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A.F.R.

CourtNo.7
Case:HABEASCORPUSNo.247of2015
Petitioner:Smt.Ramsati@ShyamsatiThrouHerHusband
Jitendra
Respondent:StateOfU.P.Throu.Prin.Secy.HomeDeptt.Lko.And
Ors.
CounselforPetitioner:KamleshKumarShukla
CounselforRespondent:Govt.Advocate
Hon'bleAjaiLamba,J.
Hon'bleAshokPalSingh,J.
(Oral)
1. As per office note, respondent no. 3 has been served
personally,however,nonehasputinappearanceforrespondentno.3.
2.ThepetitionseeksissuanceofawritinthenatureofHabeasCorpus
directing the Rajkiya Mahila Sharanalaya, Lucknow to release the
detenue and give her in the custody of the deponent Jitendra who
claimstobehusbandandnextfriendofthedetenue.
3. It hasbeenpleaded onbehalfofpetitionerthatthepetitionergot
married to Jitendra of her free will and accord. The petitioner was
tormentedbecauseherfatherandbrotheraretakingRs.50,000/toget
thepetitionermarriedwithanagedperson.Thepetitionerresistedthe
saidmatrimonialalliance,however,thefatherdidnotagree.Ithasbeen
argued that thepetitioner got married to Jitendra. The petitioner has
elopedwithJitendrathriceearlieralsoforthesamereason.
4. It has been pleaded that because marriage of the petitioner with
Jitendra has not been accepted, the respondent no. 3 lodged First
InformationReportdated10.5.2015,bearingCaseCrimeNo.0066of
2015underSections364,506IndianPenalCode,PoliceStationImaliya
Sultanpur,DistrictSitapur.Ithasbeencontendedthatthepetitionerhad
neither been kidnapped nor abducted and therefore, the charges as
leveledagainstJitendraarefalse.
5. Learned counsel has impressed on the court on the basis of
Annexures6and7thatthedetenuehasalreadygivenherstatements
underSections161and164ofCriminalProcedureCodeclarifyingthe

above contended facts. The petitioner/detenue, however, has been


housedinaGovernmentWomenProtectionHome,therebycurtailing
liberty and freedomofthe petitionerwhichisnotpermissible inlaw,
particularlybecausethepetitionerisaHinduandmarriageofaminor
Hinduisnotvoid.
6. We have taken note of the judgement rendered by this Court
(deliveredbyoneofus(AjaiLamba,J)reportedin2013(31)LCD1107,
SonuPaswanvs.StateofU.P.Andanother,wherebythisCourtwhile
observingthatevenifthedetenueisaminor,hermarriagecannotbe
saidtobeviodabinitioundertheprovisionsofHinduMarriageActand
therebydirectedforreleaseofthedetenue.Relevantparas22to27
recordasunder:
"22.EvenifitisconsideredthatRekhaDeviisaminor,hermarriageis
notvoidabinitioundertheprovisionsofHinduMarriageAct.
23. The marriage would be voidable under the Act of 2006, only if
Rekha Devi files a petition for that purpose. In the case in hand,
however,RekhaDevistatesthatshegotmarriedtoSonuPaswan,i.e.
thepetitioner,andwantstolivewithhiminhermatrimonialhome.The
marriageisnotvoidunderSection12oftheActof2006insomuchas
theconditionsstipulatedinthesaidprovisionarenotexistenceinthis
case.
24.UnderSection21oftheGuardianandWardsAct,1890,aminor
canactasaguardianofhisownwifeorchild.UndertheHinduMinority
andGuardianshipAct,1956,Clause'C'ofSection6,inthecaseof
marriedgirl,thehusbandwouldbetheguardian.
25.Consideringthefactsandcircumstancesofthiscase,incontextof
legal provisions referred to above, there is no legal impediment in
releasing Rekha Devi under the guardianship of her husband, Sonu
Paswan,thepetitioner.
26. In view of the above, the contention of learned counsel for the
respondent,whoisfatherofRekhaDevi,hastoberejected.
27.ThisCourtfurtherrecordsthatitisnotinthewelfareofafemaleto
keepherinNariNiketanforprolongedperiod,particularlywhenshe
wantstojointhecompanyorremaininthecustodyofherhusband,who
wouldbethenaturalguardian,incontextoflaw.Insuchcircumstances,
orderpassedbytheIncharge,ChiefJudicialMagistrate,Balrampur,is
renderedillegalandnotwarrantedunderLaw."

