1

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ versus HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

February 15, 2011
Facts:
The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for
certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of
July, in accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010,
private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn
Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint[1] against petitioner.
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan,
Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed
another impeachment complaint[5] against petitioner. On even date, the House of
Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the 14th Congress.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the
Committee on Rules instructed to include the two complaints in the Order of Business,
[10]
which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following
day, August 11, 2010.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.[11]
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both
complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it
at exactly the same time.
The Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published
on September 2, 2010.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two
complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust,[12] sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance
of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their
allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered
thereon.
Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010,
petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive
reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to
direct the issuance of a status quo ante order[14] and to require respondents to comment
on the petition in 10 days.
Issues:
Procedural Issues
a. Whether or not the case presents a justiciable controversy.
b. Whether or not judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and
may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary.
Substantive Issues
a. Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed
Resolutions, as to:
1. Due process of law

i. On the allegations of being bias and vindictiveness of the

Respondents chairperson (Niel Tupas, Jr.).
ii. Whether or not the indecent and precipitate haste of public
respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in form
and substance is a clear indication of bias.
iii. Whether or not public respondent failed to ascertain the
sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the
basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own
Impeachment Rules.
iv. Whether or not the Court can look into the narration of
facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her (petitioner)
submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.
v. Whether or not there was denial of due process, due to the
delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules. (Based
on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs
that
Congress
shall
promulgate its
rules
on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.)
vi. Whether or not the impeachment provisions are selfexecuting. (Section 3 of Article XI.)
2. The One Year Bar Rule
a. Whether or not the 1 year bar rule reckons to start at the
date of filing of the first impeachment complaint.
b. What is the reason of the one year bar rule?
3. Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
a. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when
the respondents did not obey the one offense, one
complaint rule.
b. Whether or not the rule on consolidation applies
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1,
2010 and September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order
issued by the Court on September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.
Ratio:
I.

Procedural Issues
a. Whether or not the case presents a justiciable controversy.

Yes
In Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives. The argument that impeachment
proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court
and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedlygranted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,
that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
b. Whether or not judicial review of impeachments undermines their
finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the
judiciary.
The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in
the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining
the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial
review.

There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks
and balances.Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of
the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
II.
Substantive issue
A. Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed
Resolutions.
(Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art.
III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.)
1. Due process of law
i. On the allegations of being bias and vindictiveness of the Respondents chairperson (Niel
Tupas, Jr.).
Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is
conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by
her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his
father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias
and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints against her.
The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there
being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.[26]
The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body
itself.
In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and
merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints.[29]
ii. Whether or not the indecent and precipitate haste of public respondent in finding the two
complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias.
An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias,
however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice[31] holds:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer
cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of
functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The
orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant
consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all
phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent
upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere
tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to
discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panels initial task
cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the
presumably regular performance of not just one but five state
prosecutors.
iii. Whether or not public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its
own Impeachment Rules.

The claim fails.

The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is
an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of
Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In
the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has
formulated determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment
complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the
House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any
contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.
The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and
providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, [36] and that the substance
requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.[37]
iv. Whether or not the Court can look into the narration of facts
constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her (petitioner) submissions
disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.
This the Court cannot do.
Francisco instructs that this issue would require the Court to make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Such
an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly,
the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is
beyond the scope of its judicial power[.][39] Worse, petitioner urges the Court to make a
preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the
facts alleged in the complaints, which involve matters of defense.
v. Whether or not there was denial of due process, due to the delay in the
publication of the Impeachment Rules. (Based on Section 3(8), Article
XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.)
Promulgation must be used in the context in which it is generally understood
that is, to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is
generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the
general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that
the restricted sense was to be used.[49]
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the
former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the
discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in
much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a
decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when
the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court
is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the
Constitution.
vi. Whether
or
not
the
impeachment
executing. (Section 3 of Article XI.)

provisions

are

self-

Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment
mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its details.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to

enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as
it has always been, that . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on
impeachment is aimed at effectively carry[ing] out the purpose of impeachment
proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it
proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet
the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the effective
implementation of the purpose of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the
provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the power of
the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed
purpose.
Impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and
not for the punishment of the offender.[55]
The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause.

2. The one-year bar rule

Article
XI,
Section
3,
paragraph
(5)
of
the
Constitution
reads:
No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
a. Whether or not the 1 year bar rule reckons to start at the date of
filing of the first impeachment complaint.
NO.
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment
complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010
of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second
impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two
former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate"
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial
action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or,
by the filing by at least one-third[61] of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3
(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint,
for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of

an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick

alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or
torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the
impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more
than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is
that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once
the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the
candle.
A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and
illusory.
Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns
its laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even
without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely intended to
effectively weed out worms in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other
prompt birds within the ultra-limited season.
Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual
complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an
almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed
aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.
There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment
complaint is filed. Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the
protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited political
vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry
whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of
reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer through the mechanism
enshrined in the Constitution.
b. What is the reason of the one year bar rule?
The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment
proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcunas separate opinion
that concurred with the Francisco ruling.[89] Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the
one-year bar is two-fold: to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow
the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation, with main reference to the records
of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:
It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the
element of time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should
defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded
from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one
impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work
of law-making.
3. Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules to effectively carry out the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment
Rules, Section 16 of which provides that the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the
Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the
House.
a. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when the respondents
did not obey the one offense, one complaint rule.
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [a] complaint
or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are
insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of

the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public respondent
gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules.
Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.
The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each
charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the
Articles of Impeachment.[94] It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need
not allege only one impeachable offense.
b. Whether or not the rule on consolidation applies.
Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a
consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it
would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.[97]
Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two impeachment
complaints were deemed consolidated,[98] her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly
fails. Petitioners theory obviously springs from her proceeding = complaint equation
which the Court already brushed aside.