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028 De Guzman Jr. v.

Ochoa
G.R. No. 169292, April 13 : 2011
TOPIC: Rules 15-19
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.

AUTHOR: Pat
* Petitioners filed a 2nd motion to dismiss, alleging that the
certification against forum shopping was not executed by the
principal parties BUT SC said they should have raised in this in
the 1st MTD.

FACTS:
1. Respondent spouses Cesar Ochoa and Sylvia Ochoa, through respondent Araceli Azores, acting as attorney-in-fact, commenced in
the RTC in Pasig City an action seeking the annulment of contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of sale and damages.
The action, docketed as Civil Case No. 68896 and entitled Cesar Ochoa and Sylvia A. Ochoa, etc. v. Josefa M. Guevarra, et al.,
was presided by the respondent RTC Judge.
2. Petitioners, as defendants in Civil Case No. 68896, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the sole ground that the complaint did not
state a cause of action. The petitioners' motion to dismiss was formally opposed by the private respondents.
3. Respondent RTC Judge denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and set Civil Case No. 68896 for pre-trial conference
4. Petitioners filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging that the certification against forum shopping attached to the complaint was
not executed by the principal parties (plaintiffs) in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering the
complaint fatally defective and thus dismissible.
5. Respondent RTC Judge issued her first assailed order, denying the second motion to dismiss
6. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration, but the respondent RTC Judge denied the motion
7. Petitioners filed in the CA a petition for certiorari contending:
(a) that the RTC should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio since it was fatally defective.
(b) that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the complaint was not signed by Cesar Ochoa or
Sylvia Ochoa but by Araceli S. Azores (Azores), who was acting as the attorney-in-fact of Cesar Ochoa only.
(c) that the powers delegated to Azores did not include the authority to institute an action in court.
(d) the denial by the RTC of their motion to dismiss was capricious, whimsical and arbitrary, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and should be struck down as null and void.
8. CA: denied the petition for lack' of merit. The CA agreed with the RTC that following the omnibus motion rule, the defects of the
complaint pointed out by the petitioners were deemed waived when they failed to raise it in their first motion to dismiss.
9. Petitioners filed this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON the second motion to dismiss violates the Omnibus Motion Rule under Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. YES.
2. WON it should have been dismissed for lack of certification of non-forum shopping. NO.
3. WON the TC should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio. NO. Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court is clear that failure
to comply with the requirements on the rule against forum shopping shall be cause for the dismissal of the case "upon motion and
after hearing."
HELD: Petition for review under Rule 45 is denied.
RATIO
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates the case nor finally disposes of it, as it leaves
something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a
motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment
after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in such cases is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate
the issue on appeal from the final judgment.
Only in exceptional cases where the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion that the Court allows the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. By "grave abuse of discretion," we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal-to perform the duty enjoined by or to .act all in contemplation of law.
In this case, the petitioners failed to convincingly substantiate its charge of arbitrariness on the part of Judge Fabros. Absent
such showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or ill motive, the Court cannot but sustain the ruling of the CA.
Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus motion as a motion attacking a pleading, judgment or proceeding. A
motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a pleading, that is, the complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like
any other omnibus motion, must raise and include all objections available at the time of the filing of the motion because under Section
8, "all objections not so included shall be deemed waived." As inferred from the provision, only the following defenses under Section
1, Rule 9, are excepted from its application: [a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b] there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause (litis pendentia); [c] the action is barred by prior judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is
barred by the statute of limitations or prescription.

In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of defective verification and certification of forum shopping only when
they filed their second motion to dismiss, despite the fact that this ground was existent and available to them at the time of the
filing of their first motion to dismiss. Absent any justifiable reason to explain this fatal omission, the ground of defective
verification and certification of forum shopping was deemed waived and could no longer be questioned by the petitioners in
their second motion to dismiss.
The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the
form of the pleading, and non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.
Similarly, the rule requiring the submission of such certification of non-forum shopping, although obligatory, is not jurisdictional.

029 Office of the Ombudsman v. Maximo Sison


G.R. No. 185954, February 16, 2010
Topic: Rules 15-19 (Intervention)
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:
October 11, 2004: the Isog Han Samar Movement (represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog,
Catbalogan, Samar) filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Ombudsman, Hon. Simeon Marcelo, accusing
Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials of the Province of Samar, including respondent
Maximo D. Sison, of highly anomalous transactions entered into by them amounting to several millions of pesos.
Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer.
2. The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated August 13, 2004 revealing that:
! various purchases totaling PhP 29.34 million went without proper bidding procedures and documentations;
! calamity funds were expended without a State of Calamity having been declared by the President;
! purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced.
3. January 24, 2005: the Office of the Ombudsman, through Director Jose T. De Jesus, Jr., found basis to proceed
with the administrative case against the impleaded provincial officials of Samar. The latter were required to file
their counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence against the complaint.
4. In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations contained in the letter-complaint and claimed his
innocence on the charges.
! He asserted that his function is limited to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation for the requisition
exists, that the corresponding amount has been obligated, and that funds are available.
! He did not, in any way, vouch for the truthfulness of the certification issued by the requesting parties.
! He averred that he never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in the minutes and attendance sheet
of the bidding.
! He alleged that not one of the documentary evidences so far attached in the letter-complaint bore his signature
and that he was neither factually connected nor directly implicated in the complaint.
5. May 6, 2005: Sison submitted his Position Paper to the Office of the Ombudsman and reiterated that he had not
participated in the alleged anomalous purchases and use of public funds by the Province of Samar.
6. Office of the Ombudsman: found Sison and several other local officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave
misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him from service.
-> Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43
7. CA: reversed ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman - Sisons responsibility as Provincial Budget Officer was to
ensure that appropriations exist in relation to the emergency purchase being made and that he had no hand or
discretion in characterizing a particular purchase as emergency in nature. Hence, he cannot be held
administratively liable for simply attesting to the existence of appropriations for a certain purpose, save if such
certification is proved to be false. -> Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and
to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration -> DENIED
ISSUE(S):Whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration of the adverse
decision rendered by the CA.
1.

