Written by {ga=imtiazgul}
Introduction
The Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) comprise one of the important geo-strategic
parts of Pakistan. Lying adjacent to the countrys north-western border with Afghanistan, this
region is inhabited by the proud Pashtun tribes, which have a long history of resistance against
invaders such as the British Imperialists in the nineteenth century, and, more recently, the
Soviets during their invasion of Afghanistan.
Covering approximately 27,200 square kilometers, FATA is divided into seven regions, or
agencies, called Khyber, Khurram, Bajaur, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Mohmand and
Orakzai. Together, these agencies have an estimated population of 4.55 million, which is
multi-ethnic and comprised of numerous tribes.
Constitutionally, FATA is a special region of Pakistan; while most of the rest of the country is
governed by provincial governments under the Pakistan Penal Code, FATA is governed directly
by the federal government through a special set of laws called the Frontier Crimes Regulations.
The legal and governance system for FATA is over a century old and draconian; it denies basic
human rights to the people of FATA and has prevented the region from partaking in the
socioeconomic development that the rest of Pakistan has seen.
Since the incidents of 9/11, and particularly after the resurgence of the Taliban in 20032004
1 / 24
against foreign troops in Afghanistan, FATA has become a focal point for the international
community. The United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accuse the
people of FATA of providing shelter and support to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Numerous
operations have been conducted in FATA, both by Pakistans own military forces and by Allied
Forces from Afghanistan. These forays have not only wreaked significant collateral damage, but
have also triggered profound anti-government and anti-US sentiments. As the Pakistani
government struggles to regain the loyalty of FATAs people, it is also confronting accusations
that it is deliberately not doing enough to stem the support from FATA to militants in
Afghanistan.
This article takes a closer look at the sort of criticism that has been leveled against Pakistan for
the role it has or hasnt played in assisting the US-led Allied Forces in the war against
terror in Afghanistan. It next looks at the measures the Pakistan government and military have
actually taken, and the costs these steps have entailed. The article then provides a brief
description of the people at the center of the FATA crisis the local tribal communities
outlining those historical, political and socio-cultural aspects of their lives which, on the one
hand, make it difficult for them to make clear-cut choices about friends and foes, and on the
other, limit the capability of the Pakistani government to take them along in its decision to
support the US-led Coalition. Finally, recommendations are presented for addressing the
longstanding problems of FATAs people and thereby finding a lasting solution to the issue of
their role in the ongoing war in Afghanistan.
Little insight is available on some of the major and controversial operations that have been
conducted in the area. While these were mainly conducted by the Pakistani military, a few were
also executed by the Allied Forces in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military establishment has
always claimed that none of the Allied Forces operations were conducted without their prior
knowledge, but the facts on the ground tell a different story; international laws and rules,
diplomatic norms and established military procedures of cooperation between two forces have
been violated. Many a times, operations in FATA were executed by American forces alone,
evoking strong reactions. The backlash has had to be borne by the Pakistani military in the form
of suicide bombing attacks, the targets of which have ranged from one of the militarys safest
bases in Tarbela to buses transporting defense forces personnel.
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Pakistan and its army are in a quandary: since FATA is a part of the federation, it cannot be the
center of an all-out military operation; at the same time, being an active member of the US led
coalition against terrorism, Pakistan cannot afford to look the other way when FATAs residents
are accused of supporting the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This is especially important given that
Taliban forces in Afghanistan have often shown their prowess against the weak, uncommitted
and disorganized Afghan National Army.
Nonetheless, the failure to maintain law and order and security in Afghanistan gets connected to
the disorder in FATA. FATAs people are paying the price of being sandwiched between local
militants, the Pakistani military and Allied forces in Afghanistan.
By the end of 2007, this disorder and threat to international peace was not showing any signs
of abating. Currently, the region remains under tight international scrutiny for al-Qaeda and
Taliban activity, and Pakistan- and US-led operations continue to be carried out against these
elements and their sanctuaries.
Although Pakistan, being the provider of logistical support to the US and Allied forces, has
suffered a great deal of violence since the beginning of the Karzi government in Kabul, the
international community and intelligentsia across the world see Afghanistan as the only sufferer
and Pakistan, the only perpetrator. It is very noteworthy that the former US intelligence chief,
John Negroponte, called FATA a main source and center of terrorism at a Senate Intelligence
Committee hearing on January 11, 2007, conveniently ignoring that while Pakistan was making
considerable efforts, government in Kabul has failed to share its responsibility in this
connection. In the same hearing, he added that Al-Qaeda terrorists are cultivating stronger
operational connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders secure
hideout in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.
