Light Infantry in AirLand Battle Future:

Organizing for Success

A Monograph

by

Major Charles H. Jacoby, Jr.

Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 90-91

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL
J a c o b y Jr.

Major C h a r l e s H.
T i t l e o f Monograph:

L i g h t I n f a n t r y I n AirLand B a t t l e
Future:

Organizing For Success

A p p r o v e d by:

Monograph D i r e c t o r
a l o n e 1 J a m e s Y M o o d y , MSBA

Director, S c h o o l o f
w n e l G o r d o n F. A t c h e s o n , MA

Advanced M i l i t a r y
Studies

Director, G r a d u a t e
P h i l i p J!

B r o o k e s , Ph.D.

Accepted t h i s

- Pld.

Degree Program

day of

$2

1991

LIGHT INFANTRY IN AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE: ORGANIZING FOR

SUCCESS by MAJ Charles H. Jacoby Jr., USA, 57 pages.

This monograph proposes an app r cp r r a t e o r q e n i z a t t o n a l

':::.t'-uctl"u"e f'.J;""~irJr,t i n f a n t rv bi"ig"",df?'S in s upp c r t of t;r'('2
o o e r a t i o o a l co nc eo t ,jer-i'./ed fCJ" {:'il-Land 8attl'.? ~:-U~UI E.
T'lf.2 f o Ll o w 011 op e r a t i o r.e l
c o nc ep t to {)ll-La'"d Eattic? :'~
e :~ pee ted t 0 add res s non 1 i n ear c:0 en bat 0 per a t i 011 S i C'I t to: 2 (I U '-t
timeframe. Nonlinearitv, the extended battlefield, post CalJ
War threats, and limited resources, have generated an
operational concept that calls for innovations and
flexibility in force design. As of now, there have been no
proposed changes for light infantry organizations. Light
infantry forces, originally designed purely for
t
t
i ity. :lO,',J ha'v2 t'1E'
tr
t

'1

a r i a p

:~::I.,:::3~::d

a b

l . : h a n ' = e

b e

u r e

en :.:.\1 (JpL:~'-3f:~.orla.l
i:uncept CD,""lg:..?;'11.31 to ~~~"i:.::.. : \la.td
Tri.; .nono q r e on ;; 1 -::i; e :,::.n:,r-'i2S t;12 C:L~I":-'::ll:; ~ lC,jIIS

.:,

infantry structure to discover insights to its

organizational development and to provide a basis for later
structural comparisons. Next, a"short discussion of the
significant world and national political and military trends
sets the stage for an analysis of the AirLand Battle Future
operational concept. AirLa.nd B.attle Future is presented as
an o c e r a t t orie I concept and 3.nc:1ly:~ed t.o df0 1.: e r- m i n e f u t u r o
~ '~y '/J i t hi::
t r 1 ,~t 0 C) (? r ,3 t i 01; a 1
b a s c.d '::;e,' or c r r t e r t a is U-,(0
:,':::";eloped to ,,"'/dlu,'l.t,e a l t ern a t r v e b;-ic;a:Je fo'-.:::,:::, j?'::.,i~lIs.
T h ). ,::; c.: r: i I: 0:, :' i i:\ is ~; I,? ~; ted i '1,3 n,) n a L y sis of I: h e I: U 1- 1- '0 n ':: 1:
!.~

c 1 '::?'3

f'

(J

c:on':~pt.

~.: ~ i2

"1"

(~i

1 i q I"': t

f a :1

i;ilel~i-EtL,.~.3.11y

~; 1, :;

brigade structure.

Several alternative light brIgade structures are

evaluated using the criteria. These alternative
organizations were selected for analysis based on their
applicability to the AirLand Eattle Future operational
concept. A synthesis of the resulting analysis formed the
proposed structure for the light infantry brigade in AirLand
Future. The Light Regimental Combat Team is the proposed
structure and answers the research question by suggesting an
appropriate brigade structure for successful employment on
the AirLand Battle Future battlefield.

I.

INTRODUCTION

II

CURREf'JT LIGHT I NF {-4f'Hr=U . . . . . . . .

I II

FORCES OF CHAf'<IGE

1 (J

IV.

AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE ..... ................

13

V.

1'10DELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <.................

19

B. SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2CJ

C. BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGADE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

VI.

LIGHT REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM

33

\/ I I .

APPEI\ID I XES:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Criteria Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Current Light Brigade Structure ...........
Alternative Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Light Regimental Combat Team
.
Deployability and Lethality Tables .........
Thoughts On The Light Division
.

(+

42

44

47

48

49

....

ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

, ~
5

B I Bl._ IOGRAPHY

Sb

I r.ITR:JDUCT IOf'J

One of the most significant developments in US Army force

structure in the last decade has been the advent of the light
The light division ~oncept was born in

infantry division.

controversy and developed and

misconception and acrimony.

implemented in an environment of

In the end the light force concept

was adopted and came to represent a

the

1 i g h teo n C

the prolific

'2 P

IN a

the d

large proportion of the

f f i ': u I t Y rn any

sol die r s h a d m 3. t c t-,

light tactical organizations with

heavy nature of AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine.

the

perc2iv~d

Now that

has embarked on the development of a new doctrine for

century,

it

is time to reexamine the light

1 11 q

the

Ar~y

the 21st

infantry organization

fighting provides a unique opportunity to reshape tactical

organizations in a manner

that

is appropriate to the doctrines'

operational concept.
[ am tE?fnptr:?.j indeed to declaf-e d cqme tt c a Ll v t n a t I<Jr.ate',,',:,r
doctrine ~he Armed Forces are ~o~king or now, the. have got
>'Jrong. I am also t ernp t e d to d e c l a r e t h a t it dOE'S not 'nattl.?,- t n s t
they have got it wl-ong. Wha.t does matte,- is t h oi r c ap ac i t-, ":"0 <'Jet
it right quickly when the moment al-l-iYe~, .. .rt is this fle,{iblll~';
both in the minds of the armed forces and in their organization,
that needs above all to be developed in peacetime. 1

These oft quoted remarks of the eminent British military

historian, Sir Michael Howard,
poin~

provide an excellent starting

for placing an Army's tactical organizations in the proper

context with

its doctrine.

8.1::!~t.pm.y... q.f.. E.~~lUC(::?_.jl.::!_,.Yi:U--:,

of military failure

posit that

the most l-evealing

is organizational dysfunction.

In

SOUI-C'?

particular an organization's inability to learn, ant~cip.+t:l-,

;ind

adapt are often the most important sources of such dysfuncxion.

This analysis directly supports the above thoughts o f Howard and

forces consideration of the question o f whether the Army is ready

and able to adapt its doctrine and organizations to the changing

realities around it.

Defined by John Shy, doctrine is simply "...the

general

co;.lsens2s among mil itary l e ~ d e r so n how to wage wal-." 3

&

:.h , G

Zefin: t ion ALE is c l ~ a r l ythe 3 c c ~ p t e dand entt-enched doc :~-i.le~f

t!l~ US Army. Organizations and wespons have been field&

that

support ALB doctrine and refinements have taken place a s the

result of validating experiences such a s the National Training
Center (NTC) and the Eattle Command Training Program (BCTP), and
;c..--, ,-l E.X?EI-

eni.e~is c c h a,;

t3is cime the Army is

in

G; et:,?d& a n c Pa.?:im.?. K:;:YFv,: .. .

!:he process

af

I:

a com~;etir,isi./er . ~ . , : j j , j , i

of ALB doctrine in a n effort to adapt to the changing world

situation and to anticipate conditions o n future battlefields.

This revision, known a s AirLand Battle Future (ALE-F), hopes to

a,/!:id

the ~irqaniza'iioa-;a1
d{sf;ln=tions that c o ~ ~ la!-:
d . -7 .7:-o r !

2.-3$gi*-,g
rl ::>mfortable.

Du;

-i<.:ctica!
..
ilrmations incp x e d

:zut
o y

J;

i l-,

date
:ntc

t C: - i n e , .?nd t : - . ~

tha r,e:<r:c.z.-,t.lr.v.

T h i s paper will propose a n appropriate light i n i a n t r ~

brigade organization for employment in the ALE-F operational

concept. The proposed structure will b e based o n a n analysis o f

the the following factors: the development and structure of the

current L I B , the forces that have led to a reshaping o f the Army

a s a whole, the ALS-F operational concept, and alternative

infantry brigade oi-gailiza';io:1~. -! h e analysis of cur.-rnt .fo~-c~+

d~sigilax1 a! ternative mooels dill h e ailed ty a the,rr~-et

ica;
cF GL3--F.
f-a;ne,wo.-k
ch&t captares the crl.trcal ~ e . s i g nps,-arneee>-s

-Ihis franewol-k will pr-odide th? basis

=
a 01
-- a.~i~werin.;
a sirn~le

- , - i tel-:j :bar

L :

..

. >
e:;:;ac;:;~.'i

. ~ ~ p l ~ ~ : ~ , - i? 3,? ~ 5~' -p# : ~ \, , i,8 -zi c~8 ,s+ ,

"l~;;

organizatio,;s.

(Ai'PEN2IX

A syothe:,is of

A>

t a l c , anal,/tic~l

process wlll lsad to a proposed b - i g a d e organi-atiosl that F i t 5

the criteria for ALB-F. With the flexibility of mind and

organization called for by Howard, the light infantry c a n b e

fully and properly integrated into the total Army force structure

and oi-~anizedfor success on future battlefields

<a,-a':y:;i.yo f t?'?

;\IT

r e ~ i e so i - i t:5 prc::ass

CC'f?RF?\rT I- :G!-!T

::a:-r211?1l;:)k

XEISAD:;

br~.:,:>dp
3 -.
,:I..S~. . ? ! : ~ r . :>J!,;;-,

of dz/clopment. H G ; ~?"re hr:;;zd~ ; s

srganized is a di:-ect reflect ;on O F

i:o+j

tnis process. ? . ~ t , ~,ich:

En?.:@? -3%G.!? t I._h_qre.,

N.oL.!ieaa~1'E_n,~.u9.h
I P ~ W ~ . E :The Case- Pf
Li.gbt,,,,Enf.a.n.t.r)(,

is the title

t h ? re:,!.-a!

, : l l - , ! ; ,

...US

a recent S&P!S monograph that

of

:+.Gi,p5 3.-

:,-,etn,.s:s

:?c?

3f

,,
;;i,-+:.
,T.C;!-lCGi J.'!!

.- :,:'
.L+

<, :- 7
,., ,.

"
>..
'::

light infantry division, and its enphasls o n deplcyability, is

beset by organizational and mission paradoxes. These problems

There is an American t1-adition for this approach to light

infantry.

During World War 11, the dichotomy between what Scott

McMichaels calls the European view o f light ~ n f a n t r y is vividly

contrasted with what would became an American concept of :i3ht
infantrv. The differ-ence berween these tws views is scbscancia:;
t!-,I

,.. ,

to the tinini:iat:;.r~,

sJoti2t:es.

i t is of;:zn a n a:-i:,i,-.er-:t? f

T h e E u ! - o p ~ a nview, aef ices a 1:ght

forces by its ta.:ticai

style, a s exemplified by German Jaegers. In this glew the !iqht

infantryman is a breed apart from the common soldier. H e is selfreliant, independent o f fixed lines o f communication, and a part
o f h i s environment. T h i s tradition o f light infantry emphasizes
the moral domain of battle and perhaps presents a model o f the
ethic required o f the warrior o n the nonlinear battlefield.

In

-3:~trasz.t h ~
Arne.-icar view o i i 'ght ~ i l : - ' ,
21-a:n:!3!-id :.:aa- I T
to t h ~ r e ~ e n tis
. more all organizaticnal view. Light indeed
;means light in tel-ms o f equipnent and fit epcwer. I t is a i-elat:vz
term to express the difference between light, conventional, and
mechanized infantry. T h e greatest benefit o f light infantry in
this view is its strategic mobility. 5

-;h;! !Js

! ic;lii lnf a ~ - : t ; -z.?