7. We have gone through the contents of Annexure6 that is the


statement of the detenue recorded under Section 161 of Criminal
Procedure Code in the course of investigation of the criminal case
(supra).Wehavealsogonethroughthestatementofthedetenue,who
is also the purported victim of offence, recorded under Section 164
CriminalProcedureCodeinthecourseofinvestigation.Contentsofthe
statements are not disputed or denied by learned counsel for the
prosecutingagency.
8. Consideringthefactthatthedetenuehasgivenastatementtothe
effect that she had thrice earlier eloped with Jitendra so as to get
marriedtohim;fatherandbrotherofthedetenuewantedtomarryher
withold/agedpersonwhileacceptingRs.50,000/;thatthedetenuehad
notbeenabductedorkidnappedbyJitendraandtherefore,Jitendrahad
notcommittedanyoffence,muchlessanoffenceunderSection364of
IndianPenalCode,weareoftheconsideredopinionthatitcannotbe
deduced at this juncture that Jitendra has committed an offence in
contextofthedetenue.
9. Issue somewhat similar has been considered by this Court (this
Bench)whiledealingwithWritPetitionNo.3519(MB)of2015,Shaheen
ParveenVs.StateofU.P.andothers. Injudgementdated23.7.2015,
thefollowinghasbeenheldinparas14to28:
"14.TheInvestigatingAgencyisconcludingthatatthepointintime
whenthevictimleftinthecompanyoftheaccused,shewasafew
months less than 18 years, which is the relevant age mentioned in
Section361oftheIndianPenalCode,aboveextracted.Clearly,the
InvestigatingAgencyistakingahypertechnicalviewoftheissue.The
otherrelevantfactsandcircumstancesofthecasearebeingignored.
15.Theissuewhetherthevictimwaskidnappedorabductedisrequired
tobeexaminedincontextofthestatementoftheprosecutrixrecorded
underSection164Cr.P.C.
16. If the statement of the prosecutrix, above noted, is taken into
account, it becomes evident that ingredients of the offence under
Sections 363/366 of the Indian Penal Code in regard to coercion,
kidnapping or abduction allegedly committed by Sarfaraj, are not
satisfied.TheprovisionsofSection363oftheIndianPenalCodeare
requiredtobeconsideredincontextofprovisionsofSection361ofthe
IndianPenalCode.SoastosatisfytheingredientsofSection361ofthe
IndianPenalCode,ithastobeestablishedbytheprosecutingagency
that the accused/sarfaraj took or enticed the prosecutrix out of the

keepingofthelawfulguardianoftheprosecutrix,withouttheconsentof
theguardian/respondentno.4.Inthecaseinhand,itisthecaseofthe
prosecutrixherselfthatsheofherfreewillwentwithSarfaraj,livedwith
him, wants to live with him and is expecting his child. Element of
coercionandenticementbySarfarajisabsent,althoughconsentofthe
guardianhadnotbeentaken.
17.Thewritcourt,beingacourtofequity,musttakeintoconsideration
allrelevantfactorsbroughtbeforeittodeliversubstantialjustice.Equity
justifiesbendingtherules,wherefairplayisnotviolated,withaviewto
promote substantial justice. A writ court cannot contemplate any
limitationonitspowertodeliversubstantialjustice.Ithastobeensured
thataconsumerofjusticegetscompletejustice,insteadofgoinginto
thenicetyoflaw.Underthecircumstances,thecourtcannotbeamere
onlookerifinjusticeislikelytobecaused.
18. Petitioner No.1the victim/prosecutrix would be the bestwitness,
rather the only witness of commission of offence under Sections
363/366I.P.C.Surely,thevictimwillnotsupporttheprosecutioncase,
ashasbeenmadeevidentbyherinherstatement,recordedinthe
courseofinvestigationunderSection164Cr.P.C.,andthereforethe
trial would result in acquittal. During course of trial, considerable
numberofmanhourswouldbewastedinprosecution/defendingand
judgingthecase.Nousefulpurposewouldbeservedandtheentire
exerciseoftrialwouldbeinfutilitybecausethevictimhasdeclaredthat
shewasnotvictimisedorkidnapped.
19.Thefactsthathaveemergedfromtherecordmakeitevidentthat
theimpugnedcriminalproceedingshavebeeninitiatedbecausemother
of the Prosecutrix/victim ( respondent no.4) has not accepted the
marriageofherdaughterwithpetitionerNo.2.
20.Incase,despitetheevidencethathascomeonrecord,asnoted
above,proceedingsarenotquashed,petitionerno.2wouldberequired
tofacecriminalchargesandundergotheagonyofatrial.
21.Wehavealsotakenintoaccountthefactthatincasethepetitioner
No.2 is allowed to be prosecuted, the matrimonial life of petitioner
No.1/the alleged victim would be disrupted. Her husband would be
incarceratedandtherewouldbenoonetotakecareofherchild,whois
yettobeborn.
22.Ifaminor,ofherown,abandonstheguardianshipofherparents
andjoinsaboywithoutanyrolehavingbeenplayedbytheboyinher
abandoning the guardianship of her parents and without her having

