Langcaan Property to petitioner spouses.
On appeal by respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. [27] The Court of Appeals ruled
that petitioner spouses are not purchasers in good faith and that the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 did not transfer ownership of
the Langcaan Property to them. Accordingly, the appellate court ordered the cancellation of the annotation of the Decision in Civil
Case No. 741-93 on the title of the Langcaan Property. The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration of said decision.[28]
Hence, this Petition.
Two issues are involved in the instant petition. The first is whether petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value and in good
faith. The second is whether ownership over the Langcaan Property was properly vested in petitioner spouses by virtue of the
Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93.
Petitioner spouses argue that they are purchasers in good faith. Further, they contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that: Ramon told him [Ernesto V. Yu] that the property is owned by his father, Baltazar, and that he is the mere caretaker
thereof[29] since Ramon clarified that his father was the former owner of the Langcaan Property. In support of their stance, they cite
the following testimony of petitioner Ernesto V. Yu:
Atty. Abalos: Mr. Witness, you testified during the direct that you acquired the subject property from one Ruperto
Javier, when for the first time have you come to know Mr. Ruperto Javier?
A: I first came to know him in the year 1992 when he was accompanied by Mr. Kalagayan. He showed me some
papers to the office.
Q: Do you know the exact date Mr. Witness?
A: I forgot the exact date, maam.
Q: More or less can you estimate what month?
A: Sometime in February or March 1992.
Q: When you said that the subject property was offered to you for sale, what did you do Mr. Witness, in
preparation for a transaction?
A: I asked my lawyer Atty. Florencio Paredes to check and verify the Deed of Sale.
Q: And after Atty. Florencio Paredes verified the document you decided to buy the property?
A: No, maam. We visited the place.
Q: When was that?
A: I could not remember the exact date but I visited the place and I met the son, Ramon Pacleb. I went there in
order to verify if the property is existing. When I verified that the property is existing Mr. Javier

visited me again to follow-up what decision I have but I told him that I will wait for my lawyers
advi[c]e.
Q: Mr. Witness, what particular instruction did you give to your lawyer?
A: To verify the title and the documents.
Court: Documents for the title?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Atty. Abalos: When you were able to get the title in whose name the title was registered?
A: It was registered in the name of the older Pacleb.
Court: By the way Mr. Witness, when you said you met Ramon Pacleb the son of the owner of the property, was
he residing there or he was (sic) just went there? When you visited the property did you find
him to be residing in that property?
A: No, Your Honor.
Atty. Abalos: You mean to say Mr. Witness, you just met Mr. Ramon Pacleb in the place at the time you went
there?
A: No, maam. He went to my office with Mr. Kalagayan. He was introduced to me at the Kelly Hardware. I do not
know Mr. Ruperto Javier. He told me that there is a property that [is] tenanted and occupied by
the son Ramon Pacleb after that I went with them to visit the place. On (sic) there he introduced
me [to] Mr. Ramon Pacleb the caretaker of the property and I told them that I will still look at
the property and he gave me some documents and that (sic) documents I gave it to my lawyer
for verification.
Q: You said that Mr. Ruperto Javier went to your office with Mr. Kalagayan, so the first time you visited the
property you did not see Mr. Ramon Pacleb there?
A: No, maam. When I went there I met Ramon Pacleb the caretaker and he was the one who showed the place to
us.
Q: Mr. Witness, since you visited the place you were able to see the allege[d] caretaker Mr. Ramon Pacleb, did you
ask him regarding the property or the whereabouts of the registered owner, did you ask him?
A: When Ruperto introduced me to Mr. Ramon Pacleb he told me that he is the son of the owner and he is the
caretaker and his father is in the States. He showed me the place, I verified and I saw the
monuments and I told him I will come back to check the papers and if it is okay I will bring with
me the surveyor.
Q: Could you estimate Mr. Witness, more or less what was the month when you were able to talk to
Mr. Ramon Pacleb?
A: I am not sure but it was morning of February.
Q: So it was in February, Mr. Witness?
A: I am not sure if February or March.
Q: But definitely
A: Before I purchased the property I checked the property.
Q: But that was definitely after Mr. Ruperto offered to you for sale the subject property?
xxx
Atty. Abalos: Okay, Mr. Witness, you said that you talked to Mr. Ramon Pacleb and he told you that his father is the
owner of the property?
A: He told me that property is their former property and it was owned by them. Now, he is the tenant of the
property.[30] (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner spouses conclude that based on their personal inspection of the property and the representations of the registered
tenant thereon, they had no reason to doubt the validity of the deeds of absolute sale since these were duly notarized.Consequently,
the alleged forgery of Angelita Chans signature is of no moment since they had no notice of any claim or interest of some other
person in the property despite their diligent inquiry.
We find petitioner spouses contentions without merit.
At the outset, we note that in petitioner Ernesto V. Yus testimony, he stated that he inspected the Langcaan Property and talked with
the tenant, Ramon, before he purchased the same. However, in his Complaint for specific performance and damages which he filed

against Javier, he alleged that it was only after he had entered into an Agreement for the sale of the property and his initial payment
of P200,000 that he discovered that the property was indeed being tenanted by Ramon who lives in the said farm, viz.:
8. Sometime on September 11, 1992, defendant came again to the Office of plaintiff reiterating his offer to
sell said Lot No. 6853-D, containing an area of 18,000 square meters, at P75.00 per square meters (sic). Defendant
manifested to the plaintiff that if his offer is acceptable to the plaintiff, he binds and obligates himself to pay the
capital gains of previous transactions with the BIR and register subject Lot No. 6853-D in his name (defendant). On
these conditions, plaintiff accepted the offer and made [the] initial payment of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P200,000.00) to defendant by issuance and delivery of plaintiffs personal check.
9. Sometime on September 11, 1992, plaintiff and defendant signed an AGREEMENT on the
sale of Lot No. 6853-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-282604, containing an area of 18,000 square meters, more or
less, located at Bo. Langcaan, Municipality ofDasmarinas, Province of Cavite, at a selling price of P75.00 per square
meter. A xerox copy of this AGREEMENT signed by the parties thereto is hereto attached and marked as ANNEX D of
this complaint.
10. Thereafter, however, plaintiff and defendant, with their surveyor discovered that
subject Lot No. 6853-D offered for sale to the plaintiff is indeed being tenanted by one RAMON PACLEB
who lives in the said farm.
11. In view of the foregoing developments, plaintiff informed defendant that he wanted the Agreement be
cancelled and for the defendant to return the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00).[31] (Emphasis
supplied)
it.

This inconsistency casts grave doubt as to whether petitioner spouses personally inspected the property before purchasing

More importantly, however, several facts should have put petitioner spouses on inquiry as to the alleged rights of their
vendor, Javier, over the Langcaan Property.
First, it should be noted that the property remains to be registered in the name of respondent despite the two (2) Deeds of
Absolute Sale[32] purporting to transfer the Langcaan Property from respondent and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, to Rebecca Del
Rosario then from the latter to Javier. Both deeds were not even annotated in the title of the Langcaan Property.
Second, a perusal of the two deeds of absolute sale reveals that they were executed only about two (2) months apart and
that they contain identical provisions.
Third, it is undisputed that the Langcaan Property is in the possession of Ramon, the son of the registered owner. Regardless
of the representations given by the latter, this bare fact alone should have made petitioner spouses suspicious as to the veracity of
the alleged title of their vendor. Moreover, as noted by the Court of Appeals, petitioner spouses could have easily verified the true
status of the Langcaan Property from Ramons wife, since the latter is their relative, as averred in paragraph 13 of their Answer in Civil
Case No. 1199-95.[33] The case law is well settled, viz.:
The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself. Corollarily,
it requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the registered
owner, although the land object of the transaction is registered. While one who buys from the registered
owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered
owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary
for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer
the land.
This Court has consistently applied the stricter rule when it comes to deciding the issue of good faith of
one who buys from one who is not the registered owner, but who exhibits a certificate of title. [34] (Emphasis
supplied)
Finally, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1199-95 (the action to annul the
successive sales of the property) cannot serve to validate the sale to petitioner spouses since the dismissal was ordered because
Rebecca Del Rosario and Javier could no longer be found. Indeed, the dismissal was without prejudice.
Based on the foregoing, therefore, petitioner spouses cannot be considered as innocent purchasers in good faith.
We now go to the second issue.
Petitioner spouses argue that the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 741-93 as to the rightful owner of the Langcaan
Property is conclusive and binding upon respondent even if the latter was not a party thereto since it involved the question of
possession and ownership of real property, and is thus not merely an action in personam but an action quasi in rem.
In Domagas v. Jensen,[35] we distinguished between actions in personam and actions quasi in rem.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in
rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A
proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the
person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the
judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are
suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An

action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as
distinguished from a judgment against the propriety (sic) to determine its state. It has been held that an
action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the
person.
xxx
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the
property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a
particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to
the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments
therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
Civil Case No. 741-93 is an action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioner spouses against Javier to compel
performance of the latters undertakings under their Contract to Sell. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, its object is to compel
Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase price, and to execute a deed of absolute sale over the Langcaan Property in their
favor. The obligations of Javier under the contract to sell attach to him alone, and do not burden the Langcaan Property. [36]
We have held in an unbroken string of cases that an action for specific performance is an action in personam.
In Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction and Development Corporation,[38] we ruled that an action for specific performance
praying for the execution of a deed of sale in connection with an undertaking in a contract, such as the contract to sell, in this
instance, is an action in personam.
[37]

Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or
given an opportunity to be heard.[39] Therefore, it cannot bind respondent since he was not a party therein. Neither can respondent be
considered as privy thereto since his signature and that of his late first wife, Angelita Chan, were forged in the deed of sale.
All told, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals finding that, as between respondent and petitioner spouses, respondent has a
better right over the Langcaan Property as the true owner thereof.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
[G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998]
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS MARTINEZ, COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent
alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there
was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On
January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment
by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). [1]
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the
owner of petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas
contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private
respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter she took over the management of the business. She then
discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that
the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no
longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had
illegally terminated his employment.[2]
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996
declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the
case.[3]
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not
giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a volunteer and not as an employee of St. Martin
Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employeremployee relationship between him and petitioner.[4]

On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor
arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.[5] Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in
its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,[6] hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion.[7]
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine
the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to
decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes
introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas
Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that
procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on
October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the
President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its
promulgation.[8] Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment
for program and policy coordination only.[9] Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy
of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and
abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. [10] The
present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all
cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten
calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the
NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless
rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law
and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative
agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which
restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. [11]
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely
file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, [12] and then seasonably avail of the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65,[13] for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the
decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in
Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional
and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65. [14]
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as follows:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals.[15]
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant

and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed
within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, [16] the following amendments of
the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in
cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original
exclusionary clause therein now provides except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act,
and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948. (Italics supplied)
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall
have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode
of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.This is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to
therein except, among others, those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with x x x the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x. This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled
and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. [17] Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the
appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction
over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P.
No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition,
also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor
Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the
Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within theappellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any
other court for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in
the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to
provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the
term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from
the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report
on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.[18]
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech [19] from which we reproduce the
following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the
same time expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only
final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third
paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of
review of factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
which excludes from its coverage the decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and
by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495
seeks to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of
the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and
the Employees Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and
corrections ours)
xxx

Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically
reducing the workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate
tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the
Supreme Court:
x x x Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these
cases which present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties involved, so that
the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task
as the guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the peoples basic rights and additional task expressly
vested on it now to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five
years ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall
continue to mount and add to the number of cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and
Human Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and
the following proceedings transpired:[20]
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, add the phrase THE
LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED. So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues
arising from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the
House of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. (Italics supplied)
xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second reading and being a
certified bill, its unanimous approval on third reading followed. [21]; Record of the Senate, Vol. V, No. 63, pp. 180-181.21 The
Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of
Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20, 1995, [22] inclusive of the dubious formulation on
appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated,
the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of
decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus
plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the
appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that
the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; [23] whereas to
indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the
intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the
Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the
contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this
reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the
advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and
conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are
factual in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions. [24]
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the
further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at

times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of
Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is
undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate
forum for the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this
pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al.[25] should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter,
the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our
judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the
exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be
stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is
not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records
thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling
herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-31303-04 May 31, 1978
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO V. DE OCAMPO, and OSCAR ANGLO, respondents.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz for petitioner.
Eusebio V. Navarro, Eugenio G. Gemarino and Eusebio P. Navarro for respondent Alfredo V. de Ocampo.
Vicente F. Delfin and V. del Rosario & Associates for respondent Oscar Anglo.
SANTOS, J.:
An appeal by certiorari filed on December 5, 1969 by petitioner, Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for short), from the resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated August 21, 1969 1 dismissing petitioner's appeal in CA-G. R. Nos. 40683-84-R, as well as from the
resolution of the said Court dated November 14, 1969 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof
The relevant and essential factual and procedural antecedents follow. Both Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and
Oscar Anglo claim ownership over the same lots, i.e,, Nos. 817 and 2509 of the Sagay-Escalante Cadastre, Negros Occidental, subject
matter of this litigation. The basis of Republic's claim is that said lots were bequeathed to the Bureau of Education (now Bureau of
Public Schools) on September 21, 1926 by the late Esteban Jalandoni through his will. 3 Republic further alleged that the said parcels
of land were already registered under the Torrens System "before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name of Meerkamp and Company"
in whose favor Original Certificate of Title (OCT, for short) No. 370 was issued, that said company sold the lots to Esteban Jalandoni
who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT, for short) No. 1251: that TCT No. 6014 was issued to the Bureau of Education when
the subject property was bequeathed to it; and that as a matter of fact, a sugar quota (Plantation Audit No. 24-10) was issued for the
lots under the name of the Bureau of Education. 4 The lots have a total area of 289.47 hectares. 5
Respondent de Ocampo, upon the other hand, predicates his claim on an application for registration of the same Lots Nos. 817 and
2509 in Land Registration Case No. N-4, LRC Rec. No. N-19196, wherein a decree of registration No. 105538 was issued over the lots,
followed by the issuance in his name of OCT No. 576, on October 1, 1965. 6 He averred that the lots were unregistered lands
belonging to and possessed by him, by virtue of a donation dated November 10, 1911 from one Luis Mosquera. 7
Respondent Anglo intervened in the case on February 21, 1966, having allegedly bought the same lots from respondent de Ocampo
on January 6, 1966. TCT No. 42217 was issued to him (Anglo) on January 12, 1966. 8
Procedurally, the records show that the Bureau of Public Schools, then represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental
initiated on December 24, 1958, a forcible entry and detainer case against de Ocampo over Lots Nos. 817 and 2509. On appeal, the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint (Civil Case No. 5353). 9
Then on June 29, 1960, de Ocampo filed an application for registration of the same two parcels of land in Land Registration Case No.
N-4 LRC Rec. No. N-19196, entitled "Alfredo V. de Ocampo, Applicant, v. Republic of the Philippines, Oppositor Republic filed its
opposition; in due time. 10
On May 2, 1961, Republic, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a complaint against de Ocampo with the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental (Branch VII) for the recovery of possession of the subject lots, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed therein as Civil Case No, 264 (6154), entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Alfredo v. de
Ocampo, Defendant, " 11 De Ocampo averred in his answer that the properties alleged to have been donated by Esteban Jalandoni to
the then Bureau of Education were different from the properties involved in this case, the former being titled lands (TCT No. 1251)
containing two million nine hundred and twelve thousand four hundred and seventy four square meters (2,912,474), while Lots Nos.
817 and 2509 applied for by de Ocampo and which Republic sought to recover were unregistered lands, and that granting, without

admitting, that they are the same lands, the court no longer had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action since the issue of
possession over said lots was already decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. 12
On May 26, 1961, a preliminary hearing was held before Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental where the land
registration case was pending, but inasmuch as the issues involved in both Civil Case No. 264 (6154) for recovery of possession and
the land registration case were Identical, the parties agreed to a joint trial, this time before Branch VI I, Judge Jose D. Divinagracia,
presiding, where the civil case was pending. 13
After a joint trial of the above-mentioned two (2) cases, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on August 3, 1965, dismissing
the complaint in Civil Case No. 264 (6154) and adjudging the registration of the subject two lots in the name of the then applicant de
Ocampo. On October 1, 1966, OCT No. 576 was issued in his name. 14
It is admitted by Republic that it received a copy of the decision on August 13, 1965 15 but no appeal was taken therefrom. However,
Republic later filed with the trial court on December 28, 1965, a "Petition for Relief from Judgment with Preliminary Injunction Pending
Proceeding 16 (petition, for short) praying, among other things, that de Ocampo be restrained from enforcing the decision dated 3
August 1965, and that after the hearing, an order be issued declaring the decision to be not yet final add executory, and granting
Republic the right to file a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the period granted, to commence upon receipt of the order.
The petition alleged inter alia that the Republic's failure to appeal was due to accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence,
specifically, stating that its docket clerk, Cesar Salud, merely committed excusable negligence when he inadvertently attached the
copy of the decision to the file of another case; that it was only on November 5, 1965, that Cesar Salud found the copy of the same;
and that petitioner has a substantial cause of action in Civil Case No. 264 (6154) and a good and substantial defense in Land
Registration Case No. N-4 Rec. No. N-19196.
An opposition to the petition was filed by respondent de Ocampo on February 5, 1966 17 on the ground that the same was filed
beyond the reglementary period. The petition was, however, given due course on January 11, 1966. 18 On February 21, 1966,
respondent Oscar Anglo filed a motion for intervention alleging that he bought the subject two (2) Lots Nos. 817 and 1509 from
respondent de Ocampo on January 6, 1966 and that TCT No. 42217 of the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental was issued to him
(Anglo) on January 12, 1966. 19 He also filed an answer in opposition to Republic's petition for relief from judgment 20 on the grounds,
among others, that the decree of registration and certificate of title had already been issued and that a writ of preliminary injunction
will not lie to restrain enforcement of the decision of the trial court.
On June 6, 1966, after respondents filed their respective memoranda, the trial court dismissed the Republic's petition for lack of
competent proof, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 38, of the Rules of Court which the court said required a hearing. 21
On July 25, 1966, petitioner Republic filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order dismissing its petition; 22 and on August
4, 1966, it filed a manifestation averring additional grounds in support of the motion for reconsideration. 23 Respondent Anglo and de
Ocampo opposed the same. 24
On September 28, 1966, Republic filed an "Amended Petition for Relief from Judgment and/or Review of Decree with Preliminary
Injunction 25 (Amended Petition, for short). In specific regard to the petition for review of the decree, Republic contended, inter alia,
that actual fraud had been perpetrated by respondent de Ocampo in securing the lower court's decision ordering the registration of
the lots in his name, as well as the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title, on the grounds
which, briefly restated. advert to respondent de Ocampo's alleged misrepresentations that the two parcels of land applied for by him
in the land registration case were "different from the two parcels of land of the same lot numbers, technical descriptions and areas
belonging to the Government, knowing such allegations to be false, the truth of the matter being that said parcels of land are the
same property owned by the Government"; 26 that there was previous registration of the same parcels of land, Lots Nos. 817 and
2509, under the Torrens System in favor of Meerkamp and Company which later sold the same to Jalandoni who, in turn, gave the lots
to the Bureau of Education as a legacy and that the Court of First Instance no longer had jurisdiction to decree again the registration
of Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, in favor of respondent de Ocampo, in view of the earlier registration of the same lands in favor of
Meerkamp and Company.
Additionally, Republic claimed that its counsel was not given notice of de Ocampo's motion and the corresponding order dated
September 16, 1965, for the issuance of the decree of registration and the issuance of the decree itself by the Land Registration
Commission, in violation of its constitutional rights to due process", 27 that it has also been "in continuous peaceful, adverse, open
and public owner and possessor, in good faith and with just title" of the lots "deriving the fruits and products of said properties and
appropriating them to the purpose and purposes they were intended for"; 28 that they were in fact declared for tax purposes; 29 that
on April 11, 1927, the lands were leased for ten (10) years but the lease was amended several times to extend the same; 30 that on
September 17, 1964, Republic's counsel filed a "Petition for an Order to Produce the Original Documentary Exhibits and Submit Same
to the NBI for Examination, 31 Which petition was communicated to de Ocampo's lawyers, Atty. Gemarino and Garingalao, earlier on
September 7, 1964; that they did not object or state that the originals were burned or lost; that it was only on September 28, 1964
that de Ocampo's lawyers revealed for the first time in their "Manifestation and Reply" that the purported originals were burned in the
house of Atty. Gemarino on May 16, 1963; 32 and that the "supposed originals were fake and their alleged burning was false and these
pretenses were intentionally resorted to only to evade the examination of the spurious documents by the NBI and as camouflage to
hide their fraudulent character. 33
On October 4, 1966, the trial court set, aside its order of June 6, 1966, dismissing the petition for relief, 34 having found Republic's
motion for reconsideration well-founded, and scheduled December 1 and 2, 1966, for Republic's witnesses to testify, and likewise
gave respondents, a chance to oppose the amended petition. Respondents and Republic filed their opposition 35 and
reply; 36 respectively. Republic alleged in the said reply that "(T)he lands in question and their incomes are used exclusively for a
public purpose: public education. 37
In a subsequent hearing on June 6, 1967, the trial court ordered Republic to present its evidence in the absence of respondents, who
objected thereto for lack of jurisdiction, the parcels of land having been already registered in the name of respondent de Ocampo and
in fact transferred to an alleged buyer in good faith, the other private respondent, Anglo.
On August 30, 1967, the trial court rendered its decision on the Amended Petition 38 against Republic, upon resolution of what it
considered the "decisive" issue, i.e., that the allegations in the said petition did not constitute actual and extrinsic fraud which is the
only ground available to review or reopen a decree in cadastral cases pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496. 39

