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N.

MY

A.

BERDYAEV

PHILOSOPHIC

(BERDIAEV)
WORLD-OUTLOOK

(1952/1937 - #476)
At the centre of my philosophic creativity is situated the problem
of man. And therefore my philosophy is to an utmost extent anthropologic. To posit the problem of man -- this means at the same
time to posit the problem of freedom, of creativity, person, spirit and
history. Therefore I have chiefly concerned myself with the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of history, social philosophy and ethics.
My philosophy is of the existential type, if contemporary terminology be used. But it can be likewise regarded as a philosophy of
spirit. In its basic tendency this philosophy is dualistic, although the
term is about dualism of a particular sort and to some measure is not
ultimate. This is a dualism of spirit and nature, of freedom and determinism, of the person and the in-general, of the kingdom of God
and the kingdom of Caesar. And in this I sense myself closer to Kant,
than to the monistic German idealism of the beginning XX Century.
The initial point of my weltanschaung-outlook is the primacy of freedom over being. This provides philosophy a dynamic character and
explains a basis for evil, as also the possibility of creativity in the
world of something new. Freedom cannot be a determinisation by being, freedom is not delimited even by God. It is rooted in non-being.
In this, as regards thinkers of the past, especially close to me were
Heraclitus, Origen and St. Gregory of Nyssa amongst the fathers of
the Church, Jakob Boehme -- who had tremendous significance for
my spiritual developement, and to a certain degree also Kant. As regards philosophers of our times those having points contingent with
me were Bergson, Gentile, Max Scheler. Amongst the representatives
of existential philosophy the closest to me is Jaspers. Dostoevsky, L.
Tolstoy, Nietzsche, one after the other they played a large role in the
working out of my weltanschaung-outlook, just as did Marx, Carlyle,
Ibsen and Leon Bloy -- in the forming of my social views.

The Tasks of Philosophy. Philosophy is the discipline or science,


scientia, concerning the soul. The scientia concerning the soul is however the scientia concerning human existence. Particularly within
human existence is revealed the meaning of being. Being reveals itself
through the subject, and not through the object. Philosophy therefore
of necessity is anthropologic and anthropocentric. Existential philosophy is a cognition of the meaning of being through the subject. The
subject is existential, existentialised. In the object, on the contrary, the
inner existence is concealed. In this sense philosophy is subjective,
and not objective. It is based upon spiritual experience.
Cognition. It is impossible to set cognition in opposition to being.
Cognition is an event within being. Cognition is immanent to being,
and it is not that being is immanent to cognition. Cognition is not a
mere mirrored reflection of being within the cognitive subject. Cognition bears a creative character and itself represents an act of positing
meaning. The opposition of the cognitive subject to the object leads to
an annihilating of being both of the subject, and also of the object.
The cognition of the object of necessity transforms cognition into objectivisation. There exist various degrees of cognition and corresponding to them degrees of objectivisation. The more objectivised the cognition, the more remote it is from human existence, and is the more
universally-binding. This logical universal-obligatoriness possesses a
social nature. The logical universal-obligatoriness of objectivised cognition is connected with a lower degree of the spiritual community of
people, based upon communication. The sphere of the physicomathematical sciences can serve by way of an example. For the recognising of truth in the sphere of the mathematical or natural sciences
the spiritual community of people is irrelevant. But this communalness has to be already the more noticeable, when the talk turns to the
social sciences. Philosophic cognition cannot abstract itself off from
human existence, for the positing of this or that truth there is necessary a spiritual in-commonness, since metaphysical cognition cannot
be to such a degree universally-significative, as is mathematical cognition. And finally, truths of a religious order demand a maximum of
spiritual in commonness between people. On the inside religious
truths (the truths of religion) seem very subjective and very disputable,
but for the religious communities, which believe in them, these truths
are universal and indisputable. Penetration into the mystery of existence presupposes a creative intuition. Objectivised cognition corresponds to a breaking-apart, a disassociatedness of the world, i.e. to its
fallenness. But within the limits of this world it has a positive significance.