~ > I c l - : $ ;~Ja:-1: , . + , , t . i b :L,?-j

E! ,sc:.:s: ,

this emphasis o- s c r ~ t e g i cmobility. in a n effor?: to i-.,z.:ucc!

cl.;r;

burden o n scarce shipping resources, experiments were conducted

to reduce the infantry division force structure to s a v e ship
bottoms. 6

After the Hunter-Ligget field maneuvers o f 1944, the

..
US abanz'onc+d the ?igbt division cor.cepz. 3 1 . 5 w a s ~ n ; ? e+- '.- ' .. ,.,.:a
. - - ., , - .' ;

be=a.ir,e

;!-,.?

di. i zio;:s c ~ ~ l
1-3:
d e :eci!i,e

t:?e stanz'ard in:'antry

he : : , > , r ; i c a l m:?s: ; ! , s

::ivisir;~i. 6f;ier-a! ? ? i l i : R ; ~ h u ; - ' r ;

;:

specif;-

criticism wac- that strategic mcbility w a s inot oarticular-ly 1-seful

if the unit w a s not effective in battle. 7

T h i s World War I 1

interpretation o f the utility o f light infantry places the

quality o f strategic mobility before method o f tactical
employment. Almost forty y e a r s later this interpretation w a s
resurrected

In npri!,
the A - m y ,
thr? I.!S

Wickham, Chluf o f '-'

=:.aff c f

o c ~ b ished
l
h i s tihi te gapor dil-ecti n ( ] the e~e1zplr;e:itc f

i isht a

divisisn;

1984 General 3 c h n {A.

t v

. f i

: f--

l :ch:e:.

in the force structure had beel-, identified a y Senera:

premise that threats outside o'f the central front in Eut-opi?

required a different force structure from the heavy o n e designed

specifically for Europe. General W i c k h a m ' s five light divisions

met several additional goals; that had little to do with how t h e . 5 ~

divisions might fight

Today, the light d i v i s ~ o nis strongly estaolis!ied but tr:e~

is still a need to clarify its r o l e and to justify its portion of

the A r m y ' s combat strength. Besides the 82d Airborne Division and

Infantry Division or.jan:zat;cns

alre unique pccduct-

3 f

Cne

~~XI-YE-

structure experiments of the 1930's. These five light d l v ~ s i o n s

meet the arbitrary strategic lift criteria of under 500 C - 1 4 1
equivalent sorties, with no outsized equipment requiring C - 5

lift

assets. 10
As demonstrated, the light divisio:is o f t h e 1990's were
born from the s a m e strategic mobility impetus of the 1 9 4 0 ' s
r::cerimr?n:s,

bc;t Armv !eaders sough!: t:,

avoid the p : t f d i 1s

tactical apprcach to l i ~ n tForces. 11.1 the 1 9 ~ 7Light I : ? f a n t l - y

Battalion doctrinal manual, F M 7-72, the emphasis placed on the
moral domain and the light fighter himself is clearly evident:

The light infantry soldier is a powerful combat weapon on the

modern battlefield. He fights at night, in rough terrain, in bad

he survives by stealth and by being

weather, and by stalking..
a master of field craft and land navigation. He is physically

strong, emotionally tough, and highly motivated. 1 1

...

This is a tactical concept that goes beyond that o f

transcend th.2 ,rattier artificial deployabi lity cri.tei-i.:+

eccablished for the organ~zation. Two pages later the manual i s

again confronting the light infantry conundrum:
Light infantry battalions are organized to .fight successful
operations in close terrain in the low to mid intensity spectrum
cf ccnf 1 ic t. On the Girl-and ha?:t!efit?lrj, they provide Lh-3 l-F"-n y
.versati!i;;., aiyd str3Cegic f!e<ibilitv th:-!)uc~ ':heir-!::;;st;-la
..
for rapid deployment
It is the doctrine for success o n the
nonlinear battlefield. 12

...

Clearly US light forces have been able to come up with an

operational concept that matched their austere organizational

requirements. As Edward Luttwak describes it, tb:e lig!it divic-ions

have attempted 20 cCfset an imnosed !a:!:

5
a 1-

c f

tact.ica! mnbi!i:..,

.;!?d

- enower with what- he feels t~ be tile more in;;o;-cant

determinants of combat power: tactical skill and opeiaticnsl

ingenuity. 13

Hand-in-hand

with this tactical concept for the

employment of light infantry were other serious steps taken to

enhance the moral element of the force. At the Infantry School at

Ft Benning, light fighter courses for junior leaders and an

emphasis on light fighter attendance at Ranger School are two
examples of this trend. In addition, the ill-fated COHCRT uni'
manning system and the regimental affiliation system
d e s ~ a n s a to help generat? the tipa o f
necessary for t h e 1 iyht forces.

were

zohesioc and unit esorit

IHowever, the adopt ion of a :isfit

c~pe~ratlanal
c oncept h a s not e n d ~ d'he

t,c;rm~-:il
over
the I-ole 0:-

the light infantry in the Army for-ce structure.

Problems still exist for the force structure despite the

seemingly happy state of affairs in the light community itself.
T h e most significant c o n c e r n s revolve around the r o l e of the
light force in what remains the A r m y ' s principle theater o f
interest, Europe. T h e Army c a n sinply not afford the large
perce.)i.aqc of

tz fsl-ce

s t l - ~ ~ c t u r - e , . - e ; r e s c ~ n t ~ i. .d1

ts c e inappropriate acrosx

'.:l.E 1 i q z b f-;-c.?.

broan range c? the c?z~-at;c.-ia!

co:;t1nuc;m. Thus, shortly after

the

deve!apment

uf t : : ~ ! i q h t

concept, there began a furious effort to.'find a way to u s e light

forces successfully o n the European or other mid- to high-

intensity battlefields. This effort h a s resulted in what is

c.i! lev!

C . ~ G

Ikch

hesvy, 1 ighk m i

cc:ice::t.

ink h a s b e e r ; skiI:ec! over heavy/ii.;h;.

inci~d::-~g

heavy/light considerations iri the latest tactical manuals; F M 7 1 100,

Di.~i_s_.l~n-Os_era.t..,:l:l~,,r!.~
and F M 71-3,

Bl.i.wde o ~ e r _ . t L e m . M o r e

importantly, heavy/light operations h a v e been incorporated into

ti-ainirlg certer-s. E x t e n s i u ~eff:2rts habe b ~ e . 1made ic.
.:1?1:!.
.
~dpi.;rk? iii? i ~ 5 5 ; i i . j :(?a!-r;ed fl-om ::lc:sa h~,i~,~y/
r.;,?,.$t.?c!-33.:;.
the m.i.lo3-

<.In\ casz, the as;> fif

iLt;ht

?.oi-.re!;

111

a ,>;A-

t . ~
f~:~:!F,.-:,ik?!i!:;!;~,~

scenario was a foregone conciclsion be:'o.-e the testing c-f th:?

concepts really got underway. Light forces could not escape a
role in Europe o r other potential mid- to high-intensity
theaters, the question w a s h o w best to employ the unique
capabilities of o n e third o f the active force.
The value of light forces for their deployahilitv a i o n e is
a mute p o ~ n tfor the European theater. Light divisions a r e no
more deployable than the m e n schedu:ed

to fail in n n POMCI!S

all-pad,; located in Eu.-ope. Light forces re~resc-ntno rrlcrr-o f

sl

te:

c?mmitment or a -1eterrent effect than the executicn o f the p!aii

for the reinfo:'cement of Ger-man., Sther :de;s

c:anc?!-n1:irj t h z

appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity

battlefield generally fall into one of two camps. The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are, to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations.
Light infantry
purests
wish to reserve the light force for.

. ..
. .,

-.

1 ichr s p e c l ~

:71

missions and sccnar ios. Th~.;c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc.

3efe;-6sof urban and forested tzrrain, re3r ;,;-eaoperatio '!s,

offensive operations in close terrsin or during period? o f

limited visibility, air assault operatidns throughout the depth

of the battlefield, and a s stay behind forces to disrupt enemy

command and control ( C 2 ) and combat service,support ( C S S )

activities. A l i of these operations a r e to .1.e c ! s ~ ? ein

as d e s c r iked h., <en:?ral

!Jaylie

A. Ooxni nq.

;,n;nti~,-.

L-?,a
c pa-ese,, s s ti:e

light infantry essence. "Light infantry commanders will hake to

guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions

with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe."

14

This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical

ci.ills c f
zt

t h ~
1icht

infantry and szeks tc pt-a'--'

- .3m discolut ion thrcugr, misuse

3.1

"s!:andarvI

' -

q u a : :

. A =

t;.:

F'.n

excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0.f Light inf.>!itrv is t h e

destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944.

In this example three lightly

armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a

division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support. 15

The light infantry purest rejects the

use of a light force, like the rangers, in a conventional role,

such as :.he attack at Cic-ts!-na. Further, the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force, invalved in a m i d intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi :h

ta h7.ghsddi t ionai

"'~.A(;~';';3.il-'I:l21:'''' ::.:aiJ,;i:.l~i.tl'

f"i.,E:?CtJ,1J2,-,

p e r f o r rn the

\-0112 of "sla"aal-cj

'.a::tlC'=-li

31G

nf en brv::,

~!'-l,j

,n;:,f'ili:./

This school of ::-loL:qht

emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and

lilnitatioll's 0f

the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the

spartan TO&E.

16

The advocate of the heavy/light mix at the tactical

level

looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sa!ne

-otaticns
c

o r n b

n a

t a

tr,e r:TCs :--a'/f:'

dt

of

the

:;~'Ja

learned effort has led

l,'Jo~.ec

fOI-CE'

-t cr

t/pes.

17

C:"'--;er:t

<:::;Y~if~rCJ1~J.;:::

<3

~;

rrs i

a o

l:;,,-=-;si,nr:::

L e

the publication of several

to

t,o~-to

packets from both the NTC and JRTC. Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavy/light mix advocates the
.~J"J

t ,-:

/ S

light fighter. General Wickham has added little to

Army has

'!~e

rc
tri v

3:'ilit~'
~-r-:'c1rji]y

cr

t'IE>

3.CC~~t

-=':)It:;3.-:-,~Ol

l';;l""'::

OiV1':,:\J("1

?d.~r,e~it'?::.:J,1

f ...;.. m 10 ......

tc

~il(jl'
fo,~c?

~L8

doctrine nas been a

slo~

infantry style of fighting

with the tenets of ALB yet,

c mrna nr:

-:;t.I-~=t'..1.-~-'

pa~nf~i

<3.n'.~

r.c:'~c';"CJl
t:<:;::;~

c2:,(~i-::~'.:3.

t11P'

...:-:

",:.li~?

TI,e

r.

f-. - "

,c"

li]ilt

its force design does not match with

intensity environment.

This painful process of adaptation is on-going.

~ignificdnt

tr

1t.\

.~~nt, ::>,

~rocess.

-c,

,.

philosophy of co:nbat readily 11ests

a doctrine clearly intended for a high

essential because the light

18

reflects that position:

:,~:?:-.n:I-::;

i.,+,r-:n:;:"'t".y

ana

dtld

f;'.-~:-~?':-:

.:.:

'-he deoate by

articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas.

Field Manual 71-100, pi_'<:.is..i.9!' ....Op..!='-atio.n.s,

::.. '.

"

c~mmunity

It remains

continues to

portio0 of thO overall force structlJre.

~ake

ue a

~cw2vel-.

~s

ied to the initiating of the A L D - 7

operational ~ot:cep?;agii,i

raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force

organization.

111.

FORCES O F CHANGE

Just a s the changed nature o f the world and the perception

o f the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development o f
!ALR doctrine, ALB-F and its resulting organizations will b e
shaped by the inomentcus ,:hc3;?qes in tcday's wGrld sit~:ati:m

.,

15

the concomitant changec perception o f the threat. Bzforti

develcping the concepts in A L S - F

and then prcposing appr-opr-i.ltc

organizations, a review of the most relevant catalysts of change

is required.
Perhaps the most striking event of the.post World War I 1

enormous consequences across the range of human activities. The

political, economic, and military calculus that has dominated

world events for the last fifty years h a s been completely

. .
disr8.1pted. But, there .-ko:~lc!
b o no mi.;talci;>q that ths 9:-!;?.::pie

The cold war was grounded in the Soviet U n i o n ' s will to empire
and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated
Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968. The abandonment of the
Brezhnev doctrine and o f the effort to control Eastern Europe by
force marks the end of the cold war. 20
The end o f the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of

!lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying

assumptions behind U.S. national security as we1 1.

Theodo8-E.

Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states:

n?e touchstcne for OIL; nation's szcux-ity c s ~ c e p t- the

containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is <ore.
The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for

7 .

General Meyer, in the summer o f 1989 was already renewiny h i s

call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model. T h i s h a s significant implications
for

USAREUER

foc!;s

and 9LB doctrine. 22

sirce tbe V:etnam must b z r,?c!xami ned.

,
.:ii:3k;!pr sf *--.
a

Indeed the entire U S Army

i s the er;.et-qc?nze o f

:a

cbe er;d

2:

I:?::.

l-?r;isn;ll isz~e'i nca; th,: tcp o r

national secul-ity concer-11s.Since Goroachev launched the Sodie::

Union o n its new path, there have been no new Soviet client
states. 23

In house revolutions and regional conflicts,

::,lec.=ndpnf r j f wicerI;-;.:p:-,n.icCIina!;::~;,s. ar-c- f

__ ,. r3:e,.l ';s ~81t.~:-f?~::c;

i
,,,,,

r n ~ r pl i : r ? : . /

rr3

[:c Ld :!J;- l:.?~l'~:t,'E.

,; -

.>';+>:.:

L,,?

;7:c.:;.#

:<

provocation and confrontation through surrogates. 2ecent e\,entr;

in the Persian Gulf s e r v e to underscore this point. The example
o f the Iraq/Kuwait crisis also underscores a further point,
: - . ? f l i c n , l ! gowe.-s. thol~gh ciassi ?ied a s thi:-c d o r l d ? cs:l

- - <;e.-.f:J1

,- \>

;\

. E.

'h

= L;alG,lc.?

- . . - 7

I,;

a ;.,.-. ,>c ,.,.,

-. .,.:?.,.,-<I
- '
,q.

-- -

.-;.-

,,..,,

"dF.,?,--'-

.,-

t,: ?,r,:?;:- c c :r:c,.7i:

'/uono t:as

.,a

7.;

;!-.3.:

<I<!

r . t l 31;t, thsrz

;i

rnZ?.E

;; < a

.II-P

t72i:

.;

::1,-:-?<3:7
<:!:-

1 ; , . , s ; t, ; : 7 , ,
o or^

~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5

!-#3

,:,:,:2,.

,,.. -

j:

-,

tlis?.2d < z ; z i -

developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1.s.

Besides drastic changes in the polltical world, another
facet o f human activity proceeds at a n even greater, perhaps
revolutionary rate o f change

technological development. As much

a proddct o f Cold War competition a s a d e s c r ~ p t o r of it, the

heilcons technology trace

mo5t !ike!y

dill

break.r?eck psis, hhrther h

L;e:,eral i,le/pr h a s ai ! ~ , < 2 3t,,

,2I.'CbJi71'4lip lOCkEd

tO

(35

3 ,*i3y

b, i;!:
LC,

continuz at the c,irrent

is a\!?:- or- nnt.

~e~i-,;:ol
3q,.
SZL:?

.?fen';*

Indced :s;

d.l,:;ipcr;.:
b:i l :
( j ~ : : d , - : j: .I & :

.ice

of redi~c:zd threat.

T h e pr-~cedel-~ce
foi- this t:.pe

thinking is best described in A. J. Bacevich's

sir secur-i

.?,he

t b

Pqnt;omi,c.,.E::.z,..

,,,,

In h i s analogy, a beleaguered Army o f the 1950s sought to justify

its existence by emphasizing the impact o f changing technologies
o n war and the Army's

ability to capitalize o n its promise. 24

Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its

r o l e in national security, great technological breakthroughs that

will help shape future battlefields are just around t h e rr.rner.
T h e above I-ev1ec.jof the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century. In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events o f the late 19805, the most
fundamental change in the Army will b e that it gets smaller. The
r ! o c i i n i : i < 3 Sa'/i&?t threat 'wi 1 1

(10

1:3813e!- serve a s

The 1argc peacetiino !nil lt;;t-y

esiabllshment th;?

L1;O

. .

, - . , : : : . ~ . ; . 1 1 ~' - ' G :

ci~i.-;--tit!
y r-?:.:is!..=.

Threat considerations aside, current U S budget deficit problems

preclude maintaining the current force structure. T h e n a t i o n ' s
political leaders a r e understandably anxious to spend the elus'
,i v e
"peace

rj

i v idend". Fowevei-, General Vuono and o t h ~ rmi ! itat-/

lsaJ,,.r, =a:~tic:-i
t-,at t h p S ~ : L . : G31-flox-.2d
~
j(lggs~:-,~;..&t
1:cJn the sc:-ap heap i:f

history. 25

:--4.
,-\.

The fir:ny fiiids iLself,

,.,\-.A

.i5

.-..,-'

. .

i i .

did in the 1950s, mired in a11 identity crises. Despite 'hz

rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear, the Army
under V u o n o ' s leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role.
T h e heart o f the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation o f the A r m y ' s role a s a strategic
force. General Vuoiio's challenge is to package what h a s always
been an important Army fux-,ctionbut, not
that o f q:nhal

ci

be1 1 defini?d

rrj::?:

police fol-ce. S i npl:/ put, the $,-my, -:a l o q e r the

l ~ n dcompone.it o f conta:nment,

must sell itsel; a s tne global

sf 25 in;izl-er-,tz.
Tile GIrn~,

.-.,,
(
.
,
,

the t:?;->atrr,t s

c:~s"i:.x;?l.j..~,

b e found thl-oughout the post-Cold :Jar won-!d,

dc7termi:lc- i:k#eway

will fight to accomplish the implied missions, and design forres

to accomplish those missions.
General Vuono h a s chosen six imperatives to serve a s a

compass heading for this reorientation of the Army. T h e six

imperatives include: keeping a quality f o r c e , maintaining a
-

: scuqh ;-ea!

na:.,taini;~q t t e a p ~ r - c ~ ! - - l a
force
te
mi;<

istl.:

?;;I:>,- 7,G :

cn:lt;,l.~~c;
mcc::?~-r.:~.:i::u::.

and t:ie 4evclopment o f qua! i t y lea3ers. c.6

h:iat is

6r?r

l.~e,df - r s : : ~

this approach is a vision of a n Army that is significantly

different

than the Cold War deterrent model. T h e new base c a s e

for the Army will b e global contingency operations. These

r,c<?,--al-i.j:,.; ,.ri::
\

t,,z

,c!:l:t

3: j. jE5.

.:.<

Ti,C

,-g,-.:.j:;,~
CC:l-l(i>,:ti..?:

,?.I,:c,T

based. Overseas troops wi!l

L. ::.?

s f :h?

i,,

,?!-.l./

d;

;,.-.

,=:,-;L!:-..::

.:.
.

!..P

!:;:::"L

present a smaller forward presence as

opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force. The Army

will continue its post-war tradition o f substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i ~ ? sfor .-a,,:!i:.;mber-,t:f
S v n ; r i ~ <up ch,? ::a:.:

;gs-.em:j.

,
,,

- c.- - <:;-,

FL? -

Tp,:?

;>;-::...

t:-:,ops
$53: .j

ail!

-,7 , - 2 .;e:>-; . I:

fc.--~f
({e:,e,.al
,
,J,,on-!l.jl, foci.5ec: c;,, t!.:rr<?e=-,c,._.;,c i . 3 1

character ist it.:c,: .fersati .l

cy

acror-s ;he o:,er.xl;ior;il r:snc: i1d1i37:,

deployability, and lethality. 27

IV. AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE

The dynamic changes outlined above s e t the broad parameters

for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept. General John

W. Foss, Commander of TRADOC, h a s played a leading r o l e in

r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns forCL:-rerit

AL3 coctr-:ne. I1 th=~~!: 5.3t ~*-,fierj

wi th t!?~: cnrt ;sued

i-z:5?.Janr:lo f t;;e tcrets of A L 3 ,

Ce:-e;-a1F:;ss

tr-?rids 3n5 new capabilities r:efna.ic: a

ne,A

fee:.., -hit ,zl;.3.;r;i;.~

ioov a', tl-e * $ ~ : n , ~ ' s

warfighting concepr, hence A L E - F .

23

The new warfighting concept

will generate important considerations for the organization and

missions of tactical units.

General Foss's ideas for the development of ALB-F a s a

warfighting concept start with the notions, espoused earlier by
General Vuono, of the future Army a s a CONUS based contingency
force. This connotes a force with an additional emphasis o n
for
?eployability. A t the thsater icv+l, smaller fo!-ce =t~-!lct~!-er-

both frier:dly and threat forces will mean the 1i:~eliliood: I +

.?

nonlinear ex tended b z t t lef ield. Nonlinearity is seen as t h e :ie:.~

battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes. Emerging technologies will be utilized a i l
the nonl.inear battlefield to find, target, and destroy enemy

Combat Developments, Robert L. Keller:

The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us

to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same
time, accommodate the changed threat while complying with the
evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints. A nonlineal- c s n c ~ p t i ~ ;
'3 cat-,:jidatcfor this ta-;
. ~ t a : concett. 3?

es t a b 1 islizd f o r ~ L J Z U I -A?r m y forces: versatility, 5tl-.3ki?3

ii

deployability, and lethality.

A s an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived a s a

cyclical process. The process itself has implications for future

force design.

The operational concept a s envisioned consists of

four phases. The first phase is long range acquisition and

surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces. This phase

puts a premium on intel!igence

assets providing near complete and

fires phase. Tarqetlng ths forces accjui,-ed and h-acked

ill

tl:%

significant numbers o f enemy combat and combat support forces.

Phase three is the maneuver phase. In this phase highly ag:.!e

maneuver forces complete the destruction o f enemy remnants and

follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations. T h e final

phase is reconstitution. Following hard but short bat'tles, lean

maneuver forces will b e reconstituted through a robust and

mareuver-or itz-ited past? lo~jistitrs system. 31

Th i

pattern n C combat is seen a,; a vjiid 7:czess

not c ; ? i ;

r;

cyci i-31

'

t!:~

corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ tmaneuver uniz.

T h e above operational concept produces important design

parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F.

T h e nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical

czt

tei-,,

cai ;

cc,mpat

9;

h:qnlv

:j;-

to obtaiti the req~li;-k?::deg,-ee :,f

,a<:

!:?

,:l&pe,;vs:

f ~ :-.?:.
-

ar;i;lty, yet; ;.e'.ai!i

T , , :-,:-.:e-

ih?

necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting

'units. T h e initial design guidance emphasizes combined a r m s
brigades that a r e interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+'
.,,st
- -fer.cr?.T:ii.s

FF,:?

<:,

,,;

s:<:,

d i l l alioki ?or i-apldly t.:ilur,il)le

;.>F(T

:s :;m 5 s , - ~ < j , ~ 5 L g . - , : + '~3l5

lca,ye?

force p.w:!,,.g,:?-,.
. c z ::; ..:::e:
:

much more a k i n til t h e ~01-3'.,o ~ - q s ~ i z a ; iiii

~ n Wc.-llj> a
: - :I. T! .:
logistic emphasis wiil b e foc~ised ac the c o r p s and br-ijade ievei.

This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force.

T h e maneuver battalions will b e lean with only the bare minimum

logistics capability required.

All of these organizational

.design parameters required by the operational concept stress the

need for a high degree o f tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements. Azcording to LTE Leon E. Salomon. iogis:i;c

in

a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v : s i o n

commander-,. 3:

In the examination o f the structuring of light infantyy

brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may b e expected to perform. The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability. Strategic deployability h a s lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces. Ironically, during the 19805, while the Army drove full
s@eed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine, i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force. The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening, though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada, Panama,
and "Desert Shield".

The nature o f current and future means of

strateqic nobility will continue to place a pre:n?urn a:.! fci-cez

thst are specifically tailol.sd for %e

efficient use o f those

means. However-, the dilemma over how to r''bd.1.y. place a cj:ed.ib.Le

fighting force o n the ground remains. Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will

ure,-ation.; gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a:-~1y;:iiq ! . h ~

characteristics of contingency operations:

In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize

or tailor a force for rapid deployment and/or combat; deploy the
force rapidly to deter a possible conflict. - Plan for the
simultaneous deployment and employment of the force; fighting may
well begin before the whole force c a n be in position. 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to

be the principle light mission in 4L3-F.

c a.;

?lth?r

a coi;?i,it;?ncy f'~,?$-cs
.i.n::

t;i

.i.;

immature theater, or a s reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr?CIS

force, the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat.