HELD: NO. Rule 43, as well as Administrative Circular No. 1-95, provides that the petition for review shall state the full

names of the parties to the case without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents. Thus, the
only parties in such an appeal are the appellant as petitioner and appellee as respondent. The court or, in this case, the
administrative agency that rendered the judgment appealed from, is not a party in the said appeal. Therefore, the Office of
the Ombudsman does not have the legal interest to intervene. Also, motion for intervention was filed out of time.
RATIO:
Arguments of the Parties:
CA - did not allow the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene, because (1) the Office of the Ombudsman is not a third
party who has a legal interest in the administrative case against petitioner; (2) the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was
filed after the CA rendered its Decision; and (3) the Office of the Ombudsman was the quasi-judicial body which rendered
the impugned decision.
Office of the Ombudsman - asserts that it has sufficient legal interest to warrant its intervention in the proceedings, since it
rendered the subject decision pursuant to its administrative authority over public officials and employees. Further, it
contends that the Omnibus Motion to Intervene was timely filed, since, at the time of its filing, the decision of the CA had
not yet attained finality..
1. It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion
in permitting or disallowing the intervention (see Rule 19, Sections 1 and 2).
2. Intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the
subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim. Its main purpose is to
settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the persons
involved.
3. To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur:
(1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and
(2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of
the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding.
The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
4. Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the instant case. It must remain
partial and detached. More importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate.
5. It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where their decisions are appealed to
a higher court for review. The raison detre for such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not active combatants in
such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court
to decide the issues without the judges active participation. When judges actively participate in the appeal of their
judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial and have become adversarial instead.
6. Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG)
The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only when hearing and
resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is brought on appeal before a higher court. The
judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who
must settle the controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence and applicable laws,
regulations and/or jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and completely state his findings of
fact and law. There must be no more need for him to justify further his judgment when it is appealed
before appellate courts. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the
appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes
personal since his objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy between the original parties
(which he had already accomplished by rendering his judgment), but more significantly, to refute the
appellants assignment of errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on appeal.

7. The facts reveal that this case was elevated to the CA via a verified Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court and Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated May 16, 1995, which govern appeals to the
CA from judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies.
8. Rule 43, as well as Administrative Circular No. 1-95, provides that the petition for review shall state the full names
of the parties to the case without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents. Thus, the
only parties in such an appeal are the appellant as petitioner and appellee as respondent. The court or, in this
case, the administrative agency that rendered the judgment appealed from, is not a party in the said appeal.
Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman does not have the legal interest to intervene.
9. Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. In the instant case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed only on July 22,
2008, after the Decision of the CA was promulgated on June 26, 2008.
10. It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware of the appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of Court
provides that the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the CA, with proof of service of
a copy on the court or agency a quo. Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman had sufficient time within which to file
a motion to intervene. As such, its failure to do so should not now be countenanced. The Office of the Ombudsman
is expected to be an activist watchman, not merely a passive onlooker.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

030 MAY D. AONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE


DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI, Petitioners,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G.
JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G.
JALANDONI as Special Administrator,
G.R. No. 178221
December 1, 2010
TOPIC: Rule 15-19
PONENTE: Padilla, J.:

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)
Petitioner seeks to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. See #3 &#4

SC: No interest. A courts power to allow or deny


intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed
by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a
person with interest in an action or proceeding may be
allowed to intervene. Otherwise stated, a court has no
authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action
or proceeding, to intervene therein. We agree with the
finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their
siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that
Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo

FACTS: (chronological order)


1. Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966. He died without issue.
2. On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration with the CFI of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latters
estate. The is currently pending before the intestate court.
3. On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation before the intestate court. In the
Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)who, in turn, was
revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis.
4. The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmotherIsabelwas, at the time of Rodolfos death, the
legal spouse of the latter. For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.
5. Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene
on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. As it was, by the time the
Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter.
To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the following documents:

a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;


b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia; and
c.) Their respective proof of births.
6. Acording to the respondent, Isabels previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was dissolved, made her
subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.
7. intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement
proceedings. The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at hand adequately establish Isabels status as the
legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the
proceedings on her behalf.
8. Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court. found that it was an error on
the part of the intestate court to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvias birth certificate. The appellate
court, siding with the respondent, held that Sylvias birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts
therein statedwhich includes the civil status of her parents. Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John
Desantis should have been taken as established.
ISSUE(S): whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court allowing the petitioners
and their siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
PETITIONER: The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari. In nullifying the intestate
courts order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of whether the same was issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Rather, it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon the issue pertaining to Isabels right to inherit from
Rodolfo.
RUling
A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of
sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene. Otherwise
stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a casethe mistake is
not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the courts
jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in
a special civil action for certiorari.
Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ of certiorari, when it examined the
evidence proving Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence determines
whether the petitioners and their siblings have successfully established Isabels interest in Rodolfos estatewhich, as
already mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence
presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of
the latters jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence
to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their
claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfos estate.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis
was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John
Desantis exists on record.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:


A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of

sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene. Otherwise
stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein. ""
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a casethe mistake is
not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the courts
jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in
a special civil action for certiorari.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

031 ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO A.


HENSON and ANGEL S. ONG, Complainants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
RAMON M. BATO, JR., ISAIAS P. DICDICAN and
EDUARDO B. PERALTA, JR., Respondents.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J
FEBRUARY
19, 2013
TOPIC: Intervention
PONENTE: REYES, J.

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)

Short facts of the case: Petitioners filed an admin case


against the respondent CA justices for issuing an
injunctive writ(which they are also assailing) stopping
them from exercising their powers as members of the
board of directors of NADECOR. Petitioners assail the
injunctive writ despite the fact that they did not
participate in the CA proceedings. The issue related to
intervention in this case is whether the petitioners have
the requisite standing to assail the said writ given that
they failed to intervene in the early stages of the case in
the lower courts?