On the other issues, the trial court found that it was through mistake, accident and excusable negligence that the decision of August
3, 1965 was not brought to the attention of Solicitor Emerito Salva "as it was inadvertently clipped to the record of another
case". 40 However, while the petition for relief itself another case was filed within the reglementary period prescribed in Section 3,
Rule 38, of the Rules of Court 41 the remedy of relief from judgment was no longer available since the decree, and later the title, were
already issued in the name of respondent de Ocampo. 42 It also held that the amended petition was still legally available as it was
filed within one (1) year after the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act No. 496, "in case of actual fraud" and that it
had jurisdiction to entertain the amended petition and to receive evidence in support thereof, 43 but it had to deny the relief prayed
for on grounds already adverted to. In regard to respondent Anglo's claim that the petition for review was no longer tenable as
against him because he was a purchaser in good faith, the trial court ruled that competent evidence to that effect should be
submitted considering, among other things, that the case was pending when he acquired his interest. 44 Finally, it held that the fact
that the Republic was not notified of the motion and the corresponding issuance of the decree and title was immaterial since petitions
for issuance of decrees in cadastral cases are analogous to petitions for execution in ordinary cases and parties are not entitled to
notice thereof as a matter of right. 45 Thus
In the light of the decision of this Court dated August 3. 1965, Section 39 of Act No. 496 and the authorities cited ...
this court is persuaded to conclude as it hereby holds, that the evidence adduced by the petitioner in this
incident does not establish actual and constructive fraud which is the only kind of fraud that is considered a legal
ground to review, reopen or set aside the decree which has already been issued in the name of Alfredo V. de
Ocampo.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition for Relief from Judgment and/or Review of Decree is hereby dismissed without
pronouncement as to costs. 46
From the said decision, Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. Nos. 4083-84-R. Private respondents
de Ocampo and Anglo moved to dismiss the appeal which was opposed by petitioner, Republic. 47 A supplemental motion to the same
effect was later filed by respondent de Ocampo for failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that it was filed on
time, 48 followed by an ex parte motion to consider the Solicitor General to have waived his right to oppose the said supplemental
motion to dismiss and that the case be submitted for resolution. 49 A new party, Salvacion Maraon, sought to intervene in the case
and also filed a motion to dismiss the appeal before respondent appellate court.
In its minute resolution of August 21, 1969, 50 the Court of Appeals resolved
(1) To DISMISS ... the appeal ... for failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the record on appeal was
filed within the period fixed by the Rules (Secs. 3 & 6, Rule 41, Sec. 1[a] & [b), Rule 50, Rules of Court), it appearing
that appellant's motion for extension of 20 days from October 14, 1967 to file the record on appeal was never
granted by the lower court (there being no showing to that effect in the record on appeal); and even if there was
such an order granting it, the extension asked for would have expired on November 3, 1967 and, therefore, the
record on appeal filed on November 9,1967 was filed six days late ...; and
(2) to DENY the motion to intervene of intervenor Salvacion Maranon following the doctrine enunciated in Hant, et
al. vs. O'Leary, et al., page 993. At any rate, the purpose of intervening; which is to join the appellees in their
motion to dismiss the appeal of the appellant, has already been served by the dismissal of the instant appeal.
On September 11, 1969, Republic filed a motion for reconsideration 51 but on November 14, 1969, the Court of Appeals
RESOLVED TO DENY the said motion for reconsideration. Killings in the pertinent cases are equally applicable to the
Republic of the Philippines where the latter is the appellant that recourse to 'the original records is immaterial
because it is what appears in the record on appeal that is essential. 52
Hence, this appeal by certiorari on the following assignment of errors, i.e., that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that (1)
prescription, the statute of limitations and laches do not lie against the Republic, as a sovereign state, and that, it is not bound or
prejudiced by the faults or mistakes of its officers and employees, (2) the dismissal of Republic's appeal is not in accordance with the
liberal construction of the Rules of Court and the promotion of its object to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of actions and proceedings; (3) the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for land registration of
Alfredo V. de Ocampo on the ground that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were already registered under the Torrens System before 1919; (4)
the dismissal of Republic's appeal placed technicality over, substance; and (5) the dismissal of Republic's appeal will abet and
promote land grabbing. 53
Private respondents in turn stress in their respective briefs, inter alia, (1) that Republic shed its immunity and sovereignty and
assumed the garb of an ordinary private litigant when it initiated an action for forcible entry and detainer case over Lots Nos. 817 and
2509 against respondent de Ocampo. filed I s opposition in the land registration case, and instituted Civil Case No. 264 (6154); 54 (2)
that Republic should comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirements of the rules on perfection of appeals, citing
cases; 55 that there cannot be one set of Rules for ordinary private litigants, and another set for the State otherwise the set-up will
result in the denial of due process and equal protection of law to private litigants as well as chaos in the administration of
justice; 56 and (4) that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by the, law. 57
The threshold and, in the ultimate analysis, the decisive issue raised by this petition is whether the dismissal by respondent. Court of
Appeals of Republic's appeal from the decision of the trial court denying its Amended Petition, is not proper and should be set aside
as contended by Republic, or correct and should be maintained, as argued by respondents. The issue framed in the context of the
suit's true significance to the parties involved in this protracted proceeding and in the light of the value the protagonists attach to the
outcome of the litigation may be stated thus-Should the government, represented by petitioner Republic not be permitted by
respondent Court of Appeals to show that it stands Lo lose thru fraudulent machinations close to three hundred (300) hectares of
prime sugar land to the private respondents who have allegedly secured their titles to these holdings long after the same parcels of
land were already titled in the name of the original owner, Meerkamp and Company and, therefore, the trial court's action in directing
the issuance of the title in the name of respondent de Ocampo is null and void ab initio and of no legal effect, simply because
petitioner Republic failed to show in its record on appeal that it was perfected on time and that it actually filed its record on appeal six
(6) days late?