In a mature theater, where a mix of f o r c e s , e x i s t s to fight

high- or mid- intensity battles, the light fdrce can b e placed in

the detection zone during Phase I. Specifically, the concept

,..
1-

: inLd.itr-y t:,

< s / s ; r:omoi,lpr:

~ I - : Tf
S
:~r:e.

be c a r t of the ~ - : ? c ~ , ~ / r ; ~ i - ~ e i l l . : n . !
T P , ~
PIin=:. y

, m ~ s s i o na ? k?,

L S

cs
f

to monitor a n d target tnreat fol-ces rnea<-~ r i n c i p l eal'.:t!,:i- - l ~ . t ? ~ * c ; t ? i

o f approach. The emphasis is not o n combat capabilities. However,
some counter reconnaissance may b e conducted. In conjunction with
aerial recon forces, forward detachments will be engaged. Light
i

l , l . ; -

E>yi?nct..-:t 2 ~~Iy:jIuc<
.5:,2i-!3;

is

-L C- ,.-rai,? ~ i t h o u t3eccl;!i1.1~dei:i-,ive!y

e!,qaqei!.

?!>!?:

;!c:

3:;l..<y)c:;:
c f I.?,?

)a,.t

-.:,:

{::

:(i,:

force in the detection zone, light infantry forces cac expect to

act a s C2 for other R/S elements in the zone. T h i s requirement

will demand a robust C2, downlink, and fusion capability to

3sr>lni!ate real tize inhc-mation. 34

2 :,,;-i.,!;
:.,p

$bs

F::-25

;:-,a.5= 1 :y:,t

d s r , ? - 2 c t l n n ;.a,;*i u i l !

.I-,f3:7:,..%, :2<%yp
;,,,,>2

---

f:.,.
,, - - - 2

bt, ;-,,:qu:l-a~: tc ,nail;ts:i';c::.-.%..'-,;.

.. :,

L,

. ..

L k !.I

enemy u7its to continue the targeting process. L:ght brlgades or

battalions may also b e used during the fires phase a s strike
assets against enemy soft targets such a s C2 and artillery. U s e
a s a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light

motorized raids. 35

In the maneuver phase licht brigades, like other maneuver

units, will b e dispersed

il-i

tactical assembly ari?as i ! ~

preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to : ~ ~ - o t s <;7;5

.t

assets.

TSese maneuvi?!- forces wil; :rapid1y c m e ko,;et>er to fo;m

appropl-iate combinations

501-

the o v p l e t z dectrac '.lor1

, ~ the
f

enemy forces that have survived the fir.es phase. G~iirlelines f c r

ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver

brigades.

General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade

is the critical element in tactical success. In stressing this

'

point he has used a s an example the necessity of permanently

attaching a brigade's direct support artillery battalion.
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and f!e.:ibility
weli. 36

as

In the battle area, maneuver brigades, to include l l ~ h t

fol-ces available for this role, must be able to mass forces

quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire. They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone. Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod.

Thi,

c o n c e ~ tof agility includes the

abiiity to :nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltesaind the optimll and

rapid force tailoring of brigade packages. A s General Foss has
emphasized, agility includes, "

...

the mental agility of the

commander and the streamlining of logistics." 37

The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution. This

phasz aiso has implicatio?:~f o l -

light i n i r i n : : r y

.
.
f o r r : e r-.?s;g!i.

-.
I . - ,. -.

nonlinear bat t ief ield present.; <;one particularly troubl i riq

problems for the logistician. Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity. Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOC's) perpendicular to the front of advance.
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOC's.

Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOC's is a

classic military maneuver at the strategic, operational, and

tactical level. 38

On the nonlinear battlefield those LOC's

by

necessity will be exposed and vulnerable. The distances between

battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the

pi-cblems o f s~ipport li; the PLS-F cancep i. . x i !

IT;~T:E.-JYPI131-.,--i)c:!?s
.
j

will seek logistic independence. The focus o f support will b e

placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps. Division will become a logistics coordinator. A
brigade's logistical assets will b e expected to maneuver with the
unit instead o f dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor. 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept, it
is c!ear

A~rmy'

that there are siqriifica~it i,xpliiations i;;r

t a c ~ i c a lo r g a n ~ z a c ~ o : : ~It
. ?.s also ciear- th?t

:,f

A:!

:::;:?;

?mpc:~rz;?C.

fluestions a r e !raised concernir~g tl:e CLAI-reiiti i q h t L ; ~ . i y ~ d e

structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept. T h e !ight
infantry brigade will b e expected to perform important functions.
T h e brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
:,.:,t-glr

d~.-i::loyabiIi:;y
!ni.5-,i.:,;. T:-. ;;his cl:isi,k::t , -

m!st have suTf icient is';hality to c-ect~reitszlf

i i :

!-:.;:':-..:

!i,:;'iI;

tk12 db,i?:::;',i;

area and support the introduction of heavier forces a s r e q u ~ r e d .

Secondly, the light brigade must b e adaptable enough to

participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle o f

cornhat. S n c c i f i c ~ l i v . t3e brigade !nlJct b e able to f ~ , ? c t : . vsc;

~ a

th? =;,.nbi .led il-,iih: ,-z,rr~n

f.-j,-ci. I;:

w : : ~ a~ i;gr-c~r
i 3te

it

muc,<

3n a b l e

th;l

.,,...

: j p : =L.r L ' - . -

I .

?.:I

12.

to in!;e~~-a?e?
ef!er?i,,e! ;

rapidly with orher maneuver br:gades

IN.,?

to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in

the battle area.

V.

A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS

To make a n assessment o f the light b r i g a d e ' s organizational

compatibility with th,e ALE-F operational concept, it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation. A set o f criteria c a n derive fundamental validity
iro.7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5. A 1 il'kacjf
ins:.;:-;.s that changzs

111

:.;I t.h

tl:c?,m-?;

<octrine. orca~iiratinnc.,and ,nat..?ric: 3c.

?at. st:-ay dangerously from

.I

filnd'amenta!

under-~jts~idlnc,
o f tL:e

nature of war. In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e ,this

theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework

for analysis in terms of a n acceptable theoretical mpdel. In this

case the model will be the domains o f combat a s articulated by

Army theoretician, James Schneider. This model represents three

fundamental components o f the combat environment that shape

events o n the battlefield:

the physical domain, the cybernetic

domain, and the moral domain.

The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects o f rsmbat

such a s the terrain and weather and also encompasses, technology,
and logistics. The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information. T h e moral domain deals with the human dimension o f
conflict and the intangibles such a s cohesion and morale. 40

The

next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ; ~ z . ? f ~ l

-Tramc?work 'for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the cor.te?.
t of

ALB-F.

AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives c a n

be derived from the earlier analysis o f the A L B - F

operational

concept. The essential design pai-ametei-5 c a n the!,

be

within th,? donains of comoat. FGI- the pu:-pus25

::hi? p . i z t i r . ti)!:

3f

gro:~ped

,analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral il&nains.

In the case o f the physical domain, ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability, sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages, and lethality expressed in terms o f firepower and
tactical mobility. In the moral domain, A L B - F

and its basic

assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the

contingency base case, generates extraordinary demands o n unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic o f the light fighter. The physical
and moral domains a s de.fined abcve can now be i:?ed

as a fl-amewot-2

for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate

organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F.

The cri::zr;a Far .;bclqing a n 31-rjanizatior il-i t<?~-nc,

,:'-

!:>.?

operational concept under which i t wi.11 b e employ:?d is

straightforward. The criteria c a n b e posed a s two questions. T h e

first question is whether t h e organization is structured so that

it c a n accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it. T h e

next que;tion

is whether that organization is, a s suggested by

Michael Howard at the beginning o f the piece, flexible enough to

aico,n>T;.lis.::
t he crucial su'.sidia!-;.
identlfi?d

for i t . The dornai:?;,

~i.;sio:;s tha: h,.3ve t.e,?,i

refined in terms

i::

t-iii 31-2-i:

design par-aneters, wi 1 1 provide the necec,sary, : . ~ E o I - E * ;1~vc ~ :

grounded, analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established. (APPENDIX 6 )
T

,L

c.~...
, . -; t e s t

of

i n f d n t , - y structcrs .aga1n::,t i t .

be t-c t : ? ~ ?tl.? r ! : : - - ; ? i f

the c r ; . t e . - l a w i . 1 :
The

cti;-i-c'!;?

! ig:-:c

::.',F:IC;:

,y

brigade structure and its generic task organized variant a r e

reflected in to APPENDIX B-1. In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the ?rm;/. A srandard 1 . i ~ n tbl'icade packaqe ~~itl?r;<t. ro~-i-di~ic,ic.;-,al
. .y c. c- it.+: st>:- i C ? 5 . I <.ix:Eyi>I Y
,.:=, ;,Ef?,,[;~.:: :(>:? ,I&? b e ~,.;.7~~(?,;c>:;
<;:?
:
E)

LJi

t:,

the advP7,-;of

t::E?

C-1';.

.c:?edLilcd

l'iT5

+,i

I!:,

.;

program buy o f 210 aircraft, %his number should h c neat-ly

to just over 103 sorties. 41

ha :v*.?:i

Recommended augmentation packages

from heavy/light lessons learned more than doubles the strategic

lift requirement. As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability. Capable o f worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters, the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead. This is a seve;e

An analvsic o f t!,?

limitation.
liqht bt-icjade i:, the ?nys:cal

dr.$nalc

Co..
#,.&in
.7
also re~.ea:s t , ? ~b . - i v i l c - s !i.ni teri -,u:-.tsiiment ,cjo~'i

T h e 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e;a;.inot z.<pect to sustain itsel:

1 i T,..

50.- mot-? th.31-

48

~OUIins a

:OW-

to mid- intensity environment. 42

The most

critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets.

Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as

helicopter resupply and

airdrop to provide sustainment functions

to dispersed elements. Foraging and caches are also options.

However, these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-

intensity environments. Foraging is only realistic for CL I and

1 1 1 . Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anni:iq prcbiem

and can have the same stultifying effect on ope!-ations a = 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots. In the heavy/light experi.ences at
the NTC, general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount.

Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not

adequate, to support the attachment of heavy forces. Light'units

attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply

ma kin:^

zxtensive use of the "push sy,;tem". This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent. 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains. In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit,;. Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility. In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility. Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters. The light brigade package being discussed can only put

12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground. This a weapon that is best

employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range. A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry.
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers :APPENDIX E). Though relatively >nobile, their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems.

lic3ht -For-r.eht3c,solight to o f f s e t it:; l<icl: 0;' ?irep:>wi?:-

through its unicue tactical style. As described by Luttwak, the

light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by

targeting elements o f the enemies CSS, C2, and morale instead o f

h i s heavy combat systems. T h e light f o r c e u s e s close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy. 44

In terms of tactical

msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h ;51-i g ~ d eeschews 0)-ganic tran?jro:-ta: l c ; asY?;,:

2 n d seeks, a 5 ii, claes ~ i t h
fir-?poi.ier. to gain

re:a?iva

ta;:!;lc&;

mobility a d v ~ n t a g ethrough the carefdl selection a f tc-r!-.3i!: i ~ c d

its tactical style. 45

In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest

strengths. Light infantry forces have been a b l e to captt~rethe
?:.oe=:J:

.?sc:-1;

<;-,;;

tkemsa;.,>,: e: i : .

,3CC;-Uils:.<; i:,i

ic>pFic:,-! th3:.

b i

t:;

,. . .

:,!,.:

th:i:

;:.!.l-..

.. ..- - .. . . .

. ..." .
i::

;f

iZ!
L>d..r

superior skills. Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the

light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces

the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the

stn:~::ec,t

t
T
.1- ,

y -

primary ,;ro~:.os.f + i A!sc

:

t7,:t

within t h e

, s .re.3t.?L:. :

, e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err,I,,,~X~L,:E
? h ? 5ki:L:
;.%----:

uf

no!

a1

; :<p,:,
k!7?

ic

d r ; , - . 3 i;1
.