beensubjectedtoanykindofpressure,inducement,etcandwithout
anyofferorpromisefromtheaccused,nooffencepunishableunder
Section363I.P.C.willbemadeoutwhenthegirlisagedmorethan17
years and is mature enough to understand what she is doing. Of
course,iftheaccusedinducesoralluresthegirlandthatinfluencesthe
minorinleavingherguardian'scustodyandthekeepingandgoingwith
theaccused,thenitwouldbedifficultfortheCourttoacceptthatminor
hadvoluntarilycome to the accused. In case the victim/ prosecutrix
willingly,ofherownaccord,accompaniestheboy,thelawdoesnotcast
adutyontheboyoftakingherbacktoherfather'shouseorevenof
tellinghernottoaccompanyhim.
23.Agirlwhohasattainedtheageofdiscretionandwasontheverge
ofattainingmajorityandiscapableofknowingwhatwasgoodandwhat
was bad for her, cannot be said to be a victim of inducement,
particularlywhenthecaseofthevictim/girlherselfisthatitwasonher
initiativeandonaccountofhervoluntaryactthatshehadgonewiththe
boy and got married to him. In such circumstances, desire of the
girl/victimisrequiredtobeseen.IngredientsofSection361I.P.C.are
required to be considered accordingly, and not in mechanical or
technicalinterpretation.
24.IngredientsofSection361I.P.C.cannotbesaidtobesatisfiedina
casewheretheminorhavingattainedageofdiscretion,allegedtohave
been taken by the accused person, left her guardian's protection
knowingly (having capacity to know the full import of what she was
doing) and voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case, it
cannotbesaidthatthevictimhadbeentakenawayfromthekeepingof
herlawfulguardian.
25.Soastoshowanactofcriminalityonthepartoftheaccused,some
kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active
participation by him inthe formationof theintention ofthe minorto
leavethehouseoftheguardian,isrequiredtobeshown.Conclusion
might be different in case evidence is collected by the investigating
agencytoestablishthatthoughimmediatelypriortotheminorleaving
theguardian'sprotection,noactivepartwasplayedbytheaccused,he
hadatsomeearlierstagesolicitedorpersuadedtheminortodoso.
(TheCourtinaboveregardstakesacuefromthejudgmentrendered
byHon'bleSupremeCourtofIndiareportedin(1965)1SCR243S.
VaradarajanversusStateofMadras).
26.Whentheabovenotedsituationisconsideredincontextofthefacts
andcircumstancesofthepresentcase,itwouldbecomeevidentthat

thevictim(petitionerNo.1)wasafewmonthsshortofattainingageof
18years.Thesaidpetitionerhadattainedageofdiscretion,however,
notageofmajority.PetitionerNo.1,thevictiminherstatementrecorded
underSection164CrPChasclearlydemonstratedthatitwasshewho
went of her free will and accord on 10.2.2014 with Mohd. Sarfaraj,
without any coercion, and stayed with him, and got married to him
willingly.ItisaconsensualactonthepartofpetitionerNo.1allthrough.
Such clear stand of the victim makes it evident that Mohd. Sarfaraj
respondent No.2 cannot be attributed with coercing petitioner No.1,
inducingpetitionerNo.1orkidnappingorabductingherincommission
ofoffence,asalleged.Surely,agirlwhohasattainedanagemorethan
17yearsandwhoisalreadycarryingpregnancycannotbestatedto
have not attained age of discretion. In such circumstances, a
technicality in law would not be attracted. The Court has not been
shown any material which would indicate coercion, inducement or
forcefulactonthepartofSarfaraj(petitionerNo.2)soastoconclude
thatoffencehasbeencommittedbyhim.
27.ThewritCourtconsideringtotalityoffactandcircumstances,cannot
ignoreordisregardthewelfareofthepetitioners,particularlywhenthe
exerciseoftrialisgoingtobeinfutility,asobservedhereinabove.
28.Inviewofthefactsandcircumstancesofthecasenotedabove,the
Courtisconvincedthattheimpugnedproceedingshavebeeninitiated
inabuseofprocessoftheCourtandprocessofthelaw.Apersonal
grudgeagainstmarriageofchoiceofthedaughterisbeingsettledby
virtueofinitiatingimpugnedcriminalproceedings,whichwouldnotbe
permissibleinlaw.Suchprosecutionwouldabrogateconstitutionalright
vested in the petitioners to get married as per their discretion,
particularlywhenthereisnoevidencetoindicatethatthemarriageis
void."

