REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

I.

JURISDICTION

How do you distinguish residual jurisdiction from residual prerogative?

What is residual jurisdiction? Jurisdiction of a court in spite losing its jurisdiction because of the perfection of an appeal still retains
it for purposes of preserving the rights of the parties.
A is the plaintiff and B is the defendant. Trial court ruled in favor B. A appeals. Before the records are transferred to the appellate court,
the trial court retains jurisdiction.
How can that particular trial court exercise such jurisdiction? Can an execution be granted ex parte? No. On what action can the trial
court act upon? Motion for execution pending appeal. Once appeal is perfected, and the records of the case have been transmitted to the
appellate court, there is no more exercise of residual jurisdiction. But in case of execution as a matter of right, once jurisdiction is lost, it
can never be regained. Nonetheless, under Rule 39, the writ of execution can be granted by the trial court only.
How can the trial court, if it has already lost its jurisdiction, still exercise the same? In the exercise of residual jurisdiction.
What is residual prerogative?
There are 3 principles involved in concurrent jurisdiction:
1. Hierarchy of Courts;
2. Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; and
3. Transcendental Importance
General rule: Jurisdiction is conferred by law.
Exception: The jurisdiction of Supreme Court is conferred by the Constitution.
1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Note: this is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.)
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (Note: This refers
to SCs appellate jurisdiction. So this power to Review, Reverse, Revise, Modify and Affirm is within the appellate powers of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.)
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. (Note: The or higher clause no longer applies
because the death penalty is suspended)
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not
exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Review, Reverse, Revise, Modify or Affirm must be defined separately and distinctly:
1.

Review consists of Reverse, Revise, Modify or Affirm. The term review is a catch-all provision. Review means to take cognizance
of the decision, but does not cover resolution of the lower body. Review means to look into.
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2.

Reverse overturn a favorable judgment to an unfavorable one or vice versa

3.

Revise revision, not a simple amendment

4.

Modify modification or amendment

5.

Affirm accept the decision of the lower body

on appeal or certiorari to what kind of appeal is it referring to?

The word appeal is by ordinary appeal. The word certiorari is appeal by certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 because
when you speak of review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm it is in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of the SC; it must have come
from a lower court and not an original action under Rule 65 which is a special civil action and not a mode of appeal.
The modes of appeal under Rule 41 section 2 are:
1.
2.
3.