. , = A. t ,

' 1 . 5

:,

>-\,

t!':
\;,;:

-.

i n d ~ d ~ c ; u a c!, : ~ ; : ! : . ? : .

his self-reliance, ingenblzy, stamilia, aid courage. 6 s McZichael

puts it, this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over h i s enemy. 47

Finally, in the moral

domain the disadvantage o f fighting with extensive augmentation

must b e considered. For any but the lowest level of conflict, i t
h a s been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation. In practice, this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team. Au:jmer;tati:?n k::;its
are slmply nct going

70

s h c w tip a t li,;ht bl-igade hedequert;.~-5

imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield

a s the light fighter.

Having analyzed the current light brigade structure

according to the ALB-F framework, it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability o f the organization. For the
first question concerning the ability o f the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission, the answer is a
qualified yes. As described above, the light: brigade a s
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ : y 'he
most permissive of environments. The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested. The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested. This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqace's de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5.
In rzgard to che second question, the light brigade is :lo?

currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions

envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept.

Although

well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield, the light brigade falls well short
aon:aiii. Only wit::

iai

tk:e physical

signif-icant and pe~rhapjJebi! itdt i:?c;

augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho de?tii-,

o f the detection zone. Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit,,
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed. The extended battlefield
means.increased time and space factors and the complete reliance
o n foot mobility and terrain advantages. Richard E. Simpkin's
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettler's German sponge
defense for central Europe, could prove dangerously
inappropriate. 48
Finally, the lighi br i g a d e ' s comb ination of firepower,

mobility, and sustainment p roblems make it unsuitable a s a

24

interchanqed with other ma;-!euve$brigades to mass for- engaqements

in the battle area. Therefore it must be concludad that there are

serious questions concerning the appropriateness o f the current

light brigade organization for ALB-F.

If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F,

the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-i,jLo dstermine ~f

thn:-e

arc; e:.:isti,ig. s o l # . l tii:.;:s

LC:.

199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB), and the British nirborne

Brigade. Each o f these organizations offer unique design features

Brigade. Other than airborne units, the NEB is perhaps the light

d i v i s i o n ' s greatest competitor for the n a t i o n ' s strategic

-: . : cc;l-ntrzloperarional

conc:??t for employ.L:ig t ! : ~?":3

ir: :>asr:ri .;;the doctrine tnat Mal-j:ie Vc,>-iecare .nost effectiie iti :-art;? w h s ,
employed a s a strategically mocile, combined-arms, air-gr-ound
combat force possessing its own CSS, all under a single
commander. Organized and employed in this manner, Marine forces
fight according to the Marine C o r p s basic combat doctrine, which
incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare. 49
L

As part o f the physical domain, the NEB h a s been carefully

designed for its strategic deployability role. The Navy h a s

. Z F 'lcient

..,L$,

amphibious shipping

t3

deploy a n entire M E 3 in both

world. The Mari,le nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is

self-deployable.

In addition, the amphibious MEBs all contain

forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault

operations. The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the

crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable

landing beaches or within range o f helicopter lift assets. The

MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in

order to off-load what are essenti.ally non-amphibious commercial

cargo shlps.

Also, in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained

by

its brigade service support group. Sustainment up to a certain

point is dependent o n the Navy shipping, requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force.
The

MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply.

I t is in terms o f lethality, a s defincd by mobiliti.. 2l;d

firepower, that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade. A M E B ' s
firepower consists o f a broad range o f armored vehicles, antitank missiles, and field artillery. In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers, 24 ;;/A-IS, and LO 2-6 ail-c;-aft.For incai 1 i t y ::>e XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi'; th!-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and o n e battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV).
Finally, in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW, 25mm, and assault gun
systems. The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile, survivable,
and deployable recon and security vehicle o f great worth. 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps h a s consistently

provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force.

This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions

expected in nonlinear warfare. Tradition and organizatio!i ccmbine

to foster a lhiqh lpvel c f unit esprit.

ri7e :3:38n~1,1r?rtk

relationships o f the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces

help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation

support packages.

In looking at the two fundamental questions o f the

criteria, the example o f the NEB c a n provide insights for future
light brigade organizations. T h e M E 8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t

i3

tied to seal ift t a sdcti ,ir exten!

thi!:

prevented from becomi:is khe p,-incioie O S contirlyeocy

gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ;ts fcrcc.6 ei'try

:::

r':;s-c~.

(;;is

capability by

either amphibious or air assault. The second advantage is that it

c a n get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
I:ght 5,-:gad[?. D y

it.;

very n a ' ; ~ r i l the M ' : L ) n s a c : - , ;

:;:-.

.,,:?r,.

~yecond qur.s.iiori cantre,--nincj

adapi;abi l i t v t c -,ecoiida;.
y Riii-F
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area. in terms
o f sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity. The
f i r e power and mobility the brigade and its air group a r e
eminent 1:.
,

aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a lona!

t

".

is cj,;cp:-,-- i
, a-

oe:-c;o!;r.e!,

a,-d

:.:ES 3t;-:,Eturi-)

I.,

too csn;pie:i. I ; ; ?!?isi-.::r;a;d

for the l i ~ h tbrigade. 51

. : z : - ~ c t ?t.
p

-,-a i 2 7 : ; p ,
:!:

is

11s'.a

I-l::wev!.?--,

iz;;
---I!

,,

1.-1

;no:.<~l

All o f the extra welght, white

efficiently carried by ship would b e prohibitive for transport by

air.

In conclusion, it is in the interaction between the moral

and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important

lessons for the light brigade. There is certainly no drop cff in

Marine cohesion, esprit? and individual warrior othic because i t

is associated with large n u ~ : ~ e ro s

f sophisticated

weapons

~..*stt.mr;.
L ight experts li!*e iuttwa*., ljhie-L.lett!er, and St,zvcn I...
Canby

Should taI:e not? o f

hcw

ths

?!arine Corps h a s trar-scend;?d

the al!.eged unma:ily eirfectr, of !machines o f war. 52

T h e P!a;- isle

Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver

warfare and the imperatives o f the nonlinear battlefield.

B.

SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE

T h e next structure t o . b e studied is the 199th Separate

Motorized Brigade (SMB). T h i s brigade is wkat remains o f the 9 t h

High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in

e't

early 19ROs. (APPENDIX C-2i

The HTLD was to ?>e a

" . . .field

middleweight force to.

a hard hitting and agile fs:-ce

that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions,

yet w a s vastly more tactically mobile than the light division."

53

After years of neglect in the late 19805, the HTLD w a s

reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system >)as

1.

.-.-.-...:,17
> . . ,-

d,.,cj

;i G ! l k

,..=rl
c: I:... '.
.

,
I"

:.
,,,.,;

, ,

:
C'..
~ > ,9
?>

?;ss;lc!..::;

:!',,2

'

L<ss;;;,,

:;:>;,;;

. .. .. ..
:--

the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the A L B - F

framework and the criteria applied.
In the physical domain the S M B offers important advantages
over the light brigade. T h e parent organi:a?-ion
.'eplo~s

01,

a little c.vel- 13C:'

C--l?r! -,o,-ti?s.

dcolo,yaal;. o n 350 sorties and v;ith the C - . l 7

number will b e cut in half. 54

r!lp
1:)

HTLD L.;+s a;;e

SVIB

to

:j,-l-z.-t:l

s~?i-vicethi??,

This cocpares favorably with a

much less capable light brigade task force. T h e 199th S M B

possesses no forced entry capability. T h e S M B h a s a significant
self-sustainment capability. However, the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role. The S M B s lethality in terms o f
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade. T h e entire force is mobi.le with its organic asseks.
In the inoral dcmai!i the 107th is subject to the s a x e
negative dynamics of the U S persocne? system a s all units.

ij:]wev=>;.,

3 : ~ti-!e

ui.llqljE 11Jtal-e

tile CI-qa17!.!at

3:

lCT:

kt;!?

ST!,<

d?!:!:.lCd'~>

of the mission, all of the inqredients are present for dynamic

leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit. The

combined a r m s nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad

hoc augmentation.

When the criteria is applied the S M B compares favorably

with the light brigade. The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc? !i?tha!,

sustaina2 le,

ant

t:he~-efor~l'
crec!it le ~'it?:?rc:?r:!:

~-

fc!-ce GI, the g r c ~ n d . 1,i t?s c;-itical sutjsidi<;~->:ZISZ

by ALD-I=,

L L > : ? ~ :-,:?:;,I<.!..=,-

the SMB has add: tional advaiitages. The 5 x 2 is

Its

specifically designed to thrive o n the nonlinear battlefield.

more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
:cne.

55

Thz q~-jatpl-let:hj! :;y

i n term.; :]f ta:;!;

2nd a l - t i ;lei y p i u s the :o.-:"=-';-,,8,.;,,:.

1:actlca: ,1:3b; L i t , *

!. i ;

~ q5 " .;!,z..-:s

tll?

.3f

5?13

.;>r,

lend itself to combat missions in the battle area. However, the

extreme lightness of the systems demand that the S M B not b e

confused with a mechanized or armor force. T h e organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc, makc t h ~ ?SMD
'

'

- ..

sre.3 a::d

is,

C3,::E)!-t

;ui:,i,I"!,?

c;!;:?.. b);-:s;a.:s:j

rnc!-o <:3mpat~t,le wit!: t?>eA L 9 - F

,:ycl~ ;''

b~k!:t:r

Far

!t:t+ :>=,:,:::-:

L .:

.,.n:;

--,

'

.A

.: .

Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the S M E (:lay b;'

natural model for a light organization in ALB-F. Evaluations o f

9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept o f the
middleweight force. 56

However, there are several negatives that

should b e emphasized. THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was

part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with. The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = . ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer: i t can ;)ut

on

ti>--

9 1 - 0 u 1 ~ dSecond
.
!y , t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea : y s~e;-;pons
s y s t ~ m sco:;ta;ned

t
i:1 the Si'19 dces in fact c ~ dcwn

t h : ~n-,Sility

of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii

a3

: -L---J-U
cc

mountains and thick jungles. This c a n be a problem in the moral

domain if

the force allows itself to become so wedded to its

vehicles that it does not dismount. Vehicle and weapons density

c a n hurt the force in terms o f stealth, deception, and OPSEC, all
important light force characteristics. Finally, the independence
o f the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance o n
Class 1 1 1 , V ,
C.

and I X .

BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE

Before synthesizing the results o f the above analysis and

proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F, it

would b e a mistake not to look briefly at some o f the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army. In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves a s a usefc~l organi.rati'2n fc:
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework. (APF'ENDIX C - 3 ) Thc. 3;-i t i.:,h
Airborne Brigade analysis must, however, b e done in the proper
context. T h e brigade serves a s the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the U S light forces. However, the British airborne brizjad~ i? rat
?::petted to perform missioi;~ in co:ijunc?iol-:;.rl th tizavy f:?r'c??s.

There is no specific role envisioned far th? use o f th;. bl-!<;ad?

in the central European battlefield.

It should also be nated that

consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F, the British

feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form

combined arms organizations. With these matters in mind the
brigade structure c a n be analyzed and the criteria applied.
In the physical domain significant differences from

previous models are quickly revealed. In terms of deployability

all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for

strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked

vehicles in the armored reccc regiment. The brigade possesses a

.:
.
1 z ) . ii: its tc.:o -1-;:an:c

s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 " f-r-ced
i~i
e r i ~ : -.;~3~&:1

;.i;-jc?ljtr:

battalions. These parachute 11.if-antrybattalions are suapo!-ted by

appropriate airborne "slices" in the C S and CSS elements o f the
brigade.

Sustainment o f the force is provided by a n organic

support battalion that deploys with s e v e n d a y s o f supply for the

brigade. Not listed a s part o f the support structure, but
available for that u s e , a r e the organic helicopter s q u a d r o n ' s
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it.This suznort st!-:;ctui-e gives thc b:-ii;.:lc!"

;ei f--,us~ai.imc-ntcapa>i! it,/ that exceed, the aiistc-I-eIJS ! I G : ~ ; ;

brigade. This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse! f

tc c r e a t i : : ~-1

more .flexible and interchangeable brigade. Lethality a s expressed

in terms o f firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of

difference with the US structure. Although the four infantry

katta! ic:.:c, jrp

dops \:at i;r!:

pssp,;t

ia:

f--

fa;- ~f!-li:i;!a;-

:3,;:j

3 : . : - , x:~e~ :...- :
.A,,.

