with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher
courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known
as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow
its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that
vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing
choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the
precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of
horizontal stare
decisis constitutional stare
decisis and
statutory stare
decisis. Constitutional stare
decisis involves
judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare
decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is
important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare
decisisin constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the
binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds
sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is
not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare
decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed
from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court,
which is again called upon to consider a question once decided. In
the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the
ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself
and not what we have said about it. In contrast, the application
of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more
inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: after a statute has been
construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of
decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a
meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been
drafted by the Congress itself. This stance reflects both respect for
Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited
resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an
ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2)
it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability.
Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule
where
(1)
its
application
perpetuates
illegitimate
and
that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though
the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations,
like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[12]
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that
circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived
by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified
in setting it aside.[13]
As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to
abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an erroneous application of the law an
application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone
cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the
intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot
allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous
ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case
law.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The
principle, entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general
rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same,
even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same
event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a
bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork
Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To
properly understand its context, petitioners posturing was that "the power
given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and
activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on
executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation
of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not
involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only
function given to the Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the
foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one,
under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse,"
belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power
to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and
it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the
proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely
recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a
limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the
propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic
examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with
each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as
(b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular
CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project
identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may
be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a
wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled
with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against
a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of
the case, Philconsas fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to
propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority
is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has been constitutionally
lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen.
If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power
of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then
it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not
its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the
prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after
the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the
GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory.
Justice Vitugs Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa
quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law,
to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that
authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I
am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely
benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the
CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa
insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members
of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This
postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply
excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is
innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada
Guro Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsas
allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of
powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule
will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a
procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In
fine, stare decisis would not apply.
Stability, uniformity, and predictability are the compelling reasons for the value
placed upon judicial precedents. Although in practice the use of precedents
may often be approximately similar in civilian and in common law jurisdictions,
the essential difference lies in the attitude towards them and the sanctity with
which they are regarded1
Under the common law doctrine of stare decisis, judicial precedents are
considered law de jure, while in civil law jurisdiction case-law, when recognized
at all, is merely law de facto.2 The variance in the underlying philosophies in
the two legal systems are rooted in the role they ascribed to their judges. In
the civil law system the traditional role of judges in law-making is very limited, 3
since law-making is considered to be the function solely of the legislators;
judicial decisions must therefore develop within the framework established by
legislation.4
On the other hand, the common law theory on judicial precedents has an
opposite premises.
decisis, that a lower court is under a duty to accept the position held on any
given issue by its hierarchical superior, 5flows from the theory in common law
that decided cases are, in their own right, sources of law. The fact that the
lower court thinks the decision wrong does not justify its ignoring the
precedent.6 The second principle which provides that a court is bound by its
previous decisions, is not the logical entailment of theory that judicial
decisions are source of law, but flows from the policy of giving the legal systems
structure and coherence in the absence code system, and also because of the
considerations of equality of treatment, predictability, and economy of effort. 7
Although the same considerations operate in the civil law system, but because
of its traditional view that judicial decisions are not formal sources of law, prior
decisions do not enjoy the same standing in civil law as they do in the common
law.8 Although though lower courts in the civil law system have at least in
theory the freedom to depart from previous decisions of hierarchically superior
courts.. as a practical mater in the great majority of case lower court n all
systems accept the position taken by their hierarchical superiors, for fear of
reversal.9
lower courts, when necessitated by the changing demands of the times and
public policy, should be allowed to depart from decisions of superior tribunals
as a direct ways of provoking a re-examination of an important legal question,
5 VON MEHREN, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1988)
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid
and giving the Court of last resort an opportunity of either reaffirming the old
doctrine or abandoning it, and adopting a new one. 10
10 Juco, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Philosophy of Law in Changing
World13 ATENEO L.J. 40, 51 (1963), at 50-51 citing dissent in People v. Santos, 104
Phil. 551, 560 (1958).