Submitted by
UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI’S
Mumbai 400098
Session 2007-2009
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Acknowledgement in my opinion is very difficult to write in words. Since it is the
part of research activities. Where you may feel emotional and at the same time you
need to recall all those incidents, where I received help from others. So fast and
foremost responsibility, I first thank to God and all those who may have contributed
on providing insight for this project report writing directly or indirectly. Behind the
success of every person there is a hand of few, it may be luck, god, parents,
relatives, family members, advisers, guides. I acknowledge and thank all of them.
ABSTRACT
INDEX
Chapter Content Page
No. No.
1 Introduction 5
2 Microfinance 8
7 About Mulshi 59
9 Findings 64
10 Suggestions 65
Annexure 70
Bibliography 78
Chapter 1
Introduction
Finance is frequently called the blood of business. Out of around one billion
people in India, 26% are poor (National Statistical Sample Organization, 2000). At
the bottom the poor need credit for small productive assets, working capital, housing,
illness, and emergencies. The demand for credit here is not only large but
heterogeneous as well. Till the 1990s the rural financial system in India was
predominantly supply driven with the state playing a major role in improving the
access to financial services by the poor. While state intervention considerably
improved the outreach of the banking system and expanded rural credit, it also
allowed rent seeking tendencies and credit indiscipline to grow (Nanda, 2000). By
the late 1980s, the rural financial system had virtually collapsed amid heavy
regulations, distraught market conditions, dual lines of control, and mounting arrears.
The beginning of 1990 saw India face one of its worst balances of payment crises. In
1991, under the initiative of the International Monetary Fund, India undertook a
liberalization of its economy. Liberalization had an important bearing on the financial
sector; banks, which had turned weak, were confronted with the challenge of making
themselves profitable while maintaining their prudential requirements and competing
with private and foreign banks in a new liberalized milieu.
Through the SHG – Bank Linkage Program the RBI and NABARD have tried
to promote relationship banking, i.e., improving the existing relationship between the
poor and bankers with the social intermediation of NGOs. The Indian model is
predominantly a “Linkage Model,” which draws upon the strengths of various
partners: NGOs, who are best in mobilizing the poor and building their capacities,
and bankers, whose financial strength is financing. As compared to other countries
where parallel model of lending to the poor is predominant, the Indian linkage model
tries to use the existing formal financial network to increase the outreach to the poor,
while ensuring the necessary flexibility of operations for both bankers and the poor.
Various credit delivery innovations such as Grameen Bank Replications, NGO
networking, credit unions, and SHG federations have been encouraged by NABARD
for increasing the outreach. It has also instituted a Micro Credit Innovations
Department for planning, propagating, and facilitating the microfinance movement.
Given the network of institutional structures supporting the microfinance movement,
the SHG – Bank Linkage Program has been increasing its outreach substantially.
Chapter 2
Microfinance
2.1 Definition of Microfinance:
For the purpose of this study microfinance can be defined as any activity that
includes the provision of financial services such as credit, savings and insurance to
low income individuals who fall just above the nationally defined poverty line and
poor individuals who fall below the poverty line, with the goal of creating social value.
The creation of social value includes poverty alleviation and the broader the impact
of improving livelihood opportunities through the provision of capital for micro
enterprise and insurance and saving for risk mitigation and consumption smoothing.
It has been approximately 25 years since the birth of Microfinance with the
founding of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh by Professor Mohammad Yunus. The
field has since spread with the adaptation and evolution of Professor Yunus’ ideas to
various countries and contexts. The UN Year of Micro credit in 2005 indicated a
turning point for microfinance as the private sector began to take a more serious
interest in what has been considered the domain of NGOs. However, with all the
excitement about the prospects of the field to contribute to poverty alleviation and the
integration of the world’s poor into the rapidly evolving global market system, the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) estimates that microfinance
probably reaches fewer than 5% of its potential clients. Although this is a very rough
estimate of those not reached by formal financial institutions, it might serve to
provide a general idea of what share of the potential clients of microfinance have yet
to be reached. India is home to a growing and innovative sector of microfinance.
With a large portion of the world’s poor, India is likely to have a large potential
demand for microfinance. For this reason, it makes sense to consider the changing
face of microfinance in India, in order to shed light on comparable changes in the
field all over the world.
The overarching question this study looks to answer in the interests of greater
impact and outreach of microfinance in India is: What are the costs and benefits of a
Microfinance NGO of transforming to a Non-Bank Financial Company (NBFC)? More
specifically, how does organizational form affect a Microfinance Institution’s ability to
achieve success both by financial and social standards? By taking a closer look at
three cases of transformation to or start up as an NBFC; we can better understand
the intricacies, challenges, successes, and opportunities for microfinance delivery of
independent Micro Finance Institutes (MFIs) in India. In looking at three MFIs in
India, we might expect to see several benefits of transformation from an NGO to an
NBFC. These include greater profitability in order to handle being a regulated
financial company and attract commercial funds, greater access to more diverse
sources of funding including equity and debt from commercial banks, greater
outreach due to larger loan portfolios, and greater efficiency due to the pressure to
lower costs to improve profitability.