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Negroponte conceded that Pakistan as a frontline partner in the war on terror had captured
several al-Qaeda leaders, but alleged it remained a major source of Islamic extremism and
harbored some top terrorist leaders. Negroponte added that eliminating the haven extremists
have found in Pakistans tribal areas is not sufficient to end the Afghan insurgency, but is
necessary. This statement amounted to a public indict-ment of the state and government of
Pakistan, flying in the face, especially, of President Musharraf, who has long been perceived as
Washingtons blue-eyed boy.
President Musharraf has had to rebut such claims on more than one occasion with the reminder
that controlling terrorism in Afghanistan is as much the duty of the US-led forces and the Afghan
National Army as the Pakistan Army. While there is little doubt that there have been nearly
4,000 deaths because of the Taliban activities in Afghanistan, the body count in Pakistan has
also risen sharply.
However, the international community appears to be deaf to these facts, and continues to
suspect the sincerity of Pakistans involvement in the war against terror in the region. Tracing
the long trail connecting global terrorism with militants based in Waziristan, one of the FATA
agencies, most foreign experts and observers see Afghanistans growing insurgency as a
consequence of Pakistani weakness, if not outright complicity, with militants in the Pashtun
border areas. Allegations to this effect abound in the mainstream Western media and in the
reports of various think tanks.
Newsweek also said in one of its investigative reports that In Ghazni and in six provinces to
the south, and in other hot spots to the east, Karzais government barely exists outside district
towns. Hard-core Taliban forces have filled the void by infiltrating from the relatively lawless
tribal areas of Pakistan from where they fled at the end of 2001. Once back inside Afghanistan
these committed Jihadi commanders and fighters, aided by key sympathizers who had
remained behind, have raised hundreds, if not thousands, of new local recruits, many for pay.
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The Economist, too, made similar comments in its early October 2006 edition, saying:
Waziristan is now a regional magnet. In the past six months, up to 1,000 Uzbeks, escaping the
crackdown in Uzbekistan after last years massacre by government security forces in the town
of Andijan have found sanctuary with al-Qaeda in Waziristan.
The magazine added that all these fighters had found a safe sanctuary in FATA along with
elements that are extremely close to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
As if this were not enough, the British intelligence leaked a secret report to the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) hours before President Musharraf landed in London in
mid-October 2006, claiming that Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was secretly
providing support to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The leaked document said the West had turned
a blind eye to the indirect protection of al-Qaeda and promotion of terrorism by ISI. The memo
also called for dismantling the ISI and ending army rule in Pakistan.
President Musharraf did not hide his reactions and, upon returning to Islamabad, disclosed to
the international media that two joint intelligence centers were operating in both Quetta and
Kabul, which were manned by officers of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), (MI-6) and
ISI. If the insurgents were having such a free ride, he said, it meant that CIA is not doing its job
well. This was by far the most direct response to such allegations in the Western media. It
astonished many analysts and observers, especially given the importance of keeping
intelligence cooperation discrete and secure.
The Council on Foreign Relations, a reputed US think tank, also questioned the solidity of
Pakistans involvement in the international cooperation against terrorism and said that Pakistan
was not doing enough to come down hard on militants in its territory.
Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation wrote that Pakistan is the only word that could
be used interchangeably with the Taliban insurgency. He added that Not one senior Taliban
leader has been arrested or killed in Pakistan since 2001. Pakistani forces in the predominantly
Pashtun north do little to disrupt the cross-border flow of Taliban insurgents, clamp down on the
cross-border drug trade, and rein in the most radical Madrassas in the region.
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The paper also quoted the US Institute of Peace report as saying that Since the US-led
invasion in 2001, Pakistan has become the chief sanctuary for remnants of the Taliban regime
that previously governed Afghanistan. Some 30 members of the Talibans top leadership,
including supreme leader Mullah Omar and the groups 10-12 member Shura Council, are
based in Pakistani strongholds, mainly Quetta, Miranshah and Peshawar.
Over the past few months, the Pakistani government has finally taken a slightly more
aggressive stance vis--vis the allegations coming from Afghanistan and the international
community. It has emphasized the need to further strengthen cooperation between nations and
their militaries, as well as reciprocity of action from all of the involved countries.
