PHILOSOPHY

OF

SRI

MADHVAGARYA

by

Vidyabhusana Dr. B. N. K.

Head of

SHARMA,

m.

a., Ph. d.,

the Department of Sanskrit and Ardhamagadhl,

Ruparel College,

Bombay-

16.

1962

BHARATIYA VIDYA BHAVAN

BOMBAY-7

Copyright and rights of translation and reproduction

reserved by the author..

First published.'

March, 1962

Pri/e Rs. 15/-

Prlnted

By

h. G. Gore at the

Bombay

22.

in

India

Perfecta Printing Works,

and published by

S.

109A, Industrial Aiea, Sion,

Ramakrishnan, Executive Secrelaiy

Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan,

Bombay

1.

Dedicated

MADHVACARYA

&R1

Who showed how

and attain

goal

Philosophy could fulfil

by

and

indissoluble

exists

between

eternal
that

its

to

enabling

man

to

its

purpose

realize

the

bond of Bitnbapratibimbabhava
the

Infinite

and

the

finite.

ABBREVIATIONS
Anu-Vyakhyana

AV.
Bhag.

Bhagavata

B. T.

Bhagavata-Tatparya

B. S.

Brahma-Sutra

Brahmasutra Bhasya

B. S. B.

Brhadaranyaka-Upanisad

Brh. Up.

Commentary

C.

Chandogya Upanisad

Chan. Up.
Cri. Sur.

D. M.
I.

I.

Phil.

S.

A Critical

Survey of Indian Philosophy

Daivi

Mimamsa

Sutras

Indian Philosophy

Phil.

G. B.

Glta-Bhasya

G. T.

Glta-Tatparya

KN.

KN.

Karma-Nirnaya
t.

M. G.

B.

Karma Nirpaya Tika

Madhva's GTta Bhasya
Madhvavijaya

M.

Vij.

M.

S.

Madhvasiddhantasara

Mbh.

Mahabharata

Mbh.

T. N.

Man. Up.
Mith. Kh.t.

Mund.Up.

Mahabharata Tatparya Nirnaya

Mandukya Upanisad
Mithyatvanumana Khandana Tika

Mundaka Upanisad

Nym-

Nyayamrta

NS.

Nyaya Sudha

NV.

Nyaya Vivarapa

PP-

Pramana Paddhati

M.

P-

Purva Mlmamsa Sutras

S.

Rg Veda

R- V.

R.G.B.
S.

Ramanuja's Glta Bhasya

N. R.

Svet.

Sannyaya Ratnavalf

Up.

Tg.

Svetaivatara Upanisad
(

TS.

Nyayamrta )-Tarangini
Tattva Samkhyana

TSt.

Tattva Samkhyana tika

T.T.

TarkaTapdava

T.V.

Tattva Viveka

Tdy.

TP.
T. A.

Tattvodyota tika
Tattva Prakas'ika
Taittirlya

Arapyaka

T. B.

Taittirlya Brahmaija

Taitt.Up.

Taittirlya

Up.KLt.

Upanisad

UpadMKhapdanatlka

VTN.

Vispy Tattva Nirnaya

VTNt

Visnu Tattva Nirnaya tika

KEY TO DIACRITICAL HARKS

a

an

~S

5K

=?

ch

3S

ft

th

s.

1.

?T.

th

dh

51.

Jna

CONTENTS
Chapters

Pages
Biographical Note

xi-xvii

Preface

I.

II

xviii-xxv

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The Function and Goal of Philosophy

Madhva's Thought

7-14

III

Madhva's Samanvaya of Upanisadic Philosophy

IV

Madhva's Contribution

VII
VIII

IX

to Indian

Thought

15-25

26-30

ONTOLOGY

II.

VI

-6

in Relation to Earlier

and Contemporary Schools

V Madhva's

Ontological Theory

31-41

Madhva's Ontological Scheme

42-44

The Concept of Vi&sas

45-57

Madhva's Doctrine of Difference

58-66

Some Other

Categories

Vis'ista,

Ams'i and oakti

67-68

Sadrs'ya Vs. the Universal

69-71

Space and Time

72-77

XII

Causation

78-79

XIII

Negation

80-81

XI

III.

EPISTEMOLOGY

XIV Madhva's Theory

XV

of Pramapas

Perception, Inference

XVI The

Status of

and Verbal Testimony

Memory

82-85
86-92

93-99

"

Vlll

Pages

Chapters

XVII
XVIII

XIX

XX
XXI

The Doctrine of Validity

100-105

The Doctrine of Saks!

106-112

Saksl as the Ultimate Criterion of Truth

113-115

Theories of Error in Indian Thought

116-130

Madhva's Theory of Error: Abhinavanyath&khyati 131-136

IV

XXII
XXIII

THE WORLD OF EXPERIENCE

Reality of World-Experience

Objections to the Reality of the

World

Answered

XXIV

XXVI

143-48

Textual Evidence in Support of the Reality

of the

XXV

World

149-50

The Meaning and Nature of Creation

XXVIII

XXX
XXXI

54-6

Madhva's Theory of the Evolution of the World

162-64

Critique of Brahma-Parinama and Vivarta Vftdas

165-76

V.

XXIX

151-53

Doctrine of " Eternal Creation " Thro'

" Paradhma-Vis'esapti

XXVII

37-42

DOCTRINE OF ATMAN

Essence of Selfhood

177-79

Metaphysical Dependence of Souls

180-84

Self-Luminosity of Souls

185-87

XXXII Madhva's Theory

of Bondage

SvabhavajMnavada

188-95

IX

Pages

Chapters

XXXIII

Plurality of Selves

XXXIV

Rational Basis of Intrinsic Gradation

and Their Svarupabheda

Among

Souls and Their Tripartite Classification

XXXV

The

XXXVIII

XXXIX

XL
XLI
XLII

214-17

Souls

Souls' Relation to

VI.

XXXVII

Brahman

Independence of Brahman
Attributes of

Knowability of Brahman

246-47

Brahman

248-53

Cosmic

is

Savis'esa Personality

Activities of

Manifestation of

Brahman

Brahman

XLIV Problem

of Evil in Relation to Ethical

XLV1II

254-57

258-60

SADHANA-VICARA

and Freewill in Madhva's Philosophy

XLVII

230-34
225-45

Brahman

XLHI Freedom

XLVI

218-29

DOCTRINE OF BRAHMAN

VII

XLV

204-13

Textual Evidence of Intrinsic Gradation

Among

XXXVI

196-203

261-69

Advancement

270-73

Classification of Adhikaris

274-75

General Scheme of Sadhanas

276-81

Karma-Yoga and Jfiana-Yoga

282-86

Conception of Bhakti,

XLIX Dhyana

and

Its

Place

Its

Orders and Kinds

287-98

299-300

X
Pages

Cfmpters

L
LI
LII

Lin

LV

806

Bimbopasanft

307-14

Place of Grace in Redemption

Aparokga-Jftana

VIII

LIV

301 -05

Pratlkopasana

815-20

God-Realization

DOCTRINE OF MUKTI

Nature of the Released State and

Critique of the Conception of

Its

Stages

Moksa

in

Other Systems

LVI
LVII

Madhva's View of

Index

331-35

M ukti

Rationale of Ananda-Taratamya in

Bibliography

321-30

336-43

Moksa

344-60

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
{)n

Madhvacarya

1238-1317

Dvaita system of Vedanta, which

He

schools of Vedanta.

was the

of

one

is

founder of the

historical

three

the

principal

was a native of Tulun&d, in Karnatak. P&jaka.

Udipi,

on the

He was

born in

appeared on the Indian philosophical scene after the

systems

ksetra, eight miles south-east of the

modern town of

west coast of S. India, was the village of his birth.

1238 A. D. and lived for seventynine years.

He

and Ramanuja had become

of Sarhkara
that

led

well-established.

The reasons

him to propound a new system of Vedanta were

his doctri-

nal differences and ideological dissatisfaction with contemporary trends

and schools of thought, within and without Hinduism and particularly

with the system of Sarhkara, which was the dominating philosophy of
the times.

nuja,

In spite of the Theistic revolt against Sarhkara led by

Madhva could

doctrine.

So he

felt

him on many

not agree with

called

upon to

give a

new

Rama-

points of Theistic

lead in thought, to his

countrymen.

Madhva

called his system " Tattvavada

by Vidyaranya,

this,

Madhva

Istasiddhi.

known by

the last

in his teens, the call

ascetic of the

Sampradaya.

Realism ).
'"

It is

described

Purnaprajnadarsana "

names have been found used by him,

widely

While yet
an

Sarvadarianasamgraha, as

and inanda TTrtha were other names of Madhvacarya.

Purnaprajria
All these three

now more

in his

"

name

of the

of

in his works.

Madhva

spirit

He

is

or Madhvacarya.

took him to Acyutapreksa,

Ekadandi order, belonging to the Ekantl or Brahma-

He

received initiation

studied the classics

from him as a Sannyasin.

After

of the Advaita school such as the

Later he began to expound the Prasthanatrayi, independently

and from a new standpoint, laying bare

pretations of Sarhkara

and

his school.

the defects in the received inter-

Sometimes, he used to enter into

xu
scholastic disputations with veteran scholars of the day.

made

He

in his

toured

Mention has been

biography of Buddhisagara, Vadisimha and Bhanu Pandita.

over India several times and visited BadarikftsVama, Bengal,

all

Bihar and Banaras in the north and

God&vari and important places

like

many

on the

centres of learning

Goa, $rlrangam and Kanyakumari,

in

the south.

Madhva

has left thirtyseven works in

all.

They include

Prakaranas or ten philosophical monographs expounding

metaphysics

ii

Commentaries on

Gtta and the BrahmasMras

the

(iv) a brief

yas of the Jtg Veda, an epitome of the

Mbh.

on the Bh&gavata; and (v) miscellaneous

poems and works on worship and

Anu-Vyakhyd,na, a
s&tras.

It is

critical exposition

a metrical work.

upon by Jayatirtha

in his

on the

It is his

meaning.

Stotras,

His greatest work

is

the

masterpiece. It was

commented

famous work, the NyHya-Sudhd.

and compression of thought.

commentary

on

Adhya-

of the philosophy of the Brahma-

Madhva's writings are characterized by extreme

ion

and

and brief notes

works comprising

ritual.

cc.

( iii )

three

first

in verses

Daia-

i )

his logic

Ten Upanisads
c.

They need

brevity of express-

the help of a very

to be understood in their fulness of thought

good

and depth of

His commentator Jayatfrtha has infused into them the necess-

ary amplitude of utterance and expansiveness of thought.

Madhva was endowed

a born leader of men.

with a fine magnetic personality.

As a

creative thinker, he cared

conventions of fashionable belief and interpretation.

He

down by mere

technical display of learning. His logic

as his faith in

Theism was unshakable.

on

his contemporaries.

Pandita,

Some

for

the

was not cowed

was

as inexorable

a deep impression

of his eminent disciples like Trivikrama

Padmanabha Tfrtha and

scholars of Advaita

He made

little

He was

Narahari Tlrtha were distinguished

and other systems before they became converted to

X1U
They belonged to

his views.

After

languages.

Madhva

different parts of India

establishing

erected a temple for $rl

idol of Bala

on

system

his

and spoke
firm

Krspa at Udipi and

different

foundations,

installed in

Krsoa secured from Dvaraka. He made Udipi the

it

the

spiritual

centre of his school and entrusted the worship at the temple to eight

Their

ascetic disciples.

lines

and those of the other

with the task of propagating his

According to

tradition,

Madhva

system, are

Narayana

Paijdita, the

Trivikrama Pandita. wrote his biography

Kavya of

16 Sargas,

Madhva's

life

and

Madhva went

known

as Madhva-Vijaya.

It is

in

son of

a Sanskrit

the main source of

activities.

directly to the fountain heads

the source-books of

He

flourishing to this day.

disappeared from vision and retired to

Badarikas'rama, in his seventyninth year.

his direct disciple

disciples, entrusted

Hindu philosophy,

to

of ancient thought,

draw his

inspiration

from them.

followed the streams of thought and interpretation emerging directly

from them and flowing

thro' the Epics,

other interpretative literature of

tions of later

more

Pur&nas and Pancaratras and

ancient standing than the interpreta-

day commentators, however eminent.

There was a strong

note of mystic fervor in his thought and writings.

His arguments were

often so intimately connected with the authorities he had

collected for himself

from forgotten and fading sources

almost entirely dependent on them.

It

so diligently

as to appear to be

was Jayatlrtha who

successfully

brought out the inherent logical strength behind his authorities.

were certain great ideas behind Madhva's writings,

ideas

There

of tremend-

ous philosophical power, significance and potentialities such as the conception of Saksl, the doctrine of Svatantratattva, " Vis'esas " in relation
to the concept of identity and difference, and creation in the

" Paradhlnavis'egapti ".

partly

from

his

With these

fruitful

ideas,

which

study of his sources and partly from his

new

sense of

he

derived

own cogitations

XIV

Madhva

based On them.

Theistic philosophy

built

up a cogent and independent system

and worked out

its

details

and put

it

He

urged

set of

funda-

enduring basis of textual sanctions and logical satisfyingness.

the necessity of adopting a fresh attitude of

of

on a firm and

mind and a new

mental concepts and categories in place of the old and worn out ideas of
the fashionable schoolmen, including the latest in the

Once the

field.

metaphysical necessity of discarding the outmoded ideas and going in for

more

and newer modes of approach was

effective theories

the whole course of philosophical inquiry was

and enter upon a new

great assets

and a

terrain.

established,

bound to take a new turn

Providence blessed

Madhva

an interpreter of such outstanding eminence

Jayatlrtha

as

whom

dialectic expositor of the calibre of Vyasaraya,

with two

harnessed

it

to the cause of expounding his system to posterity.

JAYATIRTHA
Jayatlrtha

1365-88

was Madhva's commentator par

According

excellence.

to tradition, he was the son of a nobleman of Mangalvedha,

Maharashtra

As

State.

of his married

life

and

is

disciple of

Aksobhya

Tlrtha, one of

Madhva. This Aksobhya himself was a redoubt-

reputed to have engaged the famous

in a historic disputation over the " Tat

tvam

Vidy&rapya,

asi " text, at

which the

celebrated follower of Ramanuja, Vedanta Des'ika,

is

acted as umpire

Aksobhya

and given

his verdict in favor of

" 3^ptt aT=wRHi q^jftfcrT

(Quoted

in

a young man, Jayatlrtha renounced the pleasures

and became the

the direct disciples of

able scholar

now

in

reported to have

Mwv&yirappafi Guruparamparaprabhavam of

Brahmatantra Svatantra Jeer).

XV
Madhva's works under Akgobhya Tlrtha and

Jayatlrtha studied

He

succeeded him as Pontiff of his Mutt in 1S65.

toured

all

later

over India

and propagated Madhva's Siddhanta by writing commentaries on most

of the important philosophical works of Madhva.
spent the major part of his

kheta

now

the old

in the

and

life at

district

entombed

lie

Jayatlrtha has left commentaries on

Madhva.
(

He

has also

left

the

works have been printed.

c.

there.

most of the important works of

His

logic

on metaphysics, (Vadavali.)

work

greatest

AnuVyakhyana.

on Madhva's

He passed away at Malkhed

two independent works, one on

us

Pramapa Paddhati) and another

his

Ra$ tra-Kutas of Karnatak

of Mysore State.

His mortal remains

in 1388.

seems to have

Ergola and later at Malkhed or Manya-

historic capital of the

Gulbarga

He

It is

is

the

All

Nyaya-Sudha

a work of monumental

erudition in philosophy.

Jayatlrtha standardized

He

was a born

ance and

His style

stylist.

felicity.

is

noted for

its

Madhva

He

and presentation.

brilli-

philosophical

system

brings out the architectonic

and the grandeur

metaphysical ideology of the Svatantratattva,

Vedanta on a

elegance, lucidity,

His writings are characterized by an extreme

orderliness of thought

placed Madhva's

its interpretation.

His arguments are most scholarly and penetrating and

his dialectics superb.

unity of

Madhva's thought and

philosophical

theory

and

impressively.
his

of his

He

has

interpretation of the

self-sufficient basis in respect of its

Adhikarana Pras-

thana and Vadaprasthana. For these memorable services to the system,

tradition has

par

honored him with the

excellence.

title

of "Tikacarya" or

Commentator

VYASARAYA
About a century

while

still

celebrated

Kolar).

in

He studied

in his teens.

Later, he

Saint and

is

He became

district.

Trrtha,

He was born about

a Sannyasin

and Madhva-Sastra under the

logic

scholar $rlpadaraja of Mulbagal

near

reported to have studied the classics of the Advaita,

Mimamsa

Vi&stadvaita and

He

in the Dvaita system.

Bannur, in the Mysore

Madhva

came Vyasaraya or Vyasa

after Jayatlrtha

the Prince of dialecticians

1460 A. D.,

1478--1539

systems at

Kaficlpuram,

in

Tamilnad.

succeeded to the Pontifical seat of his Guru, Brahmanya Tirtha, in

1478 and held sway for a long period of sixtyone years.

Vyisaraya had
of the Devotional
Snpadaraja.

were his

many

sides to his personality.

Movement of

the leader

Kuta of Karnatak

The famous Purandara Dasa, Kanaka Dasa and

disciples.

The

He was

after

others

Vadiraja Tirtha and Vi jay Indra

illustrious writers

Tirtha were also his disciples.

Guru

the Haridasa

He became

the religious adviser

and

spiritual

of the Emperor Krishnadeva Raya of Vijayanagar and was held

in

the greatest honor and esteem at the court of Vijayanagar, by the Kings

of the

second and third

account of his glorious

Campu Kavya
in

in Sanskrit

Vijayanagar.

dynasties of
life

and career

in the

by Poet Somanatha.

1539 at Vijayanagar (where he lived for

his mortal remains lie

entombed

in

the

We

have a

full

Vy&sayogicarita, a fine

Vyasaraya passed away

major part of

Navabmdavana, an

his life)

and

island near Ane-

gondi, on the Tungabhadra river.

Vyasaraya wrote nine works in

the

all.

The most famous of

Nyayamrta, Tarkatapdava and Tatparya-Candrika,

these are

They show

his

encyclopaedic range of knowledge of contemporary thought and philosophical literature

and an astonishingly

brilliant intellect of great clarity

XV11

and penetration, rarely to be met with

in

one man.

to marshal vast quantity of factual material

tions of thought into half
telling terms.

He had

the ability

and extraordinary ramifica-

a dozen propositions, couched in terse and

His works embody the highest achievements of Madhva's

philosophy in the spheres of constructive exposition of Siddhanta and

polemical refutation of other views and

Dasgupta has paid him

logical skill

the

and depth of acute

highest

reinforcement of Siddhanta.

tribute

in

dialectical thinking

stands almost unrivalled in the whole of Indian

I.

Phil.

Vol. iv. p.

viii. ).

saying

shown

that

"the

by Vyasatirtha

thought "

His.

of

PREFACE
This

is

the

complete

first

Madhvacarya's Philosophy,
it

has been possible for

mised

my

critical

me

readers in the Preface to the

earnestly

am

indeed

Its

very

work, which

to bring out this

Dvaita School of Vedanta and

I

and comparative exposition of Sri

in English.

volume of

first

(1960),

Literature

my

materials for a close

in

and
its

had pro-

History of

its

companion

will place in the

volumes on the History of the Dvaita school

Madhva's philosophical system, as a whole,

so expeditiously.

hope that the present work, together with

the reading public ample

happy that

intensive

historical

hands of
study of

and

doctri-

nal aspects.

Works
by

on the subject of Madhva's philosophy, years ago

written

pioneers in the field

recent ones, in the

have

field,

now become outmoded,

naturally.

Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma's Reign of Realism

Indian Philosophy (Madras, 1937)

is

restricted

Of more
in

to an exposition of the

It does not draw

Brahmasurabh&sya or the Anu-

ten small philosophical monographs of Madhvacarya.

upon Madhva's major works

VyakhyUna.

It

is

like the

not, therefore, a complete

H. N. Raghavendrachar's Dvaita Philosophy,

Madhva's philosophy.
Place in the Veddnta

and organic presentation of

Mysore Uni. 1941

Madhva's thought as a pure Monism

revolutionary interpretation, which

is

Its

has erred in represeatfag

in principle.

This

is

a novel and

opposed to the established traditions

has not only not found any wide acceptance among

but has evoked refutations from orthodox spokesmen. His
scholars
advocacy of what he calls " Svarupa-Srsti " ( creation of the essence ) of

of the system.

It

Souls in Madhva's philosophy

is,

tion of Madhva's position, as

it

indeed, a very unfortunate misinterpreta-

has been explained in the works of accre-

dited exponents of the Siddhanta.

as " Paradhinavisfegapti ",
its

point,

if

Moreover, the doctrine of Creation

specially formulated

Raghavendrachar's interpretation

been dealt with in the present work.

is

by Madhva, would

accepted.

lose

This point has

xix

The treatment of Madhva's philosophy in Dr. Radhakrishnan's

( 1927 ) has been " brief and
summary ". We have a

Indian Philosophy

more

detailed

and sympathetic treatment of Madhva's thought in DasIV ( 1949). But it has not

gupta's History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.

taken any notice of the

Apart from

that,

exhaustive.

Obviously,

new

by Raghavendrachar's book.

issues raised

Dasgupta's treatment of the subject

it

is,

by no means,

could not be expected to be exhaustive as his

object was not to write an independent treatise on Madhva's philosophy

hut simply to deal with

it

as part of the general

thought known as Indian philosophy.

should have passed over

and

movement

of

but natural then, that he

It is

many important aspects

His method of approach has been more or

larger

of Madhva's thought.

less descriptive in that

he does
not attempt any expression of opinion on the issues involved or any evaluation of doctrines.

My

aim in writing

this

book

to give a complete, critical

is

and

Comparative exposition of Madhvacarya's system of philosophy, bringing

out its logical strength and metaphysical consistency and satisfyingness.
It is

intended to be an organic presentatidn of the system in all

tial

aspects.

It differs

Dasgipta%, in showing

from

how

all

the other

the concepts

philosophical system have been conceived

:

put into

'4>ttw aHied

works in the

field,

its essen-

including

and categories of Madhva's

and formulated and have been

coherent system and in what relation they stand to those of

and rival

systems.

It

brings out the special sighitcaiKse aid

'$*i0naection&'of Madhva's doctrines and the architectonic unity of iris

;Systein relation; to its parts. The reader is enabled to see for himself

and

appreciate the precise value and significance of

distinctive contributions to the perennial

problems of religion and philo-

particularly Indian philosophy, for which

Ciedit, such as the doctrines of Saksi, Svatantra,
sophy;

PalfadJfflaavisessapti.

interpretation

some of Madhva's

The present work may

he can justly elaim

Savi&gahheda and

therefore claim to be

a
and exposition of Madhva's philosophical system.

fresh
>

XX
Not only is such a systematic and
losophical system called for
it

but

critical

exposition of Madhva's phi-

has long been overdue. Metaphysically,

it

embodies the most powerful and sustained refutation of Vedaatic

monism.

It

has produced fronkrank thinkers like Madhva, Jayatfrtha

and Vy&satirtha.

ft

has ah extensive

philosophical penetration, in Sanskrit.

philosophical literature of rat*

It

has influenced the philosophical

thought of Caitanya and his followers in distant Bengal,

a Devotional

birth to

which

movement of

has

in its turn

enriched

languages of South India.

has

It

It

has given

the Haridasa Kuta, from within

1

the

literature

become

mt#r

of one of the
.

the living faith of a large section

of the Indian people, speaking seven different languages of present-day

India.

In

its

own

sophy.

system deserves

right, then, this

has been given to

it

by our

They have done

it

modem
an

religious systems' belonging

injustice

"more

ment.

It

is

system; while

philo-

under

minor

it

'

its

Every system of philosophy,, in

own

religious basis

and develop-

an error of judgment to suppose that the religious and

theological aspects have

systems of

by classifying

than

on Indian

to the religious history than to the

philosophical development of India".

India, not excluding the Advaita, has

much more attention

scholars and writers

it

overshadowed the philosophical,

the latter

in

Madhva's

stands in undiminished brightftess

Samkara and Ramanuja.

The

ta tfce

oult of the Saguna-Brahraan

has invaded a large part of the philosophical territory of Advaita.

The

recognition given to such aspects as Paftc&yatanapuja and Tantric forms of

worship of $rI-Cakra and Goddesses like Rajarajes van among

Ad vajtins

is by no means negligible in Advaita.

" attempts a harmonious combination of

shows that the religious element

As

for Ramanuja's system, he

absolutism with personal theism",

to

quote a modern authority.

To

quote another, " Ramanuja's beautiful stories of the other world, which

he narrates with the confidence of one who has personally assisted.at

the origination of the WQrld, carry

Ramanuja move with

as

no conviction.

much Olympian

The

followers of

assurance thro' the chambers

xxi

DMne

of the

krishnan,

/.

There

mindi as Milton thro

Phil,

as

is

system as there

ii,

p 720

much

is

'

Heaven "

the halls of

RaaM-

).

of substantial philosophical thought in Madhva's

in those of

$arhkara and Ramfinuja.

Fuilure to recog-

nize this, for want of a first-hand acquaintance with the works of the three
great master-minds of the system

does not

entitle responsible

Madhva,

Jayatfrtha and Vy&satrrtha.

authors and writers

on Indian philosophy

pronounce ex cathedra judgments on the philosophical

system or dispose of

generally due to a powerful attack

philosophy

is

when men

feel

status

of Madhva's

The

a few pages, summarily.

in

it

to

progress' Bf

on current

traditions

compelled to go back upon received opinions and raise

once more the fundamental questions which their predecessors 'had disposed of on the basis of some older schemes of thought.

thought initiated by
in India.

It

of

level

thereby

Madhva

opened up

and experience
deserves

a new

Sruti

open

certitude

and Anubhava.

careful study

by

all. lovers

Ved antic thought

man viz.,

to

For

much

Sakgt and

between

authority

this reason, this

philosophy

of thought, as a fresh adventure of

.>,....

the philosophical spirit.

Freedom of opinion and independence of thought

right

of

Madhva

philosopher.

every
has

but

point, then, in

'

three

pompously accusing him

and a half pages,,

it

an excuse

as has been

"philosophy, claiming to be a
ten
v

"

by an Indian

shown by some

opposing

In

fire

Sarhkara's

exercised this right of, a philosopher.

Sarhkara" and make

scholar.

'

for. this

as

:for dismissing

done

in

the

There

"born

his

is

bo

foe

of

philosophy

in

a recent work on Indian

Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, writ-

One

is

amazed

at

the .wrong sense of 'values'

of our living philosophers, which makes

on

birth-

philosophy,

them forget

claims and importance of living systems of Indian thought and

their attention

deeper

the

Samanvaya

of

line

The movement of

era in

of philosophy at

relaid the foundations

philosophical

new

constitutes a

those that are dead and have often

the

lavish

no more than a

xxii
purely antiquarian, technical or academic interest today. Without disputing

their right to recognition, I will only say that

deserve more attention

versity

Bombay

of

from our

has

hope that

example

this

and abroad.

Uni-

the

the right lead to the reorientation of

making

sion for the study of Madhva's philosophy, in

our country

systems

living

In this sense,

philosophers.

given

philosophical studies in independent India, by

fain

our

will

its

suitable

curricula.

provi-

would

be followed by other Universities in

The honor our temples of learning can

show to the

thinkers of this

our young

men and women

country

lies

providing

in

for

facilities

study their contributions to

to

human

thought.

from

Materials
the

system

have

the

selection of

fidelity

Sanskrit

original

been

has

materials

and sources of

texts

modern

in a

presented here,

modern philosophical temper

in view the
in

the

been

and

its

garb,

keeping

and

dislikes,

likes

and emphasis on problems.

scrupulously observed,

by

side

side

Doctrinal

with

fairness

and impartiality of judgment.

The
most

work

special merit of the

fully

documented work, so

being designed to be the

lies in its

far published,

on Madhva's philoso-

phy, quoting profusely from the accredited works and original sources
of the system, for purposes
this reason, the Sanskrit

the

body of

of

elucidation

and authentication.

the reading matter in English, in

many

places.

So much

textual matter could hardly have been pressed within the limits

few footnotes here and

significance

the

there.

On

the

other

hand,

the

full

and bearing of the quotations on the doctrines at

effectiveness

For

quotations have been freely introduced within

of their

contextual

appeal,

as

intended

of a

weight,

issue

by

and

their

particular interpretations could hardly have been conveyed to the reader,

in full force,

if

the quotations

had

all

been relegated to a separate

XX1U
section, at the

end of the book.

to be found.

hope the general reader

for the inconvenience that

however,

In these circumstances, a via media had

the point and pardon

will see

may be caused by

arrangement.

this

me

have,

introduce the texts in a way that would allow the general

tried to

reader to skip over them,

and the cost of publication.

by

interruption to

These quotations have not, however, been

would have increased the bulk of the work

translated as a rule, as that

to be brought out

much

without

necessary,

if

thought or intellectual appeal.

But

their general

purport has been sought

the trend of the discussion or exposition.

These

quotations are also intended to serve as a corpus of reference-materials

(

which

will

be welcomed by many, as the printed editions of the original

works themselves are now out of print and very

difficult to

obtain

for

those interested in pursuing specialized study of the system and to stimulate their interest in going to the originals for further light.

have gone to the standard works of the different systems of Indian

philosophy, in Sanskrit, for purposes of comparing and contrasting the

views of

Madhva and

wherever necessary.

works

his
I

commentators with those of the other schools,

have consulted and have often quoted from the

modern Indian and Western

ot several

Eastern and Western thought.

writers and their

My

writers,

obligations

in

English,

on

to these distinguished

works have been acknowledged in the body of the work,

and in the footnotes.

This

is

also the first

modern work,

in English,

on Madhva's system

to present adequate collateral evidence from the standard works of the

Advaita, Vislstadvaita and other schools, for purposes of intelligent

cism, comparison
significance of

and evaluation.

Madhva's contributions to

and philosophy,
thought between

criti-

In drawing attention to the value and

the various

problems of religion

I have invited attention to striking parallelisms

Madhva and some Western

Christian thinkers like St.

of

philosophers including

Thomas Aquinas and Ralph Cudworth.

have

xxiv.

e#o drawn

attention to those aspects of

modern note or
his predecessors

and contemporaries.

of his thought

have not

sized

Madhva's thought which

are strikingly in advance of his times

So

far as

been touched

by any of the modern scholars,

am aware,

strike

and the views of

these aspects

upon or adequately empha-

who have

written

on the subject of

Madhva's philosophy.
For reasons explained

Biographical Note,

in the

both interpretative and

substantial material,

have incorporated

dialectical,

from the works

of Jayatirtha and Vy&satlrtha. Further materials from

Yyasatirtha have been reserved for another

work

In discussing doctrinal and philosophical issues,

my

ooafined

except where

further examination or

criticism

of

have generally

That

is

why

then*

dountef*-

was felt to be desirable or necessary

the interests of further elucidation or reinforcement

doctrines.

works of

attention to the problems of 'Madhva's philosophy alone,-

doctrines, pertaining to other schools,

iii

the

have in view.

of Madhva's

own

have not entered into any elaborate polemical

" Mithyatva ", the

" Adhy&sa ",
proofs,

discussions of such doctrines of the Advaita school as

nature

of

" Avidya

" Bkajlvajrianavada"

definitions

its

",

and

" $abdaparoksa ", " Pratikarmavyavasthfi. " and so

on, as falling outside the scope of this work.

Before concluding,
express

my

Scientific

have a very pleasant duty to discharge,

to

deep sense of gratitude and thankfulness to the Ministry of

Research and Cultural Affairs, Government of India, for the

generous grant of Rs. 2450/- in aid of the cost of publication of this woik.

As a

Bharatiya,

recognition of

My

feel

richly

my work from

the

rewarded and honored by

next duty and an equally pleasant one

to

assistance to complete the work.

the

Siddhanta UnnahinI

Ruparel College,
( S.

M.

S.

O.

token of

Government of my country.

and individuals who have responded

management of

this

my

is

to.thank the institutions

appeal for further financial

have to mention among these the

Bombay,

the

Srlman

Madhva

Sabha, Tirupati, the Akhila Bharata

XXV
Madhva Mahamaijdal,
Plthas

Udipi,

the Svamijis

of the following

Madhva

Raghavendra Svami Mutt, Nanjangud, Sri Adamar Mutt,

Sri

Sri Sode Vadiraja Mutt and Sri Pejavar Mutt, Udipi and SYl Vyasaraja

Mutt, Sosale

and

several enlightened

friends and well-wishers.

tender

my

Madhva gentlemen

to have this

work

printed

Bombay,

and published on

my

my

for

coming forward

behalf.

thanks, heartily, to

my

for the keen interest and ready enthusiasm he has

me by

my esteemed

heartfelt thanks to all of them.

thank the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan,

particular pleasure to record

It gives

shown

in

helping

reading and passing the proofs and in preparing the Index etc.

Ruparel College,

Bombay-16.
1st March, 1962.

B. N. K.

me

son Sudhlndra,

SHARMA.

PHILOSOPHY
O

SRI

MADHVACARYA

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

CHAPTEK

THE FUNCTION AND GOAL OF PHILOSOPHY

There are no people
this

who could be impervious

world for an explanation of

its

to the

demands

of

apparent chaos and contradictions.

Only an all-embracing explanation of life consistent with experience

would satisfy the requirements of reason, man's highest instrument for
For this reason, philosophy cannot be a mere
the regulation of life.
exercise of the intellect or a

pursuit for sheer

aesthetic

interest

or

must have a spiritual raison d'etre and must satisfy man's

spiritual needs.
It must deal with problems which force themselves on
our thought and press for a solution, viz., what man is, why he is conditioned as he is, what his goal is and how he is to attain it.
curiosity.

The

It

question

philosophy

is

being, then, has a philosophy of his

is

one of philosophy or no
Every rational
own, whether he knows it or not. It

not, therefore, merely

but one of good philosophy or a bad one.

the business of

an earnest aspirant

to go thro' the entire process of

thought, under proper spiritual guidance and find a solution of the

The

problems which vex him.

right lines.

Sastras

are there to guide

him on

Philosophy asks for an imaginable unity in place of the mysterious

multiplicity.

But neither a pure abstraction of being nor a mere

totality

Some community

or aggregate of beings can give us true unity.

" The question is how
reciprocity there must be.

little

would

suffice.

or
It

seems clear that either each must be connected with all, in at least one
way; or that all must be connected with some one. There must be a
universal principle directly relating all or a Supreme Individual to which
;

all

are related.
1.

The
Cf :

latter

would imply the former insofar as

3Wll3+ldt

W- WWT ft M^:

* =##<fofo

=JRiR

qasrft WM^c4cil fag:

ftsWRTRt g&yiuitffefr

thro' their

II

Madhva, AV.

ii,

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHVACARYA

common

Supreme One,

relation to the

each other."

indirectly, to

Madhva

all

would be

related, tho' only

a principle of unity in the unity of governand

control
of the Universe, by Brahman. He finds
ment, sustenance
finds such

this idea tellingly expressed in the Sruti text

Independent Brahman

Supreme and

The

time

in

dependent

of the

explanation of

that

all else

as

realities

Hence

is.

much

not so

is

the

logical

the cause

and metaphysical

the definition of

principle

the

of Independence in Madhva's system

^fqjrftrfcTJUfws^Hmilf^
Reality

thinking

Power

nite

a world of external

self,

Jayatlrtha, TSt

mind, three primary data

realities

and indications of an

the
Infi-

Tho' these three data are commonly

above them.

rising

q^H^H

to an inquiring

presents,

postulated as distinguishable essences, terms like 'reality', 'substance'

or
all
It

'

existence

persons,

',

are not applied to all of them, in the same sense, by

in

stages of spiritual or philosophical development.

all

has happened time and again in the history of Philosophy, both in

the East and in the West,

one or the other of them has been

Such shifting
of emphasis has led to the emergence of several forms of Materialistic, Panegoistic and Monistic heresies which, in the history of specuthat the

raised to a position of greater prominence than the rest.

lation, are quite familiar.

be

easily

experience.

Justifications for each point of

Self

so borne in

It is

The

honor.

The

found.

view could
immediate starting point of all
upon us as to easily usurp the place of
the

is

existence of things outside of us in time and space and

even the reputed existence of a Deity are,

after all, secondary, being

reached only thro' acts of private consciousness and

we know, be

illusory

may, for aught

or at any rate, not so irrefragably real as the

From an opposite point of view, Matter which can be

self.
and measured and is therefore tangible, could be set up as a
than either

reality

abstractions
Infinite

by

God

its

side.

To

Mystics,

the

to shrink into

sterner

shadowy

on the other hand,

the

Being alone, conceived as

(
1.

who seem

or the souls,

moved

James Ward, Pluralism and Theism,

by Jayatlrtha, in his

o.

D.

M.

p. 42.

on TS. See P.

5.

S. q.

An

by Madhva, B.

identical view

is

T. p.

78

propounded

THK FUNOriON AND QOAh OF PHILOSOPHY

is

so all-absorbing as to transcend

all

that there

An

is

all

and

constitutes the sole reality of

or can be.

unbalanced exaltation of any one of these three data, over the

realm of thought, feeling or action, is the cause of much false

rest in the

The more pretentious philosophies of

philosophy and bad morals.

which have sought to resolve the three data

into one, have failed inexorably in the end or have been obliged to make
compromises, or concede some sort of a " conditional " or 'phenomenal"

ancient and

modern

times,

reality to the other data.

senses,

If the material

world, which

fills

the horizon of

would lead
West or the Carvaka philosophy of the East.
explanation would land us in a Panegoism, Solipsism or

taken to be the single reality that matters most,

is

it

us to a Materialism of the

The

ego-centric

Subjective
attitude

Idealism,

would end

But

in

while the theocratic

Ekajivavada and the like
an Absolutism, Deism or Pantheism.
;

the true function of philosophy, aided

by reason and

experience,

by what relationship of the threefold data of experience

could man's thirst for an ultimate explanation of the enigma of existence
be really and fully satisfied. Reason seeks to interpret the plurality of
things and processes which constitute the world as a system of parts
evolved or conditioned by one Universal Power or Mind so as to be facAs a true philotors of one whole and subject to one universal reason.
is

to determine

Madhva ignores neither of the three data of experience ; nor does

he exaggerate the claims of any one of them at the expense of the other.
The changeable no less than the unchangeable, the Independent no less
than the dependent, is an ultimate component of Reality as a whole
sopher,

fefW

ft

sW, *m*t

(MS.

P-

286 b.)

metaphysics reais one of profoundest conclusions of Dvaita

by the evidence of Pratyakga, Anumana and Sabdapram&pas.
the universe if we
It would .not be possible to understand or explain
One
the Deity.
to
more
so
are indifferent to Matter and Spirits, much
by
guided
be
and
knowledge
own
must face facts established by our
This

ched

them, in interpreting them philosophically.

The

fact of

knowledge

is

indisputable.

And as

there can be

no know-

or knowable object, the reality of the

knower and objects of knowledge must be accepted. Whatever else
we may choose to admit or reject, absolute scepticism as to the possibility
ledge without a knower, a

known

of knowledge of any kind

our knowledge of reality, so

is

Even supposing that all

has been proved to be contradicted, the

unsustainable.

far,

PHILOSOPHY

SEI

Off

MADHVACARYA

knowledge has still to be admitted. One cannot deny the

knowledge and yet claim that knowledge has been proved to
be contradicted. Madhva says well, referring to oriharsa's dogged
possibility of

possibility of

scepticism
3T^ smftfcf ft|SKH*f*ddlft ft

mfa

Hlrftetffl JR:

At

the worst, thinking or the

HIHlg>(lRctl

mind would

(AV).

II

survive as the residuum of

still

universal doubt.

Starting then,

of

life,

we

from knowledge

beings like ourselves. 1

Can any

as one of the uncriticized certainties

are faced with a plurality of objects

We

and with other thinking

and pain.

think and reason, feel pleasure

of these states be less evident to us than our

In conceding, then, the existence of our

own good

own existence 1
we are also

selves,

forced to admit the reality of our most intimate and poignant experiences
pleasure and pain, in short, the joys, sorrows

of
life

and

limitations of

tsfi[ 5raf

?t

m&ntf&i
m'>

srefr

f%%

=* flf

StfJRt

ft

SOTm%T

*rn%r

f%r :f%tf ?rr#

II

w^

(AV.,

ii,

The fact of knowledge, again, establishes the presence of many more

and persons besides ourselves. Reality is not apprehended as
one but as many; and there is no reason to reject the apprehension of
things

many

the

as an 'appearance'

3*TO#P#? ^*jf T
It is at this

point that

Madhva

^T ft

(AV).

introduces the philosophical distinc-

between the Independent and the Dependent. The reals cannot all of
them be Independent, lest there should be chaos and strife. Neither can

tion

all

be dependent, without an Independent principle to relate them.

dependents cannot obviously control one another, without a

Principle
strife

Otherwise, there would be a regress of

which they would destroy one another and

to connect them.

and opposition

thro'

perish in the transaction.

1.

The
higher

%rfe#* *nw& tR^ssr wf^r

(AV).

THE FUNCTION. AND GOAL OF PHILOSOPHY

And
to

there

would be no

reality left in the

end

It is, thus,

very necessary

dichotomize reality into "Sva-tantra" and "Para-tantra" 1

shows that

the

human

and

souls

Experience

material environments are not

their

independent:

{DvMaia-Stotra of Madhva).

human

Were

beings independent masters

own

of their

we
human

destiny,

should expect to find peace and plenty and bliss unalloyed, in

We

life.

should lack nothing and have everything for the asking.

we know only too

well that

it

3ffiJTRJfftr:

g^'sTtab

This shows that things are directed by an

want of better name,

the

"Paramatman" or

But

cannot be:
l

( bvet.

Up.

i,

2. )

unknown agency

which, for

world agrees to designate as "God" or

Supreme Being'.

the

all

'the

In this way, then, does

Madhva

of Matter, Souls, Svabhava,

Kala,

establish

the existence

Karma and

and

reality

other eternal verities

under the control of a Supreme Being. The Svatantra and the Paratantra
The dependence

are thus the fundamental presuppositions of his system.

of the

finite reals is the

also to the great

Nyaya

proof of the existence of the Deity, according

philosopher, Udayana:

(Nyaya-Kusumanjali,

i.)

The aim of philosophy,

then, would be not merely to realize the

between 'appearance' and 'reality'; but to understand and
realize the still more important distinction between the Independent
Real and the dependent realities. Madhva is not, therefore, an
uncritical realist who takes everything to be real; nor a sentimental
distinction

who would deny all but one reality. He is for a rational realism,
which would admit whatever is established on the uncontradicted evidence
of the Pramaoas, the senses, the mind and the Saksl, in addition to
idealist

fle^iftwi^igrot:

if^

wi^, % n
*$*r

w&

Etiwft suit:

sira;,

cw

3Prt?M

m$ *m

"JKd^iftikflfJfaiN:

mrnft-

fts<9ift>wir

(Jayatlrtha' Ts)

PHILOS OFHY

He

reason and revelation.

01' Sill

introduces a

MADHVAcAEYA
new element of

value into the

problem of Pram&nas in the form of the concept of

Saksi, whose nature and scope will be explained in the appropriate
place.
The Saksi is man's highest instrument of all valid knowledge and
It is on its evidence that we become conscious, however
experience.

discussion of the

dimly, of the existence of a higher power than ourselves, in this vast

and mysterious Universe.

It will, therefore, be seen that any other approach to the problem
of philosophy and any other analysis of the reals or the data of experi-

abhava ) as in Ny&ya
( bhd,va and
and Acit ( as in Jain or Ramanuja view) would be
irrelevant to the aim and purpose of religion and philosophy, which is
to evaluate phenomena and enable man to get out of the bondage of
life which is the outcome of a misplaced assumption of his independence
ence into 'positive' and 'negative' reals
thought, or as Cit

svatantryabhim&na) in

l.

Wf

i^fcT

it

1
.

?&$, 3TMPT13CW ^cT^aicWT

'

aHr*IT, 'FnWTg$Tf^ftl<n f

3T,

F^?S

tolfap'fcMF 3T

TOSiqWffsfcfi

tf&i

TO

5I*RcT

^g,

ibid

).

CHAPTER

II

MADHVA'S THOUGHT IN RELATION TO EARLIER

AND CONTEMPORARY SCHOOLS
The system of Madhva

is

founded on the continuous authority of

a wide range of religious and philosophical literature of India which has

been the main source of Indian thought, in its widest sense.-.The history of
the evolution of Madhva's thought from these source-books of his system

and the history of its development at the hands of Madhva and his
numerous commentators and expositors have been dealt with by me in
the two volumes of my
History of the Dvaita School of Vedanta and
'

Its Literature

The

'.

present

work aims

at

fairly

complete and comprehensive

own works
and elaborated by his illustrious commentator
Jayatirtha, in the first instance and by the famous dialectician of the
Mftdhva school, Vy&saraya, who came a hundred and twentyfive years

critical exposition

and as

of Madhva's philosophy, as presented in his

further interpreted

after Jayatirtha.
If

Indian philosophy

is

to be accepted as

interpretation of certain basic texts

and

much more than an

traditions, tho' not as completely

detached from them, attempts should be

systems of thought and their logical,

made

to present the various

epistemological and ontological

foundations and their metaphysical superstructure in their architectonic

unity.

The philosophical system of Madhva and

his

commentators has

not received adequate attention, from this point of view.

No

Indian

doubt,

philosophers,

particularly the Vedantins, have

stressed the limitations of discursive thought

and shown the

possibilities

of spiritual intuition in understanding the nature of reality, urging the

necessity to correct

and supplement the conclusions of pure

metaphysical speculations with the help of one's

of bygone generations, handed

down

own

intuitions

thro' the Scriptures

and
and those
logic

and intended to
and dis-

be recaptured in our own religious and spiritual experiences

coveries.

But

this

is

not to say that reason has had no part to play in the

evolution of their thought.

cannot spin out

its

Philosophy, as an interpretation of reality,

theories in vacuo,

As Dr. Radhakrishnan

puts

it,

away from the world of experience.

perhaps a

little

too extravagantly,

" the

PHILOSOPHY OF SKI MADHVACAEYA

Indian philosophers

first arrive at

a system of consistent doctrine and

then look about for texts of an earlier age, to support their position.

They

either force

away" (I

Phil,

them

into such support or ingeniously explain

them

i p. 130).

All schools of Indian philosophy, save the Carvaka, show two main
aspects in their

system-building

one rational or philosophical and the

The forand constructs

a metaphysical theory on certain a priori epistemological and ontological
foundations of its own, on which they erect a full-fledged system and
other a dogmatic, textual, revelatory or authoritarian aspect.

mer examines

correlate

ed

it

the fundamental presuppositions of thought

which have come to be regardof philosophical knowledge and inspiration, in the

to the interpretations of texts

as ultimate sources

land and community of their birth and invested with special authority

and sanction, on problems of philosophy. While accepting the judgments of established traditions and authority, on such problems, the
Indian philosophers have, to an equal extent, used the methods of
reasoned thought and criticism, to examine the presuppositions of their
textual systems and the nature and constitution of their categories of
thought and interpretation, in the light of independent proofs.

make out a case for their

on such unexceptionable

In doing so, they have always tried to

respective theories before the bar of reason,
criteria

of system-building as adherence to

strictly

philosophical

method and outlook, sound logical deductions and analysis of principles,

consistency of thought and faithfulness to experience.
It is the business
of philosophy to look at experience as a whole and take note of the
suggestions forced upon it by the mind of man and confirm them as
theories if they have the requisite explanatory value.

Such

is

Hindu method of Tattvaniroaya (truthbody of any Siddhanta, then, there is a good

analysis and exposition of the principles of epistemology,

the essence of the

determination).

deal of critical

In the

and metaphysics of one's own school, together with a reasoned

As a modern writer 1 puts it
" Philosophy is essentially a collective and co-operative business. Effective co-operation consists in disagreement.
The true process of philologic

examination of those of other schools.

sophy,

as a science,

positions, objections

is that of a Platonic dialogue, in which the proand rejoinders of numerous interlocutors are found

Arthur 0. Loyejoy, The Mevolt of Dualism, Open Court Publishing Company

America,

MADHVA'S THOUGHT IN RELATION TO OTHER SCHOOLS

focussed upon a given question and the argument shapes

own immanent
Sastric

dialectic,

discussion

to a

in Sanskrit

than the Platonic dialogue in

conclusion".
philosophical

itself thro' its

The Vikalpa method of

writings is nothing more

perfect form. Every important doctrine

and metaphysics, of the different schools of
Indian philosophy, has been developed on the same lines. They are
the result of a long and arduous process of thought-dissection.
No
doctrine or strand of philosophic belief can thus be put down as
absolutely original, isolated from or uninfluenced by contemporary
its

of logic, epistemology

opinion or as devoid of a nexus with the past.

So

the two aspects of rational thought and textual

and synthesis intertwined in most of the Indian schools
that it is often difficult to pronounce any opinion whether they are
actuated more by a predominantly philosophical purpose or an authoritarian outlook. They disclose both kinds of leanings and it is often a question
of emphasis whether a given system is to be treated as being more specuWestern scholars have
lative and rational than dogmatic and textual.
generally held that the philosophy of the Vedanta is essentially dogmatic,
closely are

interpretation

more than a

being nothing

ingenious

clever,

and elaborate system of

good deal of

textual interpretation of the Prasthanas, doubtless with a

philosophic insight and acumen.

as truly philosophical,

outcome of a

But

insofar as

achievement cannot be accepted

its

the pursuit of philosophy is not the

a quest of

disinterested love of thought or

cution.

truly philosophical system, in conception,

That

it is

bound up with

the

down by former

method and

generations,

it

selection, emphasis, alteration

nality

It

and

has merely used

criticism, in the

fullest

with the help of canons of interpretation.

call

of

name of interpretation

or obscure text or with contradictory ones.

Ekavakyata

The commentators are seldom

a halt to philosophic speculation

when

They

faced with a trying

exercise their reason to

synthesize and extract sense out of seeming enigmas

In this they bid

right

embodies the greatest independence of thought and origi-

of conceptions under the guise of Reconciliation

obliged to

is

and built on its foundations

a new and vigorous system of thought, reserving the

(Vyakhyana).

exe-

interpretation of sacred texts

only circumstantial in that true to Indian traditions,

material handed

but has

Others regard the

been undertaken to achieve individual salvation.

Vedanta as a

truth,

and

contradictions.

fair to direct the authorities, instead of their letting

them

PHILOSOPHY OF SKI MADHVAcARYA

10

direct their thoughts. 1

to

In

elsewhere,

on

philosophy can claim

any other attempts made

this sense, then, Indian

be as genuinely philosophical in
the basis of pure reason.

spirit as

It

thus a purely historical

is

some are inclined

The supreme place Madhva has
assigned to the Saksi as "Upajlvyapramana" of Scripture, in the event of
the latter encroaching on the legitimate jurisdiction of the former is a

made Indian philosophy

accident that has

to

view

it

as incorrigibly

textual tho'

text-ridden.

example of the unflinching rational outlook of Madhva thought.

But with all the limitations imposed on the free movement of thought
by the respect for texts and traditions, the Indian philosophers have shown
striking

themselves to be actuated by an essentially philosophic spirit like their

compeers in the west and have risen to great heights in the art of philosophizing, which for alertness of mind, acuteness of thought and boldness

of ideas, cannot be rivalled by others, claiming to be more scientific or

free from dogmas.
The achievements of Indian thought cannot, therefore,
be said to be lacking in merit or devoid of a true philosophic spirit tho'
;

from view by the trappings of authority in which

they are often clothed and concealed.
these are often hidden

Criticism

sophic

life,

is

like

survival of the

the life-breath of Indian philosophical systems, as philobiological, is

fittest.

Each of

have contributed something to

governed by the same law of strife and

the older systems of thought should thus

Madhva thought

also, at least negatively,

by way of material for criticism. It is not as if his system alone grew

up in vacuo, without reference to anything that went before. Historical
interpretation must admit, here, as in other cases of contact of minds, the
impact of contemporary thought, and echoes of forgotten schools which
tho' then out of court or not "living" must still have continued to exercise a great deal of intellectual influence on successive thought currents
by their technique and methods of treatment,
in short, by laying down
the high-ways and byways of thought along which all current ontological
and epistemological progress had to be made with freedom to differ in
details and conclusions.

The

critical side

of Madhva's system, consisting partly in

its dialecti-

with earlier schools both major and minor, shows how it

was able not only to avoid their pitfalls and mistakes but also to absorb

cal struggles

Madhva's plea

for

Upajlvyapramiiiiais.

See

Of.

Literature, Vol.

II.

interpreting

my

Hittory

pp, 120-24.

"Tattvam
of Dvaita

asi

"

School

in

conformity

with

of Vedanta and Itt

MADHVA'S THOUGHT IN RELATION TO OTHBK SCHOOLS

some of

good points, or improve upon them or transcend them into

That such impact of ideas is by no means denied in
Madhva's case is clear from the description of his commentary on the
their

a higher system.

Brahmasutra as a critique of twentyone earlier ones in the field. A

not an iconoclast out and out. He receives ideas while in the act
of demolishing older opinions.
The contact of minds is a very subtle
affair. Deeper things happen there than meet the surface.
As Vijaylndra
Tlrtha observes, in his MadhvMhva-Kariitakoddhara, as an exponent of a
critic is

new
his

Madhva

Prasthana,

some, or

from

exercised his right to agree with or differ

doing so rejected much that was cumberin the older theories and used whatever ideas were

compeers, to the
effete

full

and

in

sound tho' not in the same place or within the same

Often in his criticisms, he rescued and rehabilitated ideas of
permanent significance from the ill-balanced views of earlier and confundamentally

design.

temporary schools and realigned them to better advantage.

The Carvaka system

is

condemned

outright for

its

unmitigated

and of sense-awareness is the pivot of realism which is accepted by Madhva. The Carvaka
is condemned, unreservedly for his hedonism, for his atheism and for his
Materialism (Dehatmavada); but not for his bold stand for the supremacy
of Pratyaksa Pramana.
Only, he had stopped short at Pratyaksa, refusing to go beyond, which is rather unphilosophical in that there are more
things in the Universe than could be measured by Pratyaksa alone.
Enjoyment of life is no sin. One need not, like the Buddhist, give a
counsel of despair to shun the world, abhor life and court gradual
hedonism.

But

its

faith in the reality of experience

suicide or extinction.

salutary advice

$5 gfS3

f%R#TOfWT

Mlmamsakas, surrender

the

=Rif

?(cfaq

aim of

t^fciq says

Madhva with

the

one should not, like the

to a mess of pottage, Svarga,
for

life

understood in the transient sense of a limited pleasure awm l*mcti aPJJT

To take such a view of life's purpose is to miss the true goal of the Vedic
I

The Vedas enjoin

philosophy of Karma, says Madhva.

the performance

of sacrifices with set rewards, not from the highest point of view, but
only in a limited sense. Karma-phala, attractive as it is, is not the ultimate
intention or message of the Scripture.

It

is

only an inducement to effort

1
of the right kind with a view to raising the spiritual standard of

higher and higher

l.

^TCT*rf

and taking him on and on

W&fc:

wffim

Bhag. XI,

35#>r ft*&

sm

3,

46
(

the

*W

XI,

3,

upward march, by

MmH
44

).

xii,

man

stages.

21, 23

).

PHILOSOPHY OF ^EI MADHVAcAKYA

12

Karma
be-all

is

and

only a step in the ladder tho' a necessary one.

end-all of scripture as the

Karma

It

is

Mlmamsakas would have

not the
it.

The

performed without attachment and for the sake of

no other reward than the satisfaction of God and as His worship
best

is

that

mn(BMg.

tRwf ffofa
H2jf%

(CM.

//?. i,

iv.

29,49)

is

ft

qflsffeorPT (iv,

30,40)

^ $R *0Wf

While accepting the Mlm&msaka doctrine of

7,6).

Svatahpr&maijya of Sabda,
matter of the Veda

fiffcft

Madhva emphasizes

God and

that the highest subject-

not merely a round of duties or acts of

sacrifice.

and moral code ha^e some affinity to Madhva's

The new type of Vedic sacrifices with flour-made animals (Pistapas'u yajnas) 1 instead of living animals, introduced by Madhva as a much
needed reform in Brahminical society was, in all probability, partly due
Jain philosophy

thought.

and influence of Jain ideas. A powerful commuIt was also

Kanara district then, as now.
under Jain rule in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Madhva's views
on some questions of logic, epistemology and ontology show many striking parallels to and affinities with corresponding Jain theories, notably
on the nature of the Universal (Jati) and in the theory of the self as an
The
object of perception (Aham sukhi) which is denied by the Advaitin.
recognition of certain types of cognitions like Manafyparyd,ya and Kevala
in Jain philosophy, corresponds in a measure, to the Yogipratyaksa and
Kevala-Pramana of Madhva. The self-revelatory capacity of knowledge
to the moral pressure

nity of Jainas inhabited the S.

^rRJOcflT-' *EfflTO3 is based on the triunity of Jfi&tr,

and Jn&na, all of them being admitted to be revealed in
knowledge. So also, the Jain conception of Substance in relation to its

of the perceiver

Jiieya

attributes, as

a distinction of reference and not of existence: ^'RFWTc'T^ ?P5J

is perfected by Madhva, by formulating
it,

as Haribhadra Suri, puts

the doctrine of "Savis'egabheda", to hold

together, in

one integrated mould.

The

the

substance and attributes

further distinction of qualities

or attributes as "Paryaya" and "Svabhava", in Jain ontology,

to Madhva's distinction

'Tavad-dravyabhavi".

is

parallel

of attributes into "Ayavad-dravyabhavi" and

The

Jain dichotomy of reality into Jlva and Ajiva

appears in the form of Svatantra and Paratantra, with greater philosophi1.

The M. Vij. (IX, 4i-50).]reers to an actual performance of a Pistapaiayaga,
under Madhva's direction and the opposition he had to encounter. For a work in
defence of Pitapjiuyajna see under Vijaylndra Tirfcha, in my ITutory ofDoaita
School of Vedanta and XU Lit, Vol. ii, p. 187.

MADHVA'S THOUGHT IN BlLAXION TO OTHBB SCHOOLS

cal aptness

and justification, as pointed out by Jayatlrtha.

doctrine of the Jainas that the whole Universe

is

filled

The

13

peculiar

with Jlvas,

is

also

shared by Madhva: WTISpn^S SFRTT: J#KRPt: (VTN).

.Madhva

He

as.

is

not enamoured of the extreme realism of the

recognizes the need for periodical creations

He

the Universe.

and

Mimamsak-

dissolutions of

also sets right the extreme epistemological realism of

and admits the possibility of error in human cognitions.

He is for calling error by its proper name and not for confusing the issue
by using misleading names like "Akhyati", "Akhyatisamvalitasatkhyati",
and so on. But his realism does not demand that the object of illusions
must have a reality of Us own elsewhere ( anyatra sat ) as the Naiyayikas
would have it. If experience is any test, the object of illusions is an
absolute unreality. At the same time, Madhva takes care to state that
no illusions could be explained without the acceptance of two necessary
1
reals, - a substratum (adhisth&na) and a Pradhana ( prototype ) of the
the Prabhakaras

superimposed object.

Madhva

much

was

and outand methodology

(Prakriya) of the older schools of Nyaya, Mlmamsa and Vedanta. The
interpretative principle of " Upakramaprabalya " of the Purva-Mimamsa is set aside by him in favor of the more logical " Upasarhharapra-

moded,

in

has rejected

the

that

defective, superfluous

conceptions, categories,

definitions

He

2
balya", on the authority of the Brahmatarka.

has given us his

own

revised views about the Vedantic conceptions of Saksl, Svaprakasatva,

Bhavarupajriana,

Maya, Pratibimba,

etc.

He

has propounded a fresh

doctrine of validity of knowledge with special reference to the principle

on the subject. Tho'

by him, the merit of
these new doctrines lies in the scientific and forceful way in which he has
and fitted them into their proper
potentialities
their
developed
places, in his own realistic metaphysics and elucidating their bearings
to all the earlier theories

of Saksj, as a corrective

traceable to

some of the

older sources referred to

* wfafrffi wft
2.

Madhva

refers to the

The question has been

thesis of

thesia of

fully discussed

" Upakrama-prabalya "

UpasamMra-Vijaya

Mm-m $

**

ft n

" Upasamharaprabalya "

vtn. )

in his

A V.

and established, refuting the counterand in the

) in "Vyasaraya's T.T.,
For a summary of their arguments see my

of Advaitins

of Vijaylndra Tirtha.

History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature, Vol.

ii.

pp. 54-56

and 183-86

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHVACABYA

14

upoa the

different

aspects

of

his

thought.

Similarly,

his

revised

Pramana as " yathctrtham ", so as to embrace all types of

valid knowledge and its instruments and to ensure the validity of memory
is a significant departure and advance on contemporary thought.
definition of

'

'

But, tho' open to the ideas of the older systems and their thought-

Madhva has made many striking contributions of his own, in

many important respects. It is these that entitle him to a place of honor
patterns,

in Indian philosophy.

He

has drawn the attention of the philosophical

world to the imperative need for going in for a new set of concepts and
categories like "Svatantra" and " Paratantra ", Saksl, Visfesas, Bheda
as dharmisvampa and as savMes&bhinna from it, " Svarupabheda and
" Svarupa-taratamya " among selves, Bimbapratibimbabhava relation
thro' " Paradhlnabetween Brahman and Jivas and ' eternal creation
visegapti". These ideas were so radically different from those till then en'

tertained in dealing with philosophical questions, that if their necessity

was demonstrated, the whole treatment of the problems of philosophy

would change its drift and enter upon a fresh phase. We shall see
something of this new aspect and direction of thought, ushered in by

Madhva,

in the chapters that follow.

"

CHAPTER

III

MADHVA'S SAMANVAYA OF UPANIADIC PHILOSOPHY

Labels are convenient as a rule, tho' they might mislead at times. Insofar as

Madhva admits a

Brahman

plurality

of selves,

for ever distinct

from

always subject to and guided by It, his system might be

tentatively regarded as a Pluralistic Theism.
But it would not express
the whole truth about the system, in its highest reach. There has been
a persistent tendency, however, to represent the philosophy of Madhva as
an " absolute Dualism ". This has naturally prevented the system from
getting

tho'

msed of

its

recognition, as a

sound philosophical system

in

the

Vedantic one at that for most people have an

aversion for the term " Dualism " which has some unpleasant associaplace and

first

tions.

That apart,

" Dualism "

". l

signifies

Madhva

the

recognition

of

" two

a Dualist in this
It will be shown, presently, that neither the term
sense.
Dualism
nor its Sanskrit equivalent " Dvaita " is commensurate with the
highest metaphysical ideology of Madhva's thought, which consists in
the acceptance of One Independent Transcendent-cum-Immanent Being
as the Source and explanation of all finite existence.
independent principles

is not, certainly,

'

There
of

is

a fundamental difference in outlook between the 'dualism'

Madhva and

schools.

those of the Samkhya-Yoga and Nyaya-Vais'egika

Dualism has as much to do with the question of the status

Neither the Purusas

of the reals recognized, as with their number.
nor the Prakrti have, in Madhva's system, an independent status or
functioning-capacity as in the

5, crtrct ifrsi#fc erewrfcr ?r

Nor does

ascribe

it

to

Samkhya:

^n^fs^rg

God

the

(NS.

position,

p.

329

).

merely, of an Onlooker

(Drasta) or a deus ex machina, or even of a co-operating force in the

cosmic evolution, as is done by the Nyaya and

Deism has no attraction for Madhva. God
universe; but in

it.

By

virtue of these

Yoga
is

schools.

two aspects,

He becomes

2
very ground of the reals, the giver of their reality to them.

1,

See Dogbert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, 1902,

2.

cf.

WttftS

5Tfl%:

'

cl<&4|fiftJ

Mere

not only above the

p. 84.

'fflcWHt.'

the

PHILOSOPHY OP &tf MADHVAcARXA

16

One
amental

distinguishing

mark

of the Vedanta in

absolute principle which

all its

forms

Stfwimi (a^irlftft'WI

Nothing

else (

plained reference of

Such a transcendent reference

Sariikhya

IT

SPTJTOT^

3n%ft

all.

smgqH

Brahman

self-explicable.

m h*i^i4kh^iRw^)R fgt

NS. p. 329

the fund-

the ultimate source and explanation, both logi-

is

and ontological, of all

world is self-explained or

cal

is

Universe has to be traced to an

belief that everything in the

while

its

acceptance

).

the only

is

is

denied by the

H gp%rftr

in the
self-ex-

& awft

by no means a

is

Yoga

metaphysical necessity in the Nyaya-Vai&sika or

systems.

strict

The

Vedanta, on the other hand, traces the world of matter and souls to
Brahman, which is the cause of the world and gives meaning to its being

and becoming.

Brahman is differSamkara equates it

This metaphysical dependence of the Universe

on.

ently conceived in the several systems of Vedanta.

The world of appearance would not be

Brahman, which is superimposed on the

with an Adhyasa (appearance).

there but for the reality of the

world. It has no existence outside the Brahman's: (cf^Tc? rfift$ri*rra:

Samkara, B.S.B, ii, 1. 14,). Sridhara explains the inner significance of
I

WWo^y.

the Advaitic position: ^Ufl^r

TRRt

( c.

on Bhagavata,

i,

"in

1, 1):

as

virtue

immw ftwsnfsft wm^of whose

reality,

even the

unreal creation appears to be real".

Rfimanuja, on the other hand, views the dependence of the world

of matter and souls on God, on the analogy of the dependence of the

human body on
of the world.

the soul, for

When

its

subsistence.

be, in the case of the world and the

true that our bodies cannot exist
life-giving capacity of the soul,

insofar as the soul

is

God

the soul (&tm<$)

is

the soul departs, the body perishes.

souls.

While

and function

Madhva

finds

in
this

not bound to the body as the

of Brahman would appear to assume.

does not also do complete justice to
of matter and souls that

is

it

So

it

would

remains perfectly

the

absence of the

analogy misleading
Vis'istadvaitic theory

The relation of body and sou'

the more or less derivative being

admitted in that system 1

It is

all

very well

means Aprthaksiddhi or inseparable existence. But

would cut both ways. That seems hardly fair. The mutual depend-

to say that identity

it

ed

1.

ai^lftftra^

SfRFST

f^ft

(Vedanta Des'ika).

MADHVA'S SAMANVAYA

UPANI?AD,1C philosophy

God and His

ence (a?2Tf%S) between

and

Off

17

'body' (or attributes) viz., matter

be of the same kind or order as exists or might be

between God and his essential attributes of reality, know-

souls, could not

said to exist

ledge and

the inevitable

It is

bliss.

that the Infinite

cannot

which are necessary to

exist

implication of Ramanuja's position

without

its

and Acit

attributes of Cit

Yet Ramanuja himself

it.

unable to concede

is

much in view of many texts to the contrary, especially Gttd ix, 4,

wherein he admits frankly that the Cit and Acit contribute in no way to

so

the existence of the Deity: TfoOTf ctf

Ramanuja

once,

gives

up

^|WR:

(R.G.B.).

equates inseparable existence (avlnabhdva) as "dependence"

ftJCTRT^ 'm:

*lf

Weft

^fPW

'

consequence of such a view

is

immaterial and non-essential to

ever, inconsistent with

the nature of God.

Here,

theory of reciprocal dependence

his

for

and

arf^fPTO^

q^efr (R.G.B. x,21).

The logical
that the world of matter and souls is
God in the end. Such a view is, how-

Ramanuja's general position that

It is also difficult to

conceive

it

has

basis in

its

how Brahman

could be

said to be unchanging in view of the changing nature of his Vis'esanas

The modes change from subtle to gross state and vice

make no substantial impression on the
Brahman, they cannot be said to be grounded in its nature. But Ramanuja, nevertheless, concedes that Brahman is subject to change of some
(Cit

and

Acit).

versa.

If these

sort

and

in

changes of modes

thro' these

changes of the modes themselves: OT4JHi<j3Ria-

PPF# ^OTaf^fe^lf^BTCt *r#

(Sribhasya, ii,3,18).

away

the immediate pera perpetually changing

process, a sort of progressing perfection, he cannot give us any
satisfactory explanation of the soul of the Absolute to its body" (RadhaThat is why Madhva abandons the
krishnan, I. Phil., ii, p 716 ).
'Unless

Ramanuja

fection of the Absolute

willing to explain

is

and substitute for

it

metaphor of 'body and soul' and the doctrine of 'reciprocal dependence'

1
and the 'contribution theory ', which it implies.
In his view, the world of matter and souls has

only as a result of an act of will of God, which

qRTs#3^if ft

l.

mm

fam^

(Nltimala, X,

The

aw:

p. 74,

stoujjft

g^5:

M. 2.

is

Himself in

the

exists

nimittakcLraria.

^13%^ wf%^?t^r

t| 5tf^f

Annaraalai Uni. Skt. Ser.)

'contribution theory' would also have to concede that

actuality, put
P.

afftftww ^rrgwct:

come out and

is its

making" (Radhakrishnan,

ii,

"God
p.

is

not absolute

71S) [Italics mine]

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHVACARYA

18

It

cannot

without his sufferance.

exist

$SBm\4 JWt: *#:

MWnd. Up.S

But the existence of matter and souls

to

God

Hit

world that

is,

is

the meaning of texts like

TOr

Bhag.

in the last analysis,

ii,

10, 12

).

immaterial

sfmfRrwntr^Wrl: ( Madhva, B. T. ii, 9, 31 ). It is the

bound to God, not He to it. The Universe is thus depen-

Brahman

on

dent

is

This

5*4 mft

(sjfT#IS{)

neither in the

Advaitic nor in the

but as existing and functioning at God's

will.
The self-existent being of God would in no way have been affected
if the world had never existed at all.
The relation in which the world
Visistadvaitic sense of the term

stands to

Brahman

is,

thus, neither suparimpositional as in Advaita,

nor

physical and intra-organic as in Vis'istadvaita, but a trans-empirical one,

symbolized by the idea of "Bimba-Pratibimbabhava," in which "Bimba"

defined as that which determines the satta, pratiti and pravrtti of the
" Pratibimba," as will be made clear in Chapter XXXV. The statement

is

God means that it owes its very power

God and derives them from Him ct3$H'

that the world cannot exist without

of existence, functioning
SRrracfficfalfrR^
will

It is in

will.

The

entire Universe

it is

with which

Madhva would concede

or souls.
chosen to
this

He

we

thus an expression of the Divine

can make and unmake

absolutely unrestricted 2

impossible or absurd in agreeing that

nothing, that

is

He

His absolute power.

His power over

philosophers,

etc., to

that, theoretically, there

God

it all,

at

Alone among Indian

is

nothing

can create a world out of

could bring into existence a Universe not unlike the one

are

now

familiar, without the aid of a pre-existent matter

But the fact remains that He has not, in His infinite wisdom,
do so. And all our philosophy has necessarily to take note of

and respect

dependent on

Him

He

Similarly,

it.

existence of Matter

does not choose to destroy the eternal

and Souls and other

:

?RWi*wciiwfi

&T

entities,

'ftwrsjct

even tho* they are

Tdyt. p. 9

all

).

Madhva introduces the symbolism of " Bimbapratibimbabhava ",

(Original and Reflection) in place of " Adhisthanaropyabhava ", and
Sarira&nribhava " of the Advaita and

Vis'istadvaita,

ture nature of the dependence of the selves

on God.

to

illustrate the

intended to
avoid the defects of assuming an unreal or a reciprocal dependence and

establish, in their place,

lity

2.

is

a real but unilateral dependence of

upon the Independent, for

1.

It

its

Wtf&m WWW m:
cf. *w fJrktf^ vpfa

existence,

knowledge and

finite rea-

activity.

Dvadaia-Stotra

Mbh.

3W#r:

all

iv, 67,

18

On

MADHVA'S SAMANVAYA OF UPANI?ADIO PHILOSOPHY

19

the Advaitic view of Aropa, the adhisthana cannot confer any true reality

on

the superimposed or sustain

it

of

its

own

free will,

as

God

does 1

in

Creation, then, would be completely mechanical

respect of the world.

and unregulated by a purposive will. The knowledge of the substratum,

on the Advaita view, far from sustaining the illusion, would destroy it,
at once.
Hence, the relation between the world, God and souls would
not

be a true and permanent one as

Sc^

it

appears from texts like

flcTPT

fl# ftmtf ^tf^mHI^,

on this view. But the Original or

" Birnba, " as conceived by Madhva, does sustain the reflection (pratibimba) while maintaining its own transcendence and without making the
pratibimba an intraorgainc part of itself. The mutual relation of
1

would be permanent and true of all states of the Jiva

and not merely a passing one true of Samsara alone ( as

l3ki)KilW5ra RF

Jatfa

their

and

would be ). There will be no destruction of the Pratibimba so long as the contact of Upadhi is intact. The function of an
"Upadhi" is to manifest the Pratibimba. In the present case, it is the
pristine nature of the Jlvasvarupa itself as Cit that would suffice to
arfayiiiOwfflH

manifest

itself,

to itself in

its

true nature of metaphysical dependence on

and similarity with the Supreme, in release, (cf. ^PPfaPT JRfSra: f%^lc[j
Madhva, G.B.) This power of self-revelation is hidden in Samsara
I

(. S.

iii,

5;

2,

iii,

2, 19.)

Hence, the Pratibimbatva, tho' a

bondage.

as

its

always,

It is

to the Supreme,

etc.,

fact,

by means of its internal "

own medium (upadhi) in realizing its

in

It

is

to

God.

As

Svarupa, free from

this true

essence of the Jiva,

it is

not realized in

full,

true relation of dependence

in this sense that

called for, to manifest to the individual his

is

Vis'esas " that the soul acts

an " Upadhi "

own Svarupa and

all

is

at

all

his relation

impurities, constitutes the

termed " Svarupopadhi

", in

Madhva

termino-

The term Pratibimba would be misleading, if understood in its

popular sense of an appearance brought about by a material and an
This is not the sense in which the figure of
external medium.
used
and meant to be uuderstood, in Madhvasiddhanta
is
Pratibimbatva
logy.

'

See B. S. B.

Madhva
The Supreme

iii,

2, 18.

takes us to the
is

'

independent of

extreme limit of Divine transcendence.

all

accessories in creation

%re: sot
vwffaw ^ icnft Hnwft

Cf. iit^af qg: *T$r

wt

'

Gm

).

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHVACARYA

20

Tho
in

them

'

as

capable of doing without accessories or making such changes

He

pleases,

God, out of

his

own free

will,

has

made

the world

from Himself and fwfrsr from its material cause (Prakrti).

shows how the practical and theoaspects of God's omnipotence are to be reconciled, in accor-

different

Jayatirtha, in explaining this point,

retical

dance with the Sruti.

Taking

his stand

on Bimbapratibimbabhava

metaphysical relation that would do

as the only satisfactory

and

full justice to

God and

correctly represent

Madhva finds
the key to the reconciliation of the " Bheda " and " Abheda " Gratis in
the twin ideas of " Svatantra " and " Paratantra " that underlie the very
the Svabh&vika-sambandha between

his creation,

conception of Bimbapratibimbabhava. The Bhedas'rutis, bearing testimony

to the reality of the world of matter

and

souls,

speak the truth from the

point of view of factual existence and dependence of

all finite reality on

The Abhedas'rutis speak the truth from the point of view of the
utter transcendent majesty and Independence of One Supreme Principle.
There is no essential contradiction in accepting the reality of both these
truths.
The mistake lies in pressing for " Svarupaikya " by abolishing
the finites (as unreal) or in treating them as an intra-organic part of the
The "Svatantra" of
Infinite, which would destroy its homogeneity.

God.

Madhva

is

rificed.

It is

not a mere theological concept, into which

all plurality is

sac-

a philosophical idea corresponding to the Spinozistic con-

ception of substance, defined as res complete, " complete in

itself,

deter-

mined by itself, and capable of being explained entirely by itself".

Such substantiality is possessed only by Brahman.
The Pratibimba
l.

<w\

"sprat"

sifrfcf

(NS.

II, p.

t^f%ffr^cq-

299).

*Rrc8j#rr^ watft

^mfc* ^qr^awj

fft:

*e|

ra< rojj q Ki %cf ftR^ufi fa

mat,

t^t^gwttf^t

MADHVA'S SAMANVAYA OF UTANI?AD10 PHILOSOPHY

cannot be complete in

itself,

capable of being explained by

The

not determined by

is

and

Hence, Madhva holds that

pendent Reality or the highest

and

is

not

must be based on

this

itself

itself.

true reconciliation of finite

basic fact.

21

infinite

God

reality, so to

or

Brahman

speak

the only Inde-

is

Cf, 3153 1TO

If

flc

*PT^8$3$: Madhva Chart. Up c. ) that exists. Everything else, Prakrti,

Purusas, Kala, Karma etc., is ex hypothesi dependent on Brahman for its
very existence and functioning, tho' not created by It de now. As
dependent

reals,

a limitation of

they do not constitute a

It.

Their existence

Transcendentalism while

firma of

facts,

challenge

to the Absolute or

'

not irreconcilable with the existence

is

Madhva

of Brahman in any metaphysical sense.

level of

'

thus rises to the highest

keeping his feet firmly on the terra

still

without sacrificing the

reality

of the world and

its

values

is an
must have relation to the facts of
However high and for however long the philosopher
life and experience.
might soar on the naked peaks of the Absolute, lie must, at last, set his
feet on hard earth. We cannot deny this world to have the other. Madhva

or abolishing the individuals, in the

interpretation of reality as a whole,

last analysis.

philosophy

If

it

'*
angle of Brahman " ( H$ll&' ) from which the philosopher should look at the world of matter and souls

indicates the right

grfr

=*r

<Hd*<*< :

&

ft

M *rwft%Rt
*rf|

^
#*
*TgtWn

^^

?isr ?wptr

tr=r

sat 5P^srF#rdr#Rf:

cf^frt q^t

M tow

TTJft

* * #

3mftct,3^^T#I.

?lWW

^S TOlfe
ifltitt

Tuftsin

*T

Man. Up.

(Bhag.

Bhag.

B.T.

b.t.

i,

icf^rcte.

20

a, s,

).

).

9, 31

ii,

Brh. Up,

c.

).

).

17

p.

45

ruti q. B. S. B.

SWi. C7p. C. IV, 4, 14

i,

5,

10, 12

ii,

II

OTMWI^ %#ffct 3ft^

lf| cl^#t

3fiW*ldw?ri1wn<l:

ft?iTn% ft*$sfa f*mt

m ^ TO

ii,

1, 17

).

m. " TOPfe: " WW^ejPfcls?:

Chan. Up. C.

II,

22

).

).

PHILOSOPHY OF SB! MADHVACARYA

22

In his Bhagavata-Tatparya, rising to the highest pitch of Transcenhe distinguishes the highest reality from mere existence.
Such reality
is what has being in itseif and for itself.

dentalism,

What
is

truly real

is

possessed only by

Brahman

cTfewffa TIKRJf a^Hfot SRTftcraT

The

others, especially Prakrti

for their very existence

and

They cannot

eternity.

activity

B.T. XI, 24,

1 ).

and Purusas, insofar as they depend

on the Supreme, merely exist from
be as real (Independent) as the

lay claim to

it is even permissible to speak

of them "as if not-existing 1 " or "other than real "? Such descriptions in

Supreme.

In a hypothetical sense, then,

Scripture should not blind us to the fact of their actual existence distinct

from Brahman and

in

complete dependence on

We

It.

are

welcome

to

hold that dependence signifies want of substantiality in the Spinozistic

Madhva would not be

sense of the term.

accept the contention.

Reality, in other words,

philosophical

sense.

But

perturbed by this and would

does not deprive a thing of

it

its reality.

not the same as "substantiality", in the highest

is

It

is

uncontradicted

just

existence

aTfTrdfEtcr

We

have no right to deny the reality of the world (of

it is not independent or does not exist
in the same form, always.
It is there, has been there and will be there,
Jiftfcifiowi ).

matter and souls), simply because

Even the eternal substana sense, in Madhva's

changing and depending always on Brahman.

ces,

we have

philosophy.

SsJSr:

Such

Why

exempt from

creation

Nor

answer to such a query

SJ3,

3cT

wm

ft

WWE^ \

wfam
ajltf,

creation, in

badge of

the

is

is

that given

m:

?IswwiHiififa'

more then what any

do.
The only

business to

its

it

aiswi3OT--i'

SWmTS^fiftr

finite

be such a world of matter and

all,

tolerate their existence, is

philosophy could answer.

Theistic

the

is

there should, at

why God should

or

souls,

seen, are not

by

Jayatirtha

fer: ? ffr

%(rc

%u

wr f?i%

f%

gftsrfs&ftfcT

( NS.

p.

Tho' Brahman can do very well without Prakrti or Purusas,

prefers, in its infinite glory

1.

Cf.

'? tfcmdH

and inexorable
'

will, to

do with them

289
It

Such

'feUR^'

Also " Quo omnparata neo pulehra sunt, neo bona runt, neo nint"
(St,

2.

Augustine. Con. XI,

15[n%nfe a^cRJT 3**.

i).

(iruti

q by MadhwaB.S.B.i, 1,1.,)
t

MADHVA'S SAMANVAYA
'

dependence

Brahman on

(apeksa) of

'

dependent on

no mark of

It, is

most, a self-limitation out of

enhances

its

TJPANISADIC PHILOSOPHY

Off

its

own

which are in themselves

things

or limitation.

inferiority

free will

23

and even

It

at the

is,

that attests

and

majesty

The dependent
no separate status

often treated as of " no consequence " and having

is

Tf|

ff^fiq-

w($h\

Isrf>tW#2&

*m

srrr

Bih. Up.

crerf^r *pt%

iv, 4,

14

b. t. a, 6,

).

).

(Chan. Up y,l, 15).

All this would

show

that

Madhva

has given earnest thought to the

position and status of the reals in his system, with the insight

nation of a true philosopher.

He

and imagi-

has substituted a Brahman-centric

view for the ego-centric interpretation of Upanisadic thought.

It

is

Madhva's philosophy, some historians

of Indian philosophy should have tried to dismiss him as belonging
" more to the religious history than to the philosophical develop-

pity that missing this distinction of

ment of India
with evidence,

"

He

has shown that

if

we

avoid playing tricks

are to

the only satisfactory synthesis of the conflict between

"dvaita" and "advaita"

gratis, in the

Upanigads, would be in the

adoption of the idea of the One Independent

Transcendent-cum-Immaphenomena. He has no sympathy with the reckless monism of Samkara which is indifferent alike to the hopes and
aspirations of man and reduces the panorama of creation to a random
1
At the same time, he is not for ascribing false perfection of
illusion.
any kind to the world of matter and souls. It is given just what is its
due and nothing more. The world and the souls are real in that they are
Anaropita,
not the effect of any superimposition or Adhyasa, or
nent Reference of

all

personal delusion.

His creation

1.

Cf,

2
;

and

31ft

Independent they are not

is

immanent

in

it.

% ^ IRTf^f 3f:

gnat

^Tct:

God

=1%

fPFTP$rftr -mfa:

is

greater than

It^Md^l'SR'H'KlteAsWT
(Bhamati,

gjjf^giWloMI *raf%
2.

and

Such, in a nutshell, in the position

Mbh.

ii,

1,

iv, 67,

33).
17

).

PHILOSOPHY OK

24

SM MADHVACAKYA

When we emphasize the existence of subordinate

by side with the Independence of Brahman, we have a Dualism
of Madhva.

When we

properly, a Theistic Realism.

It

from everything

resort to the 'language of

Jayatlrtha,

the

is

Jayatlrtha expounds this

thought.

monism

summit

ultimate

M ffrtfki

jv. s.

p 123

'.

level

synthesis

thought, with his characteristic clarity and brilliance

fqcTPFigwiHT

or,

more

think exclusively of the trans-

cendence of Brahman and isolate or abstract

may and do sometimes

ding to Madhva and

reals side

else,

we

Such, accor-

of Upanisadic

Upanisadic

of

).

All the Upanisadic texts, without exception, speak the glory of

Brahman, which

the

is

Of

imperfection.

abode of infinite attributes and free from all

some (1) represent It as endowed with

these,

attributes like omniscience, lordship, inner rulership, munificence,

and so on.

(2)

Others represent

It

as free from

all

beauty

such limitation as

embodiment etc. (8) Yet others desbeyond the reach of mind and speech to bring home to us its
comparative inaccessibility. (4) Others depict It as the Only One that
sin,

misery, liability to physical

cribe It as

exists in order that

we might

all

seek

it

to the exclusion of everything

all, that It might be taken

knowledge and activity. But confused
heads miss the central unity of Vedic teaching amidst the multiplicity of
approaches and introduce artificial distinctions of standpoints like
Saguna and Nirguna, Vyavaharika and Paramarthika, in interpretation. ]

else.

Others represent

(5)

as the source of

new

This
Jayatlrtha,

in

all

It as the

existence,

synthesis of

the

light

of

would be seen to be more

(

Nirvis'es.advaita

monism

Self of

Upanisadic

Madhva's

philosophy

interpretation

satisfying than

propounded
of the

the characterless

by

Vedanta,

monism

of Samkara, on the one hand and the intraorganic

Vis'ift&dvaita

of Raraanuja, which hardly allows

Brahman

to

MADHVA'S SAMANVAYA
exist

by

vada

),

itself.

UPANI?ADIC PHILOSOPHY

" Svatantradvitiya-Brahmavada 1 "

we might

if

Off

25

or Bimba-Pratibimba

philosophy of Madhva,

so agree to designate the

would appear to be logically the more consistent and philosophically the

more commensurate solution of the problem of the finite and infinite.
The Advaitin altogether ignores the relative aspect and existence of the
Universe and the souls, for all time; while the Vis'igtadvaitin detracts
from the self-sufficiency of God by his intra-organic conception of their
relation.
The new synthesis of Madhva has the advantage of preserving
these two vital
elements in proper blend.
Under the terms of

aT5g*fcr:

which

is

Sl% T Bl%

the corner-stone

Svatantra

is

^m

(Bhag.

II

of Madhva's

new

implied in the very existence

10, 12).

ii,

synthesis,

Brahman

of the relative

as

and the

Paratantra.

suggested by me, in 1936, received the approval of

Svamiji of the Uttaradi Mutt, the greatest
authority on Dvaita philosophy in recent times. It was later adopted as the title
Dr, Badhaof one of my works on Madhva's philosophy, published in 1942.
1.

This new designation

first

the late Sri Satyadhyana TJrtba

krishnan refers to "the implicit monism "of

years,

Madhva

H. N. Eaghavendrachar has claimed

rightly be called

(.2.

Phil.

i.

p. 40. ).

In recent

that Madhva's philosophy should

by the name of "Brahmadvaita" and that Madhva is a true

Alur Venkatarao of Dharwar prefers to

Monist in the truest sense of the term.

call it "

Pfirnabrahmavada. " All this

the followers of

Madhva

is

very

muoh

is

a sign that philosophical interest among

alive

and resurgent.

CHAPTER

IV.

MADHVA'S CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN THOUGHT

Madhva's philosophical categories differ much in their scope and
function from those of contemporary schools. Sometimes the nomenclature

is

retained

but the conception

names,

thing, including

Madhva

different.

is

In other cases, everygenerally allergic to

different.

is

is

over-elaboration of details and picturesque Prakriy&s, in the establishment

of his theories.
robust commonsense and a rigid adherence to the

tests

barest

both

minimum

realistic

of metaphysical presuppositions.

and

idealistic

shrink from them

or
'

He does with the

His theories disclose
He docs not
trends, in important respects.

of truth characterize his logic and epistemology.

that

system

Sa-viSegabheda

because

'

butes and between

of

this

of

between substance and attrisubstratum (dharmi) shows a

identity-in-difference )
" Difference " and its

On

acceptance

His

philosophy.

strong idealistic bent.

with

affiliations

scholastic

their

contemporary

of

the other hand, his rejection of the Universal

(samanya) shows an extreme

realistic attitude

undreamt of

in the

Nyaya-

and Mlmamsa Realisms. There is, therefore,

assumption that " the philosophical side of Madhva's teaching is mainly
based on the Pre-Madhva realisms like those of the Nyaya-Vais'esika and
Mlmamsa " or that "he makes a clever use of Nyaya-Vaiiesika cate-

Vais'esika

little

development of

gories, in the

his

views

truth in the

".

Madhva

is

original in his ontological theory of Svatantra

which

is

the keynote of his philosophy

tantra,

and

and Para-

in his philosophical

The concept

ideal of a Svatantra-advitiya-Brahman, to

which

of " Difference " is given an entirety

" Vis'esas ". Of course, categories

substance, quality, generality,

existence, time, space, causation

new
like

and the

it

leads.

orientation by the acceptance of

like are the

common

problems

and merit of their concepSo it is with Madhva.

tions that mark one philosopher from another.
His views on the nature of Substance and its relation to the qualities
"possessed" by it, and on Space and Time, are quite different from those
of the Nyaya-Vais'esika and Mlmamsa Realists and are, in many respects,
He has four
strikingly modern and far ahead of contemporary views.
new categories ViSista, Ams% $akti and Sadrsya, not recognized by the
But

of philosophy.

it is

the distinctiveness

Nyaya-Vaisegika^ealists.

He

rejects

Nyaya-Vais'esika realism, in toto.

Samavaya.

But

his Vis'esas

the

Samavaya (inherence) of the

his " Vis'esas " do duty for

He makes

have nothing, save

their

name,

in

common

MADHVA'S CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN THOUGHT

with those of Nyaya-Vais'esika.

27

Tho' a Bhedavadin, he does not subs-

cribe to the Nyaya-Vais'esika or the Visistadvaitic view that substance and

attributes should

be absolutely

Nor

vaya as in Nyaya).

different or externally related

cum-difference (bhedabheda), in

Wt

yiiijfl*K: that

cases.

all

and Nyaya

He

dismisses the

schools.

nalists that difference

He

(Jati)

He

holds a position akin to that of

effectively barring the

mind

nitions.

is

sui

(pratiyogini-

argument from universals to Monism.

to the Satkaryav&da of the Sarhkhyas as to the

Asatkaryavada of the Nyaya.

the

Nomi-

and resemblance (sadriya) are both unique and

much opposed

is as

He

and anugatasatta of the Mftna-

generis in each case, tho' perceived thro' a countercorrelate

mpya), thus

dogma of

a quality cannot reside in another, as unproved. 1

has no use for the universal essence

msft

(bySama-

does he accept the Bh&tta view of their identity-

He

does not agree with the Nyaya that

only inferentially established thro' non-simultaneity of cogto him, intuitively established

It is,

(Sakisvedya)

which

has

great psychological significance.

Madhva and

There are fundamental differences between

Realists in regard to the theory of knowledge

and

error,

of the sources of validity of knowledge, the status of

on

other

the question

Memory

as a valid

source of knowledge, on the admissibility of indeterminate perception,

the

God and

nature of soul, self-consciousness,

ultimate release.

conception of Saksi as the ultimate criterion of

all

His

knowledge and
He is concerned

on Vedantic foundations.
and the selves than with
any qualitative and quantitative analysis of phenomena and their properties, as in the Nyaya- Vais'esjka; or with their physical and intellectual
validity,

is

more with

essentially built

the philosophical status of the world

classification of

Padarthas.

He

sets

himself, in

the

spirit

of a true

philosopher, to discover and elucidate the nature of the highest principle

behind the cosmos.

The Universe

is

not self-sufficient or self-impor-

might be to a Sarhkhya or a Naiyayika. There

It would
is nothing to be gained by too much preoccupation with it.
3
on
Brahman
and
dependent
as,
at
all
times,
be enough if it is realized
This
is
the
becoming.
of
its
being
and
all
stages
It,
in
controlled by
tant to a Vedantin, as

it

main point emphasized by all schools of Vedanta, from different angles.

Madhva, also, approaches the Universe from this particular angle. The
l.

*vm

3.

&! N

jprara <rg^

i| fNtacr:

W iH ^ 31^ *m\ m^
l

av. )

(Ua. Up.)

PHILOSOPHY OF SKI MABHVACARYA

28

only an " Apara-Siddhanta " or subsidiary truth

(anusahgika) to the doctrine of Brahman, says Madhva.' His system
therefore, has its roots in the Aupanisada standpoint and cannot be treated as divorced from it.
It is true that Vedantic systems have made

doctrine of the world

is

extensive use of the categories

and thought-measuring devices of the

But the metaphysical bearings

Logical Realism of the Nyaya-Vais'egika.

of Madhva's system could not be grasped except as a reaction against

the different types of

of

Samkara

Monism

that preceded

(Nirvis'egadvaita), the

Ramanuja and

(Visistadvaita) of

it,

such as the pure

correlative or intra-organic

monism
monism

the transmutative Pantheism (Brahma-

parinaniavada) of Vrttikara, Bhaskara, Brahmadatta, Yadavaprak&s'a and

others, within a strictly Vedantic set-up.

Vedantic realisms

is

Madhva's agreement with non-

in respect of the general principles of empirical

realism such as the acceptanee of the reality of the world of difference,

Pramanas and the dualism of

aim and philosophical significance of his categories are quite different from the scholastic traditions
of these schools. These have been evolved by Madhva, as a result of
independent cogitation and a critical analysis of the principles and cate-

the possibility of knowledge, the scheme of

matter and

But

spirit.

the conception,

gories of contemporary Vedantic schools, in the light of materials gathe-

red from an older school of Vedantic Realism, traces of which are found
in the texts

from Brahmatarka and other sources

cited

by him.

For

purposes of logical refutation of other schools, including the Vedantic,

Madhva and his followers have freely drawn upon the dialectical machi-

Tbey have utilized it in

and in refuting the criticisms of the
Advaitins themselves, on all earlier forms of realistic thought, as reorientated in the light of their own special theories.
They have also used it in

nery of the Nyaya-Vaisesika and other schools.

self-defence against the Advaitins

the constructive exposition of their

own

This excessive use

Siddhanta.

of Nyaya-Vaisesika methodology of logical dialectics, in the later phases

of the

Madhva

school, tended, in the popular estimation, to give

it

an air

of being an absolute' Dualism' fighting for the reality of every human

being and particle of matter in the Universe, as a birthright and as being
of the same order and degree as that of the Supreme Being. But the
keynote of Madhva's philosophy has always been the acceptance of the
ONE INDEPENDENT REAL as 4<fikM and all the rest as of secon-

dary importance

ft&ft:

m$$ it WIMIcMff ^WHIH.

-5rq38p%erj jrawcJrsnfcwft

srara.

ns.

p.

518b).

"

MADHVA'S CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN THOUGHT

By

applying the doctrine of Savis'esabheda to Brahman,

preserved
ness of

29

its

its

complete homogeneity, without sacrificing the

qualitative content, thereby introducing a

Brahman thro

Madhva

infinite rich-

more dynamic con-

the doctrine of identity-in-difference, for the

His theory of " Vis'esas " is the life-breath
first time in Indian thought.

ception of

'

Without

it, it would be imany school of thought,

ancient or modern. Since no other school has accepted the " Vis'esas ",
the credit for the philosophical conception of " identity-in-difference,

of the doctrine of identity-in-difference.

possible to conceive of

an

identity-in-difference, in

should also go to Madhva.

This theory of Vis'esas

is

his

most out-

standing contribution to the stock of philosophical ideas in Indian

thought.

and

Its elasticity

resilience to

of reference without the disadvantage of

identity ",

" Samavaya " or "

"

admit of internal distinctions

difference ",

fictitious difference "

the resources of the substance

itself,

replaces

'

difference-cum-

(kalpitabheda), thro

many worn

'

out and out-

conceptions of Time, Space, Causation and Creation, by more

This is no small contribution to thought.
satisfactory ones.

moded

have been outHis comprehenclear distinction into " Kevala " and

In the field of epistemology, also, his contributions

some respects,
of Pramana and

standing and, in
sive definition

"Anu"; and above

criterion of all

epistemology.

far ahead
its

of his time.

conception of the Sftksi as the ultimate

knowledge and validity are front-rank contributions to

There

Indian philosophy.

all,

is

his

it in any other system of

remains Madhva's unique contribution to the

nothing approaching

It

theory of knowledge.

