Chapter 18: Justice and the World

(Amartya Sens The Idea of Justice)

By: David Del Castillo
Disclaimer: I havent read Amartya Sen in its entirety. I was assigned to do the last chapter! (kjafdhiau!) Soooo you get the picture.
Im not yet sure if I am able to understand this chapter independent of the other parts. But, heres my part. I promise to edit any
mistakes once I finish (SO HELP ME GOD!) the entire thing. Feel free to tell me any errors. Other standard disclaimers also apply. K.
thx. bye!

INTRODUCTION (of the Chapter) [p. 388]

Main Point of this part: Open-minded engagement in public reasoning is quite central to the
pursuit of justice. (p. 390)
- Contrary argument cannot be sensibly dismissed without serious engagement
- There is a requirement for public reasoning.
Illustration: Drought in the English Summer
- James Mill and David Ricardo: subscribe to a simple version of utilitarian justice
geared only to reduce suffering: at least one-third of the people must die
- They denounce social agitators who incite discontent of with the established order (the
present state) by telling people that the government can help them inflammation of the
minds of the suffering humanity
General approach of this book is inimical to such reproach. The reasons for this divergence:
1. What tends to inflame the minds of suffering humanity is an immediate interest to both
policy-making and diagnosis of injustice
Sense of injustice must be examined
We cannot be sure whether it is erroneous or well-founded without some investigation
Injustice relate to social divisions (i.e. class, race, etc.) or other established barriers makes
it difficult to objectively examine what is happening and what could have happened this
contrast is central to the advancement of justice
Approach to justice, involved in diagnosing injustice: the outrage or inflamed minds is a
prelude to scrutiny
2. The arguments of the instigators did not deserve prompt dismissal
In encouraging people to believe in legislation, they were more right about the possibility
of social relief through effective legislation
Ex: in a famine, those who lose out to the food battle can be given more market command
through income-generation measures
Hence, in the pursuit of justice, open-minded engagement in public reasoning is central.
WRATH AND REASONING [p. 390]
Resistance to injustice draws on both indignation and argument
- Frustration and ire can help motivate us. Ultimately, we have to rely on reasoned scrutiny in
order to understand the basis of those complaints and what can be done to address it
- Dual function of indignation and reasoning:

Expression of anger and exasperation: Angry rhetoric must be followed by reasoned

arguments to be considered.

The role and reach of reason are not undermined by the indignation that leads us to an
investigation of the basis of the inequities

Pure expressions of discontent can make contributions to public reasoning if it is followed

by investigation.
- Appeal to reason in public is an important approach of this book
- When we try to identify how justice can be advanced

There is a basic need for public reasoning involves arguments from divergent
perspectives

Engagement with contrary arguments does not imply that we can settle conflicting
reasons in all cases
Complete resolution is neither a requirement of a persons rationality or condition of social
choice, including a reason based theory of justice.

JUSTICE BEING SEEN TO BE DONE [p. 392]

- Agreement to do something helps the undertaking of that something

Justice shot not only be done, but also seen to be done

Administration of justice can be more effective if judges are seen to be doing a good job. If
judgment inspires confidence and general endorsement, then very likely it can be more
easily implemented

If others cannot see that a judgment is just, not only is its implementability adversely
affected, but also its soundness would be deeply problematic
- There is a clear connection between the objectivity of a judgment and its ability to withstand
public scrutiny
PLURALITY OF REASONS [p. 394]
- Importance of public reasoning and the need to accept the plurality of reasons

Adam Smith: complained of the tendency of theorists to look for a single homogenous
virtue in which all the values could be explained
o Some schools of thought insist that all distinct values be reduced to a single source of
importance
o Those who are insistent that human beings cannot cope with determining what to do
unless all balues somehow are reduced to no more than one are evidently comfortable
with counting (is it more or is it less?) but not with judgment (is this more important
than the other?).

Plurality of reasons that a theory of justice has to accommodate relates not only to objects
of value that the theory recognizes as significant but also to the type of concerns for which
the theory may make room.

