G.R. No.

L-48006

July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,

vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of
Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a headon collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela
was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the
criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8,
1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of
the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the
time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the
wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had
been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under
the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is
only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words,
The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in
Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the
case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the
Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission
not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil
obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903
of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him
primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains
that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary,

according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the
main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or
crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice
may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the
luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in
previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the
wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions which are unlawful
or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes
shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the
damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who
live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by their employees while
engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by
the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next
preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the latter what he may have paid.

REVISED PENAL CODE

ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane person,
and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there
was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such
person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from
execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be
civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the
consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable
and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property
exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishment. In default of persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed
in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation
shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses lodging
therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in
the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article
365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded."
However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between
the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action
for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage,
one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often
referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code;
for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao
al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is
this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o
negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning
articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely
repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them,
while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that
not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game
laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p.
728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability
under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una
responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es
consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons. Thus, there is a civil
responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a
necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision between two trains belonging
respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal
case, in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in

the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the
Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the
affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa
juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El
titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan
sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones,
reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de
ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa
procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las
acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen),
dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que
intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil
cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del
Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina
aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones,
y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en
el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por
diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los
cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean
responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el
articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe
responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o
empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia,
que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por
razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales
civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la
separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos
cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la
Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los
daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que
permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad,
mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no
existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se
redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento
permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that there should beres judicata with
regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which
the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the
latter, whatever each nature, a culpasurrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or
less severe. The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or
indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of
the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer

desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for
indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not pertinent and belong to another
scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in
which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without
the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and
the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime,
separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative
precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between the former provisions and
that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of
such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil responsibilities among those who, for
different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the
wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not
coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated
are the subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of
their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or
enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are
sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to theobligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice and the civil courts being a true
postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes
of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case
and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the losses and
damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence,
but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has
already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the
declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was
the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Juradohad jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex
lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and
whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article
1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author of the act. The
action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the
employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act
or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal
action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the responsibility of the employer is
principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se
debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se
funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero
semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno
responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa,
pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor,

del dueo o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado
(menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro,
etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues,
responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La
idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those persons for who one is
responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the
legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but
such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable
for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but
not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian,
proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article
referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father,
guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is
condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely
inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por
excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o
razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase
distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda
(articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que
impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this being the
doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which
gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code
distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the
responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the
civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles,
for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasidelict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from
criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent
acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of
having been run over by a street car owned by the "compaia Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a
criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company, paying for damages in the
amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of
articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The
Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la
compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y
efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo
cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los
limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o
negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o

negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903,
netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daos causados por sus dependientes en
determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar
a la compaia recurrente a la indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados
textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir
atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the trial court, in sentencing
the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the
value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act,
when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as the criminal
jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no
grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in
accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages
caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in
this latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its
employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly
followed the same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting
the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car company. This is precisely what happens
in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not
exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil
responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held
subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own
presumed negligence which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's
primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the
second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more
expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was
probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal
of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be
held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the
conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous
criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and
one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought against a railroad company for
damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly andfraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles
consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the
court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito:
1., que las expediciones facturadas por la compaia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su

demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que llegadas a su
destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con
intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron
daos y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por las
ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran este recurso, porque la demanda
inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que
no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes,
careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo
recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daos y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la
injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la
sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente
a la Compaia demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia
administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares, in relation to the evidence in the
case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles
referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise
reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and
with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him
losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize
the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as the original complaint did not
contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based on
the delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of
Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for reparation for losses
and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to
deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in
article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant company, because the latter is
connected with the person who caused the damage by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case,
the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was
held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and
not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to
the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails
slid off while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that
the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be
made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have
procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his prosecution a
suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes
obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI.
Section 1902 of that chapter reads:

"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with
them.
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"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
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xxx

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general
statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore
is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader
one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is
proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the
civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal
offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these
articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by
the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual
force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of
action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was
suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had
been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action
alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder
should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same
subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles suffices to show that the civil
liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the
law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek
out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal
actions against his employees only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the
criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not
barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing
our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it
unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully
regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs before us to have arisen
from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the
comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an
employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence
punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within

the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties
to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then
breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction
may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to
his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that
to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action
against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed
by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This
Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real
Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along
Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way
along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully
crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto
precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed,
aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward
direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and
if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body
had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this
circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant
having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death
of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing
the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban
Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover
damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10,
1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come
from another municipality to attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along
Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an
automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the
automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing.
The child died that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from
J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the
action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the
stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on
the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few
paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child
running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic
Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The

contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense
could only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J.
V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable
because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged
to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap
was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used
by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to
the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a
good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He
obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise
selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly
competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the
defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when the liability shall
cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of
the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the
complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public
vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule
in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a business or enterprise and the
negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year
1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was
on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly
killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton &
Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court,
applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:

The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the liability
of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil.,
624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages
for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to
navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a
captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa,
in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved
from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the
authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52
Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June
8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage
to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the
City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the
City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily
liable. The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The
lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code govern.
The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code
negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal
Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil
obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code
affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil
liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
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Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the
trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master
had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense
to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime
or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here made are offered to meet the
argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal
articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the
present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising
from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an
entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the
foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil
Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila
Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the

deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the
Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the
motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption from civil liability established
in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the
subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the action there had for its purpose the
enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based
on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the
defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of
the Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability
arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code, and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the
question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code.
Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code)
and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce
either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902
to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in
this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are
announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of
the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through
the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in
the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence
which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can
and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many
instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the
latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining
relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil
wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge
that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages.

Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In
construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles
calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public.
It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but
right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said,
"they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And
according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could
have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used
such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary
responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already
cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion
de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in
that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor
accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise
to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the
action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising
from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal
Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendantpetitioner.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano
et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages
from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he
was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when
criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised
Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the
other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above
grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly
examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the
above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of
errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS
THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107,
NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF
COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally
in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act
was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a
copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's
decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the
death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability,
was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that
at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already
legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and
civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil.
607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in
relation to culpa criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the
works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under
the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616,
73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the
same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902
of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the
Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been
sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is
thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages
in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate
to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to
hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly
to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of
negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from
a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the

interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902
to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in
a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous
cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs.
"Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding
of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which
is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we
believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be
diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or
private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent
civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by
the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the
concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary
acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends
to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the
time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is
precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or
interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana orquasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so,
because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted
that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it
clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether
voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts)
and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate
from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding

Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due
to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about
construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be
observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from
the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,
and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction
of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by
a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his
father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be
upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation
by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot
borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued
in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on
his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from
causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by
marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.)
And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of
the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion.
Costs against appellees.

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B.
BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS
PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
Jose M. Mesina for appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of
damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana
Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against
the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to
suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted,
and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding
has been rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an
independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his
claim for damages in the criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and
that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on February 25, 1971. 3
Petitioner makes these:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED
UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY
MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR certiorari IS NOT PROPER,
BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS DEFECTIVE. 4
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property
during the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that the nature and character of his
action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the
jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by
petitioner because of the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and
negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the
selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based
on quasi-delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically
provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is readily discernible from the foregoing
codal provision, has been expounded in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621, 6 thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple imprudence. if we were to
hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution ofculpa aquiliana would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to personsand damage to property through any degree of
negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil hability arising
from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902
to 11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a
civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases
of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and
exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and
cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more
expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure indicated
by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional
drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages.
Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably
useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and
justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and

supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits
resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's
careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And
according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fail upon the principal or
director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility
of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work
already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee vienen a ser como una sola
personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien la emplea y utihza (become as one personality by
the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.) All these observations
acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and
accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of
the character and efficacy of the action for culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to seek damages
only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we
believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we cause the
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be
diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the bet ter safeguarding of
private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, stations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely
directed by the party wronged or his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (Garcia vs.
Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra,
as allowing of an "independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in surrounding the civil action, erred in placing
reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in
the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal action has being commenced, no civil
action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal
offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation "not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176
of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction
between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two
concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to
person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law
itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages
caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to persons or property."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding
the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case
is finally terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is
hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case
No. 189 of that Court.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision 1of the respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be
recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is
twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community;
petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student
taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after
the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him
in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's
attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries;
during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone

living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not
less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other
relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and
denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or
because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or
agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his
apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by
stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and
compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for
miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying the stipulated facts which the
parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single,
Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the
present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second
year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July,
1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino
introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the
private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral
damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees
and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private
respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through
machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she
allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance
with Filipino customs and traditions made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by
looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry
her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia,

she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule
if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing
decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend before,
defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times
and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with
her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of
defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant
told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October,
1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few
days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands
and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the
whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but
defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept
reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married
to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her
godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to
marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod
City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to marry
Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and
chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256.
In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering
him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October
1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does
not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience
with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and
accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her."
In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff
must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be
photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D"
and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at
the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Baaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic)
a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50,
tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp.
55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to
go to plaintiff's hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between
them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,

communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and
defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job
at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think so low and have
so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for
several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a
common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to
satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic)
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals,
good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as
they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as
the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or
not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any
good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated
her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to
take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character.
Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the
Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement.
Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and
had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto,
this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of
fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts
will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had
the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of
substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values
which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower
court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, inMedina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to
enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro,
93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74
Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957;
unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil.
401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33
SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the
factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the
draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many
of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasidelict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully
sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the
interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A
promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise
of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal
treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault
and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code,
Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than
the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in
fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise
to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that
he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to
their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity,
the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the
Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a
victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman
because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that,

complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to
bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery
was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and
conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducementand the
woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal
lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction,
par. 56) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in
her person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil.
123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the
essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of curiosity of the
female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the
act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the
demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiffappellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for
had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles
of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that
defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case
is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by
the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a
breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court
of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic);
Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise
to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction,

hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon
v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the present
article 31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily
in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit
or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given
herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must
weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which
would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age.
But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that
reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise
to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence,
pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down inBatarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot
recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or
damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a
plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need
of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition
that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic,
regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by
him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive.
Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to
marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he
loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.
Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.
It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs
every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of
intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to
marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about
by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or
where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the other (Art.
1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is,
more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f.
Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable
behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality
and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY
MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY
CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No.
24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated November
17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang,"
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed
Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor
children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:
1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant Safeguard) and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION (Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly organized and
existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa
Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the former appears to be the employer of
defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly acknowledged responsibility for
the acts of defendant TORZUELA by extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or defendant
SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident complained of, was under their control and supervision. . . .
3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was on duty as security guard at the
"Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a
.38 caliber revolver belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police Report dated
January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the concurring negligence of the
defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence
of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751
was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a
valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since
the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature

considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo,
p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not
one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore,
the inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint is justified by the following: the Initial Investigation
Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts,
SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S
motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute
a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done
in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private
respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge
also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13, 1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts alleged in the verified complaint and
in accordance with the applicable law on the matter as well as precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the
complaint against the alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and
Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof was denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts
that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of
shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable for their negligence
either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This liability is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or
negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the
employer may therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners

submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better
resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the
offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus,
petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil action can proceed independently of the criminal
action. On the other hand, it is the private respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners
have no cause of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not
applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have
been part of his duties as security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done within the scope of the
employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action ,
reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far
better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]).
This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground
that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute
therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action (Republic v.
Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the
party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera
v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the
plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the private respondents for their vicarious
responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2
of the complaint.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court
already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court
held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. [citing Virata v.
Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since
intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial
reasons, this Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the
ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term
"physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined
in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v.
Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under
Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar,
is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable for
Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been established that the instant action is not exdelicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as
aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180
is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency

of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents
to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on
the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence
attributable to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the general rule is that the allegations in a
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements are present,
namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the
defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno
Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to
establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence
and whether it was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are
questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective
allegations and defenses. In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be
borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset;
this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a
complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the
defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint
must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the
law, it would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the
Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is
remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973

GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL,
MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL,respondents.
Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.
Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C. Martinez for private respondents.
Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf.

ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, in Civil Case No. 2850
(German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated October 21, 1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against
respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the
defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court
dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L.
Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and
operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to
Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and
bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve
on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming
passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant,
Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical
treatment and hospitalization.

Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a
fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety
of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1,
1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private
respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for
preliminary attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850 admitting
the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless
imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25 coming from the
opposite direction ascending the incline at an excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to
give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident in
question, and, therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners.
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds,
namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action; 2) that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but
without the requisite verification, hence defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the
defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with
maximum care and prudence.
The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or
20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the
Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and less serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed
subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and,
therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise
until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code,
is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of
the driver.
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the aforesaid action for damages was
instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on
quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the party
seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce.
In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained the arguments of respondents, Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil
negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should be a showing that the offended party
expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa
aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of the prayer in the
complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the
Court is of the opinion that the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972, hence this appeal oncertiorari.
There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint in Civil Case No. 2850, the
essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or
omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No.
25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages
sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the
fault or negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. The
circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a
reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers

aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of
traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly
excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the
criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is
inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized
that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal
Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has
been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621). 1
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964,
in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved
his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit
when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v. Palileo, 2 where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had already
pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the
criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party by final judgment in said
criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is legally ineffective because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant. We explained in Meneses vs. Luat 3 that when the criminal action for physical injuries against
the defendant did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement on the matter or
damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended party in said criminal
case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action, and,
therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of the New Civil
Code.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against
respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to
press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal
action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived
the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such
actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an
action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance
with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence
and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the
Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as
exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as
an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation
required in the proviso." 4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict
by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require
reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the
criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need
not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the
offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal
justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed with
the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.

G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA
SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation, which has built through its agents,
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held
civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which
is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly
fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein
respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as
Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on
respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No,
TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed
order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was
still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that
"criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a decision 4 affirming the questioned order
of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19,
1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is
predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of
action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the
claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for
relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading or
complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be
liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the
aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading
to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence
situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a man
height inter-connected cement culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip
of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again connected by defendant to a big
hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented
gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also
constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant

thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of
defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same
time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy
seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs, defendant also constructed
an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system
thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy seasons,
so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land
of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned water conductors, contrivances
and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as
follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long canals, such
that the same can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed to
destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code
on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of
the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the
land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person
who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river,
thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream
or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately
owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain
damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged
presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and
the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear
case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage
to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or
negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its
own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under
the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a
distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant
in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action
arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case
according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of
dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs.
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately
executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-4977

March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
W. H. Lawrence, for appellant.
W. L. Wright, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest
relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila.
Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del
Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the
island.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical
engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the
Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder
for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity
and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's
premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power
house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the
neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or
thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol
cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are
intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some
discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of
which each took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years
old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends
of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked
for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed,
causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David
was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the
necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises, nor how long they had
been there when the boys found them. It appears, however, that some months before the accident, during the construction of the
defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant
near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears that at or about the time when these caps were found, similarly caps
were in use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William McKinley. The caps when found appeared
to the boys who picked them up to have been lying for a considerable time, and from the place where they were found would seem to
have been discarded as detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.

No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its
premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. As admitted in defendant counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in
their play sometimes crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will on the uninclosed premises of the
defendant, in the neighborhood of the place where the caps were found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid
these children from visiting the defendant company's premises, although it must be assumed that the company or its employees were
aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports. Later he took up
work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained
employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that
he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.
The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively established by the evidence of record, and are
substantially admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact which are seriously disputed are plaintiff's allegations that the caps which
were found by plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the property of the defendant, or that they had come from its
possession and control, and that the company or some of its employees left them exposed on its premises at the point where they were
found.
The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company, apparently relying on the rule of law which places
the burden of proof of such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof.
We think, however, that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in accord with his allegations in this regard.
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively, on the McKinley extension of the
defendant company's track; that some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the company's premises a few months before the
accident; that not far from the place where the caps were found the company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies and so forth,
used by it in its operations as a street railway and a purveyor of electric light; and that the place, in the neighborhood of which the caps
were found, was being used by the company as a sort of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the
discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the
circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the
place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant company was
either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control. We think also that the evidence tends to
disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot where they
were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that
neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to
sustain a finding that the company or some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left them exposed at a point on its
premises which the general public, including children at play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew
or ought to have known that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.
Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on which these conclusions are based by
intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work on the company's well and on its McKinley extension was done by contractors.
It was conclusively proven, however, that while the workman employed in blasting the well was regularly employed by J. G. White
and Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well directly and immediately under the supervision and control of one of
defendant company's foremen, and there is no proof whatever in the record that the blasting on the McKinley extension was done
by independent contractors. Only one witness testified upon this point, and while he stated that he understood that a part of this work
was done by contract, he could not say so of his own knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the alleged contract,
or of the relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant company. The fact having been proven that detonating caps were more or
less extensively employed on work done by the defendant company's directions and on its behalf, we think that the company should
have introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention if it wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference that it was the
owner of the material used in these operations and that it was responsible for tortious or negligent acts of the agents employed therein,
on the ground that this work had been intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent superior should not
be applied. If the company did not in fact own or make use of caps such as those found on its premises, as intimated by counsel, it was
a very simple matter for it to prove that fact, and in the absence of such proof we think that the other evidence in the record
sufficiently establishes the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on its premises
were its property, and were left where they were found by the company or some of its employees.

Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the
Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by those in
which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also
for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in the service
of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive
substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place.
Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established
the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of these articles, and since we agree with this view of the case, it is not
necessary for us to consider the various questions as to form and the right of action (analogous to those raised in the case of Rakes vs.
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would, perhaps, be involved in a decision affirming the judgment of the court
below.
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the
plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent
evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in the application of these
principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were
found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not
have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around
thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant
which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.

But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and
the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident
which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the
direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter
the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him.
In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the United
States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.
In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender
years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place where
the railroad company knew, or had good reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there found explosive signal
torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees, one of which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured
him; or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it
probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury
in playing with such machine.
In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises liable.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was
liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was,
under circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad
company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to
passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its
tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of adult. While
it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of
another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the
case."
The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several state courts, and
the supreme court of Michigan in the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the
Turntable cases, especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held, in the language of
the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or
willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated
to attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation or license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact
that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children and adults as to the
circumstances that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises.
Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in by the courts in Connecticut and
Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349). And the doctrine has been questioned in Wisconsin,
Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and perhaps in other States.
On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States, citing and approving the doctrine laid down in
England in the leading case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1 Q. B., 29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these cases in accord with that announced
in the Railroad Company vs. Stout (supra), and the Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice
Harlan in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonal and reconsidered the doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and
after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of many of the adjudged cases, both English and American, formally declared that
it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."
In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as follows: The plaintiff, a boy 12 years of age, out of
curiosity and for his own pleasure, entered upon and visited the defendant's premises, without defendant's express permission or
invitation, and while there, was by accident injured by falling into a burning slack pile of whose existence he had no knowledge, but
which had been left by defendant on its premises without any fence around it or anything to give warning of its dangerous condition,

although defendant knew or had reason the interest or curiosity of passers-by. On these facts the court held that the plaintiff could not
be regarded as a mere trespasser, for whose safety and protection while on the premises in question, against the unseen danger referred
to, the defendant was under no obligation to make provision.
We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the principles involved to the facts in that case, because what
is said there is strikingly applicable in the case at bar, and would seem to dispose of defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this
case being a trespasser, the defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case could be held liable for injuries which would not
have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on defendant's premises.
We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied to the case now before us, they require us to
hold that the defendant was guilty of negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its depot
building. It could have forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure. But
it did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to visit its mine, and witness its operation. It knew
that the usual approach to the mine was by a narrow path skirting its slack pit, close to its depot building, at which the people
of the village, old and young, would often assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of frequenting that locality and
playing around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest regard for the safety of these children
would have suggested that they were in danger from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except
when snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into which a child might accidentally fall and be burned to death.
Under all the circumstances, the railroad company ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by
curiosity to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it owed no duty, or for whose protection it
was under no obligation to make provisions.
In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous traps, baited with flesh, in his own ground, so
near to a highway, or to the premises of another, that dogs passing along the highway, or kept in his neighbors premises,
would probably be attracted by their instinct into the traps, and in consequence of such act his neighbor's dogs be so attracted
and thereby injured, an action on the case would lie. "What difference," said Lord Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason
between drawing the animal into the trap by means of his instinct which he can not resist, and putting him there by manual
force?" What difference, in reason we may observe in this case, is there between an express license to the children of this
village to visit the defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an implied license, resulting from the habit of
the defendant to permit them, without objection or warning, to do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring
it the case of Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of Negligence, volume 1, page 305, note, well
says: "It would be a barbarous rule of law that would make the owner of land liable for setting a trap thereon, baited with
stinking meat, so that his neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instinct, might run into it and be killed, and which would
exempt him from liability for the consequence of leaving exposed and unguarded on his land a dangerous machine, so that
his neighbor's child attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally strong, might thereby be killed or
maimed for life."
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case of Powers vs. Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said
that (p. 515):
Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses; and others who are chargeable
with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed
to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them, and which they in their immature judgment might
naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken.
And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied invitation to visit the premises of another, says:
In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might sometimes arise when it would
not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather
for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon
his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication should arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the cases of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra)
and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that wherein those

cases originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless
spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of
machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as
inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises,
therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or
upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this,
and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered
upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The
owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to
know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least
equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable
precautions to guard the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a
breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a
stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the children in the community to
unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and
reasonably be expected to enter.
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a right to do what will with his
own property or that children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the
premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights and interests of the community (see
U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very tender years it would be absurd and
unreasonable in a community organized as is that in which we lived to hold that parents or guardian are guilty of negligence or
imprudence in every case wherein they permit growing boys and girls to leave the parental roof unattended, even if in the event of
accident to the child the negligence of the parent could in any event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it a right to recover in
such cases a point which we neither discuss nor decide.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would
not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury
were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of
the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which
therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that
plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of
the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus
incurred.
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action
between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury
should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not agree with this proposition, although
we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at
length in this decision. As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to
entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from
fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity
and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case." As we think we have shown, under the
reasoning on which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve defendant of responsibility for
injuries resulting from its negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry upon
defendant's uninclosed premises without express permission or invitation' but it is wholly different question whether such youth can be
said to have been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents,
knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an explosion. On this point, which must be determined by "the
particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid, although it is
worthy of observation that in all of the "Torpedo" and analogous cases which our attention has been directed, the record discloses that
the plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender years that they were held not to have the capacity to
understand the nature or character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands.

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than
the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after
the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the
cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described
by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by
his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to
the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to
anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time
when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the
ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a
more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the
explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might
reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under
such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of
such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of
negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the
age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age at
which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts
which may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be
gathered from an examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of
exercising certain rights and incurring certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these provisions of law are of much
practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become
responsible for his own acts varies with the varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of the Penal Code a minor over
fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible therefore, although the fact
that he is less than eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At
10 years of age a child may, under certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And
males of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G. O., No. 68, sec. 1).
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he
exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience
qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the
injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and
immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but
for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate
and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire. (Digest, book 50, tit. 17 rule 203.)
The Patidas contain the following provisions:
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he can not demand
reparation therefor from another. (Law 25, tit. 5, Partida 3.)
And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance should be against himself and not
against another. (Law 2, tit. 7, Partida 2.)

According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance should be against himself and
not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7 Partida 2.)
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays down the law touching contributory negligence
in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its provisions by the supreme court of Spain, and by this court in the
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the right to recover
damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the injuries sustained by him.
The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is directly in point. In that case
the court said:
According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence is a source of obligation when
between such negligence and the injury there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the injury produced should not be
the result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the same, although such acts or omission
were imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the injury was the negligence of the
injured party himself.
The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the alleged fault or negligence is not sufficient without
proof that it, and no other cause, gave rise to the damage."
See also judgment of October 21, 1903.
To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in his Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902
Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the decision of March 7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an
obligation when between it and the damage there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the damage caused does not
arise from the acts or omissions of a third person, there is no obligation to make good upon the latter, even though such acts
or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when it is shown that the immediate cause of the damage has been the
recklessness of the injured party himself.
And again
In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the plaintiff, it is apparent that it is
duty of him who shall claim damages to establish their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July, and
September 27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the necessary points of the proof,
which are two: An act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability, and the production of the
damage by said act or omission.
This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act or omission and the damage; the
latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages
result immediately and directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully; "necessarily presupposing a legal ground for
imputability." (Decision of October 29, 1887.)
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it. (Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6,
pp. 551-552.)
(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)
Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely settled in this court in the maturely
considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held that while "There are many cases (personal injury
cases) was exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions of the
15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided
by the supreme court of Spain "define the effect to be given the negligence of its causes, though not the principal one, and we are left
to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other countries;" and in such cases we declared that law in this jurisdiction to

require the application of "the principle of proportional damages," but expressly and definitely denied the right of recovery when the
acts of the injured party were the immediate causes of the accident.
The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the
accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing
to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the
failure to replace it. This produces the event giving occasion for damagesthat is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of
the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an
element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his act or
omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been
responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in
plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon defendant's premises the detonating
caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the relation of cause and effect between the negligent act or omission of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps. Under the
doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an infant of very tender years would have no effect in relieving defendant of
responsibility, but whether in view of the well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are snappers-up of unconsidered
trifles," a youth of the age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without fault in picking up the caps in question under all the
circumstances of this case, we neither discuss nor decide.
Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court below, without costs to either
party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be returned to the court wherein it originated, where the judgment will be
entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.

LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES,

INC.,
Petitioner,

- versus -

GLODEL BROKERAGE
CORPORATION and
R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 179446

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
January 10, 2011

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the August 24, 2007 Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82822, entitled R&B Insurance Corporation v. Glodel Brokerage Corporation and
Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc., which held petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. (Loadmasters) liable to respondent
Glodel Brokerage Corporation (Glodel) in the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity which R&B Insurance
Corporation (R&B Insurance) paid to the insured-consignee, Columbia Wire and Cable Corporation (Columbia).
THE FACTS:
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132
bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel Richard Rey
from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila.They arrived on the same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent
delivery to its warehouses/plants.Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the
cargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants in Bulacan andValenzuela City.
The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied
by its employed truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6)
truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly delivered
in Columbias warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the
destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo.
Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without the copper cathodes. Because of this
incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39. After the requisite
investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount of P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103040. It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid
to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated to the right of the consignee to recover from the
party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss.[2]
On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision [3] holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss of the subject cargo and
dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees against R&B Insurance. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the plaintiff having established by preponderance of evidence its
claims against defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the latter:
1.

To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the sum of P1,896,789.62 as actual and
compensatory damages, with interest from the date of complaint until fully paid;

2.

To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the amount equivalent to 10% of the principal
amount recovered as and for attorneys fees plusP1,500.00 per appearance in Court;

3.

To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the sum of P22,427.18 as litigation expenses.

WHEREAS, the defendant Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.s counterclaim for damages and attorneys
fees against plaintiff are hereby dismissed.

With costs against defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation.

SO ORDERED.[4]
Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed decision which reads in part:
Considering that appellee is an agent of appellant Glodel, whatever liability the latter owes to appellant
R&B Insurance Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by appellee
Loadmasters.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED in that the appellee
Loadmasters is likewise held liable to appellant Glodel in the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance
indemnity appellant Glodel has been held liable to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation.
Appellant Glodels appeal to absolve it from any liability is herein DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court presenting the following
ISSUES
1. Can Petitioner Loadmasters be held liable to Respondent Glodel in spite of the fact that the latter
respondent Glodel did not file a cross-claim against it (Loadmasters)?
2. Under the set of facts established and undisputed in the case, can petitioner Loadmasters be legally
considered as an Agent of respondent Glodel?[6]

To totally exculpate itself from responsibility for the lost goods, Loadmasters argues that it cannot be considered an agent of
Glodel because it never represented the latter in its dealings with the consignee. At any rate, it further contends that Glodel has no
recourse against it for its (Glodels) failure to file a cross-claim pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Glodel, in its Comment,[7] counters that Loadmasters is liable to it under its cross-claim because the latter was grossly negligent in the
transportation of the subject cargo. With respect to Loadmasters claim that it is already estopped from filing a cross-claim, Glodel
insists that it can still do so even for the first time on appeal because there is no rule that provides otherwise. Finally, Glodel argues
that its relationship with Loadmasters is that of Charter wherein the transporter (Loadmasters) is only hired for the specific job of
delivering the merchandise. Thus, the diligence required in this case is merely ordinary diligence or that of a good father of the family,
not the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers.
R&B Insurance, for its part, claims that Glodel is deemed to have interposed a cross-claim against Loadmasters because it was not
prevented from presenting evidence to prove its position even without amending its Answer. As to the relationship between
Loadmasters and Glodel, it contends that a contract of agency existed between the two corporations.[8]
Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who
is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or securities. [9] Doubtless, R&B
Insurance is subrogated to the rights of the insured to the extent of the amount it paid the consignee under the marine insurance, as
provided under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance
company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company
shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrong-doer or the person who has violated the contract. If
the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be
entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.
As subrogee of the rights and interest of the consignee, R&B Insurance has the right to seek reimbursement from either
Loadmasters or Glodel or both for breach of contract and/or tort.

The issue now is who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay R&B Insurance for the amount of the indemnity it paid
Columbia.
At the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to determine their liability for the
loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their
services to the public.
Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting
goods by land, through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is
generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public. [10] The distinction is
significant in the sense that the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private carriage are governed principally by their
stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.[11]
In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the contract between Loadmasters and Glodel was private in
character. There is no showing that Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services to Glodel.
In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common carrier.[12]
In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. In its Memorandum,[13] it
states that it is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and is engaged in the
business of customs brokering. It cannot be considered otherwise because as held by this Court in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage
Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., [14] a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the transportation of goods being an
integral part of its business.
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the
circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that
extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing and preserving their
own property or rights.[15] This exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the
scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have been lodged for shipment. [16] Thus, in
case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. [17] This presumption of
fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier has observed extraordinary diligence over the goods.
With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary
diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation
until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive
them.[18]
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B
Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B
Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under
the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which expressly provide:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Pertinent is the ruling enunciated in the case of Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Phoenix Assurance
Company of New York,/McGee & Co., Inc. [19] where this Court held that a tort may arise despite the absence of a contractual
relationship, to wit:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee against Mindanao Terminal,
from which the present case has arisen, states a cause of action. The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising
from the negligent and careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Even assuming
that both Phoenix and McGee have only been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a party to
the contract of service between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a cause of

action in light of the Courts consistent ruling that the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. In fine, a
liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. In the present
case,Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of the contract of
service but from the alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del
Monte Produce. Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao
Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action
arising from quasi-delict. [Emphases supplied]
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and
helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the
damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that
the employer failed to exercisediligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of
its employees.[20] To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.[21] In this regard, Loadmasters failed.
Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would fully
comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated destination. It should have been more prudent in
entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by taking precautionary measures, such as providing escorts to accompany the trucks in
delivering the cargoes. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing.
At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there exists no principal-agent relationship between Glodel and Loadmasters, as
erroneously found by the CA. Article 1868 of the Civil Code provides: By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render
some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The elements of a
contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a
juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope
of his authority.[22]
Accordingly, there can be no contract of agency between the parties. Loadmasters never represented Glodel. Neither was it
ever authorized to make such representation. It is a settled rule that the basis for agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and
on behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were
personally executed by the principal. On the part of the principal, there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally
inferable from his words or actions, while on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it.
[23]
Such mutual intent is not obtaining in this case.
What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage
suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages, a party is not relieved from liability, even
partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the damage would not have resulted. It is no
defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence
or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. As stated in the case of Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals,[24]
X x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may
be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that
one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable
for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person,
it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for
the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. [Emphasis
supplied]
The Court now resolves the issue of whether Glodel can collect from Loadmasters, it having failed to file a cross-claim
against the latter.
Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite cause of action against Loadmasters for breach of contract of service as the latter is
primarily liable for the loss of the subject cargo. In this case, however, it cannot succeed in seeking judicial sanction against
Loadmasters because the records disclose that it did not properly interpose a cross-claim against the latter. Glodel did not even pray
that Loadmasters be liable for any and all claims that it may be adjudged liable in favor of R&B Insurance. Under the Rules, a
compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred.[25] Thus, a cross-claim cannot be set up for the first time on
appeal.
For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable
grounds. Equity, which has been aptly described as a justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. [26] The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who has been at fault or
negligent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 24, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals
is MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. and
respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable to respondent R&B Insurance Corporation for
the insurance indemnity it paid to consignee Columbia Wire & Cable Corporation and ordering both parties to pay,
jointly and severally, R&B Insurance Corporation a] the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance
indemnity; b] the amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent thereof for attorneys fees; and c] the amount
of P22,427.18 for litigation expenses.
The cross-claim belatedly prayed for by respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation against petitioner
Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and
acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to
pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO,
DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA,
JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14)
RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban,
province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named
accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto
Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato,
and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio
Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying
said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and
merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in
concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the
incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a
civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states
that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley
Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of
FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of
P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and
all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo Villania,
Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of
reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial court's finding of grave
coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of
market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to
which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the
complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to
vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of accessory
penalties provided by law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages,
P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the appellants are acquitted on
ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of
P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability
results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was committed, not on facts
that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants'
properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual damages, the
imposition of actual damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER
ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT
SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO
UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR,
IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT,
THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES',
AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY
WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF
ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R.
NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the
petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a
consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal
case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability
of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate
civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad
Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v.
Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did
not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition
with axes and other instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were
denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be employed against the person, not
against property as what happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious mischief. But the law does
not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted
for, these offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either threats
or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was by means of threats', it does not allege the
particular threat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before
he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered by the
complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal

action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v.
Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise,
namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the
accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a
separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev.
Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability
which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the
rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law,
his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasidelict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover
damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177
of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section the following
rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person
entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person
who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court
expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v.
Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur
only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the
criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal
is due to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil
case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and
Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is
based does not exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense
charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a
declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the
criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. A
person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate
the public funds in his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper
accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner
not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil
case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the
accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant
efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of
perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a
separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions contained in said
Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question,
with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of
Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it
cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of
Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the
materials of the demolished stall have not been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied with the order to vacate,
the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax,
crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having first
inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the municipal building for
safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken
away, the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:

Cost of stall construction P1,300.00

Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and carted away its
contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This
finds no support in law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which
allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be
summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the complainant's market stall and had its contents
carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the passageways of Market
Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police
Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an
inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal building under the custody of
the Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action
and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic
and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a conviction in the
criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable
nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct
and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict
or other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary
expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal; and
(c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether
based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be
amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based on the same act or omission may only
be instituted in a separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action. To
dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action, would
likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance, and would violate the
doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no pragmatism in the
doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on
reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the nature of
an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate
civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or omission is punishable but
because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).

We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based
on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been
acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes
that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does
not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement
that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in
the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does
not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which imposes an uncalled for burden
before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they could not possibly
have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action
mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the
most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the criminal offense, when the
latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the
other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is
not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of
the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code
Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the
criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely
remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party
may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case
in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil
action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment of
acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

[G.R. No. 122445. November 18, 1997]

DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
"Doctors are protected by a special law. They are not guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result. They are not insurers
against mishap or unusual consequences. Furthermore they are not liable for honest mistake of judgment"[1]
The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical malpractice suit, which in simplest term is the type of claim
which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has cause bodily harm. [2] In
this jurisdiction, however, such claims are most often brought as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, [3] and
in some instances, as a criminal case under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code [4] with which the civil action for damages is
impliedly instituted. It isvia the latter type of action that the heirs of the deceased sought redress for the petitioner's alleged
imprudence and negligence in treating the deceased thereby causing her death. The petitioner and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the
attending anaesthesiologist during the operation of the deceased were charged with "reckless imprudence and negligence resulting to
(sic) homicide" in an information which reads:
"That on or about March 23, 1991, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused abovenamed, being then the attending anaesthesiologist and surgeon, respectively, did then and there, in a
negligence (sic), careless, imprudent, and incompetent manner, and failing to supply or store sufficient provisions and facilities
necessary to meet any and all exigencies apt to arise before, during and/or after a surgical operation causing by such negligence,
carelessness, imprudence, and incompetence, and causing by such failure, including the lack of preparation and foresight needed to
avert a tragedy, the untimely death of said Lydia Umali on the day following said surgical operation." [5]
Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded not guilty to the above-mentioned charge. On March 4, 1994,
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which is hereunder
quoted as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Dr. Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for insufficiency of evidence while her
co-accused Dra. Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible for the death of Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, and therefore guilty
under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 2 months and 1 day imprisonment of
arresto mayor with costs."[6]
The petitioner appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which affirmed in toto the decision of the
MTCC[7] prompting the petitioner to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals but to no avail. Hence this petition for review
on certiorari assailing the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on October 24, 1995 affirming petitioner's conviction with
modification that she is further directed to pay the heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death.[8]
In substance, the petition brought before this Court raises the issue of whether or not petitioner's conviction of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.

First the antecedent facts.