Its repercussions

are sure to be fruitful,

if

on Realism

properly exploited.

in

modern thought

His own Realism

is

there-

on the firm philosophical foundations of intuitionism,

Similarly, his thesis of
instead of on empiricism pure and simple.
'
Bimbapratibimbabhava " between God and soul is a new conception
that goes beyond all contemporary attempts to solve the problem of the
"
eternal and mutual relation between God and the finite selves. " Bheda
(difference) in the sense of pure exclusion, between Jlva and Brahman,
has no attraction for Madhva. He is not satisfied with a mere external
1
God can neither be
master-and-servant relation between God and Soul.
excluded from the Jlva at any stage of his being nor can the individual
be utterly merged in the Supreme. The only way in which he could
retain his individuality of orbit and yet be bound to the Supreme by a
by

established

Jayatlrtha Tdyt p. 29

).

PHILOSOPHY 0V bI MADHvACAKYA

30

natural attraction of being

It is

is

Birabapratibimbabhava.

thro' the relation of

not extinction of individual consciousness but

with the Infinite 1 that

is

its

sublimation in tune

at the root of the conception of Bimbapratibim-

babhava between the Supreme and the individual.

cism at a crucial point.

This

touches Mysti-

It will be seen that Madhva's views on the Svarupabheda, T&ratamya, and Traividhya among souls make important contributions to

Freedom and Freewill. He does not promise SarBut as a broad hypothesis of human nature and destiny, in the

the problems of Evil,

vamukti.

widest sense, his views on these questions are not without their strong

tho there may be many other philosophers who may not be disposed to take such a rigid view of the diversity of human nature and
points

'

Madhva,

destiny.

sophy

is

to

tell

would argue

for his part,

the truth,

whether

it

that the business

of philo-

pleases or irritates and not simply

and pleasant imaginings. His theory is a

It goes beyond the commonly accepted
theory of Karma in Vedanta, as an ultimate explana-

to indulge in pious platitudes

logically derived conclusion.

explanation of the

tion of the inequalities of

It

life.

points out that

if

the inequalities of

Karma, which is
supposed to explain such inequalities, must, in the last analysis, take its
stand on the basic differences in the " svabhava " (nature) of the souls
life

are to be explained satisfactorily, the theory of

The plurality of selves which is experienced by us will have

grounded on something that is more fundamental than Prakrtic
If that something is not
vestures and influences, including Karma.
there, the law of Karma itself would be a cruel joke upon humanity.
It is Svarupabheda alone that would supply the missing link in the theory
themselves.
to be

of Karma. Madhva has shown great boldness of spirit in detecting this

weakpoint in the theory of Karma, as generally advanced in Hindu philosophy, and rectifying it by filling the gap in the theory with his doctrines
of Svarupabheda, Taratamya and Traividhya,
the importance of the
phasis

of

theory in

among

itself in a better light, for

Cf.

sfiffff if

*m

3TFTlcI (

fac^-^KsrewJr
3i*a-WltJ
*fl% fcff

:t

the

T. A.

first

iii,

f*te5rrKsiwi$.-,

mxm. (B

T c^gre^r

S.

iii,

souls.

Considering

Hindu philosophy, Madhva's em-

on Svarupabheda of Souls would be seen

Karma

1.

Karma

put the whole theory

15, 2

).

t ^f^ri^rr
19

2,

WrfirsjpjqeJ

to

time, in Indian thought.

).

sratawftwdt

ap^^.^r

Madhva, B.

S. B.

sf#i%

srgor

HRP5.I

ONTOLOGY

II.

CHAPTEE

V.

MADHVA'S ONTOLOGICAL THEORY

As

already explained in the Introduction,

upon two

principal ideas of being, viz., reality

former represents the idea of

reality expressed in

The

pertaining to the world of matter and souls.

dental aspect of reality, that

is

may

consist in one or

aspects of existence, consciousness and activity

1^3.

space-time relations
other

the transcen-

is

characteristic of the Deity alone.

in the ordinary sense of the term,

Madhva Ontology turns

and independence. The

the three

^HWT^fcftlfrfaaprrcifFPl-

This idea

as Jayatirtha refers to them.

Reality,

more of

is

found in other systems

as well, as in the Advaita, where existence (asti), consciousness

(MM)

and bliss (priyam) are appropriated to Brahman (brahmampam) J or in

Buddhism, which defines phenomenal reality (Paratantrasatya) in terms of
;

practical efficiency (arthakriyakaritvam).

Appearance and Reality

Madhva
with a rider

embraces

affrfefw?

Vatsyayana's

?rn>$cfflf!ttflra'

'what

defines reality as

3Wl

The

'

and

is

is

unsuperimposed

'

(awdftcfq,)

an object of knowledge

'

This

).

Wffi

definition

of

difference

between the real and the unreal

the

real:

33.

IffflTO

this the former is or, under specific and known conditions, may
be the object of direct perception, while the unreal would appear in
The tortoise-hair, tho' unsuperimposed
erroneous perceptions only.
(because it is not a fact) is not a reality as it is not an object of direct
lies in

Thus, both the terms in the definition are

perception to any one.

necessary to have an adequate conception of the

real.

The above

definition bars the possibility of a real existing somewhere, without being

given as an actual psychological fact in immediate apprehension, such

" a comet rushing

thro' unpeopled space, entirely unbeheld."

For,
would argue that the real is present to the mind
of God as a system of presentations, even when our perception of it is
suspended or is not there or even in respect of realities which no human

as

Madhva,

like Bradley,

subject perceives

l.

cf.

fl^Jft^;:

sm% wfa
3Tief

ftir

WJ

^rfcf

^ frw

m mm <mg

Tdy

%c%wBq.

<rat

sm,

ll

).

Madhva

derives

Drgdrtya-Viveka, 20

this

PHILOSOPHY OF SEI MADHVAcArYA

32

epistemological doctrine

from

^RWlWlt #3, (Katha

cfar
sical

doctrine that

all

selves (Cetana) are

would

of the Upanisadic text

his interpretation

This

Up).

the implication of his

is

acts of concsiousness (pramiti

by

metaphy-

the dependent

on God's (srfotr TO^ftoa). He

views of modern Realists that the

ultimately dependent

not, therefore, agree with the

fundamental characteristic of what is real lies in its independence of all

This is the reason why Madhva
relation to the experience of a subject.
rejects the definition of Svaprakas'atva in Advaita as " unknowability " as

an object of knowledge

The

avedyatvam).

ftfceflld.

The

failing of intuitionism is that

" intuitively "

tho'

svaprakaiatvena

seeming to give one

or

the explanatory phrase

v. T.m, p.

'

Is

Or,

reality ?

existence for all time

else, real

the issue assumes

its

mere existence "

96 b

and

reality " ?

thro

'

space ?

all

is

here that

We have here one

familiar philosophical aspect.

Sarhkara's approach to metaphysics

It is

Is

and

real existence in space

is

the dividing lines of philosophical systems which splits

schools.

Tft

definition of reality as Anaropitatn raises the question of

appearance of existence

time

l%TT

no account of the way

offers

seems only to deny an explanation,

the nature and limitations of reality.

'

^ wxwicwfl

f?ra?m^PcRWFsqKj'^ra.

Madhva's

The addition of

which things are known.

in

it

Atman must

existence of the

be a part of an experience of the atman himseif

them

said to

of

into different

lie in

his

making

a philosophical distinction between existence and reality, as against the

commonsense view that accepts surface phenomena as real. " If all that
occurs or what
ces.

we

perceive were true, there would be

Dissatisfaction with the

philosophy.

first

reflective thinking asks if the first

eternal

". l

is

view

is

and the

tent attempt of philosophers

No

also the final view.

and metaphysics.

ideal, the

pedoclean element, Pythagorean numbers,

appearanall

real,

The pur-

all

thro

'

all

I. Phil,

i,

p.

Em-

these represent the persis-

the ages, to locate the real behind

philosopher would be worth his

Radhakrishnan,

is

The Platonic

Matter of the Milesians,

undertake such an analysis into the nature of being.

S.

false

the mother of

This distinction between the existent and the real

distinction of the actual

1.

no

to distinguish the unreal from the real, the transient

the point of departure between physics

the apparent.

is

While commonsense accepts surface-phenomena as

pose of philosophy

from the

view of things

527.

salt,

if

he did not

Modern philosophy

MADHVA'S ONTOLOGICAL TMBOB'Sf

$$

has been dallying with the same problems for centuries, under different
names. Descartes and Spinoza were both obsessed with it. Wolff and

Kant merely changed

Hegelian

names and opposed 'phenomena' to 'noumena'.

'being' from 'existence'.
Modern
own theories of phenomena as the splitting up of
the

philosophy

Science also has

electric energy

its

distinguished

1
.

The distinction is not, however, the monopoly of idealistic thinkers.

Madhva, as a realist, readily admits the criticism of Bradley that between
recognizing a datum and blindly recognizing its content as a reality, there
is

a world of

illusions

There

difference.

Our

Appearance

is

not

Even

should not be.

room

is

both truth and

But there

reality.

is

no reason why

existence

the critical philosopher like Kant, in holding that

the thing-in-itself cannot be objectively

To

objective experience as a reality.

simply because they do not persist,

It

in experience for

senses need not always be veridical.

is

known, would appear to recognize

say that the objects do not exist

an unwarranted perversion of logic.

and distincts. Distinction is

involves a confusion between opposites

not denial.

If

an object perceived

does not exist at

in a given setting

another place and time, we cannot rush to the conclusion that it is unreal.
Madhva would define " satyam " as
Existence, then, is a test of reality.
existence at (some) time
rily

and place

fifcf%3>ra*Rpi=ra*I )

as existence for all time and throughout space

and not necessa-

w<hi<WtftwP*RVI

Actual existence at some time and place

is

from

which cannot be said to

the unreal

=l+lf&+fWWfcT#li*r

),

),

sufficient to distinguish the real

really

and place of its appearance (or at any other), save in

our distorted imagination. The unreal has no actual existence in time
or space tho it may appear to have it. Such an appearance is indeed the

exist at the time

'

characteristic

mark of

unreality

sm*. Sc^T

Mcflfdlif ST^cT:

immediate experience, are disloyal to experience.

ception

of

unreal

the

f^sr^Tc^^^vT

5TT ?

apart

W& *

cRWlcff^'4:

Op.

cf.

ait.

ii,

Jfe

the

3RTcf:

W. -wft

Madhva

real, in

can have no con-

from such appearances

2.

We

The Advai-

).

tic dialecticians, in denying that the unreal can appear as

G. T.

<s*)i[ci

II

ii,

26).

p. 527.

^rs^Wmtsffet uv.)
(MS. 218 b)

P.M.

PHILOSOPHY OF SBl MADHVAoAEYA

34

We

however, concerned here with actual

are,

that the illusory snake in the rope has

Hit

*>srt

$(Tl%f3ST

then,

sions,

vice-versa:

3&R:

?wf

facts.

feWR: 31%dcf

#TO fl TOT S^T

SRftcfa

(G.

K.

WT^TO!

c.

17).

i,

if existent

(Madhva, G.

T.

The second

test

ii,

Illu-

and
26).

purpose

This is borne out by our own experience and no useful

would be served in trying to escape it by dialectic ingenuity.

(practical efficiency).

admits

Sarhkara

actual existence at any time

the non-existent appears as

when

arise

no

of reality recognized by Madhva is awisCTTWfosR

One cannot make vessels out of the illusory silver
;

Even where an illusory appearance of a snake in the rope

found to produce certain reactions of fear and the like, there is always

in the nacre.
is

a definite

modicum of

reality

behind

it

ft^T^Pwi*l(< cW^I%R*H II
(AV).
not the " rope-snake " that causes the fear or worse reactions
but the " consciousness " of there being a snake, however mistaken it
It is

might be, at the time.

So

concerned, there

not the

is

is

far as that particular psychological experience

slightest difference in the intensity of feeling

between it and that of an actual experience of a snake in daylight.

The
" snaky-feeling " may be overcome soon afterwards but it exists for the
;

time being and that alone

snake.

is

the cause of fear, not the non-existent

The

then,

real,

is

as the Buddhists

pective

theories

of truth

posits that the real

motived.

It is

W*w&l+l*HMr

momentary ( ksa^ika ) nor

and the Advaitins assume, in

neither

eternal,

JR*RL

a^fftrea^; a^H%cf

must be so for

all time.

This

fomwrfcr

(NS. p. 21 7

b).

their

m$l).
is

res-

Sarhkara

metaphysically-

not an epistemological or a logical deduction

srftjwi filet

necessarily

This

is

the

'ifl SRTT

Madhva

view of the matter and it cannot be dismissed as unreasonable. As a

matter of fact, even those entities whose reality is limited to a particular
period of time or place, can be reckoned to be real within the meaning

1.

astfWF^Nf w+4ift*H+?=iici.
TRfcI.

Cf. also

B,

S.

ii,

2, 14.

^MN^c^N

Samkara

sfe?T fren^fcr

(Fadavali, p. 49).

MwH ^f^RRi-

MADHVA'S ONTOLOGIOAL THEOR?

of the dictum

^m#^sifcr#rf*r?f g?^;

$5

what

for,

actually

at a

is,

given time and place, cannot admit of absolute negation with reference
all
*T

periods of time and place

m: 3

&l+iHw*i

be admitted; tho

WRlct

(VTNt.

may

it

'

The Madhva doctrine of

truth

as a

cease

t^TRTt

srp=T:

p. 95)

to

the

of

us

propounded

to

WWWtflPl^W:

aiftg,

present existence must

Its

exist

truth reminds

content,

logical

by

or day.

hour

next
the

timelessness

Plato.

Reality,

of

then,

simply in ' relation to time

^i*i*i(P'?^J
and place ':
which cannot be predicated of unrealities like hare's horn. The Madhva
conception of reality is thus a via media between the extreme momentariconsists

Madhva

ness (ksaiiikatva) of Buddhists and the eteraalism of Advaitins.

endorses the Nyaya view that a thing

is

real so

long as

a definite space-time setting and not simply so long as

The immediate

corollary of such a position

Madhva

and apparent (qiwf^fi. wJNdlU*,

definition of reality as 3WlilRciy

so-called Vyavaharika

sense of the term.

are

absolutely

" Pratibhasika
earlier

and

"

(irw#racr).

real
'

reals

Sarhkara, B. S. B.

',

to be.

is

a myth. The

intended to show that the

not

realities

in the

iii,

The "Vyavaharika"

are both admittedly falsifiable

=*

tel^^n^Ic^*

e^sicR^ *F#
2,

They

).

common ground

As Kumarila

sublated.

SH^srffefi),

is

and Pratibhasika are

the other later:

and have no

appears

true

All existents that are not superimposed (andropitam)

SPUT-fl^TO. f^frf^PHt
(

it

that the doctrine of tripar-

is

of reality (Sattatraividhya) in Advaita, into absolute,

tite classification

practical

assignable to

it is

puts

*F2fTW?g

TO

are, as such,

and

Hvmfa

there can be

one

JtT^g

5#I^T 3Tm |f%

both equally unreal

with the Paramarthika, which

it,

the

(badhya),

is

never

no common ground

between the false and the true to justify the distinction of degrees
between them or their being brought under a single category of thought

We may

speak of the opposition of the real and the unreal

of internal degrees of reality between the

real

and the

unreal.

but not

We may

man and his shadow; but not of a real man and a shadow
would be as ridiculous, if not more, to speak of the truly real,
the falsely real (vyavaharika) and the still more falsely real (pratibhasikaspeak of a

man

It

satya).

There being, then, only two possible modes of predication acceptable

to logic, Madhva is unable to concede any tertium quid between reality

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHVACAEYA

36

and

unreality.

is

either real or unreal.

call it provisionally real

asks

Madhva.

The unreal cannot, by any

accepted as real, in

fcf: ?

stretch of the imagination,

thought:

serious

a misuse of language to

It is

*WWI^SHWPT ^f^ft JTWIT

(afafrfai):

ftSTct

'TTCIfit

*n=r:

be

Such an

attempt can only be treated as a piece of sophistry or a perversion of

thought calculated to mislead the unwary

^m^Sq^Wl

55R!m^rawn%tl

ll

Kumarila

Madhva, therefore, rejects the concept of " Mithyatva " as a terlium

quid as quite unproved and equates

with absolute negation or unreality:

it

ft^i^cpHicMi^

(KN.)

ft^fsr jwrfmrara:

The Advaitins have, from the beginning, been trying to

between the two but to Madhva, it is a distinction without a
;

distinguish
difference. 1

Orders of Reality

Tho

'

existence

is

thus " reality

",

Madhva

so essentially a meta-

is

physician that he recognizes fully the necessity

account for the reality of the world of reals 2

of

reality; it

of

it.

does not exhaust

As Dawes Hicks

puts

it.
it

Nor

is it

for

a ground-real to

Existence

is

but one aspect

the highest or fullest expression

" There

so well,

ever about the notion of pure being.

Being

is

no mystery whatso-

is

simply the fundamental

category of thought which denotes everything and cannot, therefore, spedenote anything,-in other words - connotes nothing. That which

cially

is, cannot be a property by which one entity could be disfrom the others. God, whatever else He is, must certainly
But so must a triangle or a pebble in the street, a planet or the Sun.
be.
In short, there is no being which is simply and purely, being.
It is what
God is over and above mere being that is of primary significance to the

every entity

tinguished

religious consciousness " (Philosophical

While existence

thus reality and

Bases of Theism, p. 117).

possessed by the world of matter

must be something more than mere existence, having
metaphysical independence or substantiality in its own right which we

and

is

is

souls, there

1.

JTor fuller discussion of this question see

JVS and Nym, and my History

of Dvaita School of Yedanta and Its Literature,

2.

ii,

pp. 108-10.

In the true spirit of Upanisadic philosophy

Cf. s3JI%frTT5I^

^tf^JifPWT

T.P.

)
):

MADHVA'S ONTOLOGIOAL THEORY

may

37

agree to designate as the highest real or the philosophical Absolute,

which would be the ultimate explanation of

should be immanent

reality

and draw

its

in the

Such independent

else.

all

Universe, whence the latter could derive

Without presupposing such a basic and trans-

sustenance.

cendental reality that would have to be immanent in the world, there

would be chaos and disorder

1.

3T%T?[#rfcr

Hlf^R foW:

2,

s^w^

3.

^mWclT^ict SRjafint

4.

SmPWWyWtfRl ^

4<fcJJffci:

*firsr

(B. T. p. 13)

II

3M

^ta tp

wnzt

strong

3W fftfcrRT 3TOT fl%PT

Madhva makes a

in the Universe.

plea for recognizing such a principle

'

^T T 1% *$%W

(Bhag.

II

ii,

10, 12)

(Brh. Up. C. p. 45)

#3?ct

HcltcR:

srftFre

err:

s*rf flc3 fstem*rrr jrt:

SRfiRcTT: 3R3PTSI:

5.
s

cr^fprr^

wwwwift r%i%^gqT
5rn#r f^w ^*jkt^pm*i:
Tsrft

Piw<^ ^ilciwi^fei,

3#rrf%3 ftwft^lt

7.

crf^Wt*!!
^r^rrs^flwr

This

is

?T%

quite a

crTTft

bt.

p. 146

w&ssftur
(

^flff oMI^i:
f%r>*r

Madhva

(AV)

II

in

GT.

p.

665

wrct T g u

new point of view

thought, for which

the

_sr. p. 53

interpretation

should get due credit.

of Upanisadic

It is not,

of course,

new in the sense of its having been unknown to the Upanisadic tradition.
What is meant is that Madhva was the pioneer to penetrate into the
and

tangled mass of Vedic and Post-Vedic literature

and

rehabilitate the point of view

and give

it

rediscover,

refine

a proper exposition.

According to Madhva, independence is the highest form of existence

which includes independence of activity and consciousness

tiffe

1.

Cf.

T IRFfrmfo
3WI&I

# * *

PwW*cWM*RI'lffopfl*.

9# 5,

?RriftrsRS*ft3PFt

(MS.

166.)

PHILOSOPHY OK SRI MADHVACAKYA

38

(B. T.p. 108)

Independence

which

"self-determination "

philosophical

is

is

ex-

plained almost in the same terms as the substantiality of Spinoza, as

a res completa which gives meaning and completion to everything else. This
" put forward
idea is contained in the classical definition of " Svatantra

Madhva says
ft Ictalte^ftmitiR^ 'TOT^l
by Jayatlrtha viz.,
with
synonymous
is
point
view,
sentience
highest
of
even
the
that from
inasmuch
{AV. p. 20)
independence: #*3H?lTf?crrfo ^HcN ft f#
l

as " self-determination "

of

fanfcj

its

own

the real

mark

insentient

S^HfcWRT

independent existents,
are regarded

The

BT),

accord

is

).

jada

the Supreme Source and derived from

l^N
all

(SMmk

(G.B.

ii,

is

^Rct

so because

as the

human

^^

WR

cannot act

it

souls are not

a philosophical sense, they

"Reflections", Images, or "Abhasas"

knowers and agents,

by Madhva as so many

Inasmuch

of the Supreme Reality, in the sense that

of sentience:

it

in

all their

powers are rooted in

3 ft $**'

Tit fil?HS' ffeti

19) like the reflected light of the

'

moon. 8

While the Independent Real is thus the ultimate presupposition of

philosophy, the dependent reals embody the justification and proof of

the independent. Tho' the independence of

God

is

not seriously disputed

by other schools of thought, its significance and philosophical necessity

have not been so well brought out, as in the system of Madhva. It is
not as a concession to religious prejudice or a fashionable belief that
Madhva accepts the Svatantra as the highest expression of reality. It is
the warp and woof of all metaphysics. The Advaitic Brahman, being ex
hypothesi attributeless

nirdharmaka

and

static,

could not be spoken

of as " Svatantra " within the definition of

aj%dl^Wcc(^'i(lf=l1lW

Meaning
Of.
.

*Et

em,

|3'4|fcf|r)ft,j|e|

iHHHd^SITOra: l^f

xv, 12.

%ToWt3#fKlM' W13.

(NS. p. 322)

3THTRI

anT^T T WZ}.

Taitt. J7jp.(ii 7);

MADHVA'S ONTOLOGICAl, THEOBY

39

The Vis'istadvaitic Brahman being ex hypothesi " Vis'istaikyarupa ",

cannot be shown to be superior to its modes of Cit and Jada or independent of them (Paranapeksa), so long as the system is committed to
dependence of gesasesibhava and its corollary of the
" contribution theory " of mutual advantage between the two \ held by

their reciprocal

a section 2 of the Ramanuja school, tho' Ramanuja himself

at least

above such necessity

one context (under G.B.

rises

and

Vedanta
Des'ika openly endorses Madhva's view, as already pointed out, and thus
abandons the position believed to be characteristic of the Ramanuja
school that " the difference of parts of God, as matter and souls, always
existed and there is no part of Him which is truer and more ultimate
than this " ( Dasgupta, I. Phil, iii, p. 200).
If this is so, Madhva's
stand would by no means be redundant or superfluous.
in

ix, 4)

The independence of God and His freedom from all imperfections

much compromised in the Pantheistic philosophies of Bhaskara,
Yadavaprakasa and Nimbarka, so long as these systems adhere to the
is

very

actual transformation of the Brahman-stuff, whether wholly, directly or

in

part

or indirectly even, thro'

its existential

aspect (sacchakti) or

energy-aspect (cicchakti). They lead to a great disruption of moral

experience of remorse and responsibility.

sistent

with our ideals of goodness and

personal

effects,

whatever and whoever

such Pantheistic unity

human

Our

life.

is

Logical Pantheism

evil.

God

exists

must

is

is

perfect.

incon-

As His

also be perfect.

But

disproved by the inevitable presuppositions of

instincts refuse to think that evil is

Deity in disorder, virtue in crime, truth in error.

good and to

Nor

see the

can our evalua-

and error be dismissed as illusory. If the events of the

world are the modes of God, how can they be illusory 1

tions of truth

We find the
independence of

same

God

the entire Universe

inability to rise

and

stick to the high level of the

or the Absolute and the necessary dependence of

on God, in the non-Vedantic systems

and Yoga.

of

Theism

like

the Nyaya-Vaisesika

Their limitations in this respect have already been

reference in

NS.

admitted by the
of the Deity

1.

2.

made

clear ( See

Even the eternity of the atoms,

Nyaya-Vais'egikas, could not be exempted from the sway
p. 329,

quoted ante.

).

TaUvarmM&kalapa,
Tengalais.

p. 256.

See also passage from NltvmalM quoted earlier on p. 11 in.

1,

PHILOSOPHY^ OF BI MADHVACAEYA

40

tow TO#Rtra*rarM?f
^ri^

*nr$%raT

tf&m fitf 3lct

I

be

There

is

a pot.

It is

mzwsfam?*m\

3fsTTft

f^w*R^qftqTc#an^

$&m

cr*n,

(N.S, p. 330)

II

no need to suppose that what is eternal cannot possibly

on another. Let us take a non-eternal object like

dependent

'

5TTHT

3nf-(iJrMUlftli

'

not a matter of

Their non-eternity

is

'

accident

'

determined

'

that such objects are non-eternal.

by some reason.

'

they

Otherwise,

might as well be destroyed the very next moment

Similarly, what is wrong if one should suppose that the eternity of

coming

after

the

eternal

objects

is

by a

determined

also

into being.

governing

principle ?

we do

not find the non-eternal objects like pots foregoing

their non-eternity and becoming eternal just because their non-eternity is
It is the nature of the non-eternal to
determined by another principle.
Surely,

become destroyed sooner or

its

eternity

principle.

status

is

quo of the

other as an eternal

therefore, nothing illogical or

'

eternal

The

'

padarthas also are

reality of the

of the Svatantra.

dependent

'

He

perspective

a "

by

is,

anusahgika

the

is

not important

is

ft

Madhva's opinion, an importo the realization of the ideal

as

attitude to the

referring to the doctrine of the

HiM^A
Madhva

upon God.

some

critics

world in

reality

in itself to the

tfd^TlcWT l^ct

of the world as

Dvaita philosopher
ft:"^TOFr

*RTlt

p.

538 b

).

Wm,

is no place in his new creation

eternal creation' thro' " Paradhlna-

There

no theological Dualist.

'

vi&s&pti" for the 'Oriental Augustinian monarchotheistic

by sheer

have

proper

its

or Apara-Siddhanta (MS",

theory of Sadasatkaryavada and

creation at a certain date

is,

holding the view that

of Paiicabheda,

Madhva

lesser metaphysical doctrine "

The world

'

thus, in

There

for all time.

in

cannot, therefore, be charged with an obsession

for the reality of the world and

Jayatirtha puts

entity,

inconceivable

Universe

tant philosophical accessory

done.

In the same way, even where an

later.

" determined " by an other, there

is no fear of its losing

and becoming non-eternal by the caprice of the determining
For the governing principle will maintain and guarantee the

eternal entity

fiat

of

God

'

idea

of

out of fathomless nothing.

MADHVA'S ONTOLOGICAL THEORY

41

Madhva admits the creation of eternal substances

a Pickwickian sense of " Paradhlna-visesapti ", which will be
explained later. Real creation, in his view, means such an eternal
Paradoxically enough,
also

in

dependence of the world of matter and souls on God, as would

their non-existence in the absence of

God's

involve

with their reality

His
and sustaining principle that invests them
and without which they would be but void names and

bare

The

will

is

will to that effect, while

the essential condition

possibilities.

scientific

value of the doctrine of " Paradhina-

vi&sapti" would be evident when

fact that Biblical

chronolgy

in the

it is

contrasted, for a

West

moment, with the

fixed the date of creation of the

world at 4004 B.C. Geology has since vastly extended cosmic time but
actual- date might be thus thrust back indefinitely, the view
of creation as an event in time, at some indefinite period, in the past,
;

alt ho' the

still

continues to lurk in

many

have clung to

like Flint

quarters and even eminent theologians

But, thanks to the stupendous

advance of Science in recent times, such crude notions have no place
heroically.

it

in serious thinking, quite apart

the question of
create,

why

having kept in

after

from the

difficulty

the Deity should have chosen

its

of having to answer

be
on God and

then, that the dependence

'creation

God,

all

'

thro'

the

particular time

shell all along, before.

It

will

to

clear

of even eternal entities

their
" Paradhinavisesapti ", brings out the independence of

more prominently.

The supremacy of God

as the

immanent- cum-transcendent principle

of the Universe, introduces order and unity in the cosmos, in spite of

The multiverse of

its

becomes a Universe, in
that it owes its allegiance to a single source and derives its strength, power
and reality, beauty, goodness etc. now and forever, from One:
internal differences.

^,

tfot^wict

*Rf% >pW:

reals

s^ ft qitr

^IJ ?l#rwr:

II

Thus, Madhva's chief ontological

Svatantra and Paratantra does

full justice

II

M.

G. B.

classification

to the

of

iv,

24

being

into

three primary .data of

philosophy in the light of the requirements of religious consciousness

and speculative reason.

CHAPTER VI

MADHVA'S ONTOLOGICAL SCHEME.

Brahman

Madhva's philosophy.

principle of
^Jjn
(ftcJfr

as the Only Independent Real

mm

fapqwn), the Sentient of

all reality,

reality

sentients

all

TO^P^WJ,

special place

is

of perfect bliss

'JJT ),

the Eternal of eternals

(%aH%cWMiyj, the source of

OwtllMcflfaMiftlftfiftrq,

consists of Cetanas

in the finite.

and Acetana.

given there to Srftattva as the presiding

deity (principle) over the entire

for this reason,

is,

Infinite (

wm WP0

ontological

the highest

of the Cetanavarga are, to some extent, theological in

subdivisions

character.

It is
(

consiousness and activity

Dependent

The

the Real of reals

),

is

domain of Jada-Prakrti.

designated as

Sri or

Lakgml

Similar presiding

Cetana-Prakrti.

( Abhimani-Devatas ) are accepted for other material principles

Mahat, Ahaiiikara, Bhutas, Indriyas etc. on the clear authority of
the Vpanisads, Brahmasntra (ii, 1, 6) 1 and the Pancar&tras.
The
Srftattva ranks next to the Supreme Being, qua Paratantra.
But it is not
without a partial parity of status with the Supreme in virtue of being
co-pervasive in Time and Space and being ever-free from bondage
{nityamukta) and therefore designated as "Sama-na" (B.S.B. iv, 2, 7).

principles

like

Sri

is

placed in the (f^itfe) and has cosmic sway 2 ,

the destinies of the souls

position, with

of Ramanuja

some

accordingly,

and the modifications of Matter.

difference in details,

is

An

over

analogous

given to Sri, in the theology

also.

The rest of the Cetana-varga, is subject to the bondage of Prakrti

and is further subdivided into "released" and "unreleased".
There is
an intrinsic gradation among the released and the unreleased alike,
Hiranyagarbha among the released ( and in Samsara too ) occupying a
privileged position as Jivottama.

innate distinction

among

Unlike Ramanuja,

(released) souls into

Naras. The Devas are Sarva-prakaia

1.

to realize

God

an
Pa ) and

accepts

Pitr,

as pervasive), the

Sankara also admits as a Siddhanta view, the existence of Abhimanidevatas.

See S.S.B.
2.

(fit

Madhva

Deva, Egi,

See

i,

3,

33.

ImUml

SUta,

B. V. X, 125.

2TWI 3wi<*wisfd: *

* *

(DvMa&a-Stotra)

MADHVA'S 0NT0L0G1CAL SCHEME

43

Sages are Antahpraka&a and the rest Bahihpraktea. 1

The non-released

are again classified as salvable (fftcRTfrcr), ever-transmigrating (PicWTft)

and damnable (cWteTN).

to

Madhva

discussed

theology.

and philosophical

ethical

unique

is

merits will be

later.

The Acetana
negative

This tripartite classification of souls

Its

section falls into

two groups of positive

Three kinds

(abhava).

antecedent negation

of

5WSPW

),

bh&va

negation are accepted

(

subsequent

and

and

JITOTTW

31c*RfFm

The mutual negation

of Nyaya philo( 3i-qMiflT=r )
sophy is equated with " Difference " and is not treated as an abhava, as it
does not involve significant negation in the first act of perception. The

(absolute).

conception of atyant&bhava differs radically from the

its

counter-correlative (

sf^M )

In the domain of positive reals,

non-eternal.

If

everything

is

whether

the eternal and the

and uncreated, causation would
were interpreted in terms of mani-

Even if it
would still arise about the manifestation

caused or uncaused.

it is

would

also

itself,

In the former case, the question could

be continuously repeated involving a regress.

redundancy of causal effort would be there.
It

in that

we have both

eternal

cease to have any meaning.

festation, the question

Nyaya view

has no factual existence (3wtoiii+).

In the latter case, the same

be impossible to account for creative evolution, dissosome enduring stuff out of which things

lution etc., in the absence of

could be created and into which they would be resolved.

of

momentary

mind, as

The doctrine

creation and dissolution cannot be accepted

by a reflective
disproved by our experience (Pratyabhijna) and conviction

it is

of the continuity of the objects.

There

is,

thus,

non-eternal Bhavas.

a clear case for the acceptance of both eternal and

Space, time, the Vedas, the subtle aspects of the

Abamkarika Prapa, Mahat, Aharhkara and the qualities

The grosser developments of these are non-eternal. Where the substances show both the
aspects, as for example, time viewed as an eternal process and as a succession of moments, each aspect would be referred to its appropriate
category and the substance itself could be spoken of as a " Nityanitya ".
elements, senses,

of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, are deemed eternal.

S.

'

8.

B.

3re:5ROT

iv, 8,

16)

srf^sRRrcir.'

*$h+i*ii:

%r

^ra

*i<?jh*i*ii:

5EWt

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHVACARYA

44

The world of attributes comprising qualities (primary and secondary),

by Madhva as
constituting the very essence of the substances themselves. They need
actions, Satta, Sakti, Sadrs'ya, Visista etc., are regarded

own

not, then, be regarded as having a separate existence of their

ring independent enumeration or classification.

tally distinguished

from

their

requi-

But where they are men-

substances, by the

power of

internal

they could certainly be enumerated, classified and studied sepa-

Vis'esas,
1

Madhva, however, puts forward a twofold classification of attri(i) yavad-drayyabhcivi (coeval) and
(ii)
ayavad-dravyabh&vi (changing). The former type of attributes or properties, being
coessential, are identical with the substances themselves.
The latter are
to be considered as partly different and partly identical (bhimablrinna)
rately.

butes in general as

with their substances, in an equal measure.

This relation applies in
respect of the pairs (1) cause and effect (2) temporary qualities of substances,

and

Buddha

(the thing-in-itself

whole

1.

their

substratum

(3)

genus and species

and the thing as

qualified)

(4)

and

Visista
(5)

and

part and

etc.

It is

thas (into
understood.

from

ten

this

standpoint that the

categories),

in

conventional classification of Padir-

Madhvasiddhantatara and other works

is

to

be

OHAPTEK

VII

THE CONCEPT OF

VI&3SAS.

The relation between substance and attributes is one of the intriguing

problems of philosophy. It has well-nigh taxed the ingenuity and resources of philosophers in the East and in the West.

Madhva's

contri-

bution to the solution of this problem is both original and significant.

He has actually contributed a new idea the concept of Viiesas to the

treatment of

of

his.

this

philosophical problem.

Madhva

a relation of

accepts

in respect of coessential attributes

an outstanding discovery

It is
'

colorful identity

'

<#tf?r^

and difference-cum-identity ( ^T^F?

)
)

in the case of transient attributes:

*#&
He

Sfqf

^PT

M\4&.t&

has thus made a striking effort to

(TV)

**^tJL

rise

above the

'

dualism

'

of

substance and attributes and combine them into a homogeneous whole

that admits, however, of logical, conceptual

whereever necessary, thro

themselves, to be

These
stances.

known

'

exist

linguistic distinction,

as " Vis'esas ".

Vis'esas are ubiquitous

They

and

the self-differentiating capacity of substances

among

and are not confined

to

sentients as well, including the

material sub-

Supreme Being.

In sentient beings, these Vis'esas, whether manifested or not, are identical

with their substrata

while in regard to insentients, attributes which are

coeval would be identical with the substances (and distinguishable by

changing or impermanent ones would be different-cumThe whole question has been very clearly
identical with their substances.
Vis'esas); while

expounded by Jayatirtha,

in his c.

on

the G. T. xi, 15, p. 184.

philosophy oy sbI madhvAcArya

46

The argument for

The conception of

Trivikrama Pandita.

and

the acceptance of Visesas

attributes is a very difficult one.

tion of

'

substance

'

and

'

If

attributes

'

is

the relation between substance

they are identical, the distinc-

meaningless

substance alone or attributes alone, in that case; and

If the

two are

different, their relation

even

if

and so on ad

We

The

infinitum.

itself

persist

difficulty will

Substance and attributes are treated as partly identical and partly

The only way

different.

in

which a regress could be avoided, on any

first

relation

and

re-

without waiting to be explained or related to

its

with a certain capacity to take care of

late itself to the relata,

terms by another relation.

made

If

has to be re-

one of these alternatives, would be by agreeing to invest the

itself

would have

not both of them.

becomes a purely external one.

they are related internally by Samavaya, this relation

lated to the terms

thus presented by

is

itself,

explain

itself,

Since an appeal has thus ultimately to be

to the self-explicability of the relation,

it

will

be

wiser,

more

economical and expedient, to invest the substance

itself

trinsic capacity of integrating its attributes into

a homogeneous whole,

with

itself,

with such an

in-

without prejudice to their distinction of references according

to exigencies, and without the need for any external relation.

trinsic capacity of substances is

proposed to be called "Visesas"

This

in-

very

appropriate name, so far as any one could see, and one which could not

be improved upon.

We have, here,

in the Visesas of

Madhva, a remark-

able anticipation of the Hegelian doctrine of " internal relations ".

Experience shows that the various qualities of a thing are not the
The temporal, spatial, qualitative, quantita.

fictions of the imagination.

tive

and causal

characteristics of objects that

we

see are not altogether

by the mind; for there is no reason why and how

all minds should or could project alike and carry on with a sense of preestablished harmony of world-building impressions.
But there are attributes like the "light of the Sun" and the ''primary qualities" which
could not be perceived apart from the objects possessing those qualities.
The idea of a triangle as a three-sided figure involves the other idea of the
the fancies projected

sum of

its

angles being equal to

however the same tho

two

right angles.

they involve each other.

The two

ideas are not

There are a number

of practical difficulties which stand in the way of an absolute identity of
Jayatirtha draws attention to some
the two substance and attributes.
:

'

COKCBfT OV VISB?AS

'IHE

47'

important considerations of

this kind which justify a certain measure of

between the two, consistent with our experience. 1

practical distinction

In the perception ' the jar is white ', the whiteness and the jar cannot
be regarded as coterminal and coextensive. The jar is something more
than its whiteness. When one is asked to fetch a white thing, one does
not necessarily fetch a jar. (2) The two terms, the jar and whiteness, are
not synonymous in denotation, for there is no contradiction in saying
that the jar
jar.

man
its

is

The

(3)

not white as there would be in saying that the jar

jar is perceived irrespective of

feels its presence

with his hands, even when he

unable to perceive

is

This shows that the perception of a jar

whiteness.

the perception of

When

color.

its

not the same as

is

the whiteness of the object is chan-

ged into redness by a coating of paint, we

recognize the pot as such, tho

not a

is

when a blind

whiteness as

its

notin

still

continue to perceive and

former color.

All this points

to an undeniable distinction between the ideas of substance and attribu-

The

'

its

attributes not merely subsist,

but

exist.
Their distinction from
no correcting judgment to the
contrary. At the same time, the attributes have no reality apart from
the substances and are always presented in all judgments about them as
tes.

the substance

is

not illusory, as there

identical with their substances:

W-

*&'

is

3t$ttt

and content between the subject and the predicate

accepted proof of identity
intersection of identity
justification for his

and

a^

>wi u li, ].

It

This identity of form

[

is

Madhva

difference that

OTRlftw?^ ] j s
crossing

in this

finds

the

or

and

clue

concept of Vis'esas, to bridge the gulf between

an

subs-

tance and attributes and preserve the basic unity of experience without
in

any manner

1.

sacrificing

the

5Pl%^JR?BRu%(l.)
*ffc"fllk*j (3.)

ll

(6.)

(4.)

(8.)

* n?:

sfeWW^flsCT^:

cf^-

(2.)
(5.)

TOTH^-

3^2: TC ^fct^^S!? 12 ^^ifi^lTRTm:

r'*m$ Tsl^nftra^ spjrsiuSfa =*

&m:

demanded and

distinctions

MA^a4flt^ 9ft^EWW

3WW*WI<*<W

cf# 2rf^fqpHFW,
(7.)

numerous

sfcfTcqg^rRT:

spptfifera. qzisrfiq-

*^iwq&T psc^^qswMiictcfWR:

N.

(9.)

S. p.

q*w $\m

106

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHVACARYA

48

drawn by the

usage and practical utility.

We
" Vis'esas ", in whatever way we might

necessities of scientific

can never do without

such

choose to conceive of the substance.

endorse the criticism of D.

M. Datta

Madhva would, therefore, willingly

that " the necessity for

an interfrom a narrow and exclusive

conception of " terms ". If we widen our outlook and think of an entity
as possessing in addition to its essential non-relative and intrinsic character, other extrinsic relative characteristics which it might have in the infinite situations in which it may be placed, then we can easily dispense with
A thing thus comes to be
the existence of a third entity or relation.
viewed as an identity of some intrinsic and extrinsic forms or aspects.
Different words are then found to denote different forms of the same
position of a third entity or relation arises

Ways of Knowing, p. 115). These criticisms will not apply to the Vis'esas which are not conceived as extrinsic

thing in different aspects " (Six

from the terms.

neither a " third entity "

nor a
and yet capable of distinguishIts help would be indispensable
ing them where and when necessary.
in any attempt to " widen our outlook and think of an entity as possessother extrinsic
ing, in addition to its essential and intrinsic character,
to or different

relation.

It is

Vis'esa

is

part and parcel of the terms

which it might have in the infinite situations in which it

,
placed " (Op. cit)-ltalics mine. It would be impossible to effect
an " identity " between the " intrinsic and extrinsic forms or aspects " of
characteristics

may be

a thing, without the help of

*'

Vis'esas ".

It is

the only

is thus the same as the principle of

by Madhva as

Vis'esa
is

defined

f%$!

way

out.

identity-in-difference.

3#cl: Stsfe q^sfosicr:

It

II

(AV).
the peculiar characteristic or potency of things which

and

talk of difference possible

exists.

It is

same time to

makes description

where as a matter of fact only

identity

a differentiating or pluralising agency which serves at the

exhibit the pluralities as flowing centripetally towards

given object which happens to occupy the focus of attention on account

of a dominant pragmatic interest at the moment.

It renders possible the

validity of countless viewpoints while the object itself retains its

independence and integrality.

Wl<fti*lTn^i

(NS,

Jayatirtha defines

p. 106) the principle

of identity-judgements, a real

practical

it

as-

unity,

^^3WM^-

of thought whereby, in
distinction of

all

cases

a non-figurative

"

THE CONCEPT
nature,

the judgments in question

if

tautologous (paryaya), belonging

thought-as %Jt *&'

Madhva and

his

'

VI&EgAS

OB"

drawn and accepted,

or has to be

is

are not to be

to the pathology of

commentator show that such experiences, involving

found everywhere in the Scriptures

the mediation of Vis'esas, are to be

and in our daily

3TFF3

W:

ffTTpJf

m,

II

life

of lay and

W- 1:-

scientific

!JW %T^iq

commerce
31?jf:

:'

3$:

3??
fsr55f[

HFRFRt

OTTFT

W-

etc.

They introduce order into the world of substances (padartha) and

keep intact the unity of the substance in and thro all its various modes,
predicates, aspects, attributes and relations. Madhva indicates in his B.T.
'

(p.

84) about six places where Vis'esas usually

It is

l)

"3wwiMi ^

3)

?tlRtalfadlsrTft

5)

WrtS!tf5Rt%W

this

2)

4)
(

S'HFft

ft-JTRRcfScT:

CTI%:

* #

come

gi'Siwrr

into play

OTT

#11

category or " power of things in themselves " which, thro

an underlying identity of essence, enables us to distinguish

from its universal

power or energy from

from

a particu-

(1)

(3) motion or
things possessing them
(4) the Svarupa from
the Svarupin and Svarupatvam. Jayatlrtha points out that in the term
" Svarupatvam ", the use of the suffix tva stands for Vis'esas and that
without acceptance of such a shade of meaning, its use would be
lar

redundant.
the thing

Vis'esa

whereby

is,

(2)

a quality

substance

therefore, but another

maintains

it

its

its

name

unity and

for the potency

continuity thro

'

all

of
its

modes, predications and aspects

^3

f^Nt

srerrfts
qsrr

T:

&ft*r:

cPPf

cTPrr

SplcT

sr^iii^fa:

WW&f

tsft

wvft *#wjI3

ft%*sr

^Ji^f^l

^"flR

^4

II

(Madhva, Bfh. Up. C.

l.

gt

*TR:

P.M. 4

Cf.

m\

(TP.

ww

III.

<j<kr^sft

2, 30).

mw ^r

f^aft mfii, <$

p.

18),

%$ f^rat

PHILOSOPHY OF 6sf MADHVACARYA

50

A luminous
nosity.

It

stone

is

not something totally different from

stands self-related to

to rw
TO ^R ?
3

lustre

its

its

lumi-

*fcr.

*m$n

g*tfi

OTfa:

dcSHlti*l

fo^l^T

(Bfh. Up. C. p. 18 b)

The

thing itself

is

so constituted

A^i

?RftS5Fc(f5l*taRiRRT

stHTS^ct^RCT

f?*lcT:

#?focT:

II

AV.

that it can relate itself to and distinguish itself from its modes, predicates
or properties, without invoking the aid of any other relation or a " third
entity "

(as Prof.

self-contained

Datta terms

and

self -related.

SvanirvcLhaka, self-explicable,

it).

It

It is

only by the acceptance of such a

is

we can " widen our outlook " and conceive of a

substance " as an identity of some intrinsic and extrinsic forms or as-

potency in things that

This conception of substance as a unity of

pects" (Datta, p. 115).

countless Vis'esas

3?q%
held

?ids5rafi$wi<*Kwr

by Madhva,

f^rer:

(av.)

resembles the Jain theory

substance

of

as that

which has many qualities forming its essence : 3FRI*Fflf?*RR 3Rg ( Haribhadra Suri). There is however this difference that the Jain theory of
substance as a dynamic reality, an identity that changes, would be in-

complete,

round

of something like Vis'esas to

Anekantavada of the Jains involves the
will be difficult to maintain the basic identity

without

the

As

the

off.

it

Ksanikatva of things,

it

acceptance

of the substance per se, without the Vis'esas.

should not, therefore, be mistaken for new

Vis'esas

or

additional

of things, that mediate among other relations and manage to

distinguish them where necessary. Such a view will be not only opposed to the nature and role of Vis'esas, as conceived by Madhva but also
attributes

defeat the very purpose for which they have been conceived.

a misunderstanding of the nature of Vis'esas that

criticism that
grity.

If

krishnan,

it is
I.

"

If

Visesa

is

non-different

Phil,

ii,

p.

746)

different

from

from

we

it,

[Italics

is

mine].

such

at the back of the

the subject,

cannot call

It is

it

breaks its inteViiesa " (Radha-

it

COHCEtT OF VI^B?AS

tntH

51

The same confusion of thought regarding Vis'esas

it is either an attribute of the substance, or an

system, that
tity, is

Madhva's

to be seen in the writings of even distinguished traditional critics

of the system like

Madhusudana

thor of the Advaitasiddhi writes

* t

craiw^a: # * *
R^lMI^K> ;

Sarasvati and

Brahmananda.

^W^fcTflfara^ awft

*t^

?wi=iA$lm^r ^rgq-qft:

its

The au-

( tfcqi^fosft)

df SkM^^it^'

(N. S. Press edn. p. 807).

II

This criticism that the acceptance of Vis'esas in

troy

in

additional en-

oneness quite as

much

Brahman would

des-

as the acceptance of an internal difference

of substance and attributes therein, betrays a presumption that the

Vis'e-

must be different from the substance (Vis'esin) which is categorically

denied by Madhva. The criticism also suffers from a self-contradiction
in that Madhusudana himself declares that there can be no Vis'esas other
than the distinctive nature of things, and nothing more is claimed for the

sas

Vis'esas

by the Madhva philosophers

of the Advaitasiddhi, that

it is

also

To

as does the author

say,

not the nature of Vis'esas in the Dvaita

system, simply shows that he has not rightly understood their true nature

according to the Dvaitins. But strangely enough, he himself goes on to

point out that " the Dvaitins unlike the Nyaya-Vais'esikas, do not regard

from the essence of things

their Vis'esas as different

FS%?fcRT

cAl^lHRT %SF^

therefore, points

807).

(p.

out that the talk

no VUesas, other than

the

of the

"distinctive natures

presumption of

in itself involves the

SSP^T

^ 3TS?F?|%

The author of the Tarahgfyi,

Vis'esas

Advaitin) of there

of things"

f^N

f^TT

( ciTWHifc)

being

nWwH)

WWWWRWII^:

(Tg. p. 383)

In view of so

much

confusion even in learned quarters about the

true nature and scope of Vis'esas,

it

is

well to

set forth its authentic

nature in the words of the original works clearly and categorically

S^ cRftSfRffa$lNlc*W4f

ftsra:

WI!Hc% # # *
Jayatirtha defines

in

Vis'esas

the

(AV)
clearest

terms

as the " potency

f^Wt *m q^T&lRwfifi^dR. ( Vdrfavali, p. 97 b ).

Raghavendra's commentary on it clinches the matter once for all

of things " WPtaTfrft

q^wV

l-ftl

itrt'cRRfc^:

Jayatirtha again writes

elsewhere

!*S

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHVACARYA

52

fa%

t^

z&wfa,

alt s3

f^% Mwa cf^f#iq%:

the

Nyayamrta and

^ Mw

srcr,

%rft ^r,

The Vddaratnavali ( written a century before

Vi&sas

II

the Advaitasiddhi,) expounds the nature of

as "nothing but the potency of things themselves"

^n^rra^Kf

a?T ioi%fcfofasr?ffi

%.,

aft

m,

is,

thus no point in the criticism that "

we cannot

the substance,

you

will,

another

Vis'esa

name

Madhva

be

will

there

in

3W

Vttesavada Ms.

if it is

Call

q^iRtiR^onii

it

from
by whatever name

non-different

the nature of things as

for the substance, with

is

".

Vitesas

call it

:--

% tp fttw
(

There

aestfaFrfasiT

all

its

it

is

only

wonderful capacities.

thus fully justified in holding that

it

would be impossible

to establish any adequate theory of the relation between substance and

attributes

without invoking the aid of

Svarupavis'esas in

Substance.

Such

Vis'esas are forced

as a Sarvatantrasiddhanta, says

fll

Vis'esas,

which are

also called

order to show that they are not other than the

r^T %n%

fatpft

W& fa^:sR*R $

upon us by

Madhva

*rrf

Sfr

t&

the very laws of thought

ft

^Tf *#L

(AV.)

They lurk everywhere

in relations between substance and attributes from

whatever angle they might be approached, as the " mysterious Mrs.

Harris of metaphysics ", as

just a

"peculiarity"

an

one writer has racily put it. Vis'esa is

unnameable something recognized by all,

and Madhva has only tried to give it a special name and a form
and has rendered its existence explicit, in the interests of clearness of
thought and judgments. This is no small service to scientific thinking
and metaphysics.
tacitly,

Madhva undertakes to convince the open-minded that Vis'esas must

be accepted as a postulate of thought. There are only three possible
ways in which the relation of substance and attributes could be conceived,

bhinna

),

(1)

that they are entirely different

(2)

absolutely

identical with

from each other

each other

abhinna

or

atyanta(3)

both

and different ( bhinnabhinna ).

These three views have been put
forward by the Naiyayikas, the Advaitins and the Bhattas respectively.
Madhva shows by argument that every one of these views has ultiidentical

THE CONCEPT OF VI^E?AS

mately to

fall

back on

He,

Vis'esas.

53

therefore,

examines them and

dismisses them

all, in favour of a forth view of Savis'egabheda ( identity

based on Vis'esa ) as the only acceptable view, free from the difficulties

incidental to the other three.

The theory
is

not only

of absolute difference between substance and attributes

full

of

difficulties

philosophic imagination.

but cannot also

the

terms or identical with them

No.

2,

also different

we

so that

nitely,

from or

In the

first

it

1,

to our

itself

from

different

case, is the difference

terms and so on

identical with the

are left with a regress.

identical with the terms,

commend

No.

difference

Is the said

If difference

indefi-

No.

were

could not be conceived as the difference of

or that term, as such descriptions would themselves presuppose a

this

The terms and the differences would all be synonymous.

difference were said to be self-supporting, is such selfsufficiency ( svanirv&hakatvam ) different from or identical with the terms
and with the act of self-supporting ? In the former case, an endless
"
regress is sure to arise and in the latter, the expressions " nirvahya
difference.
If

the said

and " nirvahaka " (supporter and supported) and supporting (nirvahana),
involved in the definition of Svanirvahakatva,

would be

tautological.

be said that the difference between substance and attributes

If it

is

endowed with such self-supporting and self-linking capacity,

it would be but another name for " Vis'esas " and such potency could as
well be claimed for and vested in the substance itself instead of in
naturally

" difference "

If

similarly

the question arises

related

Samavaya

is

to

the

relata

may

at the very outset, so that

padartha

the

if

self-linking ( svanirvahaka

such a self-linking capacity

itself,

and externally
Samavaya relation
by another Samavaya and so

substance and attributes are to be different

by Samavaya,

as

is

on.

If

without the aid of another

well

link,

be posited of the substance

the luxury of

may be dispenced with

related
too,

srffitfcWMl

an additional

qfew WH^

relation

between the substance and attributes were however,

left as such, but
only the two terms. In the absence of any difference, we cannot even
speak of the two terms, substance and attribute as such, as even this
idea is born of difference. If the terms and difference are identical, one
If the difference

identical

with the relata, there would be no difference

may contend

that difference alone exists as a matter of fact

terms whatever!

Difference then,

and no

between substance and attributes

philosophy of r1 madhvAcArya

54

must be accepted not as being absolutely identical with the terms but
" identical with a qualification " ( Savisesabheda ), that would preserve all
three of

them

intact

tinction of reference

and prevent

may

their

Such

mutual synonymity.

dis-

indeed be most profitably attributed to the

substance themselves, instead of to the relation of difference.

The Bhedabheda view of substance and attributes is in need of

very outset. Identity and difference being opposites and
therefore mutually exclusive, cannot be brought together and conceived
to coexist ( sam&nMhikarana
without the aid of a mediating factor.
Either of them should therefore be invested with the peculiar capacity
Vis'esas, at the

of putting up with

a peculiar

its

capacity

opposite

tf^l^i^:

or ajijc^wpfc:

of making opposites meet

indeed

will

Such
be a

" Vi&>a "

Even supposing that substance and attributes are connected by a
relation of Bhedabheda, what will be the sort of relation between the
identity and the difference, mutually and to the terms ?
If that is also
one of bhedabheda, there will be a regress, if the bhedabheda is to be
!

accepted as svamrvahaka

self-linking

help of a peculiar potency in

could only be so with the

it

),

want of a better name.

bheda and abheda are different from the terms, there will be a
regress.
If identical, they cannot be represented
as " belonging " to
called Visesa, for

it

If

them ( tadiya ) without some kind of a peculiarity. Nor can difference

and identity between the terms, be again identical with them. If they are,
difference and identity will both become identical in their turn, which
will lead to an absurdity and there will be no possibility of
establishing a relation between them.

The doctrine of undifferenced

is

equally dependent on Vis'esas.

to the

famous

in the nature

definitive text (

it

akhaipdata~

laksapav&kya

of

illustrated

the Advaita

with reference

W% fFWFRT 3

three attributes of reality, consciousness

be necessary to

call to

and the oneness of Brahman

preserved.

may be

of a proposition or judgment on the nature of

and ascribes to
It will

reality

This

Are

in

the attributes

aid Vis'esas

if

and

which

is

Brahman
infinitude.

the unity of the judgment

and thro' the three attributes are to be

satvam, jnctnam and dnantyam mutually

or not 1 If they are, we have to admit an element of plurality

Brahman, which cannot be. If they are all the same, there is no need
to predicate three of them, as any one of them would do. They
will thus be synonymous in effect (paryaya) and hence redundant.
different

in

THE CONCEPT OF VI^E?A8

55-

cannot be that there are subtle shades of difference among them

for
Brahman is ex hypothesi Nirvisesa i. e. without any shade of any
kind of difference or plurality. Nor can their employment be defended
It

the

on the assumption of affirmation

f^ITf i%JJ#t),

Even

thro' negation

of the opposite*

( silctT-

must be recognized, some kind of distinction

from the opposites negated, as otherwise, the entire negation would be a
meaningless proposition. 1
The distinction from unreality must perforce
be distinct from distinction from ignorance, limitation etc. The doctrine
of Saviiesabheda is thus forced upon all as a universal principle
'

wraiRwn

).

there,

None who

Madhva's Vifesa

is

cares for the laws of thought can escape

it.

thus the counterpart of the principle of identity-

by many Western philosophers and that of the

Samavaya and Svarupasambandha recognized by the Nyaya-Vais'esikas
in-difference recognized

and the Advaitins. But it is not just another name for Samavaya.
In
it is not a relation at all in the sense Samavaya is
tho' it is
svanirvahaka like the latter. It has a clear advantage over the Samavaya,
in that its self-sufficiency is more directly and easily established than
that of Samavaya. The acceptance of Samavaya has to be supplemented
by the assumption of its self-sufficiency and ability to render a distinction
fact,

of reference without a distinction of essence, possible

ft^m^

WI<i)filAH.

which

is

3#ftsft

the hall-mark and raison d'etre of Visesas

i<*"M*i<.-

( NlSfahi*-

).

thus Madhva's most original and subis

problem of substance and attributes in Indian
in no way indebted to the Samavaya or any other category

This concept of Visesas

stantial contribution to the

ontology.

He

is

this.
The general impression of many that
based on the doctrine of the Nyaya-Vais'esikas
and their catagories has already been shown to rest on ignorance of facts
and imperfect understanding of the basic principles of ontology upon
which the Realism of Madhva is based. It may perhaps be said with

of the Nyaya-Vaisesika for

Madhva

Philosophy

is

better reason that the

Visesa of

Madhva

is

reared on the ashes of

Samavaya.
Lastly,

it

has nothing save

the (Nyaya-Vais'esikas.

x-

* m& ftfltt

its

name

(1) It is easily

3, ft

in

common with

distinguishable

*HHcft#M

the Visega of

from the Vaisegika

(Madhva, AV.)

PHILOSOPHY OF SRl MADHVACAEYA

56

Vis%gas which are ex hypothesi restricted to eternal entities alone

ftPBC31i?Rf ftWPFRrT

confined to eternal substances. They exist in non-eternal also.

purpose and function of Visesas too are different

According to the Vai&sikas, these

things alone

and

serve

eternal of a genus

known

as

Muktavali). But Madhva's Vi&sas are not

in the

(2)

The

two systems.

found in eternal
one eternal from another and one

peculiarities are

to distinguish

from others of: the same class, They are accordingly

" and apply where such- differentiation

" Vyavartaka-Vis'csas

(vyavrtti) is not otherwise possible

as between a pot and a cloth.

the Naiyayikas in

from one another

"Savayava"

class-concept or other means,

thro*

They are not, therefore, recognized by

entities, which could be distinguished

thro' distinction of parts.

The function of

Madhva's philosophy, is not merely to

and the whole, and to render a distinction of reference, without :'one of existence or essence, possible, where
necessary or desired, into substance and attribute, part and whole etc.,
within inseparable wholes.
The Visesas of the Vais'esikas, on the other
Visesas, in

distinguish, but to unify the part

hand, operate only

of absolute difference. This fact is of utmost

keep the Visesas of the two systems as the
Poles apart and expose the fallacious assumption of some scholars that
the ViSegas of Madhva's system are either derived from or inspired by
importance.

It

in cases

suffices

to

those of the Nyaya-Vais'esikas.

misleading estimate of

its

It

the failure to

is

Madhva, that

nature of Visesas taught by

role

such sweeping assertions as,

in

is

grasp

philosophy that

his

"By means

the true

responsible for

wholly

we have

of the category of ViSegas,

in
it

be possible for us to account for the world of distinction without

assuming them to be ultimate " ( Radhakrishnan, /. Phil, ii, p. 746 ).
" It is thro' the functioning of Vis'egas that we have difference or Bheda "
will

(ibid. 746).

It is

therefore necessary to point out that Vis'egas have been

admitted by Madhva, only in cases of absence of actual difference, as

between parts and whole, substance and attributes etc., and where
despite such absence of actual difference,

a certain measure of internal

distinction of parts, qualities or aspects

met

is

parlance and validated by experience.

with, in lay

ViSega

is,

thus,

and

scientific

category of

thought or power of things inherent in them which, by definition,

intended to justify and rationalize this lay and scientific

" difference in

identity".

The Vadaratnavali makes this raison

T %t ^lOTT^ ^WWWtfc'J

of the acceptance of Visesas, clear

'

is

acceptance of
d'etre
fifera-

THE CONCEPT OF VlSEgAS

src&f

^wrofe mft wr^

^^R^

wnn%,

sifter:,

^+l4$Rc4i*K jiq

era

57

^r

JCTsn^ro.

mfi ^pnt

m^wn^tiTm^tiNw&m

^Ttftra#fa:

*e<-HcJ
It could, on no account, be applied or extended
where a genuine and absolute difference reigns supreme, and
|

to cases

where there
(svarapaikya)

is

no room for the

or coexistence

be universally substituted in

between a

man and
".

).

factual

identity

cannot therefore

It

cases of actual difference in the world as

all

a horse, and difference as such and as a category of

from the world of experience, or dismissed

thought, banished

" ultimate

of

trace

slightest

samanadhikaraiyya

To attempt such a

substitution

is

as not being

confuse the original

to

with the substitute and prevent the function of the latter by extending
it

beyond

its

legitimate scope

Vis'esas

has each

fixed

beyond

is

then, to

its

own

and sphere of application. Difference and

life, well-defined and their jurisdiction

place in

possibility of enchroachment.

suggest that difference

everywhere under

all

circumstances and that

world of differences without assuming

miraculous help of Vi^egas.

It

it

The position cannot be made

own

of

life.

legitimate sphere.

" ultimate

for the

", thro'

the

which however

identity

reference,

valid

in experience:

Jayattrtha, G. T. Ny&yadipika, p. 182

clearer than this.

Nor can

the

sphere, of difference in identity, in

lessen the ultimacy of Difference as

spheres

be illegitimate

should not be lost sight of that Vis'esas

admit of an internal distinction of

of Vis'esas, in their

will

we may account

to be

are strictly limited to cases of proved basic

It

such can be replaced by Visegas

as

operation

any way

a category of experience in other

The one does not and cannot annul

Both are necessary for

the other, in its

the interpretation of reality.

" Bheda " and " Vis'esa " may therefore be described as the two poles of
Madhva's ontology.

CHAPTER

VIII

MADHVA'S DOCTRINE OF
Madhva

"

rejects the Universal as a natural corollary of his doctrine

of the uniqueness of the particular, be

uniqueness
Difference

is

is

from

So much

%58FT

This

is

it

^4^

ft

a person or a thing.

terms of difference from

in

know

reality,

A substance,

else

but constitutes

its

to

know

way and from some

in

a particular way

SFRt

VTN

a thing

it

as distinct
:

).

because difference constitutes the essence of things

and

This

all

is

that to

so,

a general

all others, in

'Et^cft

svarupa

understood

to be

not merely a component part of

very essence.

Wf:

DIFFERENCE."

dharmi-

not merely an attribute of them, related from outside.

is

according to Madhva,

is

not a bare substratum of qualities,

or an abstraction, but a synthetic unity, capable of inner distinction of

and aspects,

parts

in speech

colorlessly

),

lest

exigencies,

under

flatly

and

but only colorfully identical or

judgments of both identity and difference, that we

with objects

identical

saviiesObhinna

and thought, according to

For, difference cannot be taken to be

the aegis of Vis'esas.

do have of them, should become unaccountable.

is Madhva's theory of Difference.
It is plainly
from the Nyaya-Vais'esika and MlmamsS view and this is
another striking proof that the logico-philosophical bases of Madhva's
system are in no way borrowed from or inspired by these pre-Madhva
realisms and that they are the result of independent cogitation on the

Such, in brief,

different

problems of philosophy.

We

have seen that God, matter and souls constitute the three

of Madhva's system. The number of souls is unlimited

and the modifications of matter are numerous, in various states. These
three are conceived as distinct entities.
The reality of God is of the
independent order. That of the rest is dependent. Between matter and
souls, the former is of a lesser order of reality.
It is only in this

major

sense
things

realities

we can speak

of degrees of reality in this system. The reality of

and time, involves the differences in name, form,
relations, and tendencies.
These manifold differences are
'

'

in space

attributes,

generally classified under these heads

thing from others of

aiDther kind anJ

(3)

its

own

kind

(1) Sajatiya

(2) Vijatlya

or difference of one

or difference from those of

Svagata or internal distinctions within an organic

"

MADHVA'S D0CTB1NE OF 'DIFFERENCE.

The

whole.

last

one

is

not admitted by

In the sphere of the other

of " five-fold Difference "

two

Madhva
)

absolute sense.

:-

Is'vara

Jlva

its

adumbrated a scheme

differences he has

Paiicabheda 1

in

59

Jada

,{

}<
Jada

Jlva
5

This fivefold difference

" Pra-parica "

It is real

%:

%W- "N^t

spoken of by Madhva as

collectively

is

HT*:

and eternal and admits of no

The Advaitins have sought

to

VTN

).

stultification.

deny the

of this

reality

fivefold

their thesis of the falsity of all the three

difference, in establishing

I^H+l?4d^W^<d^Jdit<(b^>fl *eP5WraT

Samksepa&ariraka,i,2).

They have, therefore, subjected the concept of Difference to a searching

criticism and sought to discredit the logical realism of the NyayaVaisesika and Mimamsa schools, grounded on the reality of difference.
Realistic Vedantins like Ramanuja and Madhva have, therefore, been
obliged to review these criticisms of the famous Dialecticians of the
Advaita school and redefine their attitude to Difference in such a way as
We may, therefore,
to overcome the difficulties raised by them
examine Madhva's position with reference to some of these criticisms of
the category of " Difference ", urged by the Advaitic dialecticians.
.

There are only two possible ways in which difference could be

(1) as an attribute of things (dharmabhedavada) and (2) as an

conceived

Neither can be said to

integral part of the thing itself ( dharmisvarapa ).

be entirely free from logical

difference in a logical

hold that

J.

it

difficulties.

All attempts at conceiving of

manner are eluded by it. The Advaitins therefore

( Pram&yika ) and must therefore be put

cannot be " real "

Jayatirtha, in his 0. on

VTN shows how

3WII*fiWll
2.

i,

16

and fr: ^pftffl^

made
(i,

in the

Mand Up.

1,

60

dMHlt cl.,
l

T^TT

*$S:

3*f:

TO W*:

<fa:
I

'
I

SIfScfT

W^kft

sft

5ft

text

10)

Jayatfrtha has explained the derivation of the term on the

Panini, V,

Fft

distinction is olearly:

this fivefold

presupposed in the very terras of predication

'

%ft

% JTtSJFIWRTTF *HfrT

basis

of

TOI#T ."Wl-WlG
I

(NS.

i,

230

b).

PHILOSOPHY

60

down

by many

such as interdependence and

fallacies,

regarded as an attribute of things.

difference

is

MADHVAoABYA

SBl

For the conception of

Avidya.

as a product of

vitiated

Off

Whether

difference

infinite regress, if
is

viewed as in

from its relata or as different-cum-identical with them,

this relation again will have to be similarly viewed as so related and
that again similarly, ad infinitum.
its

turn

'

different

'

The supposition of 'identity' between difference and the object will

tend to abolish the reality of difference altogether and leave the object
alone to

existence of

t*fi$T,

inasmuch as difference cannot claim to have a separate

exist,
its

own, apart from an object

OT ?R#R

'qq

$^f

m$m, dWI^WNK H

R$p'

^ftftfc

Masiddhi

" Dharmisvarupa ", held by the Pr&bhaFor difference, being in the nature of
disjunction ( Vidarayatma ), the oneness of a thing will be in danger
of disruption by the numerous disjunctions ( distinctions ) which will
form part of or constitute its nature and penetrate its very essence and
individuality.
The oneness or integrity of the object will thus be
destroyed and in the absence of oneness, manyness also would cease to
be, so that only nullity ( imyata ) would be left in the end
The theory of

karas,

fi

is

difference as

equally objectionable.

WH W
c

%*f *$&&&> 1 ffcM

(

Thirdly,

if

m^ ***

W%

Anandabodha, NycLyamakaranda

W^

).

difference were included in the essence of a thing,

such

become fully known, once the object is known, and there

would be no more room for doubts of any kind subsequently, so far as
But such is not
that thing and its difference from others are concerned.
difference should

This shows that difference could not be treated

but as something outside their content

the case in experience.

as

the essence

of things,

Lastly,

difference

but only in relation to

qualified

by them.

is

its

$riharsa,

not

Kha^anakha^lakhUdya

cognized

by

itself,

and independently,

terms, either as qualifying them, or as being

But in any

case, unless

previously cognized, their difference

the terms themselves

from each other which

is

are

either

MADHVA'S DOCTBINB OF

"

DIFFBSBENOE

bound up with the cognition of the

attributive, or

"

61

correlate,

and counter-

But then, the cognition of the terms is dependent

on that of the difference already referred to. There is thus an inescapable ( mutual ) interdependence in any attempt to define the nature of
correlate, cannot be.

difference or conceive of

the

from

evident

It is

examined

the

problem

it.

the writings of

in the light

that he

Ivfadhva,

of these and

many

has carefully

other criticisms of

Maodana, Vimuktatman, Anandabodha,

Advaitic dialecticians like

way out. His posimay be summed up in a few words Whatever may be the difficulties
the way of expounding the nature of difference and accounting for its

Sriharsa and Citsukha and has attempted to find a

tion
in

perception, the fact of

its

experience cannot be denied.

If logical

diffi-

comes to be apprehended, it is open to us to go beyond the accepted theories on the subject

and explore the possibilities of other suitable explanations and adopt
culties are felt in elucidating the process

by which

it

newer angles of vision in dealing with the issue, without discrediting

the very truth and reality of the experience of difference itself as such.
It would be unphilosophical to give up the attempt as beyond solution

sitollftspft

so

to try to escape the

^^R&JMiaO^K

difference as a delusion

Advaitins have done

Jayatfrtha, Mtth. Kh. t.p.S

),

much more

by condemning the perception of

a bad name ( and hanging it ) as the

responsibility

and giving

it

Moreover, granting that all known theories on the nature of difference

it would still be impossible to prove that the conception
of difference is itself a delusion, simply because of our incapacity to
make it conform to a definite pattern already familiar to us, or to define
The Advaitins have not shown and could not
it in some particular way.
show that the ways and means of accounting for the perception of diffeare untenable,

overthrow, are the only ways of

rence, which they have attempted to

defining
devices

it

or that they could not be bettered or improved by suitable

fifa,

SJ83S

5t#c^sit

%%&&

crrr

JM>KM< Wl^fc!

mhMi stot

3##r m

JRiR

VTN

t-

W^=IW<-

p-

48

PfilLOSOPHl OF

62

1^ mvffit

&S.1

MADHtAoAKYA

1%#t ( VTNt, p. 52). They could not show that

was fraught with such inherent contradictions that in
whatever way it may be defined, one cannot escape them. To show that
particular definitions or methods of explanation are wrong, is not to
show the things themselves are indefinable and therefore unreal. In
order to show that, a particular concept has got to be analysed on the
basis of its own occurrence and the inconsistencies involved in such an
analysis, shown.
The Advaitins could not offord to do this as they
themselves are obliged to accept the category of difference and make use
of it, not in criticizing the doctrines of their rivals, where one could
the concept

?!

plead the right of

Siddhantas

itself

h<.^i3<$j

on topics

PH

like

example, " anirvacaniya"

but in formulating

some of

their

Anirvacanlya and Jlva-Brahmaikya.

own
For

by the Advailins as viQi,<ftflirt^

or the nature of being different from Sat and Asat, in essence. This
element of " difference " from Sat and Asat, which is the differentia of
Mithyatva, must be real and true; in which case it would be impossible to
hold all differences to be false. It cannot be claimed that the distinction
from Sat and Asat, present in the conception of Mithyatva, is a spurious
one while the difference that is sought to be denied by the Advaitin is
is

defined

of the genuine order

qrwrfara

],

and

that, therefore, there

is

no

self-con-

tradiction between his theory of difference

case, Sad-vailaksatjya
ttedly false,

the

and its application. In that

and Asadvailaksanya being both of them admi-

Universe will have to be regarded as both existent

and non-existent (sadasadatmaka), rather than as something different

from both. Such a position will be inconsistent with the Siddhanta of
the Advaitins.

The dismissal of

difference as a fiction of thought

and

its

relegation

to the category of a delusion as a product of Avidya,

gives

serious difficulty in defining the nature of tattvajMna, in

Advaita.

rise

to a

This

knowledge of ultimate truth is said to be knowledge of non-duality

( abheda-jfiana ) which operates as a " Badhaka-jnana " in stultifying the
agelong perception of difference and duality.
Such a sublating cognition must naturally involve an element of difference
and "opposition"
to the past.

One

is

therefore entitled to ask

if

the

Badhaka-jfiana of

some content of difference from the earlier state of

knowledge, or simply takes the form non-difference ?
In the former
case, the reality of difference of some kind will stand conceded and
come to stay even after the birth of TattvajMna, if it is not to relapse
non-duality embodies

'

'

MADHVA'S DOOTKiNE OF
.

into the former state of ignorance

Advaitin

"

DOTTEBENOE"

(ft

If, however, the tattwjn&na of the

simply one of non-duality, it will be necessary to define

is

the precise significance of the negative element

(a-bheda) in terms of
one or the other of the three well-known meanings of 'otherness',
negation ', or opposition.
In any alternative, difference and its reality
will be implicated.
For the stultifying knowledge which is to take the
form of " absence of difference " ( now ) - bhed&bh&va, must necessarily
'

'

fix
(

and

define

bheda

forms

).
'

its

content as something different from

its

counter-correlate

must, in other words, be expressed in any of these three

There is not, difference' ( now ) ; or ' there is no difference
It

that something has till now been passing for difference.'

Every one of these forms of the sublating cognition will involve an
element of difference and would be powerless to transcend it. In this
way, the denial of the reality of difference, by the Advaitin, will
(

here

)'

or else

'

involve a self-contradiction, in the last analysis.

Madhva
positively

no bar

meets the logical objections to the reality of

also.

The

to the validity of the experience of

srfct^^Rf^i

(Jayatirtha,

overcoming these and

Otherwise,

it

VTNt

'

It is

would be equally impossible

to be attained

difference

QFfcwvtWl

possible to find other

justify the perception of difference

the realization of non-difference

).

is

difference,

of interdependence etc.

socalled difficulties

and

for the Advaitin to

the highest teaching

of the

are

5WT3F'

ways of

its reality.

show

that

Vedanta,

by study and meditation; for the conception of Abheda

) is as much
open to these logical difficulties as

non-difference

Difference
It

'

itself.

should be noted, in this connection, that most of the criticisms

of the Advaitic dialecticians of the concept of difference,

made

before

Madhva, have reference primarily to the views about difference held by the Nyaya-Vais'esika and Mlmamsa realists. The fomer
have treated difference as an attribute of objects. Such a position is
hardly tenable as writers like Vimuktatman and Citsukha have rightly
the time of

shown. But the other view of difference as " Dharmisvarupa, "

constituting the essence of objects,

or

as

does not seem to have been held by

any save the Mimamsakas of the Prabhakara school. The Advaitic dialecticians have,

no doubt, urged objections against

this

view

also.

But

do not affect the new and peculiar

theory of the nature and status of difference formulated by Madhva, and
their criticisms

expounded by

in

this

Jayatirtha,

respect,

on

the basis of the

new

principle of

" Vi&sas "

PHILOSOPHY OF $Rl MADHVAOABYA

64

and " Savis'esabheda

dialecticians,

"

devised by Madhva.

the days of Citsukha,

till

and

These early

Advaitic

do not seem

including him,

to

have been aware of the doctrine of Visesas introduced by Madhva for the
first time in Indian philosophy, or its repercussions on the discussion and
settlement of the problem of difference.

new

Madhva's

fact that

This

is

conclusive proof of the

doctrine of Visesas and

application to the

its

rationalization of the perception of difference, heralds almost a revolution

Middle Ages. With

in the history of logic

and the Vedanta,

Madhva

orientation to the doctrine of difference and

new

gives a

in the

help

its

tides

over the difficulties raised by the Advaitic dialecticians against the theory

He

of Dharmisvarupabhedavada.

straightway agrees with his critics

that difference as an attribute of things

able.

In doing

this,

dharmabhedavdda

unten-

is

he has gone far ahead of the Ramanuja school

If the new solution of

which clings to the theory of Dharmabhedavada.

Difference as

does not

Savis'esabhinna

commend

itself

not because of any further

viewed in the

colorfully identical

difficulty

light of Visesas,

with the substratum,

who came

to the Advaitins

after

Madhva,

the conception of

in

is

it

difference

but because of a deep-rooted metaphysical

and in the Nirvis'esatva of

bias in favor of the unreality of difference

reality.

Madhva,

Difference, then, according to

outside the content of an object or what

constitute its essence
Ml

The
is,

'

&k

thing-

f l fi

fa

*prafftftf?t

in-- itself

'

is

in

spite

perception, the essence of a thing

others:

3# Hl(rft3

not something that

VTNt,

p.

48

*WUJ.

is

(Taitt.

of

its

difference

the sumtotal of

Up. BhSsya,

p.

its

falls

considered to

generally

a metaphysical abstraction.

and not

just because of

SRftteWRl^

is
is

).

thing

from

is

what

distinction

from

A world

10).

it

In

others.

of

and hidden in the bosom of everything. But these

them necessary or presented to cognition in
detail, everytime an object is perceived.
The number of differences that
might be perceived and correlated depends on the exigencies of the

difference lies latent

differences

This

not
of

are not all of

is

the reason

felt called

difference as

Dasgupta;
p. 375,

why

Vyasatirtna and the other followers of

upon to'meet the arguments directed against

<JSRR^

t^,

T. Phil, IV, p. 179-80;

and

my remarks

in

my

etc.

Madhva have
the conception

For farther -remarks on

Chandradhar Sharma, On.

Miliary of

fivaita

toliool.

this

ttt

Sur. I. Phil.,
Vol.

II.

p.59.

MADHVA'S DOCTRINE

COT

" DIFFBBBNOK "

65

Out of the world of differences with which an object

situation.

nonce placed

is

for the

only such as are relevant to the occasion

in opposition,

or interests of the percipient are marked and emphasized and the rest
are excluded

follows then, that in

It

lates.

from others

difference
for

and ignored without any reference to

most part

the

VTN ). Where

acts of perception of an object, its

revealed in the same act, in a general way,

is

wfd feepr

stFf:

all

their counter-corre-

however doubts

ft "?5(t4?OT

arise, they

S^TcT

and

Madhva,

must be put down to the

perception of difference from a few prominent counter-correlates only

and missing the differences from

more or
aided

W^--

^tf^tTfrRf

Vadavali, p. 83

).

owing to

others,

like distance,

SRffareft

The sphere of doubt

gtfM *t#?
3T#r npn

make out

jj^

I^li wftct. mm:

g wtmi,

^ mm

$dicf

$&:

W^

to cases of

by no means unlimited

$31%^

ci^ft

This disposes of the objection of Sriharsa

WH Sftft Wl^wi

It is

sufficient

*ftl#nft:

thus limited

is

%38ft *ncW%^r

want of

sqi'ifTtftSlNWtjUli^?

resemblance and other contributory factors.

as the objectors

their bearing a

degree of resemblance to the object in question,

by other unfavorable conditions

light etc.
(

less, close

Taitt.

Bhasya,

p.

vtn p. 5

qf^^t

?!#

sJJTlr&r

^R: ^HlcLcI^T

*n?

10 b

).

).

nW ?i

(i, p. 210).

Difference being thus dharmisvampa, the socalled perception of the

object

nothing but the perception of

is

the perception of

from

an object

is

the

same

others in a general and

all

its

difference

in other words,

as the perception of

from some

much, then, as there are no two psychoses

its

difference

in a specific way.

here, but only one unitary act

of cognition, and inasmuch as there are no two things cognized,

the object

and difference

of interdependence at

all

but only one, there

s ^ %%

#*r:

Inas-

is

no room

( viz.

for the fallacy

*W#?l3 <*f&RMcfa

Jppicftfaftftr,

This disposes of the objection of interdependence raised by Citsukha and

others.

P.M.s.

Tho' difference

is

admittedly the nature

svarapa

of objects,

toLOSOPH* of &l madhvAoAbyA

the acceptance of Viifegas in the svarupa of these objects, renders occa*

sional doubts, possible:

This

disposes

unaccountable
objects,

of
if

sf^#T wn?T5R^lR%:

the objection of

difference were regarded as

and of Vimuktatman

&&&.

#6&T

Jayattrtha points out, the mediation of

effectively.

T^THdWWI^Wsr

*T *rafcr

Sriharsa

the

cra^c^f,

Vi&sas meets
I

$%Wf

is

p.

382

MW* * *
all

would be

essential nature
*

of

As

these difficulties,

Jr^tftfof'feTtT.
(

There

NS.

that doubts

VTN.

t.p.

52 b

).

thus no logical impediment, whatever, in regarding Differ-

ence as " Dharmisvarupa " constituting the essence of objects.

In the

light of Vis'egas, the

category of difference has been fully vindicated by

Madhva and shown

to be perfectly valid

and

intelligible.

CHAPTER IX

"SOME OTHER CATEGORIES VI&TA, AM& AND ^AKTI.

We may now turn to a few other categories of Dvaita ontology
:

which have important bearing on Madhva's theology and cosmology.

1) the group of three represented by Vises ana, Vis'esya and

These are

Vis'ista, 2) the pair

represented by Ams'a and Ams'i and

3) $akti.

VI&STA
Vis'ista includes the

" composite whole

Visesana and the Vis'esya.

Vis'ista

means the

Visesana means the component or the qualifying

element and Vis'esya (or Buddha) the substance to which the qualifying
element

".

attached, in other words, the thing-in-itself.

is

The conception of Vis'ista varies in the different schools.

ceptual Realists would not look upon it as an objective real

The con-

According to Nyaya philosophy,

lutely different.

among them.

Madhva

all the three are mutually and absoThe Mim&msakas believe in the relation of Bhedabheda
The Monists hold them to be simply identical.

new

or modifies the SubHis view of the Vis'ista is akin to

the conception of whole and part in Hegelian philosophy, according to
which the whole is something more than the sum of its parts tho' depenholds that every

relation alters

stance to a greater or lesser extent.

The subtraction

dent on them for their existence in the physical world.

of any one of the parts, destroys the whole.
that a

new

Vis'ista

'

SWcKJi flKmf?

would

VTN

t )

step in then

Only,

Madhva would add

^siftfawitW'^r

^3f0355^Kmtte?I^#Tcr:

^at
Up. kh.

RRiari
t.

distinguishes carefully between relations and qualities which

with the Substance (Vis'esya) as for e.g.
Y&vaddravyabhM)
are coeval (
God and His attributes of Omniscience and those which are changing
and impermanent (ay&vaddravyabhavi). In the former case, there is

Madhva

identity

always subject

internal distinction

to

Visesas). Hence such identity

is

changing attributes and relations,

cum-identity ; 3W

4^^Tn^%q

ftT,

W&m, ^I^r^T^HNl^l
{G.T.

The same

principle applies to

of reference thro'

termed Sa-vis'esabheda. In respect of

there is only Bhedabheda or difference

Ams'am&s

also.

t,

p.

USb-.NS. 365),

The concept of

Vis'ista

'

PHILOSOPHY OF $BI MADHVACAbYA

68

has important bearings on Madhva's theory of Causation, as will be

shown

hereafter.

AMSA AND AMSI

These two terms

may be

taken roughly to correspond to the idea of

understood metaphorically. They are also sometimes
used for the part and the whole. Madhva applies the idea of amia and
fraction

amM

and

to

unit,

sentient beings

He

also.

distinguishes between

Svarupams'a

The Avatars of God are His Svarupams'a. The Jlvas

are Bhinnam&is.
The Devas also have their amias (cf. Indra and
Arjuna). The theory figures in Madhva's theology to a great extent. Tn
and Bhinnamsa.

respect of ordinary Jfvas also, the operation of

amsamMbhava

is

consider-

ed necessary to account for the harmonious working of the quantitative

adjustment of their innate potencies for bliss, volition and activity in
regard to requisite ends,
ii, 2, adh. 7 ).

thro' the

agency of Vis'esas

see

B. S. B.

3AKTI
Sakti

is

accepted by

Madhva

as nitya

and anitya according to the

nature of the substance in which it resides. They are of course inseparable from their substances, if they are coeval with them and bhinnabhitma,

when impermanent.
The differentiation of $akti and $aktimat, is
rendered possible by the agency of Vis'esas, as in the case of amia
and am&i etc.
The creative energy of Brahman, is for instance, identical with the
Brahman but it can be distinguished by the play of Vis'esas. The baktis
themselves have two aspects: saktita ( latent state ) and Vyaktita (manifested state ), also regulated by the play of Vis'esas.
Hence they do not
operate in mutual conflict, at the same time. To illustrate, the creative
and destructive energies of Brahman are both eternal and identical with
Its being.
But there is an inner pre-established harmony which regulates
their working periodically and without overlapping.
At the time of
;

dissolution, the creative energy of Brahman is in dormancy ( iaktimpa

)
and comes into play ( Vyakti ) only at the right time. The distinction
of Time into ' the time of creation ' and
the time of dissolution,
'

is

likewise based

nna from

it.

on

internal Vis'esas in

Time which

are also Savisesabhi-

a*nft

g ffi&i

#^q^ii

^^r ft&ftoft

*ll<MMIcH<M:

II

(Brh. Up. C.

iii,

4.p. 18)

CHAPTER X

SADB^YA VS. THE UNIVERSAL

Sadrsya (resemblance)
in

Madhva 's

system.

is

Here,

the category "that replaces the Universal,

Madhva

parts

company with

the

Nyaya-

and Mimamsaka -Realists, and joins hands with the modern

Nominalists and the Jainas.
Vais'esikas

There are three main theories

in

Western philosophy about the

The Nominalists look upon the particulars alone as real.

There are only individual things in Nature and particular ideas in the
mind. There is no universal at all. Only the name is common to
many. This view approximates to that of Madhva and the Jainas.
The Conceptualists think that tho' only individual things exist in
universal.

Nature, without any universal class-essence running thro

human mind
The

them.

on

ists,

them, the

'

has the power of forming abstract and general ideas about

universals then, exist in our minds as concepts.

the other

hand maintain that the universals

exist

The Real-

both in nature

and in the mind.

In

Indian

splitting

philosophy, the

Buddhists are extreme Nominalists,

even the so-called individuals into momentary essences

Svalak-

The Nyaya and Mimamsa schools show varying degrees of

realistic bias in their conception of the universal.
The argument from
universals to Monism is easy to guess.
The Jains have argued that the

sayam

).

is not one of class-essence, but of similarity or

Such resemblance is actually experienced and should be

nature of the universal

resemblance.

taken as the objective ground of the notion of universals.

The same is the stand taken by Madhva. His rejection of the

pluralistic implications
( S&manya ) is a direct corollary of the

universal

of his Svarupabhedavada.
ness of each individual

He

believes in the distinctiveness, nay, unique-

and

particular.

He could

ill

afford then, to

recognize a single universal class-essence running thro'

particulars,

He

end.
gives

it

which

therefore sets his

no

number of

quarter.

In his discussion of the problem of Sadrsya Vs.

Madhva

open the door to Monism, in the

face resolutely against the universal and

will surreptitiously

has surprisingly anticipated

Cf. fin,

hS)<m# 3
'

ffig

many

the Universal,

of the arguments against the

s#r^ svm%

fasRf

ns,

i,

1,1.

).

'

PHILOSOPHY OF SBI MADHVACARYA

70

Nominalist view of the Universal, advanced by modern writers.

Realists

'

contention

is

that

most of the

words we

use in

The

common

life

refer to things, qualities and relations or their actions ( dravyaguriakarmd^i ) which do not exist by themselves. Unless our words express
some elements which a number of particular things, qualities or relations
have in common, the purpose of language and thought would not be
served.
To that extent, inference based on Vyapti between hetu and
sddhya, would also be impossible, as our words and thoughts could not
rise above particulars, and inferences take us from particulars to the

general.
It is

urged by modern Realists that the Nominalist's attempt to meet

by substituting resemblance', for the universal, is futile.

Resemblance itself, as proposed to be used, would be a true universal in
these difficulties

'

These 'resemblances

order to apply to different kinds of resemblances,

would be far too vague, as everything resembles everything else in some

respect or other.
We should have to admit a different kind of resemblance for each universal term. It would be simpler and less cumbersome
to admit, an objective universal characteristic corresponding to each term,
instead of trying to

detect

more and more

particular forms of resem-

blance, 1

Madhva

points out in reply that there

modus operandi of resemblances and

is

a basic difference in the

universals,

which the Realist has

The extension of significance of

terms to a number of resembling particulars is achieved by 'Resemblance'
not, as in the case of the universal, by means of accepting any conven-

failed to note in his arguments. It

tional reference

kakydrtha

is this.

or on the basis of etymology (pravrtiinimitta)

lihgataya ) as to
(

of these words, directly, but only indirectly as pointers

how

by the same names, in virtue of

a striking content of resemblance with the one already

these objects could be referred to

their possessing

known

'3^ Htffeqgr

wkKq

gai'^ s$sft

nfas^qr

fcswfsft"jRTcr

Hl4Pl* 5^cH|TH>WW'l q+=ll=H'W V[*Rus! R Wcqiw-m \QiH%

The extended

significance being already

of learning the language, there

is

no

understood

difficulty

wm

(N. S.

in

the

p.

first

in limiting or

g%ft

372

instance

extending

the significance to suit the exigencies of a given context. The further

objection that " we cannot distinguish a vast number of resemblances,

by
1.

inspecting the resemblances of each relation",

Sea IPunAamantal Questions of Philosophy, A. C. Ewing,

is

pointless, says

p. 213.

SADRSYA
Jayatirtha,

WT:

THE UNIVEKSAL

71

such partial resemblances could not be eschewed even in

as

respect of universals
I

VS.

stllciPtftrlMft

^ W&t, TtmwW^t&Ptftft <P#

^ mm HHMK

TteK4MrtldHH-

NS.

p.

373

narrowed down to specific forms of the

universal and not too generalized ones, the same thing could be done in
the case of " Resemblances " too
3 f lR > fa$Mt ft fi Wc
PMKtsat q sqftreK
of reference

If the universe

is

WM

-.

5%

%ct,

a%

m^fc&r

Madhva

q? fM ^ g^Pg^ 35W:

also takes the

wind out of the

(N.S.p. 373)

of the Realist

sails

by main-

taining the extreme Nominalist position that even resemblance

and that it is sui generis in each case.

Svabhavabhedav&da according to which no

universal
his

be the essence of more than one entity 1

^W

cRTgfoftsjRt

The uniqueness of resemblance does

is

is

not a

consistent with

single characteristic

can

*****

iprsf^r

"Kttlftw^

This

||

(AV)

II

not, however, prevent

its

facilitating

extension of significance of terms in required cases, just

" differing " attributes are apprehended as " different " without

inferential

as

requiring the help of another difference to render

Madhva

them

intelligible.

also argues that the contention that extension of significance

would be impossible without the idea of a universal, will

For, if that be so, we should have to admit a series of
universals one behind the other in order to justify the title of each univerof terms

be

suicidal.

be so
" particular

sal to

Similarly, to

called.
",

we

shall have, to

S%=T sJfftdfolH

know

admit a

all
'

the particulars by the

universal

o^fctdHHtftdH

II

'

name

of particulars

(AV.)

The metaphysical consequence of Madhva

is

sui generis in

each individual

's view that resemblance

each case, appears to be that the " pratibimbatva " of

to God, based on a certain measure of Sadr^ya also,

and distinctive in each case and that no two individuals
will bear the same resemblance to the Bimba, i. e. Brahman, in respect
of their spiritual attributes of consciousness and bliss.
is

self

also unique

0f

$m *TO: SMHpti jyw

ft

Udayana

CHAPTER XI

AND TIME

SPACE

The Hindu theory of Mahapralaya, which could be traced to the Rg

Veda (X, 129), presupposes an absolute theory of space and time,
according to which, they have a being in themselves, apart from the
Space and Time must ex hypothesl
things in space and events in time.
there
would be great logical difficulty of
deny
this,
infinite.
If
we
be
conceiving of a boundary to finite space and time. We shall have to
recognize more space and more time beyond them and this would lead
to a regress

No

<

apf

rnfer

'

'

?*Fff *KTW

^Tfe

',

%m ^cRTO.

\\\<h\&:

doubt, the conception of infinite space and time, also, has

difficulty of involving the

Madhva thought,
overcomes
have

with

contradiction of a completed

most serviceable doctrine of "Svarupa-Visesas",

and makes it possible to hold that space and time

its

this difficulty

infinite potential divisibility

Madhva
intuited

by

its

But

infinite.

therefore holds that space and time are distinct realities

the Sales!

as in Kantian thought.
*vti eifiHN*. s^sr

forms of
Otherwise, they could not be intuited

and that they are not merely

^f%^(AV.

ii,

'

intuition

'

3).

The Madhva conception of space and time

is,

thus,

much ahead of

modern

that of other Indian schools and looks surprisingly

in

some

due not a little to their being interpreted in the light

of the new doctrine of Saksi and Visesas, which are Madhva 's most
striking contributions to philosophic thought.
These seem to hold great
aspects.

This

is

possibilities for the future

of metaphysics.

With these two

ideas,

Madhva

overcomes the antinomies which beset the conception of space and time
in other philosophical systems of ancient and modern thought as well.
Space
ether (

is

termed " Avyakrtakasa" by Madhva, as distinguished from

)
?j d l=Wt

2
.

The former

^^rgfl^M

is

eternal

and uncreated and the

Vyasaraya,

latter

Nym )

Vy&saraya

TC

).

SPAOE AND TIME

is

a product of matter.

73

This twofold classification

feature of Madhva's philosophy.

It

is

tersely

of space,

is

special

termed as 3<ii>Ri&aiby

Jayatirtha and Vyasaraya.

The Nyaya-Vais'esikas hold

space

vibhu

which

is

that there

the spatial characteristics of proximity,

properties and

one
is

Samkhya and Yoga

the understanding

Ny&ya view

The Mimamsakas hold similar

upon Space and Time as

buddhikalpita

Some Naiyayikas

).

'

The

views.

categories of

regard space as

Jayatirtha dismisses this as impossible on

that space is colorless.

rely inferred thro

etc.
But spatial
be perceived directly

schools look

perceived by the visual sense.

ubiquitous

eternal

only inferred from

remoteness

relations like distance, size etc., can

thro' touch, sight etc.

the

is

not open to perception, but

Nor can Space be

left to

be

enti-

sound, as even the congenitally deaf have a perception

of space.