We might also worry that the pressure to become profitable might lead MFIs
to target better off borrowers, offer fewer products and services, and therefore
inadvertently lower their poverty impact. Lastly, we might also expect to see a loss in
the flexibility to innovate and test products that NGOs tend to have if the MFI
becomes a regulated entity with more legal restrictions. The purpose of the case
studies will then be to explore whether the experiences of the three MFIs chosen
conform to these expectations. Some subsidiary questions that arise when
considering a cost benefit analysis of Indian NGOs transforming to Non-Bank
Financial Companies (NBFCs) are: What constitutes sustainable microfinance? And,
is private commercial funding the most effective vehicle for growth in microfinance?
In order to assess the costs and benefits of NGOs transforming to NBFCs, this study
focuses on case studies of three of the largest independent MFIs in India: SHARE
Microfin, BASIX Finance, and SKS, which have all chosen to transform to or become
(NBFCs). SHARE, SKS, and BASIX are useful case studies not only because they
have all made the transformation from an NGO to an NBFC, but they are also
sufficiently different in their experiences with micro credit delivery, client focus, and
organizational evolution.
With nearly 400 million people in India below or just below an austerely
defined poverty line, approximately 75 million households are potential clients of
MFIs. Of these, nearly 60 million are in rural India, the remaining 15 million being
urban slum dwellers. We are then curious about the penetration of India’s formal
financial system thus far in order to understand the depth of outreach. Understanding
the depth of the formal financial system is what drives the purpose of considering the
benefits and costs to NGOs of becoming NBFCs. How might NGOs and NBFCs
approach this market differently? What in their organizational and legal structure
positions them better or worse to increase their impact in this market? Understanding
the outreach of the formal financial systems provides the necessary information for
answering these questions.
The first of these pivotal events was Indira Gandhi’s bank nationalization drive
launched in 1969 which required commercial banks to open rural branches resulting
in a 15.2% increase in rural bank branches in India between 1973 and 1985. Today,
India has over 32,000 rural branches of commercial banks and regional rural banks,
14,000 cooperative bank branches, 98,000 Primary Agricultural Credit Societies
(PACs), and 154,000 postal outlets that are required to focus on deposit mobilization
and money transfers. India’s deep financial system is attributable to its vast network
of financial institutions. The average population served per commercial bank branch
in India in 2002, 15,000 people, compares favourably with other developing
countries. Unfortunately, the World Bank indicates that no official survey of rural
access to finance has been conducted since 1991 but the World Bank NCAER
RFAS-2003 allows for analysis of some trends between 1991 and 2003. Following
bank nationalization, the share of banks in rural household debt increased to
approximately 61.2% in 1991. Despite these achievements, there still has been little
progress in providing the rural poor with access to formal finance. Rural banks serve
primarily the needs of richer rural borrowers with some 66% of large farmers having
a deposit account and 44% with access to credit in contrast to 70% of
marginal/landless farmers that do not have a bank account and 87% that are without
access to credit. Access to other financial services such as insurance are even more
limited for the rural poor.
The second national policy that has had a significant impact on the evolution
of India’s banking and financial system is the Integrated Rural Development Program
(IRDP) introduced in 1978 and designed to be ‘a direct instrument for attacking
India’s rural poverty.’ This program is interesting to this study because it was a large
program whose main thrust was to alleviate poverty through the provision of loans
and it was considered a failure. It therefore provides a comparison of what has failed
in the past and how this affects the provision of microfinance through private means
today. The IRDP was reputed as one of the largest poverty alleviation programs in
the world with the number of loans advanced since its inception having reached
approximately 45 million Indians with financial assistance worth US$6.17 billion
disbursed. Despite the massive support for the IRDP however, a government
evaluation in 1989 revealed that it had not achieved the expected results with only
28 % of those assisted under the IRDP crossing the poverty line in contrast to
private-sector-led services and business micro-enterprises which performed better
with 33 % of those involved in the sector that crossed the poverty line. According to
the Indian government, the main factors contributing to the program’s poor
performance were loose targeting, bureaucratic delivery systems resulting in high
transaction costs, unsuitable financial products ill suited to the needs of the poor,
poor coordination of program support, and political tolerance of loan defaults
resulting in extremely poor loan recovery performance. The problem with targeting
that the government identified was that the subsidy orientation of the scheme
created a huge temptation for the non-poor to participate in the program by
dishonest means. There was no effective mechanism for enforcing the selection of
the poor clientele based on the official ‘poverty line.’ The means through which the
IRDP endeavoured to provide the poor with access to productive assets was credit
advanced by commercial banks which the government subsidized. The subsidy
provided by the government varied from 25% for small farmers to 50% for scheduled
castes and tribal people. The overarching goal of the program was to enhance the
income of the rural poor sufficiently so as to enable them to cross the poverty line.