FACTS: (chronological order)

Complainants Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez (Fernandez) and Antonio A. Henson were elected in August 2010 to the
Board of Directors (Board) of the Nationwide Development Corporation (NADECOR), a domestic corporation
organized in 1956, which owns a gold-copper mining concession in Pantukan, Compostela Valley called KingKing Gold and Copper Mine (King-King Mine), while complainant Angel S. Ong was among those elected to
NADECORs Board at its stockholders meeting held on June 13, 2012.
At the regular annual stockholders meeting held on August 15, 2011, wherein 94% of NADECORs
outstanding shares was represented and voted, two groups of stockholders were vying for control of the
company, one group led by Jose G. Ricafort (JG Ricafort) who then personally controlled 42% of the issued
shares, and the other group led by Conrado T. Calalang (Calalang), who owned 33%. Elected to the Board were
Calalang, Jose, Jose P. De Jesus (De Jesus), Roberto R. Romulo (Romulo), Alfredo I. Ayala (Ayala), Victor P.
Lazatin, Fernandez, LeocadioNitorreda (Nitorreda), and John Engle (Engle). Later elected as Corporate
Secretary was Luis Manuel L. Gatmaitan (Gatmaitan).
On October 20, 2011, two months after the August 15, 2011 stockholders meeting, Corazon H. Ricafort (CH
Ricafort), Jose Manuel H. Ricafort (JM Ricafort), Marie Grace H. Ricafort (MG Ricafort), and Maria Teresa R.
Santos (MT Santos) (plaintiffs Ricafort), wife and children of JG Ricafort, claiming to be stockholders of record,
sought to annul the said meeting by filing SEC Case No. 11-164 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 159. Impleaded as defendants were NADECOR, the members of the incumbent Board, and the
Corporate Secretary, Gatmaitan.The plaintiffs Ricafort alleged that they were not given prior notice of the
August 15, 2011 stockholders meeting, and thus failed. The plaintiffs Ricafort therefore asked the RTC to
declare null and void the August 15, 2011 annual stockholders meeting, including all proceedings taken thereat,
all the consequences thereof, and all acts carried out pursuant thereto.

RTC ruled in favor of Ricafort and declared null and void the August 15, 2011 annual stockholders meeting,
including all proceedings taken thereat, all the consequences thereof, and all acts carried out pursuant thereto.
Four separate petitions for certiorari were forthwith filed in the CA by some members of the new Board and by
NADECOR to assail the validity of the RTC order, all with application for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. namely:
(a) CA-G.R. SP No. 122782 - filed on January 5, 2012 by Director Romulo versus CH Ricafort, JM
Ricafort, MG Ricafort and MT Santos (respondents Ricafort). The case was raffled to Justice Lantion,
senior member of the 15th Division; the chairman of the Division was Justice Dicdican, while Justice
Angelita A. Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) was the junior member.
(b) CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 - filed on January 5, 2012 by Directors Calalang, Ayala, Engle and
Nitorreda versus the respondents Ricafort. Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio (Justice Reyes-Carpio) of the
11th Division was the ponente.
(c) CA-G.R. SP No. 122853 - filed on January 6, 2012 by NADECOR versus the respondents Ricafort.
Justice Samuel Gaerlan of the 6th Division was the ponente.
(d) CA-G.R. SP No. 122854 - filed on January 6, 2012 by Gatmaitan versus the respondents Ricafort.
Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente of the 9th Division was the ponente.
(NOTE THAT NONE OF THE PETITIONERS FILED FOR PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, AND
YET THEY TRIED TO ASSAIL THE DECISIONS OF THE CA)
On January 16, 2012, the 15th Division of the CA denied the application for TRO and/or preliminary injunction
in CA-G.R. SP No. 122782. On the same day, however, the 11th Division issued a TRO in CAG. R. SP No.
122784.In light of the declaration by the RTC that the August 15, 2011 stockholders meeting was "VOID and
OF NO FORCE and EFFECT," the 11th Division ordered the preceding Board, elected in August 2010 (Old
Board) to take over the company in a hold-over capacity during the effectivity of the TRO, "to prevent any
hiatus and so as not to unduly prejudice the corporation," and until a new Board was elected in a stockholders
meeting to be called by the Old Board. The new Board, which entered into its duties on August 15, 2011 (New
Board), had to cease acting and give way to the hold-over Board.
On February 17, 2012, the respondents Ricafort filed their Comment Ad Cautelam8 to the petition in CA-G.R.
No. 122784. The petitioners therein thereafter filed three (3) urgent motions to resolve their application for writ
of preliminary injunction, on March 8,9 on May 22,10 and again on June 6, 201211. However, after the lapse of
the 60-day TRO but before the CA could resolve the application for writ of preliminary injunction, Deogracias
G. Contreras, Corporate Secretary of the Old Board who replaced Gatmaitan, issued on June 6, 2012 a Notice of
Annual Stockholders Meeting to be held at the Jollibee Centre in Ortigas on June 13, 2012 at 12:30 p.m. The
notice was published on June 7, 2012 in The Philippine Star,12 and two of the main purposes of the meeting
were:
(a) The ratification of the rescission by the Old Board of NADECORs Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs) with the St. Augustine Gold & Copper Ltd. and the St. Augustine Mining, Ltd., (St. Augustine),
both dated April 27, 2010; and
(b) The ratification of the sale of unissued shares of NADECOR comprising 25% of its authorized capital
stock (for P1.8 billion) to a new investor, Queensberry Mining and Development Corporation
(Queensberry), later disclosed as controlled by the Group of Senator Manuel Villar.
On the same day, the petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 filed a Supplement to the Third Urgent Motion to