Madhva's theory of the intuitive perception of space and time has

from many modern European thinkers. The ordinary
'
view of space is what makes movement possible. The idea
scientific
of possible movement is formed by abstraction from the experience of
movement. This is circuitous. Madhva says that we cannot understand
received assent

'

movement as such without being already conscious of space. Movement does not explain space. Space explains movement. He therefore
suggests that space must be accepted as a reality given by direct percepfitted to
tion, not of the ordinary senses, but of Saksj, which is specially
sense the supersensuous.

No memory of movement

ssary to establish space inferentially

is

therefore nece-

and mentally, as some of the older

Naiyayikas thought and some modern philosophers do.

Madhva's
its

definition of space as distinguished

essential nature of providing

room

from

ether,

is

for bodies to exist: 3w*iiwr

(

This

AV.

is

true to

WRW
if,

).

supported

aWMWKSS'J:
is explained by Vyasaraya as
by a passage from the BhEgavata iii, 30, 43 ) quoted by Madhva. He
holds that space and time are infinitely divisible, into further spaces and
further parts of time, each such part being held to be a "natural " part
For, " Upadhis ", accorof it and not merely conditioned by Upadhis!
ding to Madhva, are not so much the causes of distinction ( where they
This

do not

actually exist

^W3> as

'pointers' (

fTW )

thereof.

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHVACARYA

74

Madhva shows

We

that

it is

logically inconceivable that

Space

is

created;

cannot conceive of the antecedent non-existence of space

Production also needs a material
if space is to be created.

anywhere,
stuff

and there

Prakrti

why

is

no such

stuff out of

should alone be uncreated,

it

from another

Prakrti

which space could be created. If

be repeated in respect of it, as to

that stuff, the question could

is

If the reply is that the

space also. The Buddhists' view of space as

reals

would lead

production of

same thing could be said of

stuff is inconceivable, the

f^THM (negation of tangible

to other difficulties such as that such reals existed at

when space was not yet in existence (or created ), This would
and Pralaya. Madhva therefore pleads strongly

a time

reverse the ideas of Srsti

that space

must be accepted as an uncreated and eternal substance, a view

which receives striking support from the remarks of Herbert Spencer:

"

If space is created,

it

must have been previously non-existent. The

be imagined by any mental

non-existence of space cannot, however,

of space is absolutely inconceivable, then, neceabsolutely inconceivable " ( First Priticiples, p. 27 ).

effort. If the non-existence

ssarily, its creation is

As a Vedantin

Madhva

Universe,

space

believing in the

seeks

and other ex hypothesi eternal

that everything in the Universe

(

B.

S.

Brahmakaranatvavada of

i,

space,

the entire

to reconcile the essential uncreated nature of

is,

in

reals

with the Vedantic axiom

some

sense, created

by Brahman

2 )\ by interpreting the creation of eternal substances like

and time in a Pickwickian sense of " Paradhlnavisegapti ",
'

1,

which

(W=ftifa$raifR)

Madhva

be

will

'

explained

has been the only commentator,

later.

who

This

shows

that

has had the right insight

and metaphysical significance or the principle of

Samanvaya enunciated by the Sutrakara. Madhva explains the references

into the raison d'etre

to the creation of Akas'a, in Upanisadic cosmology, as referring only to

the

^ijTTOSFand this

is

the reason

why he has admitted two kinds of Akaia,

in his system.

Time
Time,

in

cft =* *sitH

1.

'

Dvaita Vedanta,

fli^iwcfjfrg^

Creation

'

is

the essential constituent of all experience

# s^rrowi^g;

includes other cosmic determinations like

(VadSvaii, p. 95

K*ncf.

-.

).

SPACE AND TIME

But

it is

ption.

not, as in
It is

%fwi*R-

Advaita, apprehended by the ordinary sense of perce-

by

on the testimony of
no functioning of the
Hence, there is no scope for Pratyakga

held to be perceived

At

75

the Saksi,

of Susupti, there

the stage

sense organs, including the mind.

is

The perception of time in this dreamless state, is borne

out by the immediate evidence of its intuitive experience, recollected

or Inference.

immediately on waking up2 and expressed in the judgment

Sia41<*rara3*(j0 long,

have

slept

in

bliss).

^ctiitt

TO

cannot

be

'
:

This

disregarded as a mere recollection as there can be no

recollection

what has never

been experienced by oneself. For the same

immediacy, it cannot be treated as an inference to a condition of complete freedom from any kind of infelicity " at the period of
of

reason of

its

time just elapsed

person

".

who draws

If

such a condition has been experienced by the

had a direct
There can
never been experienced by him.

the present inference, he should have

experience of " that period of time which has just elapsed

".

be no inference of its condition, had it

There would thus be no explanation of the experience of dreamless sleep
( I^RPBig*Rr

unless

fttman and of bliss

i.

the
e.

perception of time

?ff15#

is

by

besides

For

accepted.

reasons, the intuitive perception of time

the Sakst,

that

of the

the same weighty

must be admitted:

The Naiyiyikas look upon Time as only inferable and not open to
it is formless.
But as Madhva rightly points out, the
inference of time would itself presuppose time as its Paka ( minor term
and the ascertainment of Vyapti in respect of time would be impossible
without a prior perception of time. There is, thus, no other Pramana,
than the Saksi, by which time could be proved. The Nyaya, Samkhya,
and Yoga philosophers would appear to hold that time is more a catedirect perception as

gory of the understanding

intuiton "

known only

gfonOta ) -as

thro' inference as there is

"

form of
no perception of blank

necessary

Madhva shows that this is not so. It

should be regarded, says he, as a fundamental ontological category that
time without a sensible content.
conditions

*'

all

sftfcWIlRl

our

being and becoming.

^!^fjs*'$KWIi l , WM'
l

^R*i^y%fy<wts(H*i&*w(^'ft<3iii

No

experience

is

possible

(.Vedanta-paribhasa, p. 22, Calcutta)

PHILOSOPHY OF &&1 MADHvAoARYA

76

without

$4

Tt is

it.

experienced along with the experience

%q3J^i+|c|j||^

JlcftoT: =T

The organ by which

ffig,

t6iw*/&dfa

Wf&Rfef

becomes aware of time,

the intuiting Self

w*lww*k which

itself

is

no other than the Saksi

itself turning its own inner searchlight, so to say, upon itself.
This
answers the difficulty felt by many Western thinkers like William James
that we have no sense for bare time, that we cannot intuit a mere duration.
The difficulty lies in our taking only the waking experience as the basis
for philosophizing. The Vedinta, on the other hand, draws its certified
data from the other states also including Susupti, in particular, which is
termed the Saksi or

the highest state of ideal experience

felicity,

if

you please

of bare ego, bare time and bare

of which every one of us has had direct experi-

ence, as the coveting of

is

it

so

conclusively

Madhva

proves.

has thus

anticipated Kant's notion of pure intuition of time without any sensible

content in his doctrine of the intuitive perception of

Time by

the Saksi.

His view has also a remarkable affinity with Alexander's acceptance

of the intuition of time and space prior to sensations and his view that
it is thro' intuition that they are immediately perceived.

Madhva

is an undifferenced and indivisible

It is an
and infinitely divisible
infinite stream of duration without beginning or end.
Each duration is
pervasive.
As in the case of Paramanus, the shortest conceivable

whole

does not hold that time

akhaptfa

duration

is

It is

).

an

infinite

also theoretically divisible,

still

whatever

Electrons in physics,

further.

tho' physically indivisible are not logically so.

Madhva

they might be said to be " atoms

size

conceive parts of them smaller than the whole, altho'

ble, for physical reasons, to split

them

srftwr: TOgaT

it
I

This enables him to hold that the divisions of time are

parts of

it

and not merely

vp *^tSW^I?r

1.

In his

B.

NS.
(

T.

p.

( iii )

3TrcH%f> or

387 b

Madhva

As

).

superimposed

'

holds that at

we can always
may not be possi-

",

all

(AVf.
" natural "

zmrf%: *R ^TRcT

in the case of space, so in respect

of

gives an interesting table of the smaller units of

time starting from the occupying a point of three trasarentts.

3 trutit

make

one vedha, three vedhas a lava, three lavas a nimesa, three nimesas a keana

and so
2.

of.

jfjsjr

on.

ftfjfsrm^f flosft,

"tMHId. (NS.p. 349

b, )

ftwft t $Trfa

*rfa$ptf<i,

?r

wnsftfr

S^ACE AND TIME

time.

Madhva posits

empty time [anadi

that

it is

eternal

and non-eternal

tf

and uncreated in the sense of bare

divisible ).
Both are intuited by

This is how he reconciles the Vedic and Upanisadic and Puranic

which speak of time in both ways

Saksl
texts

ira^ET^
*s$

8RI#<I. FRpft

W ^ *sm

at ftfar

^f?rc;

R. V. X,

Bhdg.

ii,

(t.i x,

129. 1.

12

10,
i,

WW

( Fi>pu Pwr. q. by Madhva )

by Madhva, that unless intrinsic parts are
accepted in Time, the established order of time in Srgti andPralaya could
not be maintained without risk of overlapping and the admission of
Upadhis for this purpose would be pointless unless there were already
natural distinctions in time to which these Upadhis could attach themselves apart from the difficulty of interdependence which would also
ensue, in the event of Upadhis de novo K

ftc^ $I55J

It is

w$

also pointed out

5+r<*+l^^iiidLtiHiRiifltqq5ti

snr,

p, 19

),

CHAPTER XII

CAUSATION.
The Madhva theory of Causation cannot be understood without
relation to

of

this

its

like Prakrti, Jivas,

tion of

NS.
(
tion

Space,

's

p. 431

statement
)

if

W^fl

the distincin

cT^raT^^

mind.
*prfa

important distinc-

would have prevented

as of other eternal substances

according to

1
theory of Causation, drawn by Prof. H. N, Raghavendrachar .

Madhva. The

finite reality

entities

relations,

if

borne

sensational conclusion of the 'essential creation'

This has evoked protests from

tion of

rightly understood, in the light of the

of the Jivas

's

clearly

is

^W^ffa*

true bearing

" eternal substances "

would not be missed

drawn between these two types of

Madhva

of

etc.,

faftl8l*Rr

the utterly baseless tho'

(

Time

sfRTj^wtft and awiig^awtft relations

Jayatirtha

The

doctrine of Vis'ista, already referred to.

doctrine on the question of creation of

many orthodox quarters,

embodiment of

selves

as a misinterpreta-

and such other Viseganas

being in the nature of the things, not coeval with

concerned, there

is

no

the

possibility at all of applying the principle

of Savisfesabheda between them. The proposition Rfeu*K-aj

not therefore, apply to them
( NS, p. 431 ) would

3^pwi%r

Madhva's doctrine of Bhedabheda between Vis'ista and Visesya,

)
in respect of changing attributes and relations of things,
" of Causation, which is his
leads to the corollary of " Sadasatkaryavada
(

or Buddha

general theory of Causation.

Causation implies a change, a beginning and an end:

mm ftMrsT wft, #ssr m%

" Causation

", therefore,

has reference only to the

(g.t.

h. 16

" Vis'esa " aspect of

Madhva, therefore, rejects the Satkaryavada

and the Asatkaryavada of Nyaya philosophy as
He combines them into a new theory of Sadasatkaryavada
half-truths.
for change is not merely something new appearing, but it presupposes
the substance in question.
(

of the Samkhyas

a substratum that changes, in form or state, Ex nihilo nihil fit. Causation would be impossible and meaningless, without the assumption of
1.

Svaita jPhiloiophy, lit Place in the Vedanta, Mysore Uni. J941,

CAUSATION
continuity of the cause

Hence Jayatlrtha

*m*m foq%

and

in

thro'

79
the changes

it

t gpFCPqfr *rsr(cl#

ft

has undergone.

cl^fl^g tHl'W 'W Iq frmmifcii v*&{ns. p. 394

defines Causation as follows:

).

Such a definition is intended to meet the criticism that if cause and effect
were different events they will be absolutely separate and there would
be no relation between them, The gulf between the two will remain
unbridged.
The Buddhist doctrine of causation as an ever-changing,
constant, ceaseless flux, each

"specious present" with

no

moment ( ksana )

duration,

is

of existence being but a

sharply criticized by

Madhva and

We cannot

think of a " change " without a changing thing at

There must be a " something " that is not contained in the

Jayatlrtha.

the back.

succession which carries

on each vanishing point of the succession

ii, 2, 21). Such a link
would be missing
Buddhist doctrine of Ksanikatva, as a ksana is, according
in the
to the Buddhist view, indivisible like a mathematical point and nirviiesa
at that),
There would be no split-second interval between any two vanishing points of moments at which the cause and effect could have met
and " causation " taken place by the transference of " Samskaras "
For, mere sequence or succession ( in time ) is not Causation.

and adds

it

to the next

(B, S,

Madhva
its

definite

holds,

therefore, that the effect is partially non-existent in

form and shape, while being

3TOSJTWMT

RTTOTcf2?T% ft

cFgwrtsar: TC:

He

existent in the

form of the cause:

mm W S^W ^-

{AV}

does not, however, subscribe to the Sarhkhya view of absolute

and effect, as that will render casual effort superfluous

and causation meaningless. Even if that were understood in the sense of
" manifestation ", the same difficulty would arise in its case

identity of cause

^kikA

*rt

mzmiFqw *#t

(<?.

t. )

Manifestation and non-manifestation cannot be understood in the sense

of the effect being perceived or not perceived ( tho' pre-existent in the
cause).

That

will

land us in solipsism (EF&iiB

).

There

will

be

no answer to the question why the effect is not manifested if it were

really and absolutely and without any qualification ( Vi&sa ) identical
with the cause and so pre-existent in it, The idea of manifestation itself
will be similarly open to an antinomy of production or manifestation,

CHAPTER

XIll

NEGATION
Negation, as a fact of experience,
ontological category.

other

philosophical

As a

is

a Prameya.

thought-category

conceptions like

it lies

It is

at the

an important

root of

BhavarupajMna,

many

Mithyatva,

Bheda and Causation, The positive and the negative represent the two
The Madhva philosophers agree with the Naiyayikas

aspects of reality.

independent category of experience.

accepting the negative as an

in

The argument by which some philosophers have sought to deny independent status to negation, by equating it with the mere existence of the
He points out that the
locus, has been rejected by Jayatlrtha, in his TSt
judgment there is no jar on the ground' must signify something more
than the mere locus and that that something must be a non-being.
Without reference to such a non-being, it will be impossible to define what
Otherwise, it would be open to us to speak
is meant by the locus per se.
of the non-existence of the jar, even when it is present on the ground, as
the locus as such exists even while the jar is there on it.
'

Madhva
presented
" given "
denial

of

defines the negative as

in the

srapprfcRtft

primary act of perception

ftSwiaq. or what
as

something that

and which does not involve the significant negation or

a " something " or of a relation or property to a

given something or in respect of a particular locus aflWJWt

:

SWRwlfaHMfd^wfy
non-existent

is

s?iflWTOa,l In

other words,

the perception

conditioned by reference to a particular

(af^Wt). according

to

tfPift

the exigencies of the situation.

to admit the logical possibility

positive entities

and vice

of integrating

RStad:

of the

counter-correlate

The doctrine

of " Savis'egabheda " between substance and attributes enables

l.

is
is

Madhva

negative aspects with

versa, in propositions. 1

cf. *Ktsft q*rt ftfa#r

<#^,

*fld)vKt{

<rct ?t

*Rcfl#q2pf6n?iciRKwr

(NS.

p.

286)

Legation

Madhva recognizes
subsequent
first

Its

horn, tortoise hair

ft*Jlft%fo?i or

and absolute

the second a lower

counter-correlate (siFcretf)-)

circle, hare's

is

three types of negation: antecedent (Pr&g-abhSva),

pradhvatnsa-abhava

has an upper limit

81

atyanta-abhava

and the

last

etc.).

Such non-existence

).

The

unlimited.

is

the absolutely non-existent

is

aermfomf^l-m'S

(e.g.

is

square

also called

or a negation whose counter-correlate

a myth.
Jayatirtha and Vyasaraya argue that there is nothing illogical in

utterly non-existent

figuring as

Pratiyogi in respect

an

of 3lc'RiT*m;for

" pratiyogitvam " ( being the counter-correlate ) is not an attribute which requires or presupposes the actual existence of an object like
other predications of attributes like color.

of a negation

enable us to form the idea of a negation

srfgratferRt. (Tdt.)

reality at the time of the perception of the

3WlWT%^r%Fri^fclRPR'T

abhava

is

insisted upon, even the

subsequent negations would become

equally impossible, as thre surely

is

no Pratiyogi in actual existence

That

time of the perception of the Pragabhava or of the dhvamsa.

a Pratiyogi
it

be the counter-correlate

If the physical existence of the Pratiyogi or its factual

perception of the antecedent and

at the

To

merely being the object of such knowledge as would

is

like the jar

did exist earlier

the point at issue.

such an idea
horn.

is

is

going to come into existence later or that

in the case

If then,

it is

of dhvamsa

),

makes no

Madhva with "

difference to

the idea of the "Pratiyogi" that counts,

possible even in regard to mythical things like the hare's

The concept of aremftrai^ltin^wre holds

the key to

Madhva's

The
of the Nyaya school is equated
difference " which has already been treated at length.

theory of illusions.

P.M.6.

3R^prR

by

EPISTEMOLOGY

III.

CHAPTER XIV

THE THEORY OF PRAMANAS

Life and

human

experience

being

at

times

vitiated

by

illu-

becomes necessary to define truth in experience so as to enable

The ascertainment of truth being the
us to distinguish it from the false.
first and foremost aim of philosophy, it is incumbent on it to define truth
and error in clear terms and indicate the instruments or channels of
sions,

it

The

their ascertainment.

value of such preliminary ascertainment of the

bounds and limitations of human knowledge cannot be too

In the words of Max Muller, " Such an examinahighly commended.
tion of the authorities of human knowledge ought, of course, to form the
introduction to any system of philosophy. To have clearly seen this is,
sources,

it

seems to me, a very high distinction of Indian philosophy. How much

would have been avoided, particularly among Jewish,

useless controversy

Mohammadan and Christian philosophers,

gned

in limino to the question of

possible

channels of

anything

else,

what

knowledge,

a proper place had been assi-

whether

our legitimate and only

perception,

inference

Supported by these inquiries into the evidences of

Hindu philosophers have

the

if

constitutes

built

up

their

various

philosophy or their vairous conceptions of the world,

systems

telling

or

truth,

of

us what

they take for granted and then advancing step by step from the foundation
"1
to the highest pinnacles of their systems,

Man

an epistemological animal. His irrepressible

a thesis about knowledge, Whatever differences of opinion there might be about the status and validity of particular experiences, there can be no two opinions that there are and needs
for, if logical
must be, certain experiences which are logically valid
certainty is denied or impugned, logic itself would be without foundation,
All our experiences presuppose the existence of certain a priori or
thirst for

is

essentially

knowledge

is itself

objective standards by

which they are judged,

wholesale denial of

such criteria would cut at the very roots of our experience and bring

reasoned

activities to

standstill.

Any

nature of such standards has meaning only

ted in a general manner.

even for a moment,

1.

all

inquiry into the true and specific

when

their existence

is

admit-

Absolute scepticism would be unsustainable,

If everything is invalid, the contention of scepticism

Sim Syitemi, 1912, Frefabe

xiii.

tfHE THEOKtf

would be

itself

The

invalid,

proof of something that

Buddhism and Advaita,

that

is

ted,

is

possibility of

is

doubt

is

itself

is

nothing in this

a sufficient

The contention of
phenomenal world

nothing the certainty of which could be accep-

inadmissible.

therefore,

83

not open to doubt,

is

that there

valid or that there

OF PBAMASTAS

It

stands to reason then, that there are

and valid knowledge is possible, That being so,

into the means of such knowledge is naturally in order.

things of which definite

an investigation

is known as pramapya.
But
from which it is derived ) is used in two senses ( 1
(2) the means or instruments by which it is engendered,
according to the two senses of the suffix " ana " ( lyut
Madhva has
done a distinct service to epistemology in distinguishing these two senses
and usages of the term and coining two separate terms " Kevala " and

In Indian philosophy, such validity

term pramana
true knowledge and
the

Anu "

"

pramana
"

pramana,
in

in

He

denote them, without ambiguity.

to

both the above senses as

Pramana "

the first sense ( of valid

knowledge

refers to the

capacity of true knowledge to reveal the nature of an object as

As

defines

*NW{.

it

really

Anu-Pramanas like Perception,

Inference and Sabda, it signifies the means ( s&dhana
by which such
But there is no difference in
correct knowledge of objects is obtained.
2
The Anupramanas
the directness of their relation to their objects,
is

apn^ra^faPffalft:

applied to

function with as

much immediacy

produce "

" in Jnana while

tPIctl

Hence

condition thereof.
respective

mode

1.

2.

JMna
two

But the instruments

merely acts as a manifesting

classifications are

based on their

of relation to knowability.

This definition
bring out the

the

as the "Kevala",

full

is

suitably

expanded by Jayatirtha and others so as to

force and significance of the terms "3T*n"

and "^4^"

W^ &g

and *(*$ 5^5 as tnev are technically known.

The term " Yathartham " is an Avyayibhava compound, composed
The adverb " yatha " signifies
of " yatha " and " artham ".
:

"^fclfolrclct or not going

beyond the " artha

".

" Artha" denotes

a knowable object from the root r with the w^adi suffix " tha ",
the root itself being understood in the specialized sense of "knowing"
(

avagati

3$fr |PJcNlW^l^J|rcf^lftTWl4 for%T

wrfmftfa (NS.

p. 247

by

arfe

%3$

philosophy of &Bi madhvAoArya

84

as applied to valid knowledge on the one hand and

Pramaria

other.

as

it

actually

is

means on the

a particular space-time setting

with reference to

is,

its

defined by Jayatfrtha as the knowledge of a thing

:

n other words, as knowledge which

" answers " to the nature of the thing. But by correspondence, here, is
meant, not either spatio-temporal co-existence of Pramana and Prameya
or correspondence on all fours extending to one and all of the aspects of
2fflT#srarrc

fiw\W\ft,

sfW*rr

It is no more than- li^wiefaW SMq, or

the existence
object.
of suck aspects as are actually perceived by each person according to the
extent of his capacity or understanding and other conditions governing the

a given

rapprochement to the object

I^TOazfNfcrPRfffi 5OT cl|*t*F%: cfflraq

or the actual existence of an object with reference to a spatio-temporal

setting in the manner preceived with reference to that setting.

The problem of Perception looms

large in

modern philosophy,

whether physical objects are directly perceived, and if so, to what extent.
The main obstacle to the theory of direct perception of objects as opposed
to the theory of perception of the sense-datum

is

the alleged 'gap between

The Madhva theory overcomes these difficulties by a frank admission that the way in which things appear to us is
causally determined by a number of factors which are extraneous to
the thing itself and that there are gradations of knowledge and finally
that no knowledge at the human level could lay claim to complete
comprehension of a thing, in all its innumerable aspects and relations:
evidence and conclusion.

qjprrfa

wf<WJT

^fteTWRRi.

of knowledge does not

(

'

^MMlSH'lftofH.

is

make

to

be

it

'

(NS.p. 251).
But this limitation
'.
The correspondence to facts

invalid

understood

with

naturally

reference

to

and other properties of objects

conditioned by external factors and subject to the normal conditions
certain definite

space-time settings

'

'

of perception being

fulfilled.

Kavala-Pramana

is

divided into

four types, in

the

descending

and
on the basis of intrinsic difference in quality, luminosity
and range. The first two are in the nature of Svarupa-jfiana alone while
the other two include Vrtti-jnana ( sensory knowledge ) also^ The classiorder

of

merit

as

IsVara-jfiana,

Laksmi-jfiana,

Yogi-jfiana,

Ayogi-jriana,

*WPislfo?ft^ <t$dfll<

ft^ld^WJlH MMftq
I

'

NS.

p.

248

b.)

THE THEORY OF PRAMANAS

fication tho' partly theological,

psychological significance.

is

85

not without mystic, epistemological and

is accepted by the Nyaya

Wvara-pratyaksa

and Vedanta schools as the necessary presupposition of

all

human

knowledge ( as in Berkeley ). It is, according to Madhva, all-comprehensive, always veridical, eternal and independent and part of the divine
nature itself and extremely luminous, - luminosity being an intrinsic quaLaksmijMna :is next
lity of this knowledge itself, unrelated to objects.
only to God's, in these respects.

The ramifications of Yogi-jnana include

Tattvika and Atattvika souls and of the last into those of

Muktiyogyas and others. The nature of the constitution of the

those of Eju,

Svarupajnana of these

is

explained

by

Jayatirtha in his Pram&yapaddhati.

Kevala-pramana has two aspects knowledge consisting of the

of selfhood and that arising from mental processes. These are
graded in regard to validity as regards both, into Mama, madhyama and
:

essence

adhama.

Details have been given

by

Jayatirtha.

'

6HAPTSSB Xv.

PERCEPTION, INFERENCE
Sense-perception

is

defined by

AND VERBAL TESTIMONY.

Madhva

WW.

as ftyii*i[*ii'H*HWJ*M

or knowledge produced by the right type of contact between flawless

Such contact would be in

sense-organs and their appropriate objects.

The Naiy&yikas accept six different

kinds of contact ( sannikarsa ) including a special one for abhdvapratyaksa.
With the rejection of Samaviya of the Nyiya school, all these
stand rejected by Madhva.
He accepts only one direct type of sannikarsa
the nature of an

Anu-Pramina.

of the different senses, including the Saksi, with their appropriate objects

and

The senses

their negations.

indriyas

being the products of Taijasa-

ahamkara-tattva, such contacts are presumed to be effected thro'

medium of "
the contact

rays

thro'

is

and the objects and

The

the

Another view is that in the case of the eyes alone,

" rays " and in others, directly between the organs

".

their abh&vas.

flawlessness of the

senses

and

their

contact

etc.,

to

is

by

within
the
the
truthfulness
of knowledge,
meaning of " yathartha " already given, which is itself ascertained by the

borne

be

Saksi.

out

Hence

there

is

no mutual dependence

flawlessness of the senses etc.

in the establishment

Absolute flawlessness of indriyas 1

is

of the
possi-

knowledge of God, Laksmi and the released.

The Svarupa-jfiana of Uttamajfvas is always true while the VrttijMna of
all the three classes of unreleased souls, is open to error, as the senses
ble only in respect of the

( here ) are material.

These limitations in the nature of Svarupajn&na
and Vrttijnana of the different orders of beings may perhaps explain
from the Madhva point of view, the impossibility for ordinary human

perceptions to

know

the " ding an sich " as

it is.

It is

explaining that our senses are not constituted in such a

know

us to

reality as

is

all

another

way

way of

as to enable

about given objects of perception but only as much of

life.
This would suffice to answer

adequate for our normal

make a transition from

The contents of individual experiEven of the reality of which I take

the argument of Scepticism about our right to

sense-experience to physical objects.

ences are proverbially fragmentary.

note,

can never perceive more than just those aspects that attract

attention for the time being or are significant to

my

interests.

element of selective attention in individual experiences.

1,

Technically,

SvarQpajMna

alio

ia

There

my

is

Experience

engendered by SvarOpendriyai.

an
is

PfiBOEPTtON, tNtfKRENoE

AND VERBAL TESTIMONY:

87

not a mere awareness of a succession of presented objects or relations,

undetermined by the controlling interest or purpose of the pramata. We

are thus forced to admit the necessary existence of a superhuman experience to which the whole Universe of being is directly presented ( God's

knowledge being only Pratyaksatmaka, according to Madhva ) as a complete

and harmonious system.

As

reality

has been defined as WKtFKr

can have no

meaning apart from preseHence Madhva posits a graded series

of more and more harmonious wholes culminating in the perfect and

siftfifT+W

it

follows that

it

ntation to a sentient experience.

Brahman which embrasweep (sarvavisayakam).

systematic unity of the absolute experience of the

ces the totality of all existence,

all

at once, in

its

The Madhva theory has thus deep philosophic

significance, tho' appare-

ntly treated as a purely theological doctrine.

As all reality is Savis'esa in essence and in the last analysis, and

" bare something " being inconceivable, all Pratyaksa is considered
to be fundamentally "Savikalpa" or determinate, in origin and the distinction of perception into determinate and indeterminate accepted in the
Nyaya and Advaita schools, is rejected.
the

The Sakgl

intuits its

as well as

etc.,

the

own

mind and

self
its

(atman) and

its

characteristics of bliss

processes, Avidya, knowledge arising

from external senses, the feelings of pleasure and pain etc., Time, Space
and God. The mind comprehends external reality thro' the sense organs
and acts as the independent instrument of memory (aided by Samskaras).

The other

senses have their

own

well-defined sphere of objects.

Inference
According to Madhva, inference consists

mark of
with

it,

inference as pervaded by the

in the knowledge of the

Sadhya and invariably concomitant

leading to the ascertainment of the Sadhya,

Buddhist
causality

logicians
(<ii<*io*(

regard

and

the

ci$Rl)

principles

as

of

specific

(A^NlwRc).

essential

identity

The
and

grounds of determining

Vyapti, while the Vais'esikas enumerate five such specific grounds in the

Sutra

3^?

*rf $RT *{<6r4w4ll9 f^ffa

merate seven such principles on which

tion.

Madhva

(y_ s.).

we may

The S&mkhyas enu-

base a universal proposi-

holds that invariable concomitance

is

the only relation

philosophy of ri madhvAcArya

88

on which

all

Even Paksadharmata

inferences ultimately rest.

term) being a characteristic of the Paksa (minor term),

by him to be an
(

which

is

inference.

%8jRWq,

essential factor in inference as

He

(the

middle

not considered

a Vyadhikaraoahetu

even

not spatially coexistent with the s&dhya

is

can lead to valid

also rejects the claim of the Naiyayikas that

wmwiti and

are necessary conditions of inference as these are not obviously

to be found in the Keval&nvayi and Kevalavyatireki types of inference.

Madhva

dismisses " Vyatirekavyapti" as providing any independent basis

for inference, as it merely

between Sadhya and Sadhana,

Madhva

position,

corroborates
in cases

the positive concomitance

of doubt.

Consistent with this

repudiates the threefold classification of inference as

Anvayavyatireki based on purely

combined concomitance, and recognizes
Jayatirtha
only one genuine type of inference based on anvaya-vyapti.
puts down the acceptance of the other types to a love of classification or
Kevalavyatireki and

Keval&nvayi,

positive, purely

negative and

for the sake of facility of understanding.

The Nyaya school insists on a five-member syllogism in PararthanuThe Buddhist logicians require two and the Mimamsakas three.
Madhva is not in favor of any hard and fast rule. The irreducible
minimum for him, is the statement of the Vyapti. The rest would depend
on the exigencies of the occasion. Where the subject-matter of dispute
is clear to the disputants, the statement of the " PratijnS. " could as well
1

mana.

be dispensed with.

In any case,

the five-member syllogism serves

if

merely as a reminder to the person addressed, he could reach the desired

by

remembering the Vyapti alone. In that case, the use

would be superfluous.
If the
five-member
syllogism acts as an authoritative pronouncement (Ugama) leading to the
inference, it will have no force as the disputants ( in a VSda ) have no
faith in the trustworthiness of each other.
If it is taken on trust, it can
be done so outright without the paraphernalia of a five-member syllogism
Moreover, if it should act as an Agamavakya, the Kevalavyatireki type
would have no legs to stand on. If the five-member syllogism is looked
conclusion

just

of the other members

upon as a dialectic method, Madhva points out that it would entail the
same being pursued till all difference of opinion is finally set at rest and

1.

[<pr

"HOT %N5. ]

&&& =PT W^

PERCEPTION, INFEBBNOE

AND VBBBAIi TESTIMONY

This would require a

absolute agreement reached between the parties.

series of

five-member syllogisms and not one.

The

errors in reasoning are classified into

most important of these are

the defects of reasoning
(

grounds of defeat

89

The

formal and material.

fld^T and 3WTI% in which are subsumed

including

the

fallacies

and

all

Nigrahasthanas

of the Naiyayikas.

Verbal Testimony

Madhva makes

out a strong case for according verbal testimony an

The Vai&sikas regard

independent status as a Pramana.

verbal judg-

ments as inferences (3FR *PRte$HIm). The Prabhakaras while assigning

an independent status to Apauruseyavakya subsume verbal judgments of

human

origin under inference.

verbal judgments

As

the cases.

This

is

invidious as the accessories

to

WtWI,

aJK^Wfcl'OTFr ) are the same in both

do not involve any Vyaptijfiana, they
inferential in character and should be given a

such as

verbal judgments

could not be treated as

separate status.

Sabdapramana is divided into Pauruseya and Apauruseya. The

Vedic literature is regarded as " Apauruseya " and the Smrtis, Puranas and other works based on Vedic authority are accepted as Pauruseya
Agama.

Madhva

is

Mlmamsakas, to have

the only Vedantin, after the

given the question of the infallibility and the Apauruseyatva of the Vedas

He

serious attention.

has taken special pains to establish the doctrine

with some new and original arguments of his

usual and conventional arguments based

of Varnas and the

impossibility

on

own which go beyond

the

the conception of the eternity

of proving that the Scriptures were

spoken or uttered by a particular person.

The Vedas
authority

are self-valid.

aptatva

Their validity cannot be derived from the

of any author,

human or

divine.

To

the

modern

mind, the ascription of Apauruseyatva and Anaditva to the Vedas

seem absurd.

But Madhva introduces a new

indeed thought-provoking, in that

the raison

d' etre

it

line

may

of argument, which

goes to the very crux of the problem

of any Apauruseyavakya in the domain of Pramanas.

and morality
all religion, ethics
and for the acceptance of all supersensuous values like dharma and
adharma would have to be founded on some textual authority which is not
the composition of any particular individual and does not derive its
It is this that the

ultimate sanction for

PHILOSOPHY OF &tf MADHVACAkYA

90

authority or validity

regarded as reliable

fact of being the words of that person

Unless our ideas of dharma and adharma

from the

tipta

).

it would be impossible to
and concepts on any satisfactory basis.
A philosopher who would not admit the existence of such
supersensuous values as dharma and adharma would have no scope for
his {Sastra, as the object of a Sastra is to show the ways and means

are grounded on such impersonal authority,

establish the very existence of such values

of realizing those truths which cannot be secured by other means, falling

within the scope of perception and inference.

Nor can such a

philoso-

pher claim that his system would, by proclaiming the absence of dharma,

adharma and other supersensuous values, confer a real benefit on

humanity by ridding society of its superstitious belief in them. Madhva
points out that far from benefiting humanity, such teachings undermining
the faith of the people in dharma, adharma etc., would let loose violence

and disorder everywhere by proclaiming

the long run, the people

will

the theory 'might

curse the philosopher

is right.'

In

whose teachings

would expose them to such misery. As such teachings will only lead
no faith in any other unseen benefits, his
Sastra would be futile either way.

to adverse results and as he has

Insofar then as dharma and adharma and other supersensuous values

will

have to be admitted by

other ultimate sanction

is

no

upon which they could be grounded, save

the

all

rational thinkers

and since there

impersonal authority of a Sastra, one has to accept an Apauruseya-Slstra

as furnishing the basis of universal faith in dharma,
is

no other way

possible

to

in

adharma etc.

which their existence could be established.

determine their nature and existence

authority of individuals, however great they might be

on
;

the

There

It is

hardly

supposed

for, every

human

being would have the limitations of ignorance and of being liable to

would not be justifiable to postulate for this purpose

some teacher who will be omniscient. That would be
postulating much more than what is warranted in our experience; for
omniscience in any individual is not a matter of our ordinary experience.
One would have to postulate, moreover, not only omniscience to an
deceptiveness.

It

the existence of

individual but also that such an individual

is

not given to deceiving

and further that he is the author of a particular statement or

doctrine or body of texts about the nature of dharma etc.
others

Postulation of the existence of an Apauruseya-^astra, on the other

hand, would be the simplest thing. It would not necessitate any further

PEBCEPTION, INFERENCE

AND VESBAL TESTIMONY

91

As

there is no ascertainable author of the Vedas, their

would follow automatically. On the contrary, it would
be an unwarranted assumption that they have an author, when no such
author is ascertained or ascertainable. The analogy of worldly testimony
would be powerless here as in respect of worldly testimony there is no

assumptions.

authorlessness

conception that

authorless, as

is

it

there

in respect of the Vedas.

is,

any statement from any irresponsible

no
source may be claimed as Apauruseya for established traditions would
always be a sufficient check against such wild claims and there are
other ways of ascertaining the genuine from the spurious, when such
There

fear that at this rate

is

claims are made.

The

qualification

as
tic

want of an

flawlessness

applies

to

every

objective reference to the words employed, lack of syntacfitness.

There are different theories as to
produced by the distinctive elements forming
Madhva holds the Anvitabhidhana view, according

connection or denotative

how

the verbal judgment

part of a sentence.
to

of nirdosatva

Verbal testimony, to be valid, must be free from such flaws

Pram&na.

is

which the words in a sentence convey

their specific senses compositely

thro' requisite syntactic interconnection with the rest.

necessity

This obviates the

Sphota Vada and other theories. The

hold the Anvitabhidhanavada. But while, according to

for recognizing the

Prabhakaras also

them, every word in a sentence

is

invested with the capacity to convey the

and in that process its own specific sense

recognize two stages in the process of

net syntactic relation as a whole

Madhva would appear to

amaya, each word having, at the
also,

its

outset, only a general capacity to

definite sense as correlated to such others to

tely related

by

fitness

which

and then by juxtaposition

in

it

convey

stands immedia-

the sentence taken as

a whole, with yet others, an additional capacity to convey a more specialized

form of

the

same anvaya,

in all its completeness.

Other Pramanas like Arthapatti are not given an independent position

by Madhva. Arthapatti presumption shows a way out in cases of
apparent conflict between two facts. Given that X is alive, if he is not
This can be easily
at home, he must be presumed to be out somewhere.
)

put in a

*5T%S

syllogistic

form

"^ 3\&M #R=T3 9T3

l|s?Ic<TO:

$\

#R.

1=*

The point here is that both the

There can
alternatives, taken together, constitute the mark of inference.
be no real conflict between the two alternatives of a man being alive and
his not being at home.
So there can be no difficulty in one of the alterfRTfc"4*llfei,

3*1*3."

(PP-)

92

PHILOSOPHY OF SBl MADHVACArYA

and collectively leading to the inference.

would be no room for Arthapatti either;
but only a doubt as to what may have happened to X Similarly, Upamana also, as a means of establishing similarity between two things, may
be brought under inference, perception or verbal testimony according to
the conditions of each case. " Anupalabdhi " also, in the same way, could
be brought under any of the three according to the nature and conditions
of the experience. When a jar is suddenly removed from its place, the
perception of its non-existence is the result of direct perception by the
natives qualifying the other

Should the

conflict

be

real, there

Saksl, the non-perception of the jar being merely the logical consequent of

the former.

Where one

feels the

absence of the jar in darkness by

judging thro' groping with his hands, the non-perception serves the pur-

pose not of an instrument of abhavapratyaksa but as a mark of inference.

necessity of recognizing Anupalabdhi, as a separate Pramaoa, is thus

The

obviated by the acceptance of the possibility of direct sensory contact

with abh&va as in the case of bhavas.

The well-known " Tatparya-lingas "

hara " and iruti, linga, vakya, prdkaratia
brought under the purview of Inference.

like
etc.

"

Upakrama ", "Upasam-

are also similarly to be

:)

CHAPTEB XVI

THE STATUS OF MEMORY

The

contribution of

memory

The question of

important.

Pramana or source of

valid

its

to knowledge

and

status

quite considerable

is

and

to be admitted as a

title

knowledge has engaged the attention of

While some modern philosoand sceptic of the claims of memory, others

philosophers in the East and in the West.

phers have been very
have overweighted it.

critical

In Indian philosophy, the prevailing tendency has

memory from

Pramana ', on the ground of

The Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas have deliberately defined Pramana in such a way as to exclude
memory from its scope 1 The Advaitins generally follow the Mimamsaka view. The followers of Ramanuja seem to be divided in their opinion.
Meghanadari seems to be definitely against the admission of memory to
the title of Pramana, as can be seen from his definition of Pramana as:
been to exclude
its

merely

'

'

the

title

of

'

representative character.

awwrpftsj

3?sfqfts&S33I

while Vedanta Des'ika

3f5rrf%cRicR5f%

As a
supports

Realist,

stakes his all

ll

brings

tion

it

Nyaya-Partisuddhi

on the validity of Memory and

Pramana or source of valid

*rm4fa sjpn*iwft *&?$&:

He

quite in favor of

claim to be admitted as a

its

knowledge

Madhva

WlccHRi^lci;

is

Memory under

by the mind

Its validity

Pratyaksa and considers

SR# SHft^

flTf^Ctftf^t^T

(av).

it

as a direct percep-

HHMc^^T Wl%:

cannot, he says, be treated as merely inferential.

(PL).

Otherwise,

even the perception of an object can be treated as an inference from a

karya to a Mrar^a *nWJ#T *H$T 3 +*HK*dTr WiWHMi{ (NS. p. 227 ).

Apart from that, it cannot be said that we may know the past by infer:

ence from the retention of the impression of the past experiences or from

then

1.

2.

all

an image.

Such inferences in their turn would involve

is invalid as a source of knowledge,
inferences which are based on the remembrance of Vyapti between

revival as

its

memory.

Moreover,

if

memory

Cf. 3{^%raT'tRj[ 5WMJI

Nayadyumarpi,

q.

Mimamsaka

by Dasgupta,

J.

Phil,

iii,

p. 239.

JPHILOSOPHY OF $KI MADHvAcARYA

would

the hetu and the sadhya

be valid when

it

has

cease to be valid

basis in

its

what

for

no knowledge can

Inference then, would

invalid.

is

It can similarly be shown that the other Pramaoas

at a standstill.
accepted by the other schools would also involve memory of some kind

be

as one of their basic conditions.

Madhva

holds that

necessary contact
lity

Samskaras

sannikarsa

former impressions

of the mind with the past.

of such a penetration into the past, by the mind,

is

provide the

The

possibi-

established,

says

he, on the evidence of Yogic perception of past and future and is not,
It is indeed very remarkable that Madhva
therefore, inconceivable.
should have anticipated the views of Western thinkers like Russel,
Hobhouse and others in recognizing memory as a primary source of our

knowledge concerning the past. He agrees with them that the immediate
knowledge by memory is the source of all our knowledge concerning the
past by inference. Otherwise we should never know that there was
anything past to be inferred at
ioned, there

to us

all.

If the validity

of

<$f3^ ftmfaegfcf ?TO;f%gmil ?

(AV).

against this point that " the fact that one seems to
is

memory

is

quest-

would be no proof of our past experiences having occurred

a good reason for believing that

there is independent evidence.

If

we

it

occurred

are

all

It is no argument
remember an event

but

to lose

it is

only because

our memory of

would be harder for us to reconstruct the past events,

The cross-checking of written and other
impossible.
physical records, the utilization of scientific theories which they support,
would suffice1 ". This would not apply to the question of one's own
If I lose my memory, I cannot
personal experience and its remembrance.
events,

but

it

not

by any written or other records reconstruct my past experience, for myself.

may be able to do so. But that will
hardly help me or have any binding force, so far as I am concerned. If
his
memory, no interpretation or
the reconstructor should lose
The part played by memory
correlation of evidence would be possible.
in human life, is thus considerable and it would be suicidal to question
Of course, there are delusive memories at times.
its validity in toto.
That
But so are there cases of delusive perceptions and inference also
does not affect the validity of memory per se. Madhva's insistence on
" nirdosatva " of the causal complement would be sufficient to cover
Others with their memories intact

such cases.

X.

%h$ Problem of owledr/e, A.

J.

Ayer. 1956 p, 186.

f*HE

The

general objection to the validity of

the condition

fulfill

STATUS OF MEMOBY

memory

that

is

its

makes for
The

re-presentation of the experience in toto that

memory but
object

faithfulness

to

its

object-content 1

same condition whenever

the

in

it

answered by Madhva, by pointing out that

is

or

state

apprehended is no longer present at

subsequent remembrance. Thus memory cannot lay
is first

claim to be faithful to the experience and reproduce

objection

does not

it

The

of correspondence (yathartham).

condition in which an object

the time of

What

the validity of knowledge.

is

it is

required

known

is

that

This

exactly.
it

is

not the

the validity of

of an

existence

is

not essential for

the particular state

or condition, in which knowledge apprehended a given object with reference

to a particular

space-time

particular object

a time

validity

present.

one,

is

space-time

setting.

cRM

was

cTTSSF:

of the

setting,

should really belong to

What memory does

in such
),

Its existence

now

in that

it

to recall the fact that the

and such a condition or state at such and such

This

memory

is

certainly

is

so.

former

It

irrelevant

is

condition

that

the

in the

same state or condition,

simply irrelevant to the validity of memory.

is

to

no

the

longer

or in a different
It is

only

in this

sense that scientific deductions about the past or future conditions of

phenomena could be held

(NS.

JTOTlMrjiTgft: n

There

is

to be valid.

p.

The same

applies to memory also

251.)

much force in the objection that it is

make known an already known object,

not

of a pramana to

not the function

to us.

For,

it

can never be seriously maintained that no further knowledge can arise

Neither is knowledge opposed to knowlein regard to a known object.
dge in any way, so that subsequent knowledge may be barred. It cannot
also

be held that want or absence of knowledge

Knowledge

is

a part of the

bound to arise if
The objection that
the necessary conditions for its production are there.
a pramana should not be dependent on anything else, or any other
knowledge would cut at the very root of Inference. There is thus ho
" j n such a way as to exclude memory
justification to define " Pram&oa
conditions which produce knowledge.

from

its

is

purview.

(NS. p. 251.)

"

PHILOSOPHY OF ^RI MADHVAoAbYA

$6

Memory

is generally supposed to be caused by Samskaras ( impreon the mind by the first experiences. A difficulty arises in
Such impressions, then, could only relate to the actual
this connection.
But the " experience " did not
state of the object as it was experienced.

ssions

left

object with the words "

I am past ", stamped on it,

Samskaras corresponding to the objective content of
experience produce memory, how is this discrepancy to be explained ?

certainly present

as

were.

it

If,

its

then,

This is really a ticklish question. The difficulty seems to have been

by some modern writers also, on the subject. But their explanation
The correct answer according to Ayer is
is vague and non-committal.
that " perhaps, there is no one thing that is present in every such instance
of remembering. Sometimes it is the matter of one's having a vivid image
felt

sometimes

with or without image,

sometimes there

is

no

specific

there

This leaves the difficulty unsolved.

here by boldly formulating a

is

a feeling of familarity;

mental occurrence.

new theory

Madhva

cuts the Gordian knot

memory

that our

experiences

and simply the reflections of the Samskaras, impressions,

They are direct apprehensions of the mind penetrating
feelings or beliefs.
1
Only such a theory as this would justify the position
into the past
taken by modern thinkers like Russel that memory resembles perception
in point of its immediacy and differs from it in being referred to the
That the mind has got this power to penetrate into the past and
past 2
the future is established on the evidence of Yogic perceptions of past and
future, which are recognized as direct perceptions ( Saksatkara ) and not
Such mental perception in the case of memory is,
as inferences.
are not purely

however, limited to the sphere of previously experienced objects or events

the nature of the limitations imposed by the Samskaras, which act as

by

the connecting links ( sannikarsa

with the

past;;

whereas, in the case of

Yogic perceptions of the past and future, such Sannikarsa or connecting

link is supplied by the power of Yogic merit itself. Hence. Yogic vision
is more comprehensive than ordinary mental or memory experiences.
This explains why memory is, by its very nature, connected with one's
past experiences.

The position taken up by Madhva

as an immediate perception of the past

that

Memory

by the mind

1.
Cf
the view of Samuel Alexander that " the object
part " (Spaoe, Time and Deity, i. 113, q. by Ayer).
.

2.

The Problem of JPhiloeophy,

p. 76.

should be regarded

is

is

quite unique.

It

com/present with toe as

StATUS OV MEMOES

*HI3

goes very

$7

much beyond the views of the Jainas who have valiantly upheld
memory to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge, but

the right of

have classified it as a form of mediate knowledge (paroksa ). Madhva's

view of Memory as a direct perception of the past by the mind is a
remarkable anticipation of the views of some modern philosophers like
Russel who claim that " we often remember what we have seen or heard
or had otherwise presented to our senses and in such cases, we are still
immediately aware of what we remember, inspite of the fact that it
appears as past and not as present".

Problems

of Philosophy, p. 76).

Another minor objection to the right of memory to be admitted as a

" Pramaija " is its alleged inability to serve any useful purpose (nisphalatvam ), as a source of knowledge. This is pointless, says Madhva.
In the first place, validity is a matter of fact and hardly one of utility.
Apart from that, not all instances of memory can be dismissed as serving
no useful purpose. We feel happy to remember pleasant experiences
and seek to dwell on them and go from one to another. Exercise of

memory

increases the

potencies of the impressions.

Feelings

of love

and hatred are evoked by agreeable or disagreeable memories.

memory

Insofar then as

is

of "

fully entitled to the status

uncontradicted and true,

Pramanam

"

in the

it

would be

sense of

" yattha-

been argued, however, that there is a peculiarity about

rthyam
memory which deserves notice. " The only claim of memory to the
status of knowledge and acceptability rests upon an explicit reference to
".

It as

a past experience, which

bered fact

is

professes to reproduce faithfully.

it

believed to be true just because

with the content of a past experience, which

it

This conformity to a past experience and falling back upon

own
its

archetype.

of knowledge

it

", in

for

its

favor of

Thus, the question of treating memory as a distinct type

" barred by definition ". In this view, the Advaitin

who

hold that the only kind of knowledge, so called,

knowledge of the already unacquired

therefore,

not,

" self-abdication

its

is

follows the Bhattas,

is

be proof of

validity are said to

remem-

regarded as identical
claims to reproduce ". l

it is

distinct

3Fn%lcTr?'Fg.

knowledge,

source of

is

Memory,
still

tho

'

a distinct

experience that has to be distinguished from knowledge and given a

separate name.

1.

P.M.7

" The experience in which the

D. M. Datia, 3i

Wayi of Knowing,

pp. S8-

new emerges

is

called

"

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHvAoABtl

98

Anubhuti ' and reproductive knowledge

Datta, Six Ways of Knowing, pp. 22-23 ).
'

As a

Realist,

anuxUda, both

by him and
Bhattas and

Madhva

in the

in the

called Smrti. "

is

D.

establishes the right to validity of memory

M.
and

enlarged sense of the term "Yatbartham", as defined

narrow sense of SFtfSpicnsJi^ JWFUJ accepted by

the

the Advaidns:

-a

wffcnWr dl&cwt+d:

st

(yiF.

He

aksa,
valid

of

reproduction

with

the

uncontradicted.

is

Apart from

anadhigatarthata

in

The

Samskaras.

the
it

content of

that,

there

memory.
previous
the

past

It

iii.

p. 34.

).

by means of Manasa-paty-

experience the past

by

aided

in so far as

definition.
(

we

argues that

is
is

of

experience

Thus,

it

is

memory

not barred

is

by

an element of " novelty

a mere photographic

not

experience

or

" identical

wholly
For,

experience. "

it

compre-

hends events, or objects qua past i. e., as qualified by the special

attribute of " being past " : 3Rfef^tf^J3, ; whereas, the first experience
of them would, naturally, have conceived of them qua present ! Memory,
more than a mere

then, involves an element of novelty ,-a something

photographic reproduction of experience.

As Hobhouse

puts

it,

"Memo-

an assertion of the past as past. " In the same way, an analysis of

Pratyabhijfiana (recognition) shows that it is an indivisible act of cognition,

ry

is

produced by the visual sense, aided by Samskaras

&*IWRW'

^m

sterol

(NS. p. 496 b)

perception of a mere " this "

and that

s?3mw*i<w?H*l<i ft$ii

it is

neither a simple

nor an act of memory involving a "that"

nor even two separate cognitions consisting of a perception and a memory;

nor even a compound of " mental chemistry ", as the Jainas would have

H crf^wtw
:

i'HS

STATUS OF MEMOEY

99

show that he too is not averse

in the sense of possessing " yatha,-

Jayattrtha quotes Vacaspati Mis'ra to

memory

to recognizing the validity of

rthya "

the Sutra

bdhi "

).

For, in commenting on the definition of Pram&cia in

OTS^'^tg:

cognition

WT^

Vacaspati

first qualifies

the term

by the adjunct of " being correct "

*'

Upala-

Yathartham

avoid the overpervasion of the definition in respect of doubts.

to

lest

"

validity

),

But,

the definition as modified, viz., sr^rr^Maf^g: sffTTOJ should embrace

memory "

also, he qualifies

TTT^teiSsr

" Upalabdhi " once again, by saying that

does not here include

only immediate experience.

correct knowledge, as such, but

all

This shows that the validity of

Otherwise, he would

accepted by him.

have

not

raised

memory

is

any further

Pram&na as WMI^ffeltg
which
would have sufficed to rule out memory, if it had been intended to be
excluded from the field of valid knowledge. Or, having raised an
objection of that kind, he should again have excluded the validity of
objection to the qualified definition of

Smrti, by the selfsame adjunct-'yathartham" instead of restricting the

term Upalabdhi to " anubhava " as distinguished from memory. This
establishes that in the opinion of Vacaspati, memory is ruled out, not
because of its containing any element of invalidity ( ayQthaahyam ), but

because of

its

not being in the nature of a direct or a primary experience

This shows that its validity is irrefutable and ergo, a proper

There is no
definition of " Pramajam " must be such as to include it.
{anubliava).

point in giving a partial definition and then exclaim that memory is

" barred by definition " It is unfair to interpret or define the term
" Pramanam " in such a way as would fail to achieve such a result or foil
!

Hence, the need for redefining " Pram&na ", so as to bring within its
range all types of valid knowledge, without any invidious distinction or
it.

preconceived ideas.

Madhva
ing

memory

has thus done a great service to the cause of truth in restor-

to

its

rightful place as a

source

valid

therefore fully entitled to be accepted

given a great lead to philosophers in bringing

assigning

it

of

a " Pramaja

as

it

knowledge and
".

He

has also

under " Pratyaksa " by

a special place as " Manasa-pratyaksa " under his seheme

6f sevenfold division of Pratyaksa.

It is

tribute to the .keenness of his

mental powers that his recognition of the immediate character of memory

is

receiving assent

come to

from

recognize the

'

several

modern

direct view

'

thinkers like-

of memory.

Ewing who have

CHAPTER XVII

DOCTRINE OF VALIDITY
Pram&nas give us valid knowledge of things

'
'

as they

are

in fact".

The nature of this validity and correspondence with facts, as understood

by Madhva, has already been defined. The problem that remains is that
of the criteria of truth by which we convince ourselves of the validity of

our experiences and judgments.

different tests of

and even

tests

criteria figure

truth

Modern

philosophers have put forward

such as correspondence, coherence, pragmatic

intuition.

In

Indian philosophy, also, these different

under different names.

The Sarhkhyas have held that both

to knowledge.

validity

and invalidity are innate

This means that the same factors which produce know-

make

for the validity pertaining to it and similarly, in the case of

The same principle applies to the apprehension of that validThe factors which make known the knowledge are
ity or its reverse.
alone responsible for the apprehension of its validity and invalidity.
This theory seems to rest on a naive commonsense realism that both

ledge

invalidity.

validity

and

invalidity are organic to

The S&rhkhya

position

is

knowledge.

clearly

self-contradictory.

It

may,

however, be explained by the Sarhkhyas that as the machinery of the

production of knowledge could not at any time be expected to be absolutely free

from

the operation of gwpas or dosas that arrest the capacity

to produce invalidity or validity as the case

escape the conclusion that knowledge

false,

is

may be,

bound

one cannot altogether

to be intrinsically true or

according to the prevailing condition of the karapas that produce

The only excuse

it.

roundabout explanation will be the acceptance

of the principle that knowledge by itself cannot have the contradictory
features of validity and invalidity at the same time.
The same fear of
self-contradiction should have counselled the SSrhkhyas against attributing
two mutually conflicting capacities to the Karapas themselves, in their
for such a

attempt to justify the dual nature of knowledge.

ally

make

Such a view

will actu-

the auxiliaries responsible for the Karanas' acquiring this dual

capacity.
That will land the Samkhyas in a theory of Paratah-pr&manya
of both validity and invalidity, instead of their Svatastva, as they want to

maintain.

DOOTBINE OT VALIDITY
Reflection shows, then, that truth alone

must be extraneous to

invalidity

is

101
organic to knowledge and

and must not be put down to the same

it

causes as produce knowledge, but to defective adjustment of conditions

or environment,
It is clearly illogical

to regard both validity and invalidity as innate

One

characteristics of knowledge.

and the other

extrinsic.

of

them must be natural and organic

make

Tests and verifications are needed to

of validity only in cases of reasonable doubt,- and not as a rule.

confirms the position that validity

is

intrinsic to knowledge

sure

This

and must be so.

According to the Nyaya school, both the genesis and apprehension

and invalidity are extrinsic to knowledge, i.e caused
by factors other than those which give rise to or make known the knowledge.
This is consistent with the practical realism of the Nyaya and its
pragmatic theory of truth. Knowledge, according to this school, is
of

validity

generated by well-defined contact of sense organs with objects or

specific factors (3T) (
i.

e.

which

differ

according to the nature of each casei

perceptive, inferential or verbal

by certain

by other

while

) ;

its

validity

is

brought about

special virtues in the indriyas or other causal apparatus, accor-

ding to the type of knowledge. Invalidity, on the other hand, is

produced by defects of sensory contact, or other pertinent factors. This
school also holds that while knowledge per se is apprehended by mental
perception, its validity is inferred by correspondence or other tests.
Invalidity, likewise, is inferred

from want of correspondence, unwork-

ability etc.

The weakness of the Nyaya theory

upon the satisfaction of external tests.

lies

If the tests require further tests to validate

of

them ad

infinitum.

If the first or

in its

This

is

making validity depend

clearly

second

test itself is sufficient guar-

antee of validity without the need for further tests, it

to

an admission of

much a

piece of

The

Buddhists,

on

invalidity as intrinsic to

to

them

is

would be tantamount

self-validity of the result of that test,

knowledge as

discursive

unsatisfactory.

them, there will be a regress

which

also as

the other hand, regard validity as extraneous

knowledge, as

all

etc,

and

ordinary knowledge according

and hence based on msntal construction

in terms of name, form

is,

the earlier ones.

kalpanQ

philosophy op 3rf madhvAoAkta

102

The Bhattas accept

But

in

knowledge

valid

then,

peculiar

validity to

knowledge, while invalidity

correspondence

according to them,

itself,

of " coguised-ness "

mark

be innate and invalidity to be

(sncFfl")

which

is

inferred

inferentially established thro'

is

and therefore capable of manifesting

own

its

by the

a property produced

is

The Prabhakaras regard knowledge

etc.-

extrinsic.

in

validity

want of

as self-luminous

same

the

act.

But they do not accept any invalid knowledge as such,- the so called
" invalid ", of popular conception, being regarded by them as due merely
to a failure to distinguish properly between an actual perception of a
given something and a

almost in a

memory

of something else

resembling

it

arising

),

flash.

Madhva

According to him, the

disagrees with all these theories.

by
no need to assume any special characteristic
( gunas ) for this purpose. But when vitiated by flaws the natural capacity
of these is arrested or distorted and they give rise to invalid knowledge.
As knowledge, by itself, is jad^a ( insentient ) as a modification of the
antahkararia. and therefore incapable of self-revelation, we have to admit
some other principle by which the knowledge itself and its validity
sense organs themselves are capable of producing correct knowledge,

proper contact

There

etc.

could be intuited.

knowing
"Kitwi

i.

ity are,

Self
e.

is

Such a principle

revealing itself

and

its

is

capable of both wtitel and

content. Both knowledge

and

thus grasped by the Saksl, in the ultimate analysis.

respect of invalid knowledge,

essence

the Saksl or Svarupendriya of the

is

which, as Caitanyarupa,

svarapam

while

the Saksl grasps only

its invalidity,

as

such,

viscumMa

is

its

its

valid-

But in

bare content or

ascertained by the

Saksl indirectly thro' incoherence

of Anupramanas, their validity

inferentially grasped thro' the ability to

is

stand the test of correspondence

or other

tests.

In respect

etc.

Implications of Madhva' s Doctrine of Validity

It will

admit

thus be seen that validity,

of any

degrees,

such

as

as defined

recognized

are

by Madhva, cannot
in Buddhism and

Advaita, in terms of VyavahSrika and Paramarthika-pr&manyam. It

indeed

difficult

light of

Aivaita,

to justify the

theory

Svatah- pramajyavada,
just

a^s

it

is

in the

of degrees

ostensibly

other

sy.sterqs

of validity in

admitted

of

the

by

is

the
the

Ved&nta,

DOOTBINB 0* VALIDITY

103

Degrees of validity will be inconsistent with the dictum

^W^. $&

aw*W NHMSf

Sure&ara ). On the Advaitic view, it will be more

and terminologically to speak of degrees of invalidity or unreality of experience. Validiy, if intrinsic to knowledge, must be
ipso facto absolute and unlimited and not relative or confined to parti(

appropriate, logically

cular

moments or periods of time imwm^ipfcj *m$t s*nw*^<I {AV).

:

Even supposing

that unstultifiability for all the

periods

three

of

time

(^iRiwsrtMc^)

is the true test of reality, it will not

be difficult to
secure such " abadhyatvam " ( unfalsifiability ) to our empirical know-

ledge,

which in so

time setting,

is

far as

technically

our knowledge

is

uncontradicted with reference to

it

all

space-

(Nym).

and set aside at a

would be tantamount to saying

absolutely sure to be disillusioned

has not been valid and true to

ing to be so

own

^"^i^mMsn^raTg, n

subsequent period of noumenal level,

that

its

*Hli&+N(wjdHlu|

#
If

it is

along

it

facts,

even when

WjJRftsraroFt $R<*W! ITPRTT

we have been under a

it

ar: ?

has been appear-

(AV) in other

on the screen of
knowledge and have been dealing with metaphysical shadows instead of
with the realities of life. The Advaitic philosopher is inconsistent with
himself in accepting the doctrine of Svatahpramanya of knowledge
and advocating the doctrine of degrees of reality and of validity in
the same breath. The Madhva view of validity as " yatbartham " is free
from this defect. On this view, correspondence is nothing more than
words, that

having a real object conceived as

cruel delusion played

it

truly

is

with reference to a given place

*iiwiKi>i%iH
and time ddj.'wwk d<y=bKrt^
It inclines more to
Madhva lays stress on
the correspondence theory than to pragmatism.
the fact that emotional satisfaction doe 3 not make a proposition true nor
\

the fact that a particular belief

*rRJ?n%: HTJpaffi:

%^l^l

(AV

may

induce such a satisfaction

definition of

Pramana

<<ii^R)ia^R^4i*iRcol5tr=I;rq,
validity (

tvA-vi

).

Implications of Theory of

The

Pramanas

as " Yathartba "

and of Anupramana as

confers on them a certain measure of self-

^raw^). The repercussion of such inherent validity on our

and its values, can be easily un.

experiences of the reality of the world

PHILOSOPHY OF

104

derstood.

This

is

Madhva

one of the strong points in favor of Realism.

home

has natually pressed

Prama^as to the

MADHvAcARYA

gill

reality

argument
of the world and of
this

other hand, the Advaitic philosophers,

from the

experiences

its

paying

tho*

self-validity of

On

).

service

lip

the

to the

Svatahpramanya doctrine of pramanas have been at great pains to

Pratyaksa

stigmatize
to

phenomenal

as

reality

by flaws

vitiated

^Slf^^R

Avidy&

of

referring

),

being limited to the present

and so on, and hence incapable of establishing the absolute reality of our experiences.
The tendency to pick holes in
Pratyaksa and impugn its validity is found among Idealist thinkers
( 5RffRJTT33Trf|

of

West

the

Dismissing

also.

the world as

have tried to invalidate

SOTTct.

I*"

the

belief

a superficial doctrine of Naive

aidrtifl.,

etc.

it

both by Inference

reality

Madhva

In combating these moves,

texts like

fof

^5

AWT

tiilRfl

of world-experience.

has naturally tried to take his

stand on the validity of Pratyaka in

Pratyaksa being vitiated by fontal flaws

forward until the unreality of experience

of

reality

ftsCTpfliJflW )

and by an appeal to monistic

which are supposed to deny the

the

in

Realism, the Advaitins

its

own

is

The theory of

right.

dosajanyatvam

cannot be put

otherwise established

and that

cannot be done until the Dosajanyatva of Pratyaksa is proved. There is

thus a palpable interdependence in argument. The argument from
illusions

fej

experience

is

WW ^Ic^a

equally illegitimate.

not on a par with passing illusions.

our own experience, as illusions

experience

is

are.

sjfca^M. to the unreality of all

The normal experiences of life are
They

are not contradicted within

The

plea of future stultiflability of

Inferences being dependent

dubious.

on sound Pratyakga

for their Vy&ptinWcaya cannot possibly go against their very prop

support

Upajivya

).

Perception

with the help of the Satel,

it

may

can assure

be limited to the present, but

itself

of absence of stultifiability,

as in the case of the perception of falsity of nacre in the

vested with absolute certainty

by

and

shell,

which

is

the Advaitin himself.

Finding these attempts to discredit Pratyaksa unsuccessful, the

Advaitin

tries to

base his conclusion on the authority of the identiy-texts

which, by implication and

by express

the unreality of dualistic experiences,

reference, are

supposed to establish

DOOTRIKB OF VALIDITY
This

is

also refuted

by Madhva on the

basis of

105

Upajlvyapramaoa-

virodha and the primacy of Saksi-pratyaksa, even as against the Sruti.

He shows

it is and should be the ultimate

and that its testimony must necessarily
be supreme and absolutely binding and one which cannot be transcended
by any further experience. He also shows that our experiences of the
world, so far as they come within the direct purview of the Saksi and are
testified by it, are entitled to unquestionable veracity.
Since this is so
and must be so, the only way to reconcile the seeming contradiction of
the monistic texts with the verdict of Saksi would be to agree to their
reinterpretation in some other
ways, short of factual and essential
identity of Atman and Brahman, as have been indicated by Madhva.

in his theory of the Saksi, that

criterion of all truth

and

validity

CHAPTER XVIII

THE DOCTRINE OF SAK?I

Madhva

Tho'

accepts that validity

is intrinsic to

Pram&na, defined as

Yathirtham, he does not rule out the possibility of error in experience.

Under

ideal

being what they are, error cannot altogether be

This leads us to the question of greater and

eliminated.

error

life

among

the different

of epistemology

Pram&nas and to

the

less

chances of

most important question

the quest for an ultimate basis of certainty

viz.,

experience and knowledge, without which

scientific

But the

of course, error will have no chance.

conditions,

actual conditions of

all

of

all

our claim to secular and

knowledge must remain suspect and for

conditions which

the

exclude not merely the fact but even the possibility of error.

It is

only the

discovery of such a principle that could be regarded as the true fulfilment

of the epistemological quest. The attempt to put Knowledge on a foundation that will be impregnable and will not be open to doubt

is

historically

associated with the philosophy of Descartes in the West. In Indian philoso-

phy, the issue has engaged the attention of the different schools/rom much
earlier times.
The frequently occurring discussions on " Svatastva " and

of Pramanya are essentially concerned with this moot

But unfortunately, most of the schools have touched only the
fringe of the problem and have not tackled it in all its bearings and in its
'

Paratastva

'

problem.

proper perspective, as we shall

We

have shown

see, presently.

earlier that the right theory

which admits that truth

is

organic to knowledge 1

wrcT)sw^piwr&2Tftfcr Rg,ctwicU

own proof.

on the

first

knowledge

1.

if

sfrr

itself at

is

that

fT'l'at-

and must carry

should depend upon

its

its

agree-

would have to be
and so on ad

confirming and corresponding knowledge

such a distinction could as well be conferred on the

the first blush.

the function of

Cf. fPT

carries

f|

basis of further agreement

infinitum. If the validity of the

intrinsic,

MWI<df

factor, such agreement, again,

similarly demonstrated

out that

Knowledge

If the truth of a cognition

ment with some other

could be

of knowledge

'

agreement

'

The Madhva philosophers point

samvMapramaya ) were just one

% WWHW^ur S#W *M*fl=WIct HWtH

ns.

p.

217 b

"JTTO: ( VadSvali.

wm %wrcvw^n

e re i fo,<6

1I^I#H
mti

%fcr

THE DOCTRINE OF SAKf

107

of " removing grounds of mistrust ", the validity of the knowledge in

question would turn out to be intrinsically

3ratS5T^r#ff

made out

M>l<uilMlft,

on the other hand, the samvada should establish validity inferentially,

mark of inference would have to be established first
and if that is also to be inferred, there would be a regress of inferences.
Nor can the provenness of validity be established by the absence of
falsification ( baihakahhava ) as the conviction of the fact of there being
no falsification is itself a knowledge like the affirmation of validity and it
If,

the validity of the

cannot have a greater value attaching to

knowledge ift ^V^mM

ledge

is

it,

than any other earlier

agreement with another item of know

such agreement also, as we have shown,

"iTJT^fr.

to determine validity,

If

would need further corroboration and

ratification.

Jayatlrtha points out in the course of a penetrating analysis of the

problem of

(2)

or

(3)

by reason of

(1)

or the certainty of

on the

or else

is

or

the

acceptance

open to question.

test

itself,

The same

dence between the two.

The

(4) or

agreement

at least absence of disagreement

lastly, in

of the validity of the knowledge

case also.

For, in the

inevitable.

senses will itself be

it

being caused by flawless senses;

not being generated by defective sense-organs

its

one of these cases,

pramanya"

its

basis of practical or pragmatic efficiency

with another knowledge

with another

only six possible ways in which

that there are

validity,

could be ascertained

its

of

own

the doctrine

first case,

If that

is

to be decided in the light

clear interdepen-

remain in the second

difficulty will

will

in every

" Svatah-

of

the flawlessness of the

there will be

of practical efficiency

And

right.

not apply to cases of

neutral acts of awareness or passive witnessing (ud&sfnajnana).

The

awareness of pleasure and pain, being unique forms of intuition, standing

apart from other ordinary acts of knowledge, will not admit of coherence

with others.
be the

test

If

of

agreement of knowledge with one of

validity,

(dhd,rd,va'iikabhrama

intended coherence

will

is

even a succession

of

its

own kind

illusory

is

to

impressions

have to be passed as valid knowledge.

If the

with another unit of valid knowledge, the validity

of the latter will have to be similarly established and so

on ad

infinitum.

PHILOSOPHY OF SRl MADHVAoArYA

108

Mere absence

of contradiction, so far, will not be a sufficient proof of

validity as there

may

conceivably be uncontradicted or undisturbed

sions, in experience, like the

common

attempt to establish the validity of knowledge thro' external aids

foredoomed to

We

failure.

are thus

illu-

Any

belief of the sky being blue.

is

thus

with the only other alternative

left

of the inherent validity of knowledge.

But even

not altogether free from

this is

luminosity tfrWRHl WM*l<ik4fcr ttWtm.

WW WAm\rt\H\4K(NS.

436 b

p.

with any kind of self-

smnTPTTO. NS.

p. 591

Judgments

).

Knowledge,

difficulties.

as an activity of the mind, cannot be invested

"

like

know

3^cRthis

"

point to the existence of a knowing self which alone could be claimed to

Even assuming that knowledge as such

be self-revelatory.
revealing

validity

its
(

itself, it

NS.

591

p.

*R3
).

can only manifest

3T

fm

^POTSfl2[

If validity

is

refute

revealed
validity

k&sa.

If they

as they do.

it,

do

is

capable of

but not, also,

WWR ^5^5

*PW

HWI^sft

inherently revealed by knowledge, the

make

its

validity felt

realize its validity,

they could

know-

by unbelievers
not possibly

This shows that the validity of knowledge

by the mere awareness of such knowledge

in other

is

not

words, that

is not made known by the knowledge itself, even if it be SvapraThe power of self-lumination, as has been shown, can at best,

help knowledge to manifest

power to endorse
to

form

content or

fPTTft

ledge arising from Vedic texts must

like Buddhists.

its

the validity

its

essence, to

of its

content.

a principle of truth-determination which

is

Madhva

it

cannot have any

Such a power could only belong

not materially constituted, like

the mind, and can, therefore, be credited with

judgments.

But

itself.

finds such an ultimate

absolute

validity

in

all

and absolute principle of

knowledge and validation, in the inner sense ( organ ) of the Self of man
" Svarupendriyam " -which he calls Saksi, and which is " Jn&nagr&haka " and also " Jn&na-pram&nyagrahaka " ( intuiting knowledge
-his

and

its

validity

).

The

raison d'etre of attributing

absolute infallibility and self-validation, which

is

ordinary perceptions of the mind and the senses,

to err

S& Tcst

and

is

open to doubts, albeit rarely

is

to

Saksi-pratyaksa

denied in respect of
that the

mind

is liable

whereas, the judgments of the

could not be doubted and have never been shown to have been in the

wrong and invalidated at any time

in life

THB DOCTRINE OF SAK?t

%& $W.f$% *m%^

THft

m$--

m% *wit

^iw

3, srrf^#i

[q

(AV.

4)

iii,

jvs. p. 591

).

The best proof of the unerring precision and infallibility of Saksl is furnished, says Madhva, by the most intimate and poignant experiences of
life ( of pleasure and pain ) of which none of us has occasion to entertain the least doubt in his life

SRfcOTRl^

W m&ft
'

#tW:

gist

^S3T

if

m tw cTwr%#iq.

?H 1^

VmmWWf-

<[:<

*Efal^ cP!

rational existence in the

the verdict of our

criterion of all

pRRcF T

urgftaw

faoiSft

Brf|fe5

The whole of

=T

NS.

tmt,

^i?f

591 b

p.

fflft

).

^WKf^RI.'

II

AV.

iii,

Saksl as the ultimate reference, foundation

knowledge and

).

world would be made impossible,

validity

is

and

questioned or proved to be in

The entire basis and

and science and of every
activity of life would be blown up to nothingness, as by an atom bomb,
the moment we dare to question or doubt the verdict of the Sakgi

the wrong, even in one single instance at any time.

superstructure of all religion, philosophy,

siwwswtf

jfor^iwy,

*r

q<E^r SPRIT 5Pt

3Tf%%s$ sjffir^R^,
ara

fct: \

(AV)

a?miT[4-3i^wPi^irfiwi=i*)i^ =*

m:

g^# 3*^im;pj ^s&witu ft^lm^wi: s^cte^

i)ii3*iMi

It is, thus,

macy of

"R^rraMT

ft^tfftWrT

incumbent on

all

Madhva, Pramapalaksapa

thinking persons to accept

Saksl as the ultimate criterion of

experience in the light of

its

all

the

pri-

knowledge and evaluate

foundations. The doctrine of Saksi, rightly

understood, would be seen to be both the true foundation and the crowning point of a really sound
in metaphysics.

No theory

and thoroughgoing theory

of knowledge,

of knowledge can really be complete without it,

fcHiLoscMPky ov SrI

lid

madhvAcArItA

While all other adherents o/theSvatahprUmd^ya view have been content with

assuming thai knowledge

has been the only one

and

analysis

to

of the Saksi could be the true terminus of

Madhva,

constitutes a remarkable advance of

may be

It

Madhva

This marking off of the spheres of Vrtti-jn&na and Saksi-

validation.

logy.

validity,

philosophers to insist upon a further

probe into the problem and go a step further and demons-

trate that only the verdict

jMna

own

itself carries with it its

among Indian

in Indian epistcmo-

theory of self-validity and

seen to bridge a gap in the

answer conclusively the objection of Udayana

WlNr 1

Wfft

SKWT-

WfST

no use to contend, as do most adhernts of Svatahpramanya,

that if knowledge had no power by itself to affirm its validity, nothing
on earth could give it that power and there would be no way in which
such validity could be affirmed. But then, is the Svatahpramapyav&din
aware of any single instance or form of knowledge that is incontrovertible and uncontroverted ? If there is any such knowledge or judgment,
it must perforce be the verdict of the Saksl and nothing else.
It is only
at that point that real self-validation and self-luminosity are possible :
yreffa:

ft is

^ct:5tRM,

3POT Wt s^iMsft T

Sfarl^rsffi

StfSfa:

(NS,

ll

The ordinary doctrine of " Svatahpramanya " explains

do not

arise in all cases,

but only where there

knowledge,

test

is

it

doubts

that

we have had

not so

much

and clearing doubts.

essence of Svatastva

which

is

implicit in

it.

act unquestioningly

inference.
"that

that knowledge carries with

This

upon

without waiting for

and

is

of contradiction

its

is

own

The

validity,

who

knowledge, as soon as they have

is

it

by a validating

truth to be tested and ratified

This show's that non-contradiction

this

it its

seen from the behavior of persons

their

if

for the negative one of

as

eliminating

chances

and

for the

positive task of establishing its validity,

the

).

positive knowledge of

is

conditions which seem to contradict the knowledge

arguments are employed to

p. 21 8

the only test of validity

guarantee does not forsake knowledge

till it is

positively

-disproved or doubted".
It

has been objected that this sort of an explanation

is

unsatisfactory

asit " confuses lpgipal certainty .with mere psychological belief

.

belief of validity

is

no indubitable index of

its

truth

and no

".

.A

substitute

Mfl

apparently sound

is,

in

M.

Prof. D.

for certainty.

DOCTRINE OB BAK1
Datta

It is belief

would be useful

this distinction tho'

Certainty

untenable.

the last analysis,

It

*"

argues that

thing but a quality of knowledge.

of logical reasoning.

111

if

is

no-

strengthened by a process

we could

ascertain the degree

of strength oranuuatof reasoning that would be necessary to turn a mere

belief into

But that

a logical certainty.

is

and psychologically

logically

impossible, as different persons require different degrees of certification 1

and because no objective or logical

can be set to the degree of strength that is required to establish certainty.
There is no way hitherto discovered of wholly eliminating risks of
for the validity of their knowledge

limit

error "

Six Ways of Knowing,

It is precisely at this

856

p.

point that

Saksi-pratyaksa, backed by Parlksa.

).

Madhva
( tests

interposes his criterion of

as the terminus of

),

all

tests

and processes of reasoning by which " belief could be converted into a

logical certainty ".
all

certainty,

He

explains

not reaching

The approbation of

and validation, as

clarification

cases

all

down

the Saksi

is

intuitive:

is

it

limit of

the logical

"
of doubtful cognitions as " mental perceptions

to the level of personal and intuitive level

of Saksi-

nirdharana

JTFT&

As

#t ^T:

explains,

Jayatlrtha

is

not able to

come

is

the ultimate criterion of all

to

inferential

to truth and
and verbal knowledge, the

a decision straightway, about the valid-

of a particular item of knowledge before

resorts

to

the application

experiments
Of. "

it

till

As

(A V.)

II

Being however accustomed

falsity in respect of sensory,

ity

I ST%eSSr

" The Saksi

knowledge and validation.

Saksi

To

it.

this

end then,

it

These may be tested by further

of tests.

reaches a certain level where knowledge issues in an

and amount required

to evidenoe, the kind

to

warrant knowledge, in

distinction to opinion or belief, varies generally according to the character

of the cognizing

The term

'

mind and the kind and amount

sufficient reason

Philotopky of Kwwled/t,

'

p.

of

affords no help here.

239

).

knowledge obtainable.
(

G. Trumbull Ladd,

pMitosoPH* of sb! MAi3HVAoAai?A.

ili

or similar

intuitive perception

of pleasure, pain, satisfaction, relief

intuitive reactions.

Since such intuitive experiences of the S&ksi have

not been known to have miscarried in any instance before,

assailed

rests

by

any further misgivings about

from the application of further

desists

satisfied in the validity

arrived at ".

NS.

p.

218

verdict of the Sakgl and

will

be

no

its

true

their

truthfulness

Such

is

and so

judgment

so

and highest validation by the

theory of the

the position of

not

).

self-validity

complete without the acceptance of such a

validation.

is

of truth-determination and

knowledge and

of the

b. translated

Knowledge, then, receives

tests

it

of

knowledge

final principle

Madhva's epistemology.

of

CtiAPTte XIX

SAK$I AS THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF TRUTli

The Madhva theory of knowledge
knowledge

thro'

perception

by

Madhva

the

and

intuitive

helps

distinction

of both valid and erroneous

account

consistent

to give a

This

Saksijnana.

called

self

distinguishes between ordinary

termed Vrttijnana,

sensory channels,

or doubtful cognitions, without impugning the fundamental claims of

It is conceded by Madhva
truth and knowledge to universal acceptance.

normal judgments of the mind are generally correct and valid

Tests are
certification by tests is not always necessary.
therefore applied only where validity is desired to be argumentatively

that the

and

that

established or logically ascertained in case of doubts.

The acceptance

of the Saksl obviates the necessity to carry on verifications up to " three

or four stages", as proposed by Kumarila {Hokavtirtika, ii, 61). For, if truth

is

to be

known and judgments

of validity are to be passed at any stage

could not be at any level prior to the ratification by the

Saksl From the ultimate point of view, even tests of non-contradiction
would be helpless as guarantors of validity, unless the Saksl is summoned
of the process,

to

it

vouch for the

no

satisfaction of the condition of there being not only

contradiction, but also

no

Non-contradiction, again,

possibility thereof.

may be uncontradictedness so
The latter cannot be
ever.

far

or non-liability to contradiction for

on any authority save that of

asserted

the Saksl.

The epistemological
knowledge and

its

validation

W^f^Trf^r

cT#nS

necessity

^m

is

for

such an

ultimate

principle of

1
accepted by the Advaitin also

TRHT

But such a principle cannot be a mere

The very purpose of recognizing

registering machine, as in the Advaita.

the Saksi as a validating principle

would be

lost,

if,

as

in

Advaita, the

great Censor of Saksl were to be put down as susceptible to both true

That
^TSFTT^nwra. ( Brahmananda ).
and false knowledge
:

is

why Madhva keeps

makes

it

Skasi above

the

an absolute principle of

breath of uncertainty-

1.

^fFM

OTTft

wraT

its

all

infallibility.

doubts and vacillation and

2
It is untouched by any

The reason for

credentials are never dubious.

Sf%l%>araf^sr:

ft44w*Hft4<lci:

*
(

2.

Cf.

P.M. 8.

<5!8J!5

38$.

WRTq.

P&yini Sutra.

BhUmati

*
)

PHILOSOPHY OF IeI MADHvAcABYA

114

same as

this is precisely the

^psreri;niwf

The same point

is

is

given in Advaita

HlfSPTt

5ffl3W5Wc=f

=r

*tf

ft Slf^PlT

).

W %: # # #
srsmM ^
wfa #^rra
35:

HTSfr

srr#

Madhva

cfW ST#ssq)"

sfT^r,

Brahmanandfya, i, p. 438, Bombay

thus elucidated by Madhva :

^cJFTOTT

/iF.

has thus gone far ahead of his contemporaries and compeers

new principle

in having postulated a

of truth-determination in epistemo-

form of the S&ksi as the ultimate criterion of truth which is

infallible and intrinsically valid. Its raison d'etre are (1) that it alone can
be the ultimate guarantor of the validity of all other Pram&nas
( 2 ) that
it is the logical fulfilment and culmination of any really self-complete
theory of knowledge and (3) that it is the only means of intuitive perceplogy, in the

tion of certain supersensuous categories like Time, Space, the nature "of

the self and

the mind and its modes, all knowledge of

These experiences are regarded by Madhva as

its attributes,

pleasure and pain etc.

immediate experiences

sdkscttkdra

and not as inferences, as

Take for instance, the category of time, revealed

embodied in the recollection of the happy repose of

systems.
sleep,

ssed in the judgment

'

have

slept soundly

and

blissfully,

in

other

in dreamless
sleep,

expre-

this

time'.

all

This direct experience of time and bliss in Susupti cannot obviously be

activity of the mind which is admittedly at rest then.

put down to the

We

have, therefore, to attribute

sense organ, that

itself is at rest

is active

them to the instrumentality of a special

even during dreamless sleep, when the mind

and coordinates the inmost experiences of the

this spiritual sense-organ

of the self that

the

existence

recognized,
life,

under

it

its

would
scope.

It

is

%cP^4

The

Saki, as an

instrument of knowledge and

validation, is not something extraneous to the

as such: *Tfl%<JI1Sr

Self.

designated as the S&ksi, very

WPJjT
f| ?rr#f^^ || (NS. p. 258.).
of such an instrument of intuitive perception is
be easy to bring other intuitive perceptions of

appropriately. fsTTftfrw

Once

is

3TMc^ (P. L.

t.

p. 30).

knowing

The

self

or Pramfttft,

distinction of Saksi into

sAk$E as the ultimate cbitebion of

tbuth

115

Svarapa and indriya

( self and organ ) is only one of reference and not

of
Such a distinction is rationalized by the play of " Visesas "

essence.
(

already dealt with

We
on

).

cannot go beyond the verdict of the S&ksi.

It is

the last

validation, not only of ordinary experiences, sense-perception

word

and

in-

of the teachings of Scripture. Even the identity-texts of

the Advaitins, to be valid, must concede, the infallibility of the identityjudgments based on the verdict of the Saksi ratifying their expressed
ference, but even

sense as understood

easy to see that the validity established by Saksj must ex hypo-

It is

thesi

by them.

be absolute and true for

all

time

atyantika) or

4*iiwnig^ and not

were not so, even the personal conviction of oneness said to be produced by the identity texts
would have merely a provisional and limited validity and would not
hold good for all time, so much so that it might be liable to be set
aside by some other doctrine of the Buddhist or other philosophers
merely

provisional or Vyavaharika.

The

verdict of S&ksi must, willynilly, then, be credited with abso-

lute validity for all time,

Monist, a Realist or an
of

all

3^???

built

^ ^R^k &&m: ire&r

(av).

deserves very great recognition for having discovered and formu-

lated such

and

by every philosopher, be he a Dualist or a

support
It is the basis, prop and

Idealist.

theory of knowledge

Madhva

If it

an apriori criterion of epistemological reference and certitude

his system of metaphysics, on its solid foundations :

up

ftwwwft

^Nr

mm w& sh^

wmm ^m^<^m %$ %3*&i

ns.

p.

210

ns. P 30 b
.

).

).

srcmfircft,

^inftsr^RT

XX
THEORIES OF ERROR IN INDIAN THOUGHT
OHAfTEE

Error

is

the

where an object

of

reverse
is

knowledge.

valid

cognized as something

else

characteristics that really fall outside of its

It

or

being.

is

an experience
having

as

certain

The cognition of

a rope as a snake, and so on are instances in

The explanation of errors of perception has been a live issue
Is error due entirely to the object or solely to the
in philosophy.
subject or equally to both ? Quite a number of interesting theories have
been propounded by Indian philosophers as to how error arises and
what should be the status assignable to the object represented therein.
Five main theories of error are generally referred to in Indian philo-

shell as silver, of

point.

sophical literature

These are held by the

schools

of

Buddhist

idealism, Nihilism, the

and the Advaita-Vedantins, respectively.

To these may be added the Ramanuja theory of error known as
" Akhyatisamvalita-Yatharthakhyati " and the Madhva theory of " Abhinava-Anyathakhyati ". The Madhva theory is the outcome of an implicit criticism of the other theories.
Madhva, in his AV ., has briefly

Mlmamsakas,

the Naiyayikas

reviewed the Advaita theory of error, while formulating his

nition of what constitutes " Badha " ( sublation )

own

defi-

commenting on

Jayattrtha takes advantage of this opportunity, while

the above passage, to initiate a full-fledged discussion of all the leading

by the different schools and reviews them critically

Madhva's own theory, which he shows to be the most

theories of error held

in

the light of

satisfactory one, in the end.

In his review of the various " Khyativadas ", Jayatirtha raises

subtle questions

about

the

problem.

details of the controversies

regarding

provoke thought on fresh

of Indian philosophy.

resume of

come

his

It

lines

the

arguments
Khyativadas

among modern

seems worth while for

examination of the

to his exposition of

His

different

scholars
this

many

touching
are

sure

the
to

and students

reason to give a

Khyativadas,

Madhva's own theory of Error.

before

we

THEORIES OF ERROR IN INDIAN THOUGHT

(1)

117

The Prabhakara View

of Mimamsa, is made
They may both be presen-

Error, according to the Prabhakara school

up of a fusion of two
tations

or

different cognitions.

or

representations

memory image.

In

any

one

case,

may be

error

is

percept and the other

only a partial truth.

It is

an omission rather than a commission.

In the illusory experience of shell as silver, which takes the form
" Idam rajatam" (this is silver), the "this" refers to the perception
of the given object. Owing to abnormal conditions of defect, it is
perceived as just a shining, white something. There is no perception
only imperfect knowledge.

It is

of the specific class-essence of

perception produces a

tial

impressions of

and

ness
silver

it,

nacreness

memory image

owing to the

gftcTc^SIOTPTf^fa

by

of silver

similarity subsisting

).

This par-

reviving

the

between the white-

and the brightness etc. of

Tho' memory, as a rule r is
on account of abnormal conditions of

brightness of the presented object

recalled

by the

memory

representative in character, yet,

image.

presentative capacity, by losing

it functions here in a purely
representative aspect of " thatness ".
Thus, for want of discrimi-

defect,
its

nation between the essential features and content of these two different

and give rise to an identity-judgment,

owing to the similarity of the forms of the
cognition and this is expressed in a judgment of their identity as " Idam
rajatam", and the person acts on it.

cognitions, they get fused into one

in respect of their relation,

Jayatlrtha rejoins that the illusory cognition

determinate cognition of a given object

as

in

to be a single

is felt

ordinary

perception

R?IMH It is not felt to be a composite cognition or a cross or

amalgam of two different psychoses, -a percept and a memory. There will
be no responsive activity on the part of the percipient, if there is no positive
fa($feiRVR$rc>

determinate cognition of the given thing. In the

analysis,

last

kara must admit that this dual-cognition appears as what

single determinate cognition.

That would be a

a misapprehension (viparyaya), which he

is

tacit

fighting

is

it

the

Prabha-

not -viz.,

shy

of.

His attempt to

take shelter under alleged non-discrimination between the

true

nature

of the two cognitions, to account for the ready responsive activity,

futile.

For,

non-discrimination, "as

admission of error as

mere confusion

of

is

knowledge,

cannot be the basis of such sure activity as follows the cognition. Moreover, the Prabhakara will have to face a serious difficulty in defining
the precise nature of the difference between the

two cognitions which,

"

PHILOSOPHY OF rI MADHYAoARYA

118

according to him, is missed in the illusory experience. This difference

between the two cognitions cannot be put down as the essence (svampa)

of

the

cognitions

contrariety
is

as their differentia (prthaktva), or

themselves; or

vaidharmya

).

As knowledge,

self-luminous in respect of

ous knowledge as such

is

itself

and

recognized

between the two

its

in

according to the Prabhakaras,

content and as no erronesystem,

the

how could

the

and
parcel of the content of a self-luminous cognition, be missed and
remain unrevealed? Nor can the said difference be a differentium
(pfthaktva) for cognition which is an attribute of the self cannot have
another quality residing in it. If the difference in question were to be
viewed as Vaidharmya (contrariness), one will have to define the
nature of such vaidharmya. Is it of the nature of a mutual difference
anyonyabhava ) ? Even then, is it the mutual difference between " this
(
difference

cognitions, which

is,

in reality, part

and "

*'

that is not revealed in the experience ; or the reciprocal negation between " this " and " silver " ? It will not be possible
to hold, that where distinctive terms tike " idam " and " rajatam " are
silverness

used in the proposition, in non-synonymous connotation, the difference

between " this " and " the class-essence of silverness" remains unrecognized.
is

For, Vaidharmya, in the sense of reciprocal negation of identity,

to the Prabhakara

wiww

).

absolutely

It is, therefore,

identical with its correlatives

impossible for

the

( a*fa-

Prabhakara to contend

two different cognitions here, in the illusory

them as a percept [idam) and
rajatatvam ) , is not realized. For the same reason,

that even tho' there are

experience, the mutual difference between

a memory image

the difference between the

cognition of "this" and "silver", also,

remain uncognized.
Similarly, the contrariness between
" thisness '' and " silverness " must also be admitted to be cognized by
the very terms of the judgment- " Idam rajatam ", where the attribute
of " thisness " ( idamtva ) which is incompatible with the silver is cog-

could not

nized in the object presented to the vision and the attribute of "silverness " ( rajatatva ), which is incompatible with the object presented
is also grasped in the silver.
The explanation that what
missed in the illusion is the absence of association between " this "

to the eye,
is

and "silverness" ( w*flwiktktiW

difference, would also
be futile.

wt

and not the presence of

For,

'

absence

of

their

association'

is the same as negation of such association

)
(
( OTTfafH )
and such negation, according to the Prabhftkara, is absolutely identical

THBOEIES OF BBROE IN INDIAN THOUGHT

sffewilw*

with

its

the

cognitions in question nor

correlatives (

Hence, neither difference between

).

absence

uncognized, on the Prabhakara view.

that

no such

objects

Madhva,

for to

identical with

responsive

it

'

difference

(*tmiiiftT5t).

to

the ground that there

or awil'twiq

'

Anyaelse,

is

not absolutely

is

only colorfully

The Prabhakara cannot

secure the
is

of

mistaken for something

something that

but

correlatives,

activity

is

remain

between the presented and the represented

difference

identical with the

could

quick to point out,

is

be there on the Madhva theory

difficulty will

the

of association

Jayatlrtha

thakhyati, wherein also the given entity

by missing

H9

silver,

also explain the

on

in the illusory experience,

the non-comprehension of the specific attribute

viz. shellness which would distinguish it from silver

and of the specific attribute of silverness as being present somewhere
else which would distinguish it from the given object.
Jayatlrtha says
that the two non-comprehensions together will prevent all activity. They
will hardly explain the person greedy of silver stretching out his hand
to the object before him unless he is under the strong (mis-) conception that what lies before him is the silver (that his memory image
has brought up before him, as the Prabhakara would have it). Such
activity, then, is clear proof of the perceiver laboring under a misapprehension.
The Prabhakara attempt to evade the fact of misapprehension

of the given object

and explain

in illusory experience

away

it

nation between two separate cognitions

as a case

of non-discrimi-

epistemologically unsound.

is

Ramanuja's View

(2)

Ramanuja propounds the Yathartha-Khyati view which he inherits

from the precursors of his school, tho' he expresses approval of the
R1i<swk)

view

also.

However,

it

is

the

Yatharthakhyati

has come to be prominently associated with his school, as

view.

Accordingly, Jayatlrtha also takes special notice of

it

view that
its

official

and ignores

the other view in dealing with Ramanuja's theory.

According to Ramanuja, the object represented in error is always

and there is, strictly speaking, no invalid cognition at all. His
theory is influenced by the Prabhakara view. The cognition of silver
real

in the shell

is relatively

of silver in the shell

is

true

and not absolutely

false.

true enough, with reference

silver present in the shell.

For,

world has some elements of the

says

The perception

to the element

Ramanuja, every object

other

objects,

in

its

in

of
the

constitution,

PHILOSOPHY OF iul MADHVAcABYA

120

in varying proportions.