To determine whether the allegations against Pakistan hold truth or reflect a bias, two aspects
need to be considered: firstly, the measures the Government of Pakistan has taken since
December 2001 to assist Allied Forces in the war in Afghanistan, including the costs of these
measures; and, secondly, the factors within FATA that make this region the hot spot it is today.
These facets are discussed in the following two sections.
Following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in December 2001, most of the retreating Afghan
Taliban and their foreign friends headed for Pakistans tribal areas, particularly North and South
Waziristan, both of which share a very long and inhospitable border with Afghanistans Paktia
and Paktika provinces. These provinces also provide relatively safe, vastly unguarded routes
through Balochistan to Iran and the Arabian Sea. The author was told in North and South
Waziristan that a number of Taliban and al-Qaeda stalwarts, like Abu Zubaida, Adil Aljazeeri,
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Ramzi bin al Shaiba, and Abu Faraj al-Libi, transited through Wana (South Waziristan) and
Miranshah (North Waziristan) during their journey through Balochistan to Karachi and some
destinations in the Gulf. Some chose to remain in Pakistan.
Pakistan began deploying troops in FATA soon after the US-led Allied Forces seized
Afghanistan after ousting the Taliban in December 2001. During their flight from Afghanistan, a
large number of alleged foreign al-Qaeda operatives about 300, according to official claims
were killed in several encounters with Pakistani security forces in and around the Waziristan
region. Many others were captured.
Pakistan has currently deployed about 80,000 troops and set up close to 1,000 posts along the
border with Afghanistan. Of these, about 100 are located in North Waziristan alone, with very
hard terrain and conditions.
By mid-March 2007, suspected Taliban had executed at least 75 people in FATA on charges of
espionage for the US or Pakistani government. More than 200 pro-government tribal elders and
several dozen government officials, including intelligence operatives, had also been killed.
Nearly 1,000 Pakistan army and para-military troops have fallen to militant attacks.
About a hundred operations have been conducted in FATA by Pakistani as well as US troops
based across the Durand Line in Afghanistans Paktia and Paktika provinces. Many of the
operations were carried out in South Waziristan. The first of these, conducted near Wana,
inflicted heavy losses on the Pakistan army. Until then, some 230 foreigners had been arrested
while crossing the border and handed over to the United States.
On December 1, 2005, the Pakistan military forces attacked a village outside North Waziristan,
killing a leading al-Qaeda figure, Hamza Rabia. On January 13, 2006, a similar raid was
conducted on the Damadola village in Bajaur in search of Dr. Zawahiri.
The worsening situation embedded in strong resentment among tribesmen eventually forced the
government into the September 5, 2006 peace deal with the militants. This was seen as a
face-saver for the Pakistani government, while the international community, particularly the
United States, took special interest. On more than one occasion, Washington clearly expressed
its discomfort with Pakistans decision to go soft on the militants in FATA. While President
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Musharraf boasted this deal as according to the culture of the areas, its results have been
somewhat disappointing, as the continued fighting in FATA and attacks in settled districts on
Pakistans defense forces continue. It also seems that the United States has tired of waiting for
the deal to yield fruit.
Shortly after the peace deal, a strike was made on the Zamazola village in Bajaur on October
29, 2006, which tragically left about 83 students dead.
In mid-December, 2006, a large group of infiltrators crossed into Afghanistan from this area and
were attacked by NATO forces. About 130 of the militants were killed, a US commander
reported. Several more were killed when Pakistani forces attacked the remaining infiltrators as
they fled back to Pakistan.
The pressure to change this situation began shortly after the US general elections gave
Democrats a numerical majority, with which they began questioning the unquestioned US
support for the Musharraf government. Vice President Dick Cheney was, in fact, one of the
many US bigwigs to descend on Islamabad to display their displeasure over the Pakistani effort.
Before him, the CIA chief, Robert Gates, and US Secretary of State Condolizza Rice had come
to Islamabad with the same message. As if to confirm Americas worst fears, the Taliban left
their latest calling card a suicide bomber at the gate of the mighty US Air Force base at
Bagram, near Kabul, shortly after Mr. Cheney arrived. Over 20 people were killed, including an
American and two foreigners. This kicked off another round of Pakistan-bashing within and
outside the United States. Many Pakistani policymakers termed this a mindless approach
towards a common problem and said that conveying diplomatic concerns via the media will
not help.