~ ; ; ~ ~ o ; .Itn. :!i.:

+-

.,7.

h':

;!

:-

.; 2:-!:>

re;-:-c
-. r(~~i.n:r.~.:t
,112. :

there a r e 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles. This gives the

brigade a fair degree o f agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work. These systems
a:so

ircreac;e the o r g z n i c .firepower 0f thc b;-i--do.

-. LI
pa.-tir:..i:a.-ly

:..'.t n t:.:;.

75m;j-

-;ne Ciz7:;--'.,
. chp Sri:;,):+p

qLi:,;n

. .
2;-?:;l!er-y
;-er;imr?;7t.

of

light;

iiumbe:- o f mediun antita:;i

![>5:npl

hcwity~y-!.

a:-,<:

, ,A >
I-:.-

ji~d p.;,=:ec_::

weauo~is such a s the M:lan.

, . rj

;,.

ir. ,-.

. 3 :.. ;,

r
:

:.?

Resldcs

these advantages in the physical domain, the brigade also offers

unique organizational pluses in the moral domain.

In the moral domain the framework focuses o n unit cohesion,

esprit, and the warrior qualities o f the individual soldier. T h i s
i s - p e r h a p s the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade. There

is perhaps n o personnel system a s respected for bui!ding

and esprl t a s t!?e El-icis:i rfg imental system. Tie li

fet

cchesion

imc

Brl:;ade
~ s 5 c!
cat ion of t>,e oiiicc;-sa:-3dPJC3s cf t h e 411-5c:-;.:e
prcvide a n iciea: environment fo:- the
3?

fliit-c?~,-l.i:j
of

t h ~
coi:r.-,:o!-

required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear

battlefield. What the regimental system does for the group is

described by Kellet:

...

cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational

effectiveness on.ly when the standards they enforce and the
objectives they promote are linked with the requirements o f
formal' authority. The regimental system, with its powerful
normative demands, has traditionally transmitted such
requirements very effectively, despite its isolationist
tendencies. 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of :he

type

required by the RLB-F operational concept:

There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to

the corroding effects of strain and battle...These men had

resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment,

however fearful they might be in their hearts. They would rather

have gone out than own defeat. 58

the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values

The permanent combined arms nature o f the brigade greatly

reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios. A s
discovered earlier this is a n important consideration for the US
light system. The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
reflects

th?

Sritish belief, simila~-to the !US :?a:-ine-,,that

!:h+

mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the S O L E does

not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry. The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative, the old wisdom that you fight like you train and,
therefore, the organization should reflect the concept o f how you
plan to fight. If they have the transport, and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy, then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them. Like the US
Marines, the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex. Luttwak, who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British a s an effective role model, is critical of the heavy and

conplex b!-iqace arqarli zai;:cn.

-,

II;F

91.:;;I%',

hGwzve:-, are

comfortable with the span c f co~ntrol and the nature of th?

organization. They believe it reflects the way they are most

likely to fight. 59

Applying the criteria, the British Airborne Brigade

provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade. The brigade appears to b e strategically deployable
a!t!icugh

t:?t? add: ticnal veCI:cl?s

requirements a!-?? Class I I I

A::[!

ZP:-tainly crea:p
J

:q;-eat.?ra::-! i

st

pr-oblems. The inher-en': I'o: ced

E
also !ends
entry ca~dbi!i'.y is a plus. T ~ 3;-igade

itsvli ti: CLE-

F missions expected o f light infantry in the detection zone and

the battle area. Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone. The selfsilrtzir:nrfni car;abil i
:ntfrc:,ar:geab!u

tl-c,

\in: t f c r

VI.

r,;i?

tl:e b:-;qa<:r?

.?

rcj;-i?

ti?:]

>.-,:'

-.-si.; !,:

the battle area fight.

LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM

The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is

is a

the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT). T h i s proposal

theught piece based o n t h ~

above .3ncllysis cf the cb3cq:17q i,a!il.-e
. ~ f
tCp w;:-

LC:!,

the a! t c r p a t

the fiL5-F
,
; .,e
.

g-c.,-ati~nalconc:zpt. ~ : : c ?

e::amales o f the i':EFl,

Air-borne 9:-igade.

Tile

t;:e

3!3.

aid

,?

b,

:{(,+;--..,.:
. L >.

.,

->'

k h ? 3~ i :I sf,

oroposed str-ucture i ! i c o r ~ c r a t z ~f?dtu;es

that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect.

Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability. The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy, sustain, and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios. The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
!iecessal-y for adapting t h e 2:-i&:ade to oa!-tici9at~to a !i:ni tec
extent in th? 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~
AL3-F c-cncc?t.

Ti?e !..PC:

wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in P L S - F .

(APPENDIX

D)

Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates

marked changes to the light brigade structure.

Concerning

deployability, the LRCT c a n b e deployed a s a whole by 129 C-17

sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties. This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure. With the
addition of a parachute battalion, the LRCT gains a n important
organic forced entry capability. The addition o f the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability o f getting firepower o n the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow o n forces. It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out o f the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai!, t y c e missions. The L 3 C T
battalion, after the Marine and Sritish mode:.

is

r~p0131-k

tacticslly

mobile and capable o f sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat. To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which c a n
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rFiel.d.
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate? t h e
complex interaction of the various domains. This is par1;icuiariy
true in the case of lethality. T h e LRCT trades a certain amount
o f strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility

advantage of the light cavalry squadron and

the assault helicopter company. With regards to the cavalry, the

two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to s e e the ground, conduct counter
reconnaissance, find and targel: the enemy, and in loh- and midin-ensity situations, deztroy him.

:-he LF!CT

:,as 31.;~ ~,.z:-i:sb:;.:r;crpa.;-ed i t 5 ii!zpcb~~!r i::, bd!;k,

antitank and indirect fire systems. To k i l l tanks each infantry

battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted o n
HMMWV's. In the future this c a n b e improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire. The ground troops o f the cavalry squadron
will have a mix o f 25mm chain guns and a n armored protected g u n
system. Since the mid 80's there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t . 5

to 22 ton class. T ~ c c - e..,ehls1;'5

zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the vei:erable

:?a,/?

t%.!?i.

!(!5mm

gun. Rc?por-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t t ? e '7':r:in

system. 60

For indirect f i r e the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-

battalion however, a significant effort needs to be made to

improve munitions to include a n antitank round. Completing the

- . i jai:': 3. - I -=&, ,, d C ?
.;.-*.
,,d;ll-er';
np::;~:s.P G C ~53Ztd1:0:? Nlll
-( h i 3 wa;j ;, ;os:~iar 3ysts;r: i n L : ; p ?:I:
12:I;nm :?,or-tj:-~;.

?
;:

!+

F<,

- ,-~..
1

HTL2.

proven system in many armies, the 120mm mortar promises to

provide rapid and accurate indirect f i r e s for the battalion that
include smart munitions. This system fills a fires void o n the
extcndez rior.lin~ar-battlefic!d

.
.
1 ~ F tt v tne .il:ri:tjtic!i?.
a?

: C 5 m l n h~:~ih;-..-.I:,t r : ~?;I-i.psw,?::-;t;:f

it

tail br?

.;ee:i

thz;

th? ILPC'l.

has

without an unacceptable i:lct-ease

t!i?

;t+:,::,?iit,

!:>:?

,;;,.:<.!:.,r,.,q

been r,ignific.-l;itl,y
l!>pr-s~,:-:c!
i;i

weight.

As for tactical mobility, the brigade remains a light

footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types. However, there are important
distinctions. With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron, the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility. This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems.
The par.achc~tebattalion n a y , ir: some instances, provile a rich
..
a;:n+~;?sior,
o f 5actical moblii ty. T h z assault :lei icoot;er ccv2a;iy
the support battalion wi!?

pc-ov:de o r ~ a n i c l i f t

CAI:

turn

i+

...,
i

liqht battalion in two lifts. Corps plugs can b e made available

to lift two more battalions if necessary. (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion,
esprit, and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers. The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation. Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1it.f. I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t . k e
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case. A s recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion,
structure makes no difference, it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
?;-"vide5 the
force. h i

!e:tibi 1 i

C;.J

and s p j I- i t recui:-ec!Tor
7

$3

co.?ti:7ge:ic~f

Even Uh!e-Ket t ler i-ecognizes the need fgr !1i s J.;?:;e.-.-,

to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there

organization. Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles. 62

The LRCT has the potential to create

as cohesive a force as there is in any Army. With certain

a?-';
A d -

,. 4 --la1 aclvantayes
brr..>

achieved

:t. c'sn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r =UCC?=S

~ a t

a: l

. 2 ~ 3 ~

The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion. This battalion

would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT. The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics, techniques, procedure, and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment. With a modicum of personnel management
skills, this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can b e rotated into the LRCT. This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done wit!l the IJS

CCiHO2'

!;yi;tem

2nd the c l?;r

ad~~a:,C.*qeso F the B!- i z isi: , - e ti~, . n ~ tni l l

system. The downsizing o f the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process. 63
T h e L R C T s strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team. All of the C S and

CSS elements o f the LRCT a r e organic, in keeping with the

imperatives o f ALB-F. T h i s obviates the problems frequently
i?.?:iti

I.,-

--L

fiec! wi

i:S,

the ad hoc t~s!: organization s f ".r i c ; . > l r - ><?;l:;e=.

i::teqi-attld ccmbined ar;ns :;a?:u;-eo f tkr? LRCT :-?;!i:r?s ti-:?:

nilmber s f iuqmentat ion 5.1 icil.5 4-c?quiri?(l i n d a1 lows

: ~ : l i
l

th2

critical advantage o f training in peacetime the way it plans to

fight in war. T h e use a f c o r p s transportation plugs a r e not

necessarily a detractor. Under the training and supervision of

t ! . , ~ 1 i q h c C! jvisign !i~a,."~c3:-~e;r;.
1;.:25e :;;-,:t~.w i : 1 i;:e~,ikct!>:..
'7

:i

hab:::i:il

:-plz~:o;,5:,;2

z,Ji k;l t?:?

i : < i : ~ 't
~
l-:?,.

\-

..---.- L

j>:.

:;

';r

.2

s a m e manner a s the NEBS' AAV battalion, the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL), armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) ,

and

truck transport units c a n , within the constraints of METT-T,

pro:iae
t?,?

imp(::-tant fl~::ibi?ity : c ; -

f:r7,t

LcwarC,s

si,:,s;,I;;:,:

the LRCT. T C e
.

"i!j:::!,

c ? ?<>:,:?-.:?

L'TOL.

ma\.

.Ail,.,

?vsn !:I+

.; , :

mechanizat icn. 64

The LLRCT cstlcept P I - o v i d e sA:; appropl-iate a;>,swei ti:

ti)?

~:.;c

fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within

the ALB-F concept. T h e LRCT is a deployable, credible deterrent
force. T h e LRCT c a n also b e a n effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area o f the RLS-F
extended battlefield. T h e LRCT will not b e a motorized unit. I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to cl:,se terrain and
ecsnomy o f force missions.
capaoili L y a s

we::

The more rcbust recon and secur:ty

a s t h e c!-~a:'!icani l i

the extended battlefirelo wi!!

t y

to 1 ift ur?itc:

.a;-ou;~

h e o f enormous heln to the ccmbined

arms recon force. The more capable organic suppo:t

structure

ul!i

increase the overall flexibility o f the unit making it a more

self-sufficient, rapidly tailorable force that is a more

interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades o n the

battlefield. T h e obvious moral advantages of the organization

will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with

nonlinear warfare.

VII.

CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The above analysis of the changing world, curl-~ntlight

infantry force strccture, the ALB-F operat ~ o n a lconcept, ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team. A s determined
by the analysis, this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifa;it:-yb r igade struc tul-r? for AL3-F.

The anaiycis qai~nec.:

its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F

design parameters and by applying a simple but effective

criteria.