He

doctrine

(tew)

of

of elements
Puranas.

triplication
(

out of

He

Soma and

availability of the original

many

must
the

necessarily

in

that

invalid is because

it

non-

Perception

is

Hence,

be treated as a valid experi-

perception
is

it

to

also

Such resemblances

things.

their possessing similar parts.

is

it

has no

in the case of

originals.

their

among

shell

The reason why

it.

clearly presuppose that the substitutes have

),

be on account of

ence to the extent

elements in

the

in

which permit the substitu-

of Nivara by Vrihi

resemblances

experience of silver

idea

this

and of quintuplication (w*sk<."i)

) taught in the Upanisads and

make-up some elements of

establishes so

for

ap and anna

tejas,

also argues that Vedic texts

tion of Putika for

in their

support

finds

of

regarded by

practical utility.

actual

the

silver

ordinary people as

The question of

desig-

nation and acceptance of validity of a particular experience are governed, in normal

by the

life,

fact of given objects possessing a prepond-

erance of the distinctive elements

cognition of silver in the shell

already explained.
shell.

Only,

But owing to

it is

certain

is,

that

constitute

their

no doubt, a correct one

a partial

defects

in

experience
the

sense

in the sense

of silver

organ,

The

being.

the

in

there

is

and the small portions of silver which

constitute the shell gets undue attention for the nonce and we have a
perception of the silver in what is really shell-silver. This perception
is wrong, not because it is a cognition of the unreal or what is not in
fact there, but because, it is a partial view or an imperfect cognition
of the real. Thus, error, according to Ramanuja, is not so much a
misapprehension of one real as another but a blundering into a subtle
truth about things, unawares,- which, under normal conditions, is
distortion of the shell element

generally missed or ignored.

Jayatlrtha rejects this theory as a picturesque fancy. The doctrine

of Trivrtkarana (triplication of elements ) on which Ramanuja takes
his stand to support this novel theory of illusions, has

reference

pri-

marily to the combination of the primal elements of tejobanna in primordial creation. It would be extremely far-fetched to attempt to
legitimize our perceptual errors
is

to be relied

upon

basis of Trivrtkarana,

tion of ever so
that

on

its basis.

If

remote causal relation

to validate the perception of silver in shell,

many

owing to Adrgta

it

would be possible to have the

other things also in

(

on

the

illusory percep-

shell.
It cannot be argued
unseen merit ) and other special factors, only

THEOBIBS OF ERBOE IN INDIAN THOUGHT

silver

comes

Such an explanation would be

to be perceived in shell.

in order only after

it

is

121

conclusively established that silver

actually

is

present in shell.

The presumptive reasoning based on the examples of Putika and

etc., is equally unsustainable.
For then, the question would arise

Soma

Are we

to

ascribe to Putika a preponderance of

an equal measure of them

or only a

very

Soma

elements

or

Soma
from Soma

number

small

of

In the first case, Putika would be indistinguishable

and could not be treated as a mere substitute for it. Indeed, even
Soma, according to this theory of Ramanuja, is not pure and simple
Soma but something else besides and called Soma by virtue of preponparts ?

derance of Soma-parts, in

its

composition

If,

then, the Putika

also

Soma parts, there is hardly any reason

regarded as Soma itself instead of as a substitute
should contain Soma and Putika parts in equal

should have a preponderance of

why
for

it
it.

should not be
If the Putika

measure,

will lead to the perception of both, in the object.

it

should contain only a small number of

Soma

parts

it

If

Putika
not do

could

duty for Soma.

Otherwise, even the shell could do duty for silver in

normal life. If the authority of the Sruti confers such right on Putika,
one could as well bow to the Sruti and dispense with the luxury
of ascribing to Putika parts

more or

less similar to

of some farfetched theory of things possessing

similarities

with

all

all

Soma, on
sorts of

the basis

undetected

other things.

The question of responsive activity, in such cases of illusory

would pose a serious difficulty to Ramanuja.
What
on Ramanuja's view is it that makes one who desires silver, as in the
case of Suktirajatabhrama, stoop to pick up the shell ? It can hardly be

experience,

the non-perception of the preponderant elements of shell, in

object.

even a

For non-perception cannot lead

man

in his sleep

may be

In that case,

it

should be

and

expected to act that way.

also be the perception of the limited

shell.

to such activity

the given

It

number of silver-elements
by Ramanuja if it

clarified

does,

if it

cannot
in the
is

the

perception of the small number of silver-elements as such that inspires

the activity or their perception as preponderant, or their merest percep-

On

view, the shell will never become perceived

no responsive activity, to pick it up. The
second view would open the door to Anyathakhyativada or the theory

tion (fFWCT^).

the

first

as silver and there will be

bf misapprehension, which

Ramanuja seeks

to

avoid.

On

the

last

philosophy or &ui madhvAcAbya

122

world bearing similarity with silver

come to be picked up and the activity may not be

alternative, every other object in the

may

elements

confined to the

shell.

why

Again,
elements

in

rience' ?

If it is

the

number of

should the perception of the small

silver

be normally regarded as an 'erroneous expeonly because it is an experience of a partial truth and

shell

not a complete truth comprehending the fulness of the attributes of the

given object, then, the VIsistadvaitin will have to accept that knowledge
of the Supreme Brahman attained by
would remain the biggest error 1

the very best

among gods and men

(3) Buddhist Views

The

of

idealistic school

Buddhism looks upon

in the illusion as real but not external, as in the

if

the silver represented

Nyaya school. This

silver,

actually non-existent, could neither be presented in the illusion nor sub-

lated.

There

and

no proof of its

existing elsewhere, outside, as

an extra-mental

Error consists in projecting subjective ideas as objective extra-

reality.

mental

is

The

facts.

silver represented in illusion

therefore "internal

(jmnampam and

"

without actual sensory contact also proves

is

its

its

thus merely

" ideal"

immediate apprehension
internal existence.

The

sublating cognition also merely corrects the misinterpretation.

Jayatlrtha shows that this (Yogacara) view of error

is

not supported by

the sublating cognition, which clearly establishes the truth that the silver

represented in the illusion

^wpwiqChw
upon

tfKWict.).

is

totally non-existent. (

We have no

its

totally non-existent

that what

is

The Buddhist

verdict

can

be

represented in

internal appears as external.

acceptance of the position illusion

as something that

*m

idealist himself has to

=^RT

it is

is

illusions,

Does

this

^aftc^^i-

3TC$<T

the silver represented in the illusion any reality of

internal or external.

1.

right to twist

?F&

its

and confer

own

either

admit that the

when he opines

not amount to an

the presentation of a given something

not or as involving a non-existent association

fHCT yiftwyj

3ieHhW^U|'lR%

%tT,jfWil*t|4Hft

HCTMlfcKIWI

( JV.

S. p. 53 b.

THEORIES OF EBROB IN INDIAN THOUGHT

The element

of externalism

*rwn

that

is

128

presented here,

on the

Yogacara view, is certainly not something that pertains to the silver,

which is claimed to be a purely internal reality. The contention of the
Yogacara that there is immediacy in the presentation of silver, without
sensory contact,
shell,

which

is

is

untenable as there

responsible for

the

actual sensory contact with the

is

misrepresentation.

The

theory of

would lead

internal reality of objects represented in illusions

to

absurd

There would be an actual burning sensation inside the body

when there is an erroneous superimposition of fire on a heap of Gunjiresults.

weights.

The Yogacara view seems

ontological support for

its

more

to be

interested

in

finding

doctine of Vijnana as the sole internal reality

than in giving a straightforward explanation of illusions. The AsatKhyati of the Madhyamika school of Buddhism holds that error lies in
the manifestation of the non-existent as existent.

But it fails to recognidue to the contact of the sense-organ with the shell
as the adhisthana, and under certain conditions.
This point is brought
out by Madhva in his theory of Neo-Anyathakhyati.
ze that this illusion

is

(4)

Nyaya View

The Nyaya theory of Error is *' Anyatha-Khyati". It explains

error as the misapprehension of one real object as another real object,
existing elsewhere.

What happens, according

erroneous perception of silver in

to the

Naiyayika, in an

The visual perception of shell as " this ", takes place in the ordinary, normal way.
The attribute of " silverness " which belongs to the real silver, existing
elsewhere, is presented in this cognition as an attribute of shell, which
is

shell is

before the eye, in a general way.

present elsewhere nor

its

tum

this.

Neither the real silver which

is

characteristic of silverness could, however,

be

connected with the visual organ

no perception of

simply

thro' ordinary

could arise without such sensory contact, the

have thought

it fit

to invent

a special type

relation connecting the real silver

This contact

is

and

of

But as
with the substra-

sense-contact.

silverness as synthetically connected

Nyaya

philosophers

extra-ordinary sense-

silverness with the visual sense.

the contact thro' cognition [fHcSSTOr^rrcnrt].

the present case, three

things are presented

a "

Thus,

in

idamSkara or
adhisth&na )
the silver ( aropyam ) and their
identity ( tadatmya )
or a " this " ( idam ) silverness ( rajatatvam ) and their synthesis ( samsarga).
The Naiyayikas argue that as silver, silverness ( and the
substratum ) remain uncontradicted ( even after the sublating cognition
,

this "(

PHILOSOPHY OF ^KI MADHVAoABYA

124

arises)- as

only the identity

in actual life-and as

elsewhere

existing

of "idam" and "rajatam" or the association (samsarga) between "idam"

and " rajatatvam " stands contradicted, the sublating cognition must

be understood to negative only the aspect of

tion

and not the very

kajnana

", in

"silver"

represented

the

If the silver,

non-existent,

We

perception.

in

of

this identity or

illusion

establish that the

non-existent (asat).

is

which was

associa-

The "Badha-

(elsewhere).

should not be taken to

other words,

exist elsewhere.

was

reality

the silver

represented

the

in

does

It

illusion,

could never have been presented directly to our

are thus justified in assuming that the silver represented
it

has an existence elsewhere, and that the sense-organ vitiated by defects,

tho' in contact with the shell, causes

with the

to

it

be perceived

as

identical

silver existing elsewhere.

Jayatirtha opens his criticism of the above theory by pointing out

opposed to the verdict of the sublating cognition which roundly

was no silver anywhere within the
sphere of the given substratum and that what appeared is totally

that

and

it is

categorically asserts that there

non-existent:

Sri

31%

'

WW,

WT

Z&m.'

^3T#farra:

(N. S. p, 54 b).
The point is this. There is no evidence in the
Badhakajnana that the very silver that was represented in the illusion
has an actual existence of its own, elsewhere. The exixstene of real
silver

elsewhere

selfsame
is

silver

not whether

in a real

world

is

was represented here

silver

one thing and the claim that that

is

really exists in the

The question
The question is of the

another thing.

world

status of the superimposed silver ( Sropitarajata )

imposed

real silver

( anaropitarajatam ).

and not of the unsuper-

Madhva

readily grants that

knowledge of the "aropita" presupposes the knowledge of the

" an&ropita" and that no superimposition is
possible without
the reality of
the substratum, and the prototype (pradhana) of the
not mean that we
But all that does
-superimposed object. 1
should give more than what is due to the superimposed object and regthe

ard

it

as having an existence of

Madhva,

is

going beyond

its

own per

se

elsewhere.

the verdict of the Badhakajnana.

That,

Realist seems to be in the grip of a mortal dread of admitting

T ^Pcl#n% 3T$ * * *

II

(VTN).

says

The Naiyayika
'

non-

THEOEIES OF BBROB IN INDIAN THOUGHT

(asat) coming anywhere

existence'

for

psychological experiences,

But

ations of his Realism.

range

within the

fear that

it

125

any of our

of

may undermine

this is sheer nervousness.

the found-

If the unreal and

upon our consciousness even in our illusions,

where else can they intrude ? Not certainly in our valid experiences t
If our faith in Realism is strong enongh, it can resist the siren song of
the non-existent cannot intrude

mithya drsyatvat ..Jukti rupyavat. But more of this later. Jayaseriously contended that the
it cannot be
illusory experience itself is an evidence of the actual existence of the
For, this illusory experience
silver figuring in the illusion, elsewhere.

Viham

tlrtha rightly points out that

is

in itself

If

it

an

What probative value can it have, then ?

why should we not give the go by to the Badhaka-

invalid one.

has such value,

and accept that the silver is actually there in the substratum where
experienced at the time of the illusion ? Nor can the sublating
cognition itself be cited as evidence for the actual existence of the

jfiana
it

is

superimposed

silver,

elsewhere.

presence or existence of the

It is neutral to the

apprehended.
elsewhere.

Its

There

is

not

function

silver actually

question of

much substance

its

simply

is

to

deny the
it was

the locus where

in

existence or non-existence,

in the contention that

an

illusion

cannot be satisfactorily explained without assuming the actual existence

of the ' represented object ( as such ) elsewhere. As the illusion cannot
be accounted for without the reality of the substratum, sensory and
'

environmental
established
if

it

is

existing

defects

etc.,

by implication.

only those factors

The

not existent, could be

elsewhere

elsewhere

is

how

can be taken to

silver

be
could be perceived,

met by another how could the silver

The existence of an object
1
:

be perceived here

not an indispensable contributory factor for or a necessary

in another place.
subsequent perception,
The
its

to

antecedent
insistence

question:

on

its

exietence elsewhere

may

be deemed necessary either to

account for the sensory contact with it or for the purpose of providing
the requisite mental impressions for the revival of a memory image.
In the present case, sensory contact with silver ( existing far away ) is
clearly out of the question

and there

is

actual sensory contact with the

substratum, which will do to revive the Samskaras of formerly experi-

enced

silver

and thus account for the

obliging us to invest the very silver

posed, with a factual existence

( 31=f

elsewher.

rise

of the illusion without

^cfta^ <w

that is superim-

One cannot understand

the

point that Samskaras of silver presuppose a prior experience of silver.

And

that experience,

if

valid,

would, in

its

turn, presuppose the real

PHILOSOPHY OF

126

existence of that silver

But

all this

MADHVAoABTA

gltf

somewhere within the

orbit of our

own

experience.

has nothing to do with the iropita-rajatam with which we

now

are here and

concerned,

The Naiyayika seems

in error.

to be

obsessed by his sense of realism, in trying to confer a sort of vicarious

reality

upon the superimposed

object.

But forgetful of his

logical dictum that the non-existent cannot

admit that the

identity of the given

shell

own

be presented, he

is

with the other real

epistemo-

prepared to
(

presented

or the association ( samsarga ) between " idam " and " rajatatva " that is
presented is non-existent ( asat ) and that they are somehow presented,

Madhva's question is why should we draw the line at

identity
or
samsarga and not extend it to the aropya as such ? Take again the
case of a jar which has been destroyed or one which is to be produced.
Suppose it is mistaken for some other jar. Some of us at any rate, fall
'

'

'

'

into the former type of error.

How will the Naiyayika explain

such cases

Will he maintain that the jar that is no longer in existence or is yet to

come into being has even now a physical existence of its own, elsewhere

and
or

figures in the misapprehension 1

may come

the point

is

That the jar in question did once exist

may be true enough. But

into existence at a future time,

that such existence at other times has

production of the illusory experience regarding

no direct bearing on the

now. The existence

it

of the object is useful only in producing the necessary impressions

it, which may, under certain conditions, engender a misapprehension.

of

The Naiyayika

is

fighting

a ghost of his

own

imagination

if

he

is

presuming that theoretically it is possible for any philosopher to explain

a perceptual illusion without recognizing the reality of both the
adh.isthd.na and the pradhana (prototype) of the superimposed object
(

aropya

).

Perhaps the position taken up by the Buddhist Madhyamika or

made him' think of such a possibility, and safegaurd the

the Mayfivadin

position of realism by

object elsewhere, with

insisting

a.

on

insisting

the reality of the superimposed

But the Madhva philosophers, by

vengeance.

on the equal necessity for accepting the

prototype (pradha'na) and the substratum

illusions,

have taken the wind out of the

(5) Advaitic

The Advaitic theory of error

It prefers to treat the
existent' ( as in the

is

reality

adhisthana
sails

of

existent as in Buddhistic Nihilism

Nyaya

the

Realist.

View

known

as

Anirvacafflya-Khyati.

object represented in illusions as

Nyaya and Mtmamsa

of both the

in accounting for

schools

'

neither real and

nor as unreal and non-

nor even as internal as in Yogacara.

'

'

THEORIES OF ERROR IN INDIAN THOUGHT

'

an epistemological problem, it ends by

metamorphosing it into a metaphysical problem. It introduces certain
complicated and cumbersome technicalities ( Prakriya ) in explaining the

Starting to explain illusion as

By

genesis of error.
1

|
*
i

127

clever dialectical quibbling,

it

invents the concept

and category of an indescribable and undefinable tertium quid between

the poles of Sat and Asat and introduces it into the realm of erroneous
experiences in the first instance and ultimately seeks, by more ingenious dialectics, to extend it to the whole of human experience (including
the so-called " Vy&vah&rika") and sweep it off from the sphere of reality and
'

liquidate

Khyati

it

is,

in the

'

bosom

The Anirvacanlya-

of the great Anirvacaniya.

therefore, to say the least, metaphysically-motived.

the cognition of silver in shell

as a dual-cognition.

It also

It

regards

holds that

after the contact of the defective sense-organ with the shining shell, there

a mental modification in the form of this object ' ( idamak&ra-vflti ).

Then, thro' the operation of Avidya, supported by the former impressions
of silver, revived by the similarity of characteristics of the given object,
is

'

there
[

is

the actual production of

'indescribable silver'

r%fok*rf$q

^S).

This indescribable silver lasts as long as the illusion itself lasts (dhilcala).
But then, its status is only " Pratibh&sika " ( apparent ). It is neither

real

existent

nor unreal

non-existent

special status as defying characterisation

|

(and both together)

adumbrated

\.

of Sat and

ruled out.

\
|

\
t

is

Sadasat ).

Its

terms of Sat and Asat

established by the famous Arthapatti argument

by i^amkara
Asat being

nor both

*Wr

rp%

in

arct^r

mutually exclusive,

5jcft%

their

The concept

coexistence also

is

its own defects.

In the first place, the view that
produced by nescience and is destroyed by the
true knowledge of the substratum, will be inconsistent with the terms
of the sublating cognition which denies the existence of the silver per se

This theory has

the illusory silver

is

with reference to

all

|
i

WQ

Hkfkfw

the three periods of time:

W$3N ffirm.

Nym

ST^^+lftHI^MNftl

The illusory silver being

a transformation of Avidya, which has the Atman for its locus cannot
be presented as an external reality. The externalisation of this illusory
silver
sive,
is

Mfiwjcflft'

).

cannot be explained on the ground that as the

he pervades the

shell also

and

a transformation of Avidya having

Atman

is

perva-

that in this way, the silver

which

its

locus in the

Atman

delimited by

the shell, comes to be cognized externally as associated with the shell.

PHILOSOPHY OF 1st MADHVAoABTA

128

Assuming that this is so, this silver should be open to perception

by other persons also who may be looking at the shell at the time.
Anyway, granting that this .silver is actually produced, we may
ask how it is actually apprehended. Is it by sensory contact or
there is
thro' Samskaras ( impressions ) or by Saksi ? In this case
no silver prior to the contact. It is said to be produced at the
:

very time of

apprehension.

its

no

There

is

a stalemate here.

As

the

by
Samskaras is out of the question. Nor can the cognition of the silver
be ascribed to the witness-consciousness as in the case of the inner
perception of bliss. For this cognition is invariably concomitant
with sensory activity and cannot therefore be put on a par with the
perception of bliss etc., by the Saksl. It cannot be said that as the
illusory

silver

has

had

prior

existence,

apprehension

its

sensory activity terminates with the awareness of the substratum there

is

need for the

witness-self to cognize the

silver

For, as the knowledge of the substratum does

produced by Avidya,

not seem to have any

on the perception of the silver, on the Advaitic theory,

would seem to suggest strongly that far from being
due to a transformation of Avidya and all that, the apprehension of
the silver in the shell is the outcome of a mental distortion of the given
datum caused by the sense organ being vitiated by certain defects and
abnormal conditions and that it is a case of Anyathakhyati and nothing
more. By implicating the Saksi in the error the theory takes away
the right of the Saksl to pronounce judgment upon it thro' the
Badhakajfiana. For it cannot both be the accused and the judge.
direct bearing
its

indispensability

The Madhva

theory, as will be seen, shows a

correct

appreciation

even

ever

some way

supposing that sensory contact with the

contributory to the apprehension

substratum

of the illusory

of

How-

the position and the role of the Sakgl in the sphere of epistemology.

is

silver

in

by

the Saksl, in the Advaitic theory, it will entail a compromise with the
Akhyati theory, inasmuch as the cognition of the Pratibhasika silver
the
is thus a compound of two cognitions, one of the substratum by

sense-organ and the other of the Avidyakarajata by the Saksi.

dual cognition will bar

hend the

activity.

identity of silver with the shell

fact that there are

the Saksl

if

and make

two cognitions here

present cognition of silver being

The

Even

felt to

reflection

of

the

witness-self

made

Such

to appre-

activity possible, still the

will militate against the fact of the

be a single determinate cognition.

attempt to establish a unitary cognition

neous

is

in

on the basis of the simulta-

both

the

mental

states

of

THBOBIES OF BBROK IN INDIAN TH0TJ8HT

129

and fSTOOTf^qT^fr! presupposes the acceptance of a pet

fr^w-jfrf

theory of the Advaita school.

The concept of " Anirvacaniya "

itself rests

on

presumption that

the

the object presented in illusions cannot be a non-existent

cannot be directly presented as

non-existent

experience,

assumption itself is not well-founded. In fact, the Advaitin

himself cannot explain the illusion without accepting the fact that the nonis

presented as existent, directly, in our illusions.

For the anirvacaniya silver must appear as

may be responsive activity on the part of
caniya

thing as the

in

This

existent does appear and

existent

the perceiver.

that there

If the anirva-

presented as anirvacaniya, there will be no illusion to speak

is

Or

of.

existent in order

if

arise only

should appear as non-existent

it

when and where

it is

asat

presented as existent

).

The

sat

).

error

How

can
then

can the Advaitin assert : 3Rj%5{ 5Rfi%T and conclude that ergo the object
presented in the illusion cannot be " asat". Advaitic dialecticians have
indulged in a lot of dialectical verbiage to cloud the issue.
fully

brought out

untenability.

The responsive

Jayatlrtha has

of the
cannot be explained on the assumption that there is merely a
presentation of silver without its presentation " as existing "(sat ). There
their

activity

illusion

can be no direct knowledge which is not expressed without a specific determination either positively or negatively. Hence, the question has got to be
answered whether the " existence " that is presented ( of the association
:

of " thisness "

with the shell : samsatga ) is Sat, Asat or Anirvacaniya ?

cannot be Sat as that would be inconsistent with the very concept of
Anirvacanlyata of the silver. How can the silver be Anirvacaniya if its
It

existence ( as presented in the illusory perception ) is true and real ? The

second alternative can be accepted without any difficulty. The third will
be mutually incompatible and cannot therefore be accepted. If the

mutual association of thisness and

and the association of reality of

both anirvacaniya
in their turn, there is sure to be a regress in the argument.
The question
is bound to arise
what is meant by saying that both these samsargas
are anirvacaniya ? Are they Vyavaharika or Pratibhasika ? The first
alternative is not accepted by the Advaitin as that would make the silver
too " vyavaharika ". If they are purely " Pratibhasika " even then one
shell

shell in the silver that are presented in the illusion are

'

'

should state
the

first

if

they are presented qua Pratibhasika or as Vyavaharika 1 In

case, there will be

no

activity, as

to be capable of practical efficiency.

P.M.3.

no one has found a Pratibhasika

In the latter case the question will

PHILOSOPHY OF

lSb

again arise

if

the

MADHvXoAR^I

Vyavah&rikatva perceived of them,

to their actual nature?

It

what

is

true or false

cannot be true to their nature as that would not

accord with their Pratibhasikatva.

would mean

I^bI

If

it

is

not true to their nature,

it

Asat does indeed appear directly as existent. If

it is argued that even that Vyavaharikatva is actually anirvacaniya and is
being superimposed, the whole series of alternatives will have again to
be raised with reference to this second Anirvacanlya and where such
that

is

superimposition terminates, there again will arise the impossibility of

responsive activity or the direct perception of Asat as Sat. Thus, the
concept of anirvacanlya, as applied to the object represented in illusions
or

its

relation,

makes

the

problem of error more confused and complica-

ted than any of the other theories.

CHAPTBB XXI

MADHVA'S THEORY OF ERROR ABHINAVANYATHaKHYaTI

A realistic theory of knowledge has no reason to fight shy of errors
:

and

illusions in

human

Illusions

life.

do not upset

normal founda-

the

and knowledge. On the contrary, they serve as foils to valid

The M&dhva theory of
experience and give it its significance and value.
knowledge is, as we have seen, wide enough to provide a place for dreams,
The Mlmamsakas and Ramanuja, however,
errors and illusions in life.
Madhva feels that
fight shy of errors and seek to explain them away.
wide
enough to hold
so.
Life
is
for
doing
justification
there is hardly any
both truth and error. Human nature and conditions of life being what
they are, it is not possible to eliminate errors or expect our experiences
and knowledge to be always veridical. This is proof of the limitations
of the individual. A sound theory of knowledge, therefore, must take
note of the limitations of life and human understanding and reckon with
occasional jolts, disappointments and illusions in life and be able to
tions of

life

explain their true nature and conditions, so as to

arm

us against

them.

and refuse to recognize them as

different
names
as " Vivekagraha", " Pramusthem
by
such or
tatattakasmarana " and so forth. The senses deceive us at times. But
that is only rarely and in exceptional cases and under definite conditions.
It is idle

to shut one's eyes to errors

call

Madhva feels, therefore, that there is hardly any justification for either
extreme of banishing errors altogether from life and transforming them in1
to truths and half-truths, by verbal juggleries and theological quibbles or
experience,
certainties,-as
the
merest
illuall
-ztxors
as
well
as
dismissing
sions a la accepted ones, as in the case of Buddhistic Nihilism
jjsrr

wn

*r*rr

asfoqfrf: 3TT

wft i^TTt mx
WFl

cTTT

" ^ctorf^rar fa^rr

The Madhva theory of

l.

Cf.

truth

*&l 3WT:

wmmiufa

and error

w$ *rfi%*iHi3 ^rj mq,

is

ft

<t

Madhyamaka-Karikd,

expressed in the formula

3^t TTT# *wftfa?IW lf#fOTl%

II

and Advaita:

Sribhasya,

i,

1,

PHILOSOPHY

132

TKWft4

^1

(NS.

Off

&st

madhvAoAbya

48b.)

p.

This appears to be the most rational attitude to take to the problem of

and error and stand for a dispassionate assessment of experience.

truth

Madhva

is no sophisticated realist who denies that there can be any illuany kind in our cognitions or disputes *the central assumption of
The
logic and philosophy that things are not always what they seem.

sions of
all

occurrence of illusions, at times, only confirms the possibility of true

experiences at other times.

The Madhva theory of perceptual illusions is a bold and dexterous

combination of the salient features of the Asat-Khyati and the AnyathaKhyati views. Madhva defines illusions as the contrary appearance of an
unreal, non-existent object as real
Jratft:

existent

^S^f^srcftran?FIn5rcflRftq vnftt:

such must be the nature of an

tam " and

this

and

theory

as exisent

"Pramaoa"

as

and

real in

vice versa

G. T. ii,26

).

It is

3^jcT:

sraTsfjJ.

or *?ITWi&?f^#i#cqH
some non-existent entity,

a given substratum, with which

sr?-

easy to see that

" Anaropi-

illusion, if reality is defined as

the presentation of

is

and

The root of

fact or relation

the sense organ

is

in

contact and when other conditions propitious for the erroneous cognition
are also there
cfT^IcRf

TT^:

stf

Wft#w:

NS.
(

p.

vm&&l gforawf
Wife
VTNt p. 55 b

arararafft

47

).

3R*Rrrafo &Plf

^^

*5tcl#*

^cTcIT^RHrqtfrfef^fcTT-

This element of false presentation

).

WT,

is the differentia

of illusions

It

would be

futile to

deny

it

The Asatkhyativadin

is

sions is utterly unreal.

1.

Cf.

Buddhist Karika

q. in

NS.

therefore right in holding that the object of

But he

Bamanaja's admission

is

illu-

not justified in denying any kind of

Wl'^WUftWlft

SKJTft T^T, 3pqsncPTr#^W-

&rWaya,i,

1,1

).

MADHVA 'S THEOEY OF EBROK ABHINAVANTATHAkHTAtI

l$$

of that experience, including the adhisthand dismissing the entire fabric of that experience as a baseless

reality to any of the constituents

Una

etc.,

ProRrSH>=iifl<.4l < ilct

fancy:

If nothing in the constituents of

an

would be no
would be no perceptual

illusion is real, there

sense-contact, without which there

possibility of

knowledge, true or false. Jayatlrtha clarifies another important point in

Madhva's theory of perceptual illusions that the superimposed object and
its

identity with the substratum are

away from

far

both non-existent where the former

where, as in seeing a

mango

tree

and a jack

is

But

the latter as in the illusion of the snake in the rope.

tree standing close to each

other from a distance, one misses their distinction and errs in thinking
there

that

Madhva

only one of them, only the identity

is

non-existent 1 .

is

" the

therefore holds that notwithstanding the unreality of

in the shell ",

organ, vitiated by defects, gets a distorted apprehension of

silver. It is

silver

thro' contact with the real piece of shell that the sense-

it is

subsequently realized that this silver

is

it

as a piece of

absolutely non-existent

within that spatio-temporal setting. Jayatlrtha gives classical expression to

this view:

gferaTCPiff

^H'fl+Hlrf,

II

He

NS.

p.

^HW aW3|p!MW^cnc*RT amiSHIf Stfl-^Mcf^Vm

48 b

).

also indicates clearly the parting of the

doctrine and the Buddhistic view of

V&WW ^ **W
Hitfc^iidMwr:

M<I*H OT:

w&m M?r

*$mmff3i{(NS.

ways between

Asat-khyati in

this

SR=aitWclW^>r<TcI (Tdy.

jr*pj *rra?r

p. 48 b).

It

is,

thus,

respect
p. 1

T 33

1 b). affi

m swc^

m; w?m m$

fci :

wi^.

and impossible to

needless

confound the Madhva theory as an " Asat-khyati

t.

Madhva

the

the accepted sense

", in

of the term.
Since the acid test of an illusion
( !renB?rfffO,

Now,

jnana.

its

is

in

the

sublating

cognition

true nature should be fixed in the light of the

the stultifying cognition takes the

form

"there

B&dhaka-

is

no

silver

only the non-existent silver had appeared to exist " 2 . Madhva takes
his firm stand on the express authority of this Badbakajnana, in adjudging
here

the status of the object of illusion as an utter unreality

vm%

2.

^ 3^%f|cwiiMi

cpr

era:,

atyantisat

otkiw ^wwjt, u ns.

^^, **#r*stfJtPWm/|

p.

54

).

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHVAcAHTA

134

The Anyathakhyativadin merely

ential unction that the

elsewhere, which

knowledge.

infer-

reality of its

own

hardly relevant to the form or content of the sublating

is

This

an

intoxicates himself with

superimposed object must have a

is

precisely the point of departure between the

Nyaya

and Madhva view of Anyathakhyati. It is to bring out this differentia of

''
Madhva's theory that Jayatlrtha christens it as " Abhinavanyathakhyati
( neo-Anyathakhyati ) and contrasts it with the Nyaya theory. He points
out that the scope of the BadhakajMna
presence of
it is

silver in the given

is strictly

substratum and

its

limited to denying the

identity with

it,

and that

quite indifferent to the question of the existence or non-existence

the silver elsewhere.

The

difficulty

of

of establishing a sensory contact with

an object existing elsewhere ( anyatra sat) would also be insurmountable.

It is unnecessary to assume the reality of superimposed objects elsewhere,

when
tion,

illusions

by

could be satisfactorily explained without such an assump-

certain defects in the nature of the

fact, sensory contact

been only with the actual substratum before the perceiver,

If then,

Even

sensory contact.

Anyathakhyativadin must admit that, in point of

viz.,

the

has

the nacre.

sensory contact with the shell should, as has been the case here,

actually produce the misapprehension of silver, for the nonce,

it is

surely

a piece of misplaced ingenuity to propound a very elaborate theory that

the selfsame silver must be having an actual existence somewhere else

That

is

imagination running

this case

is

simply

(anyatra sat).

happened in

somehow
there,

i.

led to

e.

its

that sensory

riot.

What

has actually

contact with nacre has

erroneous perception as identical with silver that

to say, purely non-existent.

The

is

not

existence of real silver similar

one perceived in the illusion, elsewhere, in the shop, is one thing

and to claim that that very thing has come over here or that that very
thing is there, is quite another.
Real silver may be remotely responsible
for furnishing the background to the present illusion. Madhva does not
deny that. What he denies and what the Naiyayika asserts is that the
selfsame silver ( that was superimposed ) is existing elsewhere ( and could
not otherwise have appeared ). The Naiyayika unhappily is mixing up
the issues.
The first proposition is entirely true and unexceptionable to the

that there

is

a real

silver

conceded by Madhva but

tion

outside the present illusion.

is

laid

down by him

and invariable concomitant of

It

is

not only

as the necessary pre-condi-

all illusions

"

MADHVA'S 1HE0RY OF ERROR ABHINAVANYATHAKHYAtI

135

But, there
ists

no

is

justification, says he, for the

that the superimposed object

have an actual existence elsewhere

(NS.

54

p.

dogma

Nyaya Real-

of the

must always, as suck and

33

Mcftd^WM 5!

in

Us own

self,

HFtRRraL 3TO^
I

In the light of this clear and unmistakable criticism of the

).

Nyaya

view, one cannot but express astonishment at the statement of

Madhva's doctrine that " the radical Realist that he is, Madhva wants to
give a complete objective basis to the content of error after the model of
the Nyaya school " ( P, Nagarajarao, Error, Doubt and Dream in Dvaita

Ved&nta, Journal of Oriental Research, Madras,

mine

].

aya

has an objective basis

If anything,

The

Madhva
:

xi, pt. 4, p.

295

denies that the content of error

Sit f^ 5^1 ^ifff *3f(^# ?

NS.

p.

).

[ Italics

bhramaris-

46

).

may be deemed

existence of an object of illusion, elsewhere,

necessary either for securing sensory contact with it, in order to render
the perception of silver ( or the like ) possible, or for awakening the

impression

ground

is

of silver in the

admissible.

There

mind (rajatasamsk&rodbodha). Neither

no possibility of sensory contact with an

is

object existing somewhere else and if such existence is required merely to

furnish the necessary mental impression of the object, such a result could

be explained by the past experience of it, without making the selfsame

come down and present itself in the illusion 1
It is for this reason
that Madhva insists on the reality of a "SadrsV" prototype ) in addition
(
to that of an adhisthina ( substratum ) as the sine qua non of all illusions.
But there is no reason to assign an intrinsic reality of its own to the
object

superimposed object per se. One should not miss this subtle distinction
between the Nyaya and the Madhva view of the status of the iropya and
confound the two.

A careful examination of the various theories

rent schools of Indian philosophy

and " anyathSkhyati "

of error held by diffe-

shows that the ideas of " asat-khyati

constitute their greatest

common

measure, of

Madhva's theory of " Abhinavanyathakhyati2 ," combines

agreement.

these two vital elements of the theory of illusions in right proportions

Tf^T
2.

SfttfMcr Sjlf

Wirft

ft H

ct^RSRI'c^eqRT

NS.

p.

NMmqH&^ifflU NS. p.

54

b.

46 b.

and

186

'

PHILOSOPHY OF

'.

gfll

formulates a balanced theory of Error.

MADHVAoArYA
Its

most important finding

.course* the fact of the presentation of the non-existent, in illusions

<S#T Jkfl^qqRl:
This

is itself

is,

of

SRfctr

The whole theory of Madhva turns on this hypothesis.

derived

from

the nature of the Badhakajnana (3T?^f

Wf

SRWRi. ) The question of the presentability of " Asat " (the non-existent.)
in

erroneous knowledge (3Wci: ?|#T 3Wt^cPfT vfa

acfl^WHitl: as it is techl

known) has been ably argued and established at length by Jayatlrtha

and Vyasaraya, following Madhva. As a matter of fact, the category of
Anirvacanlya itself, by definition, is made to rest on the presumption of
the non-presentability of Asat. But the assumption itself is gratuitous and
inconsistent with the conviction of difference from asat ( asad-vailaksa
nically

i}ya

),

which the monistic philosopher has, in respect of the world

arafegorf^r fra<rfw<&i

1.

For

details, see

Vpls.

i,

my History

pp. 346-18;

and

ii,

ft

of Jhaitq School of Vcdynta and

161-2.

He

Literature,

WORLD OF

THE

IV.

EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER XXII

REALITY OF WORLD-EXPERIENCE
world and

Belief in the reality of the

the fundamental tenets of

Theism.

values is, naturally, one of

thus a metaphysical doctrine
may, therefore, turn to the

its

It is

and not a mere theological dogma. We

grounds on which it is based. These may be brought under the three
heads of perceptual, rational and scriptural grounds admitted in the
system of Madhva.

We have

world-experience

recognizes an additional sense or instru-

Madhva

seen that

ment of knowledge, - the Saksi

follows

as

besides the other six

consequence

The

).

reality

of

acceptance of

of the

Pram&na
The knowledge

the doctrine of Safes! and the implications of the doctrine of

(

the other instruments of knowledge.

applied to

).

produced by the senses is normally valid and true, under requisite

conditions of knowledge and proper types of contact of the sensory
apparatus

and

accepted in

all

validity

which

this

knowledge

not ordinarily contradicted.

is

schools of Vedanta that knowledge carries with

is

intrinsic to

are pledged to this view.

it.

It

it its

is

own

The Dvaita, Advaita and Vi^istadvaita

Validity implies the factual reality

of the

object of knowledge with reference to a given spatio-temporal setting

^ftfrWprraJFFSmfair MlH'lww^r

^TTJT

Nym.

p.

142

The

).

reality of the

world would thus follow from the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge

ife

The Advaitin,
provisional reality

?^R3 W(V%

f^?R1T *#

vyavaharika-satyam

(AV).

<t ?

Perception cognizes only the

doubtless, pleads that

(

of objects

while inference of

unreality and texts to that effect disprove the absolute

reality thereof

and

that,

therefore, there

ITCTfPfaflict

Hl%f

is

no

5Rrfr ?*fcr:

conflict

or noumenal
of Pram&nas :

SO

But

this is

counting the eggs before they are hatched, inasmuch as the

and
Pram&nas

threefold classification of reality into Paramarthika, Vyavaharika

Pratibhasika,
is

based,

validity

upon which

is still
(

the theory of provisional validity of

an unproved assumption.

The very

which ceases to be valid after some time

repugnant to the basic idea of PrSmanya

idea of provisional
is

meaningless and

PHILOSOPHY OF

138

wjw

=*

MADHVACARYA

iRI

mfej

wscfr

s?rr?cir

*fc

Vyavaharika-pramanya

is,

euphemistically large.

If the principle of self-validity

to have

mere myth.

therefore, a

It is invalidity

writ

of knowledge

is

any meaning, there can be no denying or escaping from the

conclusion of the reality of world-experience

<T?^T%l^f Jf#%

gw:

?T

HN^ll^B

mm,

T:

spTFTTpT <|

There

wt^\

sflcfafflfa

T S*RctTf^ftc^ 5R&%
BMmatX,

il,

2,32

).

no need to go

in search of subtle and elaborate reasonings in support of the validity of Pratyaksa.

As Madhva says else-

thus,

is,

where, reason

may have

to

be summoned,

falsity of particular experiences in case

demonstrate validity of normal experiences

fejT
is

Tg?l?r^ Such
1

at

all,

only to prove the

but hardly to

55^'fr ftwtwMl+ft

furnished by the perception

f gm-

where it
we have seen under the theory of Pramanas.

validity

normally constituted, as

Nor

if

of serious doubts

is

itself

means of testing the soundness of the condiopen to us to institute the necessary tests
(pariksa ) and make sure of the reality of normal experience.
Madhva
contends that all our normal experience and perceptions are capable of
bearing such scrutiny and have been so tested and found to be true and
valid. It would be preposterous to say that we could never trust our senses
and that our perceptions are proverbially and inherently misleading and

we without

are

sufficient

tions of knowledge.

that

It is

we could never know

the truth of things or that perception

of revealing only the present and that

future

may

would be
ption

hold and so on.

suicidal to the

we

Such wild and

Monist himself.

to be disbelieved in every case,

is

between truth and

falsity in experience.

from

is

capable

could never be sure of what the

irresponsible objections

If the verdict of

normal perce-

would be no distinction
There would be nothing to dis-

there

All experience would be suspect

advance would be possible.
If the perception
''
of silver in the nacre and the stultifying cognition " this is not silver
same
par
of
incredibility,
all distinction between
were both of them on the
As Vyasaraya says, in
truth and falsehood would have to be given up.
tinguish illusions

and no

valid experiences.

logical or scientific

a humorous vein, the monist would stand to lose his principal in trying
1
for the interest .

If

flfelfa^ >S8HI4tI:

he does not concede the validity of the stultifying

'

Nym.

p.

139

).

REALITY OK WORLD -EXPERIENCE

cognition

"

this is

not

silver ",

139

he could never establish his pet theory of

Universe, which rests upon the analogy of the

the unreality of the

of silver in nacre.

illusion

Sense-perception could not, therefore, be deprived of

except by a
(

VTN

valid perception:

cannot be

It

).

or bald

more

set

its

validity,

Wm

could be shown to be more valid

The attempt

perception in question.

*&$& f^n

stTTOt,

by any amount of specious reasoning

aside

texts, unless the latter

SS^Rtpft

to

upset perception by

or texts would thus involve a fallacy of interdependence,

than the
inference

inasmuch as

the inference or the verbal testimony could not be invested with greater

shown

and that could not

proved to be more
authoritative, for whatever reasons.
The validity of perception, on the
other hand, is self-evident and does not need any ratification from outside.
The superiority of perception to inference and clptavcikya, is also selfvalidity unless perception

is

to be

invalid

be, unless the inference or the verbal testimony

evident, in that

it is

able to grasp even the

is

minutest features

of objects

which are beyond the ken of inference or correct confusion of quarters

which the pious words of an apta are powerless to do. The perceptive
judgment Fire is hot is intrinsically superior to any inference of its
'

'

The reality of experience derives support from the combined

evidence of a number of facts like perception of difference, reasoning in
being cold.

support of such perception, the cosmogonic texts, texts prescribing Saguoopfcana and the drift of the entire Karmakanda. Albert Schweitzer rightly

when he says " The ethics of action is hard hit by

no meaning. Man cannot engage in ethical action in a world with no meaning.
His ethical life in such a world
must be limited to keeping himself pure from it. But if, further, the
reality of the world is denied, then, ethics altogether ceases to have any
importance."
( Indian Thought and Its Development, p. 60
emphasizes

this

point

the assertion that the world has

From

another point of view, also, perception where tested and found

correct, has to

be recognized as the basic ground or Upajlvya of any

inference or texts in a contrary direction.

Such a basic ground cannot
be repudiated by any amount of wild reasoning or bald assertions of texts.
This is known as the principle of "Upajivyapramanavirodha " or conflict

with the basic ground.

The experience of the world

Upajlvya-pratyaksa.

not the superficial one

type) which

is

liable to

It is

be mistaken

rests

on such

of the $ukti-rajata-

but one which has passed the test of

PHILOSOPHY OF nl MADHVAoAKYA

140

personal endorsement by the Saksl after due examination.

" T$&g " or "

Madhva

calls

word on

tests,

is

what

q#%r which is indubitable and is the last

down to the innermost intuitive level of

having reached

which

as has been eatablished

certification

by the

minus of

Parfksa and converts belief into certainty.

all

It

",

Saksjt,

that the finite experiences of pleasure

and pain

is

the ter-

Madhva contends

in life belong to this cate-

gory of Pratyaksa certified by SakI and must therefore be accepted as

So too the consolidated experience of humanity of the

to mention the
its values, not
realization of human limitations and the consciousness of a Power transcending human conceptions. It is on this rock of Saksipratyaksa that

impregnable.
reality

of an objective universe and of

Madhva has

He

built his edifice

of Dvaita-Ved&nta,

points out that such universal experiences of the joys and sorrows

of life with a deep sense of their reality

the silver in the shell, inasmuch as

it

is

not of the hollow variety of

stands the test of practical utility and

The objection of Vacaspati, therefore, that if the

souls and Brahman ) and the consequent
of the experience of duality, is disputed on the ground of conflict

response-satisfaction.

verdict of identity

unreality

of

human

with the basic Pratyaksa ( Upajlvyapratyaksa ), even the subsequent

perception of " this is not silver," would have to be dismissed as invalid,

because
is

it is

opposed

disingenuous.

It

to the original

basic

purposely confuses the

perception of

issue.

'this

The present

is silver',
is

a ques-

and Inference or texts, and the instance cited is one of conflict between two perceptions, which is irrelevant
to Madhva's position that no perception can be invalidated save by a
more powerful perception. In other words, perception cannot be negatived by mere reasonings not based on some other and a more powerful
tion of strength between perception

perception.
in this case

is

Moreover, the basic nature of reality claimed for perception

not based on considerations of its temporal priority or logi-

depsnlen^e for purposes of negation only (ftWtww%c=ii); but upon

dependence established by rigid tests. The capacity to stand
But in
such a practical test is lacking in the ' silver in the nacre
respect of our normal experience of the world, all practical conditions of
cal

an

intrinsic

'.

validity are fulfilled.

any

They cannot therefore be regarded as

illusory,

with

justification.

As for Sruti texts, which may appear to teach the identity of God
and man, not only will they be patently in conflict with numerous others
which do teach their difference but also with the personal experience
;

JtRALlTY

Olf

WO'RLD-EXPERIENCB

141

If
of the Saksl.
( of its own limitations and difference from Brahman )
personal experiences of the Saksl are to be set aside by other Pramanas,

however powerful, the foundations of philosophy would collapse ; for,

then, there would be no surety left anywhere, in perception, reason or
revelation.
Even the conviction of identity reached by the monist qua
personal and reached at ttie baksl level, will be in the grip of doubt and
stultification by some other conceivable form of knowledge such as that
so that, nihilism would be the end ol philosophical quest,
all is void,
Madhva, therefore, insists that the verdict of the Saksl must be accepted
It must be
as the basis of logical and philosophical certitude.

accepted

as

ultimate

the

including the validity of

criterion

Scriptural

of

validity

all

knowledge.

experience,

in

Unless

this

done,

is

worth the name and there would be

nothing but a reign of universal doubt and illusions galore.
It would

no philosophy

there can be

be simply

suicidal, then, to

dare to quostion the verdict of the Saksl or

doubt

attribute the slightest touch of fallibility or

to

its

findings.

This

point has already been conclusively established earlier, u.cer CLapters

XVIII and XIX.

The primacy of Saksl having been firmly
giving suitable

established, the question of

and reasonable explanations to some

appear to support the identity of the

human

which

identity texts

souls with

Brahman and by

implication or otherwise deny the reality of the world, against the firm

conviction of the Saksl, will not be such a difficult thing after

all,

having

regard to their mystic, figurative and analogical methods of philosophic

discourse and approved canons of interpretation of texts, accepted by

Madhva

cites,

for example, the Vedic text "3RJTFT:

ful of grass is the Sacrificer

We

not be accepted.

Mimamsa

to

'

).

Here the

literal

declarations as

(P.

*the

hand-

sense of the text can.

have the authority and sanction of the Pnrvasuch seemingly absurd or inconsistent

reinterpret

statements

figurative

M.

S.

i,

4,

23).

interpreting the monistically

Madhva

worded

on

based

etymological, mystic and other considerations

*ih*ii:

m<;"

all.

ctr?d%3iTlcr?rR

claims

texts, in

functional,

the

same

genetic,

-^iRiw^lfiTlatitude in

conformity with Saksipraty-

akga and the numerous other texts which teach the reality of the world
and the difference between the human souls and Brahman.
He has,
accordingly, indicated some fresh points of view from which these
''

monistic texts " could be

more properly explained

PHILOSOPHY

142

Off

b!

MADHVAoArYA

Even the most warmly cherished " Mahavakyas " of the Monists will
have to stand on the ground of the Saksl for their ratification, in the
same way as any intimate personal experience of the joys and sorrows of
life. There is not the least difference in the status of these two experiences of the Saksl and one cannot be partial to the one at the expense of
the other.
The highest deference and most fitting homage we can pay
the Scriptures

in trying to find their true

is

import in consistency with

the logic of Saksyanubhava- instead of being swept off one's feet

by the

literal

sense of such quasi-mystic statements of identity and acosmism

forrr

m?i$

fafa

ffcT

TRcfrfa

N S.

p.

swrrtf^fawRT
601

).

wmm w&>

too well known,

sp?

*)

1*3441%-

that the literal sense

more often than not, found modified by so many

and theoretical considerations, syntactic and other
or philosophical necessities. Literalism would scotch philo-

of a proposition

is,

exigencies of practical
difficulties

It is

ft 9cffa$

sophy as nothing else would.

CHAPTER

2tXlIl

SOME OBJECriONS TO THE REALITY OF THE WORLD

ANSWERED
The Monist's attempt

to

challenge the

doubtful analogy of dreams and illusions

man catching at

is

reality

of world on the

like the proverbial

drowning

a straw to save himself. If our experience of the reality of

by the knowledge that atman alone is real and

on the ground that perception is strictly limited to the

the world could be negated

that all else

is false,

present (even tho' the conviction of

its

reality

may have

been implanted

us from time immemorial, and have stood the test of time

of the negating knowledge, which

is

),

in

the position

also claimed to be a perception

tho'

would be much worse, inasmuch as it has admittedly

a distinct beginning and is practically an unknown quantity till now.
If
we could persuade ourselves that what is known and held to have been true
and valid from time immemorial by the universal consent of human beings
all the world over, is sure to be superseded by some unknown fact of knowledge to come, what is there to prevent our supposing that the same fate
may overtake that new knowledge also ? If the known is false and the
unknown alone true, one may seriously contend that cows and bulls are
really without horns, even tho' they may appear to have them and that
hares have horns even tho' they are not visible to any of us.
The same
kind of reductio ad absurdum would hold good in respect of any infer ence
not by the eyes

about the unreality of the universe.

turn,

If this inference also

the reality of world-experience

real, the

is

untrue in

would remain unscathed.

If

its

it is

ground of generalization

cious in this case,

may

( driyatvahetu ) being obviously fallabe equally so, in other cases. The vague possibi-

of a future contradiction cannot be seriously entertained to the extent

of repudiating the consolidated experience of all humanity. Belief in the
reality of the universe, within the meaning of uncontradictability in the

lity

is held, by Madhva and his followers, to be established not by Sense-perception but by the intuitive perception of the SQksi.
This is where Madhva philosophy is on the vantage ground as compared
with the Nyaya school of realism, in meeting the challenge of monism.
Most of the dialectics of the school centres naturally on this aspect of the
question and refutes the plea of the Advaita that perception is incapable

three periods of time

of establishing the truth of things beyond the present. Jayatlrtha says

that the perception of uncontradictedness for the present involves
the
perception of uncontradictability for the future also. This does not
mean
that it is or must be so in all cases ; or that there is no
possibility of

tHllOSOfcH?

144

illusions in experience.

point of view, a

little

therefore, necessary to explain the

It is,

more

intrinsically

is

Madhva

all

Vedantins are agreed

made

out and that invalidity

So long as

clearly.

that the validity of knowledge

alone

SRI MADHVAcAbA

Off

dependent on contradiction, the normal and healthy perceptions

cannot be dismissed as illusory. Even the most ruthless tests fail

is

of life

to prove the contrary, so that the uncontradictability of

nces could not be doubted by any reasonable creature.

normal experiebe absurd

It will

to presume contradictability of experience on mere inferential considerat.

ions or as a bare hypothetical possibility. The inference itself will have to

depend upon another valid perception for the ascertainment of a sound
relation of concomitance and cannot therefore afford to destroy its own
standing ground ( Upajlvya ) by casting a universal doubt on all perceptions as such. Even the perception of the blueness of the sky is a
defect of distance and is not seen to arise in proximity or in case of
If perception as such is to

verifiable scientific explanations.

be suspected

nothing to forbid a similar fate overtaking the

monistic texts on the analogy of " the text referring to the old ox singing
foolish songs fit for the Madrakas "
of invalidity, there

is

Wffa JTspSTfa

<3Rs^

The

reality of experience

should thus be admitted as

The

practical and theoretical considerations alike.

by

efficiency

It is in this

arthakriyakaritvam

connection that

certain aspects of

is

a potent one,

Madhva

borne out

of practical

in respect

of

reality.

raises the question of the reality of

dream-phenomena.

phenomena occurring without

lies

fully

test

Dreams

are not absolutely unreal

The element of

assignable cause.

unreality

in the identification of the experiences therein with those of the

waking

state,
1

i.

e.

in taking them, at the time, to

be objects of waking

up in the course of
dream and the experiences as such are uncontradicted and are even
remembered with feelings of pleasure or aversion as the case may be, and
experience.

But, the passions, feelings etc. stirred

the

are often accompanied by incontrovertible proofs of their factual occur-

svapnahaminisambhoga ). Gaudapada
( Karikas ii, 1-7 ) and Samkara ( B. S. B. iii, 2,3 ) have adduced some
arguments for the unreality of dreams. These have been refuted by Jayatlrtha in his NS and TP. Samkara ( following Gaudapada ) argues that
dreams lack spatio-temporal conformity to facts. There is no material
stuff out of which objects could be produced in dreams.. They cannot be
rence,

1.

as

in

erotic

JRPPnst 9TPTO

dreams

m m%:

Madhva, B.

S,

S.

iii,

2,3

),

WORLD ANSWERED

OBJECTIONS TO THE REALITY OF THE

145

regarded as different from the dreamer ; or identical with him. In the

former case, they should be perceivable by others too and in the latter case,
they would be unreal as

metamorphose

it is

obviously impossible for the perceiving self to

so

many objects that appear in the dream. These

Madhva view that dreams are the exper-

itself into

objections are irrelevant to the

iences created by God, for the benefit of the Jlvas and are destroyed by
Him, immediately. The dream-creations are made of the stuff of Vasan&s
agelong potencies ) embedded in the minds of Jlvas. As these Vasan&s
are subtle and supersensuous, by nature, their objectifications also are
so and could be accommodated within the dream-centres of the mind ( or
the brain ) so much so that there is no necessity for the dreamer to go
out of his physical body to experience those phenomena, or any other
difficulty regarding spatio-temporal conformity etc,, 1
as dreams are
equipped with their own subtle space-time setting constructed by Vasanas:
(

<$Ml(fa*HWKl: <NfcFd

3%?

II

^I^HW^T^Tfr^l

## wf^Wlfa

W*&3&
fit II
(AV.)
himself endorses the position that dreams are the products of
Vasanas 2 ; but he seems to limit them to the Vasanas of the waking state
of the present life, which is hardly justifiable in the light of the
Hindu
'

Samkara

belief in the influence of past lives

and past Karma and their Vasan&s on

The acceptance of Vasanas as the Upadana ( mateout of which dream-objects are created and projected will answer

our present
rial

lives.

most of the objections

raised against the reality of dreams.

himself admits that in dreams

it is

the objective element that

Samkara
is

contra-

by waking experience and not the experience as such. 8

Madhva
goes a step further and c laims a special status for drem-creations as
produdicted

i-

iiot>k<m*i:

2.

P.

^^crt:

^TWOTRRTFm^ram

M. 10

^ wm$&&*m.\

w*m

*r

%^i m: ti&ftm&m

* * *

b.s.b. m, 2,6

TP.

iii,

2, 3

il

2 ' 14

).

ip&LOsopHy of IbI madhvAoAbYa

i4g

cts

of these beginningless Vasan&s embedded in the minds of Jivas, and

own (of a subtler order)1 They are

therefore entitled to a reality of their

not made of external ingredients ( bahyakarapaka ) like objects of waking experience. That is why they are of such subtle nature as to be

Madhva

constructed by the mind and experienced internally.

interprets the

term " mayamatram"

in the Sutra {B. S.

iii,

2,

therefore
(1)

as 'cre-

and (2) by the will of God ( as

2
These dream objects, because
their efficient cause nimittakaraipa ).
they are the products of. V&sanas, are different from physical objects of
ated by Vftsan&s

'

as material cause

our waking experience.

It is

for that reason that they

8
properties of grossness or serve one's external needs

do

riot exhibit the

But that does not

The
element
falsity
in
dreams lies not
of
the
less
real.
make them any
in the constitution of dream-objects but in their being ( mis )-taken for
.

9cftcT wifWd"!! stPW^'ferfa *rrlcr

realities, during the dream
Ramanuja also agrees with Madhva's view that dreams are real
creations of God. According to Vadiraja when sentient creatures are
presented in dreams, their bodies are made of Vasanas of the dreamer and
they are temporarily made to be tenanted by some souls at the will of

waking

(TP).

God.
Like dreams, illusions of snake in the rope

etc.

inspire

fear and

other reactions by virtue of the indisputable reality of such forms of

consciousness underlying those experiences
efoW[S!Wft ft tflW*$fa <A\i\H

ftrrcrcffo

w$

JUHMFTT

f%^Rt ^1

fam f *ra$cti

<i"j""**Tf

^tqp?

^^

ns.

p.

<lUMWI=f(i|'icl

^Tffi.'psfraJT^

ifM -Ftreti

460

ig^
8"ctt

tf

S^fT:

f%^cT;

cl^r

g^iy<^G=ijprrw*uiw

NS. 499

b.

OBJECTIONS TO THE BBALITT

Off

THE WOBLD ANSWERED

147

The hypothetical assumption of the unreality of world-experience, on the

analogy of illusions will end in making out a case for the reality of some
other world very

much

for the nonce.

In trying to

it

and stigmatize

like ours, as the

an

as

it

damn

prototype of the one superimposed

the reality of this world,

monist

illusion, the

is in

Tartar and accepting the reality of two worlds and thus

worse than the disease

'srrf%#*cf

w^,

3rff

^lfol+f<?Mcl^

3^R

spiel:

There
Advaitins,

admit and be

is

its

make

known

VadSvali, p. 53

one more obstacle to the

it

reality

will
:

remedy

the

5r*ppv#fi^cPI

prototype to be,

satisfied with the

3PKitf#fiRW BgSTR

viz.,

%&

'ms:,

^^^H^iea^iaRTi%wq'--iiii4^*Hfftea5Jr

between the known world and

Jayatlrtha, to

we know

as

danger of catching a

II

zfe ^TO

sra5%

As

be simpler, says
S3PPrea?rt*ffaTOa;

).

of the world, raised by

the impossibility of establishing any logically satisfactory

relation between consciousness

and

the objects of consciousness

in the

world (w^TOSF^ijjHHm:) 1 within the framework of accepted relations like

Samyoga, Samavaya etc. It is, therefore, urged by the monists that a
" real world " could not shine forth na prakaieta ) in our consciousness.
(

The objection

is as old as the Masiddhi.

Jayatlrtha silences it by pointing
out that the question " of the how " of the revelation of the objective

world, to consciousness,

sq^Rlqq^:

fa'wrtii

is

an

illegitimate

Vaddvali. p. 61-2

one

I^rrcrnfaWcI.

ffrt-

There is no logical difficulty

in assuming that objects are revealed to knowledge thro' a process of
" mental chemistry ", called Vrtti, facilitated by the sense-organs or by
(

).

much a characteristic of both,even as knowledge is a common characteristic of mediate and immediate

knowledge. He concludes the argument by saying that the difficulty of
the intuitive self itself, immediacy being as

establishing a nexus

work of accepted

between knowledge and objects, within the frameits devices, is no reason to doubt the existence

logic or

or reality of such relations between them.

The paucity of our vocabulary

between the two in
precise terms is no proof of there being no such relation in fact or that
such relationship is unreal and superimposed by us. It only means
that we have to revise and reorientate our thought-moulds about which
and

logical devices to correctly define the relation

there

1.

is

no

Of.

sacrosanctity

3Rj

similar objections in

mind and matter and

'

qsf

^f^ErreTf: #RT: ft

*r

^qjffa:

modern philosophy, based on the

of the difficulty of bridging the gulf

'

? !T

ft

dualism of

between them.

PHILOSOPHY OF Ib! MADHVAoArYA

148
^^qf^Prra;

nR^mfej^ t^TR.

Mith. Kh.

t.
p. 8b ).
more than the
defect in our technique. It is time we sharpen our wits and try to understand the true mechanism of knowledge but inability to do so, and
penetrate further into it than we have done, is no proof of the unreality
of the knowledge itself

The

Jayatlrtha,

difficulties raised are proofs, if

at

all,

of nothing

The

incapacity to define a thing, in

that the thing itself

is false.

How is

world as lacking in

reality ?

pertinent question

and

its

objects rendered

particular way, cannot

the position bettered

How

is

more easy or

the unreality of the latter ?

some

Jayattrtha winds

the nexus between

intelligible

mean

up the argument with a

by agreeing to treat the
consciousness

on the assumption of
superimposed on consci-

If the objects are

ousness and haye no real existence of their own, everyone should be able

and know everything or none anything at all. How, then, is the

and the fixity of objects to be explained on the theory of the falsity ( mithyatva ) of all Drsya ( objects ) ? If
the individualization etc. are to be accounted for by reference to contacts
Why not
etc. why make a fetish of the superimposition of objects ?
to see

individualization of consciousness

allow them to be real too

ftn$sft

&m mq

Mith. Kh.

t.

p. 8b,

CHAPTER XXIV

TEXTUAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE REALITY

OF THE WORLD
In view of what has already been said about the primacy of SakI as
all validity and of the doctrine of intrinsic validity of

the criterion of

knowledge,

it

will

be superfluous to

cite

a large number

of

texts

and Sutras in support of the reality of the world of

" There are so many passages
Dasgupta observes
in the Upanigads that are clearly Theistic and dualistic in purport
that no amount of linguistic trickery could convincingly show that they
yield a meaning that would support Samkara's position that the Brahman
alone is the ultimate reality and all else is false " ( /. Phil. ii. p. 2 ).
$arhkara introduces an interpretational tour de force by distinguishing
between an ordinary commonsense view of things and a philosophical
view and explains the Upanisads in the light of this twofold assumption
that while there are some passages which describe things from a purely

from

$rutis

experience.

As

philosophical point of view as the one reality without

others

of

"a

a second, there are

naturally more numerous which teach the commonsense view

real

method

world, real souls and a real

God

as

Creator".

their

This

But such a bifurcation of

standpoints would seem to be hardly consistent with the fundamental
presupposition of all Vedanta philosophers that there is only one
uniform system of thought in the Upanisads and Sutras.
That
apart, such a
distinction
of standpoints
into philosophical and
commonsense turns upon a distinction of (two) degrees of validity
as absolute and provisional, which has been shown to be unsustainable. The
argument for the reality of the word has thus been concluded by Vyasaraya:

f%%

is

applied

qft 5TOLq#Rf

to

imsm

WTl^^;3Rn<qfcr:(2)
'

(3)

$&atf

^!^

%ft

?f%

the

Sutras

c*FT?teft

also.

(i)

'

-mm

m ^ v$
'

'

*rat

'^fe^'fticr^'c^W ?dt^^tr#?^u%

^r amT%W

**

MflaHWffc ft

^ ##fcg^#sFftftcr:

(5)

sfcssrr

%gli qftd

cR 3fl^lR>*4)fcT:

(4)

'-

'^kt-

(6) ff^tRwft*

Nynt. p, 246 ). The Madhva philosophers, on the other hand, seek to

reconcile the monistic descriptions in the Gratis with the realistic texts,

from the standpoint of One Independent Transcendent-cum-Immanent

Reference viz., Brahman, as explained earlier. In doing so, they have not

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHVAoARYA

150

been obliged to do any violence to the reality of world-experience. According to the Advaita thinkers, the Scriptures would appear to be speaking
with a double voice and deceiving us
of the world and

its

mm<$ft

Spnif^r sptes

tion

is

Sflsrfcr:

creation,

all

which

along, with realistic descriptions

manifestly untrue

is

(Bhamatt,

ii,

1,

33

).

3rf^ =?,

Such a posi-

hardly complimentary to the Scriptures or compatible with their high

position of validity as 3<IIWW

It has already been stated that texts

supporting the reality of creation and of " a real world, real souls and

real

God"

are to be

in the earlier

them

1.

and

met with everywhere in the Upanisads and Sutras and

and it is hardly necessary to quote

later literature also, 1

here, in extenso.

Significant passages are B. V.

Brh. Up.
2,

13

iii, 7,

ii,

16, 1

13-24; $vet. Up. V, 6

I&j 3; etc.

and many

24, 6
i,

others cited in

of Vedanta and lit Literature

vii, 88,

JWund. Up.

9,

my

6-7

Sittory

"Vol. I, p. 22, fn, 2.

x, 56, 6;

iii, 1,

12;

173,

Katha,

i.-

ii,

tf Dvaitm School

CHAPTER XXV

THE MEANING AND NATURE OF CREATION

The material universe, according to Madhva, is neither an emanation
) of Brahman nor a production de novo.
It is merely an
actualization of what is in the womb of Matter and souls by the action of
Brahman. This creation is a reminder, however inadequate, of the
majesty of God 1
However vivid and profound a man's religious consciousness may be, he can only be conscious of God thro' His manifestations and working in the Universe.
Creation, thus, gives us a glimpse
(pariifoma

#^?t q&
God: tftarcHIBjtr:
Reason bids us assume a First Cause for the Universe.

into the majesty of

God

is

towards
means that He

effort directed

all-creator

Powerful and Satyaka-ma

Madhva

is

Up.

first

).

cause

is

ii,

degree of effort and consequences of the act

effects, accessories,

and a conscious
that

The

Creative activity presupposes a complete foreknowledge

advisedly one.

of the

(Taitt.

Jayatlrtha,

its
is

KN.

To

achievement.

Omniscient
t.

p.

4 b

say, then,

Sarvajfia

),

AIL

).

aware that creation as an event occurring at a

specific

open to serious difficulties and

inconsistencies.
The awkward question arises at once, as to what induced the Deity, which had obviously kept in its shell, all the time, to
suddenly take it into its head to come out and call a Universe
into being. 1
The objections apply, in the first place, to creation
ex nihilo. But no Vedantin subscribes to such a view.
The
hypothesis of creation in time and the argument to the existence of God
from the supposed necessity of a prius to the temporal series are definitely abandoned by Madhva.
Creation, to him, is
no doubt a real
process. But it is a continuous creation, - a constant dependence of
date in the past, at the

the world

B. T. p. 14

all

its

is

determinations

In so far as

).

it is

WW+iWwNII'^

only the starting point in

^HW^Wrift, waRRWclSon'Wfr:

(Dv^da&aStotra).

^fe^ SUsn^MU't)*^ (Madhva, Chan. Up.

C. vi, 1). Contract in this connec-

tion,

to

Samkara's remarks on S.

it:

aigw^iw

uftwm&re
2.

of the Deity,

on the Supreme for

A^"Vs<V*n

1.

fiat

S.

i,

i, 14,

Pringle Pattison, Idea of ffod, p. 303.

also

and Jayatlrtba's spirited rejoinder

iwsjwrsrct mMfjrfcr ^r

gw%m;

Cf

*m **\ iSto^ if^Ktopflu(ns.

i,

4, p. 200)

PHILOSOPHY OF SEl MADHVAcArYA

152

the process of eightfold determinations 1 ,

endorse the view of

Creator

Ulirici, that

This would not

".

" God

amount

Self,

a dual aspect of iakti and vyakti

as occasion

demands

fect beings

latency and patency

" cause "

ceaseless change

is

in the sense that

series

every

is

has

to be exercised

in

).

a world of imper-

Himself unchanging and

way and whose constant presence

of forms latent

development

God

explicable only as being maintained

by and dependent on a Supreme Being, who

perfect in

and there

energy of

this creative

the

the Deity, as the

svarupalaksa.'pa

s*rto cf Mnfrsft fa\m\i {av. 1 2

uses the term

and of

a sense,
then

differ

Madhva

and

down

to tying

in

God and

not first

is

various attributes are part of His nature

could be no limitation of His

Madhva would,

in them,

educes the

matter and brings the souls nearer to their

at every step

and so brings them into

full

self-

play and actual

manifestation

srcWH^'

$im

sir

^HSHips^

^m^m $m *$&&

The Universe thus depends on

not as

its

God

as

wnfcft

its

(b. s. b. a. 3,31

11

B. S. B.

ground and

i,

4,27

ratio essendi,

but

cause in the narrow sense of the term

Tfe*?t

SS#

t&rft d${lRdq

1.

gfsfarf^<ftW'WMiM*aTOljr:

VSmma Pur&pa,

q.

B.T.p. 13

).

THE MEANING AND NATUBB OF CREATION

158

All this will inevitably lead to the assumption of the co-existence of

Matter and souls with God.

Madhva

looks

upon

Like Aristotle, and the Greek philosophers,

the orderly realm of natural process as having neither

a beginning nor an end (pravdhato anadi

as the

God on whom

geable

is

it

).

The cosmos

is

as everlasting

depends. The changing no less than the Unchan-

an ultimate component of

reality as

a whole

^m w& 1 tprar awfflwtfr

fgj^r ft sdrt ^m m<& ^
(

(TS).
jsfs,

286 b

).

CHAPTEB XXVI

DOCTRINE OF
'*

ETERNAL CREATION " THRO'

"

PARaDHINA-VI^ESaPTI "
upon
some
destroyed or otherwise determined in numer-

The belief in the metaphysical dependence of

Brahman obliges Madhva to hold that all finite

finite

all

reality

existence

is

in

measure created, preserved,

He has enumerated twelve such
ous ways, by the Supreme Being.
determinations. These are the expression of this metaphysical dependence
of the world of Matter and Souls ( including the Cetana-Prakrti ) on the

One Source of
which

Brahman

H ?t

everything(

all existence, activity

declare

TaM. Up.

W^tt^

and

The

and consciousness.

Sruti texts

be the ultimate source and Creator of

to

others

like

^p%

fT ?TT1% ^JcTTfa

should therefore be understood to imply different forms of

metaphysical dependence of countless substances, qualities and forces that

from

constitute the world

the highest order of being to the lowest.

twelve determinations, creation or coming into existence

the most important one. It
gross

and literal

wiw+wq)

TOU
But

^'

the

understood by the Nyaya-Vaifesikas in the

is

sense of the term as a creation de novo

Madhva

Of

ontologically

is

and ex

nihilo: 3RRT:

does not, as a Parinamavadin, recognize"

apJc^fT

" or " Asat-karyavada " in any instance of causation, whatsoever.

this

does not mean that

uncreated,

in

every

aspect altogether.

Madhva

that the beginningless

all

things in the world are eternal

or abolish " 3^1+1=1*13 "

respect,

has shown,

and

on grounds of

in

logic, elsewhere,

eternal existence of certain fundamental

substances or categories like

space and time, must be accepted by

every scientific-minded philosopher, as an unquestionable axiom.

already been

shown

and

any form or

that the creation of time and space

is

It has

an impossible

hypothesis 1 .

The question then arises How is the existence of uncreated substanand time to be metaphysically reconciled with the fundamental presupposition of the Vedanta and its ideal that all finite reality
This
is explicable only as derived from One Supreme Source of all.
problem has not occurred to and has not been raised by any other Indian
:

ces like space

philosopher or commentator on

shows

1.

how

the

Upanisads and the Ved&nta.

far in advance of his times

This

Madhva's philosophic perceptions

See Chapter XI, on Space and Time.

"ETERNAL CREATION"

"PARAdHINA-VKBSAPTI"

were, over those of his compeers.

155

Madhva's answer to the question

rests

on an analysis of the concept of Causation wherein he shows that it is

capable of being distinguished into two kinds (1) production of a substance de novo in the commonsense view of the term and (2) production
:

in the sense of acquisition of a

on the

of another

will

i.

e.

change of

God

state or peculiarity that

TOsft#Rfanft:

This

depends

distinction

places the entire question of creation of eternal substances in an altogether

new

perspective

and breathes a new meaning into the entire doctrine

of Creation and marks a striking advance of thought in Indian philosophy, where the idea is quite novel. In the light of this new theory
of Creation,

it

cannot be said that

reconcile the traditional

souls, with their creation " or that "

and
of

Madhva "

Hindu doctrine of

Thomas on

St.

his ears

finds

impossible

it

the eternity of
is

it

the

to

world

a pity that the teaching

the possibility of Eternal Creation, never reached

"\

A correct understanding of Madhva's view of the Creation of eternal

substances thro' " Paradhinavis'esapti ", to be explained presently, will
show

it is the same as
Eternal Creation in the sense of positing an
and constant dependence of all finite reality in each and every one
of its states of being and becoming ( saclbhavavikaras ) and the eightfold
cosmic determinations ( Srstyadyastakam ), upon the One Infinite and
Independent Principle viz., God or Brahman.

that

'

'

eternal

which any philosophical theory of creation

in time of even eternal substances,
in some remote undiscoverable past, ex nihilo, which is fraught with logical contradictions. Such a doctrine of creation in time has been abandoned by speculative thinkers both before and after St. Augustine and
Madhva's position that creation should be regarded as an eternal act
coeval with the Divine nature and existence, is in perfect agreement with
This

the utmost limit to

is

could go, short of assuming creation

many early Christian Fathers, particularly Origen. Only we,

should understand by " creation ", according to Madhva, not only the
manifestation of being which is the starting point in the series of eightthat of

fold determinations, but one and

1.

Of.

Remarks

in a review of

ism" in the light of

S.J.

),

my work

of the

rest,

according to the nature

" Svatantradvaita or Madhva's .Theiatio Real-

the East, Calcutta, Feb. 1943, p. 31.

It is interesting to

close contemporaries

all

note that St,

Ed, Ft. Dundoy

Thomas Aquinas and Madhva were

PHILOSOPHY OF 3rI MADHvAcARYA

156

and

fitness

On

of each case.

this view, it will

be impossible to conceive

of anything at any time that could fall outside the jurisdiction of one or
the

other of the eightfold determinations or predications

existence

The position

clearly explained

is

TS

concluding passage of the

sf^TO.

3fcfr%

Jpf cf$r

?tFRn

wit wwi8

The

eternal

the Deity

of

finite

viz.,

is

by

Jayatfrtha, in

<X&[ WWri-WNrtcflW

5rc*ftiiftlcl

cpr

and absolute dependence of

not logically inconceivable.

^^ffj^faiftwi

R^'Hi wt^-

?f*r=rf% <pf errant

commenting on the

^5

#r

$*rl^prot

all

^p: af
yte<&cft

upon

eternal substances

If there is

holding that impermanent things are so, not of their

nothing illogical in

own

accord,

or for

no imaginable reason (akasmdt), the same would apply to eternal substanElse, the impermanent objects may be expected to be destroyed
ces also.
the very moment after their coming into being. This does not happen,
because there is something by which its impermanence is determined. The
eternal substances, also, could, in the same way, and for a similar reason,
of " eternal dependence " on an eternal reason, be regarded as dependent.
Simply because the non-eternity ( anityatva ) of the non-eternals is limited,
we don't find it terminating and making the non-eternals eternal ! Even
so, thare is

no

something else

becoming non-eternal just

or ' dependent on
Dependence is thus a relation which

possibility of eternal substances

because their eternality

is

like the will

said to be

of God.

'

determined

could be true of both eternals and non-eternals.

nature of things.

So long

It

is

something in the

then, as Creation is not defined in the

sense of sPJpTr vi^fq; or STFWcT:

I.

It

'

'

jjrt|ri:

should be noted here that Jayatlrtha's reference to 3JT%cT and

substances alone does not rule out the " Nityapadarthas "

purview of creation etc, as the term

3-4 )

AcqiPktf

itself,

"

ftomftc^l

eternals

"

from the

includes the

by him, in his own commentary on

and as elucidated by Vyisariya in hiB gloss on the same ( p. 7 b ).

in their subtle aspects, as explained

( p.

narrow

as in the Nyaya, the acceptance

ftcf

TT

"ETERNAL CREATION": "PARADHINA-Vl^EgAPTI"

i$?

of the creation of eternal substances also in the sense of subjection or

liability

agency

to

new phases

God ),

( viz.

Tho'

in

of being or becoming at the will of

some other

cannot be said to involve any logical incompatibility. 1

one sense

all

material transformation presupposes a

basic

name, form,
which the ori-

continuity of essence of the cause, even after the change of

properties and utility have taken place, there are cases in

any of its fundamental

There are also yet other instances of
change where the nature of the substance is changed to such an extent or
ginal substance remains intact without surrendering
qualities, temporarily or absolutely.

in essential particulars and qualities, so as to be

or nameable by the same term, as the basis of

no longer recognizable
modified

its

thus obliged to recognize two kinds of change

substratum and most of

WwmR'i/ri:

tho' certain

process of change

change effected

and

essential features

its

additional traits

( 2)

are

We are

^"Kciiw^ g|%

intact

may have

state.

one in which the

1 )

crept in, in the

another, in which as a result of the complete

in the substance, in the

we

course of the casual process,

are faced with a total change in the constitution of the substance itself so
as to

make

srfif'W-l<$=l

it

almost a new and a different one, for

<#TTJT:

Madhva

" W#tft#nft " and the

designates the

latter as

Applying these types

of

"

purposes

all practical

former kind of change as

WgR WJ

"

change to objects of experience or to

we are appraised of by scripture

ontological entities, whose existence

or reasoning, we find that most of them come under the second type of
change and are therefore to be regarded as " anitya" and ipso facto
created at a particular time and place and have a beginning and an
end.
In regard to some others, however, experience and reason and the

1.

Cf.

^d^Th^- ftcTOf

ft

tow

TO*fl'WI<Wlftc4d

^F^sferam^T

^TTg -

'

PtrM Ufl

afa iMWKft<tfl ***#&

f^raRT: "TO#T^sft,

*r

^keAtfdlilllfl:

'

OTT&

*m a#Kq

-^ tffKffl

<rf$Pmi%'lHTfi# n
(

NS.

p.

330

).

philosophy

158

oir

m madhvAoAbya
them

authority of Scripture oblige us to put

to certain

in the

former group.

regarded as Nitya or uncreated in essence, tho'

are, therefore,

new

They
open

to deny that the Hindu Scriptures

a few of such " eternal " entities called

It is useless

influences.

do teach the existence of

still

at least

Nityapadarthas or Anadinitya, which are conceived as existing from

eternity without

a beginning or an end,- such as Time, Space. Matter,

Souls and the Vedas. The question

eternity of theirs

is,

therefore,

how

to reconcile such

with the axiom of the absolute all-creatorship of

Brahman, which is not only one of the prominent attributes of Godhead,

conceivable by man, but is also the philosophical justification for a
Deity.
Is it possible to hold that even eternal things are created in some
what sense should such creation of eternals be
sense ?
If so, in
understood

This question

is

of the utmost importance, tho

not seem to have been appreciated in

its

true bearings

'

it

does

by any Indian

Madhva. It is in connection with this

he introduces his new theory of Eternal Creation'

philosopher before or other than

momentous

issue that

'

or Creation of Eternal entities, thro

most significant contribution

'

Paradhinavi&sapti.

This

is

his

to Indian philosophy.

" Paradhmavis'esapti " means the acquiring of a new trait or

complexion that depends on ( the will of ) an " Other "
( God ).
These new traits would differ according to the nature of the substance
concerned. Some of these have been enumerated and explained by
Jayatlrtha

Nature of Paradhlnavis'esapti

Nitya-Padarthas
1.

%IW4dR&<iI

Cetana-Prakrti

1^^

2.

Avyakrtakaia

3.

Prakrti

JHS^i^r %ft ;

4.

Kala-Pravaha

JTClRsR

5.

Space

3W^wt^mm

Mahadadi

6. Jivas

7.

Jtffcqft:

Vedas

ft^dftRiai^^l^T^FF?!m%rfN':

The most important point to note

Par&dhlnavises&pti

is

in connection with the doctrine of

that the special kind of change or creation, applies

):

" ETERNAL CREATION"

"fARADSlNA-VI^EgAPTI"

159

assumed by
( traits ) only, that have been
and not to its basic essence or Dharmisvarapa.
Were it not so, the entire change would have been more directly termed
The specification of the change
as " Paradhlna- svamp&ntarcLpatti ".

to the aspect of the Viiesas

the substance in question

as

Paradhlna )- Visesapti, instead,

f^RFBR

is

The

therefore significant.

point

produced by the acquisi(

tion of the new traits ai^f^ra ) but, only the " whole " ( ftWCTEH ).
The new traits, moreover, cannot, in the nature of things, be coeval
is

that

it is

not the

substratum) that

is

413'iiHWHT

Time

with the Substance, in regard to the Jivas, Prakrti, Space,

In such cases, the A^?h and the

faftlf cannot be said to

be absolutely identical with each other, but only " ftwftm ", as stated by
Jayatlrtha (Vide, TVt. p. 5, line 5 and Vy&saraya's gloss on it
etc.

Mandaramanjari

p.

lin

8,

We

16).

cannot,

equivalent to the birth of the "

Whole

ignore this

therefore,

important point of distinction and treat the birth of the

", taking

new

trait as

Jayatlrtha's remark-

^T[fJra' ?ft cR^kraffWl *rsrfct

NS. p. 431 ) as an unqualified dictum.
(
This statement of JayatTrtha must be read along with the important
distinction of attributes in question, as " Yavad-dravyabh&vl " and
l

" Ayavad-dravyabh&vi
himself, in his TVt.

",

drawn by Madhva and accepted by Jayatlrtha

and elsewhere.

point that has

// is

the failure to take note of this

in H. N.
Raghavendrachar 's claiming that in Madhva 's philosophy, there cannot be any
" eternal " or " uncreated " entities, in any sense of the term, and that all
Substances
including Space,
Time, Souls and Matter
undergo
" Svarapa-Sfsti " in the full sense of the term, inclusive
the very

crucial

core of their being.

Jayatlrtha

makes

TfFRU, applies

which

is

This

is

it

results

of
a most unfortunate perversion of Madhva

clear that creation in

in the full sense of the

therefore fittingly termed

that was not there before.

1.

disastrous

's

teaching.

3P^1

led to

"

the ordinary sense of

term only

^"ijfl^l^TJPf "

The substratum

to the Vttesas,

birth of a

new

( f&M ) could not,

trait

however,

H. N. Raghavendraohar's contention of Svarfipa-Systi of Jivas in Madhva's

philosophy was repudiated by orthodox spokesmen like Pandit D. Vasndevaohar

H.

own

N.

in

Ms Kannada work "Dvaitapradipa ") and

Raghavendraohar

yiew.

still

feels

convinced

others.

of

the

But

it

appears that

correctness

of his

"
;

be said to be produced as
the change or " creation "
of

b1 madhvacAbYA

ipJHitosopfiy oS-

1(50

and because of this acquiring of

) comes to be designated as
no point in describing the " Visesyakara " as
it is

traits that the " Vis'ista

" created

There

".

This implies that

only with reference to the Vis'esa in respect

is

substances and

eternal

new

termed " 3wf^RR5F^ "\

it is

is

"

thro'

Jlva

(e. g.

awftvid-W^Mf " if the Svarupa-Srsti " of the Visesya is possible.

Madhva and his commentator would not have labored so much to
distinguish four kinds of change and draw
a distinction between
"SPJj^T *R*T"

creation de novo

and creation in a

restricted sense of

wflilwwltl! by virtue of the Visesya acquiring some new trait, applicable

only, like Space, Time, Matter, and Souls.
to certain eternal entities
These could never have any other kind of creation; whereas objects
'

'

could

jars

like

" Paradhlnavisegapti "

the only kind of creation that

is

in respect of Nityapadarthas.
this

connection.

From

cloth, is hardly other

of

^dwA

there can be

RKN

The

piece

of

**<JW:

so that,

strictly

speaking,

creation maintainable in the system, for any

'

eternal entities

way.

'

alone,

The crux of

the fulfilment of the condition

is

possible

This being so the restricted application of creation, thro'

this objection in this

&sapti

is

be raised in

the production of a jar or

sr^Tf l^milttol^T

Paradhlnavisegapti, to

meets

may however

objection

than a case of Paradhinavisesapti, defined in terms

no other kind of

material object.

An

*PFrq.

the point of view of Parinamavada or evolution

Madhva,

accepted by

theory

" Wffi

be created in the ordinary sense of

is

Jayatlrtha

pointless.

creation thro' Paradhlnavi-

SRF^raRSre'W^

creation of a jar, out of clay,

is

not

^P 3^T-

a case of this kind,

e- qGST'WIW^ ffj% ^WWfeftl:, even tho' the material stuff of clay

may continue still to underlie the jar. The fact is that there have taken place,
i.

in the course of the change of clay into pot,

so

much

clay

so,

We have a

^
I.

we have no

now nor recognize

*KT

sirt:

'new entity
I

#C 5$

original shape

jar,

^frai

Cf. aiwra 3, Bftl^JcTfa

*fm NS p.

longer the clay intact, nor can

its
',

some far-reaching changes

i.

e.

srtJfeTOTC*N' <lfi>W5

and so forth

).

designate
(

it

as

samsthana

Hence we

).

say.-

a^ci^MtWiWiwrf

399 b

we

or arrangement

ciflc'ffwi*^]'

ffiim $3

"ETERNAL CREATION"
*

srgrw
But no such

"PARADHINA-VlJK?APTI"

Wfff: ?*pcTfflW:

t^ar

essential transformation

eternal substances

named.

161

'

ll

<4F.

ii,

3. p.

28

could be detected in the case of the

Hence, these are best put

down

in

a separate

category of creation, by themselves, as W#iftw>iil?lW&*M:

This new doctrine of creation is intended by Madhva to reconcile
l

and rationalize the existence of certain Nityapadarthas, with the

torship of

1.

Samkara

God.

all-crea-

gives greater importance to the statement of the &ruti

that

Brahman

has created everything and interprets texts Hke'31|<*|ycjc^i$*rdSJ f^TC' as gauna.

Ho

P.

M.

does not concede the

11

existence

of

uncreated

eternals

and

is

not aware of

CHAPTER XXVII

MADHVA'S THEORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD

Madhva's theory of the constitution of matter and the evolution of
Samkhya metaphysics of Upanisads, the Epics
is based on the
and PurSk^as. He quotes profusely from the Mahabharata, the Bliagavata
and other Pur&nas and from the vast literature of the Pancaratras, which
Even a cursory
still await exploration at the hands of modern scholars.
view of the quotations made by Madhva from the literature of the
Paficaratras bears witness to the strong and persistent Theistic tradition
the world

'

'

of Upanisadic thought embodied in them and which

Madhva

inherited

from them', and upon which he indented so largely, in the rcinterpretation

of the Upanigads and the Sutras and in the exposition of his own system.
The school of Ramanuja, tho' ostensibly connected with the Pancarahas not, in

tras,

its

A reference to the numerous

literature.

number of forgotten Samhit&s of

from

a large

in the

works of Madhva 2 would make

follower of the Epic Samkhya,

the doctrine of evolution of Matter

Arambhavada or 'atomic genesis of

'

explained by
(

sthiratva

Jayatlrtha, is

the Pancaratra, occurring

Madhva

Prakrti

has naturally accepted

as against the theory of

the Nyaya-Vaisesikas.

of the world of objects.

According

would entail the ultimate destruction of

none of it. 3

He
identity
it

and

Only the

2.

M.
See

Vij.

viii, 4.

my

History

Cf.

ft

atom

in

a jar

of Matter from

This has the advantage of guaranteeing the basic

and

thro' the various

changes

process of development from a subtle to a gross state.

Parinamavada

Appendix
3.

its

as

Hence, Madhva would have

it.

stability of the material stuff in

undergoes in

latter,

Pllupakavada of

to the

therefore accepts the theory of the evolution

state.

The

fraught with hourly danger to the stability

the Vais'esikas, even the slightest displacement of a single

a subtle to a gross

quotations

this clear.

As a

more

interpretation of the Vedanta, touched anything

than the fringe of that

would

be

consistent with

Madhva's theory

Vedanta and Its Literature,

of Dvaita Snhool of

Vol.

I,

ii.

sET^i yjamiftHi q^sft qwsj^ft, <$% hss#?

f^Ffr

5^ wi^swRwrnft

(ns.

p.

394 b).

^rc^ mFfa,

MADHVA'S THEORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD

objects 1

of Causation and our faith in the stability of material

refore accepts a primordial material stuff called Prakrti

lf,3

He

the-

which undergoes
various modifications and develops by a process of evolution and involution of parts. The existence of Prakrti is not logically established by
Madhva. He takes it over bodily from the Upanisadic, Epic and Puranic
Samkhya cosmology. It is an eternal insentient stuff of the most subtle

3FTT$WHW

kind:

^^^ftSRW nvrrccTO.

NS.

Madhva has stoutly opposed the attempts of other commentators on

who have denied a place to Prakrti, as the material stuff out
of which the Universe is evolved by Brahman, in the philosophy of the
the Vedanta

He

Vedanta.
ter (

establishes

Sabdatvam

on sound

textual

authority, the Sastric charac-

of Prakrti as an insentient, dependent

material

princi-

( upadana-kara^a ) of the world, and

repudiates the theory of Abhinna-nimittopadanatva of Brahman adopted
by other Bhaiyakaras on the Vedanta 2
Madhva thus champions the
cause of the Samkhya against the Advaitin and fights successfully for
Ramanuja also, has perforce
a place for Prakrti in Vedantic cosmology.

ple which

is

the

material

cause

to recognize a material principle as defined

metrical Upanisads.

the

in

and the Puranas. Neither of them however could recognize,

Madhva's point
with the Samkhya, the independence of that principle.
is that the status of Prakrti, as claimed by the Samkhyas, has nothing to
do with its being recognized by Vedantins as the material stuff out of
which the Universe is to be evolved. It is accepted as a principle dependent on the Brahman ( Paratantra ) by Madhva and Ramanuja.
the Epics

both directly and indirectly the material cause of the

development of time and the
three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas and indirectly of Mahat,
Prakrti

world.

Ahamkara
The

is

It is

the direct material cause of the

etc.

It

is

both eternal and pervasive

three gunas are supposed to

creation, in the proportion of 4: 2:

'

but not unlimited".

be differentiated at
1 (

B.T.

iii,

p.

24

the

).

beginning of

The evolution of

other forms of matter takes place on account of the disturbance in their

*m$[
2.

3.

3Ta-:5R^^% s$pg

a^isr

f^wt^'i'

gwwkr

The point baB been fully discussed in my History of Dvaita

andlts Literature, Vol. 1, pp. 133-137.
*F

iftftwfl

spawfefef %m*ff{

NS. 326

b.

(ns. 394)

Softool of

Vedanta

))

PHILOSOPHY OF &EI MADHVAcAeZA

164

commonly

equipois which gives rise to the twentyfour principles

recogni-

zed-Mahat, Ahamkara, Buddhi, Manas, ten sensory organs, five senseobjects and the five great elements, Mahat is the first and finest
evolute of matter and energy.

Ahamkara

is

the principle

of individua-

Buddhi that of discrimination and Manas of thought. The principle

of Ahamkara is divided into three classes of Vaik&rika, Taijasa and TSmasa.
From Taijasa, the ten sense organs are produced and the five sense
objects (visayas) and the elements are the products of Tamasa-Ahamkiira.
The ianm&tr&s stand for qualitatively distinct and irreducible sensequalities with a definite leaning towards their appropriate objects. These
twentyfour evohites of Prakrti are the constituents of the microcosm
and the macrocosm of the entire Brahmanda. Madhva gives a proper
reorientation to this theory of material evolution by linking it up with
a systematic hierarchy of presiding deities from top to bottom. It is
under the constant supervision and guidance of these Abhimani-devatas

tion,

or Tattvabhimanins

physical

functions

that

material transformations

all

carried

are

and psycho

The Supreme Brahman

on.

ultimately behind all these activities and of each and every one of them

<PB iff

The

JTfRtfe

f#

H?fasraT

II

three forms of Matter - viz., Sattva, Rajas

by the three aspects of Cetana-Prakrti,

Bhu and Durga

$rl,

B. S. B.

and Tamas, are

controlled

itself is

specially

in her three aspects of

wwi-*fth4)

The period of
involution

creation

is

*n*fii siift:

*rm*%aret

b. t. p. 21

said to be one-eighth of the

period of

#3 ^NTRts^T

^fcWPrar:

11

b. t. p. 71 b

Involution takes place by the merger of the effects in their causes, in the
reverse order of evolution.

This applies to the Tattvabhimani-devas also,

both in Samsara and in release.

CHAPTER XXVIII

AND VIVARTA

CRITIQUE OF BRAHMA-PARINAMA

VADAS.

Madhva's conception of the material world and its relation to

that beset the Parinama and
is free from the difficulties

Brahman
Vivarta
For,

all

visesa

Pantheism

Vadas.

worse than

irreligion,

down

the Deity to the gutter.

negates the independence

material modifications are dependent originations

They

).

fall

under two

main

heads

of

change

of

It is

God.

Paradhlnachange of

T%fel ) and change of aspect or attributes ( sfH^ ).

these may again be distinguished into reversible and irre-

Substance

Each of

versible modifications.

upon

pulls

It utterly

external agencies.

All these four kinds of change are dependent

It

would be impossible to recognize any such

Brahman, as that would immedia-

external cause of change in respect of

tely reduce

to a

it

and

believe in

any other eternal

with

as those

No

it

Brahman alone

was no other substance

that there

Parinamavada, moreover,

position of dependence.

stands committed to the view that

existed in the beginning

existence then.

in

existent, uncreated

It

does not

by Brahman or

co-existent

who believe in creation thro' Paradhlnavisesapti do ).

Brahman is thus conceivable or possible in such
the urge or direction for such modification must come

modification of

circumstances,

as

from an outside agency. It will be inconsistent with Divine perfection

to assume that Brahman itself, out of its own free will chooses to transmute itself into the world of beings and objects, - a world which is a state
We cannot say that the Brahman does not recogof sin, evil and misery.
nize the misery and imperfections of the world as it is.
For it is
ex hypothesi Sarvajfia. If Brahman does not experience the suffering in

who does ? Not

Brahman and is essentially

the world,

that the

Jlva

is

wholly exempt

Even

the

most

the Jlva

the same

for he, too,

as

only partially identical with

Brahman from a share

subtle

modifications

is

a modification of

Even supposing
Brahman it would not

Brahman.
in the

in the

misery of the world.

development of sentient

creatures are subject to external forces.

Sentients are never known
to undergo change of state or condition of being at their own free will.
It
is useless to argue that Brahman being Almighty could change
at Its own will, without reference to any external stimuli or provocation
or direction. For, the change from a state of blessedness and perfection

and limitation can hardly be a token of

would be sheer dogmatism to say that we should not
raise logical objections in a case that transcends all reason.
In that case
all philosophy should have to be given up as a wild goose chase.
The
to one of obvious misery

Almightiness

It

:;

PHILOSOPHY CW

166

iBl

MADHVAoArYA

plea of transcending logic can be urged with propriety only in cases

where the authorities are unanimous. In this case, however, it is not so,
as there are many texts which clearly deny to the Brahman any kind of
'

'

ftf^BT^Sapm^:

physical or material modification

ment of reason becomes imperative

in

coming to a

so that the employ-

definite conclusion

on

the vexed question.

equally unavailing to put in that the change of state undergone

Tt is

by Brahman

is

" deeper nature

ted to

a special kind of modification that does not affect

For the fact remains that the change of

".

Brahman by

it

is

precisely

into the abyss of misery

of the world, from a state of bliss

pretend that this does not affect

and so long as

and uniortunately
and imperfection
and self-sufficiency. How can we

the Parinamavadin

of this very kind that plunges

its

state attribu-

its

" deeper nature "

That being

so,

conceded that Brahman does not undergo any change

it is

is determined or controlled by external agencies, any state of

which we might find It, will be as natural to It as any other
admitted ( by the Parinamavadin ) that Brahman is with and

of state that

becoming
Since

in

it is

without the forms of grossness at different times,

it will be impossible to
" natural " state and which is adventitious
so that both the states would be quite natural to its being.
Granting for
argument's sake that a transformation of Brahman with a complete loss

define which of

them

of original nature

is

is Its

possible, the question

will

still

remain

As Brahman

if

such a

and
former alternative could not be true. In the latter case,
Brahman having been " exhausted" in the transformation, there would be
transformation will be partial or wholesale.

is

partless

indivisible, the

none

left

as

Brahman

during the lifetime of the world, with the result

knowledge of the Brahman, with a view

Moksa, will have to cease.

that all talk of acquiring

attaining the bliss of

that

Madhva,

therefore, rejects the view of

Brahman

is

in itself the stuff of

to

Bhaskara and many others

which the Universe

is

made.

