.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Duke University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Hispanic
American Historical Review.
http://www.jstor.org
475
rarily), so that men and munitions from Portugal and slaves from
Angola might provide her with the sinews of war and of agriculture. Whatever successes the patriots of Pernambuco might
score against the Dutch ashore (and many hard knocks did
they give them, as Tabocas and Guararapes testify), they could
scarcely hope to capture Recife itself, so long as the Dutch were
masters of the sea and could reinforce their beleaguered stronghold
at will. So long as Pernambuco held out, a potential threat to
Bahia existed, as the events of 1638, 1647, and 1649 clearly demonstrated. It was therefore essential for the safety of Brazil
that Portugal should secure at any rate local command of the
sea in defiance of the greatest maritime power of the age. The
difficulties of such a reversal of roles will become apparent if we
recollect the international situation in so far as it affected the
Portuguese Empire at the time of the Congress of Westphalia
in 1647-48.
This congress marked the close of two wars which had distracted Western Europe for generations. The Thirty Years' War
in Germany, and Holland's eighty-years' war of independence
against Spain, had both by this time lost their original raison
d'etreand had become even more futile and purposeless than most
wars. Prolonged negotiations at Minster and Osnabruck between Spain and the Hapsburg Empire on the one side and Holland, France, Sweden, and their satellites on the other, finally
culminated in the treaties collectively known as the Peace of Westphalia (January-October,1648). Unfortunately for herself, Portugal's national existence was not recognized by this treaty, since
neither France nor Holland was prepared to press the claims of
their weaker ally against the adamant opposition of Spain. Spain's
decision finally to recognize the independence of the United Provinces, which for over half a century had been an accomplished
fact, was largely because she wished to divert against Portugal
some of the veteran tercios fighting in Flanders, Germany, and
Italy. Portugal's sole friend was France, who remained at war
with Spain for another decade; but France was distracted by the
Fronde, and Cardinal Mazarin was prone to ask more of King
John IV than he was prepared to give him. The reborn nation's
precarious position was characterized by Padre Ant6nio Vieira,
who pointed out that although the Portuguese monarch had sent
a dozen ambassadors abroad since his coronation in December,
1640, and still had seven actually accredited to foreign countries,
there was not (and never had been) a single ambassador resident
476
at the Court of Lisbon. Moreover the pope had declined to recognize Portugal's independence, or even to fill the vacant episcopal
sees in this most devoutly Catholic of all countries. The diplomatic scene showed clearly enough that the other European
powers thought little of her chances of survival.'
The Peace of Westphalia left things worse than ever from the
Lusitanian point of view. Not only were Spain's hands freed to
a large extent, but those of Holland as well. A ten-year truce
had been concluded between King John IV and the States General
in June, 1641; but it was ill observed beyond the Line, whilst
Luso-Dutch relations in Europe were only occasionally correct
and never cordial. Since Holland was far and away the greatest
maritime power of the age (in some respects perhaps the greatest
maritime power of any age), whilst Spain was still a formidable
military power, the outlook for Portugal was dark indeed. She
could only continue her struggle against Spain for so long as the
maritime route to Bahia and Rio remained open for the sugar,
tobacco, and other Brazilian products whose sale paid for the
upkeep of the armies which held the Spaniard at bay along the
frontier, and for the imports of corn from North Europe to feed
her people. The Peace of Westphalia set free more Dunkirk
privateers and the Zeeland corsairs paperss) to attack Portuguese
shipping in the Atlantic, already grievously harassed by the depredations of the Dutch West India Company's shipping.
How grievous these losses were, is apparent from a glance at
contemporary sources, such as the Dutch chroniclers De Laet,
Barlaeus, and Nieuhof, or from the correspondence of Padre
Ant6nio Vieira, one of the relatively few people in Portugal who
was not only fully alive to the desperate nature of the situation,
but had a concrete remedy to propose for it. On reading the
numerous references to maritime affairs in the letters of this remarkable man-perhaps the greatest that Portugal has ever produced after Afonso d'Albuquerque and Luis de Camnes-one is
inclined to believe that the Portuguese navy lost a potentially
outstanding admiral when the young Vieira took a Jesuit's roupeta
at Bahia in 1623. Throughout his long life, Vieira evinced a
1 E. Prestage, The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal with France, England, and Holland
from 1640 to 1668 (London, 1925); Correspondencia diplomdtica de Francisco de Sousa
Coutinhodurantea sua embaixadaem Holanda (2 vols., Coimbra, 1920-1926); A. Guimaraes
de Araujo Jorge, "A restauragdo e a hist6ria diplomdtica do Brasil Holandes (1640-1661),"
Anais da Academia Portuguesa de Hist6ria, VII (1942); Eduardo Brasao, "A acgao diplomAtica de Portugal no Congresso de Vestfalia," ibid., pp. 498-544; H. Poelhekke, De
Vrede van Munster (The Hague, 1948).