10. From the above noted extracted portion of the judgement rendered
in Shaheen Parveen (supra), it becomes evident that if a minor of her
own abandons the guardianship of her parents and joins a boy, without
any role having been played by the boy in abandoning the guardianship
of her parents, no offence can be said to have been committed by that
boy/person. In the case in hand the petitioner/victim has made it clear
that she had not been kidnapped, abducted or allured/induced by
Jitendra. The petitioner of her voluntary act got married to Jitendra.
11.Thedetenueispresentincourtunderdirectionsofthecourt.On
questioningthedetenue,wefindthatsheiscapableoftakingdecision

inregardtoherfuture.Thedetenueknowswhatisrightorwrongforher
future. The detenue has reiterated that in case she is sent with her
fathertoherpaternalhome,shewouldbedonetodeath.
12. We take judicial notice of the fact that the facilities provided for
housing women in Rajkiya Mahila Sharanalaya and other such
ProtectiveHomesarenotconduciveandidealforlongcustodyofa
female.Thepetitionerhasalreadybeenhousedinsuchfacilitysince
30.5.2015.
13. Wehavealsogonethroughthecontentsoftheorderpassedby
Magistrate in deference to which the detenue/petitioner has been
housed in Rajkiya Mahila Sharanalaya. Although the Magistrate has
takenintoaccountthestatementofthedetenue/victimrecordedunder
Section164CriminalProcedureCode,however,hasoptedforsending
thepetitioner/detenueinRajkiyaMahilaSharanalaya,ratherthaninthe
companyofJitendra.
14. The petitioner has been directed to be confined in a Protection
HomebytheMagistratewithouttakingintoaccounttheimportanceand
relevanceofliberty. AsperArticle21oftheConstitutionofIndia,"no
personshallbedeprivedofhislifeorpersonallibertyexceptaccording
toprocedureestablishedbylaw."
15. Acourtoflaworanauthoritypassinganorderwhichislikelyto
curtaillibertyandfreedomofacitizenisrequiredtoconsiderallpossible
alternativestocurtailinglibertyofacitizen.Suchlegalforumisrequired
totakeintoconsiderationthewishesanddesireofthepersonwhose
libertywouldbecurtailedbyvirtueofanorderpassedbythatforum.
Thepetitioner,inthecaseinhandisnotaccusedofcommittingany
offence.
16.Inthecaseinhand,thepetitionermadeitabundantlyclearthatshe
apprehendsthreatatthehandsofherparents.Reasonsthereforhave
alsobeengiven.Thepetitionerfurthermadeitclearthatshewouldlike
togointhecompanyofherhusband,Jitendra,thedeponentinthis
case.
17.InthepresentcasetheconcernedMagistratehasnotgivendue
considerationtothefactthatthepetitionerofherownfreewillhadgone
withJitendra,andgotmarriedtohim.
18.Magistratebynotgivingdueimportancethewishesofthepetitioner
hascommittedagraveirregularityandillegality.Withoutdetailingany
processoflaworsourceofpowertodetainthepetitionerandwithout

giving any legal reason for detaining the petitioner, order directing
confinementofthepetitionerinaProtectionHomehasbeenpassed.
19. Thepetitionerhasbeenrepeatedlystatingthatsheismarriedto
Jitendra.Documentsavailableonrecordestablishedthatthepetitioner
hadnotbeenkidnappedorabductedbyJitendra,oreveninducedtoget
marriedtohim.
20. It is a clear case in which the father of the girl did not accept
marriage alliance of his daughter and therefore, in a vindictive and
egoistic action initiated criminal proceedings (supra). In such cases
victim is the best witness, who happens to be the petitioner. These
relevant circumstances ought to have been considered by the
Magistrate while giving importance to the statement of the
petitioner/victim/prosecutrix, recorded under Section 164 of Criminal
ProcedureCode. Thestatement,however,hasbeenignoredwithout
anylegalcause.
21. Asnotedabove,evenifagirlisaminor,hermarriagecannotbe
saidtobevoidundertheHinduMarriageAct1955. Thegirlhasthe
righttorepudiatethemarriage,intermsoftheprovisionsofSection13
(2)(iv)ofHinduMarriageAct.Atthispointintime,however,itisthecase
of the petitioner that she is married to Jitendra. Due regard to the
statementisrequiredtobegivenbyacourtoflaw.
22. Taking into account the abovenoted factsand circumstances in
contextoflawhaslaiddowninSonuPaswan(supra)and Shaheen
Parveen (supra) we are of the considered opinion that liberty of the
petitionerhasbeencurtailedwithoutanylegalcause.
23.Wehavealsotakennoteofthefactthatalthoughrespondentno.3
hasbeenservedinperson,however,hehasneitherappearedinperson
incourtnorthroughanAdvocate.Itindicatesthedisregardofthefather
towardshisowndaughter,thedetenue/petitioner.
24.Accordingly,thepetitionisallowed.Adirectionisissuedtorelease
thepetitionerinthecompanyofJitendra,S/oTarachand,R/oMalikpur,
PoliceStationImaliyaSultanpur,DistrictSitapur,forthwith.
25. Let copy of this order be released under the signatures of Bench
Secretary of this Court.
OrderDate:7.9.2015
Madhu

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