On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and
General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon
of the same day.[9] Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" [10] in her uterus, and
scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. [11] Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March
22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. [12] According to Rowena, she noticed that the
clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and
the floor with.[13] Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation.
[14]
The following day, before her mother was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be
postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner
told her that she must be operated on as scheduled.[15]
Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister and two aunts waited outside the operating room while Lydia
underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules
which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy
blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood from the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the same was brought by the attendant into the
operating room. After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. The operating staff then
went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a
stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able
to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person arrived to
donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for
breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San
Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived. [16] But at around 10:00 o'clock
P.M. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San
Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. [17] The transfer to the San Pablo City District
Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only
when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle
and followed the ambulance.[18]
Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr.
Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. [19] The attending physicians summoned Dr.
Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr.
Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed
petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing he could do to help save the patient. [20] While petitioner was closing the abdominal
wall, the patient died.[21] Thus, on March 24, 1991, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her death
certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent
cause.[22]
In convicting the petitioner, the MTCC found the following circumstances as sufficient basis to conclude that she was indeed
negligent in the performance of the operation:
"x x x, the clinic was untidy, there was lack of provision like blood and oxygen to prepare for any contingency that might happen
during the operation. The manner and the fact that the patient was brought to the San Pablo District Hospital for reoperation indicates
that there was something wrong in the manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted the operation. There was no showing that before the
operation, accused Dr. Cruz had conducted a cardio pulmonary clearance or any typing of the blood of the patient. It was (sic) said in
medical parlance that the "abdomen of the person is a temple of surprises" because you do not know the whole thing the moment it
was open (sic) and surgeon must be prepared for any eventuality thereof. The patient (sic) chart which is a public document was not
presented because it is only there that we could determine the condition of the patient before the surgery. The court also noticed in
Exh. "F-1" that the sister of the deceased wished to postpone the operation but the patient was prevailed upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed
with the surgery. The court finds that Lydia Umali died because of the negligence and carelessness of the surgeon Dra. Ninevetch Cruz
because of loss of blood during the operation of the deceased for evident unpreparedness and for lack of skill, the reason why the
patient was brought for operation at the San Pablo City District Hospital. As such, the surgeon should answer for such negligence.

With respect to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the anaesthesiologist, there is no evidence to indicate that she should be held jointly liable with Dra.
Cruz who actually did the operation."[23]
The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of the MTCC and upheld the latter's declaration of "incompetency, negligence
and lack of foresight and skill of appellant (herein petitioner) in handling the subject patient before and after the operation." [24] And
likewise affirming the petitioner's conviction, the Court of Appeals echoed similar observations, thus:
"x x x. While we may grant that the untidiness and filthiness of the clinic may not by itself indicate negligence, it nevertheless shows
the absence of due care and supervision over her subordinate employees. Did this unsanitary condition permeate the operating room?
Were the surgical instruments properly sterilized? Could the conditions in the OR have contributed to the infection of the patient?
Only the petitioner could answer these, but she opted not to testify. This could only give rise to the presumption that she has nothing
good to testify on her defense. Anyway, the alleged "unverified statement of the prosecution witness" remains unchallenged and
unrebutted.
Likewise undisputed is the prosecution's version indicating the following facts: that the accused asked the patient's relatives to buy
Tagamet capsules while the operation was already in progress; that after an hour, they were also asked to buy type "A" blood for the
patient; that after the surgery, they were again asked to procure more type "A" blood, but such was not anymore available from the
source; that the oxygen given to the patient was empty; and that the son-in-law of the patient, together with a driver of the petitioner,
had to rush to the San Pablo City District Hospital to get the much-needed oxygen. All these conclusively show that the petitioner had
not prepared for any unforeseen circumstances before going into the first surgery, which was not emergency in nature, but was elective
or pre-scheduled; she had no ready antibiotics, no prepared blood, properly typed and cross-matched, and no sufficient oxygen supply.
Moreover, there are a lot of questions that keep nagging Us. Was the patient given any cardio-pulmonary clearance, or at least a
clearance by an internist, which are standard requirements before a patient is subjected to surgery. Did the petitioner determine as part
of the pre-operative evaluation, the bleeding parameters of the patient, such as bleeding time and clotting time? There is no showing
that these were done. The petitioner just appears to have been in a hurry to perform the operation, even as the family wanted the
postponement to April 6, 1991. Obviously, she did not prepare the patient; neither did she get the family's consent to the operation.
Moreover, she did not prepare a medical chart with instructions for the patient's care. If she did all these, proof thereof should have
been offered. But there is none. Indeed, these are overwhelming evidence of recklessness and imprudence."[25]
This court, however, holds differently and finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that
material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing
in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. [26] In the recent case
of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al.,[27] this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that,
having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training,
care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert
testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment
and care falls below such standard. [28] Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable
only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as
to causation.[29]
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the
standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's expert
witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified
as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should
have exercised.

All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of the clinic and its untidiness; the lack of provisions such as blood,
oxygen, and certain medicines; the failure to subject the patient to a cardio-pulmonary test prior to the operation; the omission of any
form of blood typing before transfusion; and even the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation
performed on her by the petitioner. But while it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the courts below seemed beyond
cavil to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion is still best arrived at not through the educated
surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. For whether a
physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a
matter of expert opinion.[30] The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the
latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. [31] Expert testimony
should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the
standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. It must be remembered that
when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he
takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is
sufficiently established.[32] This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of provisions; the failure to
conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation
performed on her by the petitioner do indicate, even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise
of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the
fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a
reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of
such breach and the resulting death of his patient. [33] In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc.,[34] where the attending physician was
absolved of liability for the death of the complainant's wife and newborn baby, this court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the 'injury for which recovery is sought must be
the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.' In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the
injury. For, 'negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of.' And 'the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'''[35] (Underscoring supplied.)
Dr. Arizala who conducted an autopsy on the body of the deceased summarized his findings as follows:
"Atty. Cachero:
Q. You mentioned about your Autopsy Report which has been marked as Exh. "A-1-b". There appears here a signature
above the typewritten name Floresto Arizala, Jr., whose signature is that?
A. That is my signature, sir.
Q. Do you affirm the truth of all the contents of Exh. "A-1-b"?
A. Only as to the autopsy report no. 91-09, the time and place and everything after the post mortem findings, sir.
Q. You mentioned on your "Post Mortem Findings" about surgical incision, 14:0 cm., infraumbilical area, anterior
abdominal area, midline, will you please explain that in your own language?
A. There was incision wound (sic) the area just below the navel, sir.
Q. And the last paragraph of the postmortem findings which I read: Uterus, pear-shaped and pale measuring 7.5 x 5.5 x 5.0
cm, with some surface nodulation of the fundic area posteriorly. Cut-section shows diffusely pale myometrium with

areas of streak induration. The ovaries and adnexal structures are missing with the raw surfaces patched with clotted
blood. Surgical sutures were noted on the operative site.
Intestines and mesenteries are pale with blood clots noted between the mesentric folds.
Hemoperitonium: 300 s.s.,
right paracolic gutter,
50 c.c., left paracolic gutter
200 c.c., mesentric area,
100 c.c., right pelvic gutter
stomach empty.
Other visceral organs, pale.',
will you please explain that on (sic) your own language or in ordinary
A. There was a uterus which was not attached to the adnexal structures namely ovaries which were not present and also
sign of previous surgical operation and there were (sic) clotted blood, sir.
Q. How about the ovaries and adnexal structures?
A. They are missing, sir.
Q. You mean to say there are no ovaries?
A. During that time there are no ovaries, sir.
Q. And there were likewise sign of surgical sutures?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How about the intestines and mesenteries are place (sic) with blood clots noted between the mesenteric folds, will you
please explain on (sic) this?
A. In the peritoneal cavity, they are mostly perritonial blood.
Q. And what could have caused this blood?
A. Well, ordinarily blood is found inside the blood vessel. Blood were (sic) outside as a result of the injuries which
destroyed the integrity of the vessel allowing blood to sip (sic) out, sir.
Q. By the nature of the postmortem findings indicated in Exh. A-1-B, can you tell the court the cause of death?
A. Yes, sir. The cause of death is: Gross findings are compatible with hemorrhagic shock.
Q. Can you tell the us what could have caused this hemorrhagic shock?
A. Well hemorrhagic shock is the result of blood loss.

Q. What could have the effect of that loss of blood?

A. Unattended hemorrhage, sir.[36] (Underscoring supplied.)
The foregoing was corroborated by Dr. Nieto Salvador:
"Q. And were you able to determine the cause of death by virtue of the examination of the specimen submitted by Dr.
Arizala?
A. Without knowledge of the autopsy findings it would be difficult for me to determine the cause of death, sir.
Q. Have you examined the post mortem of Dr. Arizala?
A. Yes, sir, and by virtue of the autopsy report in connection with your pathology report.
Q. What could have caused the death of the victim?
A. This pathologic examination are (sic) compatible with the person who died, sir.
Q. Will you explain to us the meaning of hemorrhagic compatible?
A. It means that a person died of blood loss. Meaning a person died of non-replacement of blood and so the victim before
she died there was shock of diminish of blood of the circulation. She died most probably before the actual complete
blood loss, sir.
Court: Is it possible doctor that the loss of the blood was due on (sic) operation?
A. Based on my pathology findings, sir.
Q. What could have caused this loss of blood?
A. Many, sir. A patient who have undergone surgery. Another may be a blood vessel may be cut while on operation and this
cause (sic) bleeding, or may be set in the course of the operation, or may be (sic) he died after the operation. Of course
there are other cause (sic).
Atty. Cachero:
Q. Especially so doctor when there was no blood replacement?
A. Yes, sir."[37] (Underscoring supplied.)
The testimonies of both doctors establish hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death. However, as likewise testified
to by the expert witnesses in open court, hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock during surgery may be caused by several different factors.
Thus, Dr. Salvador's elaboration on the matter:
"Atty. Pascual:
Q. Doctor, among the causes of hemorrhage that you mentioned you said that it could be at the moment of operation when
one losses (sic) control of the presence, is that correct? During the operation there is lost (sic) of control of the cut
vessel?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Or there is a failure to ligate a vessel of considerable size?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or even if the vessel were ligated the knot may have slipped later on?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you also mentioned that it may be possible also to some clotting defect, is that correct?
A. May be (sic)."[38] (Underscoring supplied).
Defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro also gave the following expert opinion:
"Q. Doctor even a patient after an operations (sic) would suffer hemorrage what would be the possible causes of such
hemorrage (sic)?
A. Among those would be what we call Intravascular Coagulation and this is the reason for the bleeding, sir, which cannot
be prevented by anyone, it will happen to anyone, anytime and to any persons (sic), sir.
COURT:
What do you think of the cause of the bleeding, the cutting or the operations done in the body?
A. Not related to this one, the bleeding here is not related to any cutting or operation that I (sic) have done.
Q. Aside from the DIC what could another causes (sic) that could be the cause for the hemorrhage or bleeding in a patient
by an operations (sic)?
A. In general sir, if there was an operations (sic) and it is possible that the ligature in the suture was (sic) become (sic)
loose, it is (sic) becomes loose if proven.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. If the person who performed an autopsy does not find any untight (sic) clot (sic) blood vessel or any suture that become
(sic) loose the cause of the bleeding could not be attributed to the fault of the subject?
A. Definitely, sir."[39] (Underscoring supplied.)
According to both doctors, the possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: (1) the failure of the surgeon to tie or
suture a cut blood vessel; (2) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; (3) the subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied
to a cut blood vessel; and (4) and a clotting defect known as DIC. It is significant to state at this juncture that the autopsy conducted by
Dr. Arizala on the body of Lydia did not reveal any untied or unsutured cut blood vessel nor was there any indication that the tie or
suture of a cut blood vessel had become loose thereby causing the hemorrhage. [40] Hence the following pertinent portion of Dr.
Arizala's testimony:
"Q: Doctor, in examining these structures did you know whether these were sutured ligature or plain ligature
A: Ligature, sir.
Q: We will explain that later on. Did you recall if the cut structures were tied by first suturing it and then tying a knot or the
tie was merely placed around the cut structure and tied?

A: I cannot recall, sir.

Q: As a matter of fact, you cannot recall because you did not even bothered (sic) to examine, is that correct?
A: Well, I bothered enough to know that they were sutured, sir.
Q: So, therefore, Doctor, you would not know whether any of the cut structures were not sutured or tied neither were you
able to determine whether any loose suture was found in the peritoneal cavity?
A: I could not recall any loose sutured (sic), sir."[41]
On the other hand, the findings of all three doctors do not preclude the probability that DIC caused the hemorrhage and
consequently, Lydia's death. DIC which is a clotting defect creates a serious bleeding tendency and when massive DIC occurs as a
complication of surgery leaving raw surface, major hemorrhage occurs. [42] And as testified to by defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro,
hemorrhage due to DIC "cannot be prevented, it will happen to anyone, anytime."[43] He testified further:
"Q. Now, under the circumstance one of the possibility as you mentioned in (sic) DIC?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you mentioned that it cannot be prevented?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you even predict if it really happen (sic)?
A. Possible, sir.
Q. Are there any specific findings of autopsy that will tell you whether this patient suffered among such things as DIC?
A. Well, I did reserve because of the condition of the patient.
Q. Now, Doctor you said that you went through the record of the deceased Lydia Umali looking for the chart, the operated
(sic) records, the post mortem findings on the histophanic (sic) examination based on your examination of record,
doctor, can you more or less says (sic) what part are (sic) concerned could have been the caused (sic) of death of this
Lydia Umali?
A. As far as the medical record is concern (sic) the caused (sic) of death is dessimulated (sic) Intra Vascular Coagulation or
the DIC which resulted to hemorrhage or bleedings, sir.
Q. Doctor based on your findings then there is knowing (sic) the doctor would say whether the doctor her (sic) has been
(sic) fault?
ATTY. MALVEDA:
We will moved (sic) to strike out the (sic) based on finding they just read the chart as well as the other record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Precisely based on this examination.
ATTY. MALVEDA:

Not finding, there was no finding made.

