Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by

petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to
outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is
conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his
conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendozas testimony and positive
identification as its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the
pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore,
the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de
Villa should be discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based
solely on a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our
conviction was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim,
which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.

PEOPLE vs MOLINA
FACTS:
> The four (4) cases of incestuous rape were allegedly committed by accusedappellant Roland Molina; Upon the verbal complaint of his daughter Brenda,
accused-appellant was arrested.
> Despite his immediate arrest and the absence of a waiver, accused-appellant was
subjected to a regular preliminary investigation by the municipal trial judge whose
findings were affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor. Accused-appellant did not file a
counter-affidavit to refute the charges.
> Thereafter, four (4) Informations were filed against accused-appellant for raping his
own daughter who was below eighteen (18) years old.
> Roland Molina was arraigned on the four (4) indictments for incestuous rape. He
pleaded not guilty to each of the four (4) charges.
> Hearing was cut short when the prosecution "asked for a deferment to determine
whether the proposal of the accused to withdraw his plea of not guilty and change
same to guilty could have the effect of lowering the penalty attached to the offense
charged to reclusion perpetua." Trial was thus reset; defense counsel manifested the
desire of accused-appellant to change his plea to guilty as regards all the five (5)
crimes since he "was being bothered by his conscience and by way of contrition
would like to make amends." Thus he was immediately re-arraigned and entered a
plea of guilty.
> The prosecution then proceeded to present its evidence to ascertain with precision
the real culpability of accused-appellant.
> Trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of the five (5) crimes
charged on the basis of "the change of plea by the accused from not guilty to guilty,
and the testimony of the offended party Brenda Molina and the corroborating
evidence presented by the prosecution, both oral and written." The trial court
however strongly recommended executive clemency in light of his plea of guilt and
his alleged letter that ambiguously expressed his remorse for some unidentified acts.
No notice of appeal was filed from the conviction in the criminal case for attempted
rape.

> The Public Attorneys Office, in its Brief for the Appellant, asserts that accusedappellant's plea of guilty was improvidently made.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plea of guilty of the accused was improvidently made?
RULING:
YES. In this regard, we find critical omissions in the procedure adopted by
the trial court in the re-arraignment of accused-appellant. For one, Sec. 1, par. (a),
of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which requires that the accused-appellant
must be furnished a copy of the complaint or information with the list of
witnesses to be read to him in the language or dialect known to him, was not
followed by the trial court. Record of the re-arraignment merely noted that "the
accused was re-arraigned and [he] entered a plea of guilty separately in the fiveentitled cases after the consequences of the change of plea have been duly
explained to him" but it does not state that copies of the five (5) Informations and the
list of witnesses were given to him and the Informations read in a language that he
knows. We ruled in People v. Bello, that when the death penalty is at stake, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions does not apply.
Clearly, it cannot be said that the trial court complied with this rule.
Even the certificate of re-arraignment contradicts the statement therein that accusedappellant was separately re-arraigned in the five (5) criminal cases. This certificate
states "complaint" (singular) rather than "complaints" (plural) since there were five
(5) criminal cases to which he was allegedly pleading guilty and thus irregularly
attests to his guilty plea to only one (1) of the five (5) Informations.
Moreover, the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry to establish that
the plea of guilty was done voluntarily with full awareness of its
consequences. This procedure is anchored on Sec. 3, of Rule 116, 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full consequences of his plea and
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
accused may also present evidence on his behalf.
Equally distressing is the correlated omission of the transcripts of stenographic notes
of the supposed re-arraignment or plea colloquy of accused-appellant. We have
emphasized the need for and importance of such transcripts and even more in the
instant case where accused-appellant manifested his desire to change his plea on
the condition that the death penalty would not be imposed.