So far

our received knowledge and the testimony of the Scriptures go,

there would appear to be an unbridgeable gulf between Spirit and matter
as

all

Cit and Jada

=T

%cp#br: wrapt

ir%?F#RKfsft

Brahman

is

sprrft

#3cwy,

%cT=T: ^li*l=5Rf

essentially Saccidananda.

How,

and wholly lacking

in intelligence

and

(AV.i,4

).

then, could such a perfect

being of pure intelligence and bliss evolve, out of

inert

II

is,

itself,

an

effect

in addition, the

that

is

abode of

CRITIQUE OF BRAHMA-PARllSrAMA AND VIVARTA VADAS

much misery and

so

subject to ceaseless change

There

is

167

no use in

taking shelter behind alleged statements in the Sruti to the effect that

Brahman

is

immediately and in

its

own

person, the material cause of the

For not even the vociferation of a hundred texts could make the
crow white! Reason 'may test even where it cannot build. Where
world.

conflicting authorities claim to interpret

the Sruti, each to suit his

bare text

itself.

Not even

In

that case,

the

Brahman could

individual souls, too; and simplify matters for

the Sruti says emphatically that

flwwOs^igg:

Brahman

Since no causation

we must

modification in the cause,

of the Universe, elsewhere than in

strict

becomes the

the Scripture says directly that the intelligent

unintelligent.

own

more important than the

metaphysics, the employment of reason becomes

is

is

all

as

well

become the

philosophers. Moreover,

immutable and unchanging

possible without

naturally look for the

Brahman1

*.

some change or
material cause

adherence to the logic of facts and the spirit of the Srutis

Madhva

to reject the profanity of Brahmaparinamavada, in any

Even the oft-paraded promissory statement about the knowledge
of the one leading to the knowledge of the many ( on which Sarhkara
himself tries to base the case for Brahmaparinama ) does not necessarily
warrant the conclusion that Brahman is the material cause of the Uni-

compels
garb.

Madhva

verse.

has been the

first critical

Upanisad to draw attention to the

commentator on the Chcindogya

difficulties in the

wording and form of

the propositions, as they stand, which definitely militate against any facile

conclusion of material causality

No

text.

serious one

The

1.

difficulty pointed out

and cannot be

3tfTpr and TfrsEKFT

vi,

siflNKMoi^ ) being drawn from that

other commentator, ancient or modern, seems to have realized

this crucial point.

Up.

by Madhva

lightly passed over.

in the form in

The supposed reference to Brahmaparinamavada, in

(

i,

4,

24

all.

For a

full

refutation of the remarks of V. S. Ghate and

my HDS7L

i,

pp. 137-144,

and

the

more than a

teaching

of the

has been convincingly shown by Madhva to

no relevance to that problem at

see

real

which they appear in the text of Chan.

1,4-6, are virtually incapable of establishing anything

Brahmas'S.tras

is

The examples of yfc^,

discussion of the issue

Bhandarkar,

on

have

and

this point,

PHILOSOPHY of gul madhvaoAbya

168

general resemblance or point of contact

The terms " eka "

world.

used thrice

),

Brahman and

between

the

pi^4a, maiai and nakhanikrnt-

ana, prevent the establishment of an intimate causal relation (OTT^Rfal%T-

*M

WIF, *WK= ftu^Ksj s$:

%TcRT' #cfRcTl <$mi. ^ &i'WcMrft SRwqrft wtyfia ft

) among the pairs named in the text

?^

'*$$

Madhva, VTN.

reflection

little

wti

would show the truth of

aajid^

*nf#fiR^T

>w?r fa?ra w#t*r ftiRfr

*TO

II

JV5.

There

i,

4, p.

226

<*bi%fN

*pffarft

<%#,

%*$ %tf wicwWksr

fei^i

w fawn,

'

WNra %re?

).

no use pleading that we should not take the text literally

spirit
for the spirit itself has got to be deduced from the
However that may be, the third and the last illustration of
;

nail-scissors has not even the

semblance of a causal argument.

the whole case away. For, the nakhanikrntana

It gives

an effect and not

itself

is

the cause of anything else and cannot, in the nature of things,

" cause

" of

'

all that is

made of karsy&yasa.

'

It

that the argument for the material causality of the

be the

should be clear then,

Brahman breaks down,

completely and at the very first touch of criticism, in this instance.

',

position

is

Madhva,

or

kinds

therefore, prefers to take the teaching of

of

It

all

To know

WHT % ^s^ stwwRw

is

the end

knowledge.

and aim of

tpR? Chan. Up.

to

is

who

is

Gita,

is

forms

other

is
vii,

know

at

so utterly

secular learning

all

Sage Uddalaka

impress this great truth on his son

knowledge.

Brahman

all

worth knowing, about the world, that

knowledge of Brahman
culmination of

Uddalaka in terms

knowledge of Brahman over

knowledge.

all that is

dependent on

fst

The

hardly better in the other two cases.

of the primacy of the

one sweep,

).

is

but look to the

wording.

^r

25 b.

p.

this contention

).

The

and the

naturally at pains to

conceited

to gloat over his learning, divorced

enough

cf.

from Brahman-

CRITIQUE OF BaAHMA-PARIBTAMA AND VJVABTA VADAS

There

is

much

truth in

tion of material cause

named

the pairs

and

Madhva's contention, therefore, that a

effect could not

The utmost point of contact between

% 3, TOTfiFta
in the

NS.

purvapaksa:

is

p.

rela-

wording of

it.

the ?SFcT and sn^ffti that these ex-

one of resemblance of some kind: tk*wi% W3$M

451

J$fa?T

'

69

among

be easily established

consistent with the actual

in the text,

amples could establish

The point

).

conceded by the Bhamaii also

is

'if&oi^nfteZRl: TOTOT:

JPHR ^JFlt

1*1T

The other familiar examples of ( ) scorpions being produced from

cowdung ( 2 ) hair and nail growing from the human body ; and (3) the
growth of man from childhood to youth and old age, quoted to establish
the material casuality of Brahman, are equally unavailing. The point at
1

issue

is

the possibility of an unintelligent (jada

solely

from a

fore,

doubly irrelevant as

cowdung

insentient.

Even

scorpion

the

if

body which might be derived from

(

in so far as

Sarhkara's

explanation

common

with

its

it

effect

being produced

is

etc. is

living creature

there-

and the

such production were biologically true,

admits of other explanations in so far as

scorpion

The analogy of scorpions

sentient being.

the

may have one ),

dung.

it

a material

But the soul of the

cannot be a product of dung

6) that Brahman has saltd in

Akasa, overlooks the fact that this sattd,

(B. S. B.

effects like

the scorpion has

ii,

1,

body of man, distinguishable from Brahman. The

growth of hair and nails from the human body is possible only so
long as it is tenanted and sustained by a soul and not at other times.
But the Parioamavadin has necessarily to conceive of a state when
Brahman alone existed in an incorporeal or pre-corporeal state and
But a non-embodied Brahman
later produced the world out of itself.
cannot, on the very same analogy of man, produce anything.
It
would, in any case, be impossible to show that nails and hair are
directly produced from the soul
The example of the development of
man from childhood to old age pertains, in the opinion of all
$astrakaras, only to the body ( iariradharma ) of man and not to his
The ripening of wisdom with the advance of years and the
soul.
is

not, like the

appearance

of

virility

in

youth, are possible only in the event of a

body sustained by the presence of a soul. None of the developments

instanced can or is known to take place in the soul as such. And in
all

these

cases,

the

purely

physical developments are traceable to the

philosophy

170

oif

rI madhvAcArya

complement 1

physical part in the causal

with

Consistent then,

the

implications of these analogies, the Paripamavadin must admit that the

purely material part of

Brahman

can be credited with any

if it

is

the

material cause of the world and that the soul-part or spiritual element
in its make-up is the operative cause.
This would be tantamount to
a restatement of Madhva's position, in less accurate terminology. In
such a contingency, the material part will have to be regarded as
not-Brahman as there cannot obviously be anything material about

Brahman

This could give us but a Kevala-nimittakaranavada,

in

the

end:

tf *rit

snar tptwraftw u

ffcrft

(av.

i,

p. 13).

In so far as most Parinamavadins, like Bhaskara and Srlkantha, do

not admit

co-existence of a purely material principle

the

Prakrti

body of Brahman, the illustration

of scorpions etc. cannot, with propriety, be cited by them. Bhaskara
is
the only Vedantin who holds fearlessly to actual Brahmaparinama
and regards not merely the material world but the souls also as products
of Brahman. This lands him in further difficulties of having to visit
the miseries and imperfections of the finite selves also, on Brahman,
which can

against

figuratively be styled the

repeated assertions

ftremftfcr

up.

Ramanuja

sTTfrarftftft

go

to the

But

the

'

this

is

% ^m.

b. s.

i,

2, 8.

3^9RH?fS-

).

as a believer in Abhinna-nimi-

This gives him an apparent advantage over

Ramanuja cannot afford

altogether deceptive.

to

same length as Bhaskara and deny the co-existence of a purely

material principle called Prakrti, tho

and

contrary

texts to the

generally regarded

is

ttop&danatva of Brahman.

Madhva.

in

'

act as

its

'body

existence of Prakrti

'

*mww ^M

'

it

may be

Ramanuja

).

Brahman

frankly admits the

n WR^JRi cicqRwi^misr ^mii ^wpssm:

W* mftfo

subject to

^WWlWflcii.

NS.

p.

Sribhasya,

197

).

i,

4,

3.

).

CIUXIQUJ8

The

so-called

Off

BBAHMA-PAR1NAMA AND VIVARTA VADAS

Brahmopadanatva, on his view,

the procreation of a son

body

his

i. e.

by

really

is

ft^cWT *M:

The position of Ramanuja ultimately

on a par with

the father or the emergence

of nails and hair from the body nourished by the soul

aWtfct cffejT%

boils

II

AV.

down

i,

all

school, turns out to be a

The point

is

fully

smgqpsprar *mm*t

i*fftficf

aptTwf^f'?:- *r<#

Snfsprftr

3W

Hfe5R|Rt ftw*T:

^4^af5row?rPfWcf

<w.^tMiftd

II

flourish.

SffcN' '?qT$fr

'

*ffett,

^n??%fw^^Ti%a^raftt m

%fiRrc4si3PT:

his

Jayatlrtha in a searching analysis

and criticism of Ramanuja's position

vam

concerned

is

mere terminological exaggeration and

brought out by

).

by him and

of Abhinnanimittopadana, indulged in

talk

p. 12

to Kevalanimitla-

ktlranavada of Brahman, so far as the Brahma-caitanya

and

171

3rr?

qf^r#i

'

g=nfw

^ssjr%

gs%cts#f

mft *mm*m Hi+Hwvfen ^ch%,

MS.

i,

4, p.

197 b

x
)

The position of $rlkantha and other (Brahma)-$aktiparirjamavadins

like

1.

Nimbarka, Vallabha and

others, is hardly better.

For an exposition of this criticism, see

bhasya of Madhva, Madras, 1934

( p.

111 trod,

xxii

).

to

my

In so far as

edu. of

this

CatussUM-

PHILOSOPHY

172

Off

madhvAoAbta

&tl

(Cit)-&kti of Brahman, which according to these writers,

immediate substratum of the Paripama

part of

Brahman conceived

be the

real

far cry

it )

Brahman

thro'

acceptance of

its

Thus, in most cases, the

Cicchakti or Sat-sakti, as the case

Brahman

and untransforming
tenement.

in

as the residual

^rtftspfraft

*r

f^Wr^R^T, qftwrfiHT

is

this is a

The term
kara. It is

is

Pari-

Upadanatva

may

be, turns

aTOW%P8FHi

that remains unaffected

spirit'

gf^rr^sftsfa *

TO

its

convincingly established by Jayatlrtha

ftl^RT

* * *

3TF?-'$[

modes considered as

vm

variety

essential

>

aWgWSMVf 5WF1#T ^T^cRTO,

7%ji criticism covers every shade and

thro' aspects or

e.

i.

$$

II

(NS.

it,

$akti or

any given instance of change taking place in

This point also

ftl'Mk^RT^ l^Wi^rf:

I.

Even

so-called

out to be nothing more than an " Apadanatva "

'

from actual and immediate cent-per-cent Upadanatva or

namitva of Brahman.
of

call

that turns out to be

and immediate material cause of the world.

real

from

the Cicchakti

It is

Ramanuja would

as

distinguished

as Saccidanandatmaka, the latter ceases to

substratum of the change.

energy or 'body'
the

is

the

is

the soul-

p. 200).

of Brahmapartyamavada

pari of Brahman.

peculiar to Srikantha. Ciaehakti, on his

view,

is

Cidacitprapafica-

sometimes identified with Brahman and sometimes distinguished from

a loose procedure.

CRITIQUE OF BRAHMA-PARINAMA AND VIVARTA VADAS

As
at

all,

for the Vivartavada,

as

Quite apart from

culty of accounting for the obscuration of the

is

no theory of causation

does not accept any true effect that has got to be accounted

it

but only an appearance.

for,

strietly speaking,

it is,

173

there

this,

the root-cause of the appearance of the world. Thefe

difficulty than

the

is

diffi-

Brahman by Ajnana, which

again greater

is

even in the Parioamavada interpretation, in reconciling the

promissory statement of q*fil%Fto S^f^rFTq; with the illustration of clay

etc.

and the requirements of real Vivartavada

&m igtoSk =m% fop g#r

^W^'-

^^wtrsprt

'
1

would be truer

One

of the

rather than that

the wording

to say

sublates

terminological

it

qfaraft

from

iVm

w a sera'

is

"

many

not at

4, 6. p.

226

),

knowledge

produces or gives rise to any such knowledge

inexactitude.

3R<t

^ SRi%

The

expressions used by

).

more

There

is

sensible

The unreal

3sqrat

is

^mrfaRcP^fe

Cf.

merely

not

Uddalaka are
interpretation.

nothing to show that Uddalaka was trying to equate

with the unreal.

another

i,

sst-

an end to the knowledge of the many,

capable of suggesting a different and

There

NS.

jra%:

5ft ft

the Vivarta standpoint that the

or puts

%j ^erfa

arfd

WR"

rreRqrft

fR^T wr4cr get %^; aft f^rKRqc#i

It

siFJftcfct

the

many

something which has been mistaken for

&unkara, B. S.B.i.1,1,

But the

).

" in the promissory statement includes also things which have

all

been brought within the scope of Svetaketu's understanding

or misunderstanding: sjsjd gff *T^Ict,l In any case, the illustrations of clay

etc.

would appear

to

assume the

reality

of effects,- the connecting link

between the One and the many being nothing more than a resemblance; as
actual cause-and-effect relation

explained.

Clay

relation could be

is

unsustainable,

for reasons

is never the Vivartopadana of pots.

made out among the

pairs

named

in the text

distorting the actual purport of the terms of the text^

or ignoring some of them like

<?$,

iM

palpable travestyVof a causal argument

nail-scissors,

misplaced.

the

interpretations

of

and

ft

in the

$amkara

^,

and

without

or glossing over

and also

last

already

Since no causal

asserting a

instance

of the

Ramanuja are

PHILOSOPHY OF SBI MADHVAcABYA

174

The Advaitic theory

of AbhinnanimittopadanatVa of Brahman has

been discussed by Vyasaraya in his Nyayamrta, in the light of its
exposition by Prakasatman, in his Vivarcrpa. According to the Vivarcma,
there are three ways in which the position that Brahman is the material
cause of the world may be explained. ( 1 ) Brahman conjointly with
also

Maya

the material cause

is

upidina

of the world, like two

strands

make a string'. ( 2-3 Maya which may be

viewed as a power of Brahman or as dependent on Brahman is the
material cause and Brahman thro' its association or connection with
it is also, in a way, the Upadana thro' such Maya. Prakasatman further
explains that on the first view inasmuch as Brahman and Maya would
of a thread which go to

both conjointly constitute the materia^ cause of the world, there would

be no

of

violation

conjunction
Sruti

by

is

Nirvikara sruti which should be understood

the

Brahman

with reference to

Maya).

with

state of isolation,

in its

the

In

or

is

Vyasaraya

i.

e.

when not

in

other two cases also the Nirvikara

Brahman when

to be understood to refer to

Maya

it

is

not

colored

not acting thro' Maya.

He

criticizes all these explanations.

points out that

in

two threads conjointly going to make the string,

Brahman also would be as much an Upadana or transforming cause
as Maya
and there would be no point in claiming the Brahman alone
to be "Nirvikara" in the process.
Moreover, as both Brahman and
the first case, like the

Maya
the

are the material cause of the world,

essential

characteristics

Brahman

of

consciousness and bliss in the effect

that only

an

Upadana

is

intellectual

to

be associated with the

fied in claiming that the

in so far as

is

it

say that the world

reality

because

danakam),

then,

it

lind

reality,

cannot be said

effect

and not the actual

how

is

pre-

the Advailin justi-

Maya

not possess

the

or

Avidya ?
of

character

If

he should

Paramarthika

solely the product of Brahman ( sanmairopasame reasoning, he should refuse to call the

not

is

the

it

is

not solely produced by Anirvaca-

Brahman associated with Maya is regarded

changing and Brahman unqualified is to be accepted as Nirvikara,

niya
as

It

to

world possesses the character of anlrvacamya-

world " anirvacanlya " because

Maya!

the world

In that case,

a product of

does

by

Paramarthika

awareness of the essential characteristics of the

sence of those characteristics.

tvam

viz.,

we should expect
viz.,

Again,

the question will be

if

'

Is the qualified entity (

Vi&sta

to be designated

CRITIQUE OF BRAHMA-PARINAMA AND VIVARTA vADAS

as

Brahman or not ?

be unchanging

If

Brahman

regarding

the qualified entity

If

it is

Brahman,

is

could hardly

it

not to be regarded as Brahman, the question of

Upadana would simply not

as

transformation of the

175

Further

arise.

if

the

admitted then such transformation would

Vis'ista is

be of the same order of reality as the substratum, which would go against

the requirements of the Vivarta theory in which the product of Vivarta
It
cannot also be held that
has a lesser reality than its substratum.
transformation

real

takes place

illusory transformation takes

For, in order to speak

of a

transformation

illusory
difficult to

say that the

the

in

place in the

Vivarta at

Suddha

the

in

Suddha

is

also.

be some
would be

should

Hence

absolutely Nirvikara.

an

substratum ).

the

there

all,

only

while

Visista
Vitsesya

it

If it is

said that

no real Vikara in the Suddha, then, it would be equally wrong to

speak of any actual transformation in the Vifota too, since it is primarily
there

is

in the Vis'egana (

Maya)

that

any

transformation

real

taking place.

is

Upadana thro'
Maya and not directly, like the constituent parts am&u ) of threads
forming the cloth, Vyasaraya shows that the analogy is misplaced. The
As

for the third view that

Brahman

is

to be regarded as
(

constituent parts

atnht) of the thread are really the material cause of the

But the Brahman is not the constituent cause of Maya. How

then could Brahman be regarded as the constituent cause of the world
cloth.

Maya?

thro'

It

would be equally unavailing to define Upadanatvam as being the

The term " Upadana

substratum of an illusory change.

used
*'

in philosophical writings in this

clay ", which

is

the material cause of pot, as

illusory appearance of the

pot

illusory appearance of silver

Nor

is

not make the

Maya

that

term

as

other

'

of

silver.

way which

novel

philosophers

may please himself with such a diversion. But it will

Brahman the material cause of the world in the accepted
!

I^vara

Finally,
is

the material cause

ratum of the

substratum of an

material cause
in a

the

he

sense of the term

position

the

nowhere

the substratum of

Upadanatvam

has no relation to the connotation of

it,

'

is

would designate

one

the shell, the

spoken of as the

If the Advaitin proposes to define

understand

No

sense.

"

illusory

Vyasaraya points out that the

the efficient cause

nimitta

(upadana) and Buddha Brahman

appearance

of the

Advaitic

of the world,
the subst-

world makes the thesis of

PHILOSOPHY OF SKI MADHvAoARYA

176

"Abhinnanimittopadanatva "
read

into

of Brahman, so

the Prakrtyadhikarana of the

eagerly

sought

Brahmasutras, by

be

to

Sarhkara,

pointless.

Madhva
logically

and

thus establishes his point that Brahmopadanatva theory

textually unsustainable,

and philosophically unsound.

have to stick to Kevala-nimittakaranatva only.

The

a plurality of Causes.

dependent principle just

by Madhva under B.

S.

like

ii,

This will not land us in

clear fact that Prakrti

Space and Time

bar the possibility of plurality of causes.

1,

15, et. seq.

is

We

is

a metaphysically

(tho' eternal), will effectively

This point has been established

DOCTRINE OF ATMAN

V.

CHAPTER XXIX

ESSENCE OF SELFHOOD
Souls are conceived in Madhva's system as finite centres of conscious experience, each with a unique essence of
of individuality
as

its

is

that

own immediate

one

finite centre

The

experience, the experience of another.

non-transferable immediacy of

from another,

own.

its

of experience cannot

experience

that

essence
possess,

It is

this

one

self

distinguishes

in spite of their possessing certain similar characteristics

?IT5tTcrdsfirJTcr:

NS.

p.

507

).

Each has a

content of consci-

specific

is

nowhere

to be

distinct

ousness, reality and bliss and constitutes a focalization which

exactly repeated in nature.
personalities or

Their

very raison d'etre

best definition of the self

is

that given

WiR

is

common

exclusive focalizations of a

by Jayatlrtha

The

Universe.

*S^T>Tt iJ^W<g^a'

^lfcarftfcRT ^Wffirif srf^iftraft ( NS. p. 633 ). This refers to a

dynamic personality endowed with the triple properties of will, cogniThe basis of individuality is to be found in the
tion and activity.
uniqueness of ' personality ', which is a blending of consciousness,
experience and works, in proportion to its intrinsic stature {yogyatd,).
It is the core of all hedonistic, ethical and spiritual activities of man:
t

The nature of the souls, at its best, is said

and pure intelligence. It is essentially

ed

bliss

of misery or pain

Sffifa^FFWWW #RS

natural gradation of intelligence and bliss

in

UKt ),
a

one of unalloyfrom any kind

to be
free

tho' subject to a

cosmic

hierarchy

of

and subject always to the Supreme, in bondage and release.

The sense of misery, which is bondage, is external to their essence and
is brought about by a real tho' misplaced sense of independence of
initiative and conduct:
selves

3T3t fl^tsfiril^H gt'sft *Hfct TPJSIT

1,

P.

M.

Dasgnpfca unhappily has misread and misinterpreted

ITS. in his Sis. of In&.
12

JPMl

( iy, p.

113

).

ll

(B.T. p. 106

this

).

passage from the

PHILOSOPHY OV

178

jRI

MlADHvAcARYA

The question has been raised : "If each individual possesses in finite
and material outlines, the perfection of consciousness, it seems to become
a mere point of existence when it casts off the body and enters release.
Will there not be overlapping of souls there. ? If not, what is it that distinguishes one from the other?" ( Radhakrishnan, I.Phil, p. 719). In
other words, what is it that constitutes the essence of selfhood, if we are
to subtract from it, as we should, in the state of release, all the content
and vestures that enfilm its essence and are obviously incidental and nonfundamental to its being or make-up in each case ? " We seem to be reduced to an abstraction of pure being or intelligence, a monadism. It
is
''

merely then an assumption to hold that the single colorless unit, called
self ", is different in

It is

But

it is

now sub

each individual

".

easy to ask such a question or pass such ex cathedra judgments.

not easy to give a thoroughly convincing answer to

specie alierni.

Indeed,

we should

it,

here and

be in possession of the highest

which is the goal of religion and philosophy, if

and now, to place our finger on what constitutes
individuality and define it in precise terms.
That will be unravelling the
We
greatest of all mysteries, that has remained inscrutable for ages.
should cease to be embodied, if we catch our selves in their pristine essence of selfhood unconditioned by the floating perceptions of heat and cold,

form of

self-realization,

we should be

able, here

and shade, pleasures and pain. If the Advaitin could silence the objecAvidya with the lofty remark that "if we can understand the rela1
tion of Atman to Avidya, we must be beyond the two" the Dvaitin could
as well plead with equal propriety that it would not be possible to deny the
doctrine of intrinsic plurality of selves and their natural gradation, so
long as we have no means of realizing the true essence of selfhood here
and no means of proving that there is no basis of distinction in release.
Madhva does not, after all, lay stress merely on sensations, feeling and
light

tion to

bondage, in support of his doctrine of plurality of

the only

movements of the

show that the

lity

are

Avidya

real

It

selves, as if these

were

does not require much argument to

nature of the souls and their true essence of individua-

now hidden from

(

real.

us by

Svagunacchadika ).

some mysterious veil of ignorance called

Thanks to the light of Scripture and

and introspection, we may however expect to lift

and to take a peep into the truth of things and the
vision might be enlarged as we go up in the scale of discipline and

the exercise of reason

the veil ever so little

1.

Badhakriehnan, J. FMl.

ii,

p. 577,

KSSENOE OF SELFHOOD

179

Aparokga. We can arrive at some kind of working solution of the

problem now, by examining the evidences of Scripture and advancing
logically from the known to the unknown. This is the utmost that the
best of us can do and we need not despair or despise this method so
long as we have no other means of approach open to us. The individuality of experience and the impossibility of our entering into others'
experience, with the same fourth dimensional inwardness as our own, are
sufficient

proofs of the basic distinction of selves

SWRT ^ititoii:

{VMaratnavali,

ii.

CHAPTER XXX.

METAPHYSICAL DEPENDENCE OF SOULS

In spite of their

intrinsic nature

souls, as finite beings, are in

of consciousness and bliss,

the

a state of absolute dependence and limi-

bondage and release. Release is only from the

which prevent the realization of their true natures and their
metaphysical dependence on Brahman. Dependence is not a passing
tation at all times, in
fetters

chapter in their

The

entities.

lives.

It is

the very condition of their being as finite

expression of such dependence.

in the

pre-natal

^N#^t

helpless

deep sleep and

independence

%RT

of

life

WTR,

(B.T. p. 76), as

swoons.

It is

!r

WT

rifc ;

well

as

only in the state

man is found to arrogate independence to himself. He

and weak at other times, both before and after. It may
concluded

be

therefore

ftspTFRTC -tWWHIS!

dreams,

of sthlti that
lies

and post-mortem conditions

sJTfer, sfat

in Pralaya,

cosmos are simply the

Such dependence is most vividly felt

eightfold determinations of the

is

that

even

this

temporary assumption of

misplaced

ndlwi-ttrG

cRrf^K

atmSfoRi *frrt " n

am^J

5H%flTfR5lsS^

bt.

II

a,

18)

{Mary}. Up. C.)

The description of impending death in Chan. Up. VI.

15,

wherein

all

psycho-physical powers are merged in their causes, one after the other,
is

another graphic instance of the soul's absolute dependence. The very

fact of

God

its

achieving freedom from the shackles of Prakrti by the grace

an unmistakable proof of its continued dependence on HimIt would be preposterous to expect the essential metaphysical dependence of finite beings on the Independent to be cut off
of

is

even in release.

METAPHYSiOALfDKPENDKNOE
any time.

at

It

SOULS

Off

181

cannot be destroyed without destroying the very consti-

tution of the self qua Pratibimba

The

of the Infinite.

relationship

of

Bimbapratibimba between Brahman and Jlvas, being the result of Avidya, in Advaita, is taken to be destroyed in release along with the extinction of individuality as such.
But the same relation being Svabhavika
and not due to Upadhis, in Madhva's view, is not therefore liable to

Mokga.

destruction in
the

Madhva,
of

tion
the

of

persistence

Hence

personal

shorn

to

bliss,

the

Tb.8

obscuring

all

Mokga

of

JpfiMt

#ft

limitations of the soul are, therefore, partly intrinsic

extrinsic ones

are terminable.

***

The

(B.t. p. 4

intrinsic

associated

from

They are

life,

which include

and

life in

eternity with a series of material coils

Linga-iforlra or the subtle

sixteen elements.

number

has begun to bear

the seed of activity

is

It

Dasgupta
(

and

avidya

fruit,

(Z PMl.

iv,

( 3

self.

thro' the eight-

Mokga

also, to

are, nevertheless,

known as Avaranas.

p.159

Madhva's system "

is

Kama

positive ignorance

must be recognized as a

in

body or psycho-physical mecha-

both real and destructible. This

(iWPTM) 1
1.

partly

This carries the causal potentialities that lead

of future lives, in the fulness of time.

Karma which

which

and

remain with the

which they are subject. Tho' essentially uncreated, they

or

of

fold determinations of cosmic

to a

will

5RT^r: (AV).

limitations of the self are, in general expressed in

nism of

elements.

the realiza-

on the

dependent

is

full,

vimfai: s<Nr #nc*rr

The

of

state

3?H^**

extrinsic

persistence in release, also, along with

even in the

therefore, holds that

Supreme

The

its

individuality,

Prarabdhakarma

or desire which

*H<=H?MI*lHy, )

not simply a negative element

positive

force in view of

is

not

is

a negative substanoa which, by God's

veils the natural intelligence of all ".

aorreot

He

is

or Avidya

in

stating

has misread

the passage from the 2fS relating to this topic.

its

that Ignorance
will

and misinterpreted

PHILOSOPHY OF bI MADHVAoAbYA

182

being a product of

Tamoguna

independence and
self as his

own

this

Ignorance

getting destroyed

the assumption of

is

and looking upon the accessories given to the

initiative

own, in his

and

encircling the soul

by Aparoksajfiana. The essence of

right

cTWl'RHTfc'llWal' 3^qrfrftri$T

[NS.

The

locus of this Ignorance

is

the

Supreme Being which

is

self 's

is

not

inasmuch as

self,

Independent and All-powerful

witau^) obscures a part of the

SflT

26)

Such ignorance

self.

incompatible with the self-luminous character of the

the

p.

( 3TCferas?tT-

nature by means of Vitets.

This

two aspects - Jivacchadika and Paramacchadika.

The former conceals the true nature of the self ( qua Pratibimba and
positive nescience has

metaphysically

whereby

Brahman

on

dependent

man comes

from

himself and the world around to be self-subsisting

fisfN' siffo: 3ftaT

cW im$t
Indeed,

of bondage

*rn*t

the assumption of

it is
:

itself

to assume independence of initiative

ffsuqr

this

^-

(b.t. p. 18).

independence that

SPTI^MiWRl, *FW( (B. S. B.

).

believes

ft gorrcspr

*i*ftft *n

^JFrr^f^fiT

and

the root-cause

is

The marvellous hold of this

own weaknesses,

ignorance on people which makes them oblivious of their

while being alive to the shortcomings of others,
in the Visyurahasya

It

of the

effectively portrayed

is

would, thus, be seen that dependence

finite, at all times.

It

may

is

the distinctive

find expression in one or

eightfold determinations of cosmic development.

that

Madhva brings

It

is

more

mark
of the

for this reason

the eternal substances also, under the causal scheme

of Brahman, by means of the doctrine of Paradhlnavis'esapti 1 .

The dependence
also-.

He

God

Vedanta De&ka

^;i#^: qwoR^qig^rrf^ *m af^Bssite^t

defines such dependence as the possibility of reversal

pleases
(

f^sfBt

of eternal Bubatanoes on God, ii accepted by

to let

them

com, on M. 6, S.

p. 9.

OT,
Ananda Press Edn. Madras).

be

3<PH'39Rtol ftflSl^S

when

it

no longer

W^NHI ^

METAPHYSICAL DEPENDENCE OF SOULS

183

The second type of Ignorance prevents the souls from realizing the
on God and their intrinsic resemblance
There is no
to Him. Such ignorance is beginningless but has an end.
logical impropriety in conceiving of an end to what may be beginningless
and conversely of endless continuity to what may have a beginning,- e.g.
Moksa. These are facts accepted by reason and supported by $rutis
true nature of their dependence

3Fmwwr ?p
The

origin of

wc-

3RT

%%$m

bondage is also in the same way to be put down ultimateGod. There is no other explanation of the beginningless

ly to the will of

association of ignorance obscuring the selves except the mysterious will

of

Brahman

epvftsft

spsftsft

cfcT

q^T*?:

Wmkto 3%

t&

cfcT

%^: ^t m fa#* WtttR:

It is the will

of the Lord that the souls shall

respective selfhood only

Jig:

B, T. X. p.74 )

Skanda

by iridhara)

q.

know Him and

realize their

by cleansing themselves of the impurities of

Prakrti and the distractions of Avidya, after a long and arduous process

of physical, intellectual and moral effort and spiritual discipline. The seed

must be planted

The

fruit-tree.

the

in the earth before

it

material environment provided

themselves. This

Virturahasya

is

%%

^ W*8fr

arsforcpRRt

is,

God

etc.

are just

to help the Jlvas to unfold

f&'i^cti:

There

by

Karma

indeed the raison d' etre of creation according to the

^n^Rjforr ^sr

philosophy,

could sprout and develop into a

accessories of Lihgadeha, Prarabdha

is

qfcra?
gcrr

fcar

5frri:

iferr

all

of the

first

^ gf^sf%55T:

m qft JTtgw^

thus no problem at

The question

#?r

Chap.

Fall of

only of the Ascent of

Man,

).

in

Man by

Madhva's
degrees^

PHILOSOPHY OF bI MADHVAOARYA

184

after he has qualified himself steadily thro' sincere effort to realize the full

force and content of his personality.

and purity of the supreme

any way sharers
for

in the

any time

in their lives, or have

souls

came

Karma "

to " lose

these

Radhakrishnan,

/.

Karma

got the souls

(

beginningless

but,

ibid.

into

696

it is

nature of their Svarupa.

).

its

It is

in

arise

and transfer themPhil,

" Ramanuja holds that neither reason nor Scripture can

beginningless "

been "

Divine nature ", the question does not also

Madhva, of how the

selves to the rule of

" at

" Not having possessed the freedom

ii,

p.

tell

695-6
us

).

how

power; because, the Cosmic process

is

true enough that the cosmic process

is

the souls that forge their

own

chains due to basic

I'

CHAPTER XXXI

SELF-LUMINOSITY OF SOULS.
The

individual soul, as a sentient being,

be self-luminous
(

*liiWT

but

is

w*ri

a knower

conscious personality

is

the

^ifar

It

).

W% ).

same

^i

as

?t

=*r

is

Madhva

admitted by

to

not merely of the form of knowledge

is

The conception of the

in respect of

it is

#r

fa;

wm far ftf%T fa-aflft

%src:

<ffc

G. T.

xiii

as

self

God

ll

except for the fact that even the self-luminosity of the Jiva
the Supreme, which makes bondage possible :

is

dependent

on

#THt
Self-luminosity,

in the Advaita, is

a subject-object relation

But

WH+l*k4 dcWKlO. iffoifm

arfa&

pure consciousness, without

state of

W^^sq^R^l^l

3J%,

Citsukha

The Atman must be both a knowing

self-contradictory.

this is

>

own knowledge. He should know

known by them also. Jayatirtha, therefore,

subject (jnat? ) and the object of his

himself and others and be

Prabhakara view of the

rejects the

self as essentially jajLa, in that it is

substratum of qualities like consciousness,

The Bha^tas, tho' conceding the
action, enjoyment and suffering \
atman to be both conscious and the substratum of consciousness, hold
non-intelligent, being only the

that he

not self-conscious (sva-jmtr

is

aham-pratyaya

who
1.

ego-consciousness

).

),

This

but
is

holds that the atman must be self-intuiting.

itfHW^ui'

faciei**:

by Madhva,
The epistemological

fRT11^

^HUflfcl

'

only inferred thro

is

also rejected

Wife!

2.

*r*twr:

im& PtofoM'i

wm$ RA^rh.

aiftospsnci.1

^ ^ M*RwfitspRwr

#d^ET3?ft^ratrsf^3^PTrspi#Tr^

mflT ]

TP.

i, 1.

1.

ST

3 FWfl#l

Nyayaratnavali

* *m JTr-rotsgw

arrwr

barret

ft gpRifTrfctf^Rrr

cwrft

p?r^i

sfa^cftft

PHILOSOPHY OF

18Q

dogma

monism

of

MADHVAoAUYA

|3kI

knowledge cannot

that the subject of all

itself

be an

object of knowledge, for fear of offending the dictum of the impossibility

of the subject operating on

itself

3x^TFII$fa )
and experience.

is

unwarranted, by Scripture
" Visesas " in the self, enables
as

by Madhva

rejected

The

acceptance

of

to get over the difficulty of

Madhva

obscuration of the self's nature, in bondage, without denying the

law of identity. Vis'esa is the peculiar agency by which Madhva is able
partial

from

to divide consciousness

Such an explanation

itself.

will

not be available to the Advaitin, to

the atman. is essentially colorless

is

and

Pii%

aspectless (

whom
there

that

); so

to be great difficulty in accounting for the temporary and partial

bound

obscuration of atma-svarupa by Avidya or Ajnana

Wfa&m
5CTTO33.

The

*FifWt

fa&i:

(MayavOda

$arhkara

is

terra:

^wm

ft#?RRw

wn%-

^irpt

Kh.)

$rutis also establish the

^f^

such terms like

atman to be an

with the suffix

at pains to explain

away

tr )

employing

active knower,

in

the

active sense,

which

as a reference to a philosophical look'

back upon the world that was ( ^I^Hc^r &&: ). But this explanation
breaks down, elsewhere, in Brh. Up. i, 4, 10, where the Supreme Being

ing

is

said to have

known

itself

as

" I

am Brahman ", when

alone prior to creation in a state of blessedness.

self

must be recognized,

meaning.

existed all

it

The knowability of the

the pursuit of Brahmavicara is to have

if

The plea of ^KfaRftdw

not surrender facts to a mere dogma:

unsustainable here.

is

We

any
can

**$4Qsf*m. sfefPffe-RT 1<faR

Jayatlrtha says that the opposition of subject-object in a proposition like

know myself; if due merely to

ner of the grammarians as

the

way

'I

of defining objectivity in the man-

?W*fflclPwras?n#aRJ,

accruing from an act. inhering in another

),

(or "reaping

the fruit

could be overcome by rede-

fining subject

and object in such a way as to avoid the overlapping

ffcfim:

fttflfttW

3>cT?

^ IThe Advaitic

with any kind of self-luminosity.

The

tive content.

Such a content may be

The Advaitin

is

atman could not be invested

idea would presuppose

either one's

prepared to concede neither. The

some

objec-

or an " Other".

own

self

self

cannot be the object

SELF-LUMIHOSITSr

SOtJ&S

Off

187

of such a luminosity. The reality of another self'is not admitted. The only
,

sense then in which

we

in Advaita will be that

(Tdy.

t.

p. 18

of luminosity,

*&m.
fTO.

*B3cT

luminosity with

would be just non-luminous

(Tdy) which

has no

it

reference to either

In the absence of any objective or subjective reference

).

it

of the Atman as Svaprakasa

are entitled to speak

There

is

is

elucidated by Jayatlrtha

f^Rl%:
:

3*CTT

stu%

tp:
I

sfflRJRPT-

no reason to make an exception in the case of the

atman alone and claim luminosity for him even in the

objective reference or content

19 b).

KRJRT
si^Rl:

m^M Q&l mW! STO,

absence

Nothing beyond the pale of Pramanas could be described as

4^l^q<^^d^|<

>

VTN.

t.

p.

96b).

an

of

%c^f?cT (Tdy,

t.

p.

real:

OHAPTBB XXXII

MADHVA'S THEORY OF BONDAGE SVABHAVaJNaNAVADA

:

According to Madhva, souls exist from

He

Mahapralaya,

brings them

in

eternity,

At

a material milieu, under the ken of God.

creation 1 .

forefront of

to the

chaos of

the

the conclusion of each

He

has no purpose in doing so, save that of helping the souls 2 to exhaust
,

enjoyment ( bhoga ) the heavy load of Karma and Vasanas, lying to

from time immemorial and thus work out their destinies 8
Creation is, thus, an indispensable requisite for the ripening of individual
Karma and the full development of each soul. This self-development,
thro'

their credit

when complete,

leads the soul to

Madhva

its deserts.

thus guarantees

both the integrality of the souls, in so far as they exist from eternity, as
beings and the independence of God as their Ruler. This enables
him to meet and satisfy the demands of both the moral and the religious
consciousness of man.
finite

The bonds and

tial

nature

svarupa

impurities of the souls are not, however, their

at

),

any

rate,

of those of the highest order4

are foreign to the core of their being, like the rust

to be associated with

This event

Lord.

them from

is

to the Lord's pleasure.

for their

the beginning,

beginningless in time

They
on copper and are taken
pleasure of the

at the

but

essen-

is, all

the same, subject

He is thus ultimately responsible metaphysically

He threw them into it at a
(

bondage, - not in the sense that

certain point of time in history, but that its continuous association with

them
1.

2.

is,

in every way, subject to

Mlh. T,

Jf.

i,

3.

' sf

4.

*fcft

*(I*K

3Et

JHlU i Wcl

f i

'

and

riddance will depend on

its

1-3.

fr*rff<*3Frcq ft ^Ptsgtffejr

affiiwfrswpr

^T

Him

'

cTcT atlf

wn%W-

(AV

M^M^wwjWlft m%

f^TWRPr

tfftm

^W^1I-WW1P[I

tftfUftwH* (TP.)

sr^i (ibid.)
*j!ck4K-iftt.

qa; iptf

WVflwfo

ii,

1,

(NS.) cf.

33)

'

m fStw

BT).

#RT

(BSB.

II. 3, 31.)

*$&

MADHVA'S THEOBT OF BONDAGE

189

Its onset is rendered possible by the power

His grace and cooperation 1
of concealment or obscuration of the true nature of souls, which is vested
2
in the Lord and which corresponds to the " Tirodhana-Sakti " recognized
by $rikantha and in Tamil Saivism, as one of the five characteristics of
.

ParameSvara,

may, no doubt, appear to be a despotic thing for God to envelop

Maya8 but as already pointed out, it is a neeessary evil in the scheme of the universe. The association with Prakrtic
It

the souls in beginnlngless

bonds

is

a necessary step in the spiritual evolution of souls and is, therefore,

permitted by God.

It is

an ordeal

which every one of them has to

It
whatever that might be.

thro"

pass before attaining his or her full stature,

is

the desire of the Almighty that the souls shall

way and

this

And

no other.

in

there

is

fulfil

themselves only in

no questioning His

will,

He

as

is

Satyasarhkalpa.

The bonds of souls are thus real in that they are not imaginary.
They have no beginning, in time tho' depending always on His will. The
essence of this bondage

is

ignorance and misunderstanding of the true

God and of one's own self

<m <dMWI<-q|fl sft^FT "*&#rsft wfi% ^Tfrt %*m$R 3WKflft *fc*ll3, *HS8W*(3Mdi

nature of

MFfT

(NS.p. 64)
That is precisely what the Brahmajnanavada of Sarhkara denies.
According to it, it is the Brahman that is really obscured by ignorance and appears as the individual. 4 Madbva's view has certainly one
advantage over

it,

in

that

one can understand a

finite

being suffering

Brahman. The greatest stumbling block to the Advaitic view is that Ignorance can never
invade the Brahman which is both independent and of the nature of
self-luminosity and absolute consciousness (Svaprak&Sajfianasvarupam).

from ignorance

3.

but not an Infinite Independent

qrc ^fafHtifrfri qrl

Maya

is

Lord.

Madhva,

itself in

Advaita

<

mti

"

,s

cfJvet.up.vui6.

>

understood in Madhva's philosophy as the mysterious will of the

B.8.B. i, 4. 26 ). A similar power is ascribed to Ajnana
:

<H;{(M44l<Ku lftfcttftlftcl' JNll<li.l

!

Sarnksepaiariralta,

It is not inconceivable that a'Svatantra-Catana should

4.

Cf.

5fi)Rn%NT

mfo W8t 1

II

{BhanatV)

i,

have such a power,

20)

PHILOSOPHY OF

190

Madhva

rightly

points

out

lBf

MADHvAaABYA

weakness

the

and

of the

untenability

monistic theory of Bondage 1 .

?m ^ %r WW:

3 tlf^?lct
,c

?WFrat

srr ?

Brahman is the only real

come in ? If it is rendered
If

law sowr

that

is,

possible

^er

^^h.

t/p.

Kh.

where and whence can ignorance

by the intervention of " Upadhi",

the question would arise

about the Upadhi

a real and essential feature of Brahman or is

whether

viz.,

itself,

due to an

itself

it

is

earlier

layer of Ignorance.
A real Upadhi would annul Monism. To rely
on a previous ignorance to create a subsequent Upadhi would
give rise to a double fallacy of a regressus ad infinitum and a mutual interdependence between Upadhis and ignorance-layers. It is thus impossible

make out any logically intelligible relation between Upadhi and

Brahman. It is passing strange that so insuperable a difficulty should
have been represented as a point of honor to the Advaita
to

gfewf%PTr

iJJTW

1 g ^pnij

Commenting on Deussen's remarks

Masiddhi

that "

On

this

question

how

of

ignorance could possibly affect the Brahman, the authors of the Upanisads
" They give no inforgive us no information ", Radhakrishnan writes
:

mation because
nation

is

and

Phil,

( /.

information

possible.

ii,

which has somehow come

inalienable purity of

578

).

"

It

the

into

true

is

being,

in

no expla-

Avidya and Brahman can

we don't have any solution "

of

spite

self-existent

original

How

the problem for which

is

is

possible of the rise of the bewildering force of Avidya, creator of

false values,

eternal

no

co-exist,
( p.

the

Brahman"

577

just

is
).

Such

the solution of the problem of the origin of bondage, in the system

Samkara which is said to be " unmatched for its metaphysical

depth and logical power, where thought follows thought naturally,
until Advaitism is seen to complete and .crown the edifice " ( op. cit. ii,
657 ). The worst that could be said of Madhva's view of the origin of
bondage is that it involves God in a benevolent despotism. But Samkara's reduces Brahman to a position of helpless submission to its own
of

ignorance.

Certainly, there

is

much

to choose between the two.

:<;

Jftftkara, B. S, B.

ii, 1,

21

MADHVA'S THEOKY. 01 BONDAGE

'"

191

According to Madhva, tho' bondage is real, it does not follow

that it is eternal and indestructible. The possibility of its termination
-

does not make

any the

it

as

real

less

as

long

so

fact

lasts.

it

There
This follows from his definition of real as affn^tdsfafcilfW:
ignorance
is no difficulty either in conceiving of the final disruption of
i

and bondage as a
grace

The

of

God:

prolonged

result of the

sps^r

ctSTffrsr'Pnft

objection of the Advaita that

be destroyed

suffers

from a confusion of
If the

always the same as eternal existence.

(real)

ningless

ignorance

n%m:

(NS.

bondage were real

if

and the

effort of the Jivas

ftfft

ideas

Lord

p. 64),

not

could

it

for reality is not

wills

it,

even begin-

arfelz^lWW

can be terminated:

(NS). The Monist could not appeal to any such mysterious power
indepenof God, as self-delusion, thro' Ajflana, is hardly a sign of
dence and sovereignty of Brahman,

The essence of such a theory

obliged to dismiss any stage

of

kartrtva (doership) and bhoktrtw

is

that

it

bondage as
(

is

is

not

It accepts

the

realistic.

unreal.

It

of Jivas as actually

enjoyershipj

But instead
S. ii, 3, 33 ).
of realizing that these capacities of Jivas are derived from the Supreme
Being, the Jivas, in their ignorance, look upon them as self-derived.

existing in them, tho' dependent

This

is

AvidyU.

the self.

Such Avidya

Similar

is

is real,

both in

These are also as

ever, is that they are

'

much

real as .anything else;

look upon them as

and as our 'possessions'. The fact, how-

We, however,

entirely under our control

and as pertaining to
senses, bodies and their

itself

the case with buddhi, the

objects of enjoyments.

but God-given.

on God (B.

in our ignorance,

our possessions

',

subject to the

Lord

'S

wish.

These various possessions ', tho'

NS. p. 26 ).
essentially different from the essence of selfhood are not apprehended
self ',
by the selves as clearly and vividly distinguished from
on account of intimate permeation of the self in the. body and on
"TCFTmcflfafflft

3Rc&T

'

II

'

Hence on account of their inexcomes to regard them as his very own and

account of deep attachment to these.

tricable association, the self

terms of regarding himself as fortunate or

unfortunate and having a feeling of elation or shrinking of his personality
as a result. This leads to love and aversion and similar pairs of opposi-tes
of feelings in successive efforts to seek what is agreeable and avoid
is

affected

by their

effects in

PHILOSOPHY OF

192

what

is

by

known

of

this

misplaced sense of values.

is

is

the essence of

only true knowledge of the soul's relation to

from

it

this

bondage. The true and

thus, the will of the

Gunas

Every successive step

This

thus

what

as Samsara, leading to countless births and deaths in the cycle

It is

life.

redeem
is,

MADHVAoABYA

disagreeable in the embodied state.

directed
is

!Bf

final

God

that can

explanation of bondage

Lord and not merely, Karma, Ajnana, Kala,

etc.

The

objection that Dr. Chandradhar

Sharma

raises in his Critical

Survey of Indian Philosophy ( London, 1960), against Rfimanuja's theory

of bondage : " if the soul is essentially pure and changeless and selfconscious subject, why should it get associated with Karma and be bound?

Karma, it is already bound. Ramanuja explains

by the conception of a beginningless Samsara. But if
you have to fall back on something beginningless why not admit the
beginningless Avidyft ? " ( Op. cit. p, 371 ) cannot apply to Madhva. For
Madhva has gone beyond Ramanuja in tracing the origin of bondage,
ultimately to the Divine will, for reasons which will be made clear presently. Credit goes to Madhva for realizing that neither Karma nor Ajnana
can be the ultimate explanation of the origin of bondage of souls
If the soul

is

tinged with

this difficulty

( Dv&daia-Stotra )

unless such Ajnana is understood in terms of Svabhavajiiana as defined

by Madhva. The acceptance of Vis'egas in the nature of the Jlvas, by
Madhva, is a convincing explanation of the difficulty raised against the

'pure,

changeless

self-conscious

Karma and becoming bound' by

Sharma is very much mistaken if he

subject

becoming

associated

with

Dr. Chandradhar
thinks that falling back on beginFor both
ningless Avidya will be a panacea which will cure all his ills.
Karma and Avidya are equally insentient principles and cannot imprison
or obscure the

self

on

their

the Divine will.

own initiative.

It

is

conceivable

that the

finite and ever-dependent souls can be subjected to temporary and partial

obscuration of their full nature by the Divine will. But the other theory

of

monism

Itself

that the

Infinite

by throwing the

veil

and Independent Brahman

of concealment over

its

itself

deludes

own being

( Samksepaiariraka, \,2),

'

MADHVA'S THEORY OF BONDASE

and becomes

the empirical ego, to

subscribes

surely,

is,

agrees that " the

'

which Chandradhar Sharma evidently

not more convincing logically

why and

the

'

how

'

calls his

" or the theory of the souls

their

dependence on the Supreme

sftcRq ,

?ft wr^: "

" (op,

cit.

281

p.

).

view of the origin of bondage as " Svabhavajnaua-

vada

For he himself

regarding Avidya are illegitimate

'

questions and therefore an insoluble mystery

Madhva

193

ignorance of their true nature and of

'

WT

^ffPrraflreW?: "

*&: ITCfsanf^:

*mft

NS

P- 64 )-

fritwaWff

The term " Svabhava

",

by Jayatlrtha in six different ways. The first

explanation is as given above. The second takes " Svabhava " to mean
what is in fact and what is not imagined by ignorance. On this
view, Ajnana which is the cause of the soul's bondage exists in reahere, has been explained

lity

and

is

not merely something which

is

imagined to

Thirdly,

exist.

"Svabhava" signifies, "Independent Being" or God; fourthly, the

Thus, " Ajnana " of
Jlva's own nature of metaphysical dependence.

God and of one's own dependence is " Svabhavaalso explained as " Ajnana " that is induced in the Jiva by

the true nature of

jnana."

It is

the Independent Being

i.

Madhva contends
being,

still, it is

The

1
.

even tho' the

that

not

inconceivable that

own

true nature

ignorance of his

own

God

e.

true relation to

he

a self-luminous
become subject to

Jiva

is

should

and of the nature of God and of his

Him, as he is a dependent and finite being.
obscuring

of the incompatibility of ignorance

difficulty

aspects of a self-luminous being, which

will not arise in this

theory

for

the

" Sa-vteesa "

" Asvatantra " and also

would

arise in

Jlvas

are

here,

with aspects

).

by
It

help of such " Viiesas " that while some aspects of the
existence

l.

cf.

(i)

cttt

sraifa vr^eftft

(Hi)

w.

T#T

?ft

M. 13

definition,
is

self

with the
like its

are unobscured, yet others like ananda are obscured.

ftir,

P,

certain

Brahmajfianavada

wn$t

r^rcneta

5ft

^:

II

fft

m%:

m'
(

NS.

^flW^RfK:

(v)

p.

64

<m ^*#t
b.

is

^r vm. (ii) ^**t# hm%t%

wF%vwmm\ ^rcr wftsrt: 'irc^nl^fsmra:

#M

This

(iv)

cTTT

m^

^>TO^#r

#^

d|w-

m&,

ar?rFf

#rjt

philosophy

194

madhvAoArya

Off (rI

where Madhw's theory has an advantage over the Advaitic theory of

On the " nirvis'esatva "-view of the
the " nirvis'esatva " of. the Atman.

atman (or Brahman)

the

obscuration would

be simply

inexplicable

and inconceivable (p^flQ

Dr. Chandradhar Sharma dismisses the arguments by which the
Sarhkhyas and Ramanuja have tried to establish the quantitalive pluralism
of the spirit as "flimsy" {Op. tit. p. 168) and reaching not beyond the
empirical egos "whose individuality nobody denies" (p. 369).
It is
true that a quantitative pluralism of transcendental subjects cannot be

derived as a logical conclusion from the concept of Puriwas in the Sath-

and inactive beings, who take no

cosmic drama. But this cannot be said of Ramanuja's
theory of selves, in which the Purusas are active self-conscious individuals

khya system

as stereotyped, indifferent

real part in the

participating wholeheartedly in the struggle of life

from bondage.

No

for

their deliverance

doubt, monistic idealism thinks that there will be

inconsistency in holding one

and the same individual to be subject to

and achieving freedom from

actual bondage and suffering in the beginning

on in the state of Moksa. But as these two states of bondage

and blessedness are not coexistent or simultaneous, there is no inconsissuffering later

tency or violation of the principle of non-contradiction, in both being real

The contradiction is purely imaginary. There
states of the individual.
is

only a temporary obstruction of the capacities of the individual in

bondage and this obscuration is a reality and a fact and is caused by the
Divine will and its removal too is as much due to the same Divine will.
This

is

obviously the opinion of the Sutrakara

l

rcri%n*n3 ftdftcr <rat

mm ^rftwt

{b.s.

hi, 2,5.)

The idealist, on the other hand, is only trying to run away from the problem by dismissing the very problem as an illusion. It is difficult to see

how Svajnanavada

Atman or Brahman allowing

of

be deluded
and fighting mock

itself to

by Avidya and

getting finitized into empirical egos

battles to regain

its

is a better hypothesis than that of

however, one weak point in Ramanuja's
theory of selves that they are only numerically different, but otherwise

realistic pluralism.

essentially alike.

1.

Cf.

forgotten status

There

is,

Difference

|few#MT

*W>T

5T

and

distinction constitute individuality.

^m,

If

MADHVA'S THEORY OV BONDAGE

195

the selves are essentially the same, in every respect, there

in their quantitative plurality.

makes a

difference.

difference is

Madhva removes

no

it is,

essential for a reasoned theory of pluralistic realism

Madhva must admit

and Ramanuja.
that

Madhva

is

it

is

the failure

Even the most merciless

utterly consistent

quantitative and the qualitative pluralism of souls.

the critics

who have

been quick to point out

We
the

critic of

in

accepting the

fail

to understand

inconsistency in

and Ramanuja should not have expressly

improvement made by Madhva, in this respect.

the position of the Sarhkhyas

noted the

nevertheless, quite

and

that constitutes a logical inconsistency in the case of the

Jainas, the Sarhkhyas

why

it

anomaly by laying equal

differences among them.
The

emphasis on quantitative and qualitative

may be "peculiar" to Madhva; but
it

no meaning

this

doctrine

to accept

is

difference unless

CHAPTEE XXXIII

AND THEIR SVARUPA-BHEDA

PLURALITY OF SELVES
The
life

have

glaring inequalities of equipment,

rightly

been made

plurality of selves

by

the

endowments and rewards of

th starting point of the presumption of the

Samkhyas

gwgp? f^%>9%$rFE#

I)

Samkhya Karika,

18.

This stock argument emphasized by the Sarhkhyas and Ram&nuja has

been sought to be dismissed as proving nothing more than the plurality

of the

empirical ego " whose individuality

shows the

fallacy of this

inductively at

concerned as

that of our future

do throw any

and

light

differences arisen ?

by yet others ad
thing that

is

much with

We

destiny.

on

the

By

Madhva

'

distinctions

among

souls taking

Empirical facts and empirical egos

They have

cannot be laughed out of existence.

is

denies ".

argument by showing that we have to arrive

some fundamental bases of

empirical facts into consideration.

Philosophy

nobody

how

the

have to see

as with

empirical facts can or

if

How

of bamsara.

'

to be reckoned with.

problem of our genesis

have empirical

themselves or by earlier empirical ones and they

infinitum t

Do

fundamental ? Can

in the psycho-physical, mental

they presuppose or go back

the

all

and

upon some-

complex variations and differences

spiritual lives

of beings be explained

without going back upon intrinsic and fundamental differences in the ess-

ence of beings, with the help of the

Law of Karma

of beginninglessness (anMitva) of Samsara ?

an

illegitimate intrusion into

Hindu

the fact that even in the Sutras of

religion

alone or of the theory

That the theory of Avidya

and metaphysics

life.

selves

mental bases.

and try

to explain

But neither

the

is

from

as legitimate expla-

These two theories of

Anaditva of Samsara presuppose the

among

clear

Badarayana only the two theories of

Karma and Anaditva of Samsara have been mooted

nations of the divergences in

is

reality

them on some
law of

of

existing

real

Karma nor

Karma and
differences

and more fundathe Anaditva

of

PLURALITY OF SELVES AND SVARTJPA-BHKDA

Samsara

will be consistent

superimposed

as really

197

with a repudiation of the present differences

The impression

ones..

Karma

that the law of

and the anaditva of Samsara are merely empirical explanations

due to

is

an incapacity to understand their real and true significance in throwing

on empirical

light

comes

This point

differences.

out

clearly

in

Madhva's interpretation of the law of Karma as applied to the explanation

of

empirical

commonly taken
lives

of beings.

to

differences.

be the

But,

it

will

cosmic differences, unless

it

The inexorable law

of

Karma

break

down

an ultimate explanation of

as

admitted

is

that

differences them-

these

selves are in principle rooted ultimately in the nature of beings.

is

the decisive contribution which

tion of the

problem of

the principle of

life

Karma,

and

its

Madhva

has

He

diversities.

unerringly, to the

East or

originality

to the interpreta-

has thus gone beyond

No

other

Herein

this.

This

lies

(intrinsic or

philosopher,
the boldness,

and thoroughness of Madhva's approach to philosophical

He

problems.

West, has done

in the

made

"Svabhavabheda"

essential differences in the nature of beings).

in the

is

explanation of these inequalities in the

final

does

not stop

on the philoso-

at any half-way house

phical road to Truth.

It is

interesting to

note that starting from another angle,

Prof.

Albert Schweitzer, also, comes to the same conclusions Madhva, in his

interesting

work

Indian Thought and Its Development

"

How do

dual souls come into existence from the Universal soul and

reabsorbed into

it

The doctrine

how

indivi-

are they

of reincarnation in

no way requires the assumption that the individual souls have issued from
the Universal soul

with

it.

For

from the fact

will return to it again.

this doctrine, the

that in

eternity, there have

(

and

Indeed,

most natural thing

is

it

can do nothing

simply to start

a way which cannot be further explained,

all

through

been an endless number of eternal individual souls

which constitute the spiritual element in the

Universe ),for which

is

pres-

1
cribed the passing of a constantly renewed existence in the world of senses,

1.

With

this

compare Madhva's SvabhavajSanavada.

philosophy of

198

succeed

until finally they

in

winning freedom from

from

there to regard liberation

into the Universal soul as

madhvaoAbya

iSeI

And what

it.

need

is

the cycle of rebirth and return of the soul

equivalent

The

doctrine of

reincarnation

has no interest whatever in asserting such an inexplicable thing as that the

individual soul, in the end, loses

its individuality.

establish the fact that as a result of the

state of perfect bliss " (Op. cit. p. 61)

Karma
But

for

do

it

is

in

to

mine.

Italics

implies freedom of choice to

This

preference to another.
willynilly

among

good or bad.

right or wrong,

is

the crux of the moral problem.

the selves

Svarapabheda

are

not carry us very

down

thro' different

Karma

men

that

The

in the end.

It is therefore,

far.

of this quest-

in the ultimate analysis

),

All other explanations break

it is

We

thrown back on the hypothesis of innate distinctions of nature

Karma do
that

It is sufficient

freedom attained, the soul

does not explain why a particular choice alone has been made, in

it

ion.

are not

inequalities of

only a half-truth to say

all alike.

It

simply begs

the question and lands us in an anterior distinction of natures, aptitude

or outlook.
still

However beginningless

incapable of explaining

pursued

why a

the chain of

when
less

could not fully explain

answer
Desire

why

their start

also,

simultaneous.

to give to this question.

is

the seed of action.

it

is

Even a beginningless chain of

souls are not equally

all

Karmas too,

of them are equally eternal, their

all

and

be,

without reference to an ultimate differ-

in preference to another,

ence in the nature of the moral agent.

Karma

Karma may

particular course of action has been

It

Karma

is itself

good or bad,

equally beginning-

has no

self-contained

the effect of something else.

This desire or inclination must then be

admitted to differ in each case to such an inscrutable extent as to render

diversity of natures

absolutely alike,

it

and

activities intelligible.

ses of action pursued

by them as a

heavy load of Karmas,

result of which,

thro' ages.

opportunities and rewards are to be

freewill of souls, they

l.

of,

sR*ftncw

If all souls are constituted

would be impossible to account for the different cour-

must be

If

made

attributed to

gftcT^a^r (A v)

they

accumulate a

these inequalities of endowments,

consistent with freedom

an

essential

and

distinction in

AND SVARUPA-BHBDA

PLURALITY. OK SELVES

their very nature

and

The plurality of

constitution.

199

souls cannot therefore,

be explained with reference to the material plane alone, as

would not

it

explain the difficulties involved in the theory of anadi-karma, unless these

distinctions are

proposed to be dismissed as

not

running away from the problem and not solving

Sarhkhya doctrine of plurality of selves

out, the

basic defect
sB$R[ftr

^rgpoigct

w?m\

f#q:

*tr?

^Htfcf

[NS.

As

it.

really

If

plurality

from

ences, including Karma,

No

ground

of essence
tion of

among

selves

is

and

upon a

it

Madhva

multiplicity without distinction

among

rule out individual

too subtle

variations

to be obvious.
exist,

is

possible to

all

plicity

on

and

character

There

is

the ground

no

that

would be inconceivable,

of

selves is to

they

identical
is

may be

thus

and not

distinguish between likes

on the

tho'

may be

is

no way

any real

alike, there

can

two beings in creamerely similar to

the idea of

material

objects,

basis of difference in

But in respect of

which are impartible wholes, there

have

bound up with

In the case of physical or

except thro' an essential

which

underlying variation of degrees

respects between any

would be

organization of parts or atoms.

souls,

souls, in the sense of

dnanda,

infinite scale

if plurality

Difference in essence

fundamental peculiarity.

an

in

However much

justification.

If there is, they

tion.

is

objects to this

of essence

But such

be no absolute likeness in

each other.

him. there

every respect.

in

to

The same

Cetanas. Sameness or equality of essence does not

must be recognized to

meaning or

According to

jmna,

endowed

All are equally

distinction of measure.

particularly

ever hope

could

to,

among

distinction of Svarupavis'esas,

inclination.

of natural selec-

would be consistent with pure reason.

qualitative gradation of properties of

it

principle of innate distinction

invariable concomitance

the weakness of Ramanuja's position.

no basic

it

influ-

doctrine of plurality of selves that shies at

good or bad which that would lead

give a solution that

this

^ 3 m&t

must be grounded on something more than Prakrtic vestures and

this logical decision to

is

be ultimate,

to

is

this

Jayatirtha points

suffers

^wfer^JWcltEF

?rcfa

p. 32J.

But

ultimate.

spiritual

entities like

to account for multi-

mysterious distinction of natures

PHILOSOPHY OF &&1 MADHVAoAKYA

200
(

Svarupabheda

Heaven too, on
little

or Svarupa- vises, as which are not the same

We have to extend the same

individuals.

And not in the course

all

And

centuries yet to come,

not the

infinite resource

Of Nature with

Can ever
Or
ordinary

the

numerable units

and

and

the

to distinguish

all

about

The wide range,

life,

for

may

are

lives

be just

all

with them

each with very

real individuals

Even

Madhva,

so, to

the constitution of

many

so

all thro' their

the Divine

knows

the souls,

of

basis

essential

in their natures

then, of deep-rooted inequalities in the lives of the

human, animal,

plant, aquatic

and other

could not be satisfactorily explained except on the hypo-

thesis of intrinsic differences

tialities

sheep

"

one soul from another, on the

embedded

living beings, extending over the

species of

shape restore

characteristics.

who knows

peculiarities

little

they

in daily contact,

Shepherd,

quite repeat the past

just thy

passer-by,

sum

her countless

but to the shepherd who

different features

how

of
his

daschhund

Of

lives

any two

in

Kingdom

the

famous lament on the death of

the analogy of Arnold's

"

To

to

principle

good or bad.

It is

of nature, expressing themselves in potenno use, says Madhva, to take refuge

against this inescapable fact in so-called disparities of past

These Karmas

the lives of beings.

Karmas shaping

are, in fact, conditioned

by some

sub-conscious influences of past deeds and unseen merit accruing there-

from

adrsta

which, again, presupposes an earlier merit

that another and so

on

endlessly.

We

a practically beginningless gradation of

or for bad, termed SHTf^i^PTNffiT

are,

thus,

fitness

and

or natural

1,

Quoted from Pringle Pattison, Idea of God,

p, 208,

adrsta

and

left

with

potentialities for

good

fitness

(See Chapter XLIII).

ultimately

or IS by Madhva.

PLURALITY OF SELVES AND SVARtjfPA-BHEDA

201

unseen merit which determines the disparities of Karma is

and devoid of a reason at any particular stage in history,
the same excuse could be trotted out at the outset; so that the very need
for a previous birth and belief in metempsychosis could be dispensed
If

inexplicable

with,

If this

unseen merit recedes in an interminable cycle, we have

really a beginningless distinction of essence

in

a different manner,

previous merit and that

d' elre

by

but

another,

in the intrinsic nature

not produced by a

taken to find

is

among Souls

soul,

we

its

raison

accept the

3pntfj^pPj)TOT5f^

),

3TR5f^t

1^N^^&

fsrftf^sqt

(AV.

The uniqueness of individual experience

ties

potentialities accepted,
is

and worth of each

principle of intrinsic differences

without further ado

and

such unseen merit

If

adh. 5-6).

hi, 4,

sf^IT

and the inequali-

of equipment etc, point ultimately to the existence of an inalienable,

incommunicable essence of personality which underlies

all

states

experience and coordinates them into a meaningful whole, which

seen to be

repeated or to overlap in any two cases.

seriously contended that there

is

It

is

of

never

cannot be

actual overlapping of consciousness in

release where all material conditions fall off,

Such overlapping would
be inconceivable without identity of essence here and now, also, and
identity of consciousness
nalities,

purposeless.

would render

If it

the present multiplicity of perso-

should be true then, that there

individual throughout the Universe, that one being

to co-ordinate to
centres,
3$ftfs ).

which

is

itself

Moreover,

all

matically released, the

main.

the experience of

not the case, so far as

all

we

is

really

one

in a position

apparently

are aware

selves struggling for

moment

other

must be

different

Cf. SHSRRtsfirErr-

freedom should

get

auto-

a single centre gets switched off from the

The very existence of both freed and bound souls at

the

same time

philosophy of &b! madhvAcArya

202

is

a proof of their

BT/5T

distinction

fS^ g^rST^frf

and plurality

gw

HSTFIf

*Rm%WHimr ^

Vadaralnavali,

of

ii).

The theory of Svarupabheda of Souls elaborated by

thus, the only solution of the agelong problem

*R: ffe

Madhva

plurality

is,

of selves,

freedom and freewill. Questions like the following have been asked
by thinkers, all the world over :- " The Jiva was not created of a void,
at a particular time.
But he is, nevertheless, an expression of the nature
of God. How then does he happen to be so imperfect while his archetype is also the type of perfection ?" St. Augustine's agony of soul was
still more poignant
'Who made me ? Did not God who is not only good
but goodness itself ? Whence then, came I to will evil and nill good, so
that I am thus justly punished 1
Who set this in me and ingrafted in me
this plant of bitterness, seeing that I was made wholly of my most sweet
God ?" ( Confess, Bk. VII, 4; 5). The question is answered by Madhva,

their

'

under B. S.

ii,

3,

51

sncf^lW

Ki^WTi^f^l^ti^^
beginningless

fo*ft

on

Karma, Vidya

%f%^T

which

'^ql'qif^i^^^r

'

is

3M-

a fundamental difference

the basis of

etc.,

difference in nature. This interpretation

Svamin:

WOT? sfreBlfaWTftfa

in

upon an intrinsic
clearly endorsed by Raghavendra

rest ultimately

3TS1u%*rJT

'

q^^&ar^

f%f?r-

(Bhavadipa, p. 224 b ). This above is an original and

suggestive interpretation of the Brahmas&tra in question by the Madhva school. It goes beyond the commonly accepted theory of Karma for
Ifar^ "^fPstWlP^

and inequality among

and precise than
which would not be adequate as an

an ultimate solution of the problem of

And

souls.

the solution given

the vague one of

'

original sin

is

',

distinction

much more

definite

explanation of inequality of nature.

It is,

thus, in the nature of

of others to will good and

nature and these, in the

enough
will
is

for

some

souls to will evil

and

nill

good and

Yet others there may be of mixed

" neither good
language of Hume, will be
evil.

nill

These
a supper, nor bad enough for a drubbing ".
" Nitya-samsarins " of
Madhva. It
to the

correspond

thus only a half-truth to

Augustine

doing

evil "

to why,

when one

contrary ?

is

).

say

that " freedom

The

" free " to

Not because one has

must

question

will

good and

free will

is

nill

the cause

of our

inevitably arise as
evil,

one does

the

For, the same will might

PLURALITY OF SELVES AND SVARtJPA-BHEDA

have suggested to him the other course

That

it

has

208

not done so

depend on something more fundamental and foundational to

of the individual.
dual,

Svabhava.

his

this contention,

may
is

be.

Thai something, says

The

It will

be

Madhva,

difficult to

however distasteful

to one's

tripartite classification

is

the core

of

must

the

nature

the

indivi-

dispute the ruthless logic of

amour propre the conclusion

of souls, put forward by Madhva,

only a comprehensive theory embodying the same idea of Svarilpabheda

and giving
will

it

a definite shape in the form of a broad generalization.

be dealt with

in the

next chapter.

It

CHAPTEB XXXIV

RATIONAL BASIS OF INTRINSIC GRADATION

AND THEIR

SOULS

AMONG

TRIPARTITE CLASSIFICATION

Madhva's doctrine of the Soul insists not only upon the distinctiveupon an intrinsic gradation among them based
on varying degrees of knowledge, power and bliss. This is known as
Taratamya or Svarupataratamya, which comes out all the more clearly in
the released state, where the souls realize their true status. This position
is
peculiar to Madhva and is not found in any other school of Indian

ness of each soul but also

philosophy. Together with the allied doctrine of Jlva-traividhya or tripartite classification

samsarin

come

of Souls into

in for a

good deal of

( 1 )

Muktiyogya

salvable

(2)

Nitya-

Tamoyogya (damnable), it has

adverse criticism at the hands of modern

ever-transmigrating

and

scholars.

These

criticisms suffer mostly

mya and appear

to confuse the

from sentimental

Madhva

bias

against Tarata-

doctrine of Svarupatraividhya,

with the Calvinistic theory of Election, without examining the ethico-

on which the twin theories of Traividhya and

Taratamya are based by Madhva. The theory of Election rests upon a
dogmatic exercise of Divine prerogative without reference to the worth or
philosophical grounds

eligibility

of the souls chosen for deliverance or damnation.

In fact,

no room for any question. of fitness or eligibility of the souls, in

the view of Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin, that " each soul is specially
created and made to vitalize the embryo at the moment of conception" 1
The Madhva doctrine, on the other hand, is a philosophical theory intended to justify and reconcile the presence of evil with
divine perfection, in the only rational way in which it could be done, by
fixing the responsibility for goodness or evil upon the moral freedom born
of diversity of nature of the souls who are themselves eternal and unthere is

created in time.

This question has been discussed at length by Alexander Campbell

Fraser, in his " Philosophy of Theism " ( Gifford Lectures, 1894-6 ). His
conclusion affords a striking parallel to the position of
is

Madhva

and

it

not unlikely that he would have expressed himself more decidedly in

favor of the position taken up by

Fraser's analysis of the
this connection.

1,

problem

Madhva, had

is,

it

been known to him.

therefore, of great interest

Says he

James Ward, Pluralism and Theism,

p, 453,

to us in

TRIPARTITE CLASSIFICATION OF SOULS

" The mixture of good and evil in the Universe

Theism and a challenge to

lieve that all is as

it

it.

To

believe

in

ought to be and this

is

205

a sure enigma to

perfect goodness

destroyed

is

if

is

to be-

anything

is

found existing that ought not to exist, however insignificant the place in
which it is found or however rare the occurrence. Pain, error, sin and
death are the chief evils in our world. Sin is absolutely evil.
Pain is the
correlative of pity and sympathy. It is natural and, therefore, a divine
means of education of spiritual life. But the continued pretence of what
is unconditionally bad cannot he disposed of in this way.
How to relieve
the mystery of moral evil, including what seems an unfair distribution of
pleasure and pain and an unequal adjustment of opportunities for moral
growth, has been a human perplexity from the beginning. [Italics mine ].
It finds expression in the Hebrew poets like Job and in the Greek dramatists like Aeschylus.
How can it be reconciled with the goodness of

God?"
Discussing the merits of three possible solutions of the problem in

Imperfect Deity or
( 1 ) a Manichean Dualism or
( 2 ) an
an Indifferent Power of the Monist, he continues : " that this world
of good and evil must be the issue of a constant struggle bstween two
rival and eternal powers, the one benevolent and the other malevolent
is an explanation of these strange appearances.
This is symbolized in
terms of

Zoroastrian anthropomorphism of
subversion of the primary
dualistic hypothesis.

ethical

Ormuzd and Ahriman.

postulate

A similar difficulty

either that the Universal

Power

is itself

must alone

attends

Its

Monism which

a mixed good and

implied

discredit

evil

this

concludes
1

or that

Manichean Dualism in the form of two eternal powers

or Monism of a single eternal power partly good and partly evil or else
indifferent to good and evil are both inconsistent with the indispensable
moral hope and faith.
both are unreal.

"Can moral

be a necessity of finite personality or of the intractmere negation ? Several attempts have been
to explain the fact of evil in a morally governed Universe.
Some
evil

ableness of matter or a

made

are conjectures formed at the expense of moral perfection of the UniverPower. Others explain away moral evil as an unconditional necessity

sal

of

finite existence

by referring

1.

As

it

to a

or treat

it

Tempter

".

would be

in the

as an unreal negation or hide the difficulty

Pantheism of Bhaskara and others.

PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHVAcARYA

206

Then comes
"

the Professor's

own view

The question why God admits

to involve

:-

into His Universe

an unproved assumption.

assumed, cannot co-exist with God.

As moral agents, persons must be free

proved.

that are

bad

To

say that

if

God

volitions that they ought not to

is

is

bad seems

to originate voluntary acts

or undivine as well as those which are in

Divine order.

what

What ought not to exist, it is

But this dogma has never been
harmony with the
produce

perfect, free agents cannot

is

not to vindicate divine perfection, but

Omnipotence cannot be power to realize contradictions.

God cannot make two and two five cannot make a square circle.

to destroy

it

Inability in morally responsible persons to

much a

contradiction, tho' less obvious.

originate evil acts as well.

make themselves bad,

If free to act,

as

is

one must be able to

Offences must needs be,

if

persons

exist.

It

does not appear that even Omnipotence can exclude what ought not to
while there are beings whose essential character

exist,

is

that they are able

who can make and keep

themselves bad,

to bring this into existence.

Is the existence

only

of persons

transitory episode in the history

of the Universe; or must there be ever

bad persons increasing in number and increasingly bad ? The question is

incapable of settlement. That the moral agency of persons, their personal
power to depart from their moral ideal, deepened and confirmed by habit
may become an absolute final "election" to evil by themselves, which even
Omnipotent God cannot overcome, consistent with the
of those

who persist

in

keeping themselves undivince,

is

free personality

one conjecture

1
.

It

involves the mystery of existence, in the Divine Universe, of innumerable

persons increasing in number and becoming worse. 2 Another possible

view

is that such persons and their acts are capable of extinction by God
and only morality progresses so that only the good are allowed to survive;

those

who

persist in ungodliness being

reduced to unconsciousness 3

Per-

man's present moral education requires that this mystery

should remain unsolved as a teleologically needed mystery" (p. 320-21

haps,

Italics

mine.

This answers to Marlhva's view.

2.

Cf.

fgaq^j qpj|% n

cW
3.

OT:5ttRTir

Tamoyogyas

^fap^

3T

TfT

m\m\

II

Mbli. XII, q. by

Madhva

TRIPARTITE CLASSIFICATION OF SOULS

207

Judged in the light of these weighty remarks of the Professor, it will

be seen that the doctrine of innate distinctions of nature among souls,
propounded by Madhva, will have to be recognized as the most necessary
presupposition of the Hindu law of

Karma which would become

a vaga-

rious principle, in the absence of such a basis of distinction of the charac-

and behavior of

ter

souls. Sir P.S.

Sivaswami Aiycr,

in his

Kamala

Lectures

1935, p. 143 ) conies to very near conceding as much when he admits

frankly that " tho' the doctrine of Karma professes lo explain the origin

of evil and suffering,

it

does not really do so,

inasmuch as

infinite regression as expressed in the doctrine that

it

Karma

is

involves an
anadi".

As

forTraividhya (threefold classification) of souls, it is only a comprehensive

hypothesis based on the same premises. It may not be flattering to human complacency, as the doctrine of Sarvamukti may be ; but no
spurious or irrelevant considerations should be allowed to interfere with
reasoned metaphysical investigations, which should be carried on in an
atmosphere free from all passion and prejudice and from personal and
sentimental predilections. " We want hard and straight thinking and not
soft or emotional or sentimental thinking.

Philosophy should say what

does not matter whether it pleases or irritates. It must prove
logically derived conclusions and not defend at all costs, pious wishes and
is

true.

It

pleasing imaginings.

It

would be unphilosophical to endeavour the

by a pretence of its dangerous consequences

refutation of any hypothesis

"1
to

and morality

religion

paragons,

on

it is

the motto

'

If there

is

a possibility of moral and social

equally possible to hold that there

Evil,

be thou

my good

'

may

be persons

who

act

and such Satanic conduct could

only merit eternal misery.

The doctrine of intrinsic gradation among souls would follow as a

matter of course, once the principle of their plurality is admitted, as in the
system of Ramanuja. Much more so when the prerogatives of God are
not claimed for the released souls and certain irrevocable limitations are
set to their sovereignty in release and so long as God is
put down as the
inner guide

( Antaryami and $esl )

of the souls, who are subject to His
niyamya ). If the souls attain to a position of absolute equality
with the Supreme, in release, it would be difficult to find a rational
basis

control

for the stupendous difference between

s ouls,

1.

had

still

Radbakrishnan,
pp. 13-14.

them and God, when

they, the

be en in bondage, suffering the worst miseries, while

the
Reign of Religion

in

Contemporary

Philosophy,

1920,

PHILOSOPHY OF ^BI MADHVAcAeYA

208

The Ramanujlyas,
God and claim
that the joy of Brahman is enhanced every time a new soul, attains
release and comes to It, 1 could hardly deny that the bliss of Brahman and
of all the released souls, at any time, will be several times more than that
Supreme remains untouched by

who

evil

and

suffering.

posit a reciprocal dependence between the souls and

of any of the souls

still

weltering in Samsara.

to justify such a vast difference between them,

But what could be there

if their original and basic

Why

nature are the same ?

before the others and enjoy

should some souls alone

communion with Brahman,

longer period than the rest ?

Why

should the others lag behind or be

denied the opportunities and advantages, so long

of the later arrivals in Moksa,

long

get released ages

for a considerably

why

If the

All explanations of such difficulties, based on

fault

be that

should they have been delayed so

Karma would be

unavailing in the absence of an ultimate appeal to the diversity and gra-

Why

dation of essence.

dependent for ever on

exempt from the

ills

should God
Him? Why

alone be Independent and the souls

should the

Brahman be

for ever

of Samsara and the Jlvas alone consigned to suffering,

at least for the time being ?

What law

of nature could this be,

if it is

not

one of Svarupa-taratamya between two sentient beings, God and the

human soul ? Why, again, should the Brahman alone be unlimited in
space

aparicchinna, vibhu

as essentially atomic in size

and the Jlvas put down ( in Ramanuja's view

crpu ) ?
These and other essential distinc(

tions between Jlva

and Brahman, naturally, imply some kind of an

superiority of the

One over

the other,

i.

e.

intrinsic

to say, Svarupa-taratamya,

It would be preposterous to say that the Jlvas, who realize their essence
by the grace of God, manage somehow to shoot up to a position of
absolute equality with the Universal King, overnight.
Such a position
would be not only blasphemous but would offend all logic and commonsense.
It will also be a betrayal of the spirit of religion inculcated by

the Scriptures

(R. V.

1 3c*Wtown%;: falser:

Gita, xi 43

*r

1.

acSmfl wn^B* S^lcT

yet Up.

Vide the passage from Nltimala quoted on

vi,

p, 17, In.

).

).

vii,

99,2).

TRIPARTITE OLAHSJFiUATION OK SOULS

The

209

recognition of a special class of souls called " Nityasuris "

are ex hypothesi exempt from Samsara, for ever, like

God

who

Himself, in the

system of R&manuja, not to speak of the recognition of a class of

" Nityasamsarins " l also, by a section of the followers of Ramanuja, will
be similarly inexplicable without the acceptance of an intrinsic gradation
of souls into ordinary and " elect "

and so on. The higher position of

would also point to a natural grada-

$esitva to Sri vis a vis the Nityasuris,

among

tion

souls.

The classification of souls into human and divine ( cleva ) in

Hindu religious literature is no passing show based on Karmic dispaThe Brahmasntras recognize the gods as a set of specialized
rities only.
One Bruti text
beings and discuss the question of their privileges.
refers to

?)

who

are

Devas" 2

dvaitins recognize the existence of

Ananta

"

the presence in the state of release of

Sadhyas (muktas

As

earlier batches

of

already mentioned, the Viis$a

Nityamuktas

who always remain

etc.

like

Visvaksena, Garuda,

free from Samsara, that entangles

The Vedic and Puranic literature assign to the four-faced

Brahma a very high place among the gods, not only as the Creator of all
but as the first-born son of the Supreme Being and as the Saviour of
mankind

other souls.

% mM <^*nft <$ 4

fl

tpwMrWTR <fOTt

Wm

zmffil
In the Taitt. Up,
desires " in

Puranic text

i.

of.

2.
r.

m,

fl

( ii,

W?fr

^Ftt mcfo

mim

ll

).

Pra&na Up. v,

2).

Chan. Up.

iv

5,6

(q. by fkrhkara).

released souls are said to realize all their

1 ) the

eft 3i

qj^sng:

TattvamnMdMdpa,

m <$ mm #<? ^t:

u

SWft^t

(&et. Up. vi, 18

company wkh the wise Brahma. " This is supported by a

quoted by many commentators on B. S. iv, 3, 1 1

^ spgpn;
(

I %[fr qffhfa cfW

^t: q#fj^ timffi l^rer

n\^[

Y'odSntii Dcgika, Medical Hall Press,

i

'

q%

Bannras, p. 138.

PHILOSOPHY OF &KI MADHvAoAeYA

210

1OTI% awiwii:
In this and in another text

'
:

nR*ifti

<?TH;

ifc

q^ n

WFlft

'

the four-faced

Brahma

is

given a premier position as the Great Usher of the released souls into the
presence of the Supreme, as their Saviour and Guide. In fact, all other

who have attained enlightenment in the course of a particular

Brahmakalpa, are believed to bide their time and wait for the four-faced
Brahma to be released and to conduct them to the Kingdom of GodThis role of Brahma is a striking proof of his spiritual excellence and
superiority over all other souls.
Such a distinction in rank must necessarily confer on him some kind of extraordinary merit, not found in or
attainable by the others. This pre-eminent position of Brahma as the
souls,

presiding deity of Mahat-tattva or the

table.

"

We

are told that

intrinsically "

endowed with four

evolute of Matter,

%q rf*

lies

is

indispu-

in his being

great excellences

^IH^yRtW 3RT sfcM

ife4

first

such special merit of his

snrfej

^'Wcl:

^^

i)

Similar excellences possessed by other Devas of the

Hindu pantheon and

by them, oblige

references tothe marvels of spiritual discipline attained

Madhva

to formulate a comprehensive theory of intrinsic gradation in the

Cosmos, 1 upon which the whole of reality is grounded in a scheme
of graded and graduated order. This cosmic scheme of gradation is

entire

omnipenetrative, says

Madhva, running up and down

the

from

scale

the highest of gods to the vilest of fiends

# AnrPi4 mil jwiwwten^? (av. p. 48 b.

Gods and men

are not equal in their basic nature, and powers

).

or

in

the innate tendencies for good or bad; which determine their future deve-

lopment. 2

This doctrine of intrinsic gradation of souls

able hypothesis of

human nature and

destiny, suggested

and supported by reason, revelation and experience.

2-

fff

^^TR1N?pnt

(**)

is

thus

a reason-

by the moral law

TRIPARTITE CLASSIFICATION OF SOULS

" Evolution

not only a

is

movement forward.

observe a marking of time and

back.
is

It

must be so

". 1

still

more

211

many

In

cases,

Madhva,

Individual development, according to

The progressive

only an unfolding or an unwrapping.

we

often, a deviation or turning

differentiation

of selves into one or the other of the three classes is contained in the germ
and embedded in the being of each. This reminds us of the Leibnizian
theory of pre-established harmony. Taking a comprehensive view of
human nature in all its aspects, we find that some men are intrinsically good and some are intrinsically bad and the rest,
perhaps
the vast majority
are
midway between the two tho' it
of us,
would be impossible to assign any individual to a particular class

We

without superhuman insight into his fundamental nature.

could

draw a generalization of the basis of the consolidated

experience of humanity that all men are not alike and there are many
however

orders of goodness, intelligence and ability

We

ignorance and weakness.

Even

thistles.

so, every

corrupt tree brings forth

temptation of Satan

good

evil

among them,

as also of

evil,

can't gather grapes of thorns, or figs

good

tree brings forth

Adam

fruit.

and Eve

but Christ thrice said

fruit

succumbed to

" no "

his

to

of

and every
the

Tempter.

History and the national Epics of every land are replete with the records of
the highest acts of purity, benevolence and self-sacrifice, of ordinary kind-

We must,

ness and diabolical cruelty and fiendishness.

full

its

view of

nature

human

nature at

its

best

and at

and destiny, uninfluenced by

its

'.

sentimental

Taking, then, the immense and irreducible diversities of

Madhva

deration,

holds that

we could

therefore, take

worst and adjudge

considerations.
life

into consi-

not satisfactorily account for the

presence and continuation of evil in a world created and ruled by a most

perfect Being unless
others.

it

is

taken to be natural to some as goodness

Without such a fundamental division of

disparities

of

life

reflected

in the

seemingly

human

unfair

is

to

nature, the

distribution of

pleasure and pain and opportunities for moral growth are not satisfactorily explained.

merrily, while

is

a millionaire's

who

the pauper scowls jealously at

grinds his teeth at the injustice of Fate.

1,

son

Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 109,

The

rides a

him as he

light

Rolls Royce
flies

past and

of law and religion

PHILOSOPHY OF Hl MABHVAoARYA

212

have not yet penetrated many dark comers of the world, inhabited by
barbarous

tribes,

while they shine brightly

Why ? The

elsewhere.

Karma

law of

the quest for an ultimate explanation of

bilities.

It

evil, certain

to

its

cannot explain

on more

fortunate beings

could not carry us very

in

good or

given two alternatives of

why,

far,

such bewildering inexplica-

persons show a marked tendency towards the one and others

opposite.

Moral worth, knowledge, works, experience,

heredity,

opportunities, culture, none of these explanations of diversity solves the

riddle pushed to

found

its

attracts

and

gives the

deflects the

first

move

Karma

solution could only be

final

It is

the

magnetic needle which

of souls according to

own

its

currents and

to their career

^few#r mre^ vmz

i
It

The

point.

starting

in the inherent nature of beings.

would, therefore, be

Gtta

illogical to dismiss the

theories

of Svarupa-

bheda, Taratamya and Traividhya of Jlvas, on extra-philosophical and

Criticisms such as that "

emotional grounds.

of divine love emptied of

spiritual possibility of

all

God

on

view of Predesti-

this

much compromised and the quality

meaning " and that "unless we believe in the

nation, the moral character of

is

everyone that bears the human form divine,

not have a really useful ethics" (Radhakrishnan,

we

can-

not only
betray the very weakness to indulge in " soft and emotional thinking "

and

to

understanding of

religion

the

true

rests.

After

matter

vidhya

is

whether

nature and

it

pleases

As

bearing

Madhva and

philosophy

no doubt an unpleasant

cannot be helped.

1.

all,

morality" 1 ; but

and

Traividhya of Jlvas taught by

it

Phil. ii,p. 751.)

attempt to refute a hypothesis " by a pretence of

to

consequences

not

/.

has
or

to

say

irritates.

truth,

the

the

what

The mere

anU.

on

true.

is

of

which
It

does

doctrine of Traito

some.

fact that a

Against which the Professor himself has spoken in bin

in Contemporary Philosophy, quoted

incorrect

doctrine

premises

The

dangerous

an

also

of

uncomfortable

Prof. Thilly says: "

its

JMgn

That
theory

of lhiigion

TKIPAHTITE OLASSIFICATIOV OF SOULS

leaves no

room

for freewill, immortality or

213

God, does not make

false,

it

even tho' belief in such ideas should happen to help us over the dismal
places in

life

1
.

gloomy truth

cheerful falsehood "

is

companion

a better

such as Sarvamukti

).

It

thro'

would be

life

than a

irrational

to

discredit the intellect because its conclusions are not flattering to the future

of homo sapiens, in

all

cases or because

it

want, or the heaven we want or the

need

", as Prof. Thilly has

persuade us to paint

1.

it

does " not give us the world we

" The diremost

God we want ".

shown, " cannot make black white, tho'

white "

Quoted in the above-mentioned work, p,

14,

it

may

CHAPTER XXXV

TEXTUAL EVIDENCE OF INTRINSIC GRADATION

AMONG
Madhva and
Vedic

his

SOULS

commentators have cited many

texts

from

the

and post-Vedic literature, in support of the acceptance of the

Traividhya
obvious

among

Jlvas.

and prominent

It

enough to indicate only the most

will be

which the

these, in

of

doctrine

The passages point

discernible or has been expressly taught.

the prevalence of a religious tradition in which the doctrine

ted and handed

down and which

other

currents

of

unable to expurgate altogether.

Texts from Vedic Literature

ft

JTt

PRf% m$t

=%prr

fiftl

rrgRfH,

#fe STCWdfltcT
4.

SfsfcCT:

II

f% f% Wtfftm&i

5fflt$*:

X, 48,7

{r, v. vi, 47, 16)

\\

R. V.

vi,

47, 17

RV.

vi,

47, 21

swrnc^Si cra% Jri^ra^

^TW^ WIT

\{R.V.

#. v.

i,

182, 6

is

clearly

clearly

to

was accep-

thoughts

were

) ))

TEXTUAL EVIDENCE
Set

g^rf AiMicwfew:

3^ TO

q$

#ET

cT

II

A. V.

ap^FT cUTOF

Ji-iwi'r-viciluiwH^:

*mmm
10.

r. v.

qi^

#**

%si

Off

SOULS

104,1

vii,

104,5

vii,

fcTT:

JS3. C/p.

3\&w<

^w ^wusaw

* *

rai

Post-Vedic Literature

OT^T^W PK^Wiad

11-

%ft

12.

^ ^Rpff w$sRn<%r ^m *p *r

13.

upg Hfa lt%r

14.

3f#

15.

$fa(\

T^

T3T

TST

^rt

^Tf

xvi.

**WN>*ll

TR# %T cTW# =?

16.

17.

gfcTMTCft feSPTT 1T<WN<WU|':

*M l#Rraf^:

*ftftfa fcfc *

II

xvii,

% 2pfS; ^ U&W (xvi, 3)

ii*?: srirtrht #0rft

^jf

?f# Jtt^PTt jfH (xvi, 20

mfvffi

18.

Gita. xvi,5

g^IT 3WT >rES^t cIPM: (xiv, 18)

flcrfct

215

agS^ft^fa^:

8.

GRADATION

01?

*r?T3*t n

si*
*

II

sMg.)

(/p.

ii.

philosophy uk inl madhvAcAkya

216
19.

m TFK 3^pt%m:

Xfftm

m cw.-^iwt

ct*t

tottoj.

11

;flwnra#( ^i^sfH^^r

(Padma,

q.

gfrwst: gCTfrw?3

JT^JTl:

toff ft?3

^cfNft

3^Ti<##T:

The

Hue

existence

has been

\'t

snavas.

2U!i. f.

#wr

accepted

The

a.

There

is

no

"

1,

21

II

*rwq??R5:

II

Vtenu-Rahasya, Ch.

class of " Nityasamsarins ",

of a

73 b

VUfiu-Rahasya, xxxiii

tioned,

B. S. B. in,

rrtrsgrr:

mWmwmmm, tort

^a^fcf

x, p.

Madhva,

stifero

tp

xii

BT.

q.

HFnWT: 3WRR:

gfTcTRj f#rqT TpFT

23.

Mbh.

ft^crr^'irpar ffelH^WTtf'W

22.

Paramasamhita

21.

q?f

in

the

Vis'istadvailic

as already

tradition

'

men-

also and

Hayuthyuu " are most probably the Tengalai-Vai-

referuueu

in

the

writings

of

modern scholars

Indian Philosophy, to the acceptance of this peculiar position

re.

oil

the classi-

fication of Souls, in the ancient tradition of the Vi&stadvaita school itself.

Dr. Uhaudradiiar Hliarma's

no exception tn

thin.

.1

Ofilioal Survey of

/.

Phil.

