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EN BANC
Petitioner,
- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers),
Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE
PROFESSIONALS,
Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO,
Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS
OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS),
Intervenor.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR
TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION
AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC.,
and ABONO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
_______________________
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and
mandamus,[1] assails the Resolution[2] promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The
COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal
Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the
COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and
Science Professionals (ABS), AangatTayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of
Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for
Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition,[3] assails NBC Resolution No. 07-60[4] promulgated on 9 July
2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and
coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the PartyList System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of
the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning
party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC[5] (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the
Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and
179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties
under the Party-List System.[6]
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and
the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers
that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling,
that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats. [7] There
were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties
as winners in the party-list elections, namely: BuhayHayaanYumabong (BUHAY),
Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women
Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A
Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers
Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), AnakPawis,
Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No.
07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National
Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007,
had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million
two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes
under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National
and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of
the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total partylist votes cannot go any higher thansixteen million seven hundred twenty three
thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following
statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated
15,283,659
1,337,032
102,430
16,723,121
PARTY/ORGANIZATION/
COALITION
VOTES
RECEIVED
BUHAY
1,163,218
BAYAN MUNA
972,730
CIBAC
760,260
GABRIELA
610,451
APEC
538,971
A TEACHER
476,036
AKBAYAN
470,872
ALAGAD
423,076
BUTIL
405,052
10
COOP-NATCO
390,029
11
BATAS
386,361
12
ANAK PAWIS
376,036
13
ARC
338,194
14
ABONO
337,046
WHEREAS,
except
for
BagongAlyansangTagapagtaguyodngAdhikaingSambayanan (BATAS), against
which an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF
REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With
Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the
Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and
coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one
seat under the party-list system of representation in the meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act
Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections,
sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to
PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the
following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List
System:
1 BuhayHayaanYumabong
BUHAY
2 Bayan Muna
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
of
Philippine
GABRIELA
Electric
APEC
A TEACHER
AKBAYAN
8 Alagad
ALAGAD
BUTIL
COOP-NATCCO
ANAKPAWIS
ARC
ABONO
BUHAY
1,178,747
BAYAN MUNA
977,476
CIBAC
755,964
GABRIELA
621,718
APEC
622,489
A TEACHER
492,369
AKBAYAN
462,674
ALAGAD
423,190
BUTIL
409,298
10
COOP-NATCO
412,920
11
ANAKPAWIS
370,165
12
ARC
375,846
13
ABONO
340,151
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off)
shall entitle it to additional seats:
Proportion of votes received
by the first party
Equal to or at least 6%
Additional seats
Two (2) additional seats
Less than 4%
No additional seat
= 0.07248 or 7.2%
No. of votes of
concerned party
------------------No. of votes of
first party
No. of additional
seats allocated to
first party
Percentage
Additional Seat
BAYAN MUNA
1.65
CIBAC
1.28
GABRIELA
1.05
APEC
1.05
A TEACHER
0.83
AKBAYAN
0.78
ALAGAD
0.71
BUTIL
0.69
COOP-NATCO
0.69
ANAKPAWIS
0.62
ARC
0.63
ABONO
0.57
Additional Seats
BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
4.
Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of
seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the
additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of
RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained
by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes
cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding
votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold
rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the
ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX A of
COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be
used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be
proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative
seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].
5.
In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11
of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats
for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941
shall be followed.
RECOMMENDATION:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution
No. 07-60
promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes
and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and
Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the
May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections resolved among
others that the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to
the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation
of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition
of BANAT for being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.[10]
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in
NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of
NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC,
acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the
Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the
COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.[11]
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007,
the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties
entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector
No. of Seat(s)
1.1
Buhay
1.2
Bayan Muna
1.3
CIBAC
1.4
Gabriela
1.5
APEC
1.6
A Teacher
1.7
Akbayan
1.8
Alagad
1.9
Butil
1.10
Coop-Natco [sic]
1.11
AnakPawis
1.12
ARC
1.13
Abono
1.14
AGAP
1.15
AMIN
1.
Is
the
twenty
percent
allocation
for
party-list
representatives
provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2.
7941
Is
the three-seat
constitutional?
limit
provided
in
Section
11(b)
of
RA
3.
the
4.
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following
issues in their petition:
I.
Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board
of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution
No. 07-60 to
implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of
seats to qualified party-list
organizations as said rule:
A.
proportional
B.
Violates
principle
of
2.
3.
in
Party
representation
of
and
Section
Party
RA
the
constitutional
representation.
C.
Violates
the
Four
Inviolable
Parameters
of
the
Philippine
party-list system as provided for under the same case
of
Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.
II.
Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit
grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of
seats
to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely
in
consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al.
v.
COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the
issues involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the
correct
interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are
of transcendental importance to our nation.[17]
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties
in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral
arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1.
in
a
2.
3.
Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA
qualify for one seat constitutional?
4.
7941 to
5.
Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties
from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political
parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?[18]
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number
of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
qualifying and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number
of votes.[19]
x .20 =
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available
for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since
the 14thCongress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55
seats available to party-list representatives.
220
x .20 =
55
.80
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats
reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the
guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total
party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of
R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,[20] and Justice Vicente V.
Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula[21] as an
alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner
of allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No.
7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x xx
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, [22] the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a)
The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b)
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the
number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately
according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
(Emphasis supplied)
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote
requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list
representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the
COMELEC:
(a)
shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis;
(b)
rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c)
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to
the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization or
coalition as
against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.[24]
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the
proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total
nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes of a party-list
with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of
seats.[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs second
interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the
COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically
preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both
formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List
System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept
the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all
qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is
computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second
percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the
whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned
party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of
seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers
are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this
ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up.[26]
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating
parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes garnered during the elections.[27]
Rank
Party
Votes
Rank
Garnered
1 BUHAY
1,169,234
2 BAYAN
MUNA
Party
Votes
Garnered
48 KALAHI
88,868
979,039
49 APOI
79,386
3 CIBAC
755,686
50 BP
78,541
4 GABRIELA
621,171
51 AHONBAYAN
78,424
5 APEC
619,657
52 BIGKIS
77,327
6 A TEACHER
490,379
53 PMAP
75,200
7 AKBAYAN
466,112
54 AKAPIN
74,686
8 ALAGAD
423,149
55 PBA
71,544
9 COOPNATCCO
409,883
56 GRECON
62,220
10 BUTIL
409,160
57 BTM
60,993
11 BATAS
385,810
58 A SMILE
58,717
12 ARC
374,288
59 NELFFI
57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS
370,261
60 AKSA
57,012
14 ABONO
339,990
61 BAGO
55,846
15 AMIN
338,185
62 BANDILA
54,751
16 AGAP
328,724
63 AHON
54,522
17 AN WARAY
321,503
64 ASAHAN MO
51,722
18 YACAP
310,889
65 AGBIAG!
50,837
19 FPJPM
300,923
66 SPI
50,478
20 UNI-MAD
245,382
67 BAHANDI
46,612
21 ABS
235,086
68 ADD
45,624
22 KAKUSA
228,999
69 AMANG
43,062
23 KABATAAN
228,637
70 ABAY PARAK
42,282
24 ABA-AKO
218,818
71 BABAE KA
36,512
25 ALIF
217,822
72 SB
34,835
26 SENIOR
CITIZENS
213,058
73 ASAP
34,098
27 AT
197,872
74 PEP
33,938
28 VFP
196,266
75 ABA
ILONGGO
33,903
29 ANAD
188,521
76 VENDORS
33,691
30 BANAT
177,028
77 ADD-TRIBAL
32,896
31 ANG
KASANGGA
170,531
78 ALMANA
32,255
32 BANTAY
169,801
79 AANGAT KA
PILIPINO
29,130
33 ABAKADA
166,747
80 AAPS
26,271
34 1-UTAK
164,980
81 HAPI
25,781
35 TUCP
162,647
82 AAWAS
22,946
36 COCOFED
155,920
83 SM
20,744
37 AGHAM
146,032
84 AG
16,916
38 ANAK
141,817
85 AGING PINOY
16,729
39 ABANSE!
PINAY
130,356
86 APO
16,421
40 PM
119,054
87 BIYAYANG
BUKID
16,241
41 AVE
110,769
88 ATS
14,161
42 SUARA
110,732
89 UMDJ
9,445
43 ASSALAM
110,440
90 BUKLOD
FILIPINA
8,915
44 DIWA
107,021
91 LYPAD
8,471
45 ANC
99,636
92 AA-KASOSYO
8,406
46 SANLAKAS
97,375
93 KASAPI
6,221
47 ABC
90,058
TOTAL
15,950,900
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause
guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 partylist candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each
party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of
votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list.[28]
Rank
Party
1 BUHAY
Votes Garnered
Votes
over Total Votes Guaranteed
Garnered for Party-List,
Seat
in %
1,169,234
7.33%
2 BAYAN MUNA
979,039
6.14%
3 CIBAC
755,686
4.74%
4 GABRIELA
621,171
3.89%
5 APEC
619,657
3.88%
6 A TEACHER
490,379
3.07%
7 AKBAYAN
466,112
2.92%
8 ALAGAD
423,149
2.65%
9 COOP-NATCCO
409,883
2.57%
10 BUTIL
409,160
2.57%
11 BATAS[29]
385,810
2.42%
12 ARC
374,288
2.35%
13 ANAKPAWIS
370,261
2.32%
14 ABONO
339,990
2.13%
15 AMIN
338,185
2.12%
16 AGAP
328,724
2.06%
17 AN WARAY
321,503
2.02%
Total
17
18 YACAP
310,889
1.95%
19 FPJPM
300,923
1.89%
20 UNI-MAD
245,382
1.54%
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50
million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that
has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let
us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties
get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100
million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes
for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats
to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.[30]
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1.