PADRE ANT6NIO
VIEFRA, S.
J.
477
478
479
480
481
forced from Holland. This, however, was easier said than done,
since the royal treasury was empty, and neither the king nor his
Council of State could think of any way to raise the cash necessary for the fitting out of an armada, which was estimated at
300,000 cruzados. This was Vieira's opportunity, and he retorted
dramatically, "Fie on the ministers of the crown that they should
tell the king of Portugal that there is no way of raising 300,000
cruzadoswith which to succour Brazil, which is the only valuable
place that we have! Now I trust in God that with this patched
cassock I shall be able to guarantee Your Majesty the whole of
this sum today." Vieira then went to a Jewish friend of his from
Bahia, Duarte de Silva, and suggested to him that he should
advance the money in return for an impost on the sugar arriving
from Brazil. De Silva replied that the business was too much for
him alone, but that he would try to obtain a fellow-Israelite as
co-guarantor. This he did, and Padre Vieira proudly took his
two proteges to confirm their offer with the king that same
morning.
It was thus with the aid of (pace the Holy Office) "tainted"
Jewish money that the Armada Real do Mar Oceano of about
twenty sail left the Tagus on the 18th October, under the command of Ant6nio Teles, created Conde de Vila Pouca de Aguiar
and governor of Brazil for the occasion. Von Schoppe evacuated
Itaparica and raised the blockade of Bahia on hearing the news
of the armada's approach, so Ant6nio Teles found the Bay of All
Saints empty of hostile shipping when he cast anchor there on
Christmas morning, nine days after the Dutch had left. Eight
months later, Salvador Correia de Sa' e Benevides, in command
of a squadron likewise largely prepared with the financial aid of
Duarte de Silva and his co-religionists, recaptured Angola from
the Dutch, thus restoring to Brazil her most profitable slave
market. The Portuguese colonial empire had been saved from
collapse by the money raised from his New-Christian friends by
Padre Ant6nio Vieira-a singular if patriotic combination of Jews
and Jesuits.5
The fleet of "Double-With," although too late to forestall
5 Azevedo, ed., op. cit., III, 561-563; Naber, op. cit., pp. 159, 216-221, 230-231, 251-257;
Rodrigues Cavalheiro, "A colaboracdo da metr6pole na reconquista do Brasil," Publicajes
do Congresso do Mundo Portugu~s, IX (1940); Cartas del-Rei D. Jodo IV para diversas
autoridades do reino (Lisbon, 1940), pp. 173-220, et passim. From the letter of 11 May
1648 we learn that Duarte de Silva was then a prisoner of the Inquisition, so evidently
the royal gratitude was even more short-lived than usual (ibid., p. 485). Cf. also Padre
A. da Silva Rego, A dupla restaurafdo de Angola (Lisbon, 1948), pp. 182-195.
482
Ant6nio Teles at Bahia or Salvador Correia at Luanda, was never theless master of the Brazilian seas, and the danger to the homeward-bound sugar ships from Rio, Bahia, and Cape Saint Augustine was nearly as acute as ever. But the critical stiuation, and
the efficacy of Jewish financial cooperation in preparing the Portuguese armada of 1647, had finally resolved King John IV's doubts.
This monarch now strongly supported Vieira's project for the
creation of a chartered Brazil Company, whose financial sinews
were to be supplied by Portuguese Jews, crypto- and otherwise,
both at home and abroad, in return for the exemption from confiscation of their capital (whether invested in the Brazil Company
or elsewhere) by the Inquisition. At this point it is necessary
to explain just what such a step involved, and why it was regarded
with such aversion by the vast majority of Vieira's compatriots.