(London,

19(50 ) ih

TffiXTUAl, ffiVIDENOK

by some early Naiyayikas

^RRTT%t
The

too, as indicated

%wti%c*?wr %rar%srrW=F,

#rr<w?#pft wmferwrarfrf
references,

ORADATION

01.'

by

to

the

217

Jayatlrtha in his

W#rUTrw^M (NS.

#jRt ^mr*r$3<H

according

SOULS

01'

siwra.

commentators, are

iii,

p.

547).

3, p.

ns.

NS

548

b).

to the view of

We also have it on the authority of

Citsukha that certain Vateesika thinkers like Kandalikara ( i. e. ^rldhara )
-

Udayanacarya: &#RWI=rT. ^l%tRJ?H:

and Lllavatikara held the view of nityasamsSLra for

*?*5teirii3<%: tet$ff*af$r#|:

^^^rtfterori;

some

souls

ll

(Citsukhi, p. 357).

It

The doctrine of Traividhya is not thus an invention of Madhva.

has the support of Vedic and post-Vedic tradition and is the natural

corollary of the doctrine of SvarUpabheda of souls without which the

Hindu

doctrine of Karma would have no force or meaning.

It is not
simply an extension of the Samkhya theory of Traigunya or based upon
it,

as

is

sometimes

superficially

assumed

The

'.

metaphysics are but the modes of Prakrti

Rajasa and Tamasa applied to the Jlvas in

three

gunas of Samkhya

whereas the terms Sattyika,

their tripartite

classification,

according to Madhva, have reference to their basic nature of Caitanya

going beyond the play of Prakrti and

(Gita, xvii, 3). This

where he
is

clear

interprets the

further

?& Wfr^

1.

is

and more

gunas

term

?f^T5TT

explicitly rendered

Moo R. Nagaraja Sarma,

qqwQJ;

'

*ft

^S-"

5f

from Madhva's comment on the above

(

*f#l T5r )

f$g

Reign of llealism
"
tfcpqfa qafarExhr

tpf

?t:

verse,

as f%TfT3<Rr which

by Jayatlrtha as

(G. B. Prameyadipika, Xmi, 3

II

6B4. Of.

its

PW

%fT :^, after

).

in

I,

pp. 174, H53

SamKliya KariM)

Phil.,
(

and

CHAPTBH XXXVI

THE SOULS' RELATION TO BRAHMAN

have been
dependence
between the Jlvas and Brahman. Commentators have also added some

more of
" Abhasa

make

own

their

" Rupa-Pratirupa

speech and

of

Several, figures

used in the Sastras to

" Agnivisphulinga "

",

" CMyapurusa

",

occur

the

in

Terms like
" Sartra&rlri *',

these ideas.

interpreting

in

choice,

" Amsamsl

",

expressions

symbolic

clear the relation of metaphysical

",

original

texts.

The

Advaita philosophy looks upon this relation as one of Adhisthanaropyabhava ( the substratum and the superimposed appearance ) or ( Bimba )Pratibimbabhava.
Sesasesibhava.

Raman uja

prefers to call

For reasons already

it

as Sarlra-s'arlribhava, or

Madhva does not

set forth,

subscribe

any of the ideas underlying these terms as understood by Advaitins,

Bhedabhedavadins and Vis'istadvaitins. He has therefore thought it fit
to give a new and a deeper significance to the term Bimba-Pratibimbabhava, met with in the texts and use it in a symbolic sense of metaphysical dependence of the Jlva on Brahman. Along with it, he has also used
the other terms used by the Sutrakara viz., Amsa-Am&, Abhasa-AbhaWe may now discuss the
saka, which he interprets in the same sense.
to

question

the

fully.

The term " Bimba-Pratibimbabhava "

significant passage in the Bg Veda

The underlying idea in all

the

derived by

Madhra from

5#WJTFF

3^PT ^T

is

is

without

no creation of Jlvas
literally

selves

reference to their
is

47, 18

( vi.

these expressions

One independent Source of

found in the individual

is

the same, viz., that

Brahman

consciousness and activity

reality,

all

).

and which cannot therefore be explained

dependence on Brahman for their being.

As

admitted, the figure of Pratibimba should not be

construed in the sense of the Jlvas, being the actual reflections

projected by

Madhva warns

Brahman

like

that

of a concrete substance on a mirror.

his readers against taking the Scriptural descriptions

the Jlva as a Pratibimba of the

Brahman,

That is why he
no medium of reflection

actual reflection.

is

that there

is

in its gross physical sense of

of

an

so careful and particular to insist

upMhi

in this case.

This

wou ld

SOULS' RELATION TO

THffl

BRAHMAN

bring out the difference between Madhva's and Samkara's

at once

conception of the Jiva as a Pratibimba of Brahman.

latter, the

Jiva

is false

appearance or projection of the

But, to

God and

According to the

Brahman on

This relation therefore can be transcended

screen of Avidya.

all

219

Madhva,

the souls

the relation

Aparoksd,nubhv,ti,

43

the

^faST

).

of Bimba-Pratibimbabhava between

a sacred and inviolable relation, which

is

is

true for

time and goes to the very core of the Jiva and constitutes his very

essence and could

never be

missed in
complete realization of this intrinsic relation of metaphysical dependence and similarity
Pratibimbatva, according to
(in some respects) with the Supreme.
Madhva. is not a false relation, of which the Jivas are to be ashamed and
should try to shake off, as in Advaita. It is the truest and most beautiful
Samsara,

is

realized in

annulled.

Moksa.

Its

Moksa, in

full significance,

fact, is the

permanent bond with the Supreme Being and the purpose of philosophy is
progressive realization, by the Jiva. The two doctrines are thus dia-

its

metrically

opposed

Madhva brings

out the idea of metaphysical dependence, contained

in the various expressions,

the idea of a

of

1%>H

3W 3WT t?c#T^RTcRm

analogy

all

is

by a proper interpretation of them.

man and

first

his

There is
shadow, in one of the Upanisads
:

Prakna Up.

dependence and similarity

iii,

3. )

The point of

this

The two outstanding features of a-shadow are its resemblance to the original object and its dependence upon it for its existence. The Jxvas, also to
some extent, resemble Brahman ( B. S. ii, 3, 29. ) and are metaphysically
" Amsa-Amsi" also, condependent on It. Hence the figure. The terms
^MWIll^ra %*$:
I^WSM &
vey the same truth
The analogy of SRI5OT also conveys the idea that
( NS. ii. p. 453 b
God is immeasurably more than and superior to the souls, as the subThe shadow is there because of the
stance is greater than its shadow.
The
;<. but not vice versa.
substance
Substance. It is bound to the
The
shadow
reciprocal.
and
not
unilateral
dependence is thus
form. The souls have the
is outwardly similar to the substance, in
same form of reality, consciousness and bliss, resembling Brahman's
;

)'.

%W

^mw

II

philosophy of int madhvAcAbya

220

It

should always be remembered that analogies should not be stretched

The point of

indefinitely.

the

analogy

is strictly

confined to the ideas

of dependence and similarity and nothing more.

his

Abhlnavacandrikd,

of

Pratibimbatva

therefore

of the Jlva

reminds us that the

rightly

merely a

is

Satyan&tha Tirtha,

figure

figure

technical

in

Pari-

bhajika and has nothing to do with the conventional sense of the term.

Madhva

also gives a similar warning

(AV),

^rrt&tlH} ft3[#r

that

we

should not stretch the analogy to the point of the lifelessness of the

Pratibimba

atwrftfotfa =ta<5

NS.

p.

505

It is

}.

the association of

the ideas of physical reflection

and the presence of an Upadhi, in the

conventional usage of the term

initial

as current in the Advaita

that cause an

confusion in understanding clearly the nature and implications of

of Bimbapratibimbabhava, according to Madhva.

the doctrine

should therefore be

strictly

guarded against. That

special attention to the fact that the analogy of

This

why Madhva draws

is

reflection

pratibimba

should not be taken to presuppose the existence of any reflecting medi-

um

between Jlva and Brahman. The reason

immediately render the reflection transient

non-eternal. That
( ST

%<H

M$%[

significance of

would snap the

that such a

is
(

anitya

medium would

impermanent and

),

relation of co-eternity between the

TOW), Commenting on
the emphatic particles

B.S.

iii,

" 3RT

iff

^"

two

Madhva shows

2, 18,

in

the

drawing equal

attention to the points of comparison and contrast in the employment of

the simile

The points of contact are the possession, by

q^Elf^RI.

Jlva, of certain characteristics of reality, consciousness

to those

of Brahman and depending upon

It

and

for them.

the

bliss similar

The points

of

contrast

from an ordinary

medium

(Upadhi)(2) not being liable to destruction by virtue of the destruc-

tion

of Upadhi and

(3)

are

reflection

what sense he

is

is

not being conditioned by a

not being an insentient (lifeless) effect.

Madhva,

significance of the Sutra, according to

what sense the Jlva

(I)

lies

in

to be understood as a reflection of

not to be understood as

the Sutrakara on the two expressions

'

reflection.

The

pointing out

in

Brahman and

in

The emphasis

3?cr *t&' point

full

laid

by

unmistakably to the

THE SOULS' RELATION TO .BRAHMAN

221

reasons already stated by him, on which the Pratibimbatva of the Jivas

These have been rightly identified by

rests.

and

?JRHKI??

taught in the preceding Sutras

which

also implies a point of contrast

by adding

rider

is

ii,

3,

Madhva
28

iii,

as firsrs, cfap-ftra

1,1;

ii,

again well brought out by

Elw4V*irtli3Hf. If

29.

3,

no point of contrast

It

Madhva
is

inten-

ded by the Sutrakara, the suffix " ^T/* in " ^cT tn-j =<ft<wr g^Rifaflr."
pointless and redundant as pointed out by Jayatlrtha and the

would be

3tfT rr^

Sutra could as well have been worded

What

^#$1^: OTTT

emphasized by the figure of Bimbamore than an essential eternal metaphysicaldependence of the Jivas on Brahman. This relation is natural and intrinsic to them and is not conditioned by anything other than the nature of
the Pratibimbas, such as Avidya. This is achieved by making such Pratibimbatva an essential characteristic ( svalaksaya ) of the Jivas, resting on
an intrinsic relation nirupMhikasambandha ). Were it not so, the relation itself would be snapped, the moment the Upadhis or conditioning
factors that have caused and sustained the relation cease to exist.
The
would then be no more
But since the Jivas and Brahman are
both ex hypothesi eternal in the Vedanta, their mutual relation, too, must
is,

therefore, sought to be

pratibimbabhava

is

nothing

Mm

be equally
It is

of

so. So,

Bimbapratibimbabh&va must be eternal

easy to see that any relation that

Brahman and

the Jivas themselves

is

(WiWlt).

not grounded in the nature

could not be
a relation

Obviously,

eternal.

Hence, Madhva is
justified in thinking of a fresh and more lasting relationship between
the Jivas and Brahman, which would be true of them in bondage and
in release.
He finds such a relation in the symbolism of " Bimbapratibimbabhava " which is actually foreshadowed in the fi.g Vedic passage

Avidya

is

and cannot

not,

be, such

4 Si Jrf^t snjsr which he quotes in his Bhagya. There is evidently a

deep scientific idea behind this symbolism. The objection that all ordinary
;

reflections are

brought about by conditioning factors

is

met by pointing
Even

out that here we have a symbolism and not a prosaic analogy.

otherwise, the point of the illusration could be understood in a deeper

metaphysical sense

i.

of.

alaukika

f%f% f=tejpn^

than in a conventional sense

ftTO<fRRng:

laukika

).

philosophy of

222

im madhvAoAkya

however, in deference to the

If,

letter

of the Sutra, and the technical

requirements of ntciRw, one must insist

medium

upon having some

sort of a

Bimbapratibimba relation between Jlva and

Brahman, also, Madhva has suggested that the Jlvasvarupa itself could be
treated as the Upadhi. This is called " Svarupopadhi ".
This is a
complicated idea. On this view, the Jiva would constitute both the medium and the reflection, by the force of his own internal Vis'esas. This
point will be explained later. The introduction of the idea of Svarupopadhi is for the purpose of denying the presence of any external Upadhis
in the relation of the Jiva to Brahman (as there is in Advaita:
in the case of the

The same

Madhva

the case with the other expression " Abhasa " used

is

the Sutrakara

50 ). This term also

(
the ideas of dependence and similarity
B. S.

ii,

signifies

3,

by

according to

asrroiiR!Pd tat ^ursffr?rra;

cmiicii3

&4: t g

gjNr%*
(

It is needless to say that

NS.

sftfaowitefa
p. 505

).

dealing with such intricate problems,

in

we

should not vulgarise thought by the admixture of popular fancies and

superficial associations of ideas.
Madhva goes into the etymology of the
term Abhasa to bring out the hidden sense of the term in which
the

Jiva

referred to

is

explaining the

two reasons

that his

( 1 )

rely dependent

*rtf

wfi

3fa:

) that

is

he

exists, like

basis of this explanation is

3#ih sre^

JRTOf

Brahman. Jayatlrtha,
termed an Abhasa for
consciousness of himself and of others is entithe

of

that the Jiva

on Brahman and

The etymological

srwilt

an Abhasa

as

point, writes

*rr **

*rr

qWcTRTCt:

*nt

NS.

II

3*r

thus

nfeswfa^r *n%

p. 505 )

Tattvam

asi " in

amrret

iwwsfft

new

interpretation of

terms of the Bimba-pratibimbabhava relation between

Jiva and Brahman, in his commentary on Madhva's Tdy.

Elsewhere, in his Bhasya
illustration of

l.

^r

Consistent with this inter-

pretation of Abhasa, Jayatlrtha has also given us a

'*

set

Brahman.
forth by him
the

on

the B. S.

Madhva

has given us another

a puppet in emphasizing the conative dependence on

wm*u ftftrfa annrcRt, j^t# mft

n%m aFrrecT ^#r ki^

^ft

srcftat

(ns. p. 505)

a^P*w^c):

God

wi

THE SOULS' RELATION TO BRAHMAN

may be noted

It

223

Sutrakara also ascribes the

in this connection that the

This is merely to
3, 41 ).
emphasize their dependence. It is not as if, human beings are like
puppets without life or initiative. The Pratibimba has no indepencreative

dent

activity of Jivas to the

activity

G. B.

f|

ufcrf^W f&TT

*T

( ii,

It

ftrf&m fWFTW.

which should be carefully interpreted to signify

f^m^as

pointed out by Jayattrtha

In his Bhasya on B. S.

Supreme

ii,

3, 50,

G. B.

p.

t.

Madhva

8:5

).

brings out the implication

of the figure of "Bimbapratibimbabhava" between Jiva and

by drawing a

dependent on external media

not so dependent

#?
The image of
the external

*i

is

there

no

the

Upadhis.

instance

face

medium

reflected

the Jivas

Madhva

cites

which
to

an unusual

is

m\ V<:

the mirror
it is

II

is

liable to

entirely dependent

on

disappear as soon as the

is

destroyed.

But as

any time the mutual relation between

1

cannot be attributed to the action of any

a beautiful illustration of the rainbow as an

a Nirupadhipratibimba of Paramatman.

in

0f -

it, it

requires further clarification

what sense the phenomenon of rainbow

3#TRft

#lt

^ aftssfflTcJTT efdBdfriqqf

ftc^t ri5?pr viftm:

As

with a deep philosophical significance,

illustration,

not obvious on the surface of

is

show

and those which are

of a Nirupadhi-pratibimba of the Sun's rays, to elucidate his

conception of the Jiva as

this

in

of mirror and

|aid4iit: f^rrit

destruction of the Jiva at

Brahman and

sopadhipratibimba

removed from the range of the bimba or

mirror
is

the

nirup&dhipratibimba

Brahman

between ordinary reflections which are

clear distinction

Madhva,

f<farf\*fc&&&

is

Brh. Up.

Sanatsujatiya

to be understood as

philosophy

224

on'

&tf

madhvAoAbya

medium.
As everyone knows, the
The
falling on drops of rain water.
rays enter the drops and are refracted and again reflected and then broken
1

a Pratibimba without an external

rainbow

into the

caused by the Sun's rays

is

components of " vibgyor

The raindrops

We

act exactly

have to conceive

as

" as they

emerge out of the raindrops.

prism

the

the

in

laboratory.

physical

as the image and the

the Jrva

medium

at the

same time. The mirror merely throws back the light falling upon it.
The raindrops, however, receive the light and they let it traverse
through them and let it emerge out of them again and in this process
exihibit the glory of sunlight.
The raindrops must be deemed to be
active, unlike the mirror

which

merely passive.

is

This beautiful simile of the Sun and the rainbow given by

Madhva

of the relationship between the Jtva and

Brahman in a very impressive manner. The Jlva is the agent, the
His Svarlipa has the potency
vehicle for the manifestation of the Divine.
brings

out

the

significance

and energized by the Divine light falling upon it.

of God, of His love and goodness, His compassion
and other auspicious attributes is from our association with godly men,

which

is

activated

What we know now

His devotees, who,

in their lives,

manifest these virtues.

raindrops that reveal the majesty and the glory that

white rays of the Sun. By this analogy,

lie

Madhva wants

to

They

are the

concealed

in

the

convey that every

one of us is a tiny raindrop which still has the potency, the capacity to
receive and manifest the divine light. The figure of Bimbapratibimbabhava thus gives meaning, expresses a great philosophical truth and value
and establishes an intimacy of relationship between Man and God, which
is the noblest truth of philosophy and religion, to be attained by us.
The reader can see in this and in Madhva's equally beautiful interpretation

That the rainbow

is

also popularly regarded as a

be clear from the IlhasyaMpilm

( p. <>!U

Sopadhipratibimba

which dismisses such an

pretation of Mio above passage from tho Madhva- Uhasya as

3?&Rf.W2?*rnreg

sricrft*R2?

3 #r

awr

m %$ ss&m

awn*

>

will

inter-

untenable:

%i%g, #m%itfcrfW*R3T 5^-

'prra^ifwr

zmpmft

ssRrropn

THE SOULS' RELATION TO BRAHMAN

225

and mystic inward-

of the Sutra Ambuvat-agrahancLt the poetic quality

ness of his conception of the eternal and intimate relation that binds the

Jiva to Brahman.

The conception of

Madhva

clarifies the

" Svarupopadhi "

whole position

'#^l'l'%fi>Tr

^m^mm

iTtrfj:

arrfrr

s^riM^i^t

3i5Jr4di

This " internal

medium

=sr

may now

liWH

3Tflflfa

g^i^zrw 5

" is nothing

more than
it

examined.

wk*)mic<j?t v$

of selfhood operating as " Upadhis " as

be
:

II

fir%:

ft 5rfcti%5r:^^rlfr,

p%:

42

in his B. T. iv, p.

11

the constituent elements

were, by the power of Vis'esas,

which are self-linking

OTT^Tf^flt^
There

is

no

may be

it is

itself

all this is

operating as

without a Jiva already being there. 1

the need to reflect ?

reflection is

he

no point

it.

in

p. 79)

t.

highly confusing.
its

own medium

premature, in so far as the Jivasvarupa

is

(G. B.

says Madhva, in the Jivasvarupa operating as a

essentially luminous : ^STwipi si^fe
f%^R[ (G.B.)

objected that

idea of Jivasvarupa

where

difficulty,

medium, since
It

TW^teTC

And

Again,

Not God or God's.

itself

the

would be inconceivable

he should already be there,

if

whom
Nor

Would not

of reflection be

is

he to reflect

even

Or whose

[of himself, as there

is

The correct answer to these and such other difficulties will be on the
following lines. We must first of all try to understand the expression
" Svarupopadhi " clearly. That will give the right clue to the understanding of the matter without
then,

]
-

P.

any

confusion whatever.

" Svarupopadhi "

means nothing more than the constituents of the Jivasvarupa

wft^sft

M. 15

sMi^M-frr:

sitftsrprerRjra: *prra (

s p

68

viz.

his

philosophy of 3rI madhvAcArya

226

on and similarity with Brahman. These are

"
by which he is " conditioned " (for ever)
or constituted and without whose aid we cannot have any clear idea of
what a Jlva is. Ft would not give us any difinite idea of the Jlva,
to be told that he is simply as a being endowed with sentiency,
bliss and reality.'
How are we to distinguish him from Brahman which
is also of like nature?
But with the help of attributes like difference,
likeness and dependence, we could get a clearer and more definite idea of
the Jlva vis a vis Brahman.
Since these ideas of difference, dependence
and similarity help us to have a specific idea of the nature of the individual as a finite being, these may be regarded as the " Upadhis " whereby
we come to have a correct idea of a " Jiva ". They thus help to throw
light on the nature of the Jiva, to "reveal" him so to say. It is in this sense
difference from, dependence

" Upadhis

his

i.

the factors

e.

that these attributes are treated as the Svarupopadhis,

As

that go to define his nature.

in virtue

it is

i.

e-

as conditions

of these very attributes

is regarded as a Pratibimba of Brahman and of no other,

these are termed the " Upadhis " by which his Pratibimbatva is determined.

that the Jlva

As

these

Upadhis are not, however, external or

are called " Svarupopadhis

nature of the Jiva

sciousness, bliss

and the

and

so

on

True to

".

depth, intensity and maturity, the Jlva realizes

also,

they manifest the

of his con-

extent, intensity, luminosity etc.

2
to the full, in release.

physical dependence, difference

Moksa

extrinsic to the Jlva, they

their nature,

and

As

Bhakti grows in

more and more

similarity to the

Supreme.

his

meta-

And

in

where these conditions of dependence, difference and likeness

to Brahman, which constitute the essence of Jtvas, persist, they continue

to be the Pratibimbas of

Brahman, with the

fullest realization

of that fact,

unlike in Samsara, where this truth of their real nature and relationship to

Brahman

is

hidden by Ajnana and other factors, by the

will of

God.

True devotion and loving attachment to God are however capable of

moving the Supreme

own
and

to grace

svarupa by the Jiva

possible.

Such

"

?Pf

and

and of

realization of the true

the nature of

God

in fact is the place, function

dhis, in the system of

nature of one's

then becomes easy

and role of Svarupopa-

Madhva.

W^MM&iliy^-UWRn;:

3*jrf^

) (

NS.

p.

506

THE SOULS' EELATION TO BEAHMAN

227

The relation of part and whole ( Ams'ams'ibhava ) also stands for

same idea of dependence and similarity. The Jlva is an amia
( fraction ) of Brahman.
This is a purely symbolic idea. He is the
ectype of God, endowed with a smaller measure of resembling
attributes of reality, consciousness and bliss.
The figure has, no doubt,
some association of part and whole and may imply some kind of
But
identity-cum-difference as understood by Bhaskara and others.
Madhva rejects the relation of bhed&bheda between Jfva and Brahman,
accepts fundamental difference and substitutes amiatva for " identity "
the

W(vfrm$8p

$r?wf*

two kinds of Ams'as

* Jp*Jc:

viz.,

(M.B.S.B.

ii,

3,

43

).

He

Svarupams'a and bhinnamsa 2

God like Matsya and Kurma (Avatars) are His

with Him and possessing the same degree and

distinguishes
.

The mani-

festations of

Svarupams'as,

identical

extent of

The Jlvas are Bhinnamsas ( ectypes ) with relatively

of powers. The difference is one of both degree and order.
and could not be transcended
powers,

all

lesser order
It is

innate

-.

This relation of Ams'a

conflict

He

*n=0
being

3
.

TP.
It

ii,

3,

43

).

Amsa

to reconcile

cTcH=rPsR^f d<&l-

identity:

stands for likeness

and dependence of

does not denote any physical identity of part and whole.

use in regard to the Jlva

is

the

accepts difference as real and

and uses amiatva to convey the sense of

true

Madhva

used by

also

is

of Bheda and Abheda Srutis,

Its

purely symbolic/ just to aid the understanding:

This passage does not mean " separateness and non-separateness ought not
to be understood literally ", as misconstrued by J. E. Carpenter ( Theism in
Mediaeval India, 1921. p. 411 ). We need not, therefore, deplore with him
that " unhappily. Madhva did not adhere to this suggestion ". Bee my His,

of Dvaita School of Tedanta and Its Lit., i. p. 157. Unfortunately. H. N.

Eaghavendracbar, too, has similarly misunderstood and misrepresented the
text, in his

Kannada work

Dvaita Vedanta.

SiWT ftfosfa $% Ifrfer fSRt

cfcHre# cr^frrcmn^Tc^

4,

ns.

B. S. B,

p.

453

ii,

3,

47

).

PHILOSOPHY OF SBI MADHVAolBYA

228

fS?8*: 11^1
in the Sutra

ii,

B. S.

iii,

2,

3, 43, as

14

fWkara

).

" a part as

it

also interprets the

were

"

( *foS

#8:

).

Am&i

term

Ams'a

is

thus

a symbolic expression for dependence and presupposes difference as

admitted by $amkara himself. The latter half of the Sutra refers to some
kind of identity that would be compatible with Svarupabheda already

Such an
and dependence.

be grounded on similarity

identity, then, could only

accepted.

is

concedes freely that there are points of contact between

and Brahman. Their distinction, however great and ineradicable,
yet one of order and degree and not of kind. The soul of man at

its

best possesses the characteristics of reality,

Madhva

the Jlva

similar to the

the

Brahman

Brahman.
is

It

God which

enables

it

ii,

consciousness and bliss

any relation with

sometimes identified with the

virtue of this that

possible, and the Jlva

Brahman- a^'TOlWg dN^I:

akin to

in

is

3,

to be in

is

29 ). The freed soul has a nature

harmony with the divine in Moksa:

Strht scsiwr*? srmt

=*

tot 5

*|4(ll<f*5Wc<* sfT^Tfllt fNfacT ( B. S. B. iv, 2, 16

It

should be obvious then that

opposition between the two.

He

Madhva

is

not for any irreconcilable

allows even the most exaggerated and

high-flown description of the affinity between the two in mystic or philosophical parlance, provided the modicum of difference between them,
borne out by the authorities, is not tampered with. Absolute exclusive-

Brahman is not thus a characteristic of Madhva's

position.
The Brahman is the AntaryamI of the Atman and as such
could never be excluded from him. Some community of nature is cert-

ness of the Jlva and

ainly there

and even with that

it is

possible to keep

from the complete merger of the Advaita.

two are such that no merger is possible

The Mukta,

too, does not

bloom

The

the

MahSvispupurd^a

q.

by Vadaratnavali

into a sovereign lord, overnight.

released are under an irrevocable limitation with regard

of cosmic functions of the Supreme, according to B, S.

differences which persist in

position distinct

intrinsic natures of the

Mokga too,

to

The

the exercise

iv, 4, 17.

should thus be intrinsic

These
sv&bha-

THE SOULS' RELATION TO BRAHMAN

vika
It

is

and not brought about by Avidya or association with

the bodies.

on these grounds that Madhva refuses to merge and absorb the

soul in

God.

At the same

time,

God and

opposed to each other as

the difference

is

eternal

light

^ qziWffftsr:

are not flouted.

and irreconcilably

soul are not so utterly

and darkness. In the words of Jayattrtha

but not absolute:

#flc*K: Wlc*MI 3TRfcN5^:

229

^rT&sir^r

W^cT

They are explained

to the transcendental oneness of

W&W&i

NS.

3W^ (NS.

p.

435

"Kg,

The

p. 453b.)

in deeper

^rd5

^^

mNl

and richer senses referring

Brahman

WRcSffil

T #fr

identity-texts

ETri^Wj.

VI.

DOCTRINE OF BRAHMAN
CHAPTER XXXVII

INDEPENDENCE OF BRAHMAN
The independence of Brahman

The twin

conception of God.

most vital point in Madhva's

" Svatantra " and " Para-

the

is

principles of

tantra " constitute the pith of his philosophy. It

is

gical concept of his philosophy that the traditional

to his system has reference.

beyond

all

shown

has been

It

that

Madhva

His conception

of Svatantra

above the dualism of Prakrti and Purusas by denying them any kind

of metaphysical independence or independent existence,

or

" given

has gone

other Indian thinkers in emphasizing the absolute independence

and unutterable majesty of Brahman.

rises

to this central ontolo-

name " Dvaita

We

activity.

Madhva under

brought by

how

have seen

*'

Madhva's penetrative

insight

consciousness

ParadhlnaviSesapti ".

into the importance of this concept of the

metaphysical independence of Brahman

ence to the famous text of the

Eg Veda

is

shown by

x, 81, 2, in

unerring refer-

his

interpreting the term

" arambhapa " embodied in the crucial Sutra of Badarayana

which has become

'

the

bone of contention

modem

Most of our

that

ture

Up

is

their

the first

interpretation

modem

edn.

and

Monograph
that

inspired

Ramanuja

14

by

the

Rg Veda

tries to

adhisthatr"

Ser.

term

He

transln.
no.

to

eaossswe

proclaims

of

16,

x, 87, 2

in

Sutra refers

redundancy.

boldly

),

(B.S,

" and that

this

J. A. B.

11

),

He

is

Van

in

his

Introduction to

Vedarihtuamgraha (Deccan
that

ii,

1,

'

can be

there

14)

is

little

taken from or

" with thiB connection in mind,

show that the Sadvidya by advitiya denies

( op. oit. p.

to

made a commendable depar-

Kamanuja's

Poona, 1956

arambkanam

in

that assumption, in a manner

scholar to have

from this beaten track.

College

"arambhana"

and interpreting the Sutra on

exposes

his critical

doubt

1,

writers on the S.8. have been content with accepting

Satnkara's view that the keyword

Buitenen

ii,

of commentators on the

'

and modern. 1

Sutra, ancient

Chan.

sway of Brahman by means of the doctrine

How keen and lively was

the

of creation in terms of

even the eternal entities have been

also the first

separate

modern writer to approye

INDEPENDENCE OF BRAHMAN
The majesty of Brahman

Being

*fal^Rscm% ^l u^lR

Madhva
knew

not very

is

*rqi%

cT

f|

in the pores

This Universe

of

the

Supreme

much enamoured of the teleological argument and

limitations long before

its

^RRRtSW

#flT:

one among the myriads pulsating

just

revealed by the

only imperfectly

is

eightfold cosmic determinations: 1%

is

231

Hume

and other modern philosophers.

It cannot go the whole way,

It is

only

good enough so

and

yield

complete knowledge of the Deity.

far as

that the entire Universe is a

parts, these parts again,

it

goes.

It is all

very well to argue

huge machine divided into

infinite

number of

being subdivided to a degree beyond

human

comprehension and that all these are mutually adjusted with such consummate accuracy and provision as to wrest our admiration and worship
**l?%IWI^f4PWffiI. TOrf^FRgor: WT:
Supreme Mind ( Cf
Madhva Dvada&a-Stotra ) that should have designed and executed so

of the

But then, this sort of teleological argument could

more than an " architect " of the Universe, a sort of
Demiurge and not a Creator on whom all things will be metaphysi-

stupendous a thing.
yield us nothing

cally dependent.

Madhva

another vital question

raises

under a limitation

Is

He

Does

God

have to work

obliged to accept and adapt Himself to con-

ditions independent of His will and attain His ends only by such arrangements as these will admit of 1 His answer to this question has already
been set forth in the chapter on Creation. It is obvious, from what has
been stated there, that God is not merely an artificer of the Universe, a
mere ''Brahmanijakulala "; but the very source of its being and becoming.

^iSFftWT

5IcJffi%mw*Pt

show how

particular

dence of God.
the nearest

Madhva

ii, 2, 5 ).
This is sufficient to
maintaining the metaphysical indepen-

B. S. B.

is in

Save for the difference

Hindu approach

in

terminology, his position

to the Christian standpoint.

Of

is

the two,

Continued
of Madhva 's

more explicitly " referring to Kg Vedio verse as Visayaand disagree with V. S. Ghate's curt dismissal of Madhva's
interpretation on the ground that "the topic is irrelevant". The relevance
and the importance of the topic discussed by Madhva under this Sutra have
been conclusively established by me in my reply to V. S. Ghate's review of
Madhva's Sutra Bhasya ( See my History of Dvaita School of Veddnta and
Its Lit> Vol, i, pp. 150-53 ). The interested reader should note the slight
misquotation from Madhva which has crept into the text cited by Van
vakya of

" even

this Sutra

Buitenen.

philosophy of r! madhvAoArya

232

however, Madhva's

no

creation at

all

is

The only sense

ties.

God

that of

is

an

much more

philosophical, as eternal creation

while creation in time has

in

its

is

insurmountable difficul-

which the world can be said to be a creation of

eternal dependence of one beginningless real

on another

and a more powerful One. Madhva makes a concession, in theory, to

Christian Theism by conceding that hypothetically God can reverse His
But for His own reasons, He
present method or create from nothing.
has chosen to evolve a world from co-existent matter and souls, which
co-existence, too, is as much at His will and pleasure (Bh&g, ii, 10, 12),
The Vedantin if he can admit eternal and uncreated souls ( See $arhkara
B. S, B,

Matter

ii,
!

42

2,

need not shy at the acceptance of equally uncreated

No Indian

philosopher has been able or temerarious enough to

from God. It exists on the Advaitic view, also, as a force
Madhva, therefoe, adopts the only sensible and
Brahman

derive matter
latent in

'.

straightforward course by which the sovereignty of

God

and such

can be made

viz., by
hypothesi
metaphysically
dependent
on
their
ex
God
for
them
making
very being and becoming. This is substantially the view of the
2
It will also be seen that Madhva has done the
Visistadvaitins also.

consistent with the existence of such matter

thing

right

in

raising

and Vedantic Theism,

B.S. (ii, 1.15). 3

in

this

important

particular,

in

issue for

souls,

Theism

an appropriate

in

general

context

in

the

The conception of omnipotence has been much misunderstood and

abused by Theological Controversialists.
is

a dilemma to Theists.

Mere power

is

Can God achieve contradictions

the earliest and crudest predicate

Primitive man, inured to the arbitrary despotism of a chief,

power and glory for his own ends and uses the subjects as feeders of his own pomp and glory, is most easily impressed by the idea of
In most religions the attitude of
physical power and gigantic strength.

of Divinity.

who

uses

a proverbial " Oriental Ruler"

God,

Madhva

Of. "

Maya

is

transferred unconsciously to the idea of

therefore raises this familiar

exists even in Pralaya,

( Samkara, Katha, i, 3. 11
depending on the Supreme Lord "
(

2,

3,

See Desika Tattvamuktakalapa, p. 2C5.

See

f,

n, 1

on Page

167,

problem of Theism whether

Radhakrishnan,

I. Phil, ii,

).

573

).

INDEPENDENCE OF BEAHMAN

238

God or Brahman can do anything whatever or whether there are things

He cannot do and whether all existent reality other than Him has been
created by Him or whether there are other beings, personal and imperso;

nal,

whose

existence

Omnipotent God could get

Ergo,

so,

they are of

as ultimate,

is

He

it

If there

could not have prevented

and to that extent His power over them

their existence

do

and uncaused as His own.

as ultimate

is

are things whose existence

the ends without the means,

An

limited.

is

if

He

chooses to

must be inconsistent with His wisdom to use them since

no value

to

Him

except to serve a purpose which

He

could as

While conceding theothat God can do, undo and reverse his ways, Madhva and his

well have achieved without them, as with them.

retically

Commentators remind us

that

He

has not

chosen

to

do otherwise than

Vijayindra Tfrtha writes that even the

what the established facts show,

omnipotence of

God cannot achieve logical contradictions and

OT &[(*MI<

Madhvadhvakaptakoddliara, p. 58 ). As for the contention

God to have done without the access-

that

it

would have been better for

ories, as with

of

absurdities:

God

to

them 1

Jayatlrtha observes that

make Him

dependent on

Him

grnwjq#r tfwfcr:

it

enhances the greatness

act utilizing the accessories that are metaphysically

ft^stcRT

$|3W

3WT8jTCrP#T

wyrtdq^^f^wsmfi.

*TftJTta*rctP^sft,

tp.

a, l, 19

It is,

as explained by

Madhva due

This

).

partiality of the Vedantin, for recognizing accessories in creation,

a sentimental one.

HT9R'

is

not

to the necessity of

2
abiding by the facts vouched for by experience and scripture.

It is difficult for

may

any Theist

point of view of ethical Theism,

is

to assert that all logical

be consistent with divine nature

if

meaningless to speak of a Being

to some, the reply

God

is

by God.

Madhva

is

not bound by

God

resolves the

The supreme

consistency with the majesty of

aft a*ppnft

2.

Of. ajTRflZI^rrsf spfg

SWjWt,

is

it.

bound by

it

According
it,

but that

antinomy on the basis of

criterion in all such cases,

says he,

God,

Jrftjfcpfrefe ft grasrifojunfiftfa

contradictions

has been asked, from the

the moral law is so fundamental that

who

not that an omnipotent

not omnipotent.

self-limitation
is in

is

It

WW <%qtejiq

cw.)

(^mkara, X.
II

8-

S.

i,

4,3

philosophy

234

off

^IMWII^l^T
Nothing can be accepted that

aai*

&N*r*t

sfieqrftaq

tot

&mtii

5i5rr%rof^5qfrrr^:

fWcffiTO

f*3,

SW

JWITOT

3bI

madhvAoArya

^t*lRWlf&a|': awr:

(AV. p. 36 b)

||

will lower or abrogate this

<KNr*ilSW*li

t 3 r%rar^ Jfgrof^ crtfefcwHfcwft h

ar^

srftcwfrr fsj^qfirctfa aw

smRR aWRRt W#ra

ll

MS.

wfr#f
p.

present case, God's utilization of accessories that depend on

constitute

any

loss or abrogation

of His majesty

3<mms3w i?R$ms&&:

511

Him

).

^m%In the

does not

II

Vedanta DeSika

CHAPTER XXXVIII

BRAHMAN

ATTRIBUTES OF

Madhva's conception of God emphasizes two aspects of Divinity( sarvagwiapurpatvam ) and freedom from all limitations ( sartadosagandhavidhuratvam ).
These two aspects cover and
exhaust all that is great and good in the idea of God. We have an
the perfection of being

'

epistemological argument

'

ir#r

3Tsts$myu?|si4 fttft

flTC^iiftlW
that

God:

for the perfection of

ft

*{AV).

God is the highest form of perfection conceivable by human intelli^cT f^Tfifoi ^ctrft^wfa
He is the id quo maim cogitari non potest

gence.

srafftraSFT,

atsfa^l^|cJVtocl3w

transcendence and infinite

Madhva

bliss

in his interpretation

**
of

B.T. X. p. 71

God

of the Sutra:

This perfection of the Divine

is

to

).

^JTT

y^KK^T^.

sEradNr

W WKTT ?&r

gorersr

(i,

by

3, 8

).

understood in terms of an

be

unlimited pervasion in time, space and fulness of attributes

%m:

The ideas of

are similarly brought out

t^tt aft:

#11

this threefold perfection is possessed by the

The whole of finite creation is limited, in one way or
another. The Goddess Lakgml, for instance, presiding over Prakrti, tho'
unlimited by time and space, is limited in attributes ( gupair apnriri&
and therefore, dependent on Brahman. The souls are limited both
by space and in attributes and possess only temporal pervasion ( kdiato

According to Madhva,

Supreme

alone.

vydpti

in the sense of existing at all times.

),

The

limitations of finite existence are the following:

arfct "ircWof
ctstt

snii

spftm

I.

Baghavenara, BUavmrti,

tfcm

^R[f^%

cT*rr

^wft* crn

5=%Sf |HWRr #TcTTq

ii,

18,

ll

(Mbh, T.N. p. 3)

PHILOSOPHY OF bEl MADHVAoASTA

236
1

material embodiment,

Ignorance, dependence, liability to misery,

equality with or inferiority to others

].

Wsffl

srfjpifcT:

Wsfl^Hlfikiel^ SEKFSSR:

The Supreme

is

absolutely free

from

The term Atman

signifies

that

which

The above
lity.
iii,

itself,

texts

as applied to the

is

all-pervasive

He

is

of His powers at

above

all

all

times

variation of degrees of

26 ).

Bh&g.

Supreme,
a-tata

in

iii,

7,

).

highest sense,

its

emphasize the infinitude of

His nature remains the same

2, 11).

A V. p.

these

all

31%TT#'-TRin

at all times

God and His

and in

all

immutabi-

places :( B.S.

change and limitations, loss or obscuration

3rfN>TC-*

qsj

gpg[:

power or potency.

He

is

not

subject to any

Such limitations as are cau-

sed by external factors are powerless to affect His nature which

lutely self-contained
rior.

He

is

and He transcends

all,

We

have an impressive enunciation of

%?sr: *R

( i,

10-12

abso-

among many

form or measurable lineaments.

nothing more than that of reality, consciousness and

of Madhva's Mbh. T.N.

is

having neither peer nor supe-

not a Person in the sense of being just one

possessing any material

and

this in

the

His form

bliss

following

fog

is

unlimited.

passages

% Waft HU^tR

or

H<IW1W fa%:

::

ATTRIBUTES OF BRAHMAN

of

uncompromising

this

It is

God

that

theories of

is

the

mmmmz:

iJ?TT

gWRT

to

grants the

immaterial

the

(AV.)

for the same reason that he refuses to invest the Avatars

popular theology with any material vesture.

more.

and perfection

spotless purity

Madhva's determined resistance

Pantheism and Ulusionism

$t

It is

faith in

responsible for

237

possibility
if

That

Godhead and

is

For, once the

of

Monotheist

of the unlimited becoming limited,

becomes

it

such a limitation takes place in one particular instance or

why Madhva stands

its

valiantly for the Monotheistic unity

absolute freedom from material defilement

of Purai^ic fictions and theodicies

to justify their

of

and makes use

seemingly ungodly acts and

career on earth

5&CT

^WKW ^Wfiiwia

*rferc^r ^

1% 3

9^%

=3nrftr

|:

^uRniM

m&R:

3flc+flcHldl*r#S[^

f|

li

They are natural

tions

to

*t JPPPSRK

(Bhag.

II

hypothesi infinite

grats-Ml^

His being and are

*WMIj&l

jpapRigaTSfRr

v, 1

f^ltfHWliCfsr itf$&gg&$SK

The perfections of God are ex

Bfh. Up.

v, 19, 6

),

48

).

II

Bhag.

vi, 4,

not, as in Advaita,

brought about by contact with Avidya.

This

unreal projec-

is

supported by

the clear statement of the vetavatara

*vm

^rW#J

P!cr

^Wjf%^T

?Hwmi=cT

(vi.

).

))

philosophy of nl madhvAoArya

238

In the light of such a large number of clearly worded statements,

cannot deny

Nirguna

all attributes

Besides, as pointed

text.

we

the Supreme, on the strength of a solitary

to

by Madhva,

out

the

Nirguna

text

(*trtlRgw^r) posits a number of attributes such as oneness, divinity,

transcendence, immanence and omniscience 1 so that the solitary term
itself

"Nirguna", occurring by the side of such an array of positive predications

could only be taken in some restricted sense. The description of

Brahman
and

'

in several

spotless

'

Upanisadic passages as 'unsullied by

faftH

) gives

sin' ( STOIcTITOT

us the proper clue to a consistent inter-

pretation of the Nirgupa texts in the sense of denying Prakrtic or empirical attributes like grossness to

Brahman. Such an interpretation has the

support of the Puranic tradition also

*MI<Wl T SRfi%

*r

#cT

Jm?tT

(Visnu Pur.

gtrri:

( op. tit. vi, 5,

f^prepfafl.

Mbh.

i,

The plea that " when the Absolute

means that
Absolute

it is

is

9,

i.

79

43

l, l
is

said to be

Nirguna it only
and the
p. 536 ) is quite

trans-empirical, as gunas are products of Prakrti

superior to

acceptable to Madhva.

it

" (Radhakrishnan,

/.

Phil.,

ii,

work on the Brahma-Sutras ( 1960

Dr. Radhakrishnan comes out with a pronouncement " The creative
thought Let me be many belongs to Brahman. It is not simply imagined in Him. The energy that manifests itself in Brahman is one with and
different from Brahman
In his latest

'

'

The world should become an ordered beauty. If we do not accept such

a subtle power, abiding in God, God cannot be a creator. He cannot
move towards creation " (p. 142 ) - [Italics mine ]. All this, however,
is inconsistent with Samkara's conception of Brahman as "Nirvis'esa",- as
a Being that is essentially and fundamentally devoid of any attribute
whatever, whether such attributes qualify

isfratfit;

S^c#Hra: ST#

it

or are separate from

%T %*St ftgTST

II

it,

as

in

ATTRIBUTES OV BRAHMAN

239

Nyaya philosophy or are non-material and part and parcel of it, as

Madhva's view. Otherwise, Sarhkara could not have so vehemently
denied and criticized the doctrine that " Brahman has in it elements of
manifoldness " and that " unity and manifoldness are both true," as he
has done in his c. on B. S. ii, 1, 14. The statements that " Brahman and
the

in

IsVara are not distinct entities but different aspects of the

and that "it

is

wrong

same Reality

imagine that the absolutistic doctrine

to

for the philosophically initiated

and the

theistic doctrine for

others "

that " the view that the representation of Brahman as Isvara ( i. e.

gupa " ) is a concession to the weakness of the human mind as

Advaitins hold

27
as

is

it

is

and

" Sa-

some

Brahmasntra " ( op. cit. p. 126"

dissatisfaction with " Nir-visesadvaita

not supported by the

) show a sense of intellectual

propounded by Samkara in his accredited works 1

accept

"

and a reluctance

to

as the true interpretation of the philosophy of the Upanisads,

Madhva's opposition to the concept of Nirguna Brahman is also based on

precisely the same dissatisfaction with Nirvi&sadvaita.

The question of Sagupa

Nirguna Brahman has been

vs.

cussed by Vispudasacarya hvhis

Vadaratnavali

fully dis-

Pariccheda, iv

and by

Vyasaraya in his Nym. ( ii, 4 ). There is much confusion of thought, in

the popular mind over the terms " Sagupa '' and " Nirgupa ". Unfortunately, such loose ideas have sometimes a tendency to rear their heads
even in the writings of experts on Indian philosophy. " When the Abso-

becomes embodied as a personal God " , we have the Sagupa is not a

proper definition of " Sagupa " as understood and debated in the origi-

lute

The " Sagupa " of the Upani|ads is

endowed with empirical attributes. For the $rutis
clearly refer to the Brahman endowed with attributes like Satyakamatva
as the transcendental Being ( Mityavamam tamasah parastM).
The
Chandogya and other texts also refer to the act of seeing ( iksana ) on the
part of Brahman prior to the emergence of antahkarapa and other Upa-

nal texts of the Vedantic school.

what

certainly not

is

dhis of the empirical creation. 2

2.

Of. "

The

creative thought,

simply imagined
[ Italics

mine

],

in

Mm

'

"

let
(

It

me

cannot also be argued that the texts

be

many

'

belongs to

RadhaMshnan, Brahma

Brahman^ It
Stttra,

is

not

1960, p. 142.)

PHILOSOPHY OK SRI MADHVAcARYA

240

" Satyakamah satyasamkalpah which speak of the various attributes

of Brahman are merely intended for the purpose of meditation ( upasana )
without any implication of their being actually present in the Supreme
like

Brahman.

In

the

first

"Yas Sarvajhah

like

" Atmetyevop&site "

identity,

which

is

the Advaitin,

in

B. S.

(iii,

3,

1 1

there

no reference to Upasana in texts

and secondly there are texts like
to meditation on the attribute of

is

etc.

which refer

not an unreal one but

the

self

Further,

).

is

actually present

[Wkara

according to

himself in his Bhasya on

admits frankly that the quality of "Ananda"

37)

the mutual identity of

shows that the

place,

sarvavid" ($vet. Up.)

atman and

Is vara

Nor can

and
This

does not take away

fact of being prescribed for meditation

the ultimacy of the attributes in question.

explained away as mere re-statcments

etc,

should be meditated upon.

the

Saguna

of facts already

texts

known

be

or esta-

) to be set aside by the

Nirguna texts. For, the very conception
of Brahman as " Sa-guna " is derived a priori ( from the $rutis themsel-

blised

ves

by Dharmigrahaka-pramana.

The Nirguna

texts cannot, therefore,

on their
Brahman. 1 It is thus impossible to resolve
the apparent conflict between Saguna and Nirguna texts of the $ruti on
the basis of such fanciful and subjective criteria as the standpoints of
Upasana and Anuvada, put forward by Advaitins. The right way
of resolving the conflict will be to apply to their harmonization such recognized principles of Mlmamsa exegesis as ( i ) the Upakrama-nyaya
(ii) Srutilinga-nyaya
(iii) Visesa-samanya-nyaya
(iv)Niravathose very attributes which the $rutis themselves have,

falsify

own

authority, given to the

kas'a-(

nyaya

Savakaia )-nyaya
;

i'i )

Bahulya-nyaya

i )

Upajlvyopajivaka-

SavMesa-ny&ya and others, some of which have admit-

by the author of the Brahma-Sutras, himself, even

according to Sarhkara's showing.

tedly been followed

The following

a brief elucidation of the

is

application of

some of

these principles of interpretation, to the present question, based

Vadaratndvali of Visnudasacarya:

(i)

The Saguna

texts

on the

should have prece-

dence over the Nirguna as they are prescriptive in form and content,

whereas the Nirguna

3^ WU'Wf

texts are proscriptive

Nym.

ii,

).

and

in

cases

of a conflict

ATTRIBUTES
between the

%t:

initial

'a^S W-

BBAHMAN

COT

final statements

and

S^rRRETn

S^Nrft

241

(upakrama and upasamhara) as in

^yrsaf

* # * *

the

decision

has been taken in the Vedopakramadhikarana of the Purva-mimamsa

that

the

part

first

and meaning of

other.

niravakaia

Texts

( i i )

which

predicate

certain

Brahman cannot put up with any but

auspicious attributes of
literal sense (

and determine the scope

prevail over the last

shall

the

whereas the Nirguna

can

texts

their

be

easily

accommodated in the sense of denying material or empirical attributes

and so find their fulfilment of purpose. It will not be possible to
establish an absolute negation of attributes as the very same text
*$t ^r:

%%$$

13: * * lays

down

certain attributes like oneness

(^^T ) etc. in Brahman, in

and uses the term " Nirguria "

divinity

the

text

at the

first

half

or major part of the

end.

tail

<?W ),

It

is,

therefore,

necessary to restrict the scope of this negation conveyed by the expression

"ftorT"to material

the

Mlmamsakas

(%N^<*)

refers only to injuries

contended

it is

just as the prohi-

ft^TRT; ?R[ *Rirf%,

to cases other than those

trpTTsJRT. If

3JjftlWft

alone

attributes

bition of killing in the Vedic text

statutorily

that

provoked by human

is

restricted

prohibition

the

passions

by

recognized as in

"T

flfcfra."

and not

( ^PRi.' ITCH )

by Vedic injunctions ( ^r ), it may be answered back

the present case also the text " Nirgmiaica " does not negative

to those enjoined

that in

the attributes duly predicated by gratis like V: fl#:

etc.

only

but

such

S>ffot.

as are conceived or

attributes

empirical intellect or imperfect logic.

?RT TTC

M&m:

advanced by the

Absolute and unqualified nega-

tion of attributes cannot, therefore, be accepted in

any

case, since

both

have equal statutory

necessary to interpret the denial in a
It thus becomes
recognition.
way which will not annul the attributes solemnly predicated. If even
statutory prescriptions can be totally set aside, there will be no need
for recognizing Vikalpa ( alternative or optional rule ) provided in the
the

predication

Mlmamsa

of attributes

what

Nirguna

is

laid

optional rule

down by law cannot be

texts are general in scope

of Brahman

P.M. 16.

their

denial

Sastra, in such cases as arf^T differ

conception of a Vikalpa
that

and

expressly

is

311^

The very

^gticr.

based on the presumption

totally repudiated.

and cannot negative

mentioned by the Sruti

( iii )

The

special attributes

texts.

But

specific

philosophy of

242

negations like ar^jWRtg can

made

deny material

to

be suggested by

always

attributes

down

madhvAcArya
taken at their face value and

be

like grossness, that

spurious reasoning.

After

all,

Brahman

to

other

any Vedic

text.

may

in regard to

be so. ( iv ) The Saguna texts are logically

Nirguna texts bristle with contradictions 1
is endowed with the necessary attributes which
terized as " Nir-guna ",
attributeless.

e.

Nirguna-Brahman,

it

there

If
it

will

in

self-consistent
If the

i.

may come

grossness and

are they inherently auspicious attributes, tho' their opposites

attributes are not laid

Nor

jRl

no such

while the

justify its being charac-

not be really and wholly

is

Nirguoa-Brahman
" Nir-guna "

basis in the
" Nirguna " in the true

appellative

cannot be regarded as
(v) The Saguna texts

should be regarded as
" sustainers " ( S^affa? ) of the Nirguna texs.
The sustainer, being
independent of the sustained, will obviously be more powerful than
the sustained, in the event of a conflict of interest or meaning between
them. The latter, then, will have necessarily to submit to the former.
sense

This

may be

illustrated

no chance of

absolutely

of

term,

the

of

its heat.

It

by the inference of

the

to

ftfraraJ$3#T OTsftojppfQ by

we can

so far as

being cold, which has

cannot be argued that the Saguna texts are sustainers of

the Nirguna texts only

(

fire

survival, against the evidence of tactile perception

see,

extent of providing a subject for negation

h e Nirguna texts. For, there are no texts,

which say that Brahman is not Sarvajna, not
t

and so on.
The omniscience of Brahman is, thus,
gathered only on the evidence of the $ruti. Such an august truth
cannot therefore be simply set aside. There is no force in the contention
that the Nirguna texts depend, on the Saguoa and require their help only
to the extent of requiring a " bare existence "( svampam&tram ) of the
thing to be divested of attributes and nothing more.
Such a 'bare
existence can be found in many other things also besides the present
Sarvaiaktimat

'

subject
ces,

Brahman )

will

so that the denial of attributes, in

not necessarily

attributes!

It

will

the subject

of

tic value

.in

at

as

be futile to
proposition
flwrfil

" Brahman "

affect

argue
(

the circumstan-

deprive

further that the

udde&ya

and that

and

therefore,

it

of

its

attributes of

have generally no syntacthe omniscience of the

ATTRIBUTES OB BRAHMAN
1

Subject

into

uddesya

interpretation of "

The Mlmamsa

account.

does not support

" Sammarjana "

Jrff^PJ

cleaning

against the other vessels like " Caraasas

attribute of "

account.
not

SWTI?
is

It is

taken

vessels

is

graM/i )

to

Grahas

by

be

intended to

taken

Graha

(jTf flwrrfi)

cups

is

why

Bhava.iatha says

sRf^Ba^f^FtTft^a^l

into

" in *rt

syntactic

^wnffthat

to the present case,

able without

^TWlt^r H?

" Grahatva

the

^ %^WIMqT^

Once

".

3%JR#1

of

to accept that

of omniscience,

attribute

of

interpretation

Brahman being
it

inconceiv-

could become the subject

texts are taken to

^Kmi^hhii

deny

bound

is

attributes to the

is

to

Brahman,

be proper to hold that texts like " Satyam

" which posit certain attributes of

which

by the

these circumstances, a conflict with the

In

omniscience.

their express sense,

as^,

has been achieved, other

this

Applying the same principle

we have

basic evidence of the subject

Brahma

" itself

the injunction

lest

of a proposition, affirmative or negative, only as characterized

It will

js

many

of the Uddeiya are superfluous and need not be

attributes

taken into account".

Nirguna

as

"Else, we could not establish, the distinc-

of the " uddesya

tive essence

attribute

should apply to some other vessels also, used in that sacri-

That

additional

there being not one but

taken into account,

certainly

is

it

"

of the distinctive

virtue

But, so far as the distinctive attribute of

is

to the "

cleaned with a piece of cloth

be

it

a decisive role in

",

by reason of

account,

^^ffcmr^sac "

" plays

only the singular number of "

into

concerned,

fice.

Grahatva " which

not to be taken

is

'flpffrrif

Even in the Sammargadhikarana,

this contention.

seen that the specific attribute of "

restricting the

Brahman

the present case, viz..

) in

243

arise,

the

if

absolutely.

jnanam anantam

Brahman should be taken

also their primary sense.

in

Resort to any

labored explanation of such texts, in terms of the elimination of the

'

opposite of the qualities

tins,

texts.

will naturally

The

text,

named

entail

(dJjjN#3c5FTT:

resorted to by'Advai-

an abandonment of the primary sense of the

on such a view,

will not teach that

of the characteristics of reality, consciousness

etc.

Brahman
but that

is

it is

possessed
devoid of

philosophy of gui madhvAoAbta

244

The Advaitia

unreality, ignorance, limitation etc.

is

thus fighting shy of

the positive construction and running away from the express and primary
sense of the terms " Satyam jfianam " and running after roundabout

meanings and distant echoes resulting from the primary

But such

senses.

roundabout explanations cannot be accepted as the proper, legitimate or

Such farfetched meanings

straightforward meaning of the propositions.

extracted laboriously from the

first

sense of the words cannot be accepted

as the import of Vedic propositions, as pointed out

SuresVara himself

" Satyam jhinam

has
.

."

admitted that the roundabout explanation of

adopted by the Advaitin, in terms of the elimina-

tion of the opposite sense of the terms employed,

actual expressions used, but

WTKsritt.

;t

g gs^r:

it is

from

their

view.

vi )

The Saguna

more powerful

in their

They do not

is

not derived from the

potential fitness

<Tfl^r^?mi:

'

own

tell

is

maintainable only on the Saguna

:

being specific enunciations:

texts,

function in a general way and

buteless.'

'

thus clear that the primary sense of the texts

" Satyam jfianam anantam Brahma "

are

by the Mlm&msakas

right
tell

(&mfa*u(*

than the Nirguna texts which only

Brahman

us that

is

us what particular attributes

l%T )

'attri-

lacks.

it

It is

therefore open to us to interpret this general statement without prejudice

" Sarvajnatvam

to the specific enunciation of attributes like

"

and hold

that the denial of attributes has reference to attributes other than those
specifically predicated.

Mahabh&sya of

That

will

the general principles

be the right attitude to take.

out exceptions only

Patafljali points

aiHiiWwT

WQ&

The Nirguna

statements and the Saguna texts are exceptions.

and

in which they

restrictively

on

can and should be

the well-known principle

laying

of

therefore

the law as to the sense

interpreted.

of interpretation:

the

texts are general

The latter have

down

the right of overriding the former

As

restrict the scope

This

is

SWRRI^ctw

based
ftftsRT

Rwn3*(i'Hii 3m?r fas: that a negative proposition in general terms should

be modified and interpreted in the

tive statements

light of other categorical

and

affirma-

about the same subject-matter embodying specific predi-

ATTRIBUTES OF BRAHMAN

The

cations.

difficulty of

subsequent one
ation

1 W^l

is

how

easily met.

a prior fact or enunciation can override a

We

fSfSRy* ***(i,

2,

It is clear,

i,

2, 18

).

7)

245

have in P&pinian grammar a prior enunci-

overriding
then,

the
that

subsequent

mere posteriority or nega-

tiveness of content of one statement as against another

ground

to override the positive.

aside the conception of

We

Brahman

have, therefore,

as

prohibition

is

not

sufficient

no reason

endowed with numerous

empirical attributes, taught by the Srutis.

to

set

trans-

CHAPTKB XXXIX

KNOWABILITY OF BRAHMAN
There

is

opinion between the views of Dvaitins and

difference of

Advaitins about the knowability of Brahman.

While both look upon

the know-

Brahman

as self-luminous, Advaitic dialecticians have denied

ability of

Brahman by denning

its

accessibility to

3#?I&

Madhva, on

self-luminosity in a

manner

that precludes

knowledge

wd^l?|I^i2fc^g

*tfcT,

Citsukha

).

Brahman, tho'
and completeness. However
imperfect our knowledge of Brahman may be, it is still knowledge so far
as it goes. Each one of us can know God and realize His majesty so far
as lies in his power to do so
not to

the other hand, emphasizes the knowability of

its fullest

extent and

in all

its

glory

<W=atsft

Here

q^FcT

IT

M^T:

{B. S. B).

between the two schools is one of

substance and not of mere words. They are as sharply divided as the
views of Christian Mystics and Theists are from those of Spencerian
the

again,

Agnosticism.

difference

Pringle Pattison

worth while quoting him

fection?
hell,

what

If

He

is

:-

hits

off this difference so well that

it is

" Can'st thou find out the Almighty unto Per-

do ? Deeper than
comprehend means to grasp as it

as high as Heaven, what can'st thou

can'st thou

were with one hand,

know?

to

If to

all round an object,

must ever remain incompassable by the

understand thoroughly, see

then unquestionably, the

infinite

So far as Agnosticism simply emphasizes the unfathomability of

by any human sounding-line and opposes the little we
know to the vast unknown, it is a praiseworthy lesson in humility.
Curiously, neither Hamilton nor Spencer seem to realize the fundamental difference between the two conceptions- that of the inherently
unknowable and that of the unknown, the not-yet-known and doubtfinite.

the

Absolute

less never-by-us-to-be-fully-known,

(Idea of God,

p.

but

still,

the ever-to-be-better

known

"

165).

These remarks apply mutatis mutandis to

dialecticians as against that of

neither absolutely

Madhva,

unknowable nor
ITlcMt

:t

fully

=%fcq: cRtfrffl

that

the

views

God

or the

of

knowable:

tR^W:

Madhva

).

Advaitic

Absolute

is

'

KNOWABILITY OF BHAHMAN

Madhva

247

says that partial knowability establishes at least partial

terisability

f^fr^ isj^W^.

The

very

aspect of pure consciousness

prove that Braman

characteristics.

is

It is

not altogether un-aspected

in its general

is sufficient

NirvUesa

total eclipse of

the pure consciousness of being

by

partial ignorance, even for the nonce:

Brahman's
is

it

reality, as it is

from anything.
admitted that

manifested in the consciousness of the

An

absolutety uncharacterizable entity

would be

inaccessible to proofs and, therefore,

is

therefore

Samkara B.S.S.

,j.,|.

and his reply

i.

1, 1,

to it-

a myth.

It

beyond the jurisdiction of

logical or metaphysieal thinking.

Cf.

to

or devoid of

philosophically impossible to speak of an absolutely

Ignorance cannot spread over a blank and conceal

ego.

it

as admitted by Samkara, 1 )

featureless entity being obscured

There can be no

of

possibility

concealing particular aspects of Brahman, while disclosing

charac-

Ignorance

the passage beginning with dcJW 5!?!

CHAPTER XL

BRAHMAN
Such an

cannot be the object of any superimposition

entity

The assumption of a
ce of

who

all

A SA-VI^EA PERSONALITY.

IS

on the ground of alleged absen-

characterless entity

terms or bases of reference

points out inter alia that

is

refuted

by Trivikrama Pandita

would be equally impossible,

it

to connote such a reality even thro' secondary signification

as proposed by the Advaita.
nity, the unity of

God

in

and

the mediation of Vis'esas.

Atma. 1

divi-

Madhva

thro'

is

secured by

also possible to bring the

It is

for meditation

numerous

as Sat, Cit,

Sat signifies absolute perfection and freedom from

limitations

nirdosa

The term " atmS,

).

vasion and overlordship

the conception of

God

"

is

" Svatantra

The Supreme Brahman

is

", in

Ananda and
all

defects and

another point of view,

the sense of the definition of

comprehend

the other attributes.

all

thus a Person in that

The term personality

attri-

explained as possessing per-

From

3*RrWc^, TTgwTra.

as

the term already indicated, will

His own.

in that case,

laksaipavrtti

Immeasurable as are the attributes of

thro' all of them,

butes under four leading ones

also:

as applied to

He

Godhead

has a character of
denotes, according

to Madhva, not merely the existence of self-consciousness so conceived,

but also that the entire Universe

not as an abstract content,
glimpses of

this

or that

life of the world in a

absolute knowledge.

is

to

be thought of as an experience and

not limited to the intermittent and fragmentary

finite

way

consciousness, hut as embracing the whole

that

is

necessarily incomprehensible save

The Divine personality

of reference, endowed with the faculties of

activity, as part

of

its

cognition,

conation and

being

if

mm

by an

constitutes such a centrality

tp.

iii, 3,

is

).

BRAHMAN

IS

3 f^
The term

Person

'

spiritual being

no

is

essential

God

understand
action,

as

Rhwtenft

as applied

',

w>s#ara ( b.

Brahman,

to

249

t. 3 b.

embodied

constituent of personality.

Limitation

tenement.

in a psycho-physical

We may

depends.

It all

to be a great centre of consciousness, will, force

TO

180)

Ry*f*j+cP3;i

Tmr
(

NS.

IWM

cRT

421

p.

).

R. V.

If the

vii,

99,

it

we must

recognize,

and the

nothing anthropomorphic about Madhva's conception of

is

whom

a Person, everything about

no form of

is

M.G.B-

not to be a mere

is

both knowledge and knower, bliss

is

3TcTITCft-

non-thinking and non-acting being,

described as Saccidmanda, just for courtesy's sake,

with Madhva, that

^mt

^KT:

) ^Ict

Supreme Reality

indeterminate mass of non-willing,

There

and

a unit whose strength and capacities are beyond measure-

ment or conception: 3#?f^RPra^RM^RT:<lm<(ii^i^ WftR.

p.

be

therefore,

should,

from the circumscribed connotation of the term as

distinguished carefully

i'

A SA-VlSEA PERSONALITY

'

He has, by

non-material.

blissful.

God

as

definition

gross or subtle matter

ft

arcr

mfciT

3 fth3<rM&y

brings together a

iS^Et

fsfcsr

a*pi

#
Madhva

Jj^*fi^sf?re*t^r (Var&ha)

II

(VTN.

number of

texts

iii)

from the Upanisads and

Puraaas, in support of such a dynamic conception of the Divine personality

crwrft srffcsrTO*.

Taitt.

'

^fwf

'

<ftl<ls

^xrft

',

'
I

^H^wa^'

Kn<KKFTO

'

{Chan. Up.

3fTl^tif a^a:

^s^\

Mwyl.

viii.

1,1.)

ii,

2, 7

m$$,

'g$r:q#m?

era!,

'

'
)

*fo

g#^H%:
<F?

1 WIS,

frsieragw fas^r-

PHILOSOPHY OF ^RI MADHVAcArYA

250
*Rlfi| (Bhag.

But
is

48

vi, 4,

'

fttfM*lto<#ISJFREFRt:

then, these attributes are not separate

'

Bhag.

Hi,

44, 24

from the essence of God.

not a " bare something" qualified by or clothed with a number of

We have seen

butes from without.

as

an

capacity of intrinsic

Vis'egas,

integrality of being of
attributes,

is

the

self-differentiating

him smoothly

enables

of His

expression

external trappings attached to

God

by

to

preserve the

Supreme Person in and thro' His numerous

the

which are an

God
attri-

Madhva's conception of substance

that

maintained

identity-in-difference,

Him.

many

being and not so

Madhva's view of

the attributes of

Thomas Aquiand essence must

the same as that of the great Christian thinker St.

nas that "in God, the

distinction between existence

God can have no

away.

nature or essence distinguishable form His

Here and here only, the distinction between existence
and essence would have no meaning, and consequently the distinction
fall

actual existence.

between an attribute and that which

meaningless also.
it is its

own goodness.

it is all

one, to be and to be good. "

Its

goodness

phical Bases of Theism, 1937

The statement

that

is

that

which

is all

He

own

It

because, in

Dawes Hicks,

it,

Philoso-

His own body and limbs

ife^iNNRWR.*

sift

only

instruments of knowledge and activity

one of knowledge and

fWM:

not adjectival to

would be

other, that

).

God has

has His

no

say, as of

quoted from

i&{^!ss'Mc4 4 Htii *mrat sssrcFrt

means

subject of the attributes,

is

Of the Divine Being we can

bliss

pf?pr: S

WWEt mW{

f^SJ: tRHtS^R:

II

cr^&TW

sqfoaf:

Paimgi)

In so far, then, as the several attributes partake of the nature of Brah-

man, they

are also inseparable

c#r WI4'<NMMWMIlfi)'

So

far as

it

is

G. B.

ii.

necessary to concede that the

a profound character of its own and

is

72

Supreme Reality has

by no means an utter blank,

it

BKAHMAN

IS

would be utiphilosophical

( vi,

4,

48

vjt&l

vi, 8

quotes the ivetahatara text

and that of

the epithet "

capable of subsuming the countless other attributes

IT13<%

*$FTFcWrMt

(G. B.

t. ii,

of an attribute

in the sense

power and

activity

spoken of

72

dharma

in the

and the

),

svabhaviki

),

the

plea

of

vi, 8,

them

",

in

are

" is

understood

qualities of

knowledge,

vividha

texts

would

In the light

).

that the attributes are "intrinsic"

Anandabodha and others that even the

omniscience of Brahman actually presupposes, rather than opposes,

presence of ignorance

^tHftc^ssgor

Sveta&atara and other

naturally be seen to posit a variety of

of the clear statement of &vet. Up,

Bhagavan

The term " gupa

).

Jayatirtha points out that the

commonly associated with

six qualities

"RRT

^WJpRsRt

Bhd.ga.yata

to refute such a narrow view.

251

to limit the attributes to six or eight, as the

Madhva

Naiyayikas have done.

3!##fo%f

A SA-VlSE?A PEBSONALITY

Brahman

the

'3%cWT^?jTftWTl%^%, T g JlWaFfa

can only be characterized as audacious.

According to
other attributes of

the Nyaya-Vais'esikas,

God

the knowledge, activity

are abstract objectless wholes (akhantfa).

a position would render the conception of omniscience

Omniscience
also

would

is

knowledge of

all that exists.

Creative

nality of objects has nothing to

No

knowledge

eternity or non-eter-

do with the question.

In the absence of something like

terms of reference,

The

meaningless.

and other powers

similarly have reference to relevant objects.

or activity can thus be conceived as objectless.

distinctive

etc.

and
Such

it

an

internal Vis'ega to

would be

demarcate the

rationally impossible to

the limits of the creative and destructive activities in

God and

define

explain the

orderly arrangement of the evolution

succession of events.
sfesa ".
is

and involution of the world and the

In other words, God must be accepted as " Savi-

Tho' Madhva admits with the Naiyayikas that divine knowledge

eternal

and all-embracing,

it is

not,

oh

that account, undiversified.

It

PHILOSOPHY OF

252

is

multi-colored

anantavisesatmakam

by

two aspects of the Divine Will the

vyakti

which operate

),

ping and encroachment.

The Divine nature

God

is

See page 152

iakti

He

them

as

God

is

not omniscient.

we

If

self-luminous.

also

in respect of

Does God know our

He

does,

only perceives every thing as

God

sees that

we have

He would be

it is

God

is

all-embra-

human

illusions

illusions

also

much

subject

as

dilemma by pointing out

When we

in reality.

fallen into a delusion

Madhva

the patent

harmony, preventing overlap-

Jayatlrtha disposes of this

are.

silver in nacre,

of

and

).

The question of Divine omniscience

If not,

that

latent

not only all-knowing but

has been raised by some writers.

There

the agency of Vis'esas.

in pre-established
(

different

the

not only knows everything but also that His knowledge

cing.

to

and adjusted to

exigencies of creation, dissolution etc.

are

MADHVAcAbYA

I^RI

pwceive

^ %^5WT

TVt. p.

).

also takes special pains to point out that tho' the attributes

are transcendental

and

trans-empirical,

are

they

nevertheless

designated by the same terms as are applied to corresponding empirical

qualities.

This

is

merely symbolic and intended to give us some idea of

them, however limited and inadequate

i.

of.

crsrpfiwFr

^m

m, Awmi<i

^rcgl&sid:

II

B. S. B.

i^T

#r wfam.

iii,

2,

32-34

The tran-

).

^c^RW^f^wpim^

ift:

Udayana, Xutumanjali, iy

t w*a,
)

lift

ct^T qerwr

mm,

irft

&RAHMAN
scendental cannot be fully
gories

and

epithets

A SA-VI?E^A PEESONAUTY

IS

made known

or represented by empirical cate-

wmk shew m^i ^rrj

l+RgotswjH^i^i OT^wtnt gssfa

is

doctrine of

a remarkable anticipation of
'

analogical senses

'

ii

"

qiit

crwiitri^n^mHclcfra:

5RT fcJRRST&T 3^ltec?|feT m$(fa (TP.

This

253

ficicfnFPrr-

2, 34).

iii,

St.

underlying

Thomas

all

Aquinas's famous

human concepts of God.

CHAPTER XL1

COSMIC ACTIVITIES OF BRAHMAN

The cosmic powers

of the

Supreme

are eight in

number

creation,

preservation, dissolution, control, enlightenment, obscuration, bondage

and
and ultimate source of every one of these determinations.
The accounts in the Epics and Purauas dividing these activities
among the members of the popular Hindu trinity are taken by Madhva
in a deeper Monotheistic sense.
He holds that the Supreme Being itself
( identified with Vignu ) acts thro' the instrumentality of the other gods
release.

It is the sole

ffcwpifc

#* TOSBSntftaRCT

<p> *j? Jtsrcifcr:

$& n&ifm

Bhag.

x,

71, 8

q. b. s, b. a,

s,

This applies to the processes of nature also

iriwHi

iiml 5nw:

This

is

how Madhva

Padma

q.

by Madhva

post-Vedic sources with the Monotheistic idea of the

t?fi:

sarerr

Devas

flcftftsfer

mm(Mbh). But Madhva

"Madhva

Of.

nature of
of
(

Brahman

Bod,

Op.

believes

"

finds for the popular gods

142

the

cosmic determination as a delega-

characteristics

Creative activity

is

an

mentioned oolong

essential

to

the

defining quality

Brahma SUtra, p. 237 ) and his own remark

"If we do not accept such a subtle power abiding

Radhakrishnan,

Samkara

ffod

cit. p.

that

Bra\tmn.

in regard to

in

and

One Supreme:

of Hinduism a place in his theosophy and regards their limited

jurisdiction over particular aspects of

1.

).

reconciles the apparent polytheism of the Vedic

oannot
).

[ Italics

a Creator.

mine

],

He cannot move towards

creation'

1
tioa of powers or as an imperium in imperia.

by making

BRAHMAN

COSMIC ACTIVITIES OF

tion of a plurality of causes,

the

255

This overcomes the limitaSupreme Brahman alone the

ultimate and independent source in every act of emergent evolution.

Madhva

This

comments on B.S. i, 4, 15 and

ii, 3, 11.
In this sense, God is called " K&raaa-karaija "( cause of all
causes ) working in and thro' each of them
point has been explained by

It is the

in his

surfer

3fr^qrs# fersft

s*r*fa

f&d ^r

same Brahman

fasg#-

rcft

fkm:

^rt*

b. t. p. 4

and thro' every 'one of

that sustains the selves in

Murccha and Maranam.

So too, in the states of dissolution and release. The dependence of souls
on God in the state of dissolution is obvious enough. Dependence in

their five states of life

release, too,

3?cTKf

*T%

clearly taught in the Scripture: acTriarcft^&JIFT: (RV.x. 90,2)

is

WWft:

(B.S.

iv,

Jagrat, Svapna, Susupti,

( Mbh.

xii.

254, 17 )

4, 17).

The Visfurahasya puts

the idea tellingly

^TcI^ts^
The B.

T. states that

selves are

^psrsfteir:

sni^topr

f#

qsrrsiHftr tcprttji

xn, 22-23

both intrinsic and empirical forms

dependent on

srircirar:

p^q^Jp^ct (B.S.) WF^mK-

God

wi

% s$nrfe^ ( b.

t.

x, 74

).

of knowledge of

"

PHILOSOPHY OV rI MADHVAcABYA

2$6

The Supreme

is

thus the ultimate source of every one of the sixfold

determinations of organized matter and the eightfold determinations of

Of

the lives of thinking beings.

from bondage

these, release

No

cherished ambition of man.

God

conception of

complete without making room for

fulfilment

its

Up.

[!>vet.

body

this idea will

vi, 16)

3WWtsti^?'fa5

Rv

and no definition of Brahman that does not em-

That

be complete or proper.

beyond every other commentator on B.

S.

i,

why Madhva

is

The very need

for

an inquiry

Brahman

into

goes

" 3di

and interprets

1,2,

there to include a pointed reference to the redemptive function

others also.

God,

by the Supreme.

then, is the ultimate source of redemption of the world

tg:

most

the

is

can therefore be

and some

arises because

of the desire for redemption, which cannot be achieved without the grace

God

of

which

is

facilitated

^^T telkK:

by knowledge

^ufa^RIT <#*?T

affit

II

cause

is

'

of bondage,

no escaping

(B. S.

iii, 1,

this.
).

if

He

is

to

Madhva

The

God

accepts this position,

era

qf ^rsrem^Rcrat:

f^sfcf SRRFf:
(

carries the point further

Skanda,

and

q.

stg:

every respect

b. t. p. 74

is

II

by Sridhara Svamin

in release the

full

brought about by the grace

thus making the soul's dependence

literally true in

Sutrakara

and shows how even

manifestation of intrinsic bliss of the selves

God Himself,

the

%rjr;: qt

of

with

There

confirmed by the following texts

ftfrdII^T$(Wt3P gq#

sr^sft

Madhva

is

should be the ultimate

be the source of our redemption.

logic of this

*!clt

jftajt

(B. S. B.)

Philosophical reason bids us assume that

'

Tiwrni^gft T

left

on God complete

008MI0 ACTIVITIES

The

Moksa

giver of

mined

selves,

Svatantra

and Purna.
the

ft

^R:

M. 17

257

God,

then, as the great

Redeemer of our

One Independent Transcendent Being of

5?t#

P.

BRAHMAN

should ex hypothesi be Independent and Self-deter.

stands out as

metaphysics

Off

9KR:

3$ SEHrT:

W^

(Rcpsf:

?f4

TOffcFT %^5q; ?

8&

( ,4

F. p.

33

CHAPTER XLII

MANIFESTATIONS OF BRAHMAN.
The Supreme Lord
and

glory

nebulous chaos

forms

at

bliss
(

of all

when

time

remains wrapped

creation

R. V. x, 129, 2-3

the entire Universe

He puts on a

Later,

).

is

up

in

His

in a state of

multiplicity of

These forms, the

to evolve the universe thro' different stages.

innumerable, are nevertheless identical with one another, save for their

The

numerical distinction.

first in

the order of Divine manifestations

is

the quarternity of Vasudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha and Samkarsana

known

popularly

ten

differentiates itself into

thousand

and

so

Catur )-Vyuha,

credited with redemptive,

The Supreme

and destructive functions.

sustaining

creative,

the

as

on

Avatars

familiar

or twelve,

Mbh.T. N.i.10).

(G.T. ix;

further

hundred,

These

personal

manifestations of the Lord are spoken of as Suddha-Srsti, in Pancaratra

They are

terminology.

also designated as

sense.

The Ramanuja school recognizes

God

1 )

Images

Avataras

1
(5) the Immanent.

and

Madhva

he does not use this nomenclature.

ence
tely

idea

manifestations of

There

is

It is the

Cf.

a general

five kinds of manifestations

Vyuhas

But there

There

of making any

God

or putting

no room for Svagatabheda

same

Infinite

in every

Monotheistic puritanism

1.

) ; in

is

of

the Transcendent

the first one, tho'

one important

differ-

Madhva's view, these various manifestations are absolu-

that in

on a par with one another.

to the

groups

accepts all but

<*$l<*|eRlkl

is

is

no gradation among them

Madhva

in respect of powers or potentialities.

sed

Vyuhas

invidious

is

vehemently oppo-

distinctions

among

some on a higher pedestal than

in the

Supreme

manifestation.

Neha

these

others.

nanasti kvheana).

This rigorous note of

absent in Rimcinuja's system, wherein the Para-

3Mn^^KRWfft#T

'TSraisgrf^f

MAJUFES'.tATIOlSS Off BBAHltAN

Vfcsudeva

or Transcendental Brahman ) alone

Pradyumna
" of

are assigned less

etc.

number of

Madhva may be taken

Ramanuja. The " Bimbarupas

quanon of

liberation {B. S.

ent footing and are

jndmakarya

all

the six

" Bimba-

correspond with the AntaryamI of

53

3,

iii,

The

Madhva's system

The Avat&ras

).

which

soul, a vision of

are

number exceeds ten

as

on a

of

list

commonly

Ramanuja seems

Neither Sarhkara nor

ten.

the

differ-

recognized.

There are other Avatars like Hamsa, Datta and Hari, not included
popular

is

like balakarya,

concerned with specific functions

Their

etc.

to

attributes

" have a special place in

archetype of each

in that they constitute the

sine

credited with

of godliness; while the members of the Vyuha: V&sudeva,

qualities

rupa

is

259

in the

to have been

inclined to treat Krsnadvaipayana Vyasa as a full-fledged Avatar of the

Supreme

commentator Sudars'ana Suri

tho' the latter's

follow Madhva's lead that Vyasa

But

his

"

Avatar of Vismr.

soul

R. G. B.

There

partial "

influence of Prarabdhakarma,

to the
t.

iv,

is

To

according to Madhva.
status.

real full-fledged

younger contemporary, Vedanta Des'ika, thinks otherwise and treats

Vyasa as subject

human

is

prepared to

is

as

an ordinary

This will be nothing short of a sacrilege,

him,

all

Avataras are of equal merit and

no question of degrees of fulness among them, no

and " complete Avataras

"- 1

He

uncompromising

takes his

stand on the authority of the Upanisadic and other Pancaratrika texts

and

rejects the

commonly accepted
*

as inappropriate

wm mm. W^

on philosophical and

*n#rr

in rank, attributes

#t

m*

and powers.

s. b. s. b.

ii,

2,

44

3.

i.

23

He

has thus

no

God and

treats all

of

syntactic grounds.

partiality or preference for any particular Avatar of

them as equal

Bhagavala text

interpretation of the

philosophy of $ri madhvAoAbya

260

Sarhkara holds the bodies of Avatars to be Mayic and material in

The Ramanuja school regards them

stuff.

f^wnfcHj;

R. G. B.

iv,

and formed out of the transcendental form

of the Lord, residing in His highest Heaven

feKT^fRTR^Ic^
same

authority as

=T

3W

(R.G.B.

is

Des'ika, p.

13).

SRcTTCi^Wft 3WItf4OT5Deslka also quotes

the

Madhva
HTfctT *rft

jft^sf^HT

But the Ramanujiyas seem

This

as essentially non-material:

not acceptable to

to regard the

Madhva

Varaha xxxiv, 40

).

Avatara forms as non-eternal.

& ftc^:

WSRTTST
(

3HWJ

B. T. p. 5

*l
).

SADHANA-VICARA

VII.

OHAPTBK XLIII

FREEDOM AND FREEWILL

MADHVA'S PHILOSOPHY

IN

The question of human freedom and Divine control assumes great

importance in

philosophy and

Madhva emphasizes both and

ethics.

maintains that they are mutually consistent.

man
in

himself and not

This

world.

the

Madhva.

God

that

the

is

In

corollary

of

not really an agent.

is

of a superimposition on the Atman.

atman

is

afresh,

but

is

all seriousness.

Madhva

ethical, secular or spiritual

necessary

ascribe

to

real

it is

in this school,

not something to

this

view, even the spiritual

of the

activity

in

self

unable to accept such a position which

is

on the part of the

activity

all

Hence, on

be regarded as a true purposive

effort cannot

is

of the atman himself, tho*

the essence

seemingly obscured and hidden.

All activity

essentially the result

Moksa,

Since

understood in terms of identity with Brahman,

achieved

is

Svarupabhedavada of

the

due to the play of Avidya or ignorance and

reduces

first place, it

In the Advaita school of Sarhkara, which regards the

as essentially nirviiesa, the self

be

the

responsible for the evil and suffering

is

self,

activity to the self.

the Advaita school, the kartrtva

whether hedonistic, or

mere make-believe.

to

of the

If,

atman

It

as

is

therefore

contended by

is

merely due to a

is

superimpositon of the kartrtva that really belongs to the mind, just as

the redness of the japa flower

placed by

in a case of

Sopadhikabhrama

other times

outside the

so,

doer

',

'

the

perception
to

one should have the

the

mind

is

superimposed on the

is

viz.,

bhrama

that

that

( ii )

or buddhi

the japa flower

cannot possibly

that the

mind

is

'

also

is

experience

the crystal is red

Since the

'.

of the Saksl, the doership that

mind

distinctive experiences

the doer

crystal that

one has both the kinds of

side, then just as

its

is

and at

red,

atman
open

even

is

th

to the

is

said to belong in reality

fall

outside the perception

of the Sakgi.

Following the Sutrakara

with his ethical realism,

( *fid

Madhva

5lMf^R

ii,

maintains the

3,

33

and consisten

human sour

is

a rea

philosophy of gsl madhvaoArya

262
agent in

down

all

its

actions.

we do

If

not admit

Sastra which lays

this, the

injunctions and prohibitions with reference to the achievement of

specific results

would

and the moral law on which these are ultimately grounded

lose all significance

and lapse

The

into a cry in the wilderness.

The Jada

Kastra cannot be addressed to the insentient or to God.

is

incapable of responding to any mandate 1 and

God

of commandments.

have reference to any but

They cannot,

therefore,

is

above the purview

the souls.

The means of

realization of

Brahman, such as iravana, manana and

nididhyasana, prescribed in the Sastras, clearly imply that they are to be

carried out by a real agent.

If the activities in respect

a matter of superimposed assumption, there

is

no

of these are only

possibility of the fruits

of such Sadhanas practised being realized by the aspirants.

is

The Advaitin

hardly justified in denying kartrtva to the atman and relegating

buddhi,

inasmuch as Samkara himself,

in his

Bhasya on B. S.

ii,

it

to

3, 36'

has categorically rejected the view of the Sarhkhya that kartrtva pertains
to buddhi and has upheld the view that

Siddhanta .view.

it

belongs really to the Jlva, as the

The absence of discrimination (vivekagraha) between

buddhi and atman has been alleged by

the

Sarhkhyas

position of the Advaitin would be hardly different

if

also.

Hence, the

from the Sarhkhya view

he were to reject the view that kartrtva does really belong to atman.

Moreover,

if

bondage, in the form of doership, enjoyment

as an undesirable state

anartha

to the buddhi, then deliverance

),

etc.

viewed

were to be regarded as belonging only

from such bondage

also should logically

be for the benefit of the buddhi alone, and not for the benefit of the

Even ajnana which

is

a source of misery to the

Jlvas,

they need on no account bother about

deliverance from them.

{JayatKrtha, 0. B.
I

is

by giving rise to enjoyment and sufferingsand bhoktrtva brought about by ajnana are

Jlva,

So, then, unless such kartrtva

really accepted: in the

gf)^ * * *

Jlva.

regarded by the Advaitin as pertaining to the Jlva

t.

p. 897).

PBBBDOM AND JfRBBWILL

Whatever may be the aim of

spiritual effort,

something new, or to discover a forgotten

tion

must be a very

agent.

real serious effort

263

whether to achieve

state, the effort in that direc-

on the part of a true and a

real

for this reason that Albert Schweitzer argues that the doct-

It is

rine of reincarnation cannot accept the hypothesis that the soul's contact

with the bodily experiences

Madhva's that "

the soul

in the corporeal

not

moral conduct

if

from the

is

is

His contention

real.

the same as

is

any part in the liberation of

to play

cycle of rebirth, the soul must, in

some way,

participate

and be affected by the human experience and actions

So the doctrine of reincarnation can in no sense agree to the assertion

that the Universe

not real, but must hold fast to

is

its

reality

"
(

Op. cif

p. 62).

The acceptance of

real fcartrtva to the soul

He

is

circumscribed by

factors like the physical body, the sensory apparatus etc.

As Ramanuja points

"gifts" of God.

the activity of the soul

is

make

does not however

the Jiva an absolute and independent agent.

which are the

out, under Gtta xviii, 16,

said to be not independent but dependent

where

on

th e

five determining factors of the body, an agent, organization, bodily func-

tions and the direction. of the

ftcttll^ift:

power of

^4

=sr

Lord

qwicH<$:

*ifalOT cre[M K-W^l fecRlftOTR

direction

is

The

vested in God.

cn^rsrftsf

3*ora&Rjf?[fa.: cKT-

the

ultimate

Jiva pursues of his freewill

own deep-rooted nature

inclinations and past Karma.
But even this is possible because God has
given him the power to do things in conformity with his own innate
course of action that

goodness or

is

determined mostly by

He is

its reverse.

not, therefore, a

of God.

The

right to choose between right

choice

his

own, made on

is

Yathecchasi tatha kuru

It

may,

his

his

own

mere puppet in the hands,

and wrong

responsibility

is

his

and at

own and the

own risk

his

).

therefore, be stated that the Jiva

is

both a doer and a non

doer from different points of view, like a carpenter in the service of a

building-architect.

up

He

He

works, with his

to the architect for direction.

does not owe

it

to the other.

The

own hands and

.

skill

tools

of the carpenter

But not so in

is

but looks
his

own

the case of the Jiva.

He

philosophy of k! madhvAoAkya

264
has

even

derived

Creator.

B.S.

make Him

action and

God

For,

ii.

3.

He

way.

chooses,
for

but

do

however,

not,

He

former

of his

with

least

all

Oita

its

He

cannot,

He

them

set

to reach

adrift,

This book

it.

his acts,

has freedom of choice within the

chartless

blindfolded into

on the high

is

the Sastra

seas.

where

of

lies

vidhinisedhd,-

).

is

3WHM|<*W*Ws#%

individual

set out, according to

TT

creative energy of the Jlva

should be

Madhva,

dilemma sooner or

samarthya orprayatna

is

not some-

That being

every time any task

would have

throw

in the

optimum

magnitude of the

task.

to be accomplished, the individual

of his creative energy into

That

ii,

later-

thing that can be treated as different from his essence.

is

re-

in B. S.

For, any theory that makes the Jlva

the sole initiator of his actions, will have to face a

The

Jlva

blame

therefore,

does not throw the creatures

Another overriding consideration why the

The

).

moral worth and has

garded as a dependent agent

26

63

xviii,

God, for the unpleasant consequences of

God

how

not

( sfl'M^^tiler:

foreknowledge of

sufficient

of

and deserts

life

provided with a chart, a book of instructions

the haven and

1,

meshes of

of action for good or

an unknown region or

tmakam

in the

freewill, a particular line

should he have chosen wrongly.

is

God

does not interfere with the Jlva's decision in any

but never constrains

sustains

realm of works. 2

Each

involve

R. V.

responsible ultimately for the behavior of souls.

himself to thank for the consequences.

any one,

from the

things, metaphysically,

But for God, he cannot move an inch

in relation to his

42 )}

out

bad,

).

merely enables the Jlva to pursue a course of action,

arbitrarily,

B. S.

41

to

ability

his

3,

This does

112, 9).

x,

ii,

will hardly

it,

be wise or

M. 9. B.

to

of the

irrespective
fair.

so,

Nor can we

xviii. 16 )

NS. 327

FBEBDOM AND FEBBWILL

265

create internal parts into the Jiva's personality to get over this difficulty.

That

We

an identity of essence. But what we require

something more than that

of effort to the given task, which

as

we

a power to

is

the proportion

regulate

a normal power or

not

say in

find in other places,

therefore, required to put such a

an

Someone

object.

insentient

power

do

which

this

By His

would be God,

seemingly

what

not found elsewhere.

is

impossible

the Jlva cannot

into the Vis'esas.

It is

is,

not in the
Vis'e-

The only deus ex machina who can

mysterious power of accomplishing the

3^f>d^ii mil^t 3#cT:

do and

such

Vis'esas,

competence of the Jlva himself to confer such a new power on the

sas,

as

to possess anything more than a capacity to render

internal distinctions possible in

is

stage,

cannot take the help of Vis'esas also at this

known

they are not

here

an element of

destroy the unity of his being, by introducing

will

multiplicity.

very well do

He could

),

motion investing them

set the Vis'esas in

with the capacity to secure proportional adjustment of effort and creaIn

tive energy of the Jlva to carry out different tasks.

Jiva cannot
This

is,

do without the

another difficulty.

"

He

ing to
that

He

his

still

work,

himself

according

God

is

to

is

His

support of

If

one who causes

the

pleasure (B. S.

God's inexorable

renders unto every

iii,

man

2,

41

to

".

accord( iii,

remains unexplained.

of action.

He

pretation of the Sutra

the agent as well

but he does not

(Radhakrishnan,

STOlcT ?rT^Fit

( ii,

1,

If

is

Phil,

/.

ii,

p, 441).

The contradiction can only be removed by accepting Madhva's

:

do right and wrong,

Here, the Sutrakara resorts to Sruti

attempt to remove the contradiction

impartia-

man

the 'Kausitaki Upanisad

the other view in

pulls the strings for every kind

as the patient.

in

on God, inputting his creative energy to use.

secured by the doctrine that

There
lity is

way, the

his actions.

in

made by Madhva,

indeed, a very remarkable point

the Jiva's dependence

God

regulating control of

this

37

inter-

PHILOSOPHY OF SBf MADHVAcARYA

266

A
it

partiality that interferes with right

been rejected

has

and wrong

wrong by meting out rewards and punishments

them

not a fault.

is

As

Sutrakara.

and

pitilessness.

One

The other

deserts.

It

an

is

Of

as

it

impairs the validity

right as the

of

it

should act in a partial and

karma,

it

Vedas.

on misery.

brings

would mean that

the

pitiless

so far

in

as they are

Veda

the

For,

prescribes

warns us against

Such

way

Karma and

individual

means of achieving happiness and

righteousness as

to

one must be rejected

these, the first

the

accordance with

acceptable

is

it

depending on them

in

themselves subject to God.

in

There are two kinds of partiality

from disregard of

results

lies

Hence,

asset.

Jayatlrtha explains

Hence

a blemish.

is

The proper control of right and

the Sutras.

in

being the case,

un-

God

if

in utter disregard of individual

law of right and wrong taught in the Vedas

the

would be rendered meaningless.

They would then

lose their validity.

Therefore, the Sutrakara, while admitting the view of God's acting

in

accordance with Karma, has set at rest the possibility of partiality and
pitilessness in the divine dispensations.

lessness

'

deserts
defect.

in meting out punishment

is

not,

strictly

The

sort of

and rewards

speaking, a foible.

in

It

partiality

'

and

piti-

accordance with one's

does not amount to a

This solution of the conflict between the seemingly

minism of
Vedanta
of souls.

the Kausitaki

lies,

as pointed

era

the rationalism of the

by Madhva,

%m ft&m ^

fspraiwf!-^ifi%cni

qftprq

a?dsaijj f|<t4

t&
ft

v% wsm*mvk

*ra<ftftjn^<^.p.3i2b).

a^ref

shelter

under

^mww*-

ixmsmm

foiwi

tfcrqn

deter-

theory of the
"

" Svarupabheda

rather take

wimSmzTfm.

m^ %tfr ^

fatalistic

Karma

in the doctrine of

Most Indian commentators would

tfasi 'srf^n?

#t

and

?pr,

*$-

%wi

FREEDOM AND FEEEWILL

the inexorable law of

lities in this

Karma

and freedom
choice

why

is

all

eternal

implies a

But

Karma

extremity.

the only

implies freedom

does not explain why a particular

it

Even a chain of beginningless Karma could not explain

are not equally good or bad, as all of them are equally

souls

and

viz. that the

(

to its logical

choice.

and inequa-

Madhva has been

made.

their

simultaneous.

soul

to reconcile the presence of evil

world with the goodness of God.

one to push the question

267

Karmas too were equally beginningless and

The only possible explanation

Karma

55 ) which

elaborated by

is

itself is

in his

to

it.

Mbh.

T.

mRTW 4lldl
tt

3MiftRKt

m wtf

swf

*Hfo>1fa

Svampa-yogyat&

N.

xxii,

=w#i

184-88

IT fJOTsTT

-alsrrlg

t%wr

g; ftcfta

crrr

g#i:

^f^rrfci<TS%i
^i-"i

by Madhva'

the result of the distinctive nature of each

intrinsic

Madhva

that offered

is

the start

^raf^r !fifrit

11

).