The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2.
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3.
Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4.
Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every twopercenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional
seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in
R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our
allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The
percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing
the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38,
which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the PartyList System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer
of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds
to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list
seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Party
Votes
Votes
Garnered Garnere
d over
Guarantee Addition
d Seat
(B)
Applyin
al
plus
g the
Seats
(C), in
three
whole
Total
integer
Votes
for Party
seat
cap
List, in
%
(First
(Second
Round)
(A)
Round)
(B)
(C)
(E)
(D)
BUHAY
1,169,234
7.33%
2.79
N.A.
BAYAN
979,039
6.14%
2.33
N.A.
MUNA
3
CIBAC
755,686
4.74%
1.80
N.A.
GABRIELA
621,171
3.89%
1.48
N.A.
APEC
619,657
3.88%
1.48
N.A.
A Teacher
490,379
3.07%
1.17
N.A.
AKBAYAN
466,112
2.92%
1.11
N.A.
ALAGAD
423,149
2.65%
1.01
N.A.
COOP-
409,883
2.57%
N.A.
9[31]
NATCCO
10
BUTIL
409,160
2.57%
N.A.
11
BATAS
385,810
2.42%
N.A.
12
ARC
374,288
2.35%
N.A.
13
ANAKPAWI
370,261
2.32%
N.A.
S
14
ABONO
339,990
2.13%
N.A.
15
AMIN
338,185
2.12%
N.A.
16
AGAP
328,724
2.06%
N.A.
17
AN WARAY
321,503
2.02%
N.A.
18
YACAP
310,889
1.95%
N.A.
19
FPJPM
300,923
1.89%
N.A.
20
UNI-MAD
245,382
1.54%
N.A.
21
ABS
235,086
1.47%
N.A.
22
KAKUSA
228,999
1.44%
N.A.
23
KABATAAN
228,637
1.43%
N.A.
24
ABA-AKO
218,818
1.37%
N.A.
25
ALIF
217,822
1.37%
N.A.
26
SENIOR
213,058
1.34%
N.A.
CITIZENS
27
AT
197,872
1.24%
N.A.
28
VFP
196,266
1.23%
N.A.
29
ANAD
188,521
1.18%
N.A.
30
BANAT
177,028
1.11%
N.A.
31
ANG
170,531
1.07%
N.A.
KASANGGA
32
BANTAY
169,801
1.06%
N.A.
33
ABAKADA
166,747
1.05%
N.A.
34
1-UTAK
164,980
1.03%
N.A.
35
TUCP
162,647
1.02%
N.A.
36
COCOFED
155,920
0.98%
N.A.
Total
17
55
allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no
case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed
all political parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or
proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system
to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x xx We are for opening
up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That
is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated
under the party list system. x xx.
x xx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not
limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for
example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they
run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side
of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the
Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the
House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for
the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are
allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district
candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list
system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in
the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of
these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass
organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of
others like the Partidong Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question
that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties
to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations
so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically
transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge
both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the
party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of
representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in
time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor
organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the
Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and
their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the
leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO
always vote with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them,
always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why
political parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence
and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this
Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and
more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta]
amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the
same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected
representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to
become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider
constitutional arena for major political parties.
x xx [32] (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the
Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition
of parties.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party
from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. [33] In
defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party
or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political
parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the
law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form
coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There
should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the partylist election through the Kabataang Liberal ngPilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth
wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish
a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing
can field its fisherfolk nominees. KabalikatngMalayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do
the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A.
No. 7941:
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity [34] as there is
no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a
senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Proportion of votes of
--------------------
Additional seats
for concerned
=
party
concerned party
-----------------Total no. of votes
for party-list system
----------------------No. of votes of
first party
-------------Total no. of votes
for party list system
No. of additional
seats allocated to
the first party
No. of additional
x xx
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of
votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero
additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional
seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary.
In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the
reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess
of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the
three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of
additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional
representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within
such extant parameter.
[21]
Id. at 475-481.
[22]
The second vote cast by a registered voter is for the party-list candidates as provided in Section
10
of R.A. No. 7941.
[23]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 47.
[24]
Id. at 48.
[25]
Id. at 1076.
[26]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 66-81.
[27]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 969-974; rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 798-803. Party-List Canvass
Report
No. 32, as of 31 August 2007, 6:00 p.m.
[28]
Id.
[29]
Proclamation deferred by COMELEC.
[30]
Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.
[31]
The product of the percentage and the remaining available seats of all parties ranked nine and
below
is less than one.
[32]
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 256-257 (25 July 1986), 568 (1 August 1986).
[33]
Id. at 584 (1 August 1986). Dissenting opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in AngBagongBayaniOFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308,
350 (2001).
[34]
AngBagongBayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 336 (2001).
[35]
Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.