Resolve with Manifestation13 dated June 7, 2012, contending that the rescission of NADECORs MOUs with
St. Augustine would result in grave and irreparable injury to it since St. Augustine alone had the financial and
technical capability to develop its 1,656-hectare area mining claim in Pantukan, Compostela Valley. NADECOR
thus risked having its Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) with the government, its only valuable
asset, revoked by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On June 13, 2012 at 12:30 p.m., the announced annual meeting of NADECORs stockholders was held at the
Jollibee Center in Ortigas as scheduled, with Calalang chosen as presiding officer. Midway through the meeting,
however, Calalang received a facsimile copy of the now assailed Resolution of the CAs Special 14th Division,
bearing the days date. On motion, Calalang declared the meeting adjourned in view of the injunctive writ
granted by the CA. But he was overruled by the stockholders and directors holding 64% of the shares, and
Calalang and his group walked out of the assembly. The stockholders who remained in the meeting ignored the
writ and the meeting resumed, with President De Jesus now presiding. In the meeting, the following were taken
up: the election of the new Board; the ratification of the rescission by the Old Board of NADECORs MOUs
with the St. Augustine; and the ratification of the subscription of Queensberry to 25% of the capital stock of
NADECOR.
ISSUE(S): Whether the petitioners have the standing to assail the injunctive writ?
HELD: (YES/NO, and a short explanation)
RATIO:

The complainants have no personality to assail the injunctive writ.


Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main
suit cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed, he cannot be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger.34
Moreover, a person not an aggrieved party in the original proceedings that gave rise to the petition for
certiorari, will not be permitted to bring the said action to annul or stay the injurious writ.35 Such is the
clear import of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, a person not a party to the
proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court
to have the judgment reviewed.36 Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by
one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.37
The complainants, who at various times served as elected members of the Board of NADECOR, did not bother
to intervene in the CA petitions, hence, they are not entitled to the service of pleadings and motions therein.
Complainant Fernandez was himself a defendant in SEC Case No. 11-164 in the RTC, but he chose not to join
any of the four CA petitions.1wphi1
In this Courts Resolution38 dated July 18, 2012 in G.R. No. 202218- 21, entitled "Jose G. Ricafort, et al. v.
Court of Appeals [Special 14th Division], et al.," involving a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by JG
Ricafort, De Jesus, Paolo A. Villar, and Ma. NalenRosero-Galang, also questioning the validity of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the Special 14th Division of the CA, we ruled that persons who are not parties
to any of the consolidated petitions have no personality to assail the said injunctive writ.
In another Resolution,39 also promulgated on July 18, 2012, in G.R. No. 202257-60, a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by herein complainants to assail the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction in the
aforesaid consolidated CA petitions, we likewise dismissed the petition due to lack of personality of the
petitioners, since they were non-parties and strangers to the consolidated CA petitions. We pointed out that they

should first have intervened below, and then filed a motion for reconsideration from the questioned CA order.
On September 19, 2012, we denied their motion for reconsideration from the dismissal of their petition.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

032 DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZvs.HON. COURT OF AUTHOR: "


APPEALS and PHILIPPINE CHINESE CHARITABLE NOTES: (if applicable)"
ASSOCIATION, INC!
G.R. No. 184589, June 13, 2013!

"

TOPIC: RULE 19 Intervention"