Jewish unpopularity was more due to religious bigotry than
to anything else, for it seldom assumed dangerous proportions so
long as the government or the clerical hierarchy did nothing to
encourage it. Jews, or persons of real or alleged Jewish ancestry,
were often employed by the Portuguese kings as tax-farmers, taxcollectors, monopolists, and so forth. As is the way with shortsighted human kind, the hatred aroused by the exactions of these
crown agents was vented against them and their race rather than
on the monarchs and ministers who originated or sanctioned such
burdensome imposts. Jews were likewise prominent as surgeons
and physicians, whilst the death-rate from the ministrations of
medicos in the seventeenth century was alarmingly high. Popular prejudice ascribed to the malice aforethought of the Jew what
was really due to the universal lack of sound medical and surgical
knowledge. Despite the fact that a good deal of inter-marriage,
and still more inter-breeding, took place between all classes of
the population and those of Israelite descent, popular hatred of
the latter increased rather than diminished. This unfortunate
class was known by such opprobrious epithets as christdo-novo
(New Christian), marrano (swine), or by a more ambiguous but
equally significant ellipsis, gente de naqdo (People of the Nation)
mention of the hated Israel being deliberately omitted. It was
widely believed that Jewish men menstruated like women, that
they exuded a foul smell, and that they had the stump of a tail
at the end of their vertebrae. Such fatuous fables were propagated by the more bigoted of the monks and clergy down to
the nineteenth century at least.
Some modern defenders of the Holy Office of the Inquisition
claim that it imposed at least a semblance of legality on the
PADRE ANT6NIO
VIEIRA, S.
J.
483
persecution of Jews, and at any rate avoided the recurrent pogroms and lynchings from which they had previously suffered.
This may be so, but the proceedings of this tribunal bear more
resemblance to those of such fine flowers of twentieth-century
culture as the German Gestapo, the Japanese Kempeitai, and the
Russian Ogpu, than to procedure in an average law-court. Suspects brought before it were not at first told on what charge they
were arraigned, nor were they ever given the names or the opportunity to cross-examine those who had given evidence against
them. Their property and capital were impounded on their arrest, their families being literally as well as figuratively turned
on to the street; and although they had the theoretical right to
have their worldly wealth restored to them if ever they were
honorably acquitted, either of these two contingencies seldom
occurred. It can easily be imagined what facilities this tribunal
provided for informers, blackmailers, and the settlement of old
scores, and what a premium it put on the spread of envy, hatred,
malice, and all uncharitableness. This will be readily apparent
to anyone who takes the trouble to read through some of the
original witnesses' depositions, many hundreds of which have been
printed by the Portuguese scholar and archivist, Ant6nio Baido.6
As is often the way with organizations of this kind, the Inquisition arranged to have much of its dirty work done by others,
partly to save its own "face," and partly to involve other bodies
in its own nefarious activities. Obstinate sinners were handed
over (after being duly tortured of course) or "relaxed" to the
secular arm for disposal without shedding of blood-a Holy Office
euphemism for burning a person alive. Similarly, although the
confiscated wealth and property of all its prisoners ultimately
came into its own coffers, it came by way of the crown fiscal in
the first instance, though woe betide this official if any of the
money stuck to his fingers. Ever since the institution of the
6 An excellent general description of the Jews in Portugal is given in J. L. Azevedo's
Hist6ria dos christaos-novosportugueses (Lisbon, 1922), whilst the workings of the Inquisition can be followed in detail from the original records printed in such works as A. BaiAo,
A Inquisigdo em Portugal e no Brasil (Lisbon, 1921); A Inquisigdo de Goa (Coimbra, 1930);
Furtado de Mendonga, Primeira visitagdodo Santo OfficioAs partes do Brasil: Denunciates
de Pernambuco, 1593-1595 (SAoPaulo, 1929); Confissdesda Bahia, 1591-2 (Rio de Janeiro,
1935). Readers unable to cope with Portuguese will find a fair specimen of the procedure
in Mary Brearley's work Hugo Gurney, Prisoner of the Lisbon Inquisition (London, 1947),
where the relevant processo is translated into English. In addition to the above printed
sources, I have utilized some of the original records of the Portuguese Inquisition now
preserved in the British Museum Library, particularly Additional MSS, No. 20,951,
which contains numerous relevant documents for the years 1645-1654.
484
PADREANTONIOVIEIRA,S. J.