COURT:
He is only reading the record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Yes, sir.
A. No, sir, there is no fault on the part of the surgeon, sir." [44]
This court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense witnesses that
substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to by an expert
witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was
unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal
of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. While we condole with the family of Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by
the dictates of justice and fair dealing which hold inviolable the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a
conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.
[45]

The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to
render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. A
precious life has been lost and the circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased
continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the present time [46] and this Court is aware that no amount of compassion and
commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of
moral and exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Let the copy of this decision be furnished to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147703

April 14, 2004

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot
defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary
civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in
one single decision that has become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 29, 20002 and the March 27,
20013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is orderedDISMISSED."4
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.5
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum
of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for one year at P2,500.00 a month,P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum ofP237,323.75
for funeral expenses, her unearned income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum
of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum ofP22,838.00 as
funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per
month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors fees ofP170,000.00 for the
orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover
future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, andP25,000.00 as
moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00 for loss of income,
and P25,000.00 as moral damages;

g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss
earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00
for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for medicines,P1,710.00 as actual
damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual
damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount ofP250,000.00 as
actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as
actual damages;
"The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the
accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
"Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided
by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal
filed in behalf of accused.
"Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29,
1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On
December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG
moved to be excused from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is confined
to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999,
[respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss."6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once
determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against
the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had
already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory.
Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment
of conviction independently of the accused.
"B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to
the instant case."8

There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction
against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact
that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy."
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not
thereby be placed in double jeopardy.9 Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been
given a more severe penalty.10 On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil
liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as
much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.11
Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal
during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal."12
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to
the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief. 13
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in
absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless
remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x"14
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise
arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them.15 While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are
deemed to have waived the appeal.16
Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case

As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which we quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal
is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.17
Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly
liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests
lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper
himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such
goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeepers employees."
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which reads:
"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties."
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a
criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
"x x x

xxx

x x x"

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal
action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by
execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee. 19

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately
from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,20 33,21 3422 and 217623 of the Civil Code shall remain "separate,
distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and
omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since
they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish
the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.24
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex
delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately,
the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor
-- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein. 25
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable."26
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof.
Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon
M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it
noted that none can be applied to it, because "in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not interpose an appeal."27 Indeed,
petitioner cannot cite any single case in which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not
possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the
criminal cases instituted against their employees. 28 Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should
be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers,
as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as
a whole. These intentions are apparent from its Appellants Brief29 filed with the CA and from its Petition30 before us, both of which
claim that the trial courts finding of guilt "is not supported by competent evidence." 31
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the
whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate,
whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.32 This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of
conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or
reduce the penalty it imposed.34
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a
penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus
violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without his consent.

We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear,
though, that petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his
appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.35 Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period
of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang
Gioc36 ruled:
"There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one
of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it
either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will
be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x."37
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his
chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his
option.38 Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.39
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and
executory.40
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail,
he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v.
Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply to the present case, because it has followed the
Courts directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By participating in the
defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid
down -- that an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees
in the event of the latters insolvency.44 The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are
deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.45 Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial
court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the
person who is subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final
judgment rendered by a competent court.48 By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees
without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the
formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee. 49
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed
the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed
by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.50

The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination must be based on the evidence that the
offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which
the employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;51and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the
employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed
its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the
accused-employees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be
imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into
two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt
has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but
not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the
civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also
become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the
imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil
liability incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso
facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal
wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence. 52
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.53 It is merely a procedural remedy of
statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such
exercise.54 Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied with.55
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be
discarded.56 Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.57 In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous
litigations, such rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases. 58
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. 59
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be
said that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. 60 In
fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his
insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an employeremployee relationship; that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the
wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of
petitioner that "[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then
operated by petitioners driver,Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x."61 Neither does petitioner dispute
that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74041

July 29, 1987

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS and FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused,
FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused-appellant.
YAP, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XX, rendered on February 17, 1986, convicting the
accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat, of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was
Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a ,Seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed
of Es cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less.1
Only Fernando Gabat was arrested and brought to trial and convicted. The other accused, Rogelio Ligon, was never apprehended and
is still at large.
The fatal incident happened on a Sunday, October 23, 1983 at about 6:10 p.m. The accused, Fernando Gabat, was riding in a 1978
Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father, Antonio Gabat, and driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi was coming

from Espana Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. Fernando Gabat was seated beside the driver, in the front seat by the
window on the right side of the Kombi. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the
underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, the Kombi had to stop as the traffic light was red. While waiting for the traffic light to change,
Fernando Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales for short) to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales
approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to
green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at
the crucial moment, and immediately thereafter, is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. It is not
controverted, however, that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but
apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital,
where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.
Following close behind the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Prudencio Castillo. He was behind the Kombi, at
a distance of about three meters, travelling on the same lane in a slightly oblique position ("a little bit to the right"). 2 As the Kombi did
not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas
Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument, Castillo saw an ownertype jeep with two persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao."3 The two men
in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when
the traffic light turned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two men on board the jeep
turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio
Ligon, and his companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi,
a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat. 4 The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police
District and turned over to Pfc. Fernan Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also went along with them. The written
statements of Castillo and Rodolfo Primicias were taken by the traffic investigator, Pfc. Fernan Payuan. 5 Payuan also prepared a
Traffic Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the following
day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation.
Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in court against Rogelio Ligon dated December 6, 1983 charging him with
Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.7 Six months later, however, or on June 28, 1984, Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another
information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide.8He filed the latter information on the basis of a
Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo9 and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors, who
allegedly witnessed the incident on October 23, 1983.10 These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal
Cantos on January 17, 1984.
On October 31, 1983, an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Orlando V.
Salvador, who stated in his autopsy report that the cause of death of Rosales was "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, secondary to
traumatic injuries of the head."11
The prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, that Gabat grabbed the box of
cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting
the pavement. In its decision, the trial court summarized the testimony of Castillo as follows: At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of
October 23, 1983, Castillo was then driving his taxicab along Lerma Street near Far Eastern University, and at the intersection of
Lerma and Quezon Boulevard, the traffic light changed from green to red. The vehicular traffic stopped and Prudencio Castillo's taxi
was right behind a Volkswagen Kombi. While waiting for the traffic light to change to green, Castillo Idly watched the Volkswagen
Kombi and saw Gabat, the passenger sitting beside the driver, signal to a cigarette vendor. The cigarette vendor, Rosales, approached
the right side of the Kombi. While Rosales was handing the cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light suddenly changed to green. When the
Kombi moved forward, Gabat suddenly grabbed the cigarette box held by Rosales. Taken aback, Jose Rosales ran beside the Kombi
and was able to hold on to the windowsill of the right front door with his right hand. While Rosales was clinging to the windowsill,
with both feet off the ground, the Kombi continued to speed towards the C.M. Recto underpass. Castillo, who was closely following
the Kombi, then saw Gabat forcibly remove the hand of Rosales from the windowsill and the latter fell face down on Quezon
Boulevard near the Recto underpass.12
The version of the defense, on the other hand, was summarized by the court as follows: On the date and time in question, Fernando
Gabat, 31 years old, an underwriter, was on board the Volkswagen Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi had to stop at the
intersection of Lerma Street and Quezon Boulevard when the traffic light turned red. Fernando Gabat, who wanted to buy cigarettes,

called a cigarette vendor who approached the right side of the Kombi. Gabat bought two sticks of cigarettes and handed to the
cigarette vendor, Rosales, a P5.00 bill. In order to change the P5.00 big, Rosales placed his cigarette box containing assorted cigarettes
on the windowsill of the front door of the Kombi between the arm of Gabat and the window frame. Suddenly, the traffic light changed
from red to green and Rogelio Ligon moved the vehicle forward, heedless of the transaction between Gabat and the cigarette vendor.
As the vehicle sped onward, the cigarette box which was squeezed between the right arm of Gabat and the window frame fell inside
the Kombi. Rosales then ran beside the vehicle and clung to the windowsill of the moving vehicle. Gabat testified that when he saw
the cigarette vendor clinging on the side of the front door, he told Ligon to veer to the right in order that Rosales could get off at the
sidewalk. However, Gabat declared, that Ligon said that it could not be done because of the moving vehicular traffic. Then, while the
vehicle slowed down and Ligon was maneuvering to the right in an attempt to go toward the sidewalk, Rosales lost his grip on the
window frame and fell to the pavement of Quezon Boulevard. Gabat allegedly shouted at Ligon to stop but Ligon replied that they
should go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to the parents of Gabat, and later they would come back to the scene of the incident.
However, while the Kombi was speeding along Dewey Boulevard, it was blocked by the taxi of Prudencio Castillo and a jeep driven
by policemen. Gabat and Ligon were brought to police headquarters, but neither of them executed any written statement. 13
The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed
the cigarette box from Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its
window. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the
windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have fallen down, having already been able to balance himself on the
stepboard.
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on
the windowsill of the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5-peso bill of
Gabat. The court said that it is of common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their
cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bin given by a customer.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless it is shows that the
findings are not supported by the evidence, or the court failed to consider certain material facts and circumstances in its evaluation of
the evidence. In the case at bar, a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked
by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable
doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal.
While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with no motive, according to the court a quo, "other than to see
that justice be done," his testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event
could have been faulty or mistaken. The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which
Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial. 14 Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the
1978 Volkswagen Kombi is on the upper portion, occupying approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making
it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. These are
circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat
and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell down. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following
it at a distance of about three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony
that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is
thus subject to a reasonable doubt, specially considering that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds, and both vehicles
during that time were moving fast in the traffic.
We find it significant that in his statement given to the police that very evening,15 Castillo did not mention that he saw Gabat forcibly
prying off the hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, although the police report prepared by the investigating officer, Pfc.
Fermin M. Payuan, on the same date, stated that when the traffic signal changed to green and the driver stepped on the gas, the
cigarette box of the cigarette vendor (Rosales) was grabbed by the passenger Gabat and "instantly the former clung to the door and
was dragged at a distance while at the same time the latter punched the vendor's arm until the same (sic) fell to the pavement," thus
showing that during the police investigation Castillo must have given a statement to the police which indicated that Gabat did
something to cause Rosales to fall from the Kombi.16 It was by way of a supplementary affidavit prepared by the lawyer of the
complainant and sworn to by Castillo before the Assistant City Fiscal on January 17, 1984 that this vital detail was added. This
supplementary affidavit was made the basis for filing another information charging both Gabat and the driver with the crime of
Robbery with Homicide.

Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has
been established beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a
crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.
However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability.1avvphi1 While the guilt of the
accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages.17 The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.18
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission,
has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal
was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch
as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the
distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private
rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code
reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of
the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine
upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every
private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because
the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect
in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable
persons injured or wronged. 19
In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability of
Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses at the trial and
applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and
omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of
calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to
the death of Rosales. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward while the purchase
was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to
the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the driver's act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim.
These proven facts taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code 20 for the damage done to
Rosales.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Gabat for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. However, he is hereby
held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault or negligence, and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y
Ortiz in the amount of P15.000.00 for the latter's death, P1,733.35 for hospital and medical expenses, and P4,100.00 for funeral
expenses. The alleged loss of income amounting to P20,000.00, not being supported by sufficient evidence, is DENIED. Costs de
officio.
SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF EDUARDO
SIMON,
Petitioners,

-versus -

G.R. No. 157547

Present:
BRION, Acting Chairperson,**
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,***
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS,
February 23, 2011
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited
and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
Antecedents
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an
information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381
entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value
Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of P336,000.00 said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety
(90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil
action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment
(docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).[2] He alleged in his complaint the following:
xxx
2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation encashed a check
dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter that the check is duly
funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is
hereto attached as Annex A;
3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the ground that the
account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to his representation that he
has an existing account with the said bank and that the said check was duly funded and will be honored when
presented for payment;
4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the payment of the value of the check,
xerox copy of the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex B, but despite such demand defendant refused and
continues to refuse to comply with plaintiffs valid demand;
5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiffs valid demands, plaintiff has been
compelled to retain the services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as reasonable attorneys fees the amount
of P50,000.00 plus additional amount of P2,000.00 per appearance.
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation upon which this
action is brought and that there is no sufficient security for the claims sought in this action which fraud consist in the
misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing account and sufficient funds to cover the check when in
fact his account was already closed at the time he issued a check;
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one which falls under Section 1, subparagraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the plaintiff is as much
as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of damages should it be
finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. [3]
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented on August 17,
2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.[4]