PONENTE: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J."
FACTS: !
1. It"has"been"established"by"the"evidence"adduced"by"Landicho"that"the"parcel"of"land"under"consideration"was"
formerly"several"smaller"parcels"owned"and"possessed"by"the"spouses"Felix"San"Pascual"and"Juanita"Vertudes,"
Ignacio"Santos"and"Socorro"Santos,"Caconto"Cayetano"and"Verneta"Bartolome,"Gavino"Espiritu"and"Asuncion"
Cruz,"and"Lucio"Manuel"and"Justina"Ramos,"all"of"whom"in"January"1960,"executed"instruments"of"conditional"
sale"of"their"respective"parcels"of"land"in"favor"of"Landicho$
2. CFI"issued"an"Orderon"December"22,"1965"directing"the"Commissioner"of"the"Land"Registration"Commission"
(LRC)""to"comply"with"Section"21"of"Act"No."2347""on"the"issuance"of"a"decree"and"original"certificate"of"title"
(OCT)"in"favor"of"Landicho.$
3. The"subject"property"was"thereafter"sold"several"times,"and"as"the"old"TCTs"of"the"vendors"were"cancelled,"new"
TCTs"were"accordingly"issued"to"the"buyers."The"sale"of"the"subject"property"could"be"traced"from"Landicho"to"
Blue"Chips"Projects,"Inc."(BCPI);"then"to"Winmar"Poultry"Farm,"Inc."(WPFI);"and"finally,"to"herein"respondent"
Philippine"Chinese"Charitable"Association,"Inc."(PCCAI)]TCT"No."482970.$
4. On"November"14,"1996,"Landicho"executed"a"Deed"of"Absolute"Sales"over"the"subject"property"in"favor"of"herein"
petitioner"Deogenes"O."Rodriguez"(Rodriguez)."Two"years"later,"on"June"1,"1998,"Landicho"died.$
5. Seven"years"hence,"Rodriguez"filed"an"Omnibus"Motion"before"the"RTCof"San"Mateo,"Rizal,"in"Land"Reg."Case"No."
N]5098."Rodriguez"alleged"therein"that"the"Decision"dated"November"16,"1965"and"Order"dated"December"22,"
1965"of"the"CFI"in"Land"Reg."Case"No."N]5098"which"confirmed"Landichos"title"over"the"subject"property"has"not"
been"executed."Rodriguez"specifically"stated"that"no"decree"of"registration"had"been"issued"by"the"LRC"
Commissioner"(now"the"Administrator"of"the"Land"Registration"Authority"[LRA])"and"that"no"OCT"had"been"ever"
issued"by"the"ROD"in"Landichos"name.$
6. On"November"17,"2006,"PCCAI"filed"before"the"RTC"a"Verified!Motion!for!Leave!to!Intervene"in"Land"Reg."Case"
No."N]5098."PCCAI"justified"its"intervention"by"arguing"that"it"was"an"indispensable"party"in"the"case,"having"
substantial"legal"interest"therein"as"the"registered"owner"of"the"subject"property"under"TCT"No."482970."PCCAI"
likewise"pointed"out"that"Rodriguez"himself"submitted"a"copy"of"TCT"No."482970,"only"alleging"that"said"
certificate"was"fictitious."PCCAI"averred"that"Rodriguez"maliciously"failed"to"allege"in"his"Omnibus"Motion"that"
TCT"No."482970"remains"valid"and"subsisting,"there"being"no"direct"action"or"final"court"decree"for"its"
cancellation."Rodriguezs"Omnibus"Motion"constituted"a"collateral"attack"on"the"title"of"PCCAI,"which"is"not"
sanctioned"by"law"and"jurisprudence."Consequently,"PCCAI"asked"the"RTC"to"allow"its"intervention"in"Land"Reg."
Case"No."N]5098"so"it"could"protect"its"vested"rights"and"interests"over"the"subject"property;"to"note"and"admit"
its"Answer]in]Intervention;"and"to"deny"Rodriguezs"Omnibus"Motion"for"utter"lack"of"merit.$
7. RTC:"In"favor"of"Landicho;"Intervention"would"not"be"allowed"after"the"Decision"has"become"final"and"executory;"
this"merely"reiterated"the"said"Order"for"the"implementation"of"the"Decision"dated"November"16,"1966$
8. The"LRA,"upon"receipt"of"a"copy"of"the"RTC"Order"dated"April"10,"2007,"filed"a"Manifestation"dated"February"4,"
2008"informing"the"trial"court"that"it"cannot"comply"with"said"Order"since"there"were"already"two"existing"titles"
covering"the"subject"propertyand"to"issue"a"decree"of"registration"and"OCT"in"Landichos"name"would"only"
further"aggravate"the"problem"of"double"titling."$
9. PCCAI"filed"a"Petition"for"Certiorari"and"Prohibition"before"the"Court"of"Appealsassailing"the"Orders"of"the"RTC"
for"having"been"issued"without"or"in"excess"of"jurisdiction"and/or"with"grave"abuse"of"discretion"amounting"to"
lack"or"excess"of"jurisdiction."PCCAI"acknowledged"that"it"is"the"ministerial"duty"of"the"RTC"to"issue"a"writ"of"
execution"for"a"final"and"executory"decision/order;"however,"PCCAI"argued"that"when"subsequent"facts"and"
circumstances"transpired"which"renders"the"execution"of"the"final"and"executory"decision/order"unjust"or"
inequitable,"then"the"trial"court"should"refrain"from"issuing"a"writ"of"execution."PCCAI"likewise"asserted"that"the"
RTC,"as"a"land"registration"court,"did"not"have"the"jurisdiction"to"resolve"conflicting"claims"of"ownership"over"the"
subject"property."PCCAI"lastly"maintained"that"it"was"an"indispensable"party"in"Land"Reg."Case"No."N]5098"and"
that"it"should"have"been"allowed"by"the"RTC"to"intervene"during"the"hearing"of"Rodriguezs"Omnibus"Motion"for"
the"execution"of"the"Decision"dated"November"16,"1965"and"Order"dated"December"22,"1965"of"the"CFI.$
10. CA:"In"favor"of"PCCAI."Intervention"of"PCCAI"is"proper.$

ISSUE: Whether or not intervention is proper"


HELD: YES"
RATIO:"
The"basic"doctrinal"rule"is"that"final"judgments"may"no"longer"be"modified,"except"only"to"correct"clerical"errors"or"mistakes,"or"
when"the"judgment"is"void,"or"if"supervening"events"or"circumstances"that"transpire"after"the"finality"of"the"decision"render"its"
execution"unjust"and"inequitable."In"the"interest"of"substantial"justice,"this"Court"has"allowed"exceptions"to"this"rule."A"person"
who"has"a"legal"interest"in"the"matter"in"litigation,"or"in"the"success"of"either"of"the"parties,"or"an"interest"against"both,"or"is"so"
situated"as"to"be"adversely"affected"by"a"distribution"or"other"disposition"of"property"in"the"custody"of"the"court"or"of"an"officer"
thereof,"may,"with"leave"of"court,"be"allowed"to"intervene"in"the"action."
"
We"are"not"unmindful"that"[PCCAI]"filed"its"Intervention"when"the"decision"of"the"case"was"already"final"and"executory"and"
during"the"execution"stage"of"the"case."However,"the"supervening"event"which"is"the"issuance"of"a"decree"of"registration"which"
was"already"implemented"and"enforced"upon"the"order"of"the"Administrator"of"the"LRC"way"back"in"July"11,"1966"when"the"LRC"
issued"TCT"No."167861"in"the"name"of"Purita"Landicho"instead"of"an"OCT"makes"the"said"intervention"proper"and"well]taken."
"
The"subject"property"is"presently"covered"by"TCT"No."482970"in"the"name"of"PCCAI.1wphi1"As"the"registered"owner,"PCCAI"
clearly"has"a"legal"interest"in"the"subject"property."The"issuance"of"another"certificate"of"title"to"Rodriguez"will"adversely"affect"
PCCAI,"constituting"a"cloud"on"its"TCT"No."482970."
"
Although"Rule"19"is"explicit"on"the"period"when"a"motion"to"intervene"may"be"filed,"the"Court"allowed"exceptions"in"several"
cases,"viz:"
"
This"rule,"however,"is"not"inflexible."Interventions"have"been"allowed"even"beyond"the"period"prescribed"in"the"Rule,"when"
demanded"by"the"higher"interest"of"justice."Interventions"have"also"been"granted"to"afford"indispensable"parties,"who"have"not"
been"impleaded,"the"right"to"be"heard"even"after"a"decision"has"been"rendered"by"the"trial"court,"when"the"petition"for"review"of"
the"judgment"has"already"been"submitted"for"decision"before"the"Supreme"Court,"and"even"where"the"assailed"order"has"already"
become"final"and"executory."In"Lim"v."Pacquing,"the"motion"for"intervention"filed"by"the"Republic"of"the"Philippines"was"allowed"
by"this"Court"to"avoid"grave"injustice"and"injury"and"to"settle"once"and"for"all"the"substantive"issues"raised"by"the"parties."
"
In"fine,"the"allowance"or"disallowance"of"a"motion"for"intervention"rests"on"the"sound"discretion"of"the"court"after"consideration"
of"the"appropriate"circumstances."We"stress"again"that"Rule"19"of"the"Rules"of"Court"is"a"rule"of"procedure"whose"object"is"to"
make"the"powers"of"the"court"fully"and"completely"available"for"justice."Its"purpose"is"not"to"hinder"or"delay,"but"to"facilitate"and"
promote"the"administration"of"justice."