If the searching inquiry were reduced into writing, this Court would have been duly
informed of accused-appellant's sincere intention to change his plea despite the
imposition of the capital penalty and the legal impossibility of any promise of reward.
In view of the foregoing we have no alternative but to set aside the plea of guilty.
It is also urged in the Brief for the Appellant that an improvident plea of guilty per se
results in the remand of the criminal case(s) to the trial court for the re-arraignment
of accused-appellant and for further proceedings. We hold that this argument does
not accurately reflect the standing principle. Our jurisdiction does not subscribe to a
per se rule that once a plea of guilty is deemed improvidently made that the
accused-appellant is at once entitled to a remand. To warrant a remand of the
criminal case, it must also be proved that as a result of such irregularity there was
inadequate representation of facts by either the prosecution or the defense during
the trial.
Where facts are however adequately represented in the criminal case and no
procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the
defense as a result of the improvident plea of guilty, the settled rule is that a decision
based on an irregular plea may nevertheless be upheld where the judgment is
supported beyond reasonable doubt by other evidence on record since it would be a
useless ritual to return the case to the trial court for another arraignment and further
proceedings.
After a careful examination of the records, we find that the improvident plea of guilt
of accused-appellant has affected the manner by which the prosecution and the
defense conducted its presentation of the evidence, and the trial court in carefully
evaluating the evidence on record. Remand of Criminal Cases for re-arraignment
and further relevant proceedings is therefore proper. First, the prosecution failed to
lay the proper foundation for the introduction of the alleged handwritten letter of
accused-appellant acknowledging his guilt for the rape of his daughter. This could
very well be attributed to the fact that this letter was introduced only after accusedappellant pleaded guilty to the accusations for which reason the prosecution no
longer endeavored to elicit the proper foundation for this evidence.
The improvident plea, followed by an abbreviated proceeding, with practically no role
at all played by the defense, is just too meager to accept as being the standard
constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life.
The flawed re-arraignment of accused-appellant and the invalid admission of his
supposed letter-admission were caused by the omission of minimal standards for a
searching inquiry in the former and the admissibility of private documents in the
latter. We cannot conceive any reasonable legal basis to explain the oversight to
contest these errors.
While it is true that unrebutted evidence provides itself an effective corroboration,[49]
we cannot give credence to this rule given the circumstances under which such

deficiency came about. For one, had the trial court correctly implemented the
corresponding rules on plea of guilty, we may not be having this situation where only
the private complainant was heard. The absence of the transcripts of stenographic
notes of the arraignment proceedings already denies us "full opportunity to review
the cases fairly and intelligently."[50] After having set aside the plea of guilty, we
could never be sure that accused-appellant would waive telling his version of the
story, or that the facts would still be the same after we hear him say his side.
Moreover, the sad fact of this omission is that obviously we could have learned more
about the crimes alleged by the prosecution if accused-appellant had also
participated meaningfully in all the proceedings below. His voice could better assure
the fairness of any action for or against him. As in similar situations, we should
achieve such comforting posture if the court a quo is required to establish with moral
certainty the guilt of accused-appellant who allegedly wanted to confess his guilt by
requiring him to narrate the incident or making him reenact it, or by causing him to
furnish the missing details.
Given the attendant circumstances in the instant case, we are not therefore about to
order the execution of accused-appellant because of default by both the public
defender and, to a certain degree, the trial court. This Court cannot send him to the
death chamber for no matter how outrageous the crime might be or how depraved
the offender would appear to be, the uncompromising rule of law must still prevail.
Truly, there is in the ethics of judgeship the caution expected of every judge, all the
more in this case where the accused stands to be executed four (4) times. The
advocate Hugh P. MacMillan drives this point poignantly: "There is almost always
something to be said either way. And it is of the greatest importance that that
something should be said, not only in order that each party may leave the judgment
seat satisfied that, whatever has been the decision, the case has had a fair hearing,
but in order that the Court may not reach its judgment without having had in view all
that could be urged to the contrary effect. In order that the decisions of the Courts
may give satisfaction to the parties and at the same time command respect and
acceptance, they must proceed upon full arguments on both sides."
Verily, a judgment of conviction cannot stand upon an invalid arraignment.[57] Since
the vice of nullity affects not only the criminal cases for incestuous rape under
automatic review but also the criminal case for attempted rape, notwithstanding the
absence of a notice of appeal in the latter, we rule to set aside the Joint Decision
dated 3 November 1999 in toto. We therefore remand Criminal Cases to the court a
quo for rearraignment and reception of evidence for the prosecution and accusedappellant if both so desire. If the accused-appellant pleads guilty, the trial court is
instructed to conduct the searching inquiry and to inform him of his right to adduce
evidence, in accordance with the discussion herein made, complete with transcripts
of stenographic notes.