At this stage, American military and intelligence officials were of the view that despite heavy
military and economic assistance, Pakistan lacked sincerity in the anti-terror war and was more
interested in retaining its Taliban proxies to undermine the Coalition war against al-Qaeda and
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destabilize Afghanistan. Unlike President George W. Bush and his state department officials,
such critics both within the establishment and outside had a different yardstick to measure
Pakistans performance: the results of the more than 10 billion dollars provided to Pakistan in
aid.
Resumption of US aid to Pakistan had followed the latters agreement to extend support to the
international Coalition soon after the 9/11 attacks. According to some reports, by March 2007,
57 percent of the $10 billion had gone toward Coalition Support Funds, which are intended to
reimburse US partners for their assistance in the War on Terror. Roughly 18 percent, or $1.8
billion, had gone toward security assistance, mostly on purchases of major weapons systems.
Another 16 percent has gone toward budget support as direct cash transfers to the Government
of Pakistan with few real accountability mechanisms built in. This left less than 10 percent for
development and humanitarian assistance, including the US response to the catastrophic
October 2005 earthquake in Northern Pakistan.
As a result of its agreement to deploy almost 80,000 troops along the 2,460-kilometer border
with Afghanistan, Pakistan also became one of the four countries that receive budget support
from the United States. Earlier, only Israel, Egypt, and Jordan had enjoyed this source of
funding.
Washington also helped Pakistan in raising 12 new wings of the Frontier Corps (FC) in the
province of Balochistan, which shares borders with Afghanistan and Iran, as well as a few
additional wings of FC in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) for additional security along
these borders. Reportedly, the United States also plans to raise more of the FC units
comprising of tribal youth, to create more job opportunities for FATAs people along with
ensuring stronger security.
Journalists based in the Waziristan region say a rift had emerged between a local commander
and Uzbek fighters in South Waziristan in November 2006, and both the military as well as
intelligence agencies leapt to exploit the growing differences between locals and foreign
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militants. The latter were accused of criminal activities like extortions and murders to which they
had resorted for their survival in the ever-narrowing space available for them. Local elders also
alleged that rather than fighting foreign troops in Afghanistan, the Uzbek militants preferred to
target pro-American Pakistanis, whether tribal elders or government members.
Early in March, a tribal lashkar (army of local tribesmen) mounted a jihad against foreign
militants still hiding in the region. The target was Sheen Warsak, Azam Warsak and Kaloosha
small forested hamlets situated south of Wana, the administrative headquarters of South
Waziristan where al-Qaeda and Taliban militants, predominantly of Uzbek and Afghan origin,
were dug in. After several weeks of bloody pitched battles and skirmishes beginning, Pakistan
army officials reported that the tribesmen had turned the tables on foreign militants; the
commander of the Pakistani troops in the tribal areas, Major General Gul Muhammad, claimed
the tribal army had put down up to 200 foreign militants.
Although the numbers of fatalities reported by both sides conflicted, it had become clear by the
end of this period that the Pakistan army, which had been hamstrung by sniper attacks and
ambushes, and suffered heavy losses in the Waziristan region since March 2004, did play a
more crucial role in these latest operations than was acknowledged. Although the controversial
September 2006 deal with militants in North Waziristan had provided a face-saver to the army,
its problems had never ended, and it had been forced to work on like-minded tribesmen led by
Maulvi Nazir Ahmed, known for his close links to the Afghan Taliban and Arab members of
al-Qaeda. With these tribesmen, the Pakistan army had eventually engineered the lashkar, and
this became the face for the armys renewed assault on Uzbeks and Arabs in the Waziristan
region, which had remained perilous and practically out of bound even for Pakistanis. Foreign
journalists are also not permitted to visit the tribal areas, except a few selected ones under
strictly controlled visits.
We did provide them support, there was no way around it, said a major general. He admitted
that army sharp-shooters and strategists were part of the
lashkar
.
Following the assault by the lashkar, military and paramilitary forces moved in swiftly to occupy
strategic hilltops and ridges in areas like Sheen Warsak, Kaloosha and Tora Gola that had, until
mid-March 2007, been in the hands of militants.
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The operation gave the Pakistan military control over most parts around Wana, and Major
General Gul Muhammad said the progress made in clearing the area of foreign militants, mainly
Uzbeks and other Central Asians who have been allied with al-Qaeda, would serve as a model
for similar actions in the rest of the region.