The sociology of cognition possesses a significance of the first


degree. Its scope is to establish the connection between cognition, on
the one hand, and the problem of society (obschestvo) and incommonness (obschnost) of communication and community (obschenie), on the other hand. Objectivised cognition is always involved
with the in common (obschii), and not with the individual, and
therefore an objectised metaphysics, based upon a conceptual system,
is an impossibility. Metaphysics is naught other, than a philosophy of
human existence; it is subjective, and not objective, it rests upon symbol and myth. Truth and reality are not at all identical with objectification.
Anthropologism. The fundamental problem of philosophy is the
problem of man. Being reveals itself within man and through man.
Man is a microcosm and a microtheos. He is created in the image and
likeness of God. But at the same time man is a natural being, and finite. In man there is a twofold aspect: man is the point of intersection
of two worlds, he reflects in himself the higher world and the world
lower. As the image and likeness of God, man is a person. Person is
properly distinct from the individuum. Person is a category which is
spiritually-religious, the individuum however is a category naturalistic-biological. Person cannot be a part of anything: it is an integral
whole, it is correlative to society, to nature and to God. Man is a spiritual being, but also physical and fleshly. In the capacity of a fleshly
being he is connected with all the cycles of worldly life, and as a spiritual being he is connected with the spiritual world and with God.
The spiritual basis within man is dependent neither upon nature nor
upon society, and it is not defined by them. Freedom is inherent to
man, although this freedom is not absolute. The principle of freedom
is determined neither from below nor from above. The freedom inherent to man is a freedom uncreated and primordial. There is talk about
an irrational freedom: it is not about freedom in truth, but rather
about the freedom to accept or deny the truth. Another freedom is the
freedom, issuing forth from truth and from God, a freedom pervaded
by grace. Only the acknowledgement of uncreated freedom, a freedom, not rooted within being, can explain the emergence of evil,
while at the same time it explains the possibility of the creative act
and newness in the world.
The Teaching about Creativity. The problem of creativity occupies a
central place in my world-outlook. Man was created for this, that he
in his own turn should become a creator. He is called to creative work
in the world, he continues the creation of the world. The meaning and

purpose of his life is not accounted for merely as salvation. Creativity


is always a passing over from non-being to being, i.e. a creation from
out of nothing. Creativity from nothing is a creativity from freedom.
In distinction to God, however, man has need of material in order to
create, and in his creativity there is enclosed an element issuing forth
from the freedom of man. In the fount of his creativity there is a soaring upwards, a victory over the heaviness of the world. But in the results, in the products of creativity, there is discovered a downwards
tugging and pull. In place of new being they create books, articles, pictures, social institutes, machines, cultural values. The tragedy of creativity consists in the non-correspondence of the creative intended design with its realisation. Creativity presents itself as the complete opposite of evolution. Evolution is determinism, a matter of sequential
effects. Creativity however is freedom, a primordial act. The world
has not ceased to be created, it is not finished, the creation is continuing.
The Philosophy of Religion. Revelation is twofold. It presupposes
God, from Whom issues forth the revelation, and man in receiving it.
The acceptance of revelation is active and dependent upon the
breadth or narrowness of consciousness. The world of things invisible
is not forcefully compelling for us, it reveals itself in freedom. Man is
not free in his denial of the sensory world, which surrounds him, but
he is free in his denial of God. With this is connected the mystery of
faith. Revelation does not contain within itself any particular philosophy, any particular system of thought. Revelation however has to be
assimilated by human thought, which is made distinct by a constant
activity. Theology is dependent always upon philosophic categories.
But revelation cannot of necessity be bound up with any especial one
philosophy. The capacity for changes and the creative activity of the
subject, receiving the revelation, justify an eternal modernism. In their
own time both the works of the fathers of the Church and of the Scholastics were regarded as modernism.
Religious cognition is symbolic. It cannot express religious truth
in rational concepts. For the mind, truth is antinomic. Dogma -- is
symbol. But this is a realist symbolism, reflective of being, and not an
idealist symbolism, reflective merely of the condition of man. Metaphysics cannot find its completion in a system of concepts, for its endpurpose is in myth, beyond which reality conceals itself.
Religion is the connection between God and man. God is born
within man, and man is born within God. God awaits from man a