Respondent Court of Appeals, in a very simplistic approach, which disregards the substantive merits of the appeal dismissed, the
same on the grounds that the record on appeal did not show on its face that it was perfected on time, and, additionally, that even if it
were to be assumed that the motion for extension of 20 days to file the record on appeal was indeed granted, the appeal was still not
perfected on time because the record on appeal was filed November 9, six (6) days after November 3, 1967, when petitioner's
requested extension expired.
If respondents' line of reasoning were to be upheld, the dismissal of the appeal may be sustained. For, as stated, in its notice of
appeal filed on October 12, 1967, petitioner Republic received a copy of the decision of the trial court on September 14,
1967. 58 Therefore, it had until October 14, 1967 within which to file its record on appeal. The record on appeal does not show that the
extension prayed for was granted, but the lower court in its order of December 4, 1967 approved the same, as there was no
opposition to its approval. There is also no mention in the order approving the record on appeal as to whether or not it was filed on
time. The record on appeal is, however, dated November 9,1967. Assuming then that this was also the actual filing date, and on the
further assumption that the 20day extension was impliedly granted with its approval, it was still filed six (6) days late, after the
requested extension expired on November 3, 1967. 59 And, as to the legal ground for the dismissal on the foregoing bases, this Court
has repeatedly construed Section 6, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court 60 as mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, non-compliance with
which justifies the dismissal of the appeal. 61
However, a consideration in depth of the unique and peculiar facts attendant to this case and the procedural and substantive
implications of the dismissal of the appeal now sought to be reviewed and reconsidered; and a due and proper regard to the merits of
the case rather than a fascile reliance on procedural rules, compel this Court to reverse and set aside the dismissal of Republic's
appeal by respondent Court of Appeals for the following reasons, viz: (1) Should Republic prove that the subject Lots Nos. 817 and
2509 were registered in favor of Meerkamp and Company before 1919, the trial court's decision decreeing again the same lots in the
name of respondent de Ocampo in 1965 is null and void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction and a fatal infirmity necessarily attaches to
the said decision; (2) There are strong and substantial allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations employed by
respondent de Ocampo in securing his title Relevant to this is The express finding of the trial court that The Petition for Relief was
filed within the reglementary period prescribed in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and the Amended Petition was filed within
one year from issuance of the decree. If the appeal is dismissed without considering its merits, the above periods will resumed to run
and will lapse, and the reliefs sought herein will be forever foreclosed to Republic; (3) Assuming that respondents can invoke, the
material data rule, and/or the fact that Republic's appeal was filed out of time because the record On appeal was submitted to the
Court six (6) days beyond the requested extension of 20 days, it always in the power of this Court to suspend its rules or to except
certain cases therefrom whenever courtervailing considerations so warrant; and (4) This Court, is not powerless to prevent gross
miscarriage of Justice, which would follow if Republic's appeal is dismissed since it stands to lose close to 300 hectares of prime
sugar land already titled in its name and devoted to educational purposes if it is true that the land registration court was without
jurisdiction to issue a Second decree of registration in favor of respondent de Ocampo and, if it is also true that fraudulent
misrepresentations and machinations attended respondent de Ocampo's application for registration and likewise prevented Republic
from exposing the fake exhibits, on the basis of which he secured his title. 62
1. Specifically both Republic and respondents claim ownership over the same Lots Nos. 811 and 2509, hence, this controversy. If
Republic's contentions are true that the said lots had been registered twice, with OCT No. 370 issued in favor of Meerkamp and
Company before 1919 and another, OCT No. 576, issued in the name of respondent de Ocampo in 1965 or some forty-six (46)
years later then the decision of the trial court, sitting as land registration court, is null and void ab initio and suffers from a fatal
infirmity, which is also a ground for the review of a decree of registration. provided no innocent purchaser for value will be
prejudiced. 63
It is very significant in this connection that respondent de Ocampo admitted the donation of Jalandoni in favor of the Bureau of
Education, but averred that the lots so donated were titled (TCT No. 1251), 64 while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 applied for by him in the
land registration case were "unregistered. 65 Yet, both parties claim to be the owners of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509.
Respondent de Ocampo also gave the area of the lots covered by TCT No. 1251, in the name of Jalandoni, as two million nine hundred
and twelve thousand four hundred and seventy four (2,912,474) square meters, or 291 hectares plus. 66 Coincidentally, Lots Nos. 817
and 2509 claimed by Republic have a total area of 289.47 hectares, 67 or only about two (2) hectares less. These factors, brought to
light by respondent de Ocampo himself, cannot simply be ignored in reaching the conclusion that the disputed resolutions of
respondent Court of Appeals be reversed.
It is also important to advert to the documentary exhibits adduced by Republic in the hearing of the Amended Petition below, one of
which was a certification dated November 8, 1952 signed by the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, stating that on May 13,
1919, there was registered a sale executed by Meerkamp and Company in favor of Esteban Jalandoni and as a result OCT No, 370 in
the name of the Company was cancelled and TCT No. 1251 was issued to Jalandoni; that TCT No. 1251 was later cancelled by virtue of
the will of Jalandoni leaving the parcel of land to the then Bureau of Education; that TCT No. 6014 was correspondingly issued to the
Bureau of Education; and that lease contracts were annotated in TCT No. 6014 in favor of Francisco Copper, executed by the Division
Superintendent of Schools. 68 However, the above certification does not mention the lot numbers, and no certificates of title were
exhibited in court, the incumbent Register of Deeds having declared that the titles could not be found in his office. 69
The trial court also made the express finding that the alleged deed of donation by Luis Mosquera in favor of respondent de Ocampo,
dated November 10, 1911, acknowledged before one Notary Public John Boardman does not appear in his notarial book which is on
file in the Bureau of Record Management, Manila, from October 16, 191 1 to May, 1913. 70
The Provincial Assessor of Negros Occidental likewise issued a certification, dated November 29, 1966, stating that Lots Nos. 817 and
2509 were never declared in the name of Mosquera. 71 His later certification states that the said lots were assessed in the name of
the Bureau of Education, and that the technical descriptions in the Bureau of Lands records show that the same lots were in the name
of Meerkamp and Company. 72
Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court is without jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already
registered in an earlier registration case, and that the second decree entered for the same land is null and void. 73 If there is no valid
and final judgment by the land registration court to speak of, then the filing of an admittedly late appeal from the decision denying
the Amended Petition would be immaterial and of no moment, in so far as these proceedings are concerned in view of the
congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main decision. decreeing for the second time the registration of the same Lots Nos.

817 and 2509 in favor of respondent de Ocampo, despite an earlier registration in the name of Meerkamp and Company.
Jurisprudence holds that the appellant's failure to perfect an appeal on time, "although ordinarily decisive, carries no persuasive
force" and may be completely disregarded if the trial court acted without jurisdiction. 74 As held in United States v. Jayme, 75 lack of
jurisdiction. la jurisdiction over the subject matter is fatal and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction is conferred
by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law, and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection on
the lack of such jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties. The infirmity cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent, 76 or by win of the parties. 77
In the interest of justice, which is the paramount consideration in all litigations, and especially considering the cloud surrounding the
decision of the land registration court, as aforesaid, the more judicious course to follow is for respondent Court of Appeals to entertain
Republic's appeal, not to dismiss it, so that if it finds the same to be meritorious, and the decision appealed from is reversed, the
correct Identity of the lots that were donated to the then Bureau of Education (admitted by respondent de Ocampo), as well as those
parcels of land applied for by said respondent in the land registration case, may already be ascertained once and for all, in the trial
court below, and in this same proceeding, without Republic having to resort to relitigation to prove its claim. Further proceedings will
not prejudice respondents. On the contrary, the cloud over their titles, OCT No. 576 and TCT No. 42217. issued in favor of respondents
de Ocampo and Anglo, respectively, will be removed if Republic's claim is not true.
2. There is a serious charge, which is also crucial to the issue between the parties, that respondent de Ocampo used fraudulent
misrepresentations and machinations in securing his title, Firstly, there was the averment in his Answer in Civil case No, 264 (6154)
for recovery of possession of the subject lots by Republic, which case was jointly tried with the land registration case,, that the
properties alleged to have been donated by Jalandoni to the then Bureau of Education were "different" from Lots Nos. 817 and 2509,
applied for by him, the Jalandoni holdings being "titled" lands, while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were "unregistered" lands. The then
applicant de Ocampo even cited TCT No. 1251 of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental as the title covering the lots in the name
of Jalandoni, further stating that the lands donated by him to the Bureau of Education had an area of 2,912,474 square meters, 78 or
291 hectares plus. Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 have a total area of 289.47 hectares 79 or a difference of only 2 hectares, more or less. The
coincidence in area is highly significant since both claim to be the owners of the same lots. Secondly, certain documents which were
presented as exhibits by respondent de Ocampo, on the basis of which he secured OCT 576 in his name, were withdrawn from the
files of the trial court, and, thereafter were allegedly lost by fire. As a result, Republic's pending motion to have the said exhibits
produced for examination of their genuineness by the NBI could not be made. Unless successfully traversed, the inference is strong
that respondents did not want a full disclosure of the true nature of the same by the NBI and that the truth had been suppressed. The
inference is also buttressed by the Republic's claim that despite their counsel's knowledge of Republic's intention to file the said
motion which was orally communicated to them earlier, the alleged loss was not revealed to Republic's counsel. 80
If the charge is true, there is the element of wilfull intent to deprive Republic of just rights which constitutes the essential
characteristics of actual as distinguished from legal fraud. 81 As Justice Fernando stressed, "Nicolas v. Director of Lands 82 should
erase any doubt as to the extreme judicial displeasure at this species of fraud of an applicant seeking to include as a part of the
property to which title is sought land actually in possession of another. 83 This is very relevant in view of the denial of the Amended
Petition which was premised on the conclusion that allegations in the said petition did not constitute actual and extrinsic fraud and
which, according to the trial court, is "the only ground" available to review or reopen the decree. Of related significance is the express
finding of the trial court that the original Petition for Relief was filed within the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3, Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court, and the Amended Petition was filed within one year from issuance of the decree. For, if the appeal is dismissed
notwithstanding allegations of fraud which appear to be supported by the evidence adduced during the hearing of the Amended
Petition below the appealed decision will become final and executory, and the aforesaid periods will lapse, foreclosing forever to
Republic the reliefs prayed for in the Amended Petition. Although Republic may seek to recover the lots in a different action that may
still be legally available to it after the appeal is dismissed, that recourse will involve not only a re- litigation and, therefore. multiplicity
of suits, but will also entail the risk that subject lots may be disposed of to innocent purchasers for value to put them beyond
recovery. As it is, the other respondent, Anglo, has already intervened. alleging that he bought the same lots from respondent de
Ocampo on January 6, 1966, and that TCT No. 42217 was in fact issued to him. 84 A new party, Salvacion Maraon, also sought to
intervene in the case and filed in respondent Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss Republic's appeal before the said Court. 85
Finally, We held in Reyes, et al. v. Borbon, et al. 86 "(W)hen the attention of the Court of Land Registration is called to the fact that the
same land has been registered in the name of two different persons, it is the duty of said court to order an investigation of that fact
and that should be done even without requiring the parties to show that a fraud has been committed in during the double
registration. When it is established that the same has been registered in the name of two different person the titile should remain in
the name of the person securing the first registration." This Court further held that " (T)he very purpose of the Torrens System would
be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration. 87
3. The foregoing overriding considerations then the alleged lack of jurisdiction and the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and
machinations, which, buttressed by strong evidence, can nullity the second registration and/or set aside OCT No. 576 issued to
respondent de Ocampo taken in relation with the procedural and substantive implications which could and would arise if the appeal
were dismissed, namely, the risk that the holdings may be transacted to third parties and the fact that Republic's action to recover
tile holdings would give rise to multiplicity of suits compel Us to conclude that the only recourse in the interest of just and
expeditious proceedings. considering that these have been pending for close to twenty (20) years now is to suspend Our rules
and/or to except this case from their operation. For when the operation of the Rules of will lead to an injustice We have, in justifiable
instances, resorted to this extraordinary remedy to prevent it. 88 The Rules have been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing
fair trials and expediting justice. 89 As a corollary, if their application and operation tend to subvert and defeat instead of promote and
enhance it, their suspension is justified. In the words of Justice Antonio P. Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada v. Sto. Domingo,
"(T)his Court, through the revered and eminent Mr. Justice Abad Santos, found occasion in the case of C Viuda de Ordoveza v.
Raymundo, to lay down for recognition in this jurisdiction the sound rule in the administration of justice holding that 'it is always in
the power of the court (Supreme Court) to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice required it ... 90