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for
damages,[5] pertinently averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action between the
instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled People of
the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon, docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the instant action is
dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx
xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case No.
915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of the instant civil action is the herein
plaintiffs criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a
consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiffs hands upon presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land
Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff
by defendant who is the accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex 1.
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately xxx.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond
for damages, stating:
1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiffs complaint is the alleged pendency of
another action between the same parties for the same cause, contending among others that the pendency of Criminal
Case No. 275381-CR entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon renders this case dismissable;
2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the filing of
the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest; however, it is the submission of the plaintiff
that an implied reservation of the right to file a civil action has already been made, first, by the fact that the
information for violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of damages
suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private
complainant in the criminal case, during the presentation of the prosecution evidence was not represented at all by a
private prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove
damages; all of these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the right of the plaintiff
to file a separate civil action for damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which
mandates that after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment
has been rendered in the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and conveniently failed to consider that
under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides as follows:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it is based on fraud, this
action therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal action;
4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the right to file a separate
civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation
which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued
the defendant to enforce his liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the
allegation of the defendant of the alleged circumstances relative to the issuance of the check, still when he delivered
the check payable to bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by
delivery by who ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and effective against the drawer;

5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances relative to the
issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have been aware that such check was
intended only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering that the said check was payable to bearer and
was not even crossed;
6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case without a reservation
is a civil action arising from the criminal offense charged. However, in this instant case since the liability of the
defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by the negotiable instruments law, even without any
reservation at all this instant action may still be prosecuted;
7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiffs complaint the application for damages against the bond is totally
without any legal support and perforce should be dismissed outright.[6]
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs
attachment bond for damages,[7]dismissing the complaint of Chan because:
xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the
application to charge plaintiffs bond for damages.
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a)
identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be such
that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other. xxx
A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as Sum of Money and the criminal case for violation of
BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not only identical but also the cause of action being asserted,
which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the amount of P336,000.00. In both civil and
criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts, are identical.
Plaintiffs claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing to the fact
that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no private prosecutor during the
presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or criminal Information is
filed, even without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim them, the offended party has the
right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended
party has instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of the said provision conveys that the waiver
which includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the
Civil Code must be both clear and express. And this must be logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is to
prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to his right to pursue
the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the defendant herein. To the considered view
of this court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed legally barred. The right to institute a
separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. xxx
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiffs submission that the herein case for sum of money is one based
on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:
1.

Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of litis pendentia;

2.

Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000;

3.

Charge the plaintiffs bond the amount of P336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the damages
sustained by the latter by virtue of the implementation of the writ of attachment;

4.

Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the defendants physical
possession the vehicle seized from him on August 16, 2000; and

5.

Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.
Chans motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,[8] viz:
Considering that the plaintiffs arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous submissions, and
which submissions this court have already passed upon; and taking into account the inapplicability of the ratio
decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein
expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chans complaint, disposing:[9]
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review,[10] challenging the propriety of
the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.
In his comment, [11] Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice
in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case because of
the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,[12] overturning the RTC, viz:
xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the
criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is
the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity
which is also civil in nature. Thus, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in
the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1,
2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot
be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed.

In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only the civil liability
arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil action under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver
referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense
charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted
separately without a reservation.
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions
which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. xxx
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on account of the
fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed
independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.
It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The complaint was also brought on
allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by the respondent in the issuance of the check
which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court, despite the pendency of the criminal case for violation of BP
22 against the respondent. While it may be true that the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
pertaining to independent civil action became effective on December 1, 2000, the same may be given retroactive
application and may be made to apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules may be given retroactive
application. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.

In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages in favor of the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simons motion for reconsideration.[13]
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its decision on the assessment that the
civil case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the CAs reliance on the ruling
in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez [14] stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding the
application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.[15]
In his comment,[16] Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal;
that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the
criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate civil action.

Issue
The lone issue is whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an
independent civil action.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in Banal v.
Judge Tadeo, Jr.,[17] holding:
xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be
had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The
indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil
692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil
action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses (United States v.
Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the
payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended
private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the
remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave
the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant
drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to
naught.
xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear
from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing
fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but
any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.[18]
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but
any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of
the civil and criminal actions.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00
on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any
right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. [19] Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the
time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, [20] except that in criminal
cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at
the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the
Constitution.[21]
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested right, because the new
rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines
shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which
penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include
the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.[22]
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based upon the amount of the check involved which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed, in
accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last
amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party further seeks to
enforce against the accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he
shall pay the corresponding filing fees therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or
information. If not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of such
fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of
Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.

4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect
on November 1, 1997.
The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia
Dynamic Electrix Corporation,[23] thus:
xxx
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P.
22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of
Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation
of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is
no longer needed. The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
(a)

xxx

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate
or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged
therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the criminal
action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the
complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are
required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the
Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog
court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because
ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect
of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even
informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the
number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to
expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another
for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules
is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate
civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed
in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of
the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have
previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored
checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further
delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil
liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article
31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.[24]
The CAs reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez [25] to give due course to the civil action of Chan
independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution
for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the
issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22,[26] the procedures for the
recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa,

the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,[27] asDMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the
Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the
issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
To repeat, Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could
not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.
B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of
Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary,
namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such
that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the
other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil. [28]
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements
of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No.
915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil
Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby
indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were
identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise,
Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis
pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside the decision promulgated
by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 45, in Pasay City.
Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12191

October 14, 1918

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.

FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad
Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is
located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila
where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon
the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making,
his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a
moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to
cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the
railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground.
When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with
a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled
from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the
plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located
some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging
from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the fact that it was the
customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for the shipment to the market. They were
contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of
sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot
alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the
darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries which he had received were
very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm
was amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second
operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff

expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his
curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages of the
defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of
melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's
trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew
therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of
melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due
caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the
defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the
manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an
effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the
damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is
necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to
respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of
defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal
viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can
be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to
obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article
relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this distinction, which
was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In
commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself
constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident
in the performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code
is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood to be those not growing out
of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing
from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code.
(Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon employers
with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not
based, as in the English Common Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior if it were, the master would be liable in every
case and unconditionally but upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who
by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused. One who places a powerful
automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an
act of negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises
at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the
master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the
servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the
servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.

It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves the master from liability for
the latter's acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the
liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by
mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant,
taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to
them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties,
and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such
third person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent
in the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code, has held that these articles are
applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624),
which was an action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by
the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article
1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of
the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the
notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in
relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant in conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary
that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely
establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that
the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or
superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts
or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence
in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his
liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or
omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members, or which arise from these relations, other than
contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of
society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights
imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if
productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this
character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or
negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of
the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to
elect and our Legislature has so elected whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons
of public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those person who acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute

or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability with
certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control
of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another, is wholly different from that
to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or
omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred
show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform
the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to
negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficientprima
facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of
its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which
presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not
necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach was due to the negligent conduct
of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of
defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to
the action. If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the
anomalous result would be that person acting through the medium of agents or servants in the performance of their contracts, would be
in a better position than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the
bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability
for the breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his
servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically complete
immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such juridical persons can of necessity
only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had been taken in selection
and direction of such servants. If one delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the
negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the
breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection
and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere incident to the performance
of a contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and
December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant
sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected
defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence, such as those to which
article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings imposed
by the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damage done by the negligent acts of their
servants will show that in no case has the court ever decided that the negligence of the defendant's servants has been held to constitute
a defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a carriage was not liable for the damages caused
by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that
the defendant had been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages
caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get adrift by the negligence of defendant's servants in the

course of the performance of a contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the
defendant grew out of a contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are
applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages for the personal injuries
caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile in which defendant was riding at the time. The
court found that the damages were caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile, but held that the master was not liable,
although he was present at the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . . The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the
owner for such length of time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its
conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903, although the facts disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff
constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out of the contract of transportation. The express ground of the decision in this case was
that article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes the distinction between private
individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the selection or
direction of servants; and that in the particular case the presumption of negligence had not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as though founded in tort rather than as based
upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were
in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must have been the same in any
event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper
discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the
duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether
negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an extracontractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage
due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that a defendant is liable in
damages for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his
servants, the practical result is identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because the court held in the
Yamada case that defendant was liable for the damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to whom it was bound by
contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent in the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case
the court would have held that it would have been a good defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of
the contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres of contractual and extra-contractual
obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does,
the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a
person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe
means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its nonperformance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an
obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains,
the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train
had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if
the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence

merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact
guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him
could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a
passenger to alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion
that this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train
was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place
where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury
where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have
suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe
alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec.
3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving
railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age,
sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the
care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries
on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say that the test is
this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have
admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff
should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.1awph!l.net
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the
train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find,
ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant
was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a
right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as we have
already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty
owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting
passengers, the placing of them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be
noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance
from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the
passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an
aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the
passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily
affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than
men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs.
Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this
station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take
or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight
while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.

The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he
has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful
occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years.
We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and
that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other
incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both
instances. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-12163

March 4, 1959

PAZ FORES, petitioner,

vs.
IRENEO MIRANDA, respondent.
Alberto O. Villaraza for petitioner.
Almazan and Ereneta for respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Defendant-petitioner Paz Fores brings this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (C.A. Case No. 1437-R)
awarding to the plaintiff-respondent Ireneo Miranda the sums of P5,000 by way of actual damages and counsel fees, and P10,000 as
moral damages, with costs.
Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge
at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to swerve and to his the bridge wall. The accident occurred on
the morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the passengers were injured, including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper
right humerus. He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected to a series of operations; the
first on May 23, 1953, when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed into place; a second, effected to insert a
metal splint, and a third one to remove such splint. At the time of the trial, it appears that respondent had not yet recovered the use of
his right arm.
The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was
sentenced accordingly.
The contention that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the identity of the vehicle as the belonging to the petitioner was rejected
by the appellate court which found, among other things, that is carried plate No. TPU-1163, SERIES OF 1952, Quezon City, registered
in the name of Paz Fores, (appellant herein) and that the vehicle even had the name of "Doa Paz" painted below its wind shield. No
evidence to the contrary was introduced by the petitioner, who relied on an attack upon the credibility of the two policemen who went
to the scene of the incident.
A point to be further remarked is petitioner's contention that on March 21, 1953, or one day before the accident happened, she
allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain Carmen Sackerman.
The initial problem raised by the petitioner in this appeal may be formulated thus "Is the approval of the Public Service
Commission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same?"
Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the court of Appeals answered the query in the affirmative. The ruling should be upheld.
Section 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146) provides:
Sec. 20. Subject to established limitations and exceptions and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any
public service or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the previous approval and authority of the Commission
previously had
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(g) To sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property, franchises, certificates, privileges, or rights, or any part
thereof; or merge or consolidate its property, franchises, privileges or rights, or any part thereof, with those of any other
public service. The approval herein required shall be given, after notice to the public and after hearing the persons interested
at a public hearing, if it be shown that there are just and reasonable grounds for making the mortgage or encumbrance, for
liabilities of more than one year maturity, or the sale, alienation, lease, merger, or consolidation to be approved and that the
same are not detrimental to the public interest, and in case of a sale, the date on which the same is to be consummated shall
be fixed in the order of approval: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the
transaction from being negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public
service of any of its property in the ordinary course of its business.
Interpreting the effects of this particular provision of law, we have held in the recent cases of Montoya vs. Ignacio,* 50 Off. Gaz. No.
1, p. 108; Timbol vs. Osias, et al., G. R. No. L-7547, April 30, 1955, and Medina vs. Cresencia, 99 Phil., 506; 52 Off. Gaz. No. 10, p.
4606, that a transfer contemplated by the law, if made without the requisite approval of the Public Service Commission, is not
effective and binding in so far as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in relation to the public is concerned. Petitioner
assails, however, the applicability of these rulings to the instant case, contending that in those cases, the operator did not convey, by
lease or by sale, the vehicle independently of his rights under the franchise. This line of reasoning does not find support in the law. The