This point

is

PHILOSOPHY OF ^Bl MADHVACAKYA

268

anadikarma of

This takes us one step definitely beyond the stage of

Jlvas and traces
(

svarupa-yogyata

" Haiiha

From

".

in terms of

to the intrinsic nature

it

Madhva

of individual selves.

" Hatha " Karma flows as

this

good or bad

without which the Svabhava

(NS.

p. SI

and pravrtti

functioning

any charges to

its

He

course.

nature of beings.

He

of

is

their sattcl,

In allowing this basic nature of

).

for there

own

God's

does not interfere in

Theoretically,

stature

full

its

God, for

will of

partiality or cruelty;

flouting of the moral law, which

have

name

the

All these factors are

).

the souls to develop without detriment to the moral law,

to

it

outward expression

its

cannot be developed to

however ex hypothesi dependent on the

existence

gives

or fitness

actions, thro' volitional activity (Purusaprayatna).

Wmw tcmWvRfal&i WWferrcT,

(

anadi-svabh&va

its

God
He

law.

is

not open

no violation or

is

allows

it

to

working and change the

He may have the power to do

He does not choose to

pleases; but the fact remains that

whatever
upset the

moral law or change the nature of beings.

And
may

facts

matter more than vague musings and conjectures of what

be possible

for

God. The evidence of Scripture and level-headed

reason uphold the supremacy of the moral law as an expression of the

Divine

will itself.

downfall

"

no

is

" The ghost of Darius moralizes on the Persian

When, of our own

becomes our ally "

of the soul

Radhakrishnan,

allowed to have

fear of tht sovereignty of

moral character of God

can accuse

God

free will,

is

its

/.

Phil,

we rush
ii,

p,

course, whatever

God

419
it

not also challenged on

Cf.

% S$^:

$KWWlfrll,

Himself

The nature

).

be.

view.

He

There

is

The

For, one

changes the

Moreover, to change the Svarupa

the Jlvas;

the essence of Jivahood and any change

would be tantamount to a destruction of

1.

this

of partiality and cruelty only when

of the Jivas would be to destroy, to annihilate,

is

f.

may

God

being compromized on this view.

nature of some in preference to others.

" Svarupa "

to sin,

for, the
"
of " Svarupa

individuality.

$T<ur|W|W|l l+!*W=HcH

gcl<,

Nyaya

<&)!&?

Vitarana,

iv. 2, 6 )

FREEDOM AND FREEWILL

269

The theory of Svarupabheda and Svarupayogyata elaborated by

is thus the most far-reaching and at the same time highly
suggestive solution of the problem of plurality of selves and their freedom
and freewill and of the presence of evil and suffering in a moral Universe
under the government of a moral and merciful God.
Questions like
the following have been asked all the world over :- The Jiva was not
created out of a void, at a particular time.
But he is, none the less, an
expression of the nature of God. How then does he happen to be so

M adhva

imperfect,

while

archetype

his

Augustine's agony of soul

was

is

still

also

the type of perfection ?

more poignant

"

St.

Who made me

Did not God who is not only good, but goodness itself ? Whence, then,
came I to will evil and nill good so that I am thus justly punished ?

Who

me and ingrafted in me this plant of bitterness, seeing

was wholly formed of my most sweet God ? "
Confessions, Bk.
VII. 4-5 ). The answer to these questions is found by Madhva in B. S.
set this in

that I

ii,
(

3,

51 ( 3iKiPW(ifO

adfstaniyama

ther

name

).

It

in

the

intrinsic

diversity

has been shown earlier that this

human

" adrsta

nature

" is

ano-

for the "anddi-svartupayogyata" of the individual souls. Ragha-

vendra Tlrtha brings out this point, very clearly,

on

of

Jayatlrtha's

TP.

fitd&ltl -elP^WlH,

^^MlMl^f^s^^cl
(

Bhavadipa,

ii.3,

53),

in his gloss

Bh&vadipa

3reEt^W^*TnS&cfr3ng;

CHAfTKR XLlV

PROBLEM OF EVIL IN RELATION TO ETHICAL

ADVANCEMENT
The problem of Evil and suffering in the world is the most difficult
one in Theism. We have explained Madhva's attitude to the allied problem of freedom and freewill, on the basis of the doctrine of natural
selection ( anddisvampayogyati ) of good or bad and of the tripartite
classification of souls. It is not therefore necessary for

the question of the consistency of evil with

question has also been touched

rana of the B. S.

its

in the

is

This

Vaisamyanairghroyadhika-

to hold, on the traividhya view also, that

an incentive to the better class of souls, to keep off

temptation

Wc^lcl

fRfral'

*IWRi*n%H3$

There are many worshippers of Satan and

moral code or
their outlook.

Any

to answer

It is possible

the presence of evil

from

upon

Madhva

Divine goodness.

Their type

is

his

ways and they have no

They are unmitigatedly

values.

spiritual

(Visyurahaiiya, V, 12).

ll

outlined in the Scriptures 1

thoroughgoing theory of man's

spiritual destiny

take note of the irreducible distinctions of

human

anti-social in

must therefore

nature and formulate

a theory that would cover the diverse aspects of its character as a whole.
reason and experience are any guide in such matters, Sarvamukti or
universal salvation would appear to be a day dream. Bondage is not only
It all depends on
real, but it may be absolutely irremediable for some.
If

the basic nature of free beings.

and exclaim

that

we cannot have a

It is

futile

to

throw up our hands

we

really useful ethics unless

believe

one " who bears the human form

Why forget the animal and other forms divine ? Ethical
divine ".
systems all over the world have been devised only for the benefit of those
in the spiritual possibility of every

who may
is

no

The ethicization of the entire cosmos

The utmost that any useful system of ethics can

care to profit by them.

practical politics.

Of. fftta, xvi. 16-20

R.

V.

fSRrftoTT

faft

JTSSig

W^:

and

||

3^

Maitri

fRlq^rfr:-

Tfp. vii, 8

).

PROBLEM OF BVIL
do

show

to

is

means of advance. Whether particular ethical

by all sections of humanity, and acted up to, is

the ways and

doctrines will be accepted

more than any ethical system can

I. C. B. M. as a means of banishing
well as those

271

who

predict or guarantee.
capitalistic ideology

Believers

in

from the world as

believe in peaceful co-existence of nations with different

With due deference to those " who bear

Madhva maintains that their future is unof human nature is such that we cannot

ideologies will always be there.

human form

the

predictable.

shut

The

our eyes

ethical

divine",
diversity

to

or sqeeze every one into the

it,

system would be of no use

are not prepared to abide by

look

to

The

askance

at

most

the

professional

of

existence

it

if

An

same mould.

people are indifferent to

8Wff^Brf$E 5iraq,.

Some

are

it

perfect system of ethics or scoff at

does

liars

not

invalidate

the

or

bound
it.

noble

commandment

of Christ and the Upanisads, to speak the truth.

It is
hardly necessary, then, to shed sentimental tears over the doom of
Satan, Beelzebub, Balial, Kali, or Kalanemi.

each according to

his

own

deserts.

and must

minute respects.
of the Universe

will

3Hi&Dtert

are not

differ

%t *i&fil1wrf^

men

are not

or values of ethical conduct.

Some

Experience shows that

not

their reward,

women

from one another in most

Difference of character and temperament is the law

machine-made, they

who

They have

As men and

only take

all

delight

in

moved by

the same considerations

are frank Hedonists to the core,

their

Philosophy or no philosophy, they

hedonism, but are proud of

won't care.

You may

call

it.

them

"philosophical swines", but they will treat your condemnations as those

of babes and imbeciles

who run away from

life unfit constitutionally

Cf

*m

the

charms and pleasures of

to enjoy the gifts of nature.

jjjt:

WK^ikifa wit

S^wiwaiWri'W

m f^r (Naisadhd).

what you will, this type of men and women

form the majority of the race, may go on
content with its philosophical hedonism. The Omar Khayyam type is
by no means a hypothetical monstrosity. Below this self-complacent,
It

is

quite possible that, say

which may presumably

PHILOSOPHY OV ^El MADHVAoAfiTA

272

pleasure-loving type in creation,

most devilish
Such a type is

the wicked and un-moral type of the

is

and moral degradation.

by the demons and Asuras of th Puraoas and its
counterpart is not difficult to recognize in our own times of atomic and
ballistic warfare.
It is unphilosophical to close our eyes to the darker
sides of life and dismiss them as mere illusions or passing shadows.
We
must find a place for the best and the worst of natures in our philosophy
of life. Madhva has had the boldness to look at it from the practical
point of view. There is no need for the philosopher to be a moral
Alchemist and seek to convert base metals into gold. As a practical
philosopher,

Man

will

less.

Mukti

without.

propensities for destruction, vice

typified

Madhva

It

refuses to coquet with the

according

served

be

to

idea of Sarvamukti.

deserts,-

his

not a prize for good conduct to be

is

more nor

neither

conferred from

nothing but the realization of our being by each one

is

of us:

gfadlicNRPTOq

Nature

will find

already.

its

The question why

existence

it

Bhag,

10, 6

ii,

there

is

evil
It

and suffering
there

is

fight against

God and
it,

we

if

history of man,

in this

world

We

His government.

can; or else

And

all thro'.

above the influence of

evil

go under

moral

the

have to reckon with

its

weight.

attain goodness.

it

and

Such has been the

philosophy proposes to show us

and

thus as

is

and cannot be driven out of

on any ground of alleged incompatibility with

perfection of

rise

shy of nature's laws.

illegitimate.

is

5#NcT:

expression in any one of the three patterns indicated

We need not fight

profitless as

^FN

And

it

how

to

stands to

many may falter on the way and fail to reach the goal,
may struggle on and on till they reach the gummit; while some others

reason that while

others

may not

even care to think of the goal.

Attention to the baneful effects of

nality of all dross.
life

It

of purity and godliness

-iwraftw*

Wit fil^ici (TP.

frwti
iii,

evil

helps to cleanse the perso -

hastens Vairagya which strengthens devotion to a

wifc *m g-'wrat

1, 1). It is

that the S&stras describe at

ira% %F#nfr 3Jq%^

to

draw

cf?[sf

'W<iklW*f-

^r q#sfre5#r:

attention to the miseries of

some length

the souls'

wfffoft
Samsara

sojourn thro' heaven

PROBLEM OF EVIL
and

and

hell

release

is

in

womb

their sufferings in the

273

B. S.

iii, 1).

The

desire for

proportion to the intensity of suffering and the keenness of

its realization.

The
behind

reality

all efforts

of
to

experience

tha cares and anxieties to which

transmigration.

and

We are

all

the while. 1

discipline

by which

human

driving force

Many and

untold are

beings are exposed in the cycle of

our

lives to

find peace

and happiness that

we cannot extricate ourselves from this net

of God, we must naturally turn to the sche-

release

^ ^mrm^m\^n<i\y^m
P.M. 18.

strongest

Since

of bondage save by the grace

mes of

the

groping in the dark for the light of knowledge

struggling every minute of

eludes us

thus

is

attain spiritual perfection.

is

possible to be attained.

* (Tdy.t)

CHAPTER XLV.

CLASSIFICATION OF ADHIKARIS
The scheme of Sadhanas embraces

the entire

and

tual uplift comprising the physical, moral

The paths

individual.

tain roughly to

the

of

Karma

physical,

Bhakti and

ric

distinctions

to be acquired

distinguished into (1J the highest

Adhikaris

(2)

among men
can only
wardly

realize the

It is

Such of the human

beings as are

ranked below the " best of

may

of Adhikaris

As

Smarta code,

men ".

fit

have

its

own

3,

to the

36-3d) while the

as omni-

an

in

who

ascending order

and

(3) enlightened.

more than a cease'damnable'

are

are

The term " Manugyottoma" does

distinctive

sex, tho*

each group

way of approach

to spiritual

Sutrakara, and believers in the

wisdom

however, main-

thro

Traivarnikas, qualified

women

souls

the Rsis in-

Brahman

commentators on the Vedanta have,

open only

human

16)-

for nothing

tained that the attainment of philosophical

i.

3,

made

those

faithful followers of the

all

is

iv.

any distinction of caste or

not, however, involve

progress.

and

transmigration

less cycle of

B.S.

bahihprakaia

{2) purified

devoted,

(1)

is

lowest type of

Rsi-Gandharvas and the best

Madhva, B.S.B.

different classification of souls

is

(3)

pointed out that the

Supreme from without

of spiritual merit into

gation

based partly on gene-

antahprakasa) and that the gods can intuit

( B#BRir:)

present

manusyottama

of

refer-

class of Adhikaris

middling and

souls, comprising respectively, the gods,

spiri-

of the Sastras per-

Madhva with

The former

).

of man's

intellectual aspects

out by

is set

ence to different orders of aspirants

J nana

and

emotional

The scheme of Sadhanas

Sadhana.

field

spiritual perfection of the

'

for

Sastric investi-

Vedic

study,

and Sudras are given access to the

saving knowledge only thro' the literature of the Epics and Puranas and
Paftcaratra.

faithful adherence to the duties of

rally insisted upon.

the fourth order of

But
life

Madhva does
as

Varnasrama

not make a

fetish

is

natu-

of entering

an external condition precedent to the

attain-

CLASSIFICATION OF ADHIKARIS

ment of wisdom
the obvious

as in the Advaita

devotion and purity 2

existence

of

Brahmavicara

1.

Of.

increased

the
.

He

women

the same time, he concedes

order over other akramas,

opportunities

the only

'

Vedanta 3

therein,

one-pointed

attainments,

eligible for

Apatsannyasa' current in this school.

3-

for

Bhasyakara who has recognized the

of the highest spiritual

thro' the

the practice of

is

At

Sannyasa

advantages of the

on account of

)'.

275

a^tgrW^TRf^R

B. 6. B.

3^|(a.4Al,U)

iii.

CHAPTBB XLVi

GENERAL SCHEME OF SADHANAS

The aim of metaphysical inquiry

One

Divine grace.

The

them as leading to one another,

freedom from worldly attachment

Bhakti

tation

the attainment of release thro'

has naturally to think of the means of earning

Sastras describe

order

is

),

Havana (

study

and Saksatkara

Manana

Vairagya

reflection

direct realization

Rr^Rf^^3?w^i#T iw:-

Dispassion

or

a true aspirant.
is

Vairagya

The

spirit

is

the

Nididhyasana

),

first

godliness

and

spirituality.

TP

God

medi-

stnrflwffa: u

{Nym 629 b)

step or primary requisite of

of detachment and

indeed the most valuable discipline and

genuine

devotion to

%TRWr%^Tl%^rawi W *l*l R^TIcI

crcuFjftercr ran

),

it.

in the following

freedom from passions

preparation

for

life

of

constitutes the essence of spiri-

It

tual life

TKrRWR#

11$ Jf#RWrgTO.

w& 5[rt ^q^cffenti;: swntat *p

(

Attachment to sensuous

God.

One cannot

between the two,

life is

the greatest

Brk

Katha Up

***********

Up. iv, 4, 23

impediment to devotion to

One must choose sooner or

serve two masters,

Attachment to the

includes

-flesh

the

later

misplaced

notion of possession and independence

%tf JWTfftfa *fb

Steadiness of attention and

W1T5W$

exclusive

\isyu Purapa

contemplation

of

the

Supreme

can only be achieved thro' deep-rooted love of God. The intimate

GENEBAL SCHEME OF SADHANAS

277

God and

Bimbapratibimbabhava, subsisting between

relation of

and spontaneity

gives such devotion an element of naturalness

needed to make

it

an

ideal one.

The worship of

the

earns the grace of God,

such favorable conditions,

souls,

that is

Supreme, under

who

pleased to

is

Himself to the seeker.

This conviction of the comparative
evanescence of wordly goods and the perishability of all material attracreveal

tions,

so necessary for the birth of Vairagya,

patient study

and

The knowledge thus acquired

persons

life

former

in

lives

and who, as a

a congenial atmosphere, for spiritual

in

ment and whose temperaments

are properly

attuned

to

doubts, 1

is

needed to give

They are both preliminaries

direct vision

advance-

the

is

to

Manana

and freedom from

contemplation which leads to

*#:
Sravana

definiteness of content

it

result,

spirituality.

Sravana supplies the basic materials for philosophical thought and

(reflection)

Karma,

to be acquired by

to bear fruit in respect of

seen

is

who have done good deeds

are placed in this

is

reflection.

fami

fW

ftfterRHSTsqcT

II

Nym

).

defined as the acquisition of the sense of the sacred texts under

instruction of competent

subject-matter

3ff Ffl%rf )

teachers.

Manana

is

It

dispels ignorance about the

the systematic

employment of

the canons of textual interpretation and logical examination with a view

to arriving at a firm conviction that the final interpretation of the S^stras

thus arrived at

removes doubts

is

viparyaya

firms the true import of the Sastras (paroksatattvaniicaya

nididhyasana or dhyana
rect realization

1.

nfri sr

Manana

alone the correct and unimpeachable one.

samsaya ) and misapprehension

continuous meditation

{dar&ana).

t^ftcfa

).

Dhyana

).

and con-

Then comes
leads

to di-

irava^a and manana are thus subsidiary

&nft*rit %rc*n%

tp. m,

3,

43

).

PHILOSOPHY OV &BX MADHVAOARYA

278

(ahgabhutd) to nididhyasana, which

kara.

The Vivarana

place of honor
the Sastras

among Sadhanas

and

is

relegates

his

on

to Sravana

commentators

accept

),

the

all

ahgi

of Saksat-

the other hand, gives the

fixation of

manana and nididhyasana

tion as contributory factors ( "fi^faW^WJ

and

means

the chief

school of Advaita,

As

the import of

to a secondary posi-

against this,

statements:

Madhva

$\fch

*FcP#r

ftf^aJf%rSJT: as primary injunctions (apirvavidhi), These three, according

to

Madhva, represent

the authoritarian, critical

roach to philosophical

and contemplative app-

truth.

Ramanuja dismisses sftcf5^-"

Zg*%: STtcraJr *Rrs% f%l^flTf?tcfs^r:

and
,

*RTr: in

the

text

as mere restatements

3TTfTf ^T

aft

3?3WTM

and accepts only Nididhyisana as being actually enjoined by the

As for direct vision of Brahman dariana) enjoined in " WQ'- ", he
(

Sruti.
is

not

any independent position over and above Dhyana or

meditation ( nididhyasana ) which he regards as the ultimate means of
Brahmic realization, He holds that intensified meditation practised with-

prepared to give

it

out interruption attains the character of a direct perception

^ra+iMitiKi

9T

**ift :

But then, Ramanuja admits also that from the time a

( upaya ) of

).

Seeker comes to accept Brahman as the sole and only means

deliverance, his

knowledge of Brahman becomes transfigured into a deep

attachment for Brahman.

circumstances, just as

In these

one may

naturally be expected to go on thinking constantly of a person to

whom

one has become deeply attached, without the necessity for any special
injunction to do so, similarly one can dispense with the necessity for any
injunction with regard to Nididhyasana also. If the injunction is felt to be
necessary in the interest of laying down a constant and uninterrupted flow
of it, similar injunctions with regard to $ravapa to be practised under a
proper Guru

may

also be considered necessary.

In his commentary on B. S.

and importance of
final

the ideal

iii,

44-46,

3,

Guru and

Madhva discusses

the place

the importance of his grace in

the

flowering of the spiritual personality of the aspirant (Sadhaka

Similar emphasis

is

laid in the

Haridasa literature of the Madhva tradition

" ssfcr 3<*i<wy* cKf $fei<w

Not until one becomes the
Can Moksa be attained.

'

'

gffct

"

****

slave of his Guru, dear brother,

).

GENERAL SCHEME OF SADHANAS

He

279

emphasizes the point that the instruction and guidance of a compeGuru and his grace ( prasada ) are absolutely necessary for Sravana

tent

(Chan. Up.). This is in

and Manana to bear fruit: 3fl-*ri3ms#
keeping with the esoteric tradition of the Upanisads, so well exemplified
in the story of

Satyakama

in the

where the young Brahthe Devatas still

by his own Guru. Madhva says

Chan. Up.

iv, 9,

macarin, Satyakama, after receiving instruction from

begs to be

initiated

and instructed

that the grace of the

of the means of

Guru

is

jfiana, viz.,

finally

modus operandi

part of the

Sravana,

Manana

etc.

( ^flfafelcn' )

therefore

It is

complement of Jfianasadhana. He further says that of the

two viz., individual effort and the grace of the Guru, the latter is to
be deemed the more powerful factor and therefore indispensable for
one's spiritual realization.
The importance of Guru Bhakti has not been
necessary

so well brought

out as an integral part of the Theism of the Brahma

Sutras by any other Bhisyakara than Madhva. The emphasis on Guru-

prasada doss not mean that individual effort and the deserts of the aspiThey are the foundations of one's spiritual progress
;
but Guruprasada is the crowning point of this development. There is,
rant do not count.

undoubtedly, an element of deep religious mysticism in the special significance which Madhva attaches to the role of the Guru and his grace in re-

gard

of Sadhanas and their fulfilment. It is to be noted

new and different interpretation of B.S.
iii, 3, 44-46, as compared with those of Sarhkara, Ramanuja
and others.
It is an interpretation which has the most vital and intimate bearing on the
to

the subject

that this represents a completely

question of spiritual Sadhanas and therefore quite a relevant topic to

be considered in the Sadhanadhyaya and one which has the full support of
the Upanisadic traditions and teaching
3R5T ~<#

cT^

seeker

is

TO Hffm>n

#*cTi

Sisfi:

allowed to change his

cfTT

!W5RI%

Guru

gfr

fl'^lcfW:

if

full

II

he secures another with a

superior spiritual illumination, provided the latter

impart the

is

able

measure of grace and illumination that

for the self-realization of the disciple.

be of equal merit and disposition

Where both

to grant the full

the

and inclined to

may

be required

Gurus happen to

measure of

their grace

qualifying for illumination to the aspirant, the permission of the earlier

Guru

shall

other one.

have be

obtained

before

receiving instruction

from

the

PHILOSOPHY OF bI MADHVAcArYA

280

Madhva has given a higher place to be Nididhyasana or Dhyana than

t
Sravana and Manana, which are put down by him as angas to Dhyana. 1
This is because his^ conception of Dhyana or Upasana is radically diffeto

rent

whom all Upasana as such is based on

made clear. He does'nt agree to the doctrine
Sabdaparoksa of Mandana and other Advaitic writers, according

from

that of Sarhkara to

superimposition as will be

of

which Sravana alone is the true and ultimate source of illumination in

of Brahman, Manana and Nididhyasana acting
merely as
accessories to it by removing obstacles to steadiness, such as mistrust and
misunderstanding. But to Madhva, they are both subsidiary to Nididhyasana. They merely help to establish the nature of the philosophical truth (tattvaniniaya),
Then comes prolonged meditation of
particular attributes of Divinity, which is known as Upasana.
to

respect

There

is

an intimate and balanced relation between Sadhana and

Sadhya on Madhva's view.

should be a gradation of

He

spiritual

maintains

position

the

that there

joy in Moksa, commensurate with

the amount, quality and intensity of Sadhanas or spiritual effort of

different levels

and orders of Adhikarins

cw^r

"ftcTT

sprrft mifir

%fr sepjriwr^T

T^Pfr #apwfcraR*q.

wrRw

II

srp^r wjv^, sracrs srra% pr:

(AV.m,

Ic^n^^W:

cTWf^f:

$1 sffRt:

pp. 45-46).

1*^ ^PJ%RHF?f*TTM
I

TD.

GENERAL SCHEME OF SADHANAS

281

comprehensive scheme of spiritual discipline is thus the very

progress.
The importance of ethics to
all spiritual

foundation of

all philosophers, who look upon it as a

system of Sadhanas for the achievement of the highest good {nihireyasa).
complete theory of the Universe must necessarily include ethical

philosophy has been accepted by

judgments on the value or worthlessness of objects and thereby secure

an influence over our conduct. Since philosophy, in India, owes its
inspiration to the deep yearning for the realization of the religious purpose
of

life,

rather than the satisfaction of the speculative instinct,

it is

natural

amongst the various systems of Indian

philosophy in the postulates and conditions for such a realization. They
are agreed on certain general principles of ethical conduct and Sadhanas
to expect a remarkable affinity

tho' there are

many

technical terminology

and items of the

and, above
still

all,

special

discipline.

relative position

The

goal of

and value of certain forms

the attitude to the world

life,

the means of attaining the goal, tho' broadly the same, are

marked by

The

differences of emphasis, divergence of detail or

and the

certain

features

following points

fundamental differences
of

Madhva's scheme of

the place of

( 1

in.

philosophic theory.

ethics

Vicara or reasoned

relate

to

thought

the

and

scheme of Sadhanas; (2) of Karma in the

scheme of Karma, Bhakti and Jnana M&rgas; ( 8 ) the nature and
importance of Bhakti and Upasana and (4) the importance of Aparophilosophic inquiry in the

triple

ksajnftna as the final

:

bilities

means of deliverance and

of the Aparokgajnanin.

(5) the ethical

responsi-

CHAPTER

XLVI1.

KARMA-YOGA AND JNANA--YOGA.

The most prominent forms of
the

names of Karmam&rga, Jfianamarga and Bhaktimarga.

Karmayoga
first

spiritual discipline are those going

or the path of

Works

is

is

however understood

the narrow sense of Pravrtti-Marga,

in

by

these,

generally believed to constitute the

rung of the ladder. The term Karmayoga

most schools of Vedanta

Of

in

as

defined by the Mimamsakas, consisting of a faithful performance of

the round of Vedic sacrifices and ritualistic rites prescribed

and Smrtis, with the expectation of

rewards in

by the

Srutis

this

or in the next

world and the adherence to the duties of Varna and airama.

Throughout

his

commentary on

the Gits,

effecting any synthesis

while defining the

$amkara denounces

samuccaya
(

Karma

their

between

the possibility of

Karma and

in question, to himself, as

Jfiana,

all

the

Kamyakarma. But

he

hardly ever envisages the possibility of a true Samuccaya between "Nisk&ma

karma and atma-jnana.

Indeed, he seems to deny even the

to be given to the works performed

by

name Karma
Lokasam-

the enlightened soul as

graha or the work of Krsna himself as a Kwtriya in upholding Dharma.

But the whole emphasis of the Karma-Yoga of the

Gitd,

nizing the need for giving a reorientation to the concept of

redeeming

it

from the

spell of

for blending such exalted

fair to the spirit

rewards and

fruits,

form of Karma with

on recog-

is

"Karma" and

and making

it

^amkara

Jfiana.

possible
is

of the Gita in denying the possibility of the synthesis of

even such exalted form of " Niskamakarma " with " Atraajfiana

Kwna

which

himself and persons like Janaka and

standing examples.

caya

is

hardly

Madhva's point

in not accepting

", l

of

Priyavrata were

Jnanakarmasamuc-

not due to any under-estimation of Niskama-Karma as such; but to

TRRt

^craaqwRTraL WqWf sftTOcr

Esamkara G. B.

iii,

KAEMAYOGA AND JNANAYOQ-A

283

God

the unique place which Aparoksa-Jnana or direct vision of

The case

marks the highest

stage

to direct vision; but

obviously for

is

is

occupies

Ramanuja to whom Dhyana

of Sadhana which is but a mere approximation

in his philosophy.

is

different with

not actually a direct vision

of

Lord.

the

It

reason that Ramanuja pleads for a Samuccaya of

this

Jnana and Karma as Moksasadhana. Among older Vedantins, Bhaskara

and Brahmadatta too are known to have supported the Jfia-nakarmasamuccayavada

Madhva

Karma

resolves this apparent conflict between the so-called

andJfiana Margas by enlarging the scope of Karma- Yoga as understood

by Sarhkara and raising it to the level of a way of enlightened action
(

He makes

niskamam jnanapurvam karma).

ghtened spiritual activity by

ces.

all.

a vigorous plea 1 for enli-

which cannot be binding in

There can be no true wisdom without such

of

us, mortals,

to

God

consequen-

and no true Karma without enlightenment and devotion

m$ ffefa m
Madhva

its

activity, at least for all

Bhag.

interprets the statement of

iv,

2U, 49

two

the Gila, that there are

different

in the world, called Sarhkhyas and Yogas, to mean

two orders of beings among the wise and eligible souls

groups of Adhikaris
that there are
( i )

who

the select

'

few

'

Jnananisthah

like

Sanaka and other born-Yogins

pursue the path of knowledge to the exclusion of

external

form

all

Karma

in its

gfsTT%>#c#H ?TR%T: gTOR^ft. ( G. B, ) and ( i i ) all

some of the divinely appointed leaders
of society like King Janaka, Priyavrata and others, who tho' highly
enlightened, have been " commissioned by the Divine will to follow
the path of active Karma 2 and serve as an example of disinterested
):

other enlightened beings, including

For an exposition of this topic, according to Madhva, see

Sohool of Vedanta

and

its Literature, Vol, I,

my

History of Dvaita

pp. 5G-58.

King Priyavrata the Sod-intoxicated King h^d made up his mind

forest.

Brahmadeva himself comes down

resolution to renounce the world.

duties

and

The story

responsibilities as

of Priyavrata

.is

He

is

to persuade the

King

charged by Brahmadeva

a King, even tho' he

is

to retire to

to

the

give up his
to stick to his

a highly enlightened

given in the Bhagav'ata Pitrana Sk. V. 1

vant passage from the Shag, has been cited by Madhva, in his 0. B.

).

Jfianin.

The

iii,

4.

rele-

::

philosophy of nl madhvAoAkya

284

action to their fellowmen and guide them

lokasamgraha )}

work

run of humanity has, therefore, necessarily to

*Bffar

WWcRrfir

w^Wtorra-

But

Karma

this

the

Gordian knot

by distinguishing

here,

GitS from what the other philosophers

He

Vedas.

Karma

not to be viewed

in

Mim&msakas. Madhva
the Karma-Yoga of the

the narrow hedonistic or ritualistic sense of the

cuts

is

The average

thro'

the Pravrttimarga of the

call

2
points out, on sound textual authority, that the latter

deser-

is

and other Sastras and that true NivrttiM&rga is not what the other commentators think it to be viz., the
abandonment of all Karma, but its active performance in a spirit of
devotion and dispassion
vedly censured in the Glta

ft^KPT

This

is

W*V$ 3

^^

faftIT%

Vyasa - Smrti

indeed the true spirit of " Sannyasa " and Naiskarmya, inculcated

Hence it is that Madhva propounds a new theory of typical

Vedic injunctions which are almost invariably followed by goodly promise

in the Gita.

come

of attractive rewards to

33Tffi)rl%*T

the purpose of these prescriptions

us

away from

dually to a

life

is,

wfewr ^cT

the attractions of perishable rewards

of disinterested action (Niskarna

child is induced

by

its

He suggests that

paradoxically enough, to wean

and

pull us up, gra-

Karma), even

mother to take a medicinal dose of castor

as a

oil,

by

the tempting offer of sweets in reward. 3 Jayatirtha puts the case admirably.
[lffl'

3RTf^%^i<wNiiafRf:^

mfcftv,

1.23) fit

Cf. passage

the

?mt

Maim

*r

^mrII

M.

star ?Frara%

"

^vRffiT,

also.

mv$i\

&fcs&n $Gftfc\<i+Mli@mG "

G. B.

iii,

The Kftrma Pvrana

in the

same terms and Kainanuja

from a

Pafioarafcra text

in

ajcrcfot

Bhag

from Vyasa Smrti cited by Madhva.

Smrti

a^raf^'

(i, 2,

This

same passage occurs in

Hi) also defines Nivxtta

his SrXbfiapja has cited

Karma

a similar passage

KARMAYOGA AND

WfJrsrrqwdt

G. B.

t.

139

p.

Madhva

).

jft ANAYOSA

thus

285

makes out that Scripture only

the pursuit of their rewards

enjoins acts but not also

^2$: W g 5Rflff ^^Enq

x$

3 Tcf

<*i*i)

Jayatlrtha brings out the

ViMstavidhi,

47
argument that it is only a visesyavidhi and not a
The mandate is only with reference to the performance of

the act but

not also with reference to desire for the fruit thereof.

(G. 5.

).

ii,

technical point of the

The

mentioned in the Vidhi only by way of anuvada or an allusion to

what is even otherwise established and is not therefore intended to be
latter is

specially enjoined

%&$'

We

^Wrg^T^r

%m

the usual statement of rewards, as in

T^tcr

which show that Scripture

mqftfmmtftpm 5

enjoined by

it.

This

3S%

^^m q%

^SRt

f^#RST

not necessarily interested in the

is

pursuit of rewards as the invariable

sacrifices

# %m\

feMfaff

have bare injunctions in Scripture without any reference to

objective of the performance of

line of interpretation

(adopted by Madhva)

has the support of the Advaitic commentator Srldhara Svamin himself,

who

is

much

influenced

by Madhva's views

in this

and

in

some other

respects.

Even
of

this

Karma

Niskama Karma which

that

is

is,

strictly speaking, the

philosophically admissible or effective

only kind

is

not to be

admitted as anything more than an accessory to spiritual realization. It

is to be pursued for the purpose of acquiring the necessary mental purification

3OTratfllJW:Wg4*u",

ifrffFiTfajfr

*P#

( G. B.

iii,

4).

The

an independent means of release

reason why Karma
is that it is by nature, irrepressibly found to be inexhaustible by the
enjoyment of fruits. It breeds like bacteria. It is estimated that on an
average, it takes at least ten future births for an individual to work out
the amount of Karma accumulated by him from the fourteenth year of
cannot be treated as

his life, in

one birth

m: SSTSPJFgl^t:
1.

See

liia

C.

on Bliag

( xi, 3,

45

).

m^

*lfarf<[

{B. S. B.

iii,

1,8)

PHILOSOPHY OF b1 MADHVAoAeYA

286

would be a vain hope, then,

The help of Jnana is,

It

or neutralize the latent

nugatory,

is

work

to

out

it

by

therefore, indispensable to destroy

of past

effects

accumulated load

destroying the

expect

to

enjoyment.

of

ascribed to the actual vision

Karma. Such a power of

Karma, or rendering it
aparoksajnana ) l of God, thro'

past
(

Madhva, therefore, regards enlightened activity

(Niskamakarraa) merely as contributing to such knowledge thro' Vairagya,
meditation (dhyana).

3mRWiJTl^:^gf&[RT
R85Rr

msfe$m WllHl!iWu%

not at

is

all

binding in

effects as
it is

of a welling up of spiritual
?R?r

WA

#&'

XRTSr: "TOTTrW

Madhva
a

spirit

Brh. Up.

i,

4,

5T)*R3

Karmayoga, then,
progress. It is not, by itself,
motive behind it and the end

why Madhva

is

anandodreka
15

maintains that

in the form
and never goes in vain

fit

is

(g.b. Hi 20)

on

in

a powerful incentive to the acquisition of

the highest means of release.
Karma and
is

others are just accessories to

3KI

Karma

200

thus, quite clear that disinterested activity, carried

is,

*T*rfct
g#:
( G. B. t. iii, 31
theory of Jnanakarmasamuccaya

fH#:

p.

t.

^ Scr^ra^^ll

That

t.

52).

t. ii,

ffl^^^fe^M
Pll-dWH
g^# fRRfirsqsRwfa T# S?Tf<fN^ (G. B. p. 104
(

knowledge, which alone

TO

G. B.

dawn ofAparoksa has its reward

bliss

of devotion to God,

Dhyana and

G. B.

depends on the

it

performed.

every approved activity after the

a stumbling block to spiritual

its

in view with which

'

W&t

^HTOfejt

it

?rf

There

).

C", 87).

as has not legun to tear fruit

3^<ii^H(^4

f^fcairf^PfPcro
is

W ^pW^Wt fom--

^BfllfST *TStRIRf^S#T

3Rff

no

G. B.

This

apraratdha

).

*tt

jft^T:

wwt<*p,

place, then, for the

iii,

32

applies

only to such

CHAPTER XLVIII

CONCEPTION OF BHAKTI,
Madhva has
making

given

ORDERS AND KINDS.

ITS

a unique place

to

Divine grace in his system, in

of self-realization and God-realization. But,

then, the Deity has got to be moved to graciousness (savyaparikarait

the ultimate cause

This can only be done by Bhakti as the deepest attachment to

tyiyah).

the Lord, deeprooted and based

on a

of Bhakti, based on the above, in

His greatness
most comprehensive definition
which the religious, philosophical and

emotional aspects of devotion are

beautifully

and majesty,

SrTRJlftsra::

clear understanding of

Jayatlrtha has given us the

ft^eTCS)4W3l:

(NS.)

||

Bhakti

integrated

is,

thus,

^wrf^rcT'lf'T

the

steady and

continuous flow of deep attachment to God, impregnable by any

of impediments and transcending the love of our
kin, cherished belongings etc.

and

fortified

God

transcendent majesty and greatness of

and

free

from

all

blemish and

by a firm conviction of the

abode of all perfections

as the

by an unshakable

complete metaphysical dependence of everything

definition

can be accepted as a

Such Bhakti

is

classical definition

Sutras,

bondage.

who has

else

conviction

of the

upon Him.

This

of Bhakti.

necessary to manifest the natural and intrinsic rela-

tionship of Pratibimbatva of the souls to

state of

amount
own selves, our kith and

Madhva has been

thought

it

God, which

the only

lies dormant in the

Bhasyakara on the Vedanta

Bhakti a locus standi

fit to give

BrahmasUras are to be

in the

Sutras.

a complete

and selfcontained exposition of Badarayana's philosophical system, embodying

all the principal aspects of his thought, derived from the Upanisadic and
other sources. In view of the clear and significant contribution that the
early metrical Upanisads like the Katha and SvetaAvatara had made to the
This

is

as

it

should be

if

the

doctrine of Bhakti in the Upanigads,

it

would be impossible

the concept of Bhakti as something either

topic that he

1.

to brush aside

unknown to the Sutrakara or as a

did not consider such an important Sadhana of Moksa, in

*n$lMWM^

&&' '^sf^fi:

Mbh.

T,

N.

i.

86.

288

philosophy of &nl madhvAoAhya

his philosophy of

Theism

The only

rightful place for dealing with the

That earlier commenta-

topic will be in the third or Sadhana-Adhy&ya.

like-Samkara and R&manuja have not been able

tors on the Sutras

a place

find

more

S^Cr^jerq,

defect in

There

within

bound

is

presenting a philosophy of

Hindu

the basis of the

doctrine

Theism

in his Sutras.

Scriptures,

of Bhakti altogether

ftdspncMrt:

in his

be a strange

will

It

expounded

in his

he had decided to

if

*rffc

Badarayaoa

to be general agreement that

type of Indian Theism, indeed, that he will have

on

of

interpretation or in

arP3*rTC#

Sutras:

the

to

shows nothing

the Sutras

body of

the

their inherited traditions

way of approach

their

is

Bhakti

for

than

work

ignore the

chapter on Sadhanas, in his great

Even the Saguua-Brahmavada accommodated by Saihkara,

workl

to

in

his interpretation of the Sutra

cannot afford to ignore the

Bhakti as a major

Thus, looked at from any point of view,

the failure

of

Sadhana.

Pre-Madhva

the

commentators

rightful place for introducing the topic

dhyaya must be accepted as a

given special credit for having

made good

of the Sutras.

The argument

that, as

Bhakti has been

this

&Ua

(xiii,

As

4.').

vs,

Jnana.

It

it ia

and

filled

this

need not

remembered that the

its

VyQha

doctrine

in

the

to be equally solicitous of tho

would be very strange, indeed,

leave out " Bhakti " while discussing so

and

Sadhana

the Paficarofcras, one would

for

according to Samkara and Kamanuja

claims of Bhakti

right

the

fully elucidated in tha 6fita, it

expect the Sfitrakara who feels called upon to discuss

Sutras

of

Madhva must be

omission

be dealt with in the Sutras would be of no avail when

Sutras are anterior to tha

find

within

omission and

serious

gap

in the Theistic philosophy

to

of Bhakti

doctrine

many sundry and

if

the Sutras should

comparatively

less

Sadhana and Upisana, besides many topios dealt with

threadbare in the Upanisads and the Gita itself,
such as the ways of exit.

important

topics

of

Nothing but a sort af

general'* reluctance

of

prejudice against

many

scholars

still

Madhva can
to give

be responsible for the

proper

credit

to

Madhva

where his interpretations are decidedly better than those of his predecessors.
(

See for

e. g.

some remarks of Svami Adidevananda in his review of

History of Dvaita School of Vei. and Jit

SAarata

May, 1961

).

lit., Vol.

I,

in

the

my

Frdbuiiha-

BHAKTI
The point

Madhva's

in

289

on TTiJoRRIH as one of the constiand ignorant devotion is of no philo-

sophical worth.

Since the function

Jiva to

insistence

that a blind

is

of

ORDERS AND KINDS

ITS

tuents of Bhakti

relation

Brahman,

it

of Bhakti

must

is

to manifest the true

naturally be properly informed

about that true relation, which presupposes a right knowledge of the

majesty

and greatness of

God

as the

One

Hence, Bhakti

Svatantra.

has to be enriched by study, reflection and concentration

RFfa

^ %$ WiWreT:

R^IWI

5T13WR2IT

3f

5,45)

(Bhag.iii,

We

must, therefore,

God

first

of

all,

-**liWL (Mbh.

Bhakti

iv.)

is,

Emotionalism, to Madhva.

deep
it.

the pursuit of
g*TT *rT#fr T%rr

It

the

is

nat

fJ3?TPt

*rfc3T ^INtfl'gftr

a mere wave of sentimentalism or

outcome of patient study and

knowledge needs the urge of devotion

=*T

Madhva

clcj,

of moral perfection

(G.B. ix, 31).

from the true devotee of God.

can be no true devotion to

sincerity of

serve

thus, not

^FTSTRIl'J^crq as Ramanuja ( G, B. ix. p. 65 ) puts

presupposes a certain amount of knowledge in the same way as

reflection

It

knowledge of

enlarge the horizon of our

wide range of study 1 (iravana)

thro' a

God

also

f^T

W1

Tf^cT:

He affirms

that there

without a real sense of moral purity,

One cannot

purpose and detachment to worldly pleasures.

two masters.

fSf

demands a high degree

True devotion to

God would be

impossible without

the cultivation of a natural distaste for the pleasures of the world.

It is

one of the constitutive elements of true devotion

Vm %* ftr^ 133>ra?:
?T

wftwilRl

cWWtgfl^t

l.

fn%#5*rgei

<r

$F$m: 3W:
P.

M. 19

ff^flt,
(

xi, 2,

42

>.

sfts&jwrf

^m

T. B.

Brh. Up.

Bhag.

iii,

*Tf cfq

iii,

12, 9, 7

9, 26.

Vispu Purana

iii,

7,

30

philosophy of

290
Acara or purity of

in all

life,

its

aspects,

thus the sine qua non of true

is

Devotion without such purity

devotion and knowledge.

#41^ %cl ^tT%^r ^TSgJfr:

3#SST:

madhvAcArya

is.1

(G.B.

be a travesty:

will

31

ix,

Complete

).

control of the passions of the flesh, calmness of mind, impartiality of

God

conduct and love of

are emphasized by

Madhva as

the pre-requisites

of devotion and knowledge

W$ ^^rft
ct

ft^

wt sm ipF3#i

It

He

m\ ^

*r*nT*f *r

Mbh.

xii,

343,

3,

wftsf&r

jr3tTK[iiEig

ftwqj

ii

Q. Madhva, G.B.

).

emphasizes two aspects of devotion the positive and the negative.

:

The positive has been dealt with by Jayatlrtha in the definition of Bhakti
quoted before.

It

Bhakti, as taught by

worthy of note that the theory and practice of

is

Madhva and

erotic manifestations,

his followers, are free

which dominate or at

from

least color the

traces of

all

conception of

Bhakti in certain forms of North Indian Vaisoavism, like those of Jayadeva,

Caitanya and Vallabha.

to be

met with

This sensuous and passionate side of

in the writings of the

ceded Ramanuja, in the South

we come

wherein the love of

terms of the tender quality softening

conjugal love and wherein

Tamil Vaisoavas

down

Alvars

God

is

it

first

is

who

pre-

placed on

to the rapturous

emotion of

across most of those

pathological

symptoms of amorous longings which have been

systematically review-

ed and vividly described in the works of Bengal Vaisnavism.

But
Madhva's conception of Bhakti avoids these emotional excesses and
identifications and remains at its exalted intellectual and spiritual level of
firm philosophic devotion to the

Supreme Lord of the Universe who

be worshipped with loving attachment as the Bimba of

(

Jlvas

).

feeling.

in

But
For,

it is

not,

Madhva

on

all

is

that account, lacking in intensity of fervor

and

has recognized, in the clearest terms, that Bhakti

essence an ineffable blending of the emotion

gives expression to the intensity of his love

God

and

in its

to

Pratibimbas

the intellect,

is

He

sublime and raptu-

BHAKTI IM OBDBBS AND KINDS

291

and concluding stanzas of

rous aspects in the benedictory

his

works.

This abiding aspect of his teaching found fuller expression in the writings
of his great followers in the Haridasa
raya,

readily

God

as

Sripadaraja, Vyasa-

The following verse from

Purandara Dasa, Vijayadasa and others.

of Jagannatha Dasa furnishes a fine example of

the Harikathamrtasara

how

Kuta such

responds to the

ffog

call

%m,

of the heart

ffea

w3

ftgf , ^Fcft Tfer, ifo?& afff^ f*ra%r

SK*pff eft

m^jk-

Wm *T3pre *mt&t

sfff&SSSfti?

"

God

listens seated, to the

Him

That sings to

He

"

Kannada

Bhakta

in ecstasy, lying

down.

stands and listens to the one

Who

sings to

He comes
To him

God

dancing unto him that sings standing.

that dances

says

Verily,

Him, seated comfortably.

'

I'll

Hari

and

sings,

show Myself

is

to him'

most accessible to

his

own

Never for a moment does He stay away from them.

But fools caught

Know

not

how

in

to

Samsara

make Him

their

Own.

(Harikathamrtasara,

"

ii,

philosophy of inl madhvAoabya

292
But the

possibilities

Divine, are not

of erotic devotion, as a means of contacting the

unknown

gradation of fitness

Madhva's peculiar doctrine of

to him.

among

various orders of souls enables

forms of devotion to

late the different

view, Kama-Bhakti or erotic devotion

and ought not to be practised by

different orders

him

intrinsic

to corre-

of selves.

In his

the special privilege of Apsarases

is

He

others.

indicates a varieLy of stand-

points of devotion with reference to different orders of Jlvas and harmonizes the various accounts

i )

on the

^c*r?crn

basis of adhikcLras

^rr 5

*ift<*Hm:f$w:

JTtWITFcT ^P%T *rf^T

sfrreii

mw.

sri^t:

*w3ft

%^Ht

ar#4iHiwi*t|R<2ra' *#arfcr

<TWf3

qfftfa

$t*m W3T

Jr

flPit

Ri%c[.

II

Paclma

f&fit

=*r

:wfwrq

mwh mm

35: sfrlpiTt f^SJ:

fcn

g^:

II

Bhadrika

BHAKTI ITS ORDERS AND KINDS

Madhva,

B. T. X, 17, 28-36

TrcIcWTW^fOfpraf

Devotion being a state of loving attachment:

f|

293

*rf#sfeptn^(A -'S') born of knowledge and regard for the object of

r

devotion 1 ,

it

or hatred of

will

God

be obvious that no contrary emotion of positive dislike

could be taken to help

in

notwithstanding the presence of certain stray

stating

and

that

certain

persons

had reached

attainment of Moksa,

the

passages in

God

the

Pur&nas

even thro' aversion

hate:
nrrar:

wn^icfcHt

%mm?% f-m

{Bhag. VII, 1,30)

ft* 1 gwr:

%qi^H-

mwiftijfciiAKiftPt:

3ir%?f cl^i f|??r

Wf #*

f^
l.

Cf.

'

iff

*r4

fop

JJT:

erp^fci

1?TC:

^t ^t ^PE^ ^

%RT

^fTFcT

?FTOf

$%%k&m w^rRHi^^fNt

'

Bhd,g. xi, 5, 48.

ll

Bhag.

vii,

).

1,

29

).

ft

<T

II

i?f#jfaqft

jftfcfcr

R. G. B.

t.

fl

vii,

*##fci

PHILOSOPHY OF ^Kl MADHVAcAkYA

294

Such passages ought

to be treated as arthavada, says

Madhva

tqrrsFgf^PR gfanrafrch aarji

They

are meant to emphasize that

"BMur^r

always,

*,

spwto

ftriqiW^:

iTT:

God
*

" Dvesa Bhakti

"

* *

hatred of

M.

God

bring out the majesty of God.

G. B. ix 12

spirit

The

),

as a possible

mind,

*ronp ft & #
acceptance of

means of salvation 1

of the Sastras which

If the Scriptures

can be reached by cultivating hatred against

tiated

in

mffiommfi ftiWl^W

fie?

be quite inconsistent with the prevailing

(4 v).

somehow be kept

should

mfamvm IfWsft *fcn&pt miK <&m

3TOraicr.iffiT: *

meant

Him

will
is

to

God

to teach that

they should have expa-

upon His demerits and imperfections instead of on His great and

Madhva,

infinite perfections, as they do.

of ''tWi%".

none of

The

NS and

the contexts

therefore, strongly disapproves

the Sannyayaratnavali undertake to

and instances

cited

above

Moksa

fundamental position of the Vedas that

show

that

able to contradict the

is

could not be obtained

save by loving devotion.

Devotion, then, to be meaningful and justifiable must be founded

upon a firm and adequate knowledge of

the merits of the object of

such

devotion

wp$--

$st f%st

<k:

*rfraffcf$<r

Mbh. t.n.

p. 5).

Madhva speaks of three different types of devotees ( 1 ) Uttama-Bhaktas

Adhama, according to the nature and intensity
3
( 2 ) Madhyama and
(

1.

Contrast:

^T

VFfit

f% ni%fr"

TOT

Wt^Bfqf^

wttft

trri

far TOT ^TOSlJf

3TRf 1^'

s^rrrr

II

tm art

BHAKTI ITS ORDERS AND KINDS

(B.T. XI,

of devotion characteristic of them.

295

42-45

2,

).

He

insists

further that devotion, to be impregnable, must be guarded against the

insidious influences of various

#tT*l<fr

forms of

anti-theistic tendencies

Mra 3T3%TcrT

^THnf^f cf^%t

cTnr

%wm ^ ^

(MM.
Bhakti, then,

is

T.

it

N.

i,

113-15

j.

outcome of a profound admiration for Divine

the

majesty coupled with a spontaneous love and regard for the Supreme.
It

cannot be dissociated from knowledge.

But

this

not the cold intellectual apprehension of Reality.

of the Supreme Reality as the pivot of one's

and

own Bimba

that the soul

Bhakti of the right kind

is

is

f^i%

constituent of Bhakti.

often referred to as

"Jnana"

aspects

is

consciousness

capable

of.

w^h
For
is

t'tt

av

this reason, the latter

is

very

the Sastras.

Where, however,

sought to be

emphasized, their

" Bhakti " but they are basically

same thing; even as mediacy and immediacy are but

designated by the term

of

the

the integral aspects of knowledge.

Jnana

is

itself, in

the distinctive aspect of attachment

fusion

reality,

thus a blend of both knowledge and love

"^SjtflWSIc^

Jnana

own

is

a vivid perception

with the utmost warmth of love and attrac-

bliss (OTsratftfalftftfttHi ),

tion for one's

knowledge of God

It is

as

the

means

of

release

Texts in Scripture which refer to

have therefore to be interpreted

as inclusive of the aspect of Bhakti also

and

vice versa.

If

this basic

PHILOSOPHY OF

296
between

affinity

two

the

MADHVAcAKYA

!Ri

understood and kept in mind,

properly

is

of the controversy regarding the claims of Bhakti and Jiiana to

much

be regarded as the immediate means of release would vanish.

shown ably that they are but

lias

with more or

Madhva
to

among

be
the

due

regard

Taratamya

shown

the

to

trust

#tr

<#ft fftq

TO*n%: ct%S *TT%

also distinguishes three stages of Bhakti (

jMna; (2) one

that follows

of God.

God,

It

is

this

and (3) a

1 )

A V.

final stage

p. 52)

AV.

p.

41

that precedes Paroksa-

third that

comes

after direct

atyarihapra-

of Bhakti that fully manifests, by

the true relationship between the

and completes the aim of

Jlva

and Brahman

realization, viz. the manifestation of intrinsic

These three stages are designated by Jayatirtha as Bhakti, Pakva-

bhakti and Panpakva-bhakti.

It is

it

II

ll

(Aparoksajnana) and wins the absolute grace

the grace of

bliss.

the

hierarchy of devotees (of the Supreme)

*fe*fl4d^T ?% l^stft^:

sada

to

and extent of devo-

gods and men

3?dt ftwfj-

realization

must be paid

in respect of the nature

cRTra. gjrajrsr

He

of the same approach

different aspects

an interpenetrative content.

insists, further, that

principles of

tion

less

Madhva

The

last

one

is

an end

in itself

NS.

most impressively described by Madhva himself as

(AV.p.4l).

p.605).

):

BHAKTI ITS OEDBBS AND KINDS

297

Here is a very striking and an almost unique feature of Madhva's

philosophy of Bhakti, whose inspiration may be traced in the writings
of the Mystics of Maharashtra and the Gosvamis of the Caitanya school.
It

views sublime Bhakti, not as a

The

itself.

release

light of

this

Moksa

the

but on the other shore of

to an end, but as an

means

Bhakti shines brightly, not only on

between the individual soul and the Supreme Being

snapped

For, this relation

in release.

is

For

as well.
is

end

side

is

of

relation

not something that

not something that

in

is

extrinsic to

and imposed from outside by Upadhis, as in the

Madhva, a sacred relation that holds good for
something that is rooted in the very nature and being svarupa
all time
It
Its destruction would mean the destruction of the Jlva.
of the soul.
It is the
indestructible.
is a unique relation, a spiritual bond which is
relation which the great Tamil poet-Saint Tayumanavar so well puts it as:
the nature of the soul

Advaita system.

It is,

to

Enru ndn anru ni

Mukti

is

un

acjiimai allavo

merely the shaking off of what

is

extrinsic to one's nature

and

own intrinsic nature. The intrinsic spiritual relation

between the human spirit and God is so dynamic in its magnetism that
the attraction of the latter becomes more fully manifested in release than
reposing in one's

in

Samsara.

Indeed,

it

breaks thro' and finds expression there, in a

thousand ways, which are beyond our understanding and analysis from
here

Surely,

it is

not open to us,

and try to describe

state

in

Samsara, to peep into the released

in detail the behavior of the blessed ones

release, towards the Lord or towards one another.

ness

is

That

in

state of blessed-

obviously something beyond our comprehension in

its

richness

and glory.
It is

what the Bhagavata Puraria

of God-intoxicated souls like Sanaka,

ction to the

1.

Of.

" I

Lord and go on

refers to as the intrinsic devotion

who

feel

a natural bond of attra-

practising Bhakti even after Siddhi (Moksa)

and Thou are coeval

Bat then am
frcjft

f^TFTT

not your slave

%cFf%cRH#ft

cTTIOT^ Sgq??rf%

sfaj:

"
1

sffrrf aft

MW

T%-TlT%

Stl^cT

$RR

^kKMHi

Katha Up.

PHILOSOPHY

298

Off

Vl MADHVAoAlSYA

$ j rc<4t;3# *&> ?ffoppft ?fc:

11

i.

7, 1

and who decline even the special status of Sayujya and other forms of
Mukti and are quite content with their joy of devotional surrender
(

dtmanivedana

).

%RKRTf
*

Madhva

>ftiWR

*T

himself, in the

?SI#cI %!%r,( Bhd.g.

jpffrf

qsRcfff^cr

* * * *

supreme mood of
same exalted

this kind, gives expression to this

II

iii,25,

34

Op.

cit. iii,

his ecstatic
feeling, at the

29, 13

devotion of
conclusion

of his Mahabharata Tatparya Niryaya, thereby giving us a glimpse of the

ripe maturity of his true devotion to the Lord

sfNctf

#RT

U3TC55

fr#

WT: 3PJI

XUX

CHAPTER

DHYANA AND
Madhva

release
'

Tfsrr

God

Aparoksadars'ana

from Samsara

sffw

fulness of His

B.S.

vivrpute tanxvn

the ultimate

God

23-27

2,

Cf.

is

majesty,

in

),

means of

contemplation

He

W^'

Sffa S

essentially

Scriptural texts that direct

alone

'

is
'

stg

W Wf- W
^

inclined,

any subtle form.

nididhy&sana

avyakta

*
the

in

He

Himself

reveals

The grace of God, which

is

of His perfections, with steadiness and

Such contemplation of the Divine

presupposes a preliminary study of the Scriptures

Sravana

supplemented by deep thinking or reflection

all

Him, can only be obtained by prolonged

realizing

order to clear the mind of

Wm^'

<f#t

cannot be visualized save by His favor

devotion, to the best of one's capacity.

then to be

the proximate cause of

incomprehensible

Once favorably

).

svam

'

3r#ffr?r * *

sptc

But inasmuch as

iii,

many

accepts the position of

perception of

ITS PLACE.

uncertainty and

),

which has

manana

misconceptions

that

),

in

may

be lurking there from time immemorial and whose presence will retard
the constancy

Hence

and flow of devotion.

the need

philosophic inquiry and logical ascertainment of truth

The

special attention given

ment of

their Siddhanta

understood in the

light

{jijrt&scL

by Madhva philosophers to

and the

for systematic

or vicara),

dialectic establish-

refutation of rival theories has, thus, to be

of an indispensable necessity imposed by the very

conditions of philosophic inquiry.

It is

not inspired by a love of contro-

versy as such or a desire to find fault with others.

The knowledge acquired by study and

then

made

stabilized

by manana

is

the basis of steady contemplation

^T TtfT ?WT

This combination

of

Sravana,

Wm

Manana and Nididhyasana

is

termed

PHILOSOPHY OF SKI MADHVAoAllYA

300

"Jijnasa."

The

of the inquiry

last stage

contemplation: 3#%{4<|iiftiMtfctlct:

God

attributes of

may

TP.

take the form of

52

3,

iii,

or a profound rumination over the truths of Sastras

(Sastrabhyasa) whose import has been definitely settled:

WTI^a;

NS. 536 b

Madhva

as an independent

The contemplation of

fkstrartha

(Taitt.

cffe cPT:

Up.

i,

that such study and reflection should be continued

to

which they should be carried on.

a perfect Guru

not available, one

is

import has been

NS.

may study

thus treated

is

p.

by

the Upanisads

doubts are set

to

585

pointed out

It is

).

till all

The chosen Guru alone would be competent

up

limit

f.wrrf<^fi

fatfRTCT

form of Up&sana, taught by

m^SWW^ #t =TT# tifapt:

at rest.

certain chosen

of

),

Dhyana or

the time-

fix

Where such

the original Sastras

whose

by authentic persons.

fixed

The study of Sastras

is

partly also

other forms of spiritual discipline are

an aid

The

to contemplation.

Yama, Niyama, Asana, Praoayama

Pratyahara and Dharana taught by the

Yoga

Sastra.

These are

to

be

treated as accessories to Dhyana.

Dhyana, denned as atf^SSfq^R^tftflft:

state of

Samadhi or introspection taught

to the stages

introspection

JTH

=*rrsr

brahmanya

referred to in the

and

Brh. Up.

iii,

points
(

out

vairagya

by the

G.S.

ii,

from i||fe

text, it

52

^ 37^

<

if

and

turning
jfj^f

and

(tnenma)

text

5,1 )

by

most of

the

modem

Brahmin should become

gusted with learning" (Hume, Thirteen Prinaipal Upanisads,

that

as the

These

famous UpanLsadic

translators of the Upanisad, that " a

same

Manana and Dhyana corres-

pointedly rejected the view accepted

Madhva has

virtually the

of learning (panditya), reflection

#qr*r mwf- * * *

scholars

is

by the Yoga system.

three stages of spiritual advance of SVavaoa,

pond

away

had been intended

would have used the proper grammatical case

p.

menial

in

In

be

112).

dis-

Ho

aversion

conveyed

qrfo^Uci, Ft1%J

CHAPTER L

PRATIKOPASANA
There are numerous texts

other principles as

^s^cp^l

Brahman

^tW

Jt#t KrstHia;

adhibhautika, adhyatma

sftmanadhikarapya

Aranyakas and Upanisads which

in the

random, the meditation of any physical, adhidaiva or

prescribe, almost at

^cfTRftcT

srtRgqRlft STrfflW:

These numerous identifications of the

and other essences with Brahman

case-apposition

3^

thro' vibhakti-

very naturally raises the question

whether they are meant to be taken as a meditation of their identity

(

abhedopdsana

The usual answer given

such

to this question is that

texts are to be taken as prescribing " Pratlkopasana " or symbolic medi-

For

tation.

the sake of efficacy of meditation, these various objects of

meditation are to be

'

treated

'

Brahman,

as

for the nonce.

words, the idea of Brahman

is

that they could be viewed

and meditated upon

This

Sarhkara's

is

Ramanuja

to be mentally superimposed

explanation

also agrees

what

of

^ifc^'Treflcr it is

the true object of meditation, but only the

that as

an enhanced

status.

constitutes Pratlkopasana

with Sarhkara's interpretation of Pratikopasanas

that in respect of such Upasanas as *F?f

is

in

In other

on them, so

not Brahman that

mind and other objects and

conducive to prosperity to look upon and treat the inferior

it is

as superior, as in looking

upon the King's servant as the King, even

so,

Contd

Pan.

get

ii,

3,

28

tired of

more about God

f=T7f

up with

^ ^

It is interesting

II

has cited the

Madhva's.

j^jcHr

That apart,

).

or fed

Brh Up.

it is

^^T

to note that

text in

knowing

lOTgTOJcf

See Sarhkara S.8.B.

j'f^N'

absurd to suggest that true Jfianins

hearing,

?T

=5T

and

reflecting

#faf

iii 4, 47.

is fully

( Cf. also

Anaudagiri on above

).

and

SPR^rUffrf^ffcT

Sarhkara also in his

a sense which

ever

more

6.B.

ii,

11

in agreement with

H\fk< qfeffllWRTsfW

PHILOSOPHY OF

302

for purposes of meditation, the

upon

tated

Brahman.

as

&B.1

MADHvAoABYA

mind and other

objects are to be medi-

He

refuses to countenance

Madhva's views are quite

different here.

the idea of any superimposition of Brahma-drsti on any Pratlka, however

sacred or exalted

^tfRJfT

it

may be

T H#% SUSft:

m$

Upasana of any Pratlka

f%sg,

ZRWdrfc

3W

is

=1)1%

*T

Scft%

(B.S.B.

to meditate
II

way of speaking

B.S.

f|

'

^trf!T#T

'

^Tf^TT

iv, 1, 4.)
The proper way of
on Brahman as being present in it;

It is

iv. 1,4).

but natural to expect

profound a subject-matter as
God-realization and the means thereof, in the Aranyakas and the Upanisads which are noted for their love of secrecy and esotericism
the mystic

TO^RT

in regard to so

^ ft ^rr: vmtf$$:

II

Even in the writings of modern mystics, the tendency to resort to mystic

modes of expression is not rare. Madhva derives the key to the proper
interpretation of the subject of Pratikopasana in Vedanta from the
famous passage of the Aitareya Iraiiyaka ( iii, 2, 3 ) which he quotes in
tjd SET 3prr JTfcifi% jfWPET!%, ^cT'WT sp-spfe:, r^ q$ji& g%Tr:,
his works
:

qcw?#r^r

rr,

^cwrbrt,

q<w% wfcnfts, ^3

^ ^^r zm&m&fo

interesting to note that the expression tffafcRI

occurring

in

it is

above

the

passage has been explained by $arhkara also in his commentary on B.S.

i,-

1,

15 as "Upasana."

This shows that

faithfully the genuine tradition

to the principles

Madhva

represents correctly and

of the Vedic and Upanisadic Seers

in

regard

and technique of Brahmopasanfi.

While repudiating the view that the Pratlka should be meditated upon
" Atman " Samkara and Ramanuja are ready not only to condone but
to approve of a conscious superimposition of the idea of the Upasya
on the ground that it
( Brahman ) on the object chosen for meditation
as

'

It is this 1'araiuatman

indeed that the votaries of

in the groat Uktha, the Adhvaryus in the

vrata
all

Him

beings

'.

in Heaven, in the Akaiu, in

(ire,

Vedantadipa,

Rg Veda

iv, 1,

meditate

).

upon

the Ohando^as in the Maha-

the waters

in the osadhlH and in

303

pbatIkopAsanA

would
tion

serve to enhance the status of the Pratlka.

may enhance

the status of the Pratlka,

lower the status of Brahman

But while such medita-

would almost

it

There

upon one

a great danger of

be no escaping the fact that when one meditates

upon

of meditating

talk

any

It is

there-

whatsoever

Pratlka

as

vftxs

rfcr

cn#, frgMrs^pr

dWRW* WfMRJT
As

is

thing as another, the identity will apply both ways.

fore flimsy to

Brahman

will

of and

for in allowing ourselves to think

meditate on a limited object or symbol as God, there

spiritual fall.

certainly

Madhva

a true Theist,

tation of the Sutra

feels that

SfKfl^wra;

m^W-V:

ft

m.'i

(AV.

II

p.

55

b.

he cannot be a party to any interpre-

iv,

1,5), which will either condone or

approve of any conscious superimposition of the idea of Brahman on any

symbol or Pratlka used

in meditations.

That

he

will,

feels,

be a virtual

sanction of idolatry

cRSTRcfof nt'WTftlcr

No

t^Kf

Christian missionary could have been

more

of idol worship than IVIadhva has been, here.

such meditations
to say that

it is

we tend

hardly a

JRPJ.

{AV).

If

one should plead that

to annihilate the Pratlka as such,

For,

fact.

if

we

really

do

talk of Pratlkopasana as such, as the Pratika itself

reasons,

by

in

we have only

so, there

would be no

would not be

there,

wfrni? ftrar^tf, fcf: SEftaSPJ \ For these and other

Madhva discards the interpretation given by Samkara and Ra-

any longer

manuja

of the profanity

critical

for this Sutra (iv, 1, 5

treating

it

as constituting a

and

finds a better

pretation, the

Supreme Being should always

BRAHMAN

i.e.

transcending

as being

interpretation for

new adhikara^a. According

endowed with

be

meditated

infinite

it

to his inter-

attributes

upon

as

and

as

all.

In meditating on Brahman,

the devotee

may

concentrate on one

or more attributes of divinity according to his spiritual fitness and capa-

PHILOSOPHY OF 6rI MADHVAoAeYA

304

The

city.

highest

number of

four, tho' the Scriptures posit

Supreme Being (Human)

open to human comprehension are

attributes

an

number of

infinite

attributes of

souls that can not concentrate on

the

more than one

attrubute are termed " Trna-Jlvas "

by Madhva, The range of attributes

and the Rsis can meditate is
much wider and only the four-faced Brahma can meditate on most
of them

upon which superhuman

souls like the gods 2

WIT al^M%:

Trwt 3f5$:
*

gqj^f:

II

Apu-Bhasya

This sort of contemplative correlation and sublimation of both positive

and negative attributes of the Divine Being is known as " Gunopa.

samh&ra

"

#3#^sr *mr3<IM:

Madhva

says further that

among

* *

is

dmanda.
for

to be meditated

meditation

Of,

of Brahman,

S. B.
to

be

one

upon in unison with

the

other

attributes

like

In other words, each one of the attributes of Brahman, chosen

"There

to be

is

The Upanisads
1.

Madhva, B.

", infinitude, is the chief

the attributes

all

meditated upon, the attribute of "Bhumatva

which

II

represent

viewed as
;

infinite

Brahman

are only two attributes of

knowledge at

all.

The being

of

in

as Bhurna,

Sod

is

God

of

range and content.

and Purna in every

which wo, humans,

have any

not however confined within the limits

human

Our knowledge of Gtod is real no far an it goes. But

experience.
beyond us. There are an infinite number of other aspects of the
Deity along which we cannot travel, since we are restricted to two lines of
approach only, viz., mind and matter. "
W. G. Bond. Three Things That
Matter -Religion, Philosophy and Science, p, 73, Watts, Loudon,
of

reality is

2.

Br ahmasxi.tr at

According to Madhva, the

as " Para-Vidya. " are

meant

for the

benefit of the gods also.

Hence, the details therein, of Gtunopasamhara by

them also, Reference to the mode of Laya of the gods preparatory to their
release ( B. 8. iv, 2, 1-16 ) as interpreted by Madhva, which V. S. Qhate finds
unaccountable, is also to be similarly understood. As the B. 8. discuss the
fitness

and the

concerning
Burprise

right of the

their

"gods"

Sadhana and

to

goal,

Brahmavidya,. these
raised

other

questions

by Madhva, should cause no

pbatIkopAsanA

305

respect and emphasize the contemplation of this distinctive aspect as the

source of the highest spiritual realization

*jfa

3PH

form a

(Chan. Up.

vii,

23

).

Human

precise idea of the infiniteness of

ception of such infinitude

comprehension. There

is

may

number of

of time,

in the infinitude of these

cfcg?sf

would be

are

still

The con-

like,

feel

absolutely sceptic about

within the limits of our

good example.
that

Tho'

infinitude.

own

infinite is the

must have gone by since

able to conceive of

two ideas of

different Adbikarins are able to form.

-MO

unable to

some

The same

with the different conceptions of the infinite attributes of

V. M.

^\^S gWH'Rd

may be

intelligence

number of months

we

*JfTT

also differ according to different levels of

Jayatlrtha gives us a

years and the

the beginning

it

any attribute of God.

however nothing to

forming some idea of what

understanding.

ait

is

difference
the

God

case

which

C'HAPTKM LI

BIMBOPASANA
As

already pointed out, the eternal and intimate relation in which

individual souls stand to the

Paramatman

Brahman, not merely

in

conceived by Madhva as a
dependence of the Jivas on

is

peculiar metaphysical relation of constant

respect of their external outfit of

body and

senses etc., but even in regard to their very being and becoming. This
relation,

has been stated already,

it

the very nature of the souls and

something that

is

intrinsic to
It

it.

is

terms of any other relation within our empiriThe term " Bimbapratibimbabhava ( Original and Reflection)

difficult to express

cal grasp.

in

it

which has been suggested for

it,

by Madhva,

our experience.

is

to b; taken as the near-

however, to be taken
depending on any external factor or condition ( Upadhi ), as

est parallel to
literally as

is

has nothing physical about

in

it

in the Advaita school,

which would

It is not,

at

once render

it

a conditioned rela-

Madhva, an

indissoluble and
Svarupasambandha ). It is a relation of intrinsic
dependence of the Jfva and his essential characteristics of reality, consciousness and bliss. It is coeval with the Jlva ( *)ii<*icHTrft ) and becomes
fully manifested in release. The bondage of Samsara is itself due to this
relation being missed by the Jiva and becoming obscured by a false sense
No wonof independence in respect of his Sana, pratiti and pravrtti.
der that among the various forms of Upasana, the meditation on the
Bimba-aspect of the Lord has been stressed by Madhva as the sine qua
non of Aparoksa

tion and therefore terminable.

perpetual relation

It

is,

to

stfrsft

*m?Ri?n^RE#T q=H

JTt^rfcT (

Madhva's commentator gives an example. Moksa

'

after

death

'.

But that

nv.

hi, 3 ).

attainable only

is

does not mean that one gets

Moksa

at the

time of any death at random from among the innumerable ones thro'

which one has to pass, in the course of one's transmigratory

The same

is

the case with Bimbopasana, as

the

requisite

career.

of Moka.

The conception of Bimbopasana and Bimbaparoksa may well be considered to fall under the domain of mystic communion between God and
soul in

Madhva's

religious

consummation which

is

philosophy.

By

its

very

beyond discursive thought, for

nature,

it

is

elucidation.

CHAPTER

LII.

PLACE OF GRACE IN REDEMPTION

According to Madhva,

knowledge of God

this

realization of the Deity.

intellectual

It

more a

is

not a mere

is

of

feeling

deep

attraction and attachment arising from the knowledge of Bimbapratibim-

babhava between

God and

affection flowing

from

soul and sustained

Hence,

it.

by

sense of spontaneous

Bhakti, there

in

knowledge and attachment combined.

the element of

is

In the last analysis, then,

it

is

not pure knowledge that puts an end to the bondage of souls, but the
grace of God, in spontaneous appreciation of the soul's surrender.
Divine grace that plays the most decisive role
the soids, according to

On

Madhva.

from other Vedantins, partcularly Absolutists,

per se that constitutes the highest means of
his idea

from

the

importance

the

individual "

The

of

" vision "

and

to

release.
in

" grace

whom

it

is

of

considerably

knowledge

is

Madhva

derives

addition to knowledge,

of

God

falling

on the

difference is

bondage.

which emphasize,

ferutis,

in

point, he differs

this

It

the final deliverance

due to the difference

in the

conception of the origin of

The Advaitic conception of bondage as the outcome of a

mysterious ignorance

concealing the

nature of

Brahman,

which

is

dawn of knowledge, of the atman and

fRWFTW f^R&RJ^, leaves no
Brahman

automatically destroyed by the

its

essential identity with the

room

for

any kind of personal intervention of a Deity or

the termination of this ignorance.

It

is

within the

tence of knowledge (alone) to destroy ignorance, just as it

competence of light to destroy darkness.

the spirit of

man

3TT^niFffrft:

no scope

shines forth in

$rlharsa

).

its

is

Once this ignorance

pristine

grace, in

its

power and compewithin the

is

destoyed,

form as a matter of course

ftlfrRIM jft|W Wt^ftefajcT:

There

is,

thus,

for the intervention of Divine grace in the accomplishment of

Avidyanivrtti,

as

such

ct*TT

fR^TI=[3WTt Qf^t f%jftWfll^i

'

PHILOBOPHY OF l&I MADHVAoABTA

308

5p$OTR 3W*Kfad*i*|Jif NS.

p. 18 ;.

accepted by the
But later writers have been obliged to relax its uncompromizing rigidity and make a compromise with Theistic tendencies by conceding some sort of a remote connection of knowledge with grace.
Accordingly, grace is required to create a " taste for Advaita"

This

the strict metaphysical position of the Advaita,

is

older writers.

&Klsiil*lV SflmisffTCFn'

This

is

pleas.

Khat)4ana

As a

a very unsatisfactory position.

opposes such devious

We

Pwo**^.

come back to

and His grace are both necessary

'

flc^T

^PJ * * *

proper

Madhva

Theist,

naturally

The theory of Brahmajfianavada has got

And

be abandoned as metaphysically untenable.

WWfW?T

),

with

goes the

dogma

the position that the vision of

S?l* i gaict

it

harmonization

'

'

to

God

ISSTcF^HPKR^fa

of these Srutis will lead to

the acceptance of grace as the most potent factor in achieving deliverance.

Taking

his stand

on both the groups of

No

case for the necessity of Divine grace.

by

the sheer force of

his

Jayatirtha throws great light

arrq^cf

on

this point

$$, FR5Sraic+l<Kfl

^^3WNH <^MW4W<filHdi
All this

is

and

is

under B. S.

<%i

5^3 icft fon

=lWu%: %4wfo4RT
TP.

iii,

srerat

itself

3, 49)

wmfet

JTfej

3^; ^T,

fam*i\ 3W5T
(

ns. 527

).

and not merely a beginning-

This idea finds expression in Saiva philosophy

supported by the B. S. iii,

iii,

can be saved

he,

or can be the ultimate explanation of bondage, as has

already been explained.

also

II

because the Divine will

less ignorance is

man, says

argues a strong

knowledge

******

IHRIf

Madhva

texts,

2, 4,

2, 5

and &yet Up.

vi,

16.

Ramanuja

comes to very near the same position as Madhva on

GRACE IN REDEMPTION

309

the question of what causes the bondage of souls.

But

his theory does

not take us beyond the stage of "anadikarmaparampara"; which we shall

see, will

not be a final explanation of God's concealing or obscuring the

self -luminosity of the Jivas.

According to Madhva, the Sutra

3Pf*?TSWTTj

?WRspj(.

?r

( iii,

2, 19),

emphasizes the role of Bhakti in finally manifesting to the Jlva his natural

and

innate affinity with

by the

Jlva,

when he

God

will of

lies

devotion

Its

Pratibimba.

iii,

2, 5) in

Kama, Karma

that the Jlva can rise

Such knowledge of

hidden from the understanding of the

Himself, (B.S.

encrusted by Avidya,

is

of Bhakti

Brahman as

Brahman

his true relation to

the state of bondage

etc.

It is

by the

quality

above these impediments and

obscurations of his real personality and realize his true relationship to

Madhva understands

God.

the simile of water, ( ambuvat ) employed by

the Sutrakara here, as an allusion to the quality of clinging consistence of

devotion

like that of

water

),

which alone will enable the soul to know,

and adhere closely and intimately to God, forever, in the

realize

and inseparable

realization of his intimate

bhava

to

which

this

relation of

final

Bimbapratibimba-

Bearing in mind the keynote of the Sadhanadhyaya in

Him.
Sutra

is

placed, every thoughtful student of the Sutras will be

impressed by this original and felicitous interpretation of the keywords

of the Sutra: ambuvat and grahapam.

of this remarkable Sutra.

that

it

Mysticism

unborn soul also

3uh^htJ

asTTcSfi^

expect a dry

is

If,

would even have

interprets

interpretation

many of

the

of the Sutra

sFtfWcI.

However, one can hardly

who seems

Madhva that

set aside the

authoritativeness prevented

1.

'

Madhva' s

V. S. Ghate,

preconceived notion against

in

be the religion of the future n , the world's

the very core of Mysticism.

critic like

which Madhva

also the best mystic interpretation

as Radhakrishnan says, " all signs indicate

likely to

will find in

It is

to have started with a

"the very fantastic

and forced way

Sutras leaves no doubt that he

Sutras themselves

but that their uncontested

him from doing so" to understand and appreciate

Eastern Religions and Western Thought, Preface,

ix.

310

PHILOSOPHY OV &KI MADHVACARYA

the great poetic beauty and deep philosophical suggestiveness

interpretation concerning so refined

human

the

than that

a " very fantastic " one. 1

it is

be seen that

will

it

interpretation, but contextually the

Bhakti

gya"

quite in order, here, in

is

in the previous

poda}

in so far as such a relation

relevance

it

is

not merely a bold and original

between the Sun and

after the discourse

ii,

Even according

a purely

is

fictitious

Jlvas.

its reflection,

shaking off the idea

Madhva's

it is

realization, rather than

to

Samkara, would

aCTT^RX^PTRi
5if

1.

3.

is

Madhva 's

original interpretation

worthwhile quoting

m^mrcra.' %fa

For a refutation of V.
ature, Vol.

and depth of

f^,

'

his

explanation

appwns.

* * * *

*,

W>
UrahmasUtra

'

It

2, 19, is

of Jayatlrtha, has done a great

philosophy by bringing out the full beauty

question.

iii,

a Siddhdnta-Sutra, as taken by Madhva.

thought and feeling that are hidden behind

in

But

of Bimbapratibimbabhava caused by

Vadiraja, in his gloss on the TP.

of the Sutra

supposed to be established here as

would be a hindrance to

a strong indication that

service to

Vairft-

one according to Sarhkara,

Upadhis. The use of the double negative construction in Sutra

also

topic of

on "

to Sarhkara, the topic here

a help, inasmuch as true realization, according

in

The

most appropriate one.

Pada

it

Bimbapratibimbabhava, brought about by Upadhis,

their

a Siddhanta view

consist

upon

what has been

Sadhanadhyaya would be open to question, as such

to

knowledge (of
as

In the light of

Bimbapratibimbabhava between Brahman and

relates to the

its

emotion of

spiritual

breast as Bhakti or to pronounce any other judgment

above,

stated

and deep-seated a

of this

01

35T,

I.

see

my

S. (Jhato's criticisms of Madliva's interpretation of the

History of Dpaita School of

Vcddnta and

its

Liter-

pp, 131-59.

SWt

93fl7rfr}SffltS: SIcRsfrl

tWPT

II

(Samkara, 2.8.

iii, 1, 1).

Bamanuja's interpretation of this adhikarana as intended to show that Brah-

man
is,

is

not vitiated by the imperfections of the world, tho'

immanent

besides being unconnected with the subject of Sadhanavicara,

free from

redundancy

See his commentary on

i,

2, 8).

in

it

not entirely

GRACE IN REDEMPTION

nwn^
^' ^3^1

tfr ft *rffa

STcJ:

?rrt,

Even

^trthrC

SJ?FW:

stteRl'^Wfifc

fief

f=?r #fififcr %^ scq^

?ft

if*rn

tho' for brevity's sake, the

II

TP. GurvarthadipikS,, Udipi 1954

'

311

p.

139

).

Sutrakara should have used the express-

ion " on account of lack of Bliakli (the real nature of the soul's relation to

God

is

not revealed to him

chosen to use the words "

)," yet, it

Ambuvat

succinct definition of Bhakti at the

should be borne in mind that he has

"

like water

ed the word " Ambuvat " by the word " Snehena "

ment

Grahana

For, Bhakti

or grasping).

knowledge of His majesty.

"

^t^mtFTTci: "

meaning,

phor

here.

It

is

quality of water.

He

because

explicitly.

is

is

But there

well

known

is

God

at

It is to

convey so

with loving attach-

same as love of God lighted by

true the Sutrakara could

not known thro' love

God

Bhakti

all costs.

It

should have this quality

only such a love that

is

much deep meaning

God,

as His Prati-

that the Sutrakara,

telling

who

is

metaphor here to

emphasize the greatness of the quality of Bhakti and

its

place

among

].

JayatTrtha brings out

characteristic

brilliance

the rationale of Madhva's position with his

and

clarity of

thought.

the condition of bondage, ultimetely, to any

Kama, Karma

etc.,

Karma

etc.,

should be open to the soul to get back

We

cannot attribute

of the familiar causes of

each of which has a beginning.

each previous stage of Kama,

it

to convey his

an inborn and deep-rooted

is

a master of language and thought, has used a

Sadhanas

a full

have written

a special purpose in introducing a meta-

is capable of revealing to the soul his true relation to

bimba.

embody a

intention of

word " Jfiana " (understanding

that viscosity

Man's love of

of clinging firmly to

" by the

the

It is

this

Madhva, has accordingly render-

the Sutrakara in mind, the commentator,

and the word "

order to

in

Keeping

same time.

Even supposing

that

begets the next one and so on,

its

original

and

essential charac-

PHILOSOPHY OF ^RI MADHVAoArYA

312

teristic

of self-luminosity, in the states of deep

solution,
this

when

there

and universal

no play of any kind of desire or

is

dis.

But

activity.

Hence, there must be something above

not found to be the case.

is

sleep

and beyond our actions and desires (however beginningless ), which must
be regarded as having cast a

be

veil

of ignorance on our essential self-lumi-

from time immemorial.

nosity,

"Maya", "Avidya", and

is finite).

This original substance

For,

it is

an obscuring agency. But then, as

own

ultimately

it

is

this

Maya " or

"Maya

God Himself

we are

true nature

is

also

known

to the soul's attaining

;

and

only a"

is

obscures the Svampa-Caitanya

that

of the Jtvas, by means of

in the Sastras

an obstacle

to act as

to accept the position that

led

its

as

( self-

the above-mentioned principle

1 )

of Prakrti endowed with the three Gunas

and which

" Prakrti "

" or " Prakrti "

cannot be said to function independently and of

it

In this way,

freewill.

luminosity

therefore

"Prakrti", obscuring the self-luminous soul (which

in the nature of "

insentient principle,
its

may

with what the S&stras speak of under different names as

identified

of Sattva, rajas, and tamas

" Avidya " because

self-luminosity

acts as

it

and knowledge of

its

by His own wonderful and inscrutable power

( acintyadbhuta-sakti )}

As

God ie

the ultimate cause of the bondage of the Souls, in this sense,

also the source of their release

%^R:

*w*Hlft+*te

M&:

cttt

<#

m $$3

h Roller

3?cf:, srwstfNjfffftTff

STIcFT:

II

ciwft srf^r:

(Skanda,

by ^rldhara)

q.

w^i^ge^ ^^
i

^Mlft3IWlR*KlftM 3&m

^m-

f%jrft

GRACE

REDEMPTION

IN

This mysterious power or will of

" Prakrti "

Maya". 1

'*

God

also

313

is

known by

the

names of

These two different senses in which the terms are

used in the&istras should be carefully noted to avoid confusion.

This

'

Mayic " power of

God

two

also has

from comprehending

res the soul

its

own

which precludes the vision of the Lord to the

3TrP% Jifeft

It is

only the grace of

God

Contd.

II

(B.

can raise these

that

and uncover the true nature of the

of the Lord to it

self to itself

T.

X,

last

87, 13-15

veils

).

of bondage

and reveal the true nature

3^1

3RT:

TOW q^f

I. Phil. iv. p.

in the above passage

He

has

^T^R^T S^Fm

^^d^HI^KilcfiGt

Wlfil
Dasgupta

also,

159

fn. 3)

HxdH^mun

p. 19b).

has unhappily muqvated the last sentence

from the JVS, and misinterpreted

is

a " negative suistame. "

positive substance / jfrq^q ) in Madliv

's

system.

it,

as a consequence.

The

fact

Of.

ar

W&& q^r^o?r:; & *m, <ro# m tm&ft m

Cf.

(MS.

gsFcJJ^II

fam-

on this account, drawn the erroneous conclusion that "Ignorance"

in Madhva's philosophy

l.

and another

fullest possible extent

& ig STfti$# fafa

'nf^^attM!^l^p#fTJT:

one that obscu-

aspects,

essence in full

*fpftrtfi?#r foqftRfittfft

i#53FRr

Wti

II

^
"

that

is

an a
ns.

p.

it is

itfi

64b

Madhva, BSB.

i,

4,

25

SMf -

).

).

PHILOSOPHT OF 6r1 MADHVAoABTA

314

Not

all

our Karma, or Jnaaa or even Bhakti can achieve

grace of

the

Lord

to

withdraw

*rfoRM snft *f&T #rfr *

apiTt^r

5FTT:

this

33

).

Such

is

*^r

*F3f ^TfcTOT

ScJFnfestf^^cqft, 3MfWr^TT af^SI

3,

obscuration

from

without the
the

Jlva

irNw^r a&m

^ Slf^.

%T JTr^rsn^:

this

It

Madhva,

the raison d' etre of Divine grace, according to

JV. F.

iii,

Madhva.

CHAPTER

god -realization.

APAR0K!3A-JNANA or
Madhva
Aparoksa.

and sharply between Dhyana and

distinguishes carefully

This

is

from

clear

flow of mediate knowledge

L1JI

his definition

of the former as continuous

^fetfwajwr&nt:

while the latter

);

is,

names Aparoksa and Saksatkara show, a direct vision of the

Supreme Being, in its " Bimba-form ". The form revealed in Dhyana

as

is

its

therefore regarded as

construction,
revelation of

while

God

in

What

<

5p

qfi?rg<Trc&

clearly explained

^rafcjfSFct

is

(R. V.

vi,

47, 18).

B. S.

'

iii,

a substitute and not the original form

37

2,

pt vBmi.

Mtowiy,
stage

is,

by the

thus only an image constructed

II

W -^TR^C^I. 3H
S.B ).

B.

by Trivikrama Panditacarya

mi

The highest
is

is

It is just

5#*T8jPTO

Dhyana

God 3*IFm srraWU

f^KN

S"T

own

actual

the

is

TF.ii, 3.50).

impressions of the mind.

of

He

His Bimba-form, as

presented in

is

Aparoksa,

one visualized in

the

3W<

*raicri

a mental picture of the Yogin's

just

one

therefore,

W$Nm-

is still

more

31?rfeT?5f<dci^i*i<,i^q<i

Tattvapradipa

This

).

which the Yogi or Sadhaka

in

face to face with the object of his meditation and intuits the Divine

Form, which

is

his

Bimbaparoksa, which

archetype (Bimba).
is

which no one can hope to be released

#T 3"TOMRM
J?fa#t

II

*mfa

This

technically

is

termed

the highest form of spiritual perception, without

Wm ^FfRsf

(Nyaya-Vivarapa)

erf

B, S.

5#cf:

iii,

3,

53

wfrsft

WTRJTT:

*FRR. ^fi^W ffi

PHILOSOPHY OF ^RI MADHVAcArYA

316

own Bimba marks

This vivid flash-like intuitive perception of one's

the journey's end.
It is

what

known

is

and culmination of

the fulfilment

It is

all

Sadhanas.

as Aparoksajnana, which is the penultimate state of

final release.
Its intensity

the selves.

and vividness vary according to the innate capacity of

In the case of

flash; in respect to

and

Rudra

human

Devas

visualize

mirror and the four-faced Brahma

Up. Bh&sya

Tho' the Supreme Being

Madhva,

The Supreme

is

this

by any

is

sees

it

Brahman

is

own

faces in

in clear outlines

it

thro' grace

Taitt.

Nirayariadhyatma,

pleased to reveal

mm

q. B. S. B.

itself to the

fafoj!r

at *m.

being,

essentially

in

their

unmanifest and formless.

But

).

Katha Up.
can never be visual-

it

tho'

it

their subtle

iii,

2,*23)

Unlike the elements of

tanmatra

form, but visible

form, Brahman has no such diversity of

gross

aspects as gross and subtle.

(unmanifest).

27

however much one may try

which are insensible in

and manifest

2,

iii,

devotees thro' sheer grace

condescension on the part of Brahman,

finite

) it is

(B.S.B.

fire etc.

The gods Garuda

ex hypothesi unmanifest (avyakla

to visualize

cTC^f

But for

said to be like a lightning-

).

possible, says

ized

it is

a reflection of their

like

it

beings,

like the blaze of the Sun.

Hence,
is

it is

always and essentially avyakta

essentially avyakta,

it

reveals itself to the

'

APAB0K9AJKANA QOD-KEALIZATION

317

Upasaka, by

its

own

choosing to reveal

Without Brahman's

grace and inscrutable power.

itself,

way, no one can ever visualize the

this

in

limitless one,

Aparoksajfiana, then,

any more

something which, by

is

explicit description.

It is to

are hardly adequate to describe

It

it.

very nature, defies

its

be experienced and

Words

felt.

a flash-like revelation of the

is

Supreme, at the fruition of a long and arduous process of iravapa, manana

and nididhyasana,

God,

as

in the fulness of absolute self-surrendering devotion.to

our Bimba.

Ultimately,

it

He

is

that

must choose to reveal

Himself pleased by the hungering love of the soul. The Pratibimba (soul)

must turn

in

and seek and see

Bimba

his

in himself.

That

attainable only

when

is

Aparokga-

jnana:3Trc*%rem#q#U

God

Such direct perception of

specially attuned to the

is

Supreme by

and dhyana. Such a perception

specially perfected for the task

ftf^W'ra'W*il

is
:

full discipline

JH^HIH^

3*qftapffaj*Rra:

perly trained

of the

'

ripe

'

and

conflict

texts

to

'

grace of

Katha Up.

Nym.

WIST T

p.

Jigft

629

).

which deny the

',

reference to minds not pro-

merely show

that

Brahman when such

God Himself.

do

so.

'

Texts like

the

mind should be perfected

and dhyana, before

direct revelation

Aparoksajfiana

powers of eight-fold Siddhis

is

is

it

can be made to

given to

itself

by the

etc.

stage in

spiritual realization.

and the

as consti-

According to

school, the highest stage of spiritual attainment open to the

of nididhyasana

it

believed to confer marvellous

The Ramanuja school does not recognize Aparoksajfiana

tuting a distinctive

1 Tjpf

4H*ttil

with the ability of the mind to reveal the Brah-

disciplined by trayatia, manana

visualize the

ll

Brahman have

and disciplined mind

Such

because there are other texts which establish the capacity

do not however
man.

to reveal

is

immediate and achieved thro' the mind

Vyasaraja explains further that texts like

power of the mind

mind

the

of Srawpa. manana

Sadhaka

highest personal impression of the

is

this

that

Supreme

philosophy of

318

Being that one can have

in this

madhvAcAbya

i-sb!

world does not

mental image of the Supreme formed

above one's own

rise

thought and

thro' constant flow of

meditation
(ij

otrr ^
JFi

(ii)

#afe
sra#i;

srr^wa^wq

*ffcWciH$q <?#r*wMRiit

t^Riq#l^*lfft?Fc!FIfqq.

rrej =er

m ^ wft:

#r, faf^rreFW *#rfqcrr

<#rs*?err

ftfrcrft

3FR3#rac?$ aqtoi *

(r.g.b.

vh',1).

^remffirarcr,

'mh

mt*

* * *

-;=

*r

^^fer-

'

btfih ^rt.

"""

f>WFf3ifrT

9jfcr ftftrcit

This means that there

is

of God,

in this life,

no room

Brahmaparoksa or

state of

II

Ramanuja, Sribhasya

in the

Ramanuja school

direct vision or

the

other than

immediate

the highest kind

but mediate

Vedanta Desika on R.G.B.

of direct experience of

Paroksavrtti

).

which

is

tion.

thus

f^RHcW ^RWRTW^^f

of the Lord achieves a vividness that

Desika proceeds further to

intuitive perception

is

^Pt

will

Ramanuja
and

obstrfr-

This means that

).

as a seeker

says that the expe-

vivid as

to

be almost

explained by Desika
),

is

be no better than

not the same as a

final analysis,

rience of Dhyana, tho' mediate, can be so clear

immediate

vii, 1

Such an experience

a mental construct and, therefore, in the

^^RPTHct^tR,

for a distinctive

God open to man

direct immediate perception of the Lord,

^FROTRTO

1, 1

mental image conjured up by the

devotee thro' constant flow of meditative recollection

ftfcgsref feRTIcffTq;

i,

( ?*&9T

that the mental impression

almost equal to a direct presenta-

illustrate his

point by the examples of

the extravagant fancies of a person deeply in love with a

obsessions of those seized by a sense of fear and so on

woman and

the

'

APAROK?AJ$ANA GOD-KEALI.ZATION

819

*rei%

^NfajnsG&rarra: ^sflreriTRn^R?n tfr*PR?ptffa:Pi

^raKFcrft d<d MiriR

%g^ sot

(Bhavabhuti, Malatimadhava,

on R.G.B.

p.

v, 10,

is

Quoted by Vedanta

Deslika

Madhva,

not acceptable to

the level of a pure fan;y.

to

t%jt n $ft

415, Ananda Press Edn. Madras.

Such a view
jfiana

as it reduces AparokaThat will be hardly in keeping

and supreme significance attach-

profound reality, dignity

in Indian philosophical tradition as the highest
Brahmasaksatkara
ed to
and the most desirable state consummation of man's philosophical quest:
with the

W& cEPJW fg?n tmw ^JT#n%:

?5(T

jt%t

f^f

^ft

JTTOrftfr:

cT =3rg:

Wi

qentf^awT
^fa^RSt.

*f

ztqW- Wfa i&mfol{ Muri4

BflW^TCRTH
rnftsopMT

q#^(

Brh. Up.

%3T ^cT^:

TOW gwNcr iWna

(

As Vyasaraya
the

texts,

great

sprret:

refer

to

iii, 1,

iv, 4,

23

iii,

ix,

3,

Apart from

can be

12

tit. ii, 3,

).

1.9)

t/p.

the direct visualization of the

and mystics as the

figurative level.

cognition

2.

Op.

i.

points out, in his Nyayamrta, Ramanuja's view

which

Seers

Gita,

Up.

Mw?w7.

Katha Up.

*rafcr

gf^rswdt$^(vi,

*r

highest

reduces

Lord by the

means of deliverance, to a

that, it is difficult to see

how a

meditative

said to attain a vividness of presentation (%Kic*il-

equal to that of an actual immediate presentation

^iiti*lHI+R

).