Judgment about justice has to accommodate different kinds of reason and evaluative
concerns
o Recognition that we can always prioritize relative importance of competing
considerations does not indicate that it can always be completely ordered
o Reasoned conclusions can easily take the form of partial rankings
Impartial Reasoning and Partial Orderings (p. 396)
Plurality of reasons can sometimes pose no problem for a definitive decision, whereas in other
cases it can pose a serious challenge. (Ex: three children with flute)
- There can be a congruence of different reasons in many particular cases.
- The idea of justice includes cases of different types, with easy resolution in some instances
and very hard decisional problems in others.
- The competing criteria will yield different rankings of alternatives, with some shared elements
and some divergent ones.

The intersection (shared elements) of the diverse orderings generated by the different
priorities will yield a partial ordering that ranks some alternatives against each other,
while failing altogether to rank other pairs of alternatives.

The commonality of the shared partial ranking can then be seen as the definitive outcome
of that broad theory.
The basic issue is the need to recognize that a complete theory of justice may well yield an
incomplete ranking of alternative courses of decision and that an agreed partial ranking will
speak unambiguously in some cases and hold its silence in others.
- The elements of congruence of surviving impartial reasoning form the basis of a partial
ordering underlying the claims of manifest enhancement of justice

The Reach of Partial Resolutions (p. 399)

To be useful, a social ranking must have some substantive coverage, but need not be complete.
- A theory of justice has to rely fundamentally on partial orderings based on the intersection
(commonality) of distinct rankings drawing on different reasons of justice that can all survive
the scrutiny of public reasoning.
- On the other hand, there are a great many choices in which a partial ordering with specific
gaps could give us a great deal of guidance. (Ex: p. 399 last paragraph)
Reason to scrutinize and critically examine the arguments based on considerations of justice
- see how far we can extend the partial ordering that emanates from that perspective.
- no reason to turn down the help we get from the partial ordering that we end up with, even if
it leaves some choices beyond reach.
Comparative Framework (p. 400)
Debates about justice must be about comparisons if they are going to relate about practicalities.
- Identification of the transcendental requirements of a fully just society would have many
other demands on how to idealize an actual society whether or not such changes could
actually be implemented.

Justice-enhancing changes or reforms demand comparative assessments, not simply an

immaculate identification of the just society (or the just institutions)

An approach to justice can be both entirely acceptable in theory and eminently useable in
practice

The approach can include the understanding that different reasonable and impartial
judges could sensibly differ on the identification of a transcendental alternative.
-

It would be a mistake to expect that every decisional problem for which the idea of justice
\would be resolved through reasoned scrutiny.
It would also be a mistake to assume that since not all disputes can be resolved through
critical scrutiny, we do not have secure enough grounds to use the idea of justice with
conclusive judgment. We go as far as we reasonably can.

Justice and Open Impartiality (p.402)

There are two principal grounds for requiring that the encounter of public reasoning about
justice should go beyond the boundaries of a state or a region:
(1) Interdependence of interest (think Globalization Ex: p. 402 last paragraph)

The interdependences also include the impact of a sense of injustice in one country on
lives and freedom in others.

Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere, Martin Luther King

Second ground discussed in the following section.
Non-Parochialism as a Requirement of Justice
(2) Avoidance of the trap of parochialism

Possible danger of ignoring or neglecting many challenging counter-arguments that might

not have come up in local political debates, or been accommodated in the discourses
confined to the local culture, but which are eminently worth considering, in an impartial
perspective

Adam Smith: in order to resist parochialism

o Impartial Spectator:what would a particular practice or procedure look like to a
disinterested person from far or near
o Smith was particularly concerned about avoiding the grip of parochialism in
jurisprudence and moral and political reasoning
o Adam Smiths insistence that we must inter alia view our sentiments from a certain
distance from us is thus motivated by the objective of scrutinizing not only the
influence of vested interests, but also the captivating hold of entrenched
traditions and customs.