provisions of the statute are clear and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of the property, franchise, certificate,
privileges or rights, or any part thereof of the owner or operator of the public service Commission. The law was designed primarily for
the protection of the public interest; and until the approval of the public Service Commission is obtained the vehicle is, in
contemplation of law, still under the service of the owner or operator standing in the records of the Commission which the public has a
right to rely upon.
The proviso contained in the aforequoted law, to the effect that nothing therein shall be construed "to prevent the transaction from
being negotiated or complete before its approval", means only that the sale without the required approval is still valid and binding
between the parties (Montoya vs. Ignacio, supra). The phrase "in the ordinary course of its business" found in the other proviso" or to
prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public service of any of its property". As correctly observed by the lower court, could not
have been intended to include the sale of the vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such property that may be conceivably
disposed or by the carrier in the ordinary course of its business, like junked equipment or spare parts.
The case of Indalecio de Torres vs. Vicente Ona (63 Phil., 594, 597) is enlightening; and there, it was held:
Under the law, the Public Service Commission has not only general supervision and regulation of, but also full jurisdiction
and control over all public utilities including the property, equipment and facilities used, and the property rights and franchise
enjoyed by every individual and company engaged i the performance of a public service in the sense this phrase is used in the
Public Service Act or Act No. 3108). By virtue of the provisions of said Act, motor vehicles used in the performance of a
service, as the transportation of freightfrom one point to another, have to this date been considered and they cannot but be
so considered-public service property; and, by reason of its own nature, a TH truck, which means that the operator thereof
places it at the disposal of anybody who is willing to pay a rental of its use, when he desires to transfer or carry his effects,
merchandise or any other cargo from one place to another, is necessarily a public service property. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, this court has held in the case of Bachrach Motor co. vs. Zamboanga Transportation Co., 52 Phil., 244, that there may be
a nunc pro tunc authorization which has the effect of having the approval retroact to the date of the transfer; but such outcome cannot
prejudice rights intervening in the meantime. It appears that no such approval was given by the Commission before the accident
occurred.
The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court of First Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court of Appeals to only P2,000,
on the ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the trial court's appraisal, since the only evidence
presented on this point consisted of respondent's bare statement that his expenses and loss of income amounted to P20,000. On the
other hand, "it cannot be denied," the lower court said, "that appellee (respondent) did incur expenses"' It is well to note further that
respondent was a painter by profession and a professor of Fine Arts, so that the amount of P2,000 awarded cannot be said to be
excessive (see Arts. 2224 and 2225, Civil Code of the Philippines). The attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000 also awarded to the
respondent are assailed on the ground that the Court of First Instance did not provided for the same, and since no appeal was
interposed by said respondent, it was allegedly error for the Court of Appeals to award themmotu proprio. Petitioner fails to note that
attorney's fees are included in the concept of actual damages under the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court deems it is
just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code of the Philippines). We see no reason to alter these awards.
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled (Cachero vs.
Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., 101 Phil., 523; 54 Off. Gaz., [26], 6599; Necesito, et al vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz., [23]
4023, that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of
Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as follows:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
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Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under
circumstances, such damages are justify due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
By contrasting the provisions of these two article it immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately
injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only
because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual breach, but because the definition of quasidelict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties."
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage dome. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case
Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the deceased passenger to "demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" (Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 84, Resolution on motion to
reconsider, September 11, 1958). But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger
does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is
clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute of justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the
part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court
of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the
defendant, as required by Art. 220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.
The Court of Appeals has invoked our rulings in Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Co., G.R. No. 49155, December 14, 1948 and Layda vs.
Court of Appeals, 90 Phil., 724; but these doctrines were predicated upon our former law of damages, before judicial discretion in
fixing them became limited by the express provisions of the new Civil Code (previously quoted). Hence, the aforesaid rulings are now
inapplicable.
Upon the other hand, the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of transportations explains, to some
extent, the limitations imposed by the new Code on the amount of the recovery. The action for breach of contract imposes on the
defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the passenger; that latter is relieved from the duty to
established the fault of the carrier, or of his employees, and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was due to an unforseen
event or to force majeure (Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768, 777). Moreover, the carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict,
may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees (Art. 1759,
new civil code; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., supra; Prado vs. Manila Electric Co., 51 Phil., 900).
The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as
essentially extracontractual negligence, compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu, and actions quasi ex delicto, and
prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort. Neither can this action be
taken as one to enforce on employee's liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, since the responsibility is not alleged to be
subsidiary, nor is there on record any averment or proof that the driver of appellant was insolvent. In fact, he is not even made a party
to the suit.
It is also suggested that a carrier's violation of its engagement to safety transport the passenger involves a breach of the passenger's
confidence, and therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract in bad faith, justifying recovery of moral damages under Art.
2220. This theory is untenable, for under it the carrier would always be deemed in bad faith, in every case its obligation to the
passenger is infringed, and it would be never accountable for simple negligence; while under the law (Art. 1756). the presumption is
that common carriers acted negligently(and not maliciously), and Art. 1762 speaks of negligence of the common carrier.

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in article 1733 and 1755.
ART. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries, if the
proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the amount of damages shall be equitably reduced.
The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere
carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their consequences being clearly differentiated by the
Code.
ART. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be
those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when
in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally
so gross as to amount to malice; but that fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a
mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the award of P5,000.00 by
way of moral damages. (Court of Appeals Resolution of May 5, 1957). In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. No costs in this
instance. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-21438

September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral
damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the
portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint
until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and
voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a
"first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but
at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better
right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's
Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento,
"many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat
to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the
plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges
that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts
favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining
the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the
Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a decision
state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its
decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened
with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts"which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental
process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if
not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is
no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". Because as
this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of

the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the
provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were
based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the
controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony
of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such
testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that
all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written statement of the ultimate facts as
found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16They consist of the
court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as
"one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That
judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of
fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts
that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not
have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability
of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third
assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class
seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to
whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had
yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such
a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give
out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it
allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the
company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see
plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's
testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?

A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)

xxx

xxx

xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and
was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the
testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C"
and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without
any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first class"
accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal
understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong.

23

We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's
ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that
such a judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the
Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the
assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So
also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the
decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court.
Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the
conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability
in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can
a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket,
and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that,
as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability
in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts
refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the
finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the
Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its
position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a
first class seat to provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in
Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a
first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon
breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; 31 and that the
decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter
acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant
agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe
with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to
the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff
with defendant's employees.

5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff only TouristClass
accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's employees
to leave the First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments brought by defendant's
breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila. 32
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences,
embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and
the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering,
amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the
inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to
establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso
intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was oustedby petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a
white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the
petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award
for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence
is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France
while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his will, has been
sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the
purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked
by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf
of defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its
manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if the employees of the
defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not
have been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being
ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by
defendant's employees, the manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in
his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the testimony of
defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of
plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was
the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:

"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a "better right" to the seat occupied
by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part
of the "white man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a
corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have easily
proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the
presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court];
and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant
airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up
his "first class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But
can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from
enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right
thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different
from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First
Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the
aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the
presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was
occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's
Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to
occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding "first
class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful
malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. 43And this, because of the
relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action
for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of
ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger
and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in
another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point
where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from
that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to
him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of
said passenger.1awphl.nt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon
his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the flight attendants approached me
and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I
said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything
there because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to
the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read
it and translated it to me because it was recorded in French "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger
was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence
[Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh
and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of

the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of
the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for
petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser
could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages in contracts and
quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition
to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The
least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to
break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral
damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily
with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our
imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. 57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the
same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M.
MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional
Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
Balgos and Perez for petitioners.

Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the
Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoez-Benitez, for damages against the said
PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (VicePresident), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of
Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to
their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the
victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his
position in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic
institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to
dismiss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then assailed
the trial court's disposition before the respondent appellate court which, in a decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the
trial court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the law ofquasi-delicts, as
enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old Spanish Civil Code. The
comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning should give way to present day changes. The law is not
fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in
(sic) its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new challenges of progress.
Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be construed in its narrow concept as
held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; 3hence, the ruling in
the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to all kinds of educational institutions, academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of such
liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent
damage." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint
should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this
doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs.Court of Appeals. 6 In all such
cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils
or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this

material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the
PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It
does not necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other
hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the
air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on
quasi-delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as
extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France
vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat
aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not
one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air Franceis authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a
contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. InCangco vs. Manila
Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does,
the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the
mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the
same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good custom or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private
respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public
embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to
the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative
of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista
had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine.
And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the
test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material
only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua
nonto the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under
the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a
school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student
communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to
other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their
premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to
carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving
that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of
that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and
place. 9
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the
material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby
ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993

JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and ANTHONY C.
SYQUIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC., respondents.
Pacis & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Augusto S. San Pedro & Ari-Ben C. Sebastian for private respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Herein petitioners, Juan J. Syquia and Corazon C. Syquia, Carlota C. Syquia, Carlos C. Syquia, and Anthony Syquia, were the parents
and siblings, respectively, of the deceased Vicente Juan Syquia. On March 5, 1979, they filed a complaint 1 in the then Court of First
Instance against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of
contract and/or quasi-delict. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
The antecedent facts, as gathered by the respondent Court, are as follows:
On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed Syquia, plaintiff-appellants herein, filed a
complaint for damages against defendant-appellee, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of Sale (Contract No. 6885) dated August 27, 1969 and
Interment Order No. 7106 dated July 21, 1978 executed between plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia and defendant-

appellee, the former, father of deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed defendant-appellee to inter
the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery in the morning of July 25, 1978 conformably and in
accordance with defendant-appellant's (sic) interment procedures; that on September 4, 1978, preparatory to
transferring the said remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, the
concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground with the assistance of
certain employees of defendant-appellant (sic); that as the concrete vault was being raised to the surface, plaintiffsappellants discovered that the concrete vault had a hole approximately three (3) inches in diameter near the bottom
of one of the walls closing out the width of the vault on one end and that for a certain length of time (one hour, more
or less), water drained out of the hole; that because of the aforesaid discovery, plaintiffs-appellants became agitated
and upset with concern that the water which had collected inside the vault might have risen as it in fact did rise, to
the level of the coffin and flooded the same as well as the remains of the deceased with ill effects thereto; that
pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila on September 14, 1978,
plaintiffs-appellants with the assistance of licensed morticians and certain personnel of defendant-appellant (sic)
caused the opening of the concrete vault on September 15, 1978; that upon opening the vault, the following became
apparent to the plaintiffs-appellants: (a) the interior walls of the concrete vault showed evidence of total flooding;
(b) the coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt causing the wooden parts to warp and separate and to
crack the viewing glass panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased; (c) the entire lining of the
coffin, the clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled by the
action of the water and silt and were also coated with filth.
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defendant-appellee of its obligation to deliver a defect-free
concrete vault designed to protect the remains of the deceased and the coffin against the elements which resulted in
the desecration of deceased's grave and in the alternative, because of defendant-appellee's gross negligence
conformably to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code in failing to seal the concrete vault, the complaint prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00 for actual damages,
P500,000.00 for moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount determined by the court, 20% of defendantappellee's total liability as attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation and costs of suit. 2
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would be
waterproof; that there could be no quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and because there was
a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and defendant Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The trial court also noted
that the father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to
keep the grass green and that water would eventually seep through the vault. The trial court also accepted the explanation given by
defendant for boring a hole at the bottom side of the vault: "The hole had to be bored through the concrete vault because if it has no
hole the vault will (sic) float and the grave would be filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in the earth, the earth would
caved (sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave." 3
From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the contract allowed the flooding of
the vault; that there was no desecration; that the boring of the hole was justifiable; and in not awarding damages.
The Court of Appeals in the Decision 4 dated December 7, 1990 however, affirmed the judgment of dismissal. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated April 25, 1991. 5
Unsatisfied with the respondent Court's decision, the Syquias filed the instant petition. They allege herein that the Court of Appeals
committed the following errors when it:
1. held that the contract and the Rules and Resolutions of private respondent allowed the flooding of the vault and
the entrance thereto of filth and silt;
2. held that the act of boring a hole was justifiable and corollarily, when it held that no act of desecration was
committed;

3. overlooked and refused to consider relevant, undisputed facts, such as those which have been stipulated upon by
the parties, testified to by private respondent's witnesses, and admitted in the answer, which could have justified a
different conclusion;
4. held that there was no tort because of a pre-existing contract and the absence of fault/negligence; and
5. did not award the P25,000.00 actual damages which was agreed upon by the parties, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.
At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring a hole by private respondent on the vault of the deceased kin of the
bereaved petitioners. The latter allege that such act was either a breach of private respondent's contractual obligation to provide a
sealed vault, or, in the alternative, a negligent act which constituted a quasi-delict. Nonetheless, petitioners claim that whatever kind of
negligence private respondent has committed, the latter is liable for desecrating the grave of petitioners' dead.
In the instant case, We are called upon to determine whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., breached its contract with
petitioners; or, alternatively, whether private respondent was guilty of a tort.
We understand the feelings of petitioners and empathize with them. Unfortunately, however, We are more inclined to answer the
foregoing questions in the negative. There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to justify a reversal of the decision of the
respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of the petitioners.
With respect to herein petitioners' averment that private respondent has committed culpa aquiliana, the Court of Appeals found no
negligent act on the part of private respondent to justify an award of damages against it. Although a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding
that there was no negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict . . . . (Emphasis supplied).
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract
entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care" 6 on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the
parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict orculpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as
provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to be send in the interment. Rule 17 of the Rules
and Regulations of private respondent provides that:
Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wall of stone, brick or
concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the Association. 7
Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault was provided on July 27, 1978, the day before the interment, and was, on the
same day, installed by private respondent's employees in the grave which was dug earlier. After the burial, the vault was covered by a
cement lid.
Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract with them as the latter held out in the brochure it distributed
that the . . . lot may hold single or double internment (sic) underground in sealed concrete vault." 8 Petitioners claim that the vault
provided by private respondent was not sealed, that is, not waterproof. Consequently, water seeped through the cement enclosure and
damaged everything inside it.