But the fact that foreign journalists saw the vacated areas, Azam Warsak and Sheen Warsak,
from a distance of several kilometers from a military-controlled hilltop, also explained the
authorities predicament; they were not sure whether the hamlets were clear of miscreants
(This is the term Pakistani military officials invoke to denote al-Qaeda and Taliban militants).
On April 12, 2007, the New York Times noted that The military has now set upon a third way to
tackle the problem of militancy in its tribal regions, backing local armed tribesmen who have
turned against the foreigners and their local protectors.
Officials dealing with the tribal areas at the militarys General Headquarters (GHQ) in
Rawalpindi said the lashkar operation was part of a new strategy comprising three elements,
i.e. coercive deployment, political engagement and socio-economic development, to win over
the hearts and minds of the people.
However, this will not be a simple path to tread. The hostile image of both the Pakistani military
and the United States in this region makes it difficult to undertake any positive development
work that might enable the local people to think differently. The high level of hostility in the
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region was exhibited recently in North Waziristan when medicines, food and other supplies sent
by an American NGO to ensure the health of women and children in the area were burnt
publicly on the orders of local Taliban leaders. Given this social hostility against anything US, it
may be imagined that asking the local people to participate in US-sponsored social and
structural development will be an uphill task.
The Pakistani government also has much at stake. The large number of recent suicide attacks
on government installations and public places in Pakistan underscores how those being hunted
are ready to die for what they perceive as a holy cause. This is certainly a dangerous situation
that needs creative socio-political management.
The chances of success would be higher if development on the ground is preceded by an effort
to make hearts and minds more receptive. The United States and Pakistan should consider
using modern means of communication to reach out to ordinary people in the region and
gradually lead them away from a doctrine of hatred towards a life of possibilities. Even this will
be a long haul and demand effort and commitment. However, it is an inevitable undertaking.
The return to normalcy in FATA is in the interests of Pakistan, the United States, and the world
community.
The following section describes the peculiar social, cultural and political setup of FATA and the
complexities that the Pakistani government as well as the United States have to take into
account in their effort to secure the cooperation of the local people in ridding the area of
terrorism.
Following numerous failed attempts to capture and tame the tribes living in this region, British
colonialists drew a border called the Durand Line in 1893, which is still disputed. Thus, since
well before the creation of Pakistan in 1947, this area has been treated as a special territory for
governance and management: a central distinguishing factor is the principle of collective
responsibility, wherein the entire locality and tribe is considered responsible for the criminal
actions of its individuals.
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Social Codes
The local social practices are regulated by strong and entrenched customs and traditions that
are based on centuries-old dogmas, beliefs and practices. The four key sources of these are Pa
shtunwali
,
melmastia
(hospitality and protection),
riwaj
(tradition), and
badal
(revenge).
Pashtunwali is the Pathans tribal code of social conduct. Melmastia, the second most
important component of the Pakhtun honor code, makes it incumbent on local people to extend
hospitality and protection to guests. This can go to embarrassing proportions; if an enemy gains
entrance to his foes house, he can even claim asylum from the host.
Riwaj is a mixture of Islamic and local principles for the conduct of day-to-day affairs. In the
case of inheritance,
riwaj supercedes the Islamic injunctions. Finally, badal represents
the local concept of revenge, which is to be sought regardless of the cost or consequences.
This is considered an obligation on an individual or family that has been insulted or injured.
System of Governance
In 1901, British Viceroy Lord Curzon created NWFP as a new province and enforced a revised
version of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) which had been in force there for more than a
decade.
The system comprises of three parties: the Political Agent, the Malik and the tribesmen. The
Political Agent is the pivot of the entire administrative setup in the tribal areas. He represents
the federal government and serves as a bridge between the local people and the government.
He is in charge of the tribes within the agency, and administers justice in accordance with local
and tribal customs, without directly interfering with the domestic affairs of the tribes, which are
regulated by tough unwritten codes of conduct or, more appropriately, codes of honor, key
elements of which have been outlined above. The sanctity and invability of this code of honor is
cherished by the local people above all else. Someone has aptly said, Frontier Tribes are
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implacable enemies should anyone violate their code of honor: Swift and merciless is the
punishment that descends on the transgressor.
The second most important pillar of governance and control are the 35,000 or so tribal elders
and notables, who in turn act as a bridge between the political agent and their respective tribes
whenever the situation demands. Malik is the title that the government confers on them against
a symbolic currency denomination like One Rupee or Five Rupees.