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:"


DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S): "
!
!
!
!
People!of!the!Philippines!vs.!Jesus!Perez!
GR!NO.!142556!|!Feb.!5,!2003!|!Per!Curiam!
!
FACTS:!
This$is$a$case$against$Jesus$Perez$for$committing$the$crime$of$rape$penalized$under$Article$335$of$the$RPC$against$
Mayia$Ponseca,$thereby$imposing$death$penalty$on$the$accused$
The$crime$happened$on$January$22,$1997$around$12$noon$at$Sitio$Baco,$Brgy.$Macarang,$Palauig,$Zambales$
Mayia$was$walking$on$her$way$home$when$Perez$walked$up$to$her$and$introduced$himself$as$Johnny.$Then$he$
strangled$her$neck,$punched$her$in$the$abdomen,$lowered$his$pants$while$removing$Mayias$underwear.$Then$he$
inserted$his$penis$inside$Mayias$vagina.$After$satisfying$his$desires,$he$left$while$Mayia$was$bleeding$profusely$
A$certain$Virginia$Giron$saw$and$helped$Mayia$and$informed$her$parents$what$happened.$$
Perez$was$apprehended$and$he$was$positively$identified$by$Mayia$as$her$assailant$
Perez$denied$the$allegation$and$pleaded$not$guilty.$$$
During$the$pre!trial,$prosecution$and$defense$stipulated$on$the$following$facts:$

1. The$identity$of$the$accused;$
2. The$accused$was$at$the$time$of$the$incident$in$the$vicinity$thereof$
3. The$victim$in$this$case,$Mayia$P.$Ponseca,$was$born$on$23$May$1990$as$evidenced$by$her$birth$certificate,$
marked$as$Exhibit$A$
4. That$after$the$incident,$the$child$was$subjected$to$a$medico!legal$examination$to$which$a$medico!legal$
certificate$was$issued$by$Dr.$Editha$Divino.$
Trial!Court:$Perez$is$guilty$beyond$reasonable$doubt$of$the$crime$statutory$rape$and$was$sentenced$to$suffer$
death$penalty$

$
Hence%the%automatic%review%of%the%case%
%
Argument$of$Perez$
! The$prosecution$failed$to$prove$Maiyas$age$by$independent$evidence,$therefore$death$penalty$cannot$be$
imposed$
! He$contends$that$although$Mayias$birth$certificate$was$marked$during$the$pre!trial,$it$was$not$presented$or$
identified$during$the$trial$itself$
! Mayias$minority$must$not$only$be$specifically$alleged$in$the$Information$but$must$also$be$established$
beyond$reasonable$doubt$during$the$trial.$
!
ISSUE:!WON$Mayias$minority$was$sufficiently$proven$during$the$trial$
!
RULING:!!
YES!
Section!4,!Rule!118!of!the!Revised!Rules!of!Criminal!Procedure$states$that$after%the%pre3trial%conference,%the%
court%shall%issue%an%order%reciting%the%actions%taken,%the%facts%stipulated,%and%evidence%marked.%Such!order!shall!
bind!the!parties,%limit%the%trial%to%matters%not%disposed%of,%and%control%the%course%of%the%action%during%the%trial,%
unless%modified%by%the%court%to%prevent%manifest%injustice.!
The$purpose$of$pre!trial$is$to$consider$the$following:$(a)$plea$bargaining;$(b)$stipulation$of$facts;$(c)$marking$for$
identification$of$evidence$of$the$parties;$(d)$waiver$of$objections$to$admissibility$of$evidence;$(e)$modification$of$
the$order$of$trial$if$the$accused$admits$the$charge$but$interposes$lawful$defenses;$and$(f)$such$matters$as$will$
promote$a$fair$and$expeditious$trial$of$the$criminal$and$civil$aspects$of$the$case.!
In$this$case$and$at$the$pre!trial,$the$parties$mutually$worked$out$a$satisfactory$disposition$of$the$criminal$case.$In$
fact,$Perez,$assisted$by$his$counsel,$signed$the$Pre!Trial$Agreement,$which$was$also$incorporated$in$the$Pre!Trial$
Order$
Mayia$was$able$to$testify$in$open$court$as$to$her$age.$During$the$trial,$which$was$23$months$after$the$rape$
incident,$she$testified$on$cross$examination$that$she$was$8$years$old.$At$the$time$of$the$incident,$she$was$only$six$
years$and$seven$months$old$when$the$crime$happened$
!
On!leading!questions!
As$a$rule,$leading$questions$are$not$allowed.$However,$the$rules$provide$for$exceptions$when$the$witness$is$a$
child$of$tender$years$as$it$is$usually$difficult$for$such$child$to$state$facts$without$prompting$or$suggestion.$Leading$
questions$are$necessary$to$coax$the$truth$out$of$their$reluctant$lips.$
In$this$case,$it$is$proper$for$the$trial$court$to$allow$leading$questions$to$Mayia$since$she$was$young$at$the$time$of$
the$trial.$This$is$in$consonance$with$the$Rule$on$Examination$of$a$Child$Witness$for$the$following$reasons:$(1)$to$
facilitate$the$ascertainment$of$the$truth,$(2)$to$ensure$that$questions$are$stated$in$a$form$appropriate$to$the$
developmental$level$of$the$child,$(3)$to$protect$children$from$harassment$or$undue$embarrassment,$and$(4)$
avoid$waste$of$time$
$
On!police!lineup!
Perez$questions$the$absence$of$police$line!up$in$the$positive$identification$of$Mayias$assailant!
There$is$no$law$requiring$a$police$line!up$as$essential$to$a$proper$identification.$Even$without$a$police$line!up,$
there$could$still$be$a$proper$identification$as$long$as$the$police$did$not$suggest$such$identification$to$the$
witnesses!