Therefore, by this standard the IRDP did not achieve its expected results.
The last major event which impacted the financial and banking system in India
was the liberalization of India’s financial system in the 1990s characterized by a
series of structural adjustments and financial policy reforms initiated by the RBI. The
result was a partial deregulation of interest rates, increased competition in the
banking sector, and new microfinance approaches of which the most notable was a
movement to link informal local groups called Self Help Groups created by NGOs to
commercial banks like the NABARD. These financial policy reforms in the 1990s
were very significant to microfinance because they involved scrapping the interest
rate controls for credit to the poor and other types of credit. These financial
liberalization measures then made it possible for NABARD to transform what was
then a small research project into a full blown microfinance program for the whole
country.
This program was better known as the ‘SHG Bank Linkage’ model which has
come to be one of the most well known and widespread microfinance models in
India. Since many consider the SHG Bank Linkage model of microfinance to be one
of the major successes of microfinance delivery in the country it will provide the most
important direct contrast to the delivery of microfinance services by individual MFIs.
The number of women’s SHGs linked to banks was reported at 800,000 in 2004 by
the World Bank. The rough estimate of women reached was about 12 million.
Originally, NABARD provided subsidized refinancing to encourage banks to lend to
SHGs, although the demand declined as banks began to discover that SHG lending
is quite profitable. Banks would lend to SHGs at about 12% per annum and groups
would on-lend to individual members at a rate they determine, typically this would be
around 24% per annum. The hypothesis for why individual MFIs not reached as
many poor as the SHG Bank Linkage Program has been that individual MFIs have
been constrained mainly due to lack of resources and capital. Another important
point to consider is that the SHG bank linkage model is dependent on the formation
of SHGs, something that in India has been done by NGOs and therefore requires
subsidy. This provides a helpful separation of activities that require subsidy, the
creation of SHGs, and those that can operate on a commercial bas is such as bank
lending to those SHGs.
The focus of this study is on organizations that have microfinance at the core
of their operations, even if they may be diverse in their operational organization and
orientation. The main forms of legal status or organizational forms used by
microfinance institutions in India are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Non-
Bank Financial Companies (NBFCs), Local Area Banks (LABs), Cooperative
Societies under the cooperative society act, and Public Societies/Trusts. The oldest
MFIs in India are the cooperative networks while the newer entrants are Grameen
replicators such as SHARE. According to the World Bank, the major challenges to
the successful provision of microfinance in India can be summarized as improving
governance, professionalizing management, improving internal transparency,
lowering costs, better targeting of the poor, expanding beyond credit to meet the
diverse needs of borrowers, and a better financial infrastructure in order to scale up.
The question of interest here is whether the (Year of Micro-credit Conference:
Microfinance can be the biggest instrument in the fight against poverty, says Bank
Vice President) transformation from an NGO to and NBFC helps or hinders an MFI’s
ability to meet these challenges.
1. Poor people need a variety of financial services, not just loans. Like everyone
else, the poor need a range of financial services that convenient, flexible, and
affordable. Depending on circumstances, they want not only loans, but also
savings, insurance, and cash transfer services.
3. Microfinance means building financial systems that serve the poor. In most
developing countries, poor people are the majority of the population, yet they
are the least likely to be served by banks. Microfinance is often seen as a
marginal sector – a “development” activity that donors, governments or social
investors might care about but not as part of the country’s mainstream
financial system. However microfinance will reach the maximum number of
poor clients only when it is integrated into the financial sector.
4. Microfinance can pay for itself and must do so if it is to reach very large
numbers of poor people. Most poor people cannot get good financial services
that meet their needs because there are not enough strong institutions that
provide such services. Strong institutions need to charge enough to cover
their costs. Cost recovery is not an end in itself. Rather, it is only way to reach
scale and impact beyond the limited levels those donors can fund. A
financially sustainable institution can continue and expand its services over
the long term. Achieving sustainability means lowering transaction costs,
offering services that are more useful to the clients and finding new ways to
reach more of the unbanked poor.
6. Micro credit is not always the answer. Micro credit is not the best tool for
everyone or every situation. Destitute and hungry people with no income or
means of repayment need other kinds of support before they can make good
use of loans. In many cases other tools will alleviate poverty better – for
instance, small grants, employment and training programs or infrastructure
improvements. Where possible such services should be coupled with building
savings.
7. Interest rate ceilings hurt people by making it harder for them to get credit. It
costs much more to make many small loans than a few large loans. Unless
micro lenders can charge interest rates that are well above average bank loan
rates, they cannot cover their costs. Their growth will be limited by the scarce
and uncertain supply soft money from donors or governments. When
governments regulate interest rates they usually set them at levels so slow
that micro credit cannot cover its costs, so such regulations should be
avoided. At the same time a micro lender should not use high interest rates to
make borrowers cover the cost of its own inefficiency.