The Frontier Crimes Regulation is, in many ways, a draconian law. In Section 38 (4), it gives the
local administration right to cause the death of a person against whom those portions of the
FCR 1901, which are not of general application, may be forced. By permitting the killing of
somebody found guilty of a heinous crime, the law opens the door to genocide.
I find no parallel in any other existing law, which legitimizes the use of undue force as a normal
administrative measure. It is the presence of this inhuman clause of law, which is responsible
for there being no inquiries for the violence of the state apparatus against its own people, says
Khalid Aziz, a former Political Agent who retired as a chief civil servant and now runs a research
institute.
Then, Section 38 (I) gives the right to privately arrest anyone suspected of an offence under the
FCR. This is a much abused provision today; influential Maliks sometimes use it against weaker
opponents.
Under Section 21 (IV), once the Political Agent has determined that a person or tribe is hostile,
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Under Section 31, tribesmen cannot set up any settlement or undertake construction within 5
miles of any district of Pakistan.
Under Section 32, if a village or habitation is found dangerous on military grounds, it has to be
removed. No hujra (village male guest house) can be constructed or used as such without the
approval of the Political Agent under Section 33.
Under Section 40, the Political Agent can ask any one to provide security if it is determined by
him that this would prevent murder or sedition. If the person made responsible fails to do so or
the Political Agent finds the securities inadequate, the responsible person may be imprisoned
for three years. This period of imprisonment can be extended to six years, and it is for the
Political Agent to decide whether the imprisonment is to be simple or rigorous.
It is tragic that the FCR treats a tribesman as almost sub-human. Under Section 38 (4), a
tribesman may be killed and no questions asked. No judicial oversight is permitted, since there
is a bar to the jurisdiction of superior courts. The Political Agent and his associates can wreak
havoc with the lives of individuals by either throwing them in jails on mere suspicion; penalizing
them heavily; or imposing heavy fines on the entire tribe (in case of a crime in their area) under
the principle of collective responsibility. To complicate matters, the administration has been
enabled to enter the honor code of Pashtunwali, and has thus opened itself as a possible party
against which
badal can be exacted.
On the other hand, the FCR makes no allowance for the local norm of melmastia. If a tribesman
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or clan has provided refuge to a guest, the law permits the government to demand that they
renege from their commitment to protect him. If they comply, however, their honor would be
deemed tainted. Therefore, the FCRs construct is of such a type that the Pathan is always
forced to resist. And when he does so, he must be punished.
Although it has been over a century since this law was proclaimed, it is conveniently forgotten
that it was basically meant to control people in FATA like slaves, and not to serve them as
citizens. This practice of control continued even after Independence, and despite many claims
and promises by various governments, the region remains in need of a serious uplift and
assurance of an honorable life.
With such a discriminatory political dispensation, it is sheer navet on the part of Islamabad
and the world community to expect the results that would be realistic in established and settled
socio-political systems. Essentially, FATA and FCR amount to anachronisms in this cyber age;
they represent a system designed by colonial rulers to suit the circumstances of more than a
century ago. Khalid Aziz asked on one occasion: In which civilized country is the use of
excessive force permitted against its people? Perhaps the Pathans are children of a lesser
God! The anguish reflected in this comment was not merely about ethnicity; it was about a
human rights issue.
In the context of the ongoing war in terror, what needs to be borne in mind is that the FCR, by
its very nature, is bound to evoke hatred and violence among the people of FATA. It fuels the b
adal
tendencies of the Pathan. In the long run, it weakens the state rather than strengthening it.
Today, perhaps more than ever before, it is critical that the federal and NWFP governments
understand the need for change.
A tribal friend told this author during a visit to Wana in April 2004: Even our brother wouldnt
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know if we wanted to conceal something. This was Allah Noors reply when he was asked why
the political and military administration could not figure out who was taking shelter where. Allah
Noor had told the author on another occasion that most of the tribesmen, being
ultra-conservative and traditionalists, were loath to the idea of betrayal.
Most of FATAs people are staunch believers in Islam and have a strong commitment to their
code of conduct and honor. They are unable to reconcile with the new perspective in which
yesterdays heroes, the mujahidinor Taliban who drove out the Soviet invaders, are now being
hunted down as terrorists.
Repulsed by the urban pragmatism reflected in Pakistans policy changes, disliking America,
and shackled under an oppressive political and legal system, FATA has seen rising
anti-government and anti-military sentiment, and some people have resorted to providing
shelter and even ammunition to the militants.