creative and free answering. With this is connected the mystery of


God-manhood, of unity within duality. Christian philosophy is a philosophy of God-manhood and Christology. Religious life, the primal
source of which is manifest by revelation, undergoes the influences
and actions of the social surroundings. This bestows on the religious
history of mankind an especial complexity. There is therefore necessary a re-working of it by a constant cleansing, working it through and
the reviving of it.
The Philosophy of History. The acknowledging of the meaning of
history is an aspect of Judaism and Christianity, but not of Greek philosophy. The relationship of Christianity to history is twofold. Christianity is historical: it is the revelation of God within history. But
Christianity cannot be confused with history. It is a process within
history. The philosophy is history is connected with the problem of
time. We live within a fallen time, fragmented into the past, the present and the future. The victory over the death-bearing current of time
is a fundamental task of the spirit. Eternity is not an infinitude of
time, numerically immeasurable, but rather qualitative, a surmounting of time. The past for us is always already a transformed past. The
meaning of history is gained through tradition, which presents itself as
a creative connection between the past and the present. The meaning
of history ought to have meaning for each human person, it ought to
be commensurate with its individual fate. Progress however regards
each man and each generation as a means for succeeding peoples and
generations. Ruptures are inevitable within history, just as crises and
revolutions are inevitable within it, which witness to the lack of success of all human accomplishments. History ought to have an end, for
the meaning of history is bound up with eschatology.
The Philosophy of Culture. Culture is the creative activity of man.
In culture the creativity of man finds its own objectivisation. In theocratic societies, based on sacralisation, the creative powers of man are
not sufficiently free. Humanism is a liberation of the creative person
of man, and in this is comprised its truth. Beyond the theme of culture
lies concealed the theme of the relationship of man to God and to the
world. But either way it is God against man, or man rises up against
God. Humanism in its developement led to a secularisation of culture,
and in this secularisation there was its own truth and unmasking of
lie. Humanism however finished up with a self-deification of man,
and with a denial of God. And therein the image of man, which is in
the image of God, began to disintegrate. Humanism passed over into
anti-humanism. We see this with Marx and with Nietzsche. The crisis

of humanism presents itself as a movement towards principles suprahuman, either towards Christ, or towards the Anti-Christ. The force
of technology is one of the moments of the crisis of humanism. The
incursion of the masses modifies culture from above downwards,
lowers its quality and leads to a crisis of spirituality. Technical civilisation rends the integral wholeness of the human being and transforms him into a function. Only a spiritual renaissance would allow
man to subordinate the machine to himself.
Social Philosophy. The fundamental problem is the problem of the
relationship between the person and society. Society presents itself as
the objectivisation of human relationships. In society the I can remain solitary and not meet up in encounter with the thou. For sociology the person is an insignificant part, subordinate to society. For
existential philosophy, on the contrary, society assumes the appearance of being part of the person, its social side. In the person there is
inherent a spiritual principle, a depth, which is not defined by society.
Men belongs to two spheres: the kingdom of God and the kingdom of
Caesar. Upon this is grounded the right and the freedom of man. And
thus also, there exist limits to the domination of the state and society
over man. Society is not an organism. The reality of human society
defines itself by the reality of the human community. An objectivised
society, suppressing the person, arises from the disassociation of people, from their sinful egocentrism. In such a society there exists communication between people, but not community. The highest type of
society appears to be the society, in which there are united the principle of the person and the principle of community. Such a type of society might be termed a personalist socialism. In such a society, for
each human person there would be acknowledged an absolute value
and utmost worth as a being, called to eternal life, and therein the social organisation would guarantee for each the possibility of attainment of the fulness of life. It is necessary to strive towards a synthesis
of an aristocratic, a qualitative principle of person, and a democratic,
socialist principle of justice and the brotherly collaboration of people.
In the epoch of the active incursion of the masses into history
and the giddying developement of technology society becomes technically ordered. Mankind forsakes the organic rhythm of life and subordinates itself to a mechanical and technical organisation. For man as
an integrally whole being, this process is sickening and tormentive.
The tellurgic period of the life of mankind approaches its end. The
might of the machine signifies the beginning of a new period -- cosmogonic, since it subordinates man to a new cosmos. Man already no