9. Donor funds should complement private capital, not complete with it. Donors
provide grants, loans and equity for microfinance. Such support should be
temporary. It should be used to build the capacity of microfinance providers to
develop supporting infrastructure like rating agencies, credit bureaus and
audit capacity and to support experimentation. In some cases, serving spares
or difficult to reach populations can require longer term donor support. Donor
should try to integrate microfinance with the rest of the financial system. They
should use experts with a track record of success when designing and
implementing projects. They should set clear performance target that must be
met before funding is continued. Every project should have a realistic plan for
reaching a point where the donor’s support is no longer.
10. The key bottleneck is the shortage of strong institutions and managers.
Microfinance is a specialized field that combines banking with social goals.
Skills and systems need to be built at all levels; managers and information
systems of microfinance institutions, central banks that regulate microfinance,
other government agencies and donors. Public and private investments in
microfinance should focus on building this capacity, not just moving money.
11. Microfinance works best when it measures and discloses its performance.
Accurate standardized performance information is imperative, both financial
information (e.g. interest rates, loan repayment, and cost recovery) and social
information (e.g. number of clients reached and their poverty level). Donors,
investors, banking supervisors and customers need this information to judge
their cost, risk and return.
The lack of access to credit for the poor is attributable to practical difficulties
arising from the discrepancy between the mode of operation followed by financial
institutions and the economic characteristics and financing needs of low-income
households. For example, commercial lending institutions require that borrowers
have a stable source of income out of which principal and interest can be paid back
according to the agreed terms. However, the income of many self employed
households is not stable, regardless of its size. A large number of small loans are
needed to serve the poor, but lenders prefer dealing with large loans in small
numbers to minimize administration costs. They also look for collateral with a clear
title - which many low-income households do not have. In addition bankers tend to
consider low income households a bad risk imposing exceedingly high information
monitoring costs on operation. Over the last ten years, however, successful
experiences in providing finance to small entrepreneur and producers demonstrate
that poor people, when given access to responsive and timely financial services at
market rates, repay their loans and use the proceeds to increase their income and
assets. This is not surprising since the only realistic alternative for them is to borrow
from informal market at an interest much higher than market rates. Community
banks, NGOs and grass root savings and credit groups around the world have
shown that these micro enterprise loans can be profitable for borrowers and for the
lenders, making microfinance one of the most effective poverty reducing strategies.
1. The family lives in a house worth at least Rs. 25,000/- or a house with a tin
roof and each member of family is able to sleep on bed instead of on the floor.
2. Family member drink pure water to tube-wells, boiled water or water purified
by using alum, arsenic free, purifying tablets or pitcher filter.
3. All children in the family over 6 years of age are all going to school or finished
primary school.
4. Minimum weekly loan instalment of the borrower is Rs. 200/- or more.
5. Family uses sanitary latrine.
6. Family members have adequate clothing for everyday use, warm clothing for
winter, such as shawls, sweaters, blankets, etc and mosquito –nets to protect
themselves from mosquitoes.
7. Family has source of additional income such as vegetable garden, fruit
bearing trees, etc, so that they are able to fall back on these sources income
when they need additional money.
8. The borrower maintains an average annual balance of Rs. 5000/- in his
saving accounts.
9. Family experiences no difficulty in having three square meals a day
throughout the year, i.e. no member of the family goes hungry any time of the
year.
10. Family can take care of health. If any member of the family falls ill, family can
afford to take all necessary steps to seek adequate healthcare.
For the year 2006-07, the data has been presented fewer than two models of
microfinance involving credit linkage with banks.
• SHG Bank Linkage Model: This model involves the SHG financed directly by
the banking agencies viz. Commercial Banks (Public Sector and Private
Sector), Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) and Cooperatives Banks.
• MFI Bank Linkage Model: Under this model Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs)
avail bulk loans from banks for on lending to SHGs and other small borrowers.
Note:
2. Actual number of MFIs provided with bank loans would be lower as several
MFIs have availed loans from more than one bank.
The year 2005 was proclaimed as the International year of Micro credit by The
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in a call for the financial and
building sector to “fuel” the strong entrepreneurial spirit of the poor people around
the world.
Chapter 3
When we speak to families in a locality, we will find that some kind of mutual
liking already exists between many of them. Some known reasons for mutual
affinities are:
For this ask the following questions. If ‘Yes’ is answer for three or four of
these questions, consider that the family is poor.
3. Are the women compelled to go far in the open in the absence of latrine?
• Transparency in operations.
• Propagator of voluntarism.
• Purveyor of credit.
Simple rules are required for SHGs function. The following are some important rules:
• Basic mathematics.
• Writing of books.