Interviews with tribesmen, including educated ones, bring to light the following main lines of
thinking:
- You might eliminate or arrest terrorists but the Islamic faith runs deep in the tribal
society, which has been kept backward and ignorant by the administration for its own vested
interests.
- The tribal people are straightforward, averse even to the thought of betrayal, and
strangers to pragmatism or enlightened moderation. For them, al-Qaeda means standing up
to the United States as staunch Muslims, and Pashtoonwali demands that brothers under
siege must be protected.
- Importantly, the above sentiment does not necessarily translate into direct and active
support of Taliban or al-Qaeda. People are generally wary of incessant government pressure
and the continued army presence in the border areas, and ask why tens of thousands people
should suffer for the alleged crimes of a few dozen?
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FATAs people hold al-Qaeda followers in esteem, but privately concede they would do other
Muslims a great favor by moving out or abandoning their mission to save the common tribal
people from the wrath of the government. Fear of reprisals also deters the common people from
confronting the al-Qaeda/Taliban militants, who have begun knocking at the doors of bigger
cities like Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore and Karachi. Numerous suicide attacks in these cities
since mid 2007 and the heightened state of security there underscores the new realities in
Pakistan, i.e. that Pakistan is much more dangerous today than it was before joining the
international coalition against terrorism in September 2001.
It was in this context that former governor of the NWFP, General Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai,
told the author in February 2007 that the tribal people have been treated like caged monkeys
for too long and We are responsible for their plight today.General Orakzai possesses a
thinking mind and has served in both military and civilian capacity in the tribal areas. Being from
the tribal areas himself, he understands not only the plight of FATAs people but also the root
causes and reasons for the militancy that has had such a long-term negative effect on the
region and its people.
Multiple factors are aggravating the overall situation in FATA, the most basic being the
Pashtoon tribal codes that require a brother to stand by another in times of need, a Pashtoon
militant told the author in early 2007. Whether any power in the world agrees or not, the
Pashtoon factor in the matters of power sharing in Afghanistan has been terribly compromised
over the past few years. President Hamid Karzai is himself a Pashtoon, but a clear majority of
the Pashtoons in Afghanistan do not own him as one of us; he continues to be seen as an
American puppet, installed to undermine the Pashtoon right to share power in Kabul. When
Pashtoons are attacked from both the Pakistani and the Afghan side, militants on both sides of
the Durand Line are bound to unite to face the two common enemies: Pakistan and the US-led
coalition. Given the cultural, historical, tribal and economic ties between the people living on
both side of the border, the problem of infiltration and mutual cooperation between the warring
Taliban and al-Qaeda elements is bound to continue.
While Pakistan needs fresh approaches to address the issues and problems in FATA,
Afghanistan and the US-led Coalition also need to look into the gaps in their political policy
regarding the war against insurgents. Tribal militancy is a coherent, socially accepted and
religiously motivated phenomenon. It can never be rooted out with the use of force alone. More
needs to be done.
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in September 2006, and made a similar arrangement in Bajaur in April 2007, these belated
moves did little to control the damage that had already been done. They could not bridge the
gulf created between the tribesmen and the authorities by the latters attack in late October
2006 on a seminary in Bajaur Agency, followed by a couple more such attacks that left over a
hundred alleged militants dead. This mistrust has been exploited by activists supporting the
Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Real political reform should have followed the surgical search and surveillance operations in
these areas in the aftermath of the Taliban defeat. By not integrating these areas into the
federation, Pakistan squandered a golden chance for transforming FATA.
On May 12, 2007, a tribal jirga (a traditional Pushtoon gathering) representing the seven
agencies of FATA was held in Peshawar and demanded an independent council to legislate for
FATA.
We, the representatives of the tribesmen, cannot legislate for their areas. We represent them in
parliament. We could formulate laws for the whole of the country except FATA, therefore, the
establishment of an empowered legislative council for FATA is inevitable, Senator
Hameedullah Jan Afridi was reported as saying.