Exceptions to the operation of the mandatory and jurisdictional character of the rules on perfection of appeals are to be noted
in Sarmiento v. Salud, et al., 91 penned by Justice J.B. Reyes, Dequito v. Lopez 92 and Carillo v. Allied Workers Association of the
Philippines 93 both written for the Court by Justice E. M. Fernando, decided years after the Revised Rules of Court took effect in
January, 1964. In the Sarmiento case, the late appeal was allowed on the ground of laches on the part of the appellees, the filing of
the motion to dismiss having taken place six (6) years after the brief for appellees was filed, and after the case was submitted for
decision. This, according to the Court, "constitutes a unique instance of laches without comparable precedent in the records of the
Court. 94 The Dequito and Carillo cases, upon the other hand, took into account the fact that labor cases were involved. Justice
Fernando expressly noted in the Dequito case that "in the light of the constitutional as well as codal and statutory mandates, there
being an explicit command of protection to labor as well as the promotion of social justice," 95 the motion to dismiss the late appeal
which was "filed much too late" hardly deserved sympathy or consideration. 96 In the Carillo case, no question whatsoever as to the
late appeal was raised, hence, "it would seem that whatever right to contest the jurisdiction could have been availed of is by now no
longer in existence. 97 Continuing, Justice Fernando stated that "Social justice would be a meaningless term if in a situation like the
present, an element of rigidity would be affixed to procedural precepts and made to recover the matter. Flexibility should not be ruled
out. Precisely, what is sought to be accomplished by such a fundamental principle expressly so declared by the Constitution is the
effectiveness of the community's effort to assist the economically underprivileged." The responsibility to protect labor is incumbent
"not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary, to translate this pledge into a living reality. 98
While the above exceptions are predicated on different grounds, they nevertheless support the view that the rigid adherence to the
rules on perfection of appeals may and should be relaxed where compelling reasons so warrant. The grounds invoked in this case
not only lack of jurisdiction but gross injustice itself more than justify the exception considering further that the delay in the
perfection of the appeal involved six (6) days only.
4. Finally, enshrined in our legal and judicial annals is the maximum Chat no person should enrich himself at the expense or prejudice
of others. 99 Courts should not be used as instruments Lo disregard this elemental and basic norm which is the essence of justice
and fair play. The whole trust of our laws on civil relations enjoins all those who come before the courts of justice to observe true faith
and candor in their dealings with one another the government included. 100 The commendable and determined efforts on the part of
the citizenry to fashion a New Society rid of graft, corruption and the persistent malaise of land grabbing, will be set back, if the
subject lots consisting of close to 300 hectares which are devoted to educational purposes have indeed been wrongfully titled to
respondent de Ocampo, Happily, We can at this stage still prevent this, if true, by setting aside the dismissal of Republic's appeal and
according the parties the opportunity in this proceeding, and without further need to re-litigate, to terminate this litigation, which has
been pending for close to twenty (20) long years in fairness to both parties.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 21, 1969, dismissing the appeal, as well as its resolution
of November 14, 1969, denying petitioner Republic's motion for reconsideration in CA G.R. Nos. 40683-84 are hereby SET ASIDE. The
case is remanded to the said Court to give due course to and consider on its merits Republic's appeal. No costs.
Castro, C.J., Fernando, Muoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
This case illustrated graphically once more 'the correctness of the Court's turning away from and setting aside of the rigid material
data rule in the perfection of appeals and its adoption, in the interest of substantial justice as against mere technicality, of the liberal
rule since the leading case of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals 1 that "the mere absence of a formal order granting the motion for
extension of time to file the record on appeal should not be fatal to the petitioner if the record on appeal filed within the requested
extension period was approved by the court a quo.
Here, even conceding that the record on appeal was filed six (6) days later beyond the requested extension period, special
considerations have been shown in the case at bar for the application of the principle of substantial justice as set out in the main
opinion of Mr. Justice Santos. Among others, it should be stressed that the State's record On appeal was approved as per the trial
court's Order of December 4, 1967 with the express statement that there was no opposition from respondents-appellees to its
approval; and that the State's claims, that its e e preponderantly shows that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the land
registration application of respondent de Ocampo filed belatedly after forty-six years and with alleged fraudulent misrepresentations
and machinations since the lots in question (some 289 hectares of prime sugar land) were long ago before 1919 already duly
registered in the name of the predecessor-vendor of Esteban Jalandoni who subsequently bequeathed the same to the Bureau of
Education exclusively for educational purposes, which were rejected by the trial court on erroneous grounds, raise a jurisdictional
issue that should properly be reviewed and determined by the appellate court.
It should be further stressed that to uphold the appellate court's peremptory dismissal of the State's appeal would bar the State from
"seeking again to recover the lots in a different action that may still be legally available to it after the appeal is dismissed"
notwithstanding the main opinion's declaration to the effect 2 since the petitioner State would be foreclosed by the principle of res
adjudicata from filing still another suit for the recovery of the lots in question. And the State itself in its comment of February 13,
1970 on respondents' motion to dismiss (filed through then Solicitor General, now a member of this Court, Associate Justice Felix Q.
Antonio) expressly so admitted "that if the petition is dismissed, thereby sustaining the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing
the appeal by the Government, then the latter would have no further remedy. Certainly, to lose a remedy resulting in unjust
deprivation of one's property cannot be categorized except as substantial. 3
The precedent if Paulino vs. Court of Appeals 4 what re the Court ordered the giving of due course to an appeal notwithstanding that
the same was admittedly filed two days beyond the reglementary period and had been therefore rejected by the appellate court is
fully applicable to the case at bar. We cited therein inter alia the demands of substantial justice and the presence of special
circumstances in this case) for giving due course to the appeal and reiterated that "(T)he underlying principle in the administration of
justice and application of the rules is substantial justice and fair play. As restated by the Court in Obut vs. Court of Appeals, 5 (W)e
cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place the administration of justice in a straight-jacket for then the result