• Scheduling of meetings.
• The group to decide the rate of interest to be paid/ charged on savings/ credit
to members.
• The group should function in a democratic way allowing free exchange of
views and participation by members.
• The group should maintain simple maintain simple basic records such as
Minute book, membership register, savings and credit registers.
• The bank’s loan is to the group and not through the group.
Soon after an SHG is formed and one or two meetings held where the savings
are collected, a saving bank account can be opened in the name of SHG.
The Reserve Bank of India has issued instruction to all commercial banks and
Regional Rural Banks, permitting them to open SB A/cs of registered or unregistered
SHGs. SB A/c in the name of SHG could be opened after obtaining from the group
the following documents:
1. Resolution from the SHG: The SHG has to pass a resolution in the group
meeting signed by all members, indicating their decision to open SB A/c with
the bank. This resolution should be field with the bank.
2. Authorisation from the SHG: The SHG should authorise at least three
members, any two of whom, to jointly operate upon their account. The
resolution along with the filled in application duly introduced by the promoter
may be filed with the bank branch.
3. Copy of the rules and regulations of the SHG: This is not a must. If the group
has not formulated any such rules or regulations, loans can be sanctioned
without them. A savings book account passbook may be issued to the SHG.
This should be in the name of the SHG and not in the name of any individual.
1. After saving for a minimum period of 2 to 3 months, the common savings fund
should be used by the SHG for lending to its own members.
2. The purpose, terms and conditions for lending to its members, rate of interest
etc., may be decided by the group through discussions during its meeting.
(RBI and NABARD have permitted the members to decide on these aspects.)
The interest is usually kept as 2 or 3 rupees per hundred rupees per month.
The interest per month is better understood in villages, than annual interest.
3. Simple and clear books of account of savings and lending should be kept by
the SHG.
It needs to know whether the SHG has been functioning well. The check list
given bellow will help us to assess each SHG in a sample, but effective manner.
2. Type of members Only very poor 2 or 3 not very Many not poor
Members poor members members
10. Utilisation of Fully used for Partly used for Poor utilisation
savings by SHG
loaning to Loaning
members
11. Loan recoveries More than 90% 70 to 90% Less than 90%
13. Accumulated More than Rs. Rs. 3000-5000/- Less than Rs.
savings 5000/- 3000/-
16. Knowledge of Govt. All are aware of Most of the No one knows
Govt. rules
Programs members know
(Source: A Handbook on Forming Self Help Groups.)
Important:
3. SHGs with rating of less than 10 “very good” factors will not be considered for
loan.
• The members of SHGs know that the bank loan is their own money like
savings.
• They are aware that they are jointly responsible for the repayment.
• Because of this, bank gets a much better repayment from the SHG.
This contains the duly stamped agreement between the bank and the SHG
wherein both the parties agree to abide by the terms and condition set thereon. The
group members are collectively responsible for the repayment of loans to the bank.
Under no circumstances, the SHG should allow any of its members to default to the
bank.
NGO SHPAs which have village wide development focus make participation
across castes a condition of their programme. As part of a deliberate strategy, we
find that this takes persistence, time and a lot of convincing by the field staff. But it
does lead to some degree of interaction across castes, including SCs and different
sub-castes. Over time, the experience of women from different castes and sub-
castes coming together from their separate hamlets and being part of village
meetings can help to build the confidence of the usually marginalized and begin to
break down some prejudices. The findings underline the persistence of traditional
attitudes and divisions, but show that in some areas, and with SHPA initiative and
persistence, SHGs are beginning to bridge such divisions, through mixed caste
membership in some cases, and in others through joint actions across groups of
different castes.
The most common single type of action taken up by SHGs is the attempt to
close down local liquor outlets. Alcoholism – and the accompanying problems of
domestic violence from men, the drain on household finances, impaired health – is
an aspect which in so many villages we found prompts perhaps the most anger
amongst women, but also despairs. Dealing with this issue is a major struggle which
pits women not only against a behavioural syndrome, but also against institutional
and business elements which have a vested interest in continuing to sell alcohol –
and make money out of it.
The stories show how women in SHGs have mobilized across communities to
act forcefully to close liquor vendors in their village. Some of these actions (7 out of
18 in this study) have been effective in at least closing the local supply. However in
as many cases (8 out of the 18) women say they had only partial success in that
they have managed to close down the local liquor outlet, reducing the immediate
opportunity for men to buy alcohol; but supply continues – from a nearby village or
another outlet in the same village. And some of these outlets do after all have the
‘official’ sanction of a lease from the local panchayat or the State government, which
derive substantial revenues from the availability of alcohol.
SHPA support seems critical in providing or facilitating ideas for group based
enterprise. Though this does not in itself guarantee viability or effective returns,
especially given the inherent difficulties of group based enterprises. Roughly half of
the group enterprises appeared to be viable, though with relatively low earnings for
SHG members. Where successful, such enterprises have enabled women
collectively to access and manage assets or contracts which they lack the capacity
as individuals (or as separate households) to do.