485
The king and Vieira now went ahead with their plans, but the
formal incorporation of the Brazil Company was delayed for six
months, partly because Duarte de Silva and others of the principal
intended directors were busy with the preparation of Ant6nio
Teles' armada and Salvador Correia's squadron throughout the
autumn, and partly because the theological wrangles with the
Inquisition and its supporters still continued. The arrest of
Duarte de Silva, one of the principal investors in the projected
Brazil Company, by the Inquisition in 1648 also delayed things,
it is to be presumed. By 6th February, 1649, all was ready, and
on that day the king sent for the bishop-inquisitor-general and
his council. On their arrival at the palace, he had the terms of
the alvarc, or decree formally embodying the Brazil Company,
read over to them. These terms expressly included the izenado
do fisco, whereupon the bishop and his colleagues respectfully but
emphatically protested against them. The king in his turn equally politely, but still more emphatically, rejected their protest,
telling them that the danger to Portugal and Brazil was so great
that the foundation of this company (which other theologians
had assured him was justified) was the only possible means of
saving the situation. He added that they would be very unwise
to make any outward demonstration of their opposition, which
he would strongly resent. He then dismissed the fuming inquisitors.
486
J.
487
488
shareholders had not even the semblance of control over the company's finances, and in this respect the Brazil Company differed
from the Dutch Company. Board meetings were conducted at
a large round table in order to avoid wrangles over place and
precedence.
It was categorically stipulated that the governing board was
to be completely independent of all the crown courts and tribunals, as also from interference by the Inquisition. The triennial governing board would only have to account to its successor
for its doings, and of course to the king if necessary. In this
respect it enjoyed much greater freedom of action than its counterpart in the W. I. C. (or would have done if the statutes had been
properly enforced). Its legal affairs were to be handled by a
juiz conservador,a peculiar official with far-reaching powers. He
was empowered to deal summarily with minor cases without
right of appeal. Lawsuits involving large sums of money were
to be handled by him in a special court nominated by the king
from officials selected by the directors-a packed court, if ever
there was one! A procurator-fiscal was appointed on similar
terms.
Special facilities were accorded the company for securing shipbuilding supplies and labor, it being specifically exempted from
interference by the crown officials who on the contrary were enjoined to help it, particularly arsenal and dockyard authorities.
The company was allowed to build ships not only in continental
Portugal (Lisbon, Oporto, Aveiro, Pederneira, Alcacer) but in
Brazil (Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, SAo Vicente, and Maranhao) on
the same terms as the crown. Facilities were also accorded for
chartering English, Swedish, Hamburg, and other ships laden
with ship-chandlers stores and artillery. Under royal license,
foreign ships could also be chartered by the Brazil Company to
sail in its sugar fleets. Similarly it could supplement the shortage
of Portuguese soldiers and sailors by enlisting English, Scandinavians, or Germans to serve in its convoys.8
I Largely on account of Ant6nio Vieira's representations videe Azevedo, ed., Cartas de
Ant6nio Vieira S. I., I, passim) measures of this kind had already been taken in 1647-48.
Thus a royal alvard of 15 March 1648 prohibited the construction or chartering of any
ship of less than 350 tons; whilst another of the same date ordained that from the 15th
March 1651, no ship of less than 350 tons and sixteen guns would be allowed to trade to
any of the Portuguese colonies. In view of the angry protests which this ordinance
provoked from those interested in the coastal trade (where caravels and vessels of small
tonnage predominated) another alvard of 25 January 1649 subsequently reduced the
minimum tonnage to 250. In any event, this law and others like it were but ill observed.
Ant6nio de Sousa de Macedo also advocated the adoption of the convoy system about
this time (cf. Afonso Pena Junior, op. cit., pp. 177-180).
489
490
could vote in the triennial election for the eight directors. Capital
invested in the company by both Portuguese and foreign nationals
was specifically exempted from confiscation by the Inquisition
or by any other tribunal. Even in the event of war between
Portugal and the country of a foreign investor, the latter did not
forfeit his investment or dividends; whilst all substantial foreign
merchants resident in Portugal had to subscribe to the company
according to their means, on pain of not being allowed to participate in the colonial trade anywhere. These statutes were confirmed in the most categorical and solemn manner by the king
on the 10th March, three days after another alvard had been
promulgated, formally exempting New-Christian investors from
having their capital confiscated by the Inquisition "for the crimes
of heresy, apostasy and Judaism." Padre Ant6nio Vieira's triumph appeared to be complete, and the Portuguese Jews seemed
on the threshold of emancipation from their long night of oppression; but the forces opposed to the company were only
momentarily foiled and they soon returned to the attack. 9
Truth compels us to add that they were not only the forces
of reaction. Along with the professional Jew-baiters of the Holy
Office, and clerical obscurantists of every sort and kind from
mitred bishops to begging friars, were to be heard the complaints
of sailors, merchants, and skippers from ports like Vianna, Aveiro,
and Vila do Conde, to say nothing of the Azores and Madeira.