PHILOSOPHY OF

820

It

cannot be

in the sense of

its

i$Rl

MADHVAoARYA

acquiring a deeper content and a wider

range of details than a mere remembrance-series.

experience

original experience

which
is

it

flows.

from which

As

it

is

It is,

an immediacy of experience

recollective

memory image from

reality and, in

verance by such means!

perception,

no doubt, possible to imagine that there

in

it

is

such cases by auto-suggestion or under

abnormal psychological conditions.

of

derived or the

for actual identity, with immediate

out of the question.

facts

For, a

cannot posssess a wider range or deeper content than the

any case,

it

But that
will

be too

will not alter the

much

to expect

hard
deli-

VIII.

DOCTRINE OF MUKTI
CHAPTER L1V

NATURE OF THE RELEASED STATE AND

ITS

STAGES

In each system of thought, the doctrine of Salvation

the conception of the nature of souls and

God.

Nirvana or utter annihilation of personality as

The reason

life.

permanent

is

simple.

They don't

self other than the five

is determined by
The Buddhists believe in
the highest end and aim of

recognize, even in Samsara, a

skandhas, as a transmigrating

spirit.

Hence, the question of the survival of any such non-material principle

Some modern apologists

who try to argue that Nirvana is not extinction of self-consciousness, or of the Atman, know not what they are talking about. Buddhism
after the achievement of release does not arise

of Buddhism,

is

a frank and fearless Nairatmyavada and that

hold the absorption of the individual

form of

self in

is

to be the highest

realization, as individuality is merely the result of

by Avidya and

is

not an intrinsic

a pluralization

Madhva's conception of the

fact.

metaphysical dependence of souls on

The Monists

that.

Brahman

God

as His Pratibimbas, not in the

sense of a false reflection, but as coeval and co-eternal but dependent and
finite

beings controlled by

intrinsic difference

God

as their antaryami and his acceptance

duals, lead naturally to the persistence of

these

and from God,

intrinsic bliss

ment.

The

absence of

of

and gradation of fitness (yogyata) among them, as indivi-

an

irreducible distinction

in respect not only of the quality

among

and degree of

enjoyed by them but also in their capacities for such enjoy-

final state, according to

all

traces of pain, evil

Madhva,

and

is

suffering,

marked by a complete
coupled with a positive

enjoyment of inherent spiritual ananda. This bliss has nothing material

about it and is not conditioned by the possession or enjoyment of material
objects.
evil

Ergo, there

is

no fear of

its

being ever diminished or tainted by

or otherwise becoming tiresome:

P.M.21.

Pra&na Up.

i.

16

).

philosophy of

322

ibI

madhvAcAbya

criticism that in such a description of the released

The

are only transferring the distinctions and values of

beyond
ion

and

loses

not at

is

that

when

point

its

remembered

it is

dynamic conception of
it

Is release a state of blissful existence ?

dom from all

is

thus a

Is

here, to a life

game

at

it

to the beyond.

life

are hankering after a

a state of absolute free-

beyond ! The charge of

mean

transfer-

Madhva maintains

which two can play.

the abolition of the plurality

or the personality of selves; but only the removal of the false sense

of separateness and independence, which

is

do not

x,90, 2)

at the root of Samsara. There

it is

stated that the bliss of

not an external possession of souls but an essential characteristic

of their being that manifests

texts like

is

when

question of transference of values,

Mukti

souls

we

If so,

there

it

that the realization of truth does not

no

liable to the facile

pain and shortcomings? Even so, we are simply transferring

what we regard as valuable

ence of values

would be

release

involves a transference of values of this

certain value of life and seeking

is

the bliss in quest-

that

something welling up from the nature of the selves themsel-

it is

criticism that

life

we

a world

dependent on the presence of external material objects

all

ves. Else, any

of

state

this life to

get themselves

3TPr *

Soffit

completely, there. That these released

itself

dissolved

ym%$$l

?rc:

Wn lf%: (Mbh.

in

R, V.

Absolute

the
i,

35.6

from

clear

is

3rcTTfcR#RlR:

R. V.

which attribute to the Supreme

xii),

Being the same kind of sovereignty over the world of the released, as in

The

respect of this one.

text

Wffer {Bfh. Up.

iv, 5,

13) has refer-

ence only to the termination of empirical consciousness, even as interpreted by $arhkara

It

cPT

f^&TOfcnffccT

cannot, therefore, be cited as

Svarupajnana of
atfWRJTT

souls,

a^S^wf

state.

{Brh. Up.

This text of the

that the

Atman

is

rf+KWIcl^

evidence against the

claimed by Dvaitins.

support of the persistence

SlPT

iv, 5.

of

14

makes

a<wiwil

of

have been cited by Madhva, in

indestructible (avinaii)

also are inviolable ( anucchitti-dharmd,

persistence

Passages like

personality in release,

Brh. Up,

ftjpRRJT

two
and

in

its

refined

significant statements
(

The former

that his attributes

carries

an implied

refutation of Buddhist Nairatmyavada and the latter of the NirvMe^a-

NATtJKE OF HB BEtBASED STATB

Cinmatravada of Advaita by

Atman and

his attributes.

in the highest state of

It is

on

insisting

This means

323

the indestructibility

that the self is

of both the

not conceived, even

Moksa, as a mere abstraction or a yawning

to be noted that Sarhkara

and

his

escape the implications of the term anucckittidharma by treating

paraphrase of the
redundant. 1

first

predication

" avinaii " which

itself viz.,

Jayatlrtha points out in his

that the difficulty felt

void.

commentators, here, have tried to

by Maitreyl was not

it

VTN

commentary on Madhva's
at all in respect of any

as a

it

makes

supposed

contradiction between the earlier and latter declarations of her husband

(

%rw #rft %w. sgcmr

crT%r#*wfcr

3#r which may be

looked upon as having been

ing the difference

between

experience

", 2

" the

^CT

human and

Moksa

is

3#f

) as that
:

would make

$!<$<$

fasFer:

was no consciousness

the goal of

ajgwfcsRPfr

fTcf

real

'

ift

$m^\

Ramanuja rightly
human personality

programme
(

calculated to help

whether actually existing or

due to the nuisance of Avidya, and attain to a

state of unalloyed bliss for ever

rqq^r%n

bondage

after

unfit to

f| $fr4tarc*rpf :

For, as

II

accepted, the whole spiritual

merely taken to be

Mokga

snw^ffcfsafari Rr4

KHT*rrlr ^ft^rf>sf5r&cf

the individual self to get rid of his

See his

Atmic

the

points out, in his Sribhasya, unless the survival of the

in

his explain-

of

kffi

SfcTW

by

was

%rR3rc$r jpRRq stRnrr* qf

frNcT

levels

be sought as a Purusartha

fo

$ft

Jayatlrtha rightly points out that Maitreyfs difficulty

in accepting her husband's statement that there

death

and

set at rest

'T

afterwards),

would cease to have any

(VTNt.)

Yajfiavallcyan Motion' ( Assays,

in Tattvavdda, Bangalore.

Jamakhandi, S6) and

my criticism

PHILOSOPHY OF nt MADHVAoABYA

324
meaning.

If all that the

Vedanta has to

himself will cease to be at the end of

goodbye to Vedanta.

eternal

Surely,

to be told that even tho' he himself

the earnest seeker

tell

is

would be no consolation

it

reasonable person would take the trouble of undergoing

be

left

of

lost there will

some pure consciousness of no particular content.

Apart from

how

ness

For no

is

that, Jayatlrtha points out that if Maitreyl's difficulty

ing

may

the rigors

all

fond hope that even when he

him

to

as a self-conscious personality

cease to be, some bare or rarefied consciousness will survive.

spiritual discipline with the

that he

he would bid an

his efforts,

all

the

Atman, who was

Vijndnaghana

was in understand-

described as a mass of conscious-

earlier

could subsequently be said to lose

after death, as contended

by Sarhkara, and

if

consciousness

all

the said difficulty

was

resol-

ved by pointing out to her the difference between the empirical and the
trans-empirical levels of consciousness,

we should

expect to find Maitreyl

referring to the two specific statements of her husband

mutual contradiction, as

She merely

kind.

husband

aHN

it

appeared

TT

how

there is

their

5T

3tf$!T

and says to her

&T mt

ffr

3?fer

no consciousness

after 'death',

This conclusively establishes the point that Maitreyl's

for the individual.

levels

T ^CT Wi

wm. ^ramf^

that she could not understand

difficulty

one text

refers to only

and mention

But, she does nothing of the

to her.

had nothing whatever

of experience " as

to

Prof.

do with "

the

human and

the Atmic

R. D. Ranade has tried to explain

defence of Sarhkara's interpretation of the text.

It

plainly

it,

in

shows that

her difficulty was concerned only with the denial of the survival of consciousness in the released state which was apparently what Yajfiavalkya's

words

seemed

to

suggest:
f

ajgw^ft s^nfturar: .f%,

?ft

qftirc:

sPTfafa

wis

W&

II

t$l?t

II

VTNU

'

3#RT

ft?wi'

tfoiu

13,

em

*rtcr,

TT

*PRR,'

s&m,

gr:

3#w

'

%$

n ^m

*mn.

jf}^3
differ'

tftewwrtoi

NATUKE OF THE RELEASED STATE

This crucial point, raised by Jayatirtha,
assessing the

merits of the

relative

famous Ydjhavalkyan dictum.

It

would

words:

m%

( ^gf^rfcl3)

WJl

>

but

inconsistency of

of the Atman, with the

nature

we cannot

that

take the statements

* #RL**

as

vigorous

as a

plea

statement
survival

the

for

of facts
of

consciousness in Moksa, by means of a reductio ad absurdum.

by Madhva.^

precisely the stand taken

interpretation

is

may be noted

It

self-

Such

is

that such an

supported by the two categorical assertions of

clearly

Yajfiavalkya in his clarification that both

are alike indestructible

in

upon the

reply to his wife's objection, beginning with the

SffnTcfop^. Sc%T

the complete

the

from this

follow

made by Yajfiavalkyain

of the utmost importance

different interpretations put

shows

about

Saihkara's interpretation
context.

It

is

325

the

Atman and

his

attributes

3#TT#

awnw

3$

ETC

3*gflgf%iq?fr

which establishes beyond doubt Yajfiavalkya's anxiety to emphasize not

merely the survival of the

Atman

in

Moksa, but also

the survival

of

his

attributes of consciousness, bliss etc.

The
'

pure

distinction

self

drawn by

and our

'

'

the Advaitin between the

ego -personality

'

aham-artha

For, even the deepest experiences of the

(

ahamartha

this identity

iv,

16

4.

1.

in his

pure
'

made by

tp^

513

state.

ego-self

'

The evidence of

furnished by the reference to the experience of the

on waking up

as the

unsustainable.

the identity of the

with the witness-self of dreamless sleep.

is

repose of dreamless sleep

ately

establishes

is

in our dreamless sleep

self

which according to Sarhkara himself reveals the Atman

See B. S. B.
(

Atman

happy

us in recalling the experience immedi-

g^flfWPSPJ.

If

the ego-self

who

In his VTIT. Marlhva has convincingly demonstrated the nntenability of Sarhkara's interpretation of the passage from the Brh. Up.

harangue to his wife.

details

Jayatirtha in his

of the interpretations of

latter's interpretation

o.

on the

embodying Yajfiavalkya's

VTlf., has gone into the

Madhva and Sarhkara and shown

cannot be sustained^

tha.t

the

philosophy of rI madhvaoArya

326

recollects himself after

waking from the Susupti

reality (pratyagartha) that stands distinguished

(parag-artha

from

one should expect the

),

ego-self,

state

some one

else's that

not the true inner

all

external reality

sometimes on waking up

deep sleep to entertain a doubt whether

his

is

from

it

was

own

his

had undergone the happy repose of sleep

sufficient evidence that

the inner self [pratyagatma

it is

self

or

Here

is

himself that

the subject of the recollection of the happy repose of sleep and that

same pratyagatman that

that

he recalls his

own

that tho'

only the pure self that

it is

judgment,

earlier experience.

as there

still,

Atman who

Susupti, the

no

is
is

by the term "

referred to

is

It is
is

no use

Aham " when

contend against

to

is

it is

this

really the subject of the recollective

activity of the antahkaraiia

mind

in

revealed in Susupti gets himself fused with

antahkarana on waking up from the Susupti

and in virtue of

state

this

contact with the mind he gets the "ego-feeling" and that this accounts
for the configuration of the recollective judgment

words
it

37fff^l -H.

creates a

more

in Advaita that

there intuited

ahamkara

is

by

'

is

Now,

the pure self.

is

paramarsa

For,

serious difficulty to the Advaitin.

Avidya or Bhavaropajnana

ingenuity

the pure

in the

But

admitted

is

present in Susupti and

self,

cannot be recollected by the ego-self

former personal
ego-self

intuition

is left

ahamartha

in

ther

collection about

it

as

its

it

),

as

its

by

on

own

words, as the

own.

could not give expression to any re-

This

is sufficient to

establish that the ego-

self and the witness self of Ajnana in dreamless sleep are one

and

later

ahamartha ), was not the actual witness of Ajnana in dreamless

according to Advaita

sausuptikanubhavaparamarda

T f^if^fi^ra^l

is

according, again, to the Advaita,

completely merged in Susupti and only pure atman

a recollective judgment

thro'

being,

it

itself.

In these circumstances, the intuition of avidya, in Susupti,

there.

sleep

The explanation, no doubt,

that the attempt to distinguish

The Ch&ndogya

text,

them

is

and

Muktas

taking the context here, which

is

Cf. B. S. iv, 4,2).

one of

same

a failure.

^atc*l^n.^RFi: refers clearly and

to the sportive activities of

the

final release as

There

admittedly
is

no mis-

can be seen from

NATURE OF THE RELEASED STATE

the opening

words of the

section:

sets

released souls,

by prescribing a

This sutra

is

shipwrecked everytime
of safety.

Its

^iSSTTrafiJ,

from

Monism

the rock on which Vedautic

its

17

iv, 4,

ships have attempted to cross over to a haven

remarkable significance to a pucka Dualistic interpretation

it is

add anything

Without such

to his weighty remarks

ence of personality, the

Moksa

will

their

has been

of the Sutras has been brought out by Thibaut and

of

The

of the latter by

the sovereignty

limit to

excluding cosmic responsibilities

province.

s^tSOTKl #T ^Trftrft6

an insurmountable barrier between Brahman and the

Vedanta Sutra

'rt

327

game

on

the point.

not possible to

The

be worth the candle.

will not

persist-

ideal

not be worthy of pursuit without the guaranteed persist-

ence and survival of the

self

that can be

assured of

its

deep sense of

repose and happiness earned after so much- effort and suffering

That

is

<$S?rft ft

W^4

J?teRRnM<WI=Mcl:

why Madhva holds

sciousness as released

from

all

%nm #ft?

JWW f|

and

'
||

Mbh.

(Yamuna

xii)

Siddhitraya)*

that the released retain their individual con-

rest in the full

knowledge of

their

deliverance

misery

^IM-Wr

9Jc3T gfctl

fW^Tcgg:

According to Madhva, Aparoksajflana or direct vision of God in His

aspect of one's Bimba, opens the door to spiritual redemption.

dawn of Mukti and carries with

1.

P M. Modi
new

in bis

'

it all

Critique of the

explanation of " jagadvyapara

sutra

and

is at

It is the

the promise and potency of the ineffa-

",

BrahmasUtra

which

is

'

p.448, tries to give a

redundant in the light of the

variance with the sense of 'vyapara

'

last

used in an earlier antra

(iii, 1, 16).

philosophy of 6bI madhvAcAbya

328
ble

and endless

of complete self-realization and God-realization, to

bliss

It is the foretaste of the bliss

come.

of

Moksa

htc#cpb to. iferrpfrsf f^na; ( Gita

It is

natural that close on the heels of Brahmaparoksa, the shackles

of material bondage should begin to

Madhva

successive stages.

Aparokga:

(2)

one has reference of the gods,

^FTi

#fw^

the

the

^R3T

3#?

heap

TRI:

3#S

TP.

iv, 1,

1.

15

is

Madhva

sentence in Madliva's bhasya

why

).

The

fruit

viz.,

latter is des-

to

be worked out.

This

a fixed

is

confused these two aspects of Utkranti and

Laya and speaks of the vthranti

puzzled

between two

begun to bear

and the disagreeable

The 'Prarabdha' alone remains

is also

distinguishes

that has not

or the

Aparoksajnana:

of

" credited " to the account of the released in

V. S. Ghate(ISfi Vedanta) has

He

fire

(TP.)-

Sancita

immemorial,
the

way and dog

the

clog

that

by

).

of

The

Bhoga.

(4)

its

fruits

who have no " utkranti " as such

time

Karma

the agreeable

troyed and the former

Moksa.

from

consumed

kinds of andrabdha-karma

" ?S " and

Karma

of

Jlva
is

stages

of the

3 sr^iaar ^f*iAi-

3*%r'r

kinds

the

of

steps

accumulated

%&sw.

three

every one of

Utkranti (3) Laya and

third

era

one by one, and that Aparo-

four

distinguishes

Karma-naia

(1)

fall off,

state of increased blessedness at

ksa should usher in a

Of

).

of the gods ( misunderstanding the opening

^rrfff

3^?rFcr^#PT^

3xJJ$

iv > 2 >-

the gods should at all be introduced in this context.

Well, the gods also are recognized as adhikarins for Brahrnavidya both in the

Upanisais and in the S.S. The question of their release would not, therefore,
be irrelevant in the Sutras.
(iv,

gods

2,

1-16

in their

).

In

Mnndaka

archetypes

preparatory to Moksa.

and

Hence,
iii,
'

2, 7,

Madhva
we

merging

'

allots

some space to them

actually read of the entry of the

into

them, a

clear oase of

Laya

NATURE OV THE BELEASED STATE

329.

Even in

quantity, the sources of fresh accumulation having been cut off.

regard to Prarabdha Karma, reductions and concessions are possible (B.S.

iii,

4, 16).

The Karmas performed by Aparoksa-Jnanins

of Aparoksa has the effect

Knowledge by

itself

of enhancing the spiritual

confers release

Jfiana,

Moksa.

bliss in

from pain and misery of Samsara

but the welling up of the intrinsic spiritual bliss

Karma,

dawn

after the

by good

possible only

is

Upasana or Bhakti

OTRP?T

The Aparoksajfianin

is

Wftr

mm *m*sfrm

known

also

(B.S.B.

II

as Jivanmukta.

iii,

4,

He continues

33

in his

physical frame as long as the arrears of prarabdha continue to exact their

SFRfSIWFnTrsft

debt:

^%JRm^'tqW*iaiM<pr6WT^

^Rn^n^T, mn*$m #HTCI3fWT HtZFffjlfatruction of

place

takes

his Lihga-s'arlra

(Nym., iv,4

JTr^R&-

cTWTpaR'T

The des-

).

along with the four-faced

Brahman's

it

should bs noted that there are two distinctive aspects of realiza-

tion according to

Madhva, the negative and

attainment of freedom.

The

phases of the

the positive

in riddance

negative aspect consists

obscurations of personality by the crust and consequences of past

etc.

and the destruction

and
side.

f3s"T^

The

of

all

as they are briefly

positive aspect

is

suffering

the Liiiga^arira.

to,

constitute

the

the enjoyment of intrinsic bliss of

Jayatlrtha accordingly defines

Moksa

in its

3tfc2ri%^:wH-im and

1.

The term

2.

Text cited by Samkara in his B.S.B,

is

and

referred

used ,by Vyasaraya in his

dual aspect

TOTR^W
Nym.

( iv,

iv, 3, 11.

),

of

Karma
ft'STPM

negative
selfhood.

dvidalatmaka

VTNt.

all

p. 117

),

PHILOSOPHY OF SRl MADHvAcAeYA

330

The system of Madhva

accepts also the four-fold distinction of

into Salokya, Samipya, Sarupya and Sayujya,

taught in the Bhagavata Purapa.

tions

that

these

represent

an

see

M. BSB.

Moksa

iv, 4,

19)

Vyasaraya, in his Nyayamrta, menascending

order

of blessedness.

The

nature of Bhoga in release will be dealt with in Chapter LVI.

M.

Nandi, in his doctoral thesis at the

Baladeva", (1955.)

is

nize these four kinds of Mukti

that Baladeva,

been refuted in
Vol.

ii.

and making

who recognizes them,

out and out ( 0$.

ait. p.

my

pp. 336-37.

Bombay

Uni. on"" the Philosophy of

quite mistaken in assuming that

453 ).

it

Madhva does not

an argument for his supposition

could not have been a follower of

These and other contentions

History of Dvaita School of

recog-

of

Madhva

M. Nandi have

VedSnta and It* Literature

CHAPTER LV

MOKA

CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPTION OF

IN OTHER SYSTEMS.
Madhva and

commentators have

his

briefly reviewed

concep-

the

release according to the other systems, in order to bring out

of

tion

the distinctive features of their

The Jain theory of Moksa

own conception
as a ceaseless

akasa has nothing spiritual or divine about

and make

the heart of the seeker

Entry into

it,

of

and

it

superiority.

its

upward flight in Aloksays Madhva, to kindle

glow.

it

Mahas'unya, advocated by

the

Buddhist,

equally

is

The Buddhists are frank Nairatmyavadins.

There is no Atman or Self, on their view, which can be said to coordinate
the fleeting experiences of moments into a meaningful whole.
Reducforbidding in

its

tion to nullity

From

this

prospect.

may

thus be said to be

tion of a pot or

something

from the

limjt of Sunyata,,

a so called " individual

is

nothing to

mark

else to

The Void being

".

The Advaitic view of absorption

SPWrerra;

talization of the

Absolute

save

ideal,

fom

^gTOf^FJ.

human

viz..

a^rfcl^

our

self

ailc*HI<iir

'
I

y*d<Piadi4idi^

'jWRfTT g^i:

]foj

dH W^k- cWdSUHRIId;

w#

the

3*1
'n:

life is

hardly different
in

terminology:

The

spiritual vola-

colorless

and

featureless

its nullification.

glow to be told that some

it

process

the

in

srreWcTFtfrl:

It

spiri-

we hold

of realization

SforWRWlfer ^

^FTcTSft stremi

S# 9TP3J ?#?1^ '^m JJ3 Wc ^dWwi:

^\*w<m

grR:

^^NJljaifW^ri^fr^r ( Nym.

argued that the aim of

).

another.

even after we ourselves or what

destroyed

is

is

difference

(NS.p. 633

annihilation of

from

Brahman

and dreary a prospect as

tual spark will continue to be,

dearest

fcsunyata

the

personality into

quite as bleak

is

from the

absolutely characterless, there

into

for

could never touch the heart and make

jft%

of time.

such a state of disintegration to the

other Sunyata arising

one phase or aspect of

off

from the Buddhist

sr$mraT

moment

achieved, every

point of view, there will be nothing to distinguish the reduc-

not so

much

to

'

feiKswi

^ ^

383

It

p.

).

be happy

'

as

gggsifft:

cannot be
'

to

become

philosophy of iM madhvaoArya

332
happiness

itself

Philosophers have to respect the law of

'.

cannot change the aim of

dogma

happiness

whims and

They

life.

Otherwise,

dictates.

Nyaya philosopher may as well get away with

Atman or the extinction of all

the Buddhists and the

their

to their

life

that the extinction of the

is the

aim of

life.

In the absence of the survival of personality and full scope for the

would be a misuse of language

enjoyment of the innate

bliss of selfhood,

to call the condition of

Moksa promised by

3HKMI

*T

^TfTPtft^xT^f

it

the Advaita a state of bliss

NS.

534

p.

).

The Nyaya-Vaifesika and Samkhya account of Moksa

negative.

Pleasure unmixed with pain or unattended by

unknown

in

insist

upon

the world.

then,

If,

it,

purely

is

they argue,

is

one should be so sentimental as to

the enjoyment of happiness in release, one should,

of the same logic, admit the possibility of

by the force

some measure of pain and

But that would be ridiculous. It would make

release as good or as bad as Samsara.
The only rational course would
suffering also, therein.

therefore be to accept

Moksa

as a state of complete absence of

of pain coupled with the absence of any kind of pleasure or

Madhva contends

called.

that

could not supply the necessary

fruitful

dynamism and motive

spiritual effort to achieve release,

lie

at the

mm
1.

ftf :#53fa

Of.

"A

^i aiffr:

'
i

joy

lives

f^nat

'

so

Moksa

force for

any

on the part of the aspirant.

back of attempts of persons

maladies to put an end to their

'

such a purely negative ideal of

Jayatlrtha points out that a positive hankering after

be seen to

any kind

happiness could

suffering

from incurable

by suicide

igrrcnj/

ft

s&rr#:

its' mmqj

tendency to escape from oneself into God may have been the central

motive of some seers of the Upanisads, the Orphio brotherhood in ancient Hreece

and some Christian and

aohieved such a goal.
impossible.
lie

who

712).

He who

Sufi Mystics.

But there

is

no evidence that any Mystic

In the nature of things, evidence of such absorption

has become G-od cannot return to

narrates the story has not

become God, "

tell of his

is

experience and

Badhakrishnau,

I. Phil.,

ii,

MOK$A IN OTHEB SYSTEMS

51c?

[NS. pp. 632-33).

The doctrine of absorption,

idea of

The

self.

personality.
as "

333

what

It is

Aham "

"

"

Advaita, cuts at the very root of the

in

all

understand

the deepest spring of

it, is

revealed and implicated in all our experience

is

It is

).

we

as

self,

the basic principle of

elan vital, which

the

life,

possesses an inalienable and incommunicable individuality of

own,

its

which furnishes the basis of the self-conscious psycho-physical mechanism

of

life

carried

principle that
ftnratfcr:

on
is

a series of transmigrations.

thro'

the

S&Tl^cTC

most cherished possessions of man

aRpreieUT ( Bfa.

Up.

There

).

consolidated experience of humanity for a deeper or a

essence of the self of
tenacity throughout

of our

which we enter

into

any meaning and

was

it

'gm.'ipft

no place

is

in the

with desperate

clings

inmost experiences

in the released state, if

reality for us.

such a living content and a link with what

cT%TcT, ^PT:

more fundamental

in the

must therefore survive

self

that state should have

the one to which he

and

life

This

lives.

man,

underlying

this

It is

self

devoid of

of bondage

in the state

would be but an empty abstraction and a spectre of the absolutist fancy.

Even supposing that such an abstraction is possible, we cannot be persuaded to love and cherish

we do

the self

above

it

we know

some

a lot of trouble to help

on

the ashes of our

farat *m&ps(m,
SRTJcRg

In any case,

own

it

bliss

NS.

p.

would be

that the absolutist goal

and enjoy the

self,

'

things in life and hold

moments of our

pure

;ffi

srRiT^r

*T

it,

as

or go through

that

will

rise

|[tfOT4lfrf<f

f%rf*l

'

tg<ft

ft4

<r&f?t

633

little

more than a verbal jugglery

essentially

is

#s

fast to

bliss,

consciousness

to manifest itself;

wnyg, *gm

STl^Ts?: f

5R:

all

in the purest

'

blissful

'.

to

say

the capacity to feel

It is

and the presence of one who enjoys, that makes

happiness meaningful and worth striving for and not the bare presence of
happiness,

gwt:

On

much

pit

less

our

%ft#iM.

'

'

identification

m wq.'

'

icftxsrarr

the absolutist view, however, there can be

with

it

>

1 m^L. ^lccfl

3t#tf^i (Nym- pp 635-36).

.

no question of enjoying the

philosophy

334

bliss

off

of selfhood, in view of the avowed

Moreover, one may ask the Advaitin

in

madhvAcArta

inl

Moksa ?

If

bliss

in the

Atman

as the essence of bliss alone, there will be

of that

bliss

If

he

Atman

Without the acceptance of

integrated

H+IWTM&

p,

pWERPTRR,

It is

of

this,

and

Atman

its

3?Rlc*n$&

self

and

is

room

to be conceived

bliss

and

shattered.

is

Atman.it

will

consciousness

be
or

^iwi: ipWPIcI,

3W3c3fn%:

Nym.

the bliss of Atman, being always self-

and

it

cannot therefore be made an object

no use contending that

obscured by nescience in the

the Advaitin, this bliss

is

*$<

state

of Samsara

bliss

this

has been

bondage ) and comes to be

realized only after the obscuration has been removed.

from the

conceived

consciousness or realization

bliss

of

being

ajjJT'tc^

subsistent, will always be there

of spiritual pursuit.

no

he

If

).

Visesa, in the

internal

ant

in the

Apart from

627 bj.

to be

as a differenceless oneness

impossible to have the "aspects"

)

Atman

the

be conceived as both of the nature of

to

is

consciousness, the thesis of

revelation

Kartrkarmabhava.'

'

simply as a bare consciousness, then, there will be no

any realization of

left for

how is

of

difficulty

For, according to

ex hypothesi self-luminous and indistinguishable

identical with

it.

It

should, therefore, be capable of

being fully revealed along with the revelation of the self

along.

It

cannot be held to be vaguely or partly and imperfectly revealed or

felt

in the state

partial

and

of bondage and fully manifested

full manifestations, clarity

in release.

For, such ideas of

and obscurity of revelations

imply and presuppose the presence of aspects or

of features in the subject

Vis'esas

But

etc.,

or a diversity

or a principle of identity-in-difference, in the

essence of the Suddhacaitanya, by which the hidden shades

gressively realized.

all

all

this is impossible in

come

to be pro-

a theory of Nirvisesa-

dvaita or Nirvifea-cinmatravada or Akhanda-Caitanyavada, such as has

been sponsored by Sarhkara and his followers.

Samanya and
is

no

There can be no talk of

Visesa, general and particular, in the " Nirvis'esa ".

There

place for any such inner shades of being or diversity of content or

aspects or
tion of the

by whatever name one may choose to

Atman

as

call

it,

in the concep-

bare consciousness, without aspects

nirasta-

MOK?A IN OTHER SYSTEMS

samastaviiesam
fuller stages

of

pure being that

is

There can be no new or

adumbrated by Sarhkara.

bliss of

being yet to be intuited or rediscovered in a

ex hypothesi colorless, shadeless and aspectless

ftf$tmtfl<*lc*Ml HI$Pra) <^ra:

This criticism
cingly.

is

335

not only hard to rebut

Madhva

but has not been rebutted convin

WWWH^cT ^

*C

fifa^.

II

JV5. p. 634b)

CHAPTER LVI

MADHVA'S VIEW OF MUKTI

Madhva,

therefore, lays great stress

dual personality, as such,

on the survival of every

This

in release.

realization of the intrinsic bliss of selfhood

a positive experience, to be

felt

and be

We

time, incommunicable to others.

further and ask

another.

It is

how

As

by each one of

release
us,

by each and

it

is

the

must be

at the

same

cannot, obviously, press the point

one

self differs

from

that of

purely a matter of intuitive experience of each individual

^farm^

it

As Ramanuja

at that.

fTCH^NsWC,

it

Jlva.

realized

the blissful experience of

and we have to leave

Hence,

the corollary of his belief

is

Svarupa of each

in the distinctiveness of the

indivi-

will

says

a^^

# # #

Vedartha-Samgraha

presumptuous on the part of anyone to attempt to

be

define in clear and precise terms what exactly the released state would be
like, from this side

and

inquisitive

of release

about what

Nevertheless,

lies

in

man

store for

is

him

irrepressibly curious
in

the great beyond.

People expect the philosopher to throw some light on these questions.

As an
on

and an expositor of the

interpreter

this point,

Madhva

traditions of the Vedafestra,

bases his account of the released state

coordinated interpretation of the Scriptural facts and evidences.

addnces his reasons

in

support of these interpretations.

oughly consistent picture of the released

idealistic

accounts of

Upanigadic sources.
rich in its details,
full

Moksa found
It

state,

of mystic inwardness,

in

some

his is

He

gives a

harmonizing the

in the Vedic,

must be said that

uncompromising

He

on a

realistic

and

Upanisadic and Post-

distinctive view

of Moksa

in principles, trenchant in its logic

respects.

also

thor-

and

MADHVA'S VIEW OF MUKTI

The

and foremost fact about Moksa emphasized by Madhva

first

He opposes

is its positive aspect.

by the Sarhkhyas and

highest one at that,

be

it

fully manifested,

a full consciousness

must be a

of the Chandogya

that

as

it

to

the

intrinsic bliss of selfhood

Similarly, another Sruti

(

TO

*l*t

ffcjrfSlft

famous

discusses the

establishes

Mukta and
and

its

NS.

therefore

out;

ruled

which speaks of the destruction of

p.

573

),

while the

enjoyment are accepted without reserve.

f^sTcTT:)

^^

because other

all desires

=* ?ffct:'

^clfl.1

>ruti texts,

V$i f#W ^11%*; sqi^Wra.

^m^m^rOTsn

m 1 ^M^TRSTR:

discuss the question of

JVS.

how

573

).

'|1^%ctT

desire

WTHt

in

*FT:-

m q^pqft mm-

The Vedanta Sutras

specially

the released spirits enjoy themselves at

all,

as

they have transcended the material plane and have no physical bodies or
sense organs and answer the question

( iv.

4, 10-16

from different stand-

points, consistent with the trans-empirical character of the released state.

The Sutrakara says,

will,

which

is

for instance, that the released

can

also satyasamkalpa in conformity with

able bodies out of Suddhasattva or

KM. 2a

enjoy

fashion,

God's

themselves

connected with

df<mft

crs*mrfct^ spirit rqcrwf

p.

of

has reference only to the

WTRH^fcf &m$ti

ths Mukti state, do speak of the fulfilment of every spiritual

Moksa

text

and shows that the

*IOT:

:1ft ^wHm PP^flTk^:

# Jlfsp^ ^WT ^T ff^

I

to enjoy the experiences of this

is

Madhva

material longings of the cmtakkarapa'-

T ^^^'JjtRT^

must

bliss

only the material joys and pleasures that are regarded

is

disagreeable

the heart

This

bliss.

This would naturally pres-

enjoyed.

one who

the

juxtaposition of the words

clearly that

supreme

state of

being

it is

aftrflt

a " Purugartha " and the

To be

c, capable of being actually felt and enjoyed with

i.

In this connection,

state.

Mokga, held

the purely negative view of

the Naiyayikas.

uppose the survival of

blessed

337

with

at their

will

their

suit-

own

philosophy of SbI madhvAoArya

338
spiritual bodies

composed of

ananda

Cit,

These answers are merely

etc.

Moksa from our own

intended to show that we cannot judge the state of

limited range and angle and conclude that
is

no kind of enjoyment of
no

possible for these Muktas, because they have

bliss

bodies like

material

ours and that therefore, the state of Mukti should be one of utter inactivity

and

the souls. This

inertia for

reme

felicity

according to

an unfair view

is

There

accounts.

all

Muktas from enjoying themselves

to take of a state of sup-

nothing to prevent the

is

in their state of blessedness,

Man

which human imagination can hardly comprehend.

He

fathomed the mysteries of nature.

outer space.

remember

We may wish him

that there are

many

still

Mbh.

begun to coquet with

just

q.

realization of something

and

it

his

by ^aifakara (BSB.

tmm zfimaz: irfcw

makes

beyond

are

to

under-

^?ni#TRf V^llSNrq.
Realization, then,

do him good

will

it

things which

standing and are bound to remain so

3#n%rr

has

Godspeed; but

ways

in

has hardly yet

(Mbh.

Bhag.

xii.

vii, 1

ii,

1,

).

337,29)

34)

possible for the souls to have a sense of

rest

on

their oars

and

taste the unalloyed bliss

of their pure being, which has so long been obscured by the encrustation
of Avidya,

Kama, Karma etc. There

is

no difficulty of manifestation of the

full-fledged personality of the self, in all

in the state of release,

on

the

its

richness

Dvaita view, as the

be a unity-in-diversity (Savisesa-svarupa and not

some of whose

aspects have been obscured

influence of Prakrtic bonds.

essential aspects

the

Lord

is

There

is

by

and

entirety of aspects

self there is

admitted to

Nir-vis'esa, as in Advaita),

the will of

God and

no impediment therefore to

the

these

becoming/wl/y manifested and realized in Moksa. when

pleased to

lift

the

veil of

His

'

Maya

'

and manifest the

MADHVA'S VIEW OF MUKTI

of the soul

true and essential nature

Kartrkarmavirodha

is

negation of the idea of

Madhva,

therefore,

in

it,

The

full.

an untenable objection since

therefore
self to

to

339

deny self-consciousness to

so-called

it is

the very

it

regards Mukti as a complete self-expression,

self-manifestation and self-realization, in short, a complete unfolding of

the

self in all

promise and potency

its

q^Mftftwrei

#r

Sl^ft&SFWFStf

The
lity

^rrfiiPwdci' {Chan. Up.)

<H#T

sjjqftsrRr:

mean

realization of the truth does not

of the world

the world and makes

God, 3

ii,

10, 6).

the abolition of the plura-

but only a removal of the false sense of

2
ness and independence.

the eyes of

(Bhag.

as

all

separate-

a new insight that changes the face of

It is

The Mukta

things new.

sees everything thro'

dependent on God, in their proper perspective, which

he has failed to do in Samsara.

The pleasures of

the highest state, described in

Upanisadic passages, are not the

last

word on the

broad indications of what the supreme

of

state

Sattvata q.

by

some of

subject.

felicity

them

as garish fancies.

has

left

siutt

(&mkajra. B.

S.

may

literally,

|)

(BrJi. Up.).

B. 1,4, 19)

II

q^, ww

2nW^f

be

and

are only

like

).

nor dismiss

us in no doubt as to the manner

q^jj;

SP rCWKlft

They

Des"ika, B.G.t. xviii, 32

Consequently, then, we need neither take them too

Madhva

the Vedic

m^M afrHumfa

(lWi,M*4JvJR

8.

B. iv,4,B),

philosophy of inl madhvAoAkta

340
of

life

led

contented.

by the freed souls

They don't have

Wisdom and enjoyment

of Heaven.

With

all that,

there

tion all round.

is

no fear that

Tlteistic

Like the Lord, they are for ever

in release.

to seek satisfaction

for theirs

that there

is

scope for activity and

own

abilities.

blessedness,

They may contrast

their present with their

their deliverance.

They may adore

Him in
iRsnft

nothing

is

is

no

w m$m

His

to,

the only difference being

that

st:

VijMna,

every kind,

there

from within,

is

of

activities

B.T. p. 89).

q.

or code of conduct in

unlimited scope for spontaneous, creative

Karma,

Jnana, and Bhakti. 2

no one to

call

There

is

upon you to do this or

no

call for

that.

The

entirely

i%TfRW4c=iiiS!c4 rraftr

God and

sing

cefo*BcraT

they wish

prescribed round

activity in that there is

is

past and feel thankful for

a thousand ways

offer sacrifices, if

Moksa, which means

urge

in the

Brahman.

like the Advaitic

obligatory there.

There

work of

for every one

The released may rest

the majesty of

They may

nature.

make condiMadhva is satisfied

play of capacities

full

of us, there, according to his or her

praises or worship

own

would be one of stagna-

their condition

more stagnant than an Advaitic view of it

their

kingdom

the

account of Moksa cannot, any day,

tions there

contemplation of

is

of perfect bliss are their

twit g^rf^rar

toll:

<

**

%mi

** * 8 . * 6

)-

B. s. b.

iii,

3, 30,

).

'

MADHVA'S VIEW OF MTJKTI

The worship and

activity in

They

themselves.

are not

Moksa, such as they

means

^R<w4N

world as

this

activities

these are

prohibitions; or attended

performance.
the

life in

jftajWT^
tionable.

It

is

this

Moksa from
l

B. S. B.

freedom from

ordinary

B.S.B.

the released state

is

The most important

non-

iii,

3,

30

recognized,

".

sr^roSRRmT^

it

f|

really unexcep-

is

will

be

difficult

sticks, despite

Such

the

service as the

itself

Madhva, Brh. Up. C.

together certain texts, 1 bearing

on

the nature of

and these have been elucidated by the author of

the Madhvasiddhantasara.

1.

).

in the event of

from stones and

life in

663)

conditions that distinguishes

purely voluntary and an end in

Madhva has brought

21

p.

by injunctions and

Madhva's point

life.

m?L

all

reputed possession by them of " consciousness

is

GT.

cannot reduce the released state to the level of

to differentiate the liberated souls

God

iv, 4,

no longer determined

Unless some kind of activity

freed render to

-ETPaWH

by unpleasant consequences

3FJPSFT aftaptfa *T

are an end in

are,

an end

to

'UlU4|tf<3<t5(wl

The assumption of

34J

of these are

philosophy of inl madhvAoAkya

842

fff%

1.

%fo?frft*r

2.

%faj W*4<ll<#<s[mi%

(ibid).

3.

%^FT 4hri^^u>JT qiFRT

^1%

4.

^rg^lor

Cf. ChSn. Up.

'%%, 51,

%^r

Up.

Taitt.

m$& S#c!

<#irra#fl

Cf.

RV. X,

Cf.

10,

iii,

cwt ir^

IcRi;

fii

s^ppft

'

( rfl8

sprang

Mbh. Vdyoga Farva. Q. Madhva

$:

p^l^cR mm %fe

ii

w 0p
-

%#

A V.

ii,

iU * 10,

f%=*TTfcr

3, p.

<** IX

29

Mbh. xiii,

confd.

vim* Trawd ii

72, 11)

^ifeKr<^iw(%

'

5.

12, 2 )

viii,

5)l

b. )

"^

18, 6

MADHVA'S VIBW

7.

CMn.

55.

^Icfftr

11.

%^?f^gr(?r

individuality

the released.

of the

^#3

and ^arhkara

Chan. Up.

viii,

BSB

25,2

iv. 4, 8 )

and Samkara's Com. thereon.

mz&fa

Moksa, 1

must be some outlet

deny desires to
of a worldly nature and born of the

in

there

Scripture

freed.

It is the desires

does not

that are denied:

sin

2.

1-10

343

persists

1.

viii, 2,

iv. 4, 12,

10.

for the energies

mind

Up,

%ro U)<MiRr:

As

M0KTI

%^^pn^or ftm^RsRft
(

8.

Off

of.

3^^ v

Madhva

#it^

?t

WW q'SW fft f%m:

^r^r^rsrorn (av.

sfr-szmm anferrPTOf

*.'

p. 45

VP- >

points oat that the term " Hrdi " in the Op. text shows

the desires arising in the mind are intended.

).

that only

C HAPTEN LVII

RATIONALE OF ANANDA-TaRATAMYA

Since

the

many,

souls are

their plurality

multiplicity without distinctions

thinking selves as

must survive

and gradations

we know them, Madhva

is

finds

release.

in

personality

of

persistence

the

recognize

All Theists

MOKA

IN

But as

there.

inconceivable

among

necessary to main-

it

tain that there are distinctions in the quality, intensity, range etc.

Svarapananda enjoyed by them,

capacities and intrinsic fitness

of selves,

is

This

is

fsastras

accretions
in

as equal,

not acceptable to
to

the difference

among

there

tho'

all;

Madhva, who

is

numerical distinction.

accept the differences between the gods and

Karmic or other

among

causes.

As

the

theory; tho'

general

he inherits from the ilvars

of Nityasurls

among

ordinary Muktas,
inconsistency

the

is

in

beings not

Ramanuja

among

the souls in

Vaisnava theology which

committed to the existence of a special

)

souls

not

is

as distinguished

attained release after bondage.

class

from

the

This inner

in the Vis*istadvaitic position has been taken note of

Vyasaraya in his Ny&yamrta

aratamya

in the

the other classes

different orders of

a matter of fact,

tradition of

released

who have

their essence,

finds sufficient evidence

quite consistent in not accepting intrinsic gradation

his

in his theory

the different class-

and therefore not touching

of souls as inherent distinctions

traceable to

Ramanuja,

).

and human beings, as the outcome of Karma

es of souls, such as gods

which he regards

svampayogyata

down

inclined to put

and other Prakrtic

of the

in the released state, according to their

Mokga,

in

by

support of Madhva's theory of Anandat-

as against the Saraya theory of

Ramanuja, as

will

be shown presently.

Madhva's theory

of

Ananda-taratamya, in Mokga.

is

a logical

conclusion from the hypothesis of Svarupabheda and Taratamya

dation)

among

souls.

It is

gra-

one of the main points of disagreement

between the schools of Madhva and Ramanuja; tho' both are schools
of staunch and uncompromising Vaisnava Theism and show
points

of mutual agreement in doctrine and theology.

many

Much

other

contro-

AnandatAbatamya

in

mok?a

343

as raged between these two schools over this issue from the
days of Vyasaraya and some controversial works written on the subject

versy

by champions of
It

the respective schools are actually in existence. 1

should be borne in mind that a theory

of

possible

difference

and gradation in the qualitative enjoyment of Svarupananda in Moka

has meaning only in a system of thought in which the difference
among the souls is accepted as a fact. It has no place in a
monistic system like Samkara's where all difference among souls
( atmabheda ) even in
Samsara is merely due to false Upadhis and
is utterly wiped out in release for an Advaitin.
It has significance and
bearing only in Theistic systems like those

wherein the plurality of souls

is

of

Ramanuja and Madhva

fact.
Of course,

admitted as an ultimate

as against barhkara and his school,

Madhva and

commentators have,
Atmans as a
fundamental fact, on strong grounds including textual evidences. Acceptance of the doctrine of plurality of Atmans is the same as accepting
" Svarupabheda" among Atmans and rejecting the view of "Ekatmavada"
that there is, in reality, only one Atman, who appears as many on account
of Upadhis.
Once " Svarupabhedavada " among Atmans is accepted as
a philosophical fact, it will be easy enough to establish " Svarupaas

we have

his

seen, tried to establish the thesis of plurality of

Taratamya " also among such Atmans which will logically lead up to
Svarupanandataratamya among them, in Moksa. The latter is the inevitable logical corollary of the former.
Madhva and his commentators feel
strongly that the

Ramanuja school

bheda of Atmans warmly but

is

not justified in accepting Svarupa-

in refusing to subscribe to the doctrine

Ananda-Taratamya among them, in Moksa, which

deduction from it. As for the main arguments
theory, they will be dealt with, presently.
Since

Moksa

is

in

of
be the most natural
favor of Madhva *s

only the discovery and enjoyment

selfhood,

in

immersed

in the enjoyment of

its

will

pristine

purity

and

bliss,

there

of

no

one's

own

of
exchanging one's experiences of bliss with another's, or of its transference
to another, whether wholly or in part.
Each soul rests fully satisfied and
so to say.

Jayatlrtha

Many

weighty

and Vyasaraya,

doctrine of Theism.
1.

For details see

Vol, II.

As
my

is

possibility

its " Svarupananda ", to saturation point,

arguments have been urged by Madhva,

in their

works, in support of this important

the subject of

Moksananda and Svarupananda

History of Dvaita Selool of Vedanta

and

Its Literature

philosophy of ini madhvAcArya

346

domain of Mysticism, students and critics of

Madhva's doctrine of Svarupananda-Taratamya of souls, in Moksa,

pertain largely to the

should not fail to take due note of the mystic inwardness of this doctrine,
however strange and unfamiliar it may seem to them, at first sight.
Viewed in the light of an expression and an interpretation of the
mystic joy of self-realization, in Moksa,

of Mysticism

itself will

its

contribution

to the philosophy

be seen to be quite remarkable.

All souls could not have put forth the same quality or quantity of

same intensity or duration. It thus stands to reason that

must be a proportionate difference in the nature of the reward reaped
by them. This is one other ground of Taratamya ( gradation ) of ananda
There are highly evolved souls like those of Brahma
( bliss ) in Moksa.
effort of the

there

and the other gods, whose

tells

And

and the wide

must certainly be greater

cannot go in vain.

The evidence of

us of superhuman Sadhanas practised by

some of the gods

than that of us mortals.

Scripture

spiritual perfection
it

difference in their quality, quantity, duration etc.

beyond human conception.

These could not

all

par

;m&\

psTf*f

-s

^frsf

affair $f/%

^rf^RT

jft%

55tjrftrcir

**

^il%3

HHf

rs.

3PT sdrf^fsft^

'
I

ft3lNl<H|<fci: 5Rsn5[?

ST^t
(

^m, spfri: m*&

AV.

iii,

p.

which are

be treated on the same

45-46

fcf: f

ANANDATABATAMYA
Again, the S&stras

IN

MOKgA

us that there are persons

tell

ly for their salvation as well as great souls like

who

love

God

847

who work

Sanaka

deliberate-

Ekantabhaktas

own sake ( and not for their salvation) and decline

Surely,
with Him.
any theory of Moksa, if it is

for His

the prospect of unity

to be balanced, must take note of these intrinsic differences and give

proper place for Ekantabhaktas and others, according to their worth.

Madhva bases one of his arguments for accepting Taratamya in Moksa

on

this

point also

Tfc
'

<

'

aRSF* T

*m$m %wwifi
?tawf *
*

%$m
imUG.B.

ii,

WR

=T

er

srcn^'

TS&fa. %fat
qcBccf^jcr

5>H%

'

Bhag. m. 15, 48

iii,

25, 34

'

II

( iii,

29, 13

518

52).

Vyasaraya, in his Nyayamrta,

has given us the best critical exposi-

Madhva's doctrine of Anandataratamya, in its logical and textual

aspects.
Some of his arguments have been specially directed against the
school of Ramanuja. This school accepts Svarupabbeda between God
and the souls and among the Mukta-Jivas themselves. But, it is not
prepared to go further and accept, with Madhva, any Svarapa-vaicitrya
(distinguishing characteristics ) among the souls or any gradation in their
Svarupananda, in Moksa. Vyasaraya shows how it has accepted Svarupa
taratamya, in principle, not only between Brahman and the Mukta-Jivas
tion of

but

among

the

Mukta-Jivas as

well, at least

in

a few

cases.

If,

then,

Svarupataratamya can be accepted among Jlvas, in principle, there is no

reason to shy at the acceptance of Svarupananda-Taratamya also. For,
in the last analysis, Svarupananda of each individual and of Brahman is

Madhva and his commentdo not also accept the position of Ramanuja that the differences
between the Devas ( including Brahma, Rudra, Indra and the goddesses )
and other souls referred to in the Sastras are not Svabhavika but are the
nothing but the expression of their own nature.
ators

result of bodily

and other Karmic Upadhis alone. Madhva

ed to endorse such an extreme view; which, he feels, will

with the spiritual

traditions

of the Sastras.

is

not prepar-

be out of tune

philosophy of $rI madhvAoAeya

348

is
accepted by the
and Brahman. Brahman here is conceived as Vibhu, Segi and Svatantra; while the Jivas are all Arm, Sesa
and Paratantra. In this circumstance, complete equality between such

Anyway,

Svarupataratamya

the principle of

Viistadvaitin in respect of the Jivas

widely differing natures

of Wvaras,

if

is

out of the question.

The Sutra

3FWtR'?tn(

Such cosmic

released souls.

3iFF%

afFBRt

Muktas owe
(

saipkalpa

own

Taitu Up.

denies cosmic functions to the

Brahman

of

inner joy.

).

Cf

are obviously and

*fit

IprRTfl. %:

Ramanuja himself admits

wm~

that the

the very manifestation of their Svarupa to the eternal

Brahman

of

TO,

:t

17

iv, 4,

activities

admittedly an expression of His

sfa

lead to multiplicity

It will

pressed further.

W^

0^<Wc4lRl4+WMIKSr

will

WM$m ^

|g-

fl^ft ^m-- v& ^PRpm^ * * #

( R. B. S.B. iv, 4, 20 ).
Thus, he accepts the relation of Niyamya-niyamakabhava ( controller and
This should
controlled), between them, to be intrinsic to their natures.
ffict

lead to the legitimate conclusion that the bliss of the Niyamaka (controller)

must be

greater, wider

iWFFS'spa^a,

cKWctGwm+l'KcTO.

#*F<iT3c!?f:

^CTTHR^:

II

Nym

order of bliss superior

is

and more intense than that of the controlled:

no reason why

Since

).

to that

#f

&&, 2OT

&PRT

Brahman is capable of enjoying an

of the Jivas under

its

control, in release, there

should not do so.

it

The Sutra #WI^OTR?f^nr^

position.

ent one
(iv, 4,

(iv, 4, 21 ) will not conflict with this

For, according to Ramanuja, this Sutra is not an independ-

but one that

17 )}

by him,

is

syntactically connected with

The term rmtra

not in the sense of the entirety of the bhoga

the sense of emphasis

(sj^IWT) intended

Brahman

to the aspect of bhoga or

vent
Its

its

^TOSfFJM^q* * * *

in bhogamatra here, has been

sFfRPT

extension to the cosmic activities

other characteristics.

then, as interpreted

On

to

restrict

the basis of this Sutra

by Ramanuja,

it

the:

but in

equality with

ananda alone

( ^l'si.NI4R)

explained

(WHc^M

and

pre-

of Brahman

and

#'TJTl5KlFqf&'lFc%

cannot therefore be decided whether

ANANDA TABATAMYA

IN

MOK?A

349

the equality in the enjoyment of bliss between the Jlvas

is

just in respect of

ther

its

The same

suffix matra in

of emphasis and entirety

commentary.

Hence, the Sutra

^wmm&$mz% will be of no use

Mukta-Jlvas with Brahman, in the enjoyment of

ing to each

and every aspect of

The cosmic
inner joy

activities

enjoying the bliss of

The Ramanuja
and also that

its

bhogas, extend-

of Brahman are indeed an expression of

Brahman

and

engage in

it

must stand
such

its

to reason that

activities,

cannot be

associated with such activities.

school recognizes further that the

also occupies the position of tffa to all the Jlvas

)

complete equality of
all

it.

^^TO^I#fOTcP?frciiFr

Mukta-Jlvas who do not

Jlvas

or whe-

bhogamatra cannot bear two separate senses

nor has Ramanuja made any such suggestion,

to the Visistadvaitin in establishing the thesis of

the

applies to each and every aspect of Brahman's enjoyment (w*n%I*t.)

it

in his

and Brahman

general aspect of bhoga (^TfTOfTF^ ff)

Goddess LaksmI

including the

certain superior souls like Visvaksena,

the special status of " Nityasuris

",

who

Mukta

are given

exercise control over the other Jlvas

a clear and unambiguous acceptance of the principle of

Jivasvar&pa-t&ratamya in the Ramanuja school, notwithstanding its suppoin release.

This

is

sed denial on the ground that

Karma

all

among Jlvas is due to

Laksml and the "Nityasuris",
support to Madhva's doctrine

difference

alone. This special status given to

in the Visistadvaita hierarchy, gives solid

Svarupa-Taratamya among Muktas. From Svarupa-taratamya to

" Svarupananda-taratamya " it is but a single logical step, forward.

of

The Hindu Scriptures refer to an ascending order of Mukti : Salokya,

Samlpya, Sarupya and Sayujya, in which each succeeding stage includes
the joy of the preceding one.
This would certainly imply an intrinsic
gradation of bliss in Moksa. As Sayujya carries with it an element of
Sarupya

also,

it

cannot be equated with ^flj, or identity of being. This

*K*W SIjp} tiwhMwr-ilfi where

from the Upanisadic text
the knower who has attained Sayujya with the moon is again referred to
as enjoying the benefits of Salokata. The etymology of the word
Sayujya 33#*lfa: tii^^ also disproves the sense of " identity ". The
gradations of the four kinds of Mukti accepted by the Ramanuja school
also, makes it incumbent upon it to accept the principle of Taratamya
in Moksa.
is

evident

PHILOSOPHY OV SKI MADHVAoAbTA

350

Tho' the Svarupananda of each individual Mukta-Jlva is a single

it is conceivable that there can be gradations

unit of atomic dimensions,

in their Svarupananda, in regard to their quality, range, intensity etc. Since

Moksananda

is

ex hypothesi trans-empirical,

it

will

be

difficult to clarify

and precise terms from

We can only say, in the words of Ramanuja, that
the empirical level.
the Svarupananda of the Jlvas, in Moksa is, like the very Svarupa of the
Jivas, " Svasamvedya " and " Vdcam agocarah" sui generis and that,
the exact nature of

its

inner gradations in clear

*-NW^l and WT^WfNR::

their gradations too are

the point clear by means of an analogy,

satisfaction derived

from

Vyasaraya has made

the different

the tasting of water

and

Vyasaraya has also argued in his Nyay&mrta

levels of

joy and

nectar.

that the

of

principle

means and ends, if applied to the two different types of

Sadhanas accepted by the Ramanuja school, viz. Bhakti and Prapatti,
will inevitably lead to the acceptance of gradation of Svarupananda in

parity between

Moksa among

help to manifest

produce

it

is

break. 3

is

Muktas and not

abhivyakti )the Svarupananda of the

is trustful

God

surrender of self to

bhara-nyd,sa

and

These two are conceived as independent means of release

calls for the faithful

and

performance of the duties of VarnSirama and

fit

the

ifgwiprwi^iti ^^q^ctW^ fRrq;

<#fitamwrsrr

According to the Ramanuja school, the way of

Srauta-Smarta dharmas, 4 in order to

fcr

to

continuous flow of contemplative thinking of God, without

not as complementary.
Bhakti

validity of the principle of parity

not weakened, as Sadhanas in both the systems merely

(janaka ).

Prapatti

Bhakti

The

the released souls.

of means and ends

5prf%: srcorpnfa':

mind

Nu m

for nididhycisana.

042

p-

q. Des'ika, n. b. b.

^^iwiwrof^irw g^ng^ircfcrq

tfrahaej/a

xvw

i,

1,1

66

It

AnandatAratamya
is

such UpSsana of

God

mok?a

in

351

with the help of any one of the Vidyas taught in

and grace of

the Srutis that earns the love

The two ways of Bhakti and

God on

oneself.

Prapatti are thus different.

needs repetition of Upasana and requires adherence

Bhafcti

the Srauta and

to

Smarta Karmas and Varnairama dharmas. Prapatti, on the other hand,

free

from the obligations of such Karma and needs no repetition

It is

enough to

Bhakti

is

offer Prapatti

but once with

all

ed with the obligations of Gastric Karma. 3

and other

The way of

one's heart.

more arduous one and long drawn

thus the

out.

is

(clvrtti).

also burden-

It is

In view of this structural

differences between them, as Sadhanas,

one will have to accept

a corresponding difference in the nature of the ananda which they will

help to manifest in release. 4
Vyasara-ya argues that they cannot bz equalized in respect of their
final fruit,

trust in

(viivasadhikya) and attributing less of such

to the discipline of Bhakti.

2.

to invest Prapatti with a greater

by our proposing

God

" Prapatti

is

On

I. Phil,

3.

" In the

Bhakti

it

iii, p.

God

would seam to be a

an old doctrine in Southern Vaisnavism.

In the JVyasatilaha-

on the fact that; Prapatti aa a path of approdifferent from the path of Bhakti and superior to it. (Dasgupta,

Vyahhya great emphasis

ach to God

the contrary, there

measure of

trust in

380, fn. 2

laid

is

).

Nyasatilaltavyalthya

and Prapatti

is (

it

ifl

that

that tho

said

the former

chief difference between

in of tiie

meditation while the latter has to be done once for

nature of unbroken

all; (ii)

the former needs

varying accessory methods of worship and continnal action, whereas in the latter

we have

exoeisive faith " ( ibid

^jrwriwf^iifTrwfi

).

ftwsra;

( Italics

<^

mine ).

ro -

iv ' 5)

Nym.

p.

644

b.

).

&m madhvAoAkta

philosophy of

352

better case for holding that there will be a greater measure of trust in

God

created by Bhakti, on account of constant and repeated practice of Upasana, which

is

defined as

^w'lMKWiWi
than in Prapatti, which

3rcrs*i#tw * * *

enough to

it is

offer once. It

fallacy of interdependence, if one should

still

would lead to

the

disregard the disparity bet-

ween the two Sadhanas and assert that they are both on a par and that their results also would be the same. For, unless their parity as Sadhanas is
first established on satisfactory grounds, the equality of their
be taken for granted
and unless the equality of fruit is
the equality as Sadhanas cannot also be established.

fruits
first

It is,

same

deny that Bhakti and Prapatti are not on the

therefore, futile to

The former must be accepted as the more

par, as Sadhanas.

arduous one and the

The

latter as the easier one.

lating the principle of equity,

by those who

cannot

proved,

practise the

if

Sastras

who

seek

Him

vio-

attained

is

A God who

more arduous means.

the different types of Sadhakas,

would be

they allow the same fruit as

rewards

thro' such admittedly un-

equal means, to the same extent and degree would also be liable to the

charge of partiality and cruelty.

efforts

and

The

results established in B.S.

principle of equity in regard to

ii,

1,

34,

would

also

be flouted on

such a view. 1
In his commentary on Ramanuja's G.B.

66

xviii,

Vedanta Des'ika,

introducing an alternative explanation of the verse given by Ramanuja,

refers to Prapatti
social

and other

Marga

who, for

as intended for the benefit of those

disabilities, are

unable or incompetent to follow the more

arduous course of Bhakti coupled with Upasana and the Varnas'rama and

sparer^, ^^f^rr^n: fcrcg<#r^

4(1^39
(

Vq#E
Nym.

p.

644

).

im

AN ANDATABATAMYA IN MoU$A

|
I

other Karmas. 1

by both

'

comments

Prapatti " not so

much

'

The view

referred to

II

that

it

appears from

he

is

viewing

Karma and Bhakti, but as an aid to

which come in the way of one's putting

sins

'

the regular Bhakti-Yoga into practice

*TO^ aifrcftj:

to be

an independent means on a par with the

Vedic Upasana Marga based on

ST?*!^

But then,

in this connection,

as

overcome the obstacles and

is

Margas and types

the

on account of the difference in the

of Adhikarins being the same,

competence and capacity of the Adhikarins. 2

further

Sadhanas

In other words, the disparity of the

reconciled with the final result achieved

Des'ika's

353

^ fl^TOErcTCPTOir

^W^Hfllfag

{ibid).

by Vyasaraya,

in his

Nyayamrta very probably

represents the position of the Tengalai school of Srivaispava thought, which

has given special prominence to Prapatti as an independent Sadhqna of

Moksa which can be

i.

e.

practised

by

all

without social and other restrictions,

to say as an alternative to Bhakti in its Vedic aspect. 3

3.

" The older school thinks that the person

should give up
(

a&rama

all

Scriptural

for it is well

one's religious duties

Phil.,

ilj,

p, 91.)

who

It.

G. B. xviii, 66)

adopts the path of Prapatti

duties assigned to the different stages of

evidenced in the BUS, text that one should give up

arlli

surrender oneself to God

".

Dasgupta,

jffii.

life

al

of I,

See in this connection the views of the Tengalai sect such

KUai Lokacarya and Ahigiya Manavala Muni.

P.M .23

Deslka,

a,s

WaifcoSofH*

i4<

'"'

"Vy&saraya says that there

any

such

distinction

oJr-

is

&xi

if a>hvAcAb*a

no warrant

dichotomy in the

or

of Sadhanas.

field

conceding that there are two different levels of Sadhanas

and Prapatti, suited to different

involve

arily

levels of

viz.,

The

achieved by them.

no account,, be

That

is

Bhakti

the

result

means and ends can, on

principle of parity of

set aside.

Even

Sadhakas, they must necess-

corresponding difference in the nature of

making

in the $astras for

why Rumania Bhatta

himself, in

his Vartika recognizes

tfairomsit

even tho'

that
Srutis

it

is

there

are no

to i wit*

express statements to the effect, in the

accepted on principle, that lesser rites have lesser fruits and

bigger rites have higher fruits.

Vyasaraya further points out that the religious

and other

spiritual activities

who may be Bhaktas

duties,

meditations

performed by Aparoksa Jnanins

like

ISuka,

or Prapannas, cannot be regarded as accessories to

the -acquisition of Jnana, as in the case of unenlightened Adhikarins,

way of

creating a zest for knowledge in

them

or by

way

by

of putting an

end to their sins arising in the event of non-performance of those duties,

because, persons like

Suka are already Aparokajnanins.

activities carried out

by them, cannot also be taken to contribute

to the

fruit

is

attained

Karma

is

activities in

attaining Jnana

directly

Samuccaya of

Karmas

after Jfiana

diversity in the result,

would not be acceptable to the

can, obviously, have

cause they would care for

improvement

the

Vis'itadvaitin.

which Jnanins, Bhaktas and Prapannas engage in

ed away merely as
its

-If

admitted, then the diversity of

would have to be accepted as producing a

to that extent, which

Such

religious

of Moksa, as that would entail the acceptance of the

Jnanakarmasamuccayavada, by the Vifis^advaitiu.

Jnana and

Such

no

activities

no

( after

other goal except Moksa, be-

other fruit. Their activities cannot be explain-

performed for the benefit of the world or

lokasahgraha

or as

commandments of God.

Nona

of

'

anandatAhatamya
these can be ends in themselves. If

by them merely to earn

moka

God

for themselves,

point that they have already earned such love of

level of Jnanins,

er

Bhaktas and Prapannas.

If they

in striving for

it, if

Nor can

in the case of

God

Moksa

their activities be

kga Jfianins, such performance of actions, in

f

3)i

We
tivities

^ wfl&mra i^OTRjjmftwF

is

not enhanced to any

mere sportive

all

sirat

upon

activities as

Aparo-

the

seriousness

sister

*tfo.

cannot therefore escape from the conclusion that

all spiritual ac-

of Aparokga Jnanins, whether they take the form of Karma, Bhakti

or Prapatti, must hate

their

own rewards

bility

of any* other kind of reward in

one's

own

nanda

there will

activities,

For, the Srutis do enjoin

Himself.

have to

will

rising to the

by such a fresh measure of God's love

being showered on them, their joy in

appreciable extent.

we

God by

wish to achieve a great-

measure of God's love upon themselves by such

be no point

355

supposed that they are performed

it is

the love of

in

innate bliss,

will

in

Moksa.

Moksa than

some kind of a

As

there is

realizing

fresh welling

up of

no

possi-

and enjoying
Svarupa-

this

have to be admitted as an indisputable certainty.

There

is

thus a very strong case for accepting the thesis of Svarupananda-Tara-

tamya

in

Moksa.

The nature and degree of

in proportion to

tion (sadhana)

its

bliss

enjoyed by each soul should thus be

natural fitness (yogyata) and

including

its

between them and God, there

qualitative
is

and

amount of prepara-

already this wide difference that they

could not take part in the cosmic functions of the Supreme

4,

17

and

),

there

that

of

must be a wide
the released.

As,

other differences.

difference in the bliss of the

This

is

accepted by the

B. S.

iv,

Supreme

Sruti

text

PHILOSOPHY OF b! MADHVAOAbYA

356

HdR&HfcCWNI'ft ^jm% TPfigq%Pcr

whose

implications

need

not

necessarily be restricted to the state of bondage. This limitation between

the

Supreme Being and the

is

God to

command to

'

Jlvas is not impracticable in

control the latter.

It is

the effect, for His wish

Wfa

Sr

<m atmiij.'

Moksa, as there

of course, needless for

(T.I.

law unto them 1

is

iii,

15,

a)

[B.S.B.

iv,

Him to issue
q#% <<w 3ii

2,26]

As in an ideally Communistie State, the released can be expected to

know what is good and best for them and they can be trusted to carry on
their

way, without encroaching upon one another's province or

of God. They neither do nor can will what

or beyond their deserts.
true,

Madhva would

it

remains true that

all their

desires

come

on no occasion would they entertain a

or one bsyond their powers of achievement or juris-

H#TctT

% ^t

3Klfac<Hlfct

ft#

TTRW ftrpdsft Mli^for wM.\\

f|

t ^
The

liberties

impossible of achievement

explain, that

low and unholy desire

diction

While

is

rights

and

W$ 35Tft fylfot *%

mmm

jjira, a?r:

B. S. B.

iv, 4, 18).

wiiw+wt

nv.

iv, 4,

of the freed are thus constitutionally defined and

properly safeguarded by the principle of undictated harmony
( satyakamata) of their nature. There is no room for discord or
jealousy
liberties

there.

Each one has

1.

Of.

his

reward and each

feels

" Thy Will be done on Earth, as

happy and
it is

full to the

in Heaven. "

brim

AnandatAratamya

sterol

3rat(-M!Jffl$:

mok?a

in

85?

(q.Brh. Up.

Each

much

so

is

absorbed in his

C.

4, 10

iii,

own contentment and

).

has no thoughts

to give to the disparity

more than
and

that every other person, also,

One

of

the

with difference

(B.S.

sees nothing

4,

iv,

22).

Madhva's

true.

objections to the admission of multiplicity

familiar

Taratamya

He

happy and contended

Communism come

thus, a philosophical

is,

likewise

is

brim: *t'WIWiilfe*ra

full to the

Moka

between him and the others.

Mokaa

in

is

that

there

if

are

differen-

ces

and

among

own

inequalities there, they

would inevitably lead

the released and reduce the

released

to jealousy

and

state to the level

strife

of our

world.

An
j

tible

obvious reply to

this is that difference is

with cooperation and goodwill also,

Madhva

not

consistent

and compa-

necessarily with conflict.

goes a step further and argues that inequality by

itself

cannot

lead to

It is

strife.

the feelings of jealousy

are ultimately responsible for

differences, or inequalities,

For, there
eliminated,

within our

if

hatred and

and as these are ruled out in Moksa,

by themselves cannot do any harm.

no assurance that such discord

absolute

own

tional levels

is

it

and other bad passions that

'

equality

experience

'

is

accepted

at the domestic,

will

be completely

Instances are not wanting,

national and

even interna-

of persons, communities and nations harbouring jealousy,

evil

designs against their

*$$fc ^ffer:

own

equals

*forfo fcft

dWHi: SWRt SET

?T ?

iW^ctr

3lft

358

philosophy of

S^P%

Such tendencies,

human

jbi

madhvAoAeya

WT^

STpt St%; ^ST TPPT

in the last analysis, should be traced to defects in the

But inasmuch as Moksa

character.

blessedness free from

all

is,

the released souls.

Precisely the

or discord arising

Hence, the presence of

gradation in the

line

Moksa would

not, in

any way,

state.

of argument has been adopted by Aristotle in

of private property

defence

Jlvas in

harmony of the released

same

of embo-

strife

Svarupa and Svarupananda of

disturb the peace and

by definition, a state of

such imperfections and bad passions

died existence, there can be no possibility of any

among

against

pleas

the alluring

in

favor

of

community of property:
" Such legislation

Men

readily listen to

may have
and are

it

wonderful manner, everybody

ally

when some one

heard denouncing the

is

there

is

common
vast

the wickedness

much more

quarrelling

tho' there are not

number who have

Madhva
difference

silences

a^Rf c^dw:
1.

Madhva

'

however,

of human nature.

among

many

those

).

friend,

now

some

especi-

existing in the

arise

out of poss-

due to a very

are

Indeed,

who have

we

all

see that

things

in

of them, when compared with the

[Italics

mine

Politics, Tr,

Aristotle's

].

such frivolous objections against the presence of

and gradation
1

evils,

private property ".

Jowett, Oxford, 1931, p. 63

evils

which are said to

),

These

ession of private property.

become everybody's

will

States ( suits about contracts etc.

different cause,

a specious appearance of benevolence.

easily induced to believe that in

in

Moka by quoting the words of

flWHctNI*rt

^Nqfot^ 3fKTq,

reads 3tfq?jW! as against 3 W'iW

Their interpretation of the term " aupasada "

of

the Sutrakara:

( B. S,

iii,

3,

34

J.

Samkara and Ramanuja, here

also, is different.

AnanhatAratamya
The
(

aksara-dhi

are

souls

released

They

).

attuned

fully

moka

in

embodied

from

Those

they

like true disciples

love and regard.

aupasacla

This

sutras.

It

Such

is

goodwill

from
The

beautiful

prevailing in

The humbler

original interpre-

S&dhanadhyaya of the Brahma-

the

objections to the doctrine of Ananda-

all

Moksa.
complete mutual harmony and

picture of

Moksa, according
it

new and

would be

to

Madhva.

It

shows how

to judge the trans-empirical

nature,

all

Moksa,

as a state of blessedness, precludes

by

disturbing passions and psychological complexes.

there

lead a

fellowship and

of

life

unalloyed happiness

communion with

and disharmony, which are

left

the Lord.

It is

behind, once for

Thus does Madhva conclude

his

all.

rupananda-taratamya

own way;
generis.

of.

therein.

but the perfection

It

is

an

exposition

(pur^atva)

of

m,

*rt

sex sr d*nftr frjjr

sWtrtH*j5rW<l*ftfr

||

Chan. Vp.

its

of

own

of

each

viii, 13.

freed

mutual
strife

subject of

the

Sva-

distinctive

The

of

perfect in

is
is

selfhood.

& ut&m ng^r

The

Every released soul

expression

very

above

state

life.

its

blissful

in

Moksa, with a beautiful and spirited defence of the concept

l.

state

the standpoint of the passions and prejudices of our earthly

state of

souls

the

in

and ridiculous

absurd

from

completely disarms

taratamya among souls,

be

looking upon their 'Gurus with unbounded

tation of this important Sutra

be

all

them with love and reverence

those above

indeed a refreshingly

is

will

in a higher status will

extending their help and friendship to others below them.

among them would look upon

and other

all evil

Hence,

existence.

mutually well-disposed to one another.

Brahman

the Imperishable

to

are, as such, absolutely free

disturbing passions of

859

its

sui

significance

*ifl<*i*d

mm

philosophy of &nl madhvAoArya

360

unique doctrine lies as much in its logical trenchancy as in

unfathomable mystic inwardness. It is a conception which applies

of this
its

to spiritual life, the principle of peaceful co-existence

the whole

community of

them the fundamental

the complete

and

the released souls

right to exist sui juris

distinctive

enjoyment of

to

and be in a position to have

its

nanda, in communion with Brahman.

II

and fellowship

and guarantees to each one of

Sft*MJ||(Su|*|^

own

selfhood and Svarupa-

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Works
C. R. Krishna

Rao

in English)

Sri Madhva, His Life and Doctrine.

H. N. Raghavendrachar

Dvaita Philosophy,

R. Nagaraja Sarma

Reign of Realism

B.

N. K. Sharma

Place in VedQnta

Its

in

Indian Philosophy.

Calussatribhasya of Madhvaccirya (Ed.).

Svatantradvaita

Madhva's

Theistic

Realism.
History of

Dvaita School of VedSnta

and

Its Literature, Vols. I

Sri

Madhva's Teachings

and
in

II.

His

Own

Words.
S.

N. Dasgupta

History of Indian Philosophy, Vols

Ill

S.

Radhakrishnan

II.

and IV.

Indian Philosophy, Vols.

Reign

of Religion

in

and

II.

Contemporary

Philosophy.

Brahma Sutra
Chandradhar Sharma

Datta D. M.

Six Ways of Knowing.

Ghate V.

Vedcinta.

Ayer A.

S.

J.

Critical

Survey of Indian Philosophy.

The Problem of Knowledge.

PHILOSOPHY OF

362

Carpenter E.

J.

!Rl

MADHVAoAbYA

Theisfn in Mediaeval India.

Ewing A. C.

Fundamental Questions of Philosophy.

Fraser A. Campbell

Philosophy of Theism.

Dawes Hicks

Philosophical Bases of Theism.

Pringle Pattison

Idea,

of God.

James Ward

Pluralism and Theism.

Herbert Spencer

Fundamental

Albert Schweitzer

Indian Thought and Its Development.

Principles.

SANSKRIT TEXTS
(

Consulted or Cited

DVAITA VEDANTA
Madhvacftrya

Anu-Vyakhyana

Brahmasutrabhasya,

and

Ny&ya-Vivarapa
(

Da&i-Prakaraoas

naya;

Ai?u-Bhaya
Visputattva-nir-

Tattvodyota,

Tattvasamkhyana,
dhikhan4ana,

Karmanirnaya,

Tattvaviveka, Upa-

Mayavada-Kharjdana',

Mithyatvanumanakhandana,

Laksana

),

Pram&na-

Bhagavata-Tatparya

bharata-Tatparyanirnaya

Gfta-Tatparya

Maha-

Glta-Bhagya,

(with oc. of Jayatfrtha);

Dvadafe-Stotra and Commentaries on

Taittiriya,

Cbandogya, Brhadarapyaka,

Mandukya and Kena Upapigads.

Padmanabha Tlrtha

SannySya-Ratn&vali

Trivikrama Pandjta

Tattvapradipa

Jayatirtha

Nytya-Sudha, TattvaprakMk&,

36.4,

PHILOSOPHY OF nl MADHvAoARYA
Pramd^a-Paddhati, V&ddvali and

cc.

on

Da& Prakaranas

Visnudasacarya

Vadaratnavali

Vyasatirtha

Njayamrta,

T&tparya-Candrika,

TarkatQ^ava and gloss on Tattvaviveka

Ramacarya-Vyasa

Nyayamrta-Tarangfyi

Vijaytodra Tlrtha

Madhvadhva-Kantakoddhara

Vadir&ja Tlrtha

TattvaprakaMkd-Gurvarthadipikd

Vidyadhifo Tlrtha

Vakyartha-Candrika

Raghavendra Tlrtha

Tattvapraka&ika-Bhavadipa

Jagannatha Tlrtha

Bhdsya-Dipikd

Vedagarbha Fadmaiiabha

Madhvasiddhantasara

ADVAITA-VEDANTA
Gaudapada

Karikas with

c.

of Samkara

5
1

Samkara

Brahmasatrabhdsya

C.

drapyaka Up. and Gita

Mariana

Brahmasiddhi

on

Brhad-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

VOrtikas ( on Brh. Up.

Sure^vara

Vacaspati

365

Mi&a

ai

Bh&mati

Vimuktatman

Istasiddhi

Anandabodha

Nyaya-Makaranda

Sarvajfiatman

Samksepa-Siriraka

Praka&tman

Pc&capcidikct-Vivara^a

Srlharsa

Khaif4cmakhan4akhMya

Citsukha

TattvapradtpikS

Madhusudana

SarasvatI

Brahmananda SarasvatI

AdvaitaSiddhi

Brahm&nandiya

VI$ITADVAITA

Yamuna

Siddhitraya

Ramanuja

tfribhSsya,

Gttibhclsya

samgraha

Vedanta De&ka

Narayanarya

Tattvamuktakaldpa

Nitimdld

c.

on Gftabhasya

366

PHILOSOPHY Off &Bf MaDHvAoAb*A

OTHER SYSTEMS
Nagarjiraa

M&dhyamaka K&rikas

Vatsyayana

Nydyasutra-Bhasya

Iivarakrsija

Samkhya-KMkas

Kumarila Bhatta

Vartikas

Udayana

Nydya-KusumMjali,

Jnanadeva

Jnane&vari

Bauddhadhikkara

INDEX
(Diacritical

(Note.

marks have been dropped)

S.=Samkara

R.=Ramamrja M.=Madhva)

A
Abhava

43,80-81

Abhedasrutis

20
42

Abhimanidevatas
- S. on
Abhinavaeandrika
Abhinavanyathakhyati

Anirvaeaniyakhyatf,
review of

220

a dexterous combi
nation of two vital ele

from
Buddhist view
from Nyaya view

135-36

Aeintyadbhutasakti
Advaitic view of absorption,
Vy's criticism

Adrshta
Advaita Brahman
Adhikarins

138
134-35

Aiyer Sivaswami
Agnosticism
Akhandata, dependence on
Viseshas
Akhyatl
Aksharadhi

(Amsatva
Amsa-amsi
Aiiandabddhsi
-Anugatasatt'a

.,*

.' ''

,'Ariaoaataratamya
controversial works on'
.

Aparnsiddhantn
Aprthaksiddhi

Appearance and

interpretation
Attributes, twofold classfn.
Atma, meaning of
Atman, survival in Moksha
identical with

232
312

334
200
38
274

reality

358
259
191
181

Avidya
Avaranas of Jiva

Ayer A.

J.

.94

13

358
227
68
251
27
304
274
344
345f.
28

31-36
299, 315

attained by mind
variations in intensity
stages after
in It's system

recognised by
R's school

317-19

on

76

54-55

319
317
316
328
318-20

texts

337
'4*
246
333

155,,202,269

(disciple)

Avataras

.:

325.26

ahamartha (ego)
Atoms, as partible
Augustine St.

331-32
207
246

40

Aparoksliajnana

not

91-92

Asariram va (Srutt)

Aupasada

Moksha

358

358

Anandataratamya

Ahamartha, survival

'

153, 155,

Aristotk'
his defence of private property q. in support of

171
38

theory of

Aiiuhhashya
Antahprakasa

91

43

Arthapatti

Abhasa

in.

91

M. and

bet.

cliff,

Prabhakara view
Antahprakasah
Aquinas St. Thomas

distinction

Abhirmanimittopadana
view of Ri

92

205, 250, 253

"

ments

126-30

Anupalabdhi
Anvitabhidhanavada

42f.

as

its

268

Anadisvabhava

Bergson
Bhakti (defn.)
_
as blend of love
and knowledge

211,
287,

Moksha

and end

in B.S.
in
as ?in
Prapatti
(diff.

Bharanyasa
Bhaskara
Bhavabhuti
Shamati

,'

""'

f.
f.

295
287^88
297-98

841
'

bet.)
:!

351-52
350-51
170

319
113f;138;150

Bheda

as dharrrfistfarupa

59

BimbapratibimbabhaVa

18,29
218
219

of God and souls

in Advaita

Bimbaparoksha

306, 315

PHILOSOPHY OF b! MADHVAoABYA

368
Bliss of Moksha,
texts on

342
304 f.

BondW.G.
B rahmajnanavada

167;

Btahmopadanatva, analogies
Brahmasaktiparinamavada
Brahma, prominent position

f.

167-69
171-72
210"

souls

as

Dundoy

Fr.

Dvesha-bhakti, refuted

190
165-66

criticized

Brahmaparinamavada

among

Usher

210

of Souls

Brahmananda, on Viseslias
Buitenen J.AS.

51

230 f.

227 f.
204

Carpenter J.E.
Calvin
Causation
Buddhist view

bhedabheda

342;
on
Error (review
117-19
Prabhakara view

view
119-22
Buddhist views
122-23
Nyaya view
123-26
128-30
Advaitic view
Eternal substances
what sense
158
metaphysical dependence
texts

f.

of)

R's

'created'

bet,

80
42,158,164
246
61,63-65,185

Prakrti

Christian Mystics

40, 156; 157f.

of eternals
Evil, its consistency

with

270
70 f.

God's goodness

79

cause and effect

Chetana

337

Enjoyment, in Mukti

in

15
155 f.
294

Dualism, defn.

Citsukha

Chandradhar Sharma
64f; 192; 194; 216f.
(on Vy.)
157
Change, two kinds of
69
Conceptualises
39
Contribution theory
"Consciousness and objects,
147-48
qa. of nexus
84
Correspondence of knowledge

Ewing A.C.

F
Fellowship, in moksha
Fivefold difference
Flint

359
58-59
41

Fraser A. Campbell (on pro204-06

blem of Evil)

Gaudapada

144

Gitatatparyatika
44 f.
on Viseshas
231f; 304; 309-10;
Ghate V.S.

328; 378

D
Dasgupta

God, as a Personality
Viseshas in God's

39, 149, 177f:

181f; 313f; 351f; 3_56f

64 f,
-remarks on Vy.
Datta D.M.
48, 97-98, 111
36,250
Dawes Hicks
318, 355 f;
Desika Vedanta
319
on Aparoksha
59
Dharmabhedavada
64
Dharrm'svarupabhedavada

Difference
Advaitic dialecticians on 60-61
concept implied in
;
Advaitic view of
63
'non-duality
62
and anirvacaniya

His
nature
His
'body non-material
Source
bondage

Source
God's knowledge
not 'akhanda'
and
our
Grace, M's view
Advaitic
Personality
trans-empirical

of
of release

as
as

illusions

attitude to

Gradation bet.
Salokya and Sayujya

Gunopasamhara
Guruprasada

63-66
249-50,251

248-49

251-52
252-53
260
183
256-57

251
252
307
308-09

349
304
279

critique of (answered)

'Divine Personality,

Dreams

unreality (in Advaita)

estabd.

reality

144-45
144-46

Haribhadra Suri
Harikathamrtasara,

50
291

INDEX
Harmony

(in difference

Moksha
Hatha
in

356
267
74
98
202; 300 f.

Herbert Spencer

Hobhouse
Hume,

369
84-85

Kevalapramana, dns. of
Kevalanimittakaranavada
Khyativadas (See Error)

Rumania

176
35,36,113
84

(Bhatta)

Knowledge, gradations of

Law
29

Identity-in-differencc
Identity" of Jiva-Bruhman in
what senso

229
189

Ignorance, is real
in M's phil.

182-83
177-79
109

Individuality, basis of
Infallibility of Sakshi

87
88

Inference, nature of
types of
Infinitude
different conceptions of

of Karmn, its limitations

as loading to Jivasvarupa-

266-67

bhedavada
Laksmi as Seshi to

349
85
328
329

released souls

Laksmijnana

84,

Laya
Lingabhanga

181

Lingasarira

Lovejoy Arthur

8; f

305

Madhusudana Sarasvati
on Viseshas

James Ward

2,204f.

Jayatirtha

Jiva,

monotheism
new
problem

182

Madhoasiddhantasara

44 f; 341,

225
204

Mandana (Misra)

325 and passim.

as obhasa of Brahman
222 f.
his kartrtva real
261-63
and dependent on God 264-65

Jivatraividhya

Evidence

not same

207-09
211

of
rationale of
as

212

predestination theory
doctrine not derived
from Samkhya theory of
trigunas

Jivanmukta
Jnanakarmasamuccayavada
Jnanottarakarma
Jnanesoari

217
329
282, 286
286
294

K
Kamabhakti
Karma, not an ultimate

292-94

selves

197-98

of its limitations
as an expln. of taratamya

Karmanasa

Karma

of Aparokshajnanins
Kartrkarmabhavavirodha

P.M. 24,

254-55

his

solution of
of difference
interpretation, of
B.S. Mi, 2, 19.

64
309-11

342-43

61
312

Maya

174
189
313
Mahabharatatatparyanirnaya 236, 295

as material cause
in M's phil.
its two different senses 146,

Maitreyi
her philosophical difficulty

Manana

Max

Muller

Memory,

324
276,277
82

as immediate

perception by mind
96-98
qn. of its correspondence
with experience
96

a/c
Vacaspati Misra
element of

of
its

explanation of plurality of

law

51
176, 185, 232

and passim

2, 5, 38, 147,
148, 159, 296, 305,

Jivacchadika
Jivopadhi, two kinds

Madhva

validity

to

99
98

'novelty' in

significance
M's contribution to
the concept of

99

Meditation

212
328
329
338

variations in range
Meditative cognition

Meghanadari

Mimamsanyayas

for

305
319
93

PHILOSOPHY OF

370

Sagunaprabalya
Mithyatva
Modi P.M.
Moksha,

& MADHVAoABYA

240-43

36
327 f.

Advaitic view (examined)

Buddhist viey (examined)
Nyaya-Vaiseshika view
fourfold distinction

(examined)

330
334
321

scope forof M's view

332
322

and enjoyment in

340

criticism

activities

Moral Evil, how reconcilable

with God's goodness

205

Monistic texts,

sanctions
how
be explained

figurative interpretations:
for
141
to
142,229
Muktas, their attitude to
mutual taratatnya compared
to Gurusishyabhava
358

Paradhinaviseshapti

40, 41, 155,

Parinamavada

157-58, 160,
165, 230
162; f.

of

M.

160
182
296

Paramacchadika
Paripnkvabhakti
Perception,

uncantradictedness
Upajivya
by Sakshi
validity of

of

as

Prahuadhabharata
Prakasatman
Prakrti

two

Pramana

twofold
M's theory

senses of
evolutes
(derivation)
dn.
implications of
of
defn. applicable to

138-39
143
140
288, f.
174
163

313
164
83

its

83

103-305

Memory
Nagaraja Sarma

217 f.

Nandi M. (on four kinds

Moksha a/c to M.)
Nairatmyavada
Nayadyumani
Negation (defn.)

as

a 'prameya'

Nimbarka
Nirguna, meaning
Nirguna Brahman

of

Nitimala
17 f;
Nirvikalpakapratyaksha
untenable
Nirvisesha

320 f.
321-22
93 f
80
80
39
238
239
39 f. 208 f.

87

Nishkamakarma

282, 285

276-77
260
209
202

in Nyaya school
Nityasuris

Nominalists

Nyayasudha
Nyayamrta
Nyasatilaka-VyaUiya

209, 216 f.

217
209, 344, 349
69
15, 20 f passim
347 passim
351 f. 2-3
,

Origen

232-33
155

f.

354-55

Pratikopasana,

M's view
view
view

302-03
301

Prarabdhakarma

328-29

S's

302

R's

151f; 200f;

Pringle Pattison
Priyavrata (King)

246
283

H
Radhakrishnam Dr.

7, 32f, 33f;

207 f;

178; f; 190,
212, 238, 239 f;
255, 265, 268

50,56

on Viseshas
Baghavendrachar H.N.

78, 159, f; 227,

f;

Raghavendra (Tirtha)
235f; 268
Ramanuja
16, 17, 39, 170, 195;
199, 278, 310, 319, 349
on intrinsic gradation
of selves
207-08
his expln. of B.S. iv, 4, 17
.,
not. against anandataratamya
348-49
in release
his view of different

of
on dreams
on nididhyasana
classes

Omnipotence of God

defined

350,

334-35 f.

Nididhyasana
a/c to M.
Nityamuktas

97-99

(defn.)

Prapannas

of

Nityasamsarins
in R's system

Prapatti

Ranade R.D.

344

souls

146,
27!

323,

f; 8!

INDEX
perception of space

Recognition, as a
unitary cognition
Realists

Reality (M's defn.)

orders of
threefold classfn.

modern European views

Space and Time

36-41

Spinoza

35

342-43
70-71
94
15 f.

Resemblance Vs. class-essence

Russol

Runes Dogbert D.

Sabdapramana

89
280
40, 78

Sabdaparoksha
Sadasatkaryavada
Sadhanas, diversity and

field

primacy

6,

10,

self-validity of knowledge
as ultimate criterion of
truth
Sakshijriana alone can be
self-luminous
its right to override
identity-texts
in reL to identity-texts

in Advaita
Sarnana (Laksxni)
Samavaya, needs Viseshas

346
105

114-15
87
141

of
as completing doctrine of

110

115
108

228

Scripture, attitude to Karma,

Simile of Sun and rainbow
Simile of water

intuitive

276-77
170
16,183,256
17,318
4,60,307

Srikantha
Sridhara Svamin
Srihhashya
Sriharshu

259
831

Sudarsana Suri
Sunyata (as Moksha)
Svabhavajnanavada
Svaprakasa
Svaprakasatva of Atman
in Advaita
Svagunacehadika
Svarupajnana
Svarupabheda

193;

of
Svarupataratamya
among
in

186-87
178

86
30
159

84,

19
225-26

Jivas

Jivas

R's system

Svarupayogyata
Svatantra
Svatantra-advitiya-Brahman
Syllogism (members)
Synthesis of
Upanisadic thought
Synthesis of

Hatha,

f.

43
185

347
267
41
25
88-89

24

Karma and
267-68

115
111
113-14
42
55

Samskaras, as links in memory

94
Samskaras In memory
96
Sarvamukti
213,270,272
Saechaktipariiiama of Brahman 172 f.
Satyadhyana Tirtha
25 f
Saviseshabheda
23, 29
Sayujya
230, 849
Schwitzer Albert
139,197-98

Buddhist view of
M's view of

gradation

Sravana

Prayatna

16, 34, f; 85,

144, 190, f; 240,
260, 302, 322

Solipsism
Space, as uncreated

72
38
281

theory of

Svarupopadhi

raison d'etre
of

on amsatva

absolute

73

Svarupasrshti (of Jivas)

gradation, as pointers to
taratamya in mokshananda

Sakshi

cf.

98
69
31,38

Spiritual efforts,

in Advaita
Released State
as one of blissful
enjoyment (texts.)

Samkara

371

285
224-25
309-11

3
74

74

Tamil Saivism
Taranginl (on Viseshas)
Taratamya, in Molcsha

189
51

moksha met
a mystic
moksha not

857.58

objections
in
as
doctrine
in
liable
to discord

Tattvamasi
Tattvamuklakalapa

346
357
10 f.

39

Tatparyalingas

Tayumanavar
Tengalais

Thibaut G.

209 f;
232 f.
92
297
39; f; 355
327
213

Thilly Prof.
Time, perception by Sakshi
Jayatirtha on

Nyaya, Samldhya and

f;

75-76

74

PHILOSOPHY OV gal MABHVAoABTA

372

other views untenable

75-76
203

Tripartite classifn. of Souls

Trnajivas

for
function in M's phil.

304
248

Trivikrama Pandita

Trumbull

108

Upamana, subsumed
Upasamharaprabalya

Upasana

1S2
92
13;

f.

300

Upadhis, function of
Utkranti

73

328

V
Vadavali
Vadaratnaocdi
on Viseshas
Vadiraja
Validity (of knowledge)

Buddhist view
Bhatta view
Nyaya
view
Samkhya view
ascertainment

impossible without
acceptance of Sakslu

implications

of
M's doctrine of
Vasanas, as material
cause of dreams

Vairagya
Vatsyayana
Vedas, apaurusbeyatva
arguments for a/c to M.

Vedarthasamgrdha
Vedanta Desika

65
179,202'

52
310
102
101
102
101
100

107-08

102-03

146
277
31

Vimuktatman
Visesha (defn.)

56

Viseshana, two kinds,

ayavaddravyabhavi

67
67
Brahman
39
Vishmrahasya
182, 183, 260
Vivarcma on Sravana
268
on Brahmopadanatva,
refuted
174
Vivartavada (criticism)
173-76

Visishta

Visishtadvaitic

Vyapti, grounds of
determination
Vyasa, as Avatara

Vyasaraya

87-88

269

138, 149, 159,

317, 319, 330, 347, 354

-on Space

on Time of
criticism

72
72
R's view

of Aparoksha
,,T

r ~-,, *,,_....,.

Vyuhas

320
347-55
138
258

W
William James
Will of God, as ultimate
cause of bondage

Women, Brahmavicara by

76
312-13

275

89-91

336

16, f; 93, 182, f;

209f; 234, 259, 318-19

Vijayindra Tirtha
Vikalpa method

54
50
52
49

M's view radically different

from Nyaya-Vaiseshika

2S2,f.

Ulirici

relation
as self-explicable
as
Sarvatantrasiddhanta

applicable

U
Udayana

46-48
56-57

Bhedabheda

in

lll.f.

Truth, as organic to knowledge

arguments

implied

where

11,233

9
61,66
48

Yadavaprakasa
Yajnavalkya
Yajnavalkyan fiction
Yogipratyaksha
Yogic perception of past

39
324
323,

f.

12

98

INDEX OF SAMSKRIT WORDS

HII<$WWI

183

181

sfalcJTr

201

329

223

123

177, 179

43

135

f.

147

81
83

157

f.

72

f.

wrfer

322, 324

43

81

155

309

196

227

59;

358

3WFT

%&%

180

189

153

73

341

185 f

182

168

186

43 f.
327
149

STTW:

JUKI!

siHKiwy

35, 116

21

167
181

374

PHILOSOPHY

43

jjrewjw

^tBjpr^R^

Off

rI

*w?#fr

341

I'WS.

21

*Ri*|w

108

madhvAoAbya

r*

35

^<=fd^HK*Al'^T

55

SF^tf^ra?^

140

'

^WWWI^K

193;

183
f^rs3.

fasfa:

wltoii

269

|S

200

67
47

f.

CORRECTIONS

875

Read

Page

Line

45

16

Wherever

80

20

not given

20

does involve

125

38

elsewhere

156

25

there

171

15

*nN

248

15

wa^ia

288

30

of

313

19

ofirfogpij

323

Ln.2

See Prof. Ranade's