Chapter 4
NABARD launched a Pilot Project for linking Self Help Groups with banks in
1991-92 as an alternative mechanism for providing hassle free banking services to
rural poor and reduce their dependence on exploitative informal credit delivery
system consisting of money lenders, land lords, traders, etc. simultaneously, it
helped the banks in reducing their transaction costs and risk costs in delivering small
loans. The programme is called as SHG Bank Linkage Programme and is unique
and most cost effective micro finance initiative in the world. Over a period of a
decade and half, the programme has emerged as the largest micro finance outreach
programme in the world. Continuing the fast expansion trend of the previous two
years, the SHG Bank Linkage Programme reached new height in the year 2006-07
in Maharashtra with credit linkage of 94,386 new SHGs to banking system (56%
growth over previous year). This achievement was possible through sustained efforts
and positive approach by all the partners in the programme which include banks,
Governments agencies and NGOs and excellent coordination among them.
Cumulatively, 2,25,856 SHGs have been credit linked in the state covering 3.38
million families and 16.94 million rural poor. A redeeming feature of the programme
was providing repeat finance to the existing SHG which were credit linked already.
As many as 19,382 such SHGs were provided repeat finance by the banks during
the year in the state. Highlights of the programme in Maharashtra are given bellow:
Physical achievements
March 2007
• Number of poor families who have accessed bank credit : 3.4 million
March 2007
Financial achievement
• Bank loan disbursed to new SHGs during 2006-07 : Rs. 2,143 million
During 2006-07
to March 2007
• Commercial banks : 19
(Lakh)
The share of SHG in the total was 9, 56,317 forming 22.9% of the total SHGs
having saving accounts in the banks.
Commercial Banks 87,436 2.1 77.42 2.2 15,798 24.95 76,083 68.61
(Private Sector)
Sub Total 22,93,771 55.1 1,892.42 53.9 5,71,062 524.49 17,94,720 1651.47
Commercial Banks
Regional Rural 11,83,065 28.4 1,158.29 32.9 3,00,427 188.66 9,74,811 1042.99
Banks
Cooperative Banks 6,83,748 16.4 462 13.2 84,828 44.35 5,01,708 330.52
As on 31 March 2007, the average savings of SHGs with banks was Rs.
8,469 which varied from Rs. 9,791 per SHG with RRB to Rs. 6,914 per SHG with
cooperative banks. The share of women SHGs in the total SHGs with saving bank
accounts in the banks was 78.63%.
4.2 Microfinance Institutions Bank Linkage:
2. Cooperative MFIs
3. NBFC MFIs under Section 25 of Companies Act 1956 (not for profit)
4. NBFC MFIs incorporated under Companies Act 1956 and registered with RBI.
Following RBI guidelines in its circular dated 18 February 2000, (all scheduled
commercial banks including RRBs) MFIs availing bulk loans from banks for on
lending to groups and other small borrowers. On the basis of returns received from
banks for the year 2006-07, 12 Public Sector Commercial Banks, 12 Private Sector
Commercial Banks and 2 Regional Rural Banks, and 1 State Cooperative Bank have
financed MFIs for on lending.
As on 31 March 2007, the progress under MFI- Bank Linkage is given in table-
(Rs. Lakh)
Year Launching a pilot project of linking 500 SHGs with the banking system.
1992
1995 Setting up Credit and Financial Services Fund (CFSF) within NABARD-
to support expansion of the programme.
• Documentation
• Defaulters
• Size of group
• Service area etc.
1997 Organizing National Level Training Consultation Meet - thrust trainers
training.
Long term objective of SHG Bank Linkage Programme will be to ensure that
one woman from every household in rural areas in SHG an all the SHGs are credit
linked. This is proposed to be achieved within a period of 4 years. Strategy will be
devised for credit linking new SHGs based on number of rural household in the state.
In addition, other aspects like presence of NGOs working for promotion of SHGs,
bank working as SHPI, presence of IRVs, farmers clubs, response of government
agencies, likelihood of new SHGs being promoted etc., also need to be taken in
consideration. A rough estimation indicates that 5.80 lakh SHGs need to be
promoted and credit linked during the next 4 years to achieve th objective of covering
all households in rural area.
Chapter 5
(NABARD)
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) came into
existence on July 12, 1982 as an apex institution in agriculture and rural
development by merging together Agriculture Credit Department of Reserve Bank of
India (RBI) and the Agriculture Rural Development Co-operatives (ARDV), which
was set up in 1963 to meet the long term credit needs of the rural areas. The RRBs
and co-operative sector came under NABARD and it provides finance to commercial
banks.
• Conducts training & workshops for NGOs, Bank Staff & SHGs.