We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Regulations of
the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof. Private respondent's witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel,
explained that the term "sealed" meant "closed." 9 On the other hand, the word "seal" is defined as . . . any of various closures or
fastenings . . . that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening." 10 The
meaning that has been given by private respondent to the word conforms with the cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite
clear that "sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract are clear and leave
no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. 11 Contracts should be
interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment. 12 As ruled by the
respondent Court:
When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his signature to the Deed of Sale (Exhibit "A") and the attached
Rules and Regulations (Exhibit "1"), it can be assumed that he has accepted defendant-appellee's undertaking to
merely provide a concrete vault. He can not now claim that said concrete vault must in addition, also be
waterproofed (sic). It is basic that the parties are bound by the terms of their contract, which is the law between them
(Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 178 SCRA 739). Where there is nothing in the
contract which is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, the validity of the contract
must be sustained (Phil. American Insurance Co. vs. Judge Pineda, 175 SCRA 416). Consonant with this ruling, a
contracting party cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It cannot be
extended by implication, beyond the terms of the contract (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). And as a rule of evidence, where the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the document
itself, being constituted by the parties as the expositor of their intentions, is the only instrument of evidence in
respect of that agreement which the law will recognize, so long as its (sic) exists for the purpose of evidence
(Starkie, Ev., pp. 648, 655, Kasheenath vs. Chundy, 5 W.R. 68 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the Phil.
p. 153, 1973 Ed.). And if the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control (Santos vs. CA, et al., G. R. No. 83664, Nov. 13, 1989;
Prudential Bank & Trust Co. vs. Community Builders Co., Inc., 165 SCRA 285; Balatero vs. IAC, 154 SCRA
530). 13
We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation to the Syquias. While this may be so, can private
respondent be liable for culpa aquiliana for boring the hole on the vault? It cannot be denied that the hole made possible the entry of
more water and soil than was natural had there been no hole.
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with
the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." 14 In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the
contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.
The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act boring of the hole negate the allegation of negligence. The
reason for the act was explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said that:
Q It has been established in this particular case that a certain Vicente Juan Syquia was interred on
July 25, 1978 at the Paraaque Cemetery of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., will you
please tell the Hon. Court what or whether you have participation in connection with said
internment (sic)?
A A day before Juan (sic) Syquia was buried our personnel dug a grave. After digging the next
morning a vault was taken and placed in the grave and when the vault was placed on the grave a
hole was placed on the vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining
heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be filled with
water and the digging would caved (sic) in and the earth, the earth would (sic) caved in and fill up
the grave. 15 (Emphasis ours)
Except for the foreman's opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a heavy rainfall, from the above-mentioned
explanation, private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside
the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with earth.

Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find no reason to award damages in favor of petitioners.
In the light of the foregoing facts, and construed in the language of the applicable laws and jurisprudence, We are constrained to
AFFIRM in toto the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated December 7, 1990. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000

VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche
Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in
Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the
jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the
back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third
of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case
wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending
physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months and would
have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former
in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint
against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the
driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by
Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable
to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on
a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The
appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is entered
ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause
of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its
passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the
award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence.
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasidelict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle ofres judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and
his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon
the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this
case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.2 In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art.
1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof.

There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the
damage to petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the
jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasidelict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the
diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of
death or injury to passengers. It provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746,
Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755
and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733
and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of
petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate
against petitioner's contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the
broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as
amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede
the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct
the free passage of other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of
32(a) of the same law. It provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more
freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated
merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's
contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable.3 This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the
cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render
it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor.4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.

Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention
well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student in that school year 1989-1990 at the
Silliman University, majoring in Physical Education. Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the second
semester of that school year. She testified that she had no more intention of continuing with her schooling, because
she could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major in Physical Education "because of my leg which has
a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under confinement, she cried in pain because of her
injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has "residual bowing of the
fracture side." She likewise decided not to further pursue Physical Education as her major subject, because "my left
leg . . . has a defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just
and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the
items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.5 As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap
results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which
the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.6
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner
acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the
driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it
was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his
injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,

G.R. No. 173259

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus -

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC.

Promulgated:

Respondent.

July 25, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
As between a bank and its depositor, where the banks negligence is the proximate cause of the loss and the depositor is guilty of
contributory negligence, the greater proportion of the loss shall be borne by the bank.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals January 31, 2006 Decision[1] in CA-G.R. CV
No. 81349, which modified the January 30, 2004 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila City, Branch 46 in Civil Case No. 97-84010, and
the June 26, 2006 Resolution[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
The antecedents are aptly summarized by the appellate court:
In its complaint, it is alleged that [respondent F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc.] (hereinafter FFCCI) opened savings/current or socalled combo account No. 0219-830-146 and dollar savings account No. 0219-0502-458-6 with [petitioner Philippine National
Bank] (hereinafter PNB) at its Timog Avenue Branch. Its President Felipe Cruz (or Felipe) and Secretary-Treasurer Angelita A.
Cruz (or Angelita) were the named signatories for the said accounts.
The said signatories on separate but coeval dates left for and returned from the Unites States of America, Felipe on
March 18, 1995 until June 10, 1995 while Angelita followed him on March 29, 1995 and returned ahead on May 9, 1995.
While they were thus out of the country, applications for cashiers and managers [checks] bearing Felipes [signature]
were presented to and both approved by the PNB. The first was on March 27, 1995 for P9,950,000.00 payable to a certain Gene
B. Sangalang and the other one was on April 24, 1995 for P3,260,500.31 payable to one Paul Bautista. The amounts of these
checks were then debited by the PNB against the combo account of [FFCCI].
When Angelita returned to the country, she had occasion to examine the PNB statements of account of [FFCCI] for the
months of February to August 1995 and she noticed the deductions ofP9,950,000.00 and P3,260,500.31. Claiming that these
were unauthorized and fraudulently made, [FFCCI] requested PNB to credit back and restore to its account the value of the
checks. PNB refused, and thus constrained [FFCCI] filed the instant suit for damages against the PNB and its own accountant
Aurea Caparas (or Caparas).
In its traverse, PNB averred lack of cause of action. It alleged that it exercised due diligence in handling the account of
[FFCCI]. The applications for managers check have passed through the standard bank procedures and it was only after finding
no infirmity that these were given due course. In fact, it was no less than Caparas, the accountant of [FFCCI], who confirmed the
regularity of the transaction. The delay of [FFCCI] in picking up and going over the bank statements was the proximate cause of
its self-proclaimed injury. Had [FFCCI] been conscientious in this regard, the alleged chicanery would have been detected early
on and Caparas effectively prevented from absconding with its millions. It prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.[4]
Regional Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court ruled that F.F. Cruz and Company, Inc. ( FFCCI) was guilty of negligence in clothing Aurea Caparas (Caparas) with
authority to make decisions on and dispositions of its account which paved the way for the fraudulent transactions perpetrated by Caparas; that, in
practice, FFCCI waived the two-signature requirement in transactions involving the subject combo account so much so that Philippine National
Bank (PNB) could not be faulted for honoring the applications for managers check even if only the signature of Felipe Cruz appeared thereon; and
that FFCCI was negligent in not immediately informing PNB of the fraud.
On the other hand, the trial court found that PNB was, likewise, negligent in not calling or personally verifying from the authorized
signatories the legitimacy of the subject withdrawals considering that they were in huge amounts. For this reason, PNB had the last clear chance to
prevent the unauthorized debits from FFCCIs combo account. Thus, PNB should bear the whole loss

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant [PNB] to pay plaintiff [FFCCI] P13,210,500.31
representing the amounts debited against plaintiffs account, with interest at the legal rate computed from the filing of the
complaint plus costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[5]
Court of Appeals Ruling
On January 31, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming with modification the Decision of the trial court, viz:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that [PNB] shall pay [FFCCI] only 60%
of the actual damages awarded by the trial court while the remaining 40% shall be borne by [FFCCI].
SO ORDERED.[6]
The appellate court ruled that PNB was negligent in not properly verifying the genuineness of the signatures appearing on the two applications for
managers check as evidenced by the lack of the signature of the bank verifier thereon. Had this procedure been followed, the forgery would have
been detected.
Nonetheless, the appellate court found FFCCI guilty of contributory negligence because it clothed its accountant/bookkeeper Caparas with
apparent authority to transact business with PNB. In addition, FFCCI failed to timely examine its monthly statement of account and report the
discrepancy to PNB within a reasonable period of time to prevent or recover the loss. FFCCIs contributory negligence, thus, mitigated the banks
liability. Pursuant to the rulings in Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals [7] and The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,[8] the appellate court allocated the damages on a 60-40 ratio with the bigger share to be borne by PNB.
From this decision, both FFCCI and PNB sought review before this Court.
On August 17, 2006, FFCCI filed its petition for review on certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No. 173278.[9] On March 7, 2007, the Court
issued a Resolution[10] denying said petition. On June 13, 2007, the Court issued another Resolution[11] denying FFCCIs motion for reconsideration.
In denying the aforesaid petition, the Court ruled that FFCCI essentially raises questions of fact which are, as a rule, not reviewable under a Rule 45
petition; that FFCCI failed to show that its case fell within the established exceptions to this rule; and that FFCCI was guilty of contributory
negligence. Thus, the appellate court correctly mitigated PNBs liability.
On July 13, 2006, PNB filed its petition for review on certiorari which is the subject matter of this case.
Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it found PNB guilty of negligence.[12]
Our Ruling
We affirm the ruling of the CA.
PNB is guilty of negligence.
Preliminarily, in G.R. No. 173278, we resolved with finality[13] that FFCCI is guilty of contributory negligence, thus, making it partly liable
for the loss (i.e., as to 40% thereof) arising from the unauthorized withdrawal of P13,210,500.31 from its combo account. The case before us is, thus,
limited to PNBs alleged negligence in the subject transactions which the appellate court found to be the proximate cause of the loss, thus, making it
liable for the greater part of the loss (i.e., as to 60% thereof) pursuant to our rulings in Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals[14] and The
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals.[15]
PNB contends that it was not negligent in verifying the genuineness of the signatures appearing on the subject applications for managers
check. It claims that it followed the standard operating procedure in the verification process and that four bank officers examined the signatures and
found the same to be similar with those found in the signature cards of FFCCIs authorized signatories on file with the bank.
PNB raises factual issues which are generally not proper for review under a Rule 45 petition. While there are exceptions to this rule, we
find none applicable to the present case. As correctly found by the appellate court, PNB failed to make the proper verification because the
applications for the managers check do not bear the signature of the bank verifier. PNB concedes the absence[16] of the subject signature but argues
that the same was the result of inadvertence. It posits that the testimonies of Geronimo Gallego (Gallego), then the branch manager of PNB Timog
Branch, and Stella San Diego (San Diego), then branch cashier, suffice to establish that the signature verification process was duly followed.
We are not persuaded.

First, oral testimony is not as reliable as documentary evidence.[17] Second, PNBs own witness, San Diego, testified that in the verification
process, the principal duty to determine the genuineness of the signature devolved upon the account analyst. [18] However, PNB did not present the
account analyst to explain his or her failure to sign the box for signature and balance verification of the subject applications for managers check, thus,
casting doubt as to whether he or she did indeed verify the signatures thereon. Third, we cannot fault the appellate court for not giving weight to the
testimonies of Gallego and San Diego considering that the latter are naturally interested in exculpating themselves from any liability arising from the
failure to detect the forgeries in the subject transactions. Fourth, Gallego admitted that PNBs employees received training on detecting forgeries from
the National Bureau of Investigation.[19] However, Emmanuel Guzman, then NBI senior document examiner, testified, as an expert witness, that the
forged signatures in the subject applications for managers check contained noticeable and significant differences from the genuine signatures of
FFCCIs authorized signatories and that the forgeries should have been detected or observed by a trained signature verifier of any bank.[20]
Given the foregoing, we find no reversible error in the findings of the appellate court that PNB was negligent in the handling of FFCCIs
combo account, specifically, with respect to PNBs failure to detect the forgeries in the subject applications for managers check which could have
prevented the loss. As we have often ruled, the banking business is impressed with public trust. [21] A higher degree of diligence is imposed on banks
relative to the handling of their affairs than that of an ordinary business enterprise. [22] Thus, the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness
expected of their officials and employees is far greater than those of ordinary officers and employees in other enterprises.[23] In the case at bar, PNB
failed to meet the high standard of diligence required by the circumstances to prevent the fraud. In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of
Appeals[24] andThe Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[25] where the banks negligence is the proximate cause of the loss and
the depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated the damages between the bank and the depositor on a 60-40 ratio. We apply the same
ruling in this case considering that, as shown above, PNBs negligence is the proximate cause of the loss while the issue as to FFCCIs contributory
negligence has been settled with finality in G.R. No. 173278. Thus, the appellate court properly adjudged PNB to bear the greater part of the loss
consistent with these rulings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2006 Decision and June 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 81349 areAFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.