would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders, such as the one subject of this petition, are issued
to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances attending the case may warrant. What should
guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint
or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities.
As in the case of Carco Motor Sales, Inc. vs. of Appeals, 6 wherein we also set aside the appellate courts dismissal of an appeal for
failure to file appellant's brief due to the fault and negligence of counsel's office secretary, we are herein persuaded that the higher
interests of justice and fairness justify the setting aside of respondent court's peremptory dismissal of petitioner's appeal and that the
exercise of the Court's "inherent right" to reinstate an appeal that was dismissed as the result of fraud, mistake or unavoidable
casualty is fully justified under the circumstances of the case at bar.
Referring briefly to the view expressed that the State's record on appeal be remanded so that its appeal would cover not only the
denial of its petition for relief but the lower court's adverse judgment on the merits, 7 it should be noted that as stated hereinafter the
trial court in effect granted the petition for relief and reopened the case, setting aside its first adverse decision of August 3, 1965,
(from which no appeal was taken), although it again rendered an adverse judgment against the State as per its decision of August 30,
1967, which is the subject of the State's appeal. The judgment of the Court has therefore properly ordered the reinstatement of the
State's appeal and remanded the same to respondent Court of Appeals for determination on its merits without need of amending the
record on appeal, since the State's notice of appeal (as well as its pleadings and brier duly appealed from the trial court's decision of
August 30, 1967 "on the ground that said decision is not in accordance with law and the evidence adduced in these cases. 8
One final word. The record shows a sorry lack of care and dedication to duty on the part of the staff of the State's counsel that almost
cost the State by default the forfeiture and loss of the valuable lots involved, were it not for the special circumstances and the
interests of substantial justice which have led the Court to set aside respondent court's summary dismissal of the appeal. The State's
suit against respondents for recovery of the land was first dismissed by the trial court in its judgment of August 3, 1965 and although
the State was duly served with copy thereof on August 13, 1965, it took no appeal therefrom since the docket clerk misfiled the same
in another case and the period for appeal lapsed. 9 Fortunately, the State's petition for relief from judgment was eventually granted
by the trial court which reopened the case and received additional evidence from the State, although ultimately it rendered its
questioned judgment of August 30, 1967 again dismissing the State's suit. Here again, the appeal taken by the State appears to have
been perfected late by six (6) days, which normally would have meant forfeiture of the right of appeal. The attention of the Solicitor
General should be called to these acts of carelessness and neglect so that the proper remedial and administrative measures may be
taken to avoid the recurrence thereof.
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the well-written opinion of Justice Santos. I will even go farther. I vote for the remand of the case to the trial court so that
the State can amend its record on appeal and appeal from the lower court's decision of August 3, 1965, dismissing its complaint for
recovery of the possession of the disputed land and ordering the registration thereof in the name of Alfredo V. de Ocampo. The appeal
from a judgment denying relief under Rule 38 includes the review of the judgment on the merits (Sec. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
The ultimate issue is whether the land already registered as patrimonial property of the State (for the use of the Bureau of Public
Schools), as allegedly shown in TCT No. 6014, can still be registered in the name of another person. My answer is that it cannot be
done because section 46 of Act 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The action to recover possession of registered land does not prescribe.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
This case illustrated graphically once more 'the correctness of the Court's turning away from and setting aside of the rigid material
data rule in the perfection of appeals and its adoption, in the interest of substantial justice as against mere technicality, of the liberal
rule since the leading case of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals 1 that "the mere absence of a formal order granting the motion for
extension of time to file the record on appeal should not be fatal to the petitioner if the record on appeal filed within the requested
extension period was approved by the court a quo.
Here, even conceding that the record on appeal was filed six (6) days later beyond the requested extension period, special
considerations have been shown in the case at bar for the application of the principle of substantial justice as set out in the main
opinion of Mr. Justice Santos. Among others, it should be stressed that the State's record On appeal was approved as per the trial
court's Order of December 4, 1967 with the express statement that there was no opposition from respondents-appellees to its
approval; and that the State's claims, that its e e preponderantly shows that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the land
registration application of respondent de Ocampo filed belatedly after forty-six years and with alleged fraudulent misrepresentations
and machinations since the lots in question (some 289 hectares of prime sugar land) were long ago before 1919 already duly
registered in the name of the predecessor-vendor of Esteban Jalandoni who subsequently bequeathed the same to the Bureau of
Education exclusively for educational purposes, which were rejected by the trial court on erroneous grounds, raise a jurisdictional
issue that should properly be reviewed and determined by the appellate court.
It should be further stressed that to uphold the appellate court's peremptory dismissal of the State's appeal would bar the State from
"seeking again to recover the lots in a different action that may still be legally available to it after the appeal is dismissed"
notwithstanding the main opinion's declaration to the effect 2 since the petitioner State would be foreclosed by the principle of res
adjudicata from filing still another suit for the recovery of the lots in question. And the State itself in its comment of February 13,
1970 on respondents' motion to dismiss (filed through then Solicitor General, now a member of this Court, Associate Justice Felix Q.
Antonio) expressly so admitted "that if the petition is dismissed, thereby sustaining the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing
the appeal by the Government, then the latter would have no further remedy. Certainly, to lose a remedy resulting in unjust
deprivation of one's property cannot be categorized except as substantial. 3
The precedent if Paulino vs. Court of Appeals 4 what re the Court ordered the giving of due course to an appeal notwithstanding that
the same was admittedly filed two days beyond the reglementary period and had been therefore rejected by the appellate court is
fully applicable to the case at bar. We cited therein inter alia the demands of substantial justice and the presence of special
circumstances in this case) for giving due course to the appeal and reiterated that "(T)he underlying principle in the administration of

justice and application of the rules is substantial justice and fair play. As restated by the Court in Obut vs. Court of Appeals, 5 (W)e
cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place the administration of justice in a straight-jacket for then the result
would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders, such as the one subject of this petition, are issued
to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances attending the case may warrant. What should
guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint
or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities.
As in the case of Carco Motor Sales, Inc. vs. of Appeals, 6 wherein we also set aside the appellate courts dismissal of an appeal for
failure to file appellant's brief due to the fault and negligence of counsel's office secretary, we are herein persuaded that the higher
interests of justice and fairness justify the setting aside of respondent court's peremptory dismissal of petitioner's appeal and that the
exercise of the Court's "inherent right" to reinstate an appeal that was dismissed as the result of fraud, mistake or unavoidable
casualty is fully justified under the circumstances of the case at bar.
Referring briefly to the view expressed that the State's record on appeal be remanded so that its appeal would cover not only the
denial of its petition for relief but the lower court's adverse judgment on the merits, 7 it should be noted that as stated hereinafter the
trial court in effect granted the petition for relief and reopened the case, setting aside its first adverse decision of August 3, 1965,
(from which no appeal was taken), although it again rendered an adverse judgment against the State as per its decision of August 30,
1967, which is the subject of the State's appeal. The judgment of the Court has therefore properly ordered the reinstatement of the
State's appeal and remanded the same to respondent Court of Appeals for determination on its merits without need of amending the
record on appeal, since the State's notice of appeal (as well as its pleadings and brier duly appealed from the trial court's decision of
August 30, 1967 "on the ground that said decision is not in accordance with law and the evidence adduced in these cases. 8
One final word. The record shows a sorry lack of care and dedication to duty on the part of the staff of the State's counsel that almost
cost the State by default the forfeiture and loss of the valuable lots involved, were it not for the special circumstances and the
interests of substantial justice which have led the Court to set aside respondent court's summary dismissal of the appeal. The State's
suit against respondents for recovery of the land was first dismissed by the trial court in its judgment of August 3, 1965 and although
the State was duly served with copy thereof on August 13, 1965, it took no appeal therefrom since the docket clerk misfiled the same
in another case and the period for appeal lapsed. 9 Fortunately, the State's petition for relief from judgment was eventually granted
by the trial court which reopened the case and received additional evidence from the State, although ultimately it rendered its
questioned judgment of August 30, 1967 again dismissing the State's suit. Here again, the appeal taken by the State appears to have
been perfected late by six (6) days, which normally would have meant forfeiture of the right of appeal. The attention of the Solicitor
General should be called to these acts of carelessness and neglect so that the proper remedial and administrative measures may be
taken to avoid the recurrence thereof.
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the well-written opinion of Justice Santos. I will even go farther. I vote for the remand of the case to the trial court so that
the State can amend its record on appeal and appeal from the lower court's decision of August 3, 1965, dismissing its complaint for
recovery of the possession of the disputed land and ordering the registration thereof in the name of Alfredo V. de Ocampo. The appeal
from a judgment denying relief under Rule 38 includes the review of the judgment on the merits (Sec. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
The ultimate issue is whether the land already registered as patrimonial property of the State (for the use of the Bureau of Public
Schools), as allegedly shown in TCT No. 6014, can still be registered in the name of another person. My answer is that it cannot be
done because section 46 of Act 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The action to recover possession of registered land does not prescribe.
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and
JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January 28,1987 and another motion to refer the
case to and to be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the Court en
banc is granted but the motion to set the case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case
of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering the
amount of damages sought in the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages. 2While the present
case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. 3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the
declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein. 4 However, in the present case, the prayer is for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced
forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such property of defendants that maybe
sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of purchase and
sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally
to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during the trial as
attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and

to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint
alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff. 5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The
complaint was considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated
were treated as merely to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well
as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in
the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is not
capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of
the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of
assessment of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of this Court together with similar other
cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an
amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by emanating
any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this
Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases that
were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts
which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced
amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the
damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery
of ownership and possession of real property. 8 An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the
government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said
amended complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for
the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient,
nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be
paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and
regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended
complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee.11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and the
prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering
the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless
of the actual date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the
payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. 13 For
an legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting
the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount
of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original
complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million
is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing
fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as
this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended
complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in
obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the
amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body
of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount
of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted,
or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought
in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and
reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 85879 September 29, 1989
NG SOON, petitioner,
vs.