The programme was launched in March 2006 with the basic objective the
enhance the capacities of the members of matured SHGs to take up micro enterprise
through appropriate skill up gradation/ development in existing or new livelihood
activities both in farm and non-farm sectors by way of enriching knowledge of
participants on enterprise management, business dynamics and rural markets
programme. The duration of training programme can vary between 3 to 13 days
depending upon the objective and nature of training.
(Rs. Lakh)
Year 2006-07
NGOs 352 1,110.66 40,562 1,656 3,675.65 2,05,112 1,619.78 1,49,464 95,856
Total 384 1,403.96 59,662 1,890 4,749.96 3,09,272 1,980.77 2,44,686 1,52,928
In order to identify, classify and rate Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) and
empower them to intermediate between the lending banks and the clients, NABARD
had introduced a scheme for providing financial assistance by way of grant to
Commercial Banks, Regional Rural Banks and Co-operative Banks to avail of the
services of accredited rating agencies for rating of MFIs.
Banks can avail the services of credit rating agencies viz. CRISIL, M-CRIL,
ICRA, CARE and Planet Finance for rating of MFIs and avail financial assistance by
way of grant to the extent of 100% of the total professional fees of the credit rating
agency subject to a maximum of Rs. 1.00 lakh. The facility is available for the first
rating of a MFI with a minimum loan outstanding of Rs. 50.00 lakh annum and
maximum loan outstanding Rs. 500.00 lakh. The scheme will be operational up to 31
March 2010. So far, on commercial bank has availed the assistance for rating of MFI
i.e. Bharat Integrated Social Welfare Agency in Orissa State.
NABARD provides loan funds in the form of Revolving Fund Assistance (RFA)
on a very selective basis to MFIs. The RFA provided to these agencies is necessarily
to be used for on- lending to SHGs or individuals and the amount is to be repaid
along with the service charge within a stipulated period of 5 to 6 years. This enables
them to build a ‘credit history’, which would help them to access credit facilities
through the regular banking channels. During 2006-07, RFA of Rs. 1 crore was
sanctioned to Rashtriya Gramin Vikas Nidhi, Guwahati (Assam). Cumulatively, RFA
of Rs. 2832.00 lakh was sanctioned to 32 agencies and Rs. 2163.8 lakh has been
released against which Rs. 615.2 lakh stands outstanding against 9 agencies.
Chapter 6
SGSY, which was launched in April 1999, is a holistic program of the Central
Government covering all aspects of poverty alleviation, providing employment/ self
employment, organising poor into Self Help Groups, etc. The basic objective of the
program was to bring 30% of the BPL families above the poverty line. All earlier
programs like Integrated Development program (IRDP), Development of Women and
Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA), Gram Kalyan Yojana (GKY) and Million Well
Scheme (MWS) were merged with SGSY. Under this program, families (not the
individuals) are the focal point of the development initiatives.
The BPL families are organised into SHGs and assistance package includes
loan, subsidy, training, capacity building, infrastructure and development of linkage
subsidy @ 50% and 30% of the project cost, with ceiling of Rs. 10,000/- and Rs.
7500/-, is provided to the beneficiaries to belonging to SC/ST category and others,
respectively. There is no ceiling on amount of subsidy for minor irrigation purposes.
For group activity of the SHGs, subsidy is provided to the extent of 50% of the
project cost, subject to a maximum of Rs. 1.25 lakh per group. SHGs are also
provided a revolving fund of Rs. 25,000/- for their internal lending for which subsidy
of Rs. 10,000/- is provided by the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA), out of
the total funds allocated for SGSY in district, 20% is to be utilized for infrastructure
development and 10% for training of beneficiaries.
This program is being implanted by DRDA in the district, which has identified
block-wise key activities, that can be taken up under the program. DRDA, Pune has
also set up a marketing outlet “SAVITRI” for sale of the products of SHGs, assisted
under SGSY and other programs. The performance of Pune district in the
implementation of this program has been noteworthy and the targets fixed under the
program are being achieved regularly. The district has also won state level awards
for best performance in the implantation of this program.
Chapter 7
About Mulshi
Taluka Mulshi is an administrative division of the Pune district of Maharashtra
state. Taluka Mulshi lies west of Pune, in the Western Ghats mountain ridge. To the
north of Talq. Mulshi lies Talq. Maval, to the east Talq. Haveli, to the south Talq.
Velve, all part of the Pune district and to the west lies the Raigarh district. The river
Mula crosses the Talq. from west to east, starting at the artificial lake at Mulshi Dam
in the west, running near the village Paud in the centre of the Talq. and then leaving
the Talq. and continuing to Pune.
Mulshi Dam is the major source Hydroelectric Plant, water from the
river Mula is also used to irrigate Paddy. Paddy is major crop of this area, which
cover much area in the valley around the river. Rice named Kamod is grown here on
a large scale.