T h e first key points o f the analysis identified explicit

and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe:-ationai ccncept. Tiic5e mlcslons i?clbded.

the

i::t-

ir::w.;.

mission of a rapidly de?loyable ccntingency f o r c ~and subsidi2;f

missions a s a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area. Analysis of
the current light brigade, using the theoretical framework o f the
domains, found the light brigade deficient. T h e light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role.
T h e brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area.
In the second part o f the analysis, a study o f alternative

brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for

reorganization. The MEBs multiple forced entry capability a s we!:

25

ic.;

T!'z

sere att.i.-~=
tive ~1-cai11z.iti~nal
z<?var.:aG;e5.

lethal i:y

S M B demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without

prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability. T h e aritish

Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility, a forced

entry capability, and a special advantage in the moral domain

with its regimental system. All of these organizations

demonstrate the wealth o f good ideas and alternatives that exist

in

f i l - ~ ct l i s ~f;qh:ilig <;nits ; y <,..- h responsihi 1 i ti..;

d3-l~:

.ni,.:sio.is

simi!a:- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b ! - ~ g a d e .

T5e L.?CT PI-o~c;sal1 5 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t

proceeded it. It is not intended to b e a simple c o m p i l ~ t i o nof
the best features o f other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations. T h e light brigade retains its "light essence".

.,??,.~eue:-,
,
k 7.;

5u<:;p5t"(j

~mp:-ou;lnr?:,tsa::

11':;';
'3

Cb,?

f,.:;

i s :',:

-:;;-ce
S t . . c i ~ ~ L -.:,;;.: - ~ .L?:?

p!c3:$.+ irl
ti-;? o v c . ! - a ..; .

: t z ?re;;?..-

j w

::;'..?

:
. ...

,1

. S ..

a n organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli a n oper-atiilna!

concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have

done with ALB.

t+:.

g:,,id:.>-,
L. - - :r
.,,..

., ,. .:

.,

,I..

>
.

L .

>

..

-, :,..:-:,
,

:,.:??,:'

.
-

.::p"'-- i fi z

->,.-,
'

,- .:, ,:.;

P,L!:,:
"

i
\

;
2;

,,,..!

. c.

q!;

.. ,. - . ..
', < . .!i.2 :

>. '.

,!

. , .-.
-:,

'

.-..
. . , ,. -- .

i , - . c ; .' ,

cows" in terms o f organizations and ideas. Or1 the cit:.,?tArmy cannot afford

.'..,.
. . -.
..+ , - ,

::.j

j j

ha.rd,

!:he

to indiscriminately dismantle what is not,

broken. T h e Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential

contribution to national security.
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic, political, and military t - e n d s
ccnf I-oiiting the Army. This d o e s !riot kcwever, q u a r ~ n ; e e :h;i::
. .
4 c ? y wi 1 1 :iecessarily n c v ? ; h :iid r l ~ n tdoc l;i-:?a:
ai~i:
st-cianizatinnal direction. -. h e prncess ict- ch,ir.;jing dir-PCt : a n

the

is

critical. Anaiysis o f future crqanizations and doctrines must b e

thoroughly grounded in theory. Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war. It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development. T h e currently flawed light
force is a painful example o f how the process c a n go astray. T h e
ALE-F operational concept is demanding. Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Ar:ny. I,:
turn, the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion, canl;ot Ce
the product of branch parochialism, bureaucratic imperatives, or
personal agendas.
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F.
However, a s cautioned by Howard, it is better to have flexibility
af

mird a:id oryanizaticn than to believe :bat yoc: have -;cri.;r-atel.:.

guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal-. ;?s an al t c - t - n . i ! : i v ~

::?

what h a s become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational

mindset, the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield, across the operational continuum. I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr

succzss. The reduced profile of t-e light i:ifan;ry in the eve:-al!

fzrce structure will !helu ?revent the urgency n f janining a :-acr~i:j
light peg into a square, 6LE-F, high-intensity hole.

.
RPFEHDIX 8-1:

CURREHT LIGHT IHFRHTRY BRIGADE

LIGIIT IHFIIHTRY BRIGADE

CURREWT D I V I S I O H S WITH T H I S L I B ORGRHIZRTIOH:

6 T H IHFRHTRY D I V I S I O H
7 T H IHFRHTRY D l V l S l O H

2 9 T H IHFRHTRY D l V I S l O H (HRTIOHRL GURRD)

SOURCE:

IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS:
B R T T L E B O O K , connmm RHD
6EHERRL STAFF COLLEGE, FT. LEAVEWUORTHl KSI 1 9 8 9 .

'LIGHT

RPPENDIX 8-2:

SEPRRRTE L I G t l T IHFRHTPY ERIGRDE

LT
IHF 3

H It C

* H E E D E D FOR H V Y / L T

EHGR

SOURCE:

nlx

CRL 8 9 - 2

111

SIG

ADA

RVH
GS R R T Y
0 s RRlWI
TPRHSPORTRTIOH
GS R E D
I I V Y E Q P EHG

H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIltRHD.

SPT

RDHIH

R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC,
P

S C O T T R F B , H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 ; RHD U.S.

RRHY.

LERRHED.

COIlDlHED RPHS CEHTER,

LERRHED,

F T . L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9 .

--H E R V Y - L I G H T

LESSOHS

C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S

APPEHDIX C-1:

HRRIHE EXPEDITIOHRRY BRIGRDE <HE01

RRRIHE EXPEDITIOHARY BRIGRDE (NEB)

(HOTIOHRL

T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH)*,

RPPROX
PERSOHHEL
USHC 1 5 . 8 8 8
USH
788

IHRRIHE
1 I 1 1
R/C

GRP

RIRCRRFT/LRUHCHERS
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 1 9 f l - 4 R
2 4 F / R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4
18 R-6
8 CH-53E
1 ER-6
2 8 CtI-53D
4 RF-48
4 8 CII-46
5 OR-4H
1 2 UI4-1
6 KC-I38
1 2 RII-1
6 0'4- 1 8
6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S
1 5 STIHGER TERHS

RGTL
L R H D TI!

O D E svc
S P T GRP

H R J O R G R O U H D CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
1 7 TAHKS
.
2 4 8 1 ~ IIORTRRS
n
9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S
1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S
4 7 RAV
36 LRV
I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R GREHRDE

2 4 1 5 5 HOU<T)
~ ~
6 I J S H R HOU(SP)
6 8 HOYCSP)
27 6
8 H O~R T R~R S
1 3 8 58 C R L HG
2 5 5 1 1 - 6 0 RG
LRUHCtIERS

L R C T U R L T R S K . O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y
V A R Y F R O H T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH.

F O R C E SHOUH, U R E H A D D E D T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST, E D U A L S
R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l / J OF T H E T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S . T H I S
F O R C E I S H O T I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E : 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D
n l n l n u n T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB).

ITHE
RVIRTIOH

SOURCE:

HRVY/HRRIHE

(RRSTFS),

CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E RIR-GROUHD TRSK F O R C E S

H e , U S R C , URSHIHGTOH,

D.c.,

28 n R Y 1 9 8 5 .

RPPEHDlX C-2:

199TN SEPARflTE HOTORIZED BRIGADE (SHE)

L I G H T RTTRCK B H

L COIIBIHED RRHS BH (LIGHT)

H COIIOIHED RRHS BH (HERVY)

SOURCE:

D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S RND HOU-TO-FIGHT
IHFAHTRY BRIGADE (HOTORIZED),

UHlTE PAPER.

199TH

F T . L E U I S , URS. JUHE 1 9 9 8 .

R P P E H D I X C-3:

UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E

H P 8 S I G SOU

, ( L T GUN)

E H G RGT -)

SIG TP

+i Ci.8

F L D RRBL

P R O COY<-)

i
00

T P T SOH

O R D COY

F L D UKSIiP

TPT-TRRHSPORT

oRD=oRDHRHCE

F L D U K S H P = F I E L D UORKSHOP

F L D R R B L = F I E L D RRBULAHCE

PRO-PROVOST

PC DET=POSTRL/COURIER

SOURCE:

S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK.

U K S T R F F C O L L E G E , C A H B E R L Y I 1988.

R P P E H D I X 0: L I G H T REGInEHTRI. COnStlT TERM (LRCT)

**
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THE L I G H T RUMORED CRVflLRY SOURDROH llRS R L R V V R R I n H T SCOUT V E l l I C L E

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S T F O F C R S IIRHDBflOK; CGSC,
V!lITE PAPER.

--

IIRGTFS;

O R T T L E k?t?llC;

UK S T F c O L ,

R H D 199711 I!lF

BDEs

In devising a more appropriate organization for

light brigade,

the

the role and structure of the light division

must be briefly addressed. Speculating on the the future

T ,"

ideas of ALB-F,

the light

dLvi310n

be

~ea~qu~rte~s C~G

greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely. The

realities of airlift restrictions and recent

historica~
r

,
';

::.

~'or

p c c ! age

.-

.' ,

'.,

stl-ateglc

: -" ,":

c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss ,

. _

I...

"'- .

.'

I .., adJi t i c n ,

. ,):1

t I") \:=

high intensity battlefield and in heavy/light <;cenal-ios,

most critics, from Luttwak to General Downing feel

brigade i3
~. ! -

t~e

most

ef~2ct~ve

s:ze

far

el~me~t

the

t~~

'I

."

"

KM by

150 I<M.

In this

type of scenal-io,

the c ur r e nt

~,'

liyht

division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct R/S
operations.

The light OISCOM, OIVARTY, and separate

battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch

parochialism and

wedded

waste of v a Luao l e

to

They

c o n-s t i

t ut e

the c onb-a t

f cr ces

a\:j

l rne ar t b v ,

airfra.mes "70,

~..

iv i

em~

l o v e d

a s

SUC;-i

~ould

~,

';:;

~.r.

b e c o m e

":". ~- f.'

" b

~ ~ -, !. -,; ~ .. ,-,

~ol,-=<;"

:3
t~'c~

ths t;

C=

consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F

force roles. As the Army downsizes it cannot afford

the

extravagance of so many excellent, yet narrowly applicable

division sized units. Though it is beyond the scope o f this
paper' to expand the analysis o f this argument, the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv.2 o f Gsnera1 Vuonc ' s s i c
tor thz

Cu";i~-e

i r n ~ p i - dt i l . ? %

Armv..

The 1 iqh t divisidr

headrla,31-ters

should be ,-educed

:::,

lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters. The number o f

light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps. These headquarters elements will, a s
required, synchronize the tr-aininq o f

*:-,<<

;z:j~~~,,<:c
;.-r?,:T.y.
~;~?
j;>-,pf+Cse<j

the geographica!!y
.

:.;:,;,,.

rh:: :, ;,,

>,:

1
6.7

5 , : . ,,,!

responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are

routinely required by the LRCTs. Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure, lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-.j51. There shc#,~ld
i;e

cf

i,7c1.,.-;
.
tracked

01-

the f u t t i i - e , ';?GI-

air:rra-i*:! ihe

t i i ~ ,: ~
t i ~t

;.,s;;>?a

w h e e i " ~ /.':PC2 2nd a.;i;.ju i x i - e l

tri?

V-22

may

p!c,b

!;I:

,-.

:
,L
--'):.=.-'
.-:

2 .

*: i.

a comi~~aci-:

role o n the battlefield and would be a n appropriate asset

for the corps. Fast;self-deployable,

possessing helicopter

flight characteristics, and increased internal and sling

loaded payloads, the VTOL may be the wave of the future.
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion o f the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force a s describ:?d by LTC Herrlv. : h i s
72:-c? is needed to bc-idge the va~.;ni:?~
,;.gp

teiwee,; the ::ea ,;

and 1 i g h t Yorcs struct.ire. In cambat, the l:.~ht r!ivisicjn

headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d ~ p l o y e dfor a

c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-,ztio!,. !.i.?CTs

i o i l c w - o n il,ldrJl?weioh:

2 1 1 ~

(2:-

heavy f o r c e s c a n be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs

dictate.

In any case, t h e opportunity for fixing

f o r c e e x i s t s in ALB-F.

the light

A s d e s c r i b e d in t h i s s t u d y , t h e

b a l a n c e in t h e f o r c e m i x n e e d s s u c h a n a d j u s t m e n t .

1. Sir Michael Howard, "Military Science In An Aye Of

Peace," Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture, 3 October 1973.

2.

El iot A. Cohen and John Gooch, ~1.1.it.a.r.y..

fl.i,,5f.gr_t,unes:.,
T h e

(New York: The Free Press, :9?0),

. Of.-. Failuy,,-J,n.,.War,,

- ... -..
pp. 21-28.