longer lives amidst bodies inorganic and organic, but amidst organised bodies. In such an epoch especially there is need for a strengthening of spirit and spiritual movement for the preservation of the image
of man. Without a spiritual renewal it is impossible to attain social restructuring.
Ethics. Personalism is a basis for ethics. Moral judgements and acts
are always personal and individual, they cannot be defined by the
concepts or choice of a collective or society. The distinction between
good and evil is a consequence of the fall into sin. The paradisical existence was situated above good and evil. There exist three views of
ethics: the ethics of law, the ethics of redemption and the ethics of
creativity. The ethics of law is the most widespread amongst sinful
mankind. The ethics of law is the ethics of a social everydayness, it is
based upon the subordination of man to norms, and for it there does
not exist the human individuality. For it man exists for the Sabbath.
The good however, which observe the law, shew themselves often
to be evil. In this ethics it is the idea of an abstract good that governs. The ethics of law found its most extreme expression in Phariseeism. This is a normative ethics. The ethics of redemption issues forth
from a lived human existence, and not from an abstract idea of the
good. The ethics of creativity is based on the creative gifts of mankind. The creative act has a moral significance, and a moral act is a
creative act. The true moral act is unique, it cannot be repeated. The
moral act is not a fulfilling of the law, of norms, but is rather a creative newness in the world. Every creative act has moral significance,
though this be a creativity of cognitive or aesthetic values. Ethics is
bound up with the eschatological problem, the problem of death and
immortality, of heaven and hell. Hell is situated in the subjective, and
not in the objective, and it remains within time, within unending
time, and does not pass over into eternity. The ontology of an eternal
hell is impossible. Hell is created by the good for the evil, and
therein they render themselves evil. The kingdom of God is on the
other side of our here and now good and evil, and the thought
about it can only be apophatic.
________________________
Basic works for the understanding of my philosophic worldview are: The Meaning of Creativity (published in English title
The Meaning of the Creative Act), The Meaning of History,
Philosophy of the Free Spirit (published in English under title

Freedom of the Spirit), The Destiny of Man, I and the World of


Objects (published in English under title Solitude and Society).
And in matters that touch upon the philosophy of culture, one
might refer to suchlike works of mine, as The New Middle Ages
(in English text The End of Our Time), Christianity and Class
War, The Truth and Lie of Communism (in English text The
Russian Revolution Chapter entitled The Religion of Communism),
and
The
Fate
of
Man
in
the
Modern
World.
Nikolai Berdyaev
1937 / 1952

2000

(1952/1937

by

translator
-

Fr.
476

S.

Janos
-en)

MOE PHILOSOPHSKOE MIROCOZERTSANIE. First published


1937 in German as entry in Philosophen Lexicon compendium under title Die philosophische Weltschaung N. A. Berdiaef.
As journal article, first published posthumously in 1952 in Russian, in
the journal Vestnik Russkogo studentcheskogo khristianskogo
dvizheniya (Messenger of the Russian Student Christian Movement), No. 4-5.
We have not reproduced here the numerous bibliographic philosopher
footnotes provided in the 1990 Russian journal Philosophskoe
nauki (Bk 6 p. 85-89). This was reprinted in the 1994 A. A. Ermichev
(editor) text, N. A. Berdyaev: Pro and Contra, p. 23-28.

- -.
Return to Berdyaev Online Library.

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