James Dobbins, a former US envoy to the Afghan Northern Alliance, also offered an interesting
perspective as well as advice on how to handle the situation in and around FATA. In March
2007, presenting testimony before the US Senates Foreign Relations Committee, he requested
a deeper study of NATO and US policies towards Afghanistan and the role of Pakistan:
We need to address the question that if America, Europe and India can be legitimate
long-distance players in Kabul, why not Pakistan, which is directly in the firing line of the
blowback from Afghanistan? This will require greater Pakistani input into how to cobble a new
Afghan political system and state that is adequately represented ethnically and is friendly to
Pakistan without being a Talibanised state. Second, America and NATO will have to expend
resources in nation-building and on creating stakeholders, not just in Afghanistan, but also in
the tribal areas of Pakistan to woo people away from radicalism and extremism. Third, America
and the international community will have to actively support the revival of democracy and
mainstream politics in Pakistan urgently so that a greater national consensus can be developed
on integrating it with the global economy and stopping it from sliding into widespread
anti-Americanism, religious extremism and consequent isolation.
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If this democratization isnt accomplished in Pakistan while the moderate and mainstream
parties still have roots in the masses, extremist religious groups will fill the vacuum of opposition
politics. Should that happen, Pakistan will degenerate like much of the Muslim world, ruled by
military-monarchial oligarchies in which the fundamentalists are constantly trying to break down
the gates of the failing state. In the event, al-Qaeda will have the last laugh.
As Dobbins rightly pointed out, Pakistans tribal areas particularly the Waziristan region
are at a crossroads. With the right combination of domestic and international policies, the region
can become a bridge between Pakistan, Afghanistan and even Central Asia together with other
borderlands. But poor handling of the crisis and policies based on expedience and opportunism
might well backfire and result in large-scale instability. Although the tribesmen are resilient and
warlike, for the moment, external influences are determining their destiny. Mere lip service to
their problems will not do; nor will promises of development in which, in any case, the actual
beneficiaries may be only a few individuals, including the political administrators and some very
senior officials.
It must also be noted that people in FATA are now looking forward to being treated as equal
citizens and not as pawns in the great game alone. Political involvement of ordinary people will
certainly ensure the cultivation of long-term social, political and economic stakes in the system,
and this will eventually help the society to slip out of the clutches of those extremists and
elements who want to keep the people tamed, ignorant and backward.
High-handed handling of the chivalrous tribesmen might undermine their allegiance to the state
of Pakistan. It might not only deliver many of them into the hands of Pashtoon nationalists but
also expose them to the religio-political ambitions and goals of violent pan-Islamists. In this
situation, even if they are small in numbers, the peoples ability to keep the region embroiled in
conflict in the form of the sort of low-intensity guerrilla warfare being witnessed in Waziristan,
for example would ensure that the authorities are continually challenged.
The leadership needs to act swiftly and listen, not to a few thousand bureaucrats and their tribal
cronies, but to the aspirations of the majority of the five million people who yearn for the
abolition of the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulations, and an end to their treatment as
sub-humans controlled by authorities through laws over a century old. It is time the anachronism
of FATA was removed, and the inhabitants of this area were invited to lead honorable lives as
citizens of Pakistan.
20 / 24
References
Financial Times, London,December 14, 2006.
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2006/09/29/2006-09-29_pakistans
_spies_aid_qaeda_brits_print.html. Accessed on 24/12 /2007
When all else fails, call a Jirga. The Friday Times. Lahore Issue: October 6-12, 2006.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/12/news/pakistan.php
http://www.azadiradio.org/en/news/2006/09/F5D5ECBF-B8E1-4EAE-BBB9-251CFACDAC16.A
SP, accessed on 26/12/2007
http://www.azadiradio.org/en/news/2006/10/931B0F7E-DD44-4707-A3C5-2B3F67B57D2D.ASP
, accessed on 26/12/2007
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Khalid Aziz. Paper read at Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) conference, February
2006.
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2006/09/29/2006-09-29_pakistans_spies_aid_
qaeda_brits_print.html.accessed on 24/12/2007
When all else fail, call a Jirga, for the writer, The Friday Times, Lahore Issue: October 6-12,
2006.
Ibid.
22 / 24
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/12/news/pakistan.php
http://www.azadiradio.org/en/news/2006/09/F5D5ECBF-B8E1-4EAE-BBB9-251
CFACDAC16.ASP, accessed on 26/12/2007
http://www.azadiradio.org/en/news/2006/10/931B0F7E-DD44-4707-A3C5-2B3F
67B57D2D.ASP, accessed on 26/12/2007
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/15/business/tribal.php#end_main,27/12/07
Khalid Aziz, paper read at Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) conference, February
2006.
Khalid Aziz.
Allah Noor was gunned down along with another journalist, Amir Nawab, in early 2005.
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