In$this$case,$Mayia$was$able$to$positively$identify$and$point$at$Perez$as$her$assailant!
!
DISPOSITIVE!PORTION:!
WHEREFORE,$the$Decision$dated$October$26,$1999$of$the$Regional$Trial$Court$of$Iba,$Zambales,$Branch$69,$in$Criminal$
Case$No.$RTC!2116!I,$finding$appellant$Jesus$S.$Perez$guilty$beyond$reasonable$doubt$of$the$crime$of$qualified$rape,$
sentencing$him$to$suffer$the$death$penalty,40$and$ordering$him$to$pay$the$victim$Mayia$P.$Ponseca$the$amount$of$
P75,000.00$as$civil$indemnity$and$P50,000.00$as$moral$damages,$is$AFFIRMED$in%toto.!

In$accordance$with$Article$83$of$the$Revised$Penal$Code,$as$amended$by$Section$25$of$the$Republic$Act$No.$7659,$upon$
the$finality$of$this$Decision,$let$the$records$of$this$case$be$forthwith$forwarded$to$the$Office$of$the$President$of$the$
Philippines$for$possible$exercise$of$the$pardoning$power.$
!
007Saguid vs CA
G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003
TOPIC: Pre-Trial Brief
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

AUTHOR: Mr. Z
NOTES:

FACTS: (chronological order)


1. Private respondent Gina Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, herein petitioner.
2. As a result of such separation, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court.
3. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00,
representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
4. Petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a
captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondents meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to
contribute in the construction of said house.
5. In the court, the judge declared the petitioner in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief as required by Supreme Court
Circular No. 1-89.
6. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
7. The private respondent was allowed to submit her evidence ex-parte and the TC rendered a decision in her favor.
8. The petitioner filed with the CA an appeal but the decision of the TC was affirmed. The CA ruled that the propriety of
the order which declared the petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new rules now require the filing of a pre-trial brief and the defendants noncompliance therewith entitles the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE(S): Whether the trial court erred in allowing private respondent to present evidence ex parte due to his failure to
file a pre-trial brief
HELD: No
RATIO:
The petitioner contends his failure to file pre-trial brief was due to the fact that he did not have a counsel. Hence, the court
was incorrect to deny his motion for reconsideration. He further contends that the rule on failure to file a pre-trial brief is a

new rule that was unjustly applied retrospectively in this case.


The TC was correct in finding the petitioner in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief. Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to
appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis
thereof. The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration, showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. The motion need not really stress the fact that the defendant has a
valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his defenses is already on record.
In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he was not represented by
counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present evidence
ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by counsel. In the instant case, the fact that
petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. The assistance of
lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectively of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically,
Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to present
evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively,
the same is not called for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997,
the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1, 1989.
Pursuant to the said circular, [f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to appear at the
pre-trial, that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
!
!
035 Yao v Perello
G.R. No. 153828. October 24, 2003
TOPIC: Rule!19!Intervention
PONENTE: Corona, J.

AUTHOR:
NOTES:

Nature: petition for certiorari filed by Lincoln L. Yao, assailing the resolution and Order of the RTC Paraaque Br 274, which respectively granted
private respondent Bernadine D. Villarins petition for prohibition and denied petitioners motion for intervention.
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) against a certain
corporation, PR Builders, Inc. and its managers, Enrico Baluyot and PablitoVillarin, private respondents husband.

FACTS:
1. On September 17, 1999, the HLURB rendered a decision rescinding the contract to sell between
petitioner and PR Builders, and ordering PR Builders to refund petitioner the amount of P2,116,103.31,
as well as to pay damages in the amount of P250,000.
2. Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ of execution against PR Builders and its managers, and referred the
writ to the office of the Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa for enforcement.
3. Pursuant to the writ, the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land in Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna,
registered in the names of spouses PablitoVillarin and private respondent, Bernadine Villarin. The
property was scheduled for public auction on March 20, 2002.
4. On March 19, 2002, private respondent filed before the RTC, a petition for prohibition with prayer for
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff Melvin T. Bagabaldo from
proceeding with the public auction.
5. Private respondent alleged that she co-owned the property subject of the execution sale; that the property
regime between private respondent and her husband was complete separation of property, and that she
was not a party in the HLURB case, hence, the subject property could not be levied on to answer for the
separate liability of her husband.

6. On even date, public respondent Judge Norma C. Perrello issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order
and set the case for raffle and conference on March 22, 2002.
7. The case was eventually raffled to RTC, Branch 276, presided by public respondent judge. A conference
was then conducted, after which public respondent judge issued the assailed resolution of March 22,
2002 granting private respondents petition for prohibition and declaring the subject property exempt
from execution. Hence, the scheduled auction sale did not materialize.
8. On April 25, 2002, or more than a month after public respondent judge issued the resolution of March
22, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for intervention. However, public respondent judge denied the motion
in her assailed order
9. ORDER: The MOTION FOR INTERVENTION is denied, considering that this case has long been
decided, hence the intervention is too late. There is no case for them to intervene.Let the decision be
executed to satisfy the judgment debt.
10. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to public respondent
judge in: (a) declaring the subject property exempt from execution and therefore could not be sold to
satisfy the obligation of private respondents husband, and (b) denying petitioners motion for intervention
on the ground that the same was filed late.
11. It is a basic precept that the power of the court in the execution of judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. The levy by the sheriff on property by virtue of a writ
of attachment may be considered as made under the authority of the court only vis-a-vis property
belonging to the defendant. For indeed, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.
ISSUE(S): Whether intervention should be allowed.
HELD: Petitioners claim is without basis. To allow intervention it must be shown that a) movant has alegal interest in the
matters in litigation or otherwise qualified and 2) consideration must begiven as to whether the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties may be delayed orprejudiced or whether the intervenors rights may be protected in a separate
proceedings or not.Both requirements must concur as the first is not more than the second. In the case at bar, itcannot be
said that petitioners right as judgment creditor was adversely affected by the lifting ofthe levy on the subject real property.
Records reveal that there are other pieces of propertyexclusively owned by the defendants in the HLURB case that can be
levied upon.
RATIO:

1. In the case at bar, the property levied on by the sheriff was clearly not exclusively owned by
PablitoVillarin. It was co-owned by herein private respondent who was a stranger in the HLURB case.
The property relation of spouses Villarin was governed by the regime of complete separation of property
as decreed in the RTC order.
2. [Based from Articles 145 and 146 of the Family Code governing the regime of complete separation of
property] It is clear from the foregoing that the only time the separate properties of the spouses can be
made to answer for liabilities to creditors is when those liabilities are incurred for family expenses. This
has not been shown in the case at bar.
3. Accordingly, private respondent acted well within her rights in filing a petition for prohibition against the
deputy sheriff because the latter went beyond his authority in attaching the subject property. This right is
specifically reserved by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
4. Petitioner insists that, in a petition for prohibition, it is essential that the party who is interested in
sustaining the act or acts sought to be prohibited or enjoined be impleaded as private respondent. Thus,
as the judgment creditor in the HLURB case, petitioner claims that he was an indispensable party in the
petition for prohibition and should have been allowed to intervene in the said case. He was not allowed to
do so.
5. Consequently, petitioners claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said
provision (Sec2 Rule 65) requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for
prohibition. On the other hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to
whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenors rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as
the first is not more important than the second.

6. In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners right as a judgment creditor was adversely affected by
the lifting of the levy on the subject real property. Records reveal that there are other pieces of property
exclusively owned by the defendants in the HLURB case that can be levied upon.
7. Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right to intervene, he
must exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within the period prescribed therefor.
8. As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition
of judgment by the trial court. In this case, Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way
beyond the period set forth in the rules. The court resolution granting private respondents petition for
prohibition and lifting the levy on the subject property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002,
after the lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already become final and executory.
9. Besides, the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the reconsideration of the trial courts resolution is
sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the instant petition. Certiorari as a special civil action will
not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an
opportunity to correct its errors, if any.
10. Finally, grave abuse of discretion is committed when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The Court fails to find grave abuse of discretion
committed by public respondent judge in rendering the assailed resolution and order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

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PINLAC et al. vs CA
G.R. No. 91486. September 10, 2003

AUTHOR:

TOPIC: Intervention (Rule 19)!


PONENTE:"YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:!
FACTS:

This resolves the Petition-In-Intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Registration Authority and the Motion for Clarification filed by respondents.
The controversy stemmed from a Petition for Quieting of Title filed by petitioners over 3 vast parcels of land.
On March 21, 1988, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision in favor of petitioners and against the defendants
who were declared in default, including respondent owners of Vilmar-Maloles (Vilma) Subdivision whose
properties were within Lot No. 2.
On May 17, 1989, the defaulted title owners of Vilma filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul the
Partial Decision of the trial court, which was granted in a decision dated November 15, 1989. The appellate
court ruled that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondents because of defective
service of summons by publication. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied;
hence, they filed this petition for certiorari.
On January 19, 2001, SC rendered a Decision denying the petition and affirming the Judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending, inter alia, that the disposition of the trial court with
respect to Lot No. 3, should not have been annulled by the Court of Appeals because the petition for annulment
of judgment filed by the respondents concerned only Lot No. 2. They prayed that the January 19, 2001 decision

of the Court which affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals be reconsidered insofar as Lot No. 3 is
concerned.
On November 20, 2001, the SC issued a Resolution partially granting petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), thru
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention
ISSUE(S): whether or not Republic of the Philippines motion for intervention should be allowed.
HELD: Yes, the intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public interest as well as government

properties located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law can certainly be invoked by the Republic which
is an indispensable party to the case at bar.
RATIO:

The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and
completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding
technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof.
Indeed, in exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by
the trial court. In one case, intervention was allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed judgment
was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.
The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the
full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same. But needless to say, this discretion should be
exercised judiciously and only after consideration of all the circumstances obtaining in the case.
But it is apparent that the courts a quo only considered the technicalities of the rules on intervention and of the
petition for relief from judgment. The denial of their motion to intervene arising from the strict application of the
rule was an injustice to petitioners whose substantial interest in the subject property cannot be disputed.
It must be stressed that the trial court granted private respondent's petition for prohibition with injunction
without petitioners being impleaded, in total disregard of their right to be heard, when on the face of the
resolution of the Community Relations and Information Office (CRIO) sought to be enjoined, petitioners were
the ones directly to be affected. We need not belabor the point that petitioners are indeed indispensable parties
with such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made in their
absence without affecting, nay injuring, such interest.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals where the motions for intervention were filed when the case had
already reached this Court, it was declared:
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the
proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted
for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under
x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 19, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure].
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the
whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice.
The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the

administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
In Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this Court allowed intervention almost at the end of the
proceedings. Accordingly, there should be no quibbling, much less hesitation or circumvention, on the part of
subordinate and inferior courts to abide and conform to the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court.
It also certified that the NGCHP under its Peoples Housing Alternative for Social Empowerment land
Acquisition Development Program (PHASE-LADP), has already awarded 3,975 TCTs to its beneficiaries. This
program comprises the biggest chunk of the NGCHP with about 117 hectares intended for disposition to
qualified beneficiaries. Further, in line with the National Governments thrust of fast-tracking the implementation
of the NGCHP, the remaining 20,696 TCTs are about to be awarded to qualified beneficiaries.
Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public interest as well as government properties
located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law can certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an
indispensable party to the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, while the provision is
intended as a protection of individuals against arbitrary action of the State, it may also be invoked by the
Republic to protect its properties.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

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