They clamored against the blow dealt to their coastal shipping
by the company's insistence on well-armed vessels of large burden,
and complained bitterly of the evils flowing from the company's
monopoly of the four essentials of Brazilian colonial life, wine,
olive oil, cereals, and codfish. Nor were their complaints entirely frivolous, for as the Marques de Niza wrote from Paris in
November, 1648 (when the formation of the company was still
under discussion), "Monopolies of those articles which form the
necessities of life always proved to be highly prejudicial to those
monarchs who authorized them, for even though some benefit is
derived by the royal exchequer therefrom, the harm suffered by
the common people far outweighs that strictly limited advantage."
This early apostle of free trade found many supporters in Portugal, and after a few years of acrimonious discussion the com9 This summary of the 1649 statutes of the Brazil Company is taken from the original
printed Instituizam da Companhia Geral para o Estado do Brazil, dated 8 March 1649,
together with the Alvard de confirma~doof King John IV, dated 10 March 1649, published
at Lisbon by Ant6nio Alvares, March 1649 (British Museum, Additional MSS, 20,951,
contains a printed specimen).
PADRE ANT6NIO
VIEIRA, S.
J.
491
492
The pamphleteers noted that at this stage Dutch opinion towards the Luso-Brazilian problem could be roughly divided into
the following three viewpoints. Firstly, the proponents of an
offensive guerre a' l'outrance, with a view to the capture of Bahia
and all Portuguese Brazil. This was the policy advocated by
the directors of the W. I. C., and by the Provinces of Zeeland and
Groningen; it was exemplified by the dispatch of the powerful
expeditions under Banckert (1646), Witte de With (1647), and
Haulthain (1650). In fact, Zeeland's adherence to the peace
with Spain in 1648, was only secured because Holland and the other
provinces promised to prosecute vigorously the war against the
Portuguese in Brazil. Secondly, there were those who advocated
standing on the defensive in Pernambuco, and relying on an intensified privateering war at sea to bring the Portuguese government to heel by entirely disrupting Lusitanian maritime trade.
This was the policy actually in vogue in 1649, although its virtually sole advocates were those born privateers, the Zeelanders, with
their motto of schijt in den handel alseer buit te halen is. Most
of the remaining provinces were advocates of the third policy,
which was to open peace negotiations with King John IV, on the
basis of formal Portuguese recognition of Dutch Brazil within its
boundaries of 1645, and an assured supply of slaves from Angola.
Such were the viewpoints of the Dutch in Holland, but of more
practical importance was the situation as seen through the eyes of
the beleaguered Hollanders at Pernambuco, to which we will
briefly turn our attention.12
By a stroke of luck for the Portuguese, Admiral Witte de
WTith'sfleet (or most of it) had left Brazil for Holland between
September and November, 1649, mainly on account of want of
victuals and supplies, although clearly the admiral and the council
of Recife were on bad terms. Hendrik Haecxs and his colleagues
were thus seriously perturbed when they received news on the
16th February 1650, that a large Portuguese fleet was in the offing,
estimated at fifty-seven sail in all. This fleet remained cruising
between Olinda and Cape St. Augustine for a week, during which
11Declaratie van sijn Koninghlijcke Majesteyt van Portugael . .. , oc. cit.; and De Instellinge van de Generate Comnpagnie.. ., in the University of Michigan Library (No. 6466
in Knuttel, op. cit.).
12 Amsterdams Dam-Praetje, van wat outs en wat niewus en wat vreemts (Amsterdam,
1649), in the University of Michigan Library (No. 6477 in Knuttel, op. cit.).
493
494
via Bahia in convoy, the sugar fleet from Rio made the return
voyage independently. The English admiral, Robert Blake, was
blockading the mouth of the Tagus and intercepting all Portuguese shipping, in revenge for the protection afforded by King
John IV to Prince Rupert's royalist privateers. Orders had been
sent to Bahia, instructing the fleet not to sail until the coast of
Portugal was clear; but Antdo Temudo, commander of the Rio
detachment of twenty-three sail did not call at Bahia en route.
He was thus surprised by Blake off the Tagus on the 27th September, and although he escaped into Setiibal with the flagship,
eight of her consorts were sunk or captured by the English.