Example of current debates: Death sentence for crimes committed in a persons

juvenile years
Distant judgments are particularly important to consider and scrutinize in order to avoid
being trapped in local or national parochialism
o Scrutiny from a distance can be very useful in order to arrive at grounded but openminded judgments, taking note of questions that consideration of non-local
perspectives can help to generate
Despite the undoubted importance of local knowledge, global knowledge has some value
too, and can contribute to the debates on local values and practices.
o It does not require us to be respectful of every argument that may come from abroad.
o Willingness to consider an argument proposed elsewhere is very far from a
predisposition to accept all such proposals.
o

Justice, Democracy and Global Reasoning (p.408)

Giving serious consideration to distinct and contrary arguments and analyses coming from
different quarters is a participatory process that has much in common with the working of
democracy through public reasoning.
- The two are not the same:

democracy is concerned with a political assessment leading us to government by

discussion

undertaking non-self-centered and non-parochial scrutiny through paying attention to

distant perspectives may be largely motivated by the demands of objectivity
Implications of these recognitions are for the demands of global justice and also for the nature
and requirements of global democracy:
- For the foreseeable future, it is really impossible to have a global state, and therefore a
fortiori a global democratic state.
- Yet if democracy is seen in terms of public reasoning, then the practice of global democracy
need not be put in indefinite cold storage.

The plurality of sources enriches the reach of global democracy

The distribution of the benefits of global relations depends not only on domestic policies,
but also on a variety of international social arrangements

Active public agitation, news commentary and open discussion are among the ways in
which global democracy can be pursued, even without waiting for the global state
- The challenge today is the strengthening of this already functioning participatory process
Social Contract versus Social Choice (p.410)
Reliance of public reasoning is an important aspect of Sens approach. His argument is to replace
transcendental institutionalism (mainstream approach to justice i.e. Rawls) by focusing questions
of justice:
first, on assessments of social realizations, that is, on what actually happens (rather than
merely on the appraisal of institutions and arrangements)
- and second, on comparative issues of enhancement of justice (rather than trying to identify
perfectly just arrangements).
Sens Approach: influenced by tradition of SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY
- concentrates on making evaluative comparisons over distinct social realizations (social
choice) rather than the discipline of reasoning about justice in terms of the idea of a social
contract (duh, social contract)
- Limitations of Social Contract:

directly concerned only with the identification of just institutions - transcendentalism

Rawls focused on institutions as the subject matter of his principles of justice.

The social realizations are assumed to be determined by a combination of just

institutions and fully compliant behavior by all to make a predictable transition from
institutions to states of affairs.
In a world where those extremely demanding behavioral assumptions do not hold, the
institutional choices made will tend not to deliver the kind of society that would have
strong claims to being seen as perfectly just.
o

Differences and Commonality (p. 412)

Commonality of the Theories of Justice (Social Choice and Contract):
- Directly concerned with peoples lives and capabilities, and the deprivation and suppression
suffered
- The connections between the disparate theories of justice have to be firmly noted since, in
the debates about different theories, the focus tends to be on differences rather than on
similarities

A shared commitment of theories of justice is to take these issues seriously and to see
what they can do in terms of practical reasoning about justice and injustice in the world

Distinct theories of justice may compete in finding the right use of that concern, but they
share the significant feature of being involved in the same pursuit
- The pursuit of a theory of justice has something to do with a similar question: what is it like to
be a human being?

Those distinctions remain, and my reason for asking what it is like to be a human being is
different it relates to the feelings, concerns and mental abilities that we share as human
beings.

The general pursuit of justice might be hard to eradicate in human society, even though
we can go about that pursuit in different ways
There is no automatic settlement of differences between distinct theories,
- But it is comforting to think that not only do proponents of different theories of justice share a
common pursuit,
- They also make use of common human features that figure in the reasoning underlying their
respective approaches.

these basic human abilities to understand, to sympathize, to argue people need not be
inescapably doomed to isolated lives without communication and collaboration.