This area receives heavy rainfall. It is hilly region. Most of the area especially around
the dam is covered with forest. Teak, Oak, Mango are found in the forest. This forest
is the home to diverse wildlife including Leopards.
Town - 20,233
Female - 68,303
Literacy % :12.35%
APL - 1482
A grade : 168
B grade : 44
B grade- they have Income Generating Activities (IGA) they does not require RF]
APL- 9
Enterprises of SHGs:
• Dairy
• Bakery
• Goat rearing
• Agro Service Centre
• Fishery
• Making paper files
• Super market, etc.
(Up to 20/06/2008)
Bank Name BPL APL Total
Canara Bank 13 69 82
Chapter 8
This NGO give training of different business to the SHGs, for that NGO
require a strong support and this work is successfully done by the Mahabank Self
Employment Training Institute time to time. This institute is located at Hadapsar in
Pune city. The NGO gave training of different business like making of powder of
Ayuredic Plant, Beauty Parlour, Tailoring, etc. special they focus on empowerment of
women’s.
8.1 Working:
Chapter 9
Findings
Chapter 10
Suggestions
10.1 Suggestion to the Bank:
Loan to group
Bank SHG/ Individuals
Repayment
Commission
NGO
Loan Loan
Bank MFI SHG/Individual
Laon 9% - 11%
Repayment Monitor
SHG/
Bank MFI
Individual
Originator
Repayment
collection
NGO
Working of model:
• Bank gives the loan directly to the SHGs or individual, so that bank can know
the each group and keep information about groups and group members.
• Bank gives the loan as per the RBI norms.
• SHGs link with the bank with the help of NGO.
• The NGO work as a originator.
• The main role of this model will play by MFI.
• MFI and NGO collectively monitor on the SHGs.
• Also they both focus on their health, literacy and other problems.
• Repayment collection will in two step-
- Collection from SHGs by NGO and transfer to MFI.
- Collection from NGO by MFI and transfer to Bank.
• Give a specific day to the MFI for repay the loan.
Advantages:
Limitations:
Background:
a. The GOI will provide funds for Microfinance Programme to SIDBI, which shall
be called ‘Portfolio Risk Fund’ (PRF). This fund would be used for security
deposit requirement of the loan amount from the MFIs/NGOs and to meet the
cost of interest loss. At present, SIDBI takes fixed deposits equal to 10% of
the loan amount. The share of MFIs/NGOs would be 2.5% of the loan amount
(i.e. 25% of the security deposit) and balance 7.5% (i.e. 75% of the security
deposit) would be adjusted from the funds provided by the GOI. The
MFIs/NGOs may avail the loan from the SIDBI for further on lending on the
support of the security deposit.
b. The Government would provide the needed fund in four years of the Xth Plan
and release the fund on half yearly basis based on demands for security
deposit. By contributing an amount of Rs. 6 crore during the Xth Plan under
Microfinance Programme, SIDBI can provide loan of Rs. 80 crore to
MFIs/NGOs. This would benefit approximately 1.60 lakhs beneficiaries,
assuming an average loan of Rs. 5,000/- beneficiary.
c. The SIDBI will pay interest to the Government on the fixed deposit made
available by the Government at the same rate as followed to NGOs. Other
terms and conditions will be fixed mutually by SIDBI and GOI.
e. After full recovery of loan from the MFIs/NGOs, the 7.5% security deposit of
the loan amount provided by the GOI and the interest accrued thereon would
be rotated further as a security deposit for MFIs/NGOs with the approval of
committee of the GOI or the same will be returned to the GOI.
g. The activities covered under the scheme are manufacturing, service sector
and non-farming activities.
The GOI would help SIDBI in meeting the training needs of NGOs, SHGs,
intermediaries and entrepreneurs and also in enhancing awareness about the
programme. This task would be performed through National Level Entrepreneurship
Development Institutes (EDIs) and Small Industries Service Institutes (SISIs). The
Research Studies would also be arranged through reputed agencies.
The budgetary provision for the scheme in the 10th Five Year Plan is Rs. 7
crore and the provision in the current financial year 2003-04 is Rs. 0.25 crore. The
entire amount of Rs. 0.25 crore is to be provided to SIDBI as ‘Portfolio Risk Fund’
(PRF) during the year 2003-04. Under the scheme, allocation of an amount of Rs. 1
crore is for studies, training, awareness, etc. and amount of Rs. 6 crore is for
contribution to SIDBI as PRF. Savings if any, under any activity would be utilized on
other activity of the scheme so that budget allocated may be fully utilized.
Administrative arrangement:
These issues with the concurrence of Integrated Finance Wing of the Ministry,
vide their Dy. NO. 387/Fin I/04 dated: 01-03-2004.
(Praveen Mahato)
Director (EA)
Annexure 2
World’s Top 50 Microfinance Institutions
1 ASA Bangladesh 14 83 56 40
Bibliography