Meanwhile the Bahia squadron had either received the warning
or were luckier, since bad weather forced its return to Bahia,
whence it sailed for Lisbon for the second time on 24 September,
1650. The English admiral had previously stopped the outwardbound Brazil fleet on 21st May, 1650, and confiscated nine chartered English ships which he incorporated in his own squadron. The return voyage of the belated Brazil fleet of 1649-50,
was apparently unmolested by either Dutch or English, since
eighty merchant ships from Brazil convoyed by eighteen warships
are recorded as entering the Tagus early in 1651. The Armada
Real under Ant6nio Teles which was returning from Bahia in
company with the combined Brazil fleet was less lucky. A severe
storm off the Azores caused the loss of four of the finest galleons
(Sdo Pantaledo, Santa Margarida, Sdo Pedro de Hamburgo, and
Nossa Senhora da Conceiyfo) on the island of Sio Miguel during
the first week of January 1651.14
Despite these losses, the Portuguese still managed to find the
wherewithal to equip a Brazil fleet of sixty sail which appeared
off Recife on the 25th February, 1652. Haulthain's fleet of
twelve "capital warships" had been in Brazilian waters since
May, 1650, and formed the nucleus of a respectable squadron
which was now dispatched to shadow the Portuguese armada,
in order to cut off any stragglers therefrom, or to bring part
of it to action if a favorable opportunity should occur. In this
Haulthain failed, as the convoy kept such excellent order that
although the Hollanders shadowed the armada for nearly two
weeks, they were unable to pick up a single prize. An inconclusive naval action was fought off the Bay of St. Augustine,
1' SimAo de Vasconcelos, S. J., Vida do padre Jodo d'Almeida (Lisbon, 1658), pp. 246251; J. R. Powell, The Letters of Robert Blake (London, 1937), pp. 11-30; "Het dagboek
van Hendrik Haecxs . .. .," loc. cit., p. 287; Conde de Ericeira, Portugal restaurado( vols.,
Lisbon, 1679), 1, livro xi; Archivo dos Agores, XII (1892), 423427.
PADRE ANTONIOVIEIRA,S. J.
495
496
THE
HISPANIC
AMERICAN
HISTORICAL
REVIEW
This decisive stroke was only made possible through the formation and action of the Companhia Geral do Estado do Brasil,
which whatever its political and economic shortcomings, had
thoroughly justified its existence from the strategic point of view.
The company was the brain-child of Padre Ant6nio Vieira, and
well might he write in 1689, to his critic the Conde de Ericeira,
that it was his company which "brought always from Brazil the
sinews wherewith to sustain the war against Castile, to maintain the kingdom, to recover Pernambuco, and still today helps
with prompt and lavish means in times of greatest need."
APPENDIX
RELAAO
DOS GALEGENS
DA ARMADA DA COMPANHIA
Name
Tonnage Guns
840
Sao Paulo [flagship]. .. .
840
Sao Pedro [Almirante]. .
34
Sao Pedro de Lisboa ... .
480
450
30
Sao Theodosio .
Sao Joao ...............
440
30
Santa Luzia ............
360
30
30
Sao Francisco . .
350
Na Sra da Concei~do. .
Jesus Maria Joseph . .
Santo Antonio do Porto
Santo Antonio de Padua
300
250
250
400
24
22
20
26
GERAL DO
1649*
Captain
Raphael Coelho
Joao Faleiro
Victorio Regalo
Nicoldo de Siqueira
Antdo Themudo
Bernardo Ramires
Antonio de Abreu de
Freitas
Francisco Barrozo
Domingos da Silva
Jodo da Rocha Ledo
Antonio Fernandes da
Costa
'B "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs . . . ," loc. cit., pp. 291-301; Francisco Manoel
de Melo, Epanaphoras de varia historia portugueza: Epanaphora IV (edited by Edgar
Prestage, Coimbra, 1931, from the original edition of 1660), both of which show the vital
importance of the naval side. The land operations are related in detail in such contemporary pamphlets as Relagam diaria do sitio e tomada de Recife (Lisbon, 1654) and the surrender conditions in pamphlets 7537-7541, in Knuttel, op. cit., subsequently reprinted in
Aitzema's Zaaken van staat ende oorlogh (Amsterdam, 1669).
* Biblioteca de Ajuda, Codex 52-X-2, Doc. No. 85.
Sao Cipriao............
Ben~do
................
Tres Simois ............
Thomas e Luzia .........
Tabor.................
S&oPedro Grande.......
NaSra da Graga... . ....
400
300
300
300
300
450
300
28
24
28
26
28
32
26
497
[General, Conde de Castelmelhor; admiral, Pedro Jacques de Magalhaes. These eighteen galleons left the Tagus 4 November 1649,
convoying the Brazil fleet of sixty-six ships, ten of them well gunned.]