HON. ALOYSIUS ALDAY, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BILLIE GAN AND CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.
Braulio R. G. Tansinsin for petitioner.
Augusto Gatmaytan for private respondent Billie T. Gan.
Del Rosario, Lim, Telan, De Vera & Vigilia for China Banking Corp.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Applying literally the ruling on docket fees enunciated in Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (L-75919, May 7,
1987, 149 SCRA 562), respondent Judge, on 11 August 1988, ordered (1) that petitioner's Complaint below (in Civil Case No. Q52489), for reconstitution of a savings account, and payment of damages and attorney's fees, be expunged; and (2) that the case be
dismissed. He also denied, on 21 October 1988, the reconsideration sought by petitioner of that Order.
The aforementioned savings account was allegedly maintained with the China Banking Corporation (CBC) by Gan Bun Yaw, both of
whom are respondents herein. Petitioner, Ng Soon, claims to be the latter's widow.
The pertinent portions of the Complaint and Prayer read as follows:
2. During his lifetime, Mr. Gan Bun Yaw opened Savings Account No. 17591-2 with CBC wherein he deposited
P900,000.00 more or less.
3. Before his death on January 3, 1987 he lapsed into a coma until he finally took his last breath. But his passbook
still showed a deposit of P900,000.00 more or less.
xxx xxx xxx
5. For almost three (3) long years, she looked for the deposit passbook with the help of her children to no avail.
xxx xxx xxx
7. She discovered further that aforesaid savings account was closed by defendant CBC on December 8, 1988. x x x.
8. She discovered finally that defendant Billie T. Gan connived and colluded with the officers and officials of CBC to
withdraw all of the aforesaid savings account of Mr. Gan Bun Yaw by forging his signature. This has to be done
because Mr. Gan Bun Yaw slipped into a comatose condition in the hospital and could not sign any withdrawal slip.
xxx xxx xxx
11. Due to the wanton and unfounded refusal and failure of defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she
suffered actual damages in the form of missing money in aforesaid savings account and expenses of litigation.
12. Due also to the unfounded and malicious refusal of defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she
suffered moral damages, the amount whereof she leaves to the discretion of the Court.
13. Due likewise to the unfounded and wanton refusal and failure of defendants to heed her just and valid demands,
she suffered exemplary damages, the amount whereof she leaves to the discretion of the Court.
14. Due finally to the unfounded and wanton refusal and failure of defendants to heed her just and valid demands,
she was constrained to hire the services of counsel, binding herself to pay the amount equivalent to twenty percent
payable to her, thereby suffering to the tune thereof.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that this Honorable Court render judgment:
1. Ordering defendants China Banking Corporation to reconstitute Savings Account No. 47591-2 in the name of Mr.
Gan Bun Yaw in the amount of P900,000.00 with interest from December 8,1977 or ordering them both to pay her
the principal and interest from December 9, 1977, jointly and severally.
2. Ordering both defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages of not less than P50,000.00.
3. Ordering both defendants to pay her attorney's fees equivalent to twenty percent of all amounts reconstituted or
payable to her, but not less than P50,000.00.
She prays for such other and further relief to which she may be entitled in law and equity under the premises.
[Emphasis supplied] (pp. 11-13, Rollo)
For the filing of the above Complaint, petitioner paid the sum of P3,600.00 as docket fees.
Respondent Billie Gan and the Bank, respectively, moved for the dismissal of the Complaint. Subsequently, respondent Gan, joined by
the Bank, moved to expunge the said Complaint from the record for alleged non-payment of the required docket fees.
On 11 August 1988, respondent Judge issued the questioned Order granting the "Motion to Expunge Complaint." He explained:
It can thus be seen that while it can be considered at best as impliedly specifying the amount (namely,
P900,000.00, more or less) of what is referred to in its par. 11 as 'missing money 'which apparently is the main part
of the alleged actual damages), the body of the complaint does not specify the following, to wit: the amount of the
rest of the alleged actual damages; the amount of the alleged moral damages; the amount of the alleged
exemplary damages; and, the amount of the alleged attorney's fees. As regards the alleged attorney's fees, in
particular, the clause 'the amount equivalent to twenty percent payable to her' is vague and indefinite. It leaves to
guesswork the determination of the exact amount relative to which the 'twenty percent' shall be reckoned. Is it the
amount of P900,000.00, more or less? Or is it the total amount of all the actual damages? Or is it the grand total
amount of all the damages-actual, moral, and exemplary-'payable to her'?
As regards the prayer of the complaint, while it may be regarded as specific enough as to the principal sum of
P900,000.00 as actual damages, it cannot be so regarded with respect to the amount of moral and exemplary
damages (No. 2 of the prayer) and attorney's fees (No. 3 of the prayer); for, evidently, the phrase 'not less than
P50,000.00' in each of Nos. 2 and 3 of the prayer merely fixes the minimum amount, but it does not mean that
plaintiff is not praying for an unspecified sum much higher than said minimum. And, again, the clause 'equivalent to
twenty percent of all amounts reconstituted or payable to her' in No. 3 of the prayer is as vague and indefinite as
the similar clause found in the complaint's body referred to earlier. What exactly is the amount relative to which the
'twenty percent' shall be determined? Is it the amount of P900,000.00, more or less? Or is it the total amount of all
the actual damages? Or is it the grand total amount of all the damages-actual, moral, and exemplary-'payable to
her'? Certainly, the great difference between any of these amounts, on the one hand, and the amount of
P50,000.00 in the phrase 'not less than P50,000.00' in No. 3 of the prayer, on the other hand, is quite too obvious to
need underscoring.

Needless to state, implicit in the obligation to specify is the duty to be clear and definite. A purported specification
which is vague and indefinite obviously is no specification at all; indeed, it will serve no purpose other than to evade
the payment of the correct filing fees by misleading the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fees.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants defendants' aforesaid 'MOTION TO EXPUNGE COMPLAINT and hereby denies
plaintiffs aforesaid 'URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION (ETC.)' and 'OPPOSITION (ETC.)' inclusive of all the prayers contained
therein and, accordingly, plaintiff's complaint herein is hereby deemed EXPUNGED from the record. Further, being
rendered moot and academic as a result hereof, defendant Billie T. Gan's 'MOTION TO DISMISS' dated April 25,1988
and defendant China Banking Corporations' 'MOTION TO DISMISS' dated May 25,1988 are hereby dismissed. (pp.
16-18, Rollo)
Petitioner's Motion for the reconsideration of the said Order having been denied, she asks for its review, more properly for a Writ
of Certiorari.
The Petition is anchored on two grounds, namely:
1. The doctrine laid down in the Manchester case was incorrectly applied by respondent Judge; and
2. Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the Complaint expunged from the
record although petitioner had paid the necessary filing fees.
During the pendency of this case, respondent Gan filed a Manifestation alleging, among others, that petitioner is an impostor and not
the real Ng Soon, wife of Gan Bun Yaw, since the real Mrs. Gan Bun Yaw (Ng Soon) died on 29 July 1933, as shown by a Certificate
issued on 27 April 1989 by, and bearing the seal of, the An Hai Municipal Government.
This allegation was, however, denied by petitioner in her "Sur-rejoinder to Manifestation" filed on 12 August 1989, to which
respondent Gan has countered with a Reply on 9 September 1989.
We resolved to give due course to the Petition and dispensed with the submittal of Memoranda, the issues having been thoroughly
threshed out by the parties.
Upon the facts, the pleadings, and the law, we grant the Petition.
It is true that Manchester laid down the rule that all Complaints should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in the
body of the complaint but also in the prayer; that said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case;
and that any pleading that fails to comply with such requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall, otherwise, be
expunged from the record.
While it may be that the body of petitioner's Complaint below was silent as to the exact amount of moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees, the prayer did specify the amount of not less than P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and not less
than P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. These amounts were definite enough and enabled the Clerk of Court of the lower Court to
compute the docket fees payable.
Similarly, the principal amount sought to be recovered as "missing money" was fixed at P900,000.00. The failure to state the rate of
interest demanded was not fatal not only because it is the Courts which ultimately fix the same, but also because Rule 141, Section
5(a) of the Rules of Court, itemizing the filing fees, speaks of "the sum claimed, exclusive of interest." This clearly implies that the
specification of the interest rate is not that indispensable.
Factually, therefore, not everything was left to "guesswork" as respondent Judge has opined. The sums claimed were ascertainable,
sufficient enough to allow a computation pursuant to Rule 141, section 5(a).
Furthermore, contrary to the position taken by respondent Judge, the amounts claimed need not be initially stated with mathematical
precision. The same Rule 141, section 5(a) (3rd paragraph), allows an appraisal "more or less." Thus:
In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or more in accordance with the appraisal of
the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be.
In other words, a final determination is still to be made by the Court, and the fees ultimately found to be payable will either be
additionally paid by the party concerned or refunded to him, as the case may be. The above provision clearly allows an initial
payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim subject to adjustment as to what later may be proved.
.... there is merit in petitioner's claim that the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 5(a) clearly contemplates a
situation where an amount is alleged or claimed in the complaint but is less or more than what is later proved. If
what is proved is less than what was claimed, then a refund will be made; if more, additional fees will be exacted.
Otherwise stated, what is subject to adjustment is thedifference in the fee and not the whole amount (Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corp., et als., vs. Court of Appeals, et als., G.R. No. 76119, April 10, 1989).
Significantly, too, the pattern in Manchester to defraud the Government of the docket fee due, the intent not to pay the same having
been obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint, is patently absent
in this case. Petitioner demonstrated her willingness to abide by the Rules by paying the assessed docket fee of P 3,600.00. She had
also asked the lower Court to inform her of the deficiency, if any, but said Court did not heed her plea.
Additionally, in the case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd., et al., vs. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion et al. (G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13,
1989), this Court had already relaxed the Manchester rule when it held, inter alia,:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period (Italics ours).
In respect of the questioned Identity of petitioner, this is properly a matter falling within the competence of the Court a quo, this
Court not being a trier of facts.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of respondent Judge, dated 11 August 1988 and 21 October 1988, are SET ASIDE, and he is hereby
directed to reinstate Civil Case No. Q-52489 for determination and proper disposition of the respective claims and rights of the
parties, including the controversy as to the real identity of petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 45155, Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 31, 1936
G.R. No. 45155
CARMEN C. VIUDA DE ORDOVEZA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORIA RAYMUNDO, respondent.
Crispin Oben for petitioner.
Marcelino C. Malong for respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Petitioner is the appellee and respondent the appellant in a case now pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, entitled Domingo
Ordoveza vs. Honoria Raymundo, and numbered 44763 in the records of the court. The period for the filing of the appellant's brief in
that case expired on March 20, 1936. On March 31, 1936 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failure of the appellant to file
her brief within the time prescribed by the rules of the court, and ordered that after fifteen days the record of the case be remanded
to the court below. On April 6, 1936 the appellant filed a petition for reconsideration of the order dismissing the appeal, which petition
was denied on April 8, 1936. A second petition for reconsideration was filed by the appellant, and in view thereof the Court of Appeals
on April 14, 1936, passed the following resolution:
Upon consideration of the second petition of the attorneys for the appellant in case G. R. 44763, Domingo Ordoveza vs. Honoria
Raymundo, etc. praying that the resolution of this court of March 31, 1936, dismissing the appeal for failure to file their brief be
reconsidered; in view of the reasons given in said petition and the special circumstances of the case, said resolution is hereby set
aside and the appeal reinstated; provided, however, that the attorneys for the appellant shall file their printed brief within five days
from notice hereof.
On April 17,1936 the appellee filed a motion praying that the resolution above quoted be reconsidered and set aside, which motion
was denied.
Upon the foregoing state of facts, the appellee filed this petition for a writ of certiorariwith a view to having declared null and void the
order of the Court of Appeals restating the appeal.
Petitioner now contends (1) that the Court of Appeals had no power to reinstate the appeal because it lost jurisdiction of the case on
April 5, 1936, in that fifteen days had already elapsed from March 20, 1936, the date when the period fixed for the filing of the
appellant's brief expired; and (2) that granting that the Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction of the case, it had no authority to grant
the appellant an additional period of five days within which to file her brief.
By section 145-P of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3, and in virtue of the resolution adopted
by the Court of Appeals on February 8, 1936, the rules of the Supreme Court governing the filing of briefs and the dismissal of
appeals are applicable to cases cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
Rules 23 and 24 of the Supreme Court are pertinent to the consideration of the present petition. The rules read as follows:
23. Motions for extension of time for the filing of briefs must be presented before the expiration of the time mentioned in Rules 21
and 22, or within a time fixed by special order of the court. No more than one extension of time for the filing of briefs shall be allowed,
and then only for good and sufficient cause shown, to be demonstrated by affidavit.
24. If the appellant, in any civil case, fails to serve his brief within the time prescribed by these rules the court may, on motion of the
appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its own motion, dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal.
1. The first contention of the petitioner rests on the theory developed in his argument that upon the failure of the appellant to file her
brief within the time prescribed by the rules of the court, her appeal became, ipso facto, dismissed. Consequently, he argues that at
the expiration of the period of fifteen days from March 20, 1936, the Court of Appeals lost jurisdiction of the case, and had, therefore,
no power to reinstate the appeal. This view finds no support in the rules of this court. Rule 24 above transcribed clearly indicates the
contrary view when it says that upon failure of the appellant to file his brief within the period prescribed by the rules, the court "may",
on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or its own motion, dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal. The use of the
word "may" implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the court, and that failure of
the appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed by the rules does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically.
Viewed in this light, the period of fifteen days must be counted in the case under consideration not from March 20, 1936, but from
March 31, 1936. Having been entered on April 14, 1936, the order reinstating the appeal came within such fifteen-day period.
2. Granted that the Court of Appeals still had jurisdiction of the case when it reinstated the appeal, it seem reasonable to conclude
that it also had authority to grant the appellant an additional period of five days within which to file her brief. Rule 23 provides in
specific terms that the court may by special order fix a time within which motions for extension of time for the filing of briefs must be
presented. It would seem to be within the spirit of this rule to hold that the court may grant either the appellant or appellee an
additional time for the filing of his brief even without any previous application therefor. Moreover, as the Supreme Court of the United
States has aptly observed, "it is always in the power of the court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it." (U. S. vs. Breitling, 20 How., 252; 15 Law. ed., 900, 902.)
We conclude that the Court of Appeals had authority to reinstate the appeal in the aforesaid case numbered 44763 in its records, and
to grant the appellant an additional period of file days within which to file her brief.
The petition for a writ of certiorari must be denied. So ordered.
Avance
[G.R. No. 141117. March 25, 2004]
UNITED PULP AND PAPER CO., INC., petitioner, vs. UNITED PULP AND PAPER CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing the Resolutions dated October 12, 1999 [1] and December 10, 1999[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55245,
entitled United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. vs. United Pulp and Paper Chapter-Federation of Free Workers.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are as follows:
Sometime in July 1991, United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc., petitioner, implemented a Promotions Policy [3] that recognizes the
excellent and meritorious work performance of deserving employees during the last twelve (12) months. The Promotions Policy sets
forth the following guidelines:
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINES

1. Except in abnormal situations (subject to approval by the General Manager), promotions shall be made only if a
vacancy in the next higher position occurs and Management has decided to fill-up such vacancy through
approval of the Personnel Requisition form.
xxx
9. In case of union employees, the promotional increase shall be 5% compounded for every pay class
jump. However, the resulting effect of 5% promotional increase shall not cause the promoted employees
salary to exceed that of the lowest paid incumbent within first, the section, second, department, and third,
division. If this constraint will result to a promotional increase of lower than 3% over his previous salary,
the employee will receive an increase of 3%.
x x x.[4]
On April 1, 1998, Teodorico Simbulan was promoted from Welder I to Welder II with the corresponding pay class (PC) movement
from PC V to PC VIII.
For and in behalf of Simbulan, United Pulp and Paper Chapter-Federation of Free Workers, respondent, questioned the regularity
or correctness of the salary increase granted by petitioner. Invoking Section 1, Article XVII of the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA),[5] respondent maintains that Simbulan is entitled to a 5% salary increase (for every pay class movement) because such salary
increase does not exceed the salary rates of other incumbents. Respondent also contends that petitioner is guilty of discrimination
against Simbulan since other employees, like Enrique Cruz and Joselito de Castro who were previously promoted, enjoy the 5% salary
increase for their pay class movements.
The controversy was submitted to the grievance machinery, but the parties failed to reach an acceptable settlement.
Thus, the matter was elevated to a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB),
Regional Branch No. III at San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as NCMB-AC-583-RB3-10-024-98.
On July 1, 1999, the Voluntary Arbitrators rendered a Decision [6] partly reproduced as follows:
In light of all the foregoing, this Panel holds that the promotional increase in the case of union employees is 5% compounded for
every pay class jump unless the effect of such increase will be such as to cause the promoted employees salary to exceed that of the
lowest paid incumbent in the same position as that to which the employee is being promoted, in which case the promotional increase
shall be limited to not less than 3%.
Consequently, in the case of the subject employee, Teodorico Simbulan, since there is no showing that, for the second and third
jumps in his promotion on 1 April 1998, his salary would have exceeded that of the lowest paid incumbent in the pertinent position if
granted a 5% promotional increase, he is entitled to a salary increase of 5%+5%+5%, compounded for each pay class, effective as of
the said date.
WHEREFORE, respondent United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to pay Teodorico Simbulan the difference between the
promotional increase of 5%+5%+5%, compounded for each pay class, and the salary increase be actually received as a result of his
promotion, effective as of 1 April 1998.
The respondent is also directed to continue implementing the promotions policy, in appropriate cases, in the manner stated in this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Voluntary Arbitrators in a Resolution [7] dated September 3,
1999.
On October 6, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Voluntary Arbitrators.
In a Resolution dated October 12, 1999, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition outright for being insufficient in form, thus:
"1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel for the petitioner corporation,
rather than by a duly-authorized officer thereof;
2. The affidavit of service is inadequate, as the registry receipts evidencing mailing of copies of the petition to the
respondent were not attached;
3. Absence of the mandatory written explanation required under Sec. 11, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to explain
why personal service upon the respondents of copies of the petition was not resorted to.
The foregoing defects warrant an outright dismissal of the instant petition.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
On October 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution
dated December 10, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in dismissing its petition for review
on mere technicalities.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. Section 5, Rule 7 of the same Rules [8] provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues
in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency.
Here, only petitioners counsel signed the certification against forum-shopping. There is no showing that he was authorized by
the petitioner company to represent the latter and to sign the certification.
In Sy Chin vs. Court of Appeals,[9] we held that the petition is flawed as the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by
counsel and not by the party. The rule requires that it should be the plaintiff or principal party who should sign the certification,
otherwise, this requirement would easily be circumvented by the signature of every counsel representing corporate parties. [10]
Moreover, petitioners failure to attach with the petition a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally
violates Section 11, Rule 13 of the same Rules. [11] We have ruled that where no explanation is offered to justify the service of
pleadings by other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the pleading becomes mandatory. [12] Thus, the Court of
Appeals correctly considered the petition as not having been filed, in view of petitioners failure to present a written explanation why it
failed to effect personal service of its petition for review.
In Kowloon House/Willy Ng vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, [13] we held that (r)ules of procedure exist for a purpose, and to disregard
such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere
technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of
substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation.But they help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner, at the
prescribed time in a peaceful though adversarial confrontation before a judge whose authority litigants acknowledge. Public order and
our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance of the rules of procedure, particularly by government officials and
agencies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Vitug, (Chairman), J., on official leave.

[5]

[8]

[9]

Section 1. Benefits and Practices. The terms and conditions of employment of employees within the above-defined bargaining
unit shall be those as are embodied herein. Benefits and personnel practices not otherwise modified by this Agreement and
which are being regularly enjoyed by the employees prior to the date of effectivity of this Agreement shall continue to be
enjoyed by them.
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing. x x x.
G.R. No. 136233, November 23, 2000, 345 SCRA 673, 684.