Anatomy
.
.. ..... ..

!+.

iJilliam H. Caldweil I(/,Mo-t L i g h t Enou::?

T o G.zt T'.I:+,~.?,
Nqt..H@,a,vy ,En?,u.g.h,.Tp.
!J:i?:..,T!i,e Cas_e..,O,?The .UEi .L.igh.t . i ~
allt;:~.,
f
Monograph,School o f Advanced Military Studies, USCGSC, 1987.

7.

Edward N. Luttwak, An. Histqr-irra,l.,.P_n_a_l~.si.~

.... And..Projectic!?

11. U S . Army, Field Manual 7-'72, Llght.In_fan.t_ry .,B~:.t;llipr>,

(Wash DC: 16 March 1987), p . i.
12. Ibid, p.

13. Edward N. Luttwak, "Light Infantry: The Army's Most

.J.?~r:iz,,l
I:iternai.io~.ai,
Important 1 : i~tiat iv~!?, ermed,, F c ~ r c e s
May 1987, p . 8 .
I'

l ' t . Wayne :.i. Dow~liny. " L i g h t : infant;-y Integr,3tio:~1 r i C2n:r-l;

ELl:-.ope. " x !,I, i tar y R E ~ Ie w , S c p temS(.?~1 ?&s.
2 . ,?9.

17. William W. Hartzog and John D. Hohard. "Heavy/Llght

Operat ions, P!i.li,ta,ry R e v : e w , Apr i 1 1987, p 31.

18. John A. Wickham, "Light Infantry Divisions," NAT.05

Sixteen
Feb/Mar 1985, pp. 100-107.
.
.. ..... ....... .. ..- ---Nations,
..
-.-.- 19. House, p. 45.

20. Jeane Ki~rkpatrick,"9~yr:nc The Cold L l a r , " Fore7

a
.
:
L
; ? 7 0 ? 5 . '1.

o _ l l

22. Edwin C. Meyer, Central European Securitv." Forsign

eff .a,irs,Summer 1989, p . 32.
23. Michael Nandelbaum, "Ending The Cold.War," F_or,ei.gn

Rffair.5, Spring 1989, p. 18.

25. Car 1 E. Vuollo, The..U n i t.?-.St+.t?s A,rmy,.;,

.,,%St,r,atec,ic:.F?rci?
E~.r~-Ihe-_1990s.~_r?d,.
Beyon, (Washington DC: H Q D9, January
1990), p . 6.

25. Ibid, pp. 3 - 4 .

29. U.S.

Army Combined Arms Center, "RirLand Battle Future

Alternate Base Case Stud7,Phase 1 , " 26 February 1790, p. I 2.(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred
to by there Phase number.)
30. IJ.S. Army, Cnmbined 91-insCenter. Airl,,,3nd ,9,,z; tl?
L!m.b,rel :a C0ncep.t.. (DRAFT). , .Ji;ne 199C. p 32.

i!lt!.l~-e:

31. Phase 4 : p. I'd-:

F I ~ r m y Field I'lanual l : > ( > ...,

- ' q 133rss !Zper.afiqn,s.

(Washington DC: September i989), 3 . R-:.

33. G . S .

34. U. S. Army Combined Arms Center , A j.r.L.and,.Bat..t,l_e

f.u,tur?,:.

umbr,e.!la.. Con.c.~eettttt~..D~.9ETT?, Julie 1990, P. 4.

35. Ibid, p. 5.

36. Phase 5 , p. 11-2.

37. Ibid

38. Baron de Jomini, The, Ayt..Of..,War., (Philadelphia: J.B.

Lipplncott & Co., 13621, pp. 104-1:l.
U.S. A:-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center, ''NGII;
i :?ear
ions Foi- AirLand Bat t !e Future (Craft)," 1 :
Con.---icierat

3'2.

1790, p.

.?u:-i?

i3.

40. Patrick Neky, "Environment Of Combat", (Unpuplished

~,

Draft Revision)" Field Manual 100-5, O ~ e r a U o . ,September

1990, pp. 1-2.

4 1 . McDonnel Douglas, gSAF. .C.-G7,1 Navember

1987.

43. U.S. Army Center For Army Lessans Learned, e.ga.vy.:L,i.qht.,

Lesson.,Ccs'ay.ned, august 1989, PP. 12-15.

Stsven L. Canhy, "Light Infantry In Perspective."

Infartry, July-R~gusc !73". p . 31.

L5.

49. U.S. Marine Corps, Operational Handbook 6-1, Groynd

HQ USNC, CDC, January 1988, p. 1-3.
..Combat
... .. ... . .... ..--Opwa.tjgns,
. .50. Navy Marine Corps 2710, Ma_rjn.e.-.e.ir:cjround-'Ta;II_Foyces,
HO USMC. May 1985, p. 1C.

51. i-uttwak, "Light Infantry.. ' :

p. 9.

53. 199th lnfantry 8 r i q a d e ( M o t c r l r e d ) , Des

a ~ How-Tq:F.ight
d
,.Wh,it:e,,
P.:p.er,

( F t Lewis: WA
54. Ibid.

55. I b i d .

56. Herrly, p . 55.

57. K e l l e t , p.

112.

59. interview wi'h

Col Pol-ter, Sritish L i a i s o n O f f i ~ e r Eo
t h e U.S.Army Combined A r m s C e n t e r , 6 November 1970.

ii. Inter.diew with Col J.

P.
:\

,. 7 ,.9 : ; .

62. Uhle-Wettler,

p.

:,

Raffenne, French Liaison

!!?:;::..,<>,>

2 , ::.;

-.

.,?<
,I;:.>
!-

,.

',,-,
:..

--l.,
!il

..,!.

'?C.

63. Interview with M a j Elliot R o s n e r , Director initial 8 2 d

A i r b o r n e D i v i s i o n C O H O R T project, 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990.

Bacevich, A. J. T h e Pentamic Era: The,,U,S.P_rm! %t.?!een

K o r e,..a. And ...Vietnam.
. -.......
Washington: T h e National D e f e n s e

U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1986.

<-

- ,7 a r k .

A s j es a:.

Ai:a:y:;is.

eel.
I

.
:

TC? Q c f p n - , e l:ip;crn
?he .?ohns : - ! o n k ;r;s

> $ ? l i b . a t ~ : :~;~.:;.,r-:

gn:versi t . .

P r e s s , i984.

Kel let, Anthony. Cqmb,at,.,Motiv,ati?-?:. T h e , .Be5a.vior of .S?.~dieys

in Battle,. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a . 1785.

S i m p k in, Richard E. RAC?, ..To. ,Th,e ~ w i F $ _ : . . T , h o + g h t sCln ,,

F.ir.s.3.C?n,tur)(..Wayfar,e. iondon: S r a s s e y ' 5 D e f e n c e
Pub!ishers, 1985.

Boylan, P e t e r J. "Power P r o j e c t i o n , Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht

Fgrce. " M,i 1.1.&3.~y ,P?v l o w , Vav 1982, p p . 6 2 - ' 7 3 .

Of

A Eliianced Fcrce. " ?,r-.y, J u n e 1 9 d 9 , PF3.2C,. +' l

Downing, Wayne A. "Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral

Europe. " I'l.1l,itar,y.,fieview,

September 1 9 8 6 ,
pp. 1 0 - 2 9 .
Hartzog, William W., and Howard, John D. "Heavy/Light
Operat ions. " Mi_1.~t,ar.y..-Re.v.,i.ew, Apr i 1 1 9 8 7 , PP. 24-33.
Herrly, Peter F. "Middleweight Forces and the A r m y ' s
Deployability Dilemma." Parapeter=., September 1 9 8 9 ,
pp. 4 6 - 5 7 .

Huddleston, Louis D. "Light Infantry Division: Azimuth

Check. " ~~~~~~~~~~~~..Review, September 1985, PP. 1 4 - 2 1 .

1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7" :!r:ned. ,F?,,rce;

May 1987, p. 8.

.,,,J ,o+,ly~,+,i
. Intwriit io~i,,al

Mandelbaum, Michael. "Ending The Cold War." Forei-qn

e.f,f.ai,,rs,
S pring 1 9 8 9 , pp. 16-36.

Wass de Czege, Huba. "Three Kinds Of Infantry." infantyy,

July-August 1 9 8 5 , pp. 11-13.
Wickham, John A. "Light Infantry Divisions." I\!gTO.:,r
Feb/Mar 1985. pp. 100-107.

Mi 1 i tary Air 1 if t Command. 4,:lr.lif

Scott AFB,November 1986.

t Pl.a,nn-i._nq,-.G.~:!.ide.Ho

MAC:

McDonnell Douglas. USW C-17.,Report No. MDC K0282C, Long

Beach, CA., November 1989.

McM i chae 1 , Scott R /?~,Histp_r.ica~~~,PPe_~.s~e.c.c~i.vve_e_aannnnL

iqht
Infantry,
Combat Studies Institute, Command and

.. .
.- .
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1987.

,,

Nav" Marine Corpz 2710, Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k . T o - c e s

(iYrAG'TFS) 1Jah;!iinr;ton, DC: !-IP Clni ted S t ~ t e sr'lar
Corps. 28 May IYES.

Neky, Patrick. E!iy.iri?nm?n.t.. Q?.. Co,nba.t Craft Revis:on F M : G 3 - - 5

Upeyatrlonq. September 1990.

!:.S.

:?:-my.Coabined Arms I)~?::ts!-. "Air!-.ind D 3 t : 1" F ~ k . i : ; - ?

~4t
1 ernate Base Case S c u z y . P3,,isz 1 . " Far t Lra,/~nwa-

i::.,
Kansas. 26 February 1990.

U.S. Army, Combined'Ai-ms Center. "AirLand Battle Future

Alternate Base Case Study. Phase 2." Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas. 30 March 1990.

U.S. Army, Combined Arms Center."AirLand Battle Future

Alternate Base Case Study. Phase 3." Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas. 19 April 1990.

U.S. Army. Combined Arms Center. "AirLand Battle Future

hiternate Base Case Study. Phase 4." Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. I+ June 1900.
U.S. Ai-my. Combired Arms Ze.~tr?!-."airl-and Eatt!? F~:ture

.3 l sernate Base Case Study. Pt,ase 2 .

Fort Leavenwcr .;h.
Kansas. 18 June 1990.
"

Ormy, Fiela *!anc;a: '7-'?2, Lj;-lht,1:fay;try

B.?t,tal> s l y .
Washington, DC: HQ Department O f The Army., Marc11 1787

U.S.

U.S. Army, Field Manual 71-100, D j . v i . s i ~ . ~ . . O p e . ~ , a & l q n , s .

Washington, DC: HQ Department O f The Army,June 1990.

vuono, Car 1 E . T,h,e..l?.n.i.t.ed

.S.tate.s..4rw.: ..A...Str..+tea_Lc

Force

HR

For
T
h
e
1990s
And
B
e
p
a
,
Washington,
DC:
...-. .......... .......
. -. .- ..- .- ... -

Department O f The Army, January 1990.

...

149th

..

Infan?)-y Br iqade (Mororl:ec!.

D=si,qc2 Cspazi i i !ti?::
; ,
2 . ........
. . . . . . :.:. . . .

. I.!,!. J.. ' i . : ;'. . . . . . , ..............

. .-.,
7

:.

Caldwell John F.W. "Forced Entry: D o e s The Current Airborne

Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light
Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment?"
I'lor,orj:-aph,School c f Advaricerl P!i 1; ka1-v !>tutl?ec,. ! . : S E S X .
'?

J . : ~ n ~ ; a i -I~? ? ? .

Campbell, Cbarles C. "Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force: A

Marriage O f Convenience 3 r Necessity." Monograph, USCGSC,
2 December 1985.
Peddy, Charles A . "The Light Infantry Division: No Tool For
The Tactical Commander." Monograph, USCGSC, 2 Term 88-87.
Tamlin, Harry A. " 0 r g a n i z a t ~ o n a 1Des:gn O f 1-ight For::es: 2
Str-ucti~rei o i - A! i Seasons. " M.?r.ogr;lph, USCGSC, ; :?8--3".

R o s n e r , E. J. C-~,+l,,-J,ntey_.v,lew.J a c o b y , Charles Ii.

1 1 O c t o b e r 1990.

JI-.,