Ordinary Appeal;
Petition for review; and
Appeal by certiorari

But the kind of certiorari mentioned is a mode of appeal because when you speak of Review, Reverse, Revise, Modify and Affirm, it is
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
How could it be an original action when it is certiorari? Certiorari there refers to Rule 65 because Rule 65 is a special civil action, it is
not a mode of appeal.
What is a mode of Appeal by certiorari? Rule 45. So the statement there on appealordinary appeal or certiorari---appeal by
certiorari---it cannot be a special civil action because it is appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
In civil actions, you do not go to the Supreme Court by ordinary appeal. In criminal actions, there is notice by appeal to the Supreme
Court. There is no more automatic appeal because of the removal of the death penalty, but it does not mean you can no longer appeal to
the Supreme Court. You can still do so by notice of appeal and when you speak of the Constitution, it applies to both civil and criminal
cases.
Lourdes L. Eristingcol vs CA: Petitioner is an owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village, Makati City. On the other hand,
[respondent Randolph] Limjoco, [Lorenzo] Tan and [June] Vilvestre were the former president and chairman of the board of
governors, construction committee chairman and village manager of [Urdaneta Village Association Inc.] UVAI, respectively. UVAI is an
association of homeowners at Urdaneta Village.
Petitioners action against UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre is founded on the allegations that in compliance with the National Building
Code and after UVAIs approval of her building plans and acceptance of the construction bond and architects fee, Eristingcol started
constructing a house on her lot with concrete canopy directly above the main door and highway; that for alleged violation of its
Construction Rules and Regulations (or CRR) on Set Back Line vis-a-vis the canopy easement, UVAI imposed on her a penalty of
P400,000 and barred her workers and contractors from entering the village and working on her property; that the CRR, particularly on
Set Back Line, is contrary to law; and that the penalty is unwarranted and excessive.
The parties reached a temporary settlement whereby UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre executed an undertaking which allowed
Eristingcols workers, contractors and suppliers to leave and enter the village, subject only to normal security regulations of UVAI.
UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. They
argued that it is the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes involving
homeowners associations, pursuant to Exec. Order No. 535, Series of 1979, as amended by Exec. Order No. 90, Series of 1986.
Petitioner alleged, among others, that UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Secs. 4 and 6,
Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC after they voluntarily
appeared therein and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an Undertaking.
RTC denied the MTD holding that its jurisdiction may not be assailed after they voluntarily entered their appearance, sought reliefs
therein, and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an undertaking to desist from prohibiting (Eristingcols) workers from entering
the village. It applied the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. CA dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether it is RTC or Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.
Ruling:
HLURB. As regards the defendants supposed embrace of the RTCs jurisdiction by appearing thereat and undertaking to desist from
prohibiting Eristingcols workers from entering the village, suffice it to state that the invocation of the doctrine in Tijam, et al. v.
Sibonghanoy, et al. is quite a long stretch.
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The factual milieu obtaining in Tijam and in this case are worlds apart. As found by the CA, defendants appearance before the RTC was
pursuant to, and in compliance with, a subpoena issued by that court in connection with petitioners application for a TRO. On
defendants supposed agreement to sign the Undertaking allowing petitioners workers, contractors, and suppliers to enter and exit the
village, this temporary settlement cannot be equated with full acceptance of the RTCs authority, as what actually transpired in Tijam.
The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception to the general rule that an objection to the courts jurisdiction over a case may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, as the lack of jurisdiction affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of a case. In
that case, the Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss before the CA, raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time15 years after
the action was commenced in the CFI of Cebu. Indeed, in several stages of the proceedings in the CFI, as well as in the CA, the Surety
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief, and even submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits.
Consequently, it was barred by laches from invoking the CFIs lack of jurisdiction.
To further highlight the distinction in this case, the TRO hearing was held on February 9, 1999, a day after the filing of the complaint.
On even date, the parties reached a temporary settlement reflected in the Undertaking. 15 days thereafter, defendants, including
Limjoco, filed a MTD. Certainly, this successive and continuous chain of events cannot be characterized as laches as would bar
defendants from questioning the RTCs jurisdiction.
Duero vs CA: According to Duero, private respondent Bernardo Eradel occupied Gabriel Dueros land in Surigao del Sur. As shown in
the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. Despite repeated demands, Eradel refused to leave. Duero filed before the
RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership against Eradel and Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Duero and Ruenas
executed a compromise agreement, stating that the Ruenas bound themselves to respect the ownership of Duero. Eradel was not a party
to the agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint. Duero presented his evidence ex parte.
RTC ruled in his favor.
Eradel filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr. He explained that
he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land
and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, RTC denied the motion for new trial.
A RED Conflict Case, an administrative case between Duero and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained
pending with the Office of the Regional Director of the DENR in Davao City. It was forwarded to the DENR in Agusan del Sur. Duero
filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. He averred that
unless there is a determination on who owned the land, he could not be made to vacate the land. Also, the judgment of the RTC was
void inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio, who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded. The grandchildren of Artemio who were
claiming ownership of the land, filed a Motion for Intervention. RTC denied the motion. RTC denied the Petition for Relief from
Judgment. In an MR, Duero alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only P5,240 and
therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the MTC. RTC denied the MR.
Duero filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted. Entry of Judgment was made of record and a writ of execution was issued
by the RTC. Duero filed his petition for certiorari before the CA. CA gave due course to the petition, maintaining that Eradel is not
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC when Eradel filed with said court his MR And/Or Annulment of Judgment.
Issue:
Whether private respondent was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions before it.
Ruling:
No. It was Duero who filed the complaint before the RTC, believing that the RTC had jurisdiction. RA 769117 amending BP 129 had
already become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC. Eradel, an unschooled farmer, in the
mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the Artemio, his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the
heirs of Artemio, who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, Eradel was declared in default. He
then filed a Motion for New Trial in the RTC and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by
his landlord. He stated that he had evidence to prove that he had a better right than Duero because of his long, continuous and
uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee. But his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the
RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. RTC denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his MR, he raised
for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was denied. Eradel raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case
was already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial and for
relief from judgment, and denied his 2 MRs. After RTC still refused to reconsider the denial of Eradel's motion for relief from judgment,
it went on to issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution.
The lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even
by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and
even on appeal. RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if Eradel actively participated in the
proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of
acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer
jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.
Estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice. Duero filed his
complaint before a court without appropriate jurisdiction. Eradel, a farmer whose tenancy status is still pending before the
administrative agency, could have moved for dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer could not be expected to
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know the nuances of jurisdiction and related issues. This farmer ought not to be penalized when he claims that he made an honest
mistake when he initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before he realized that the controversy was outside the RTC's
cognizance. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case. He
would be evicted from the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case would remain unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if
allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to till the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.
Gonzaga vs CA: Facts: In 1970, petitioners purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc. The lot was
specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 and was mortgaged to SSS as security for their housing loan. Petitioners started the construction
of their house on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Private respondent informed
petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 to widen their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the
construction of their house. However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by
SSS and petitioners certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of SSS. After Lot No. 19 was foreclosed,
petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from private respondent that their contract of sale be reformed and
another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house was built therein. However, private respondent
refused. Thus, petitioners filed, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of contract and damages with the RTC.
On January 15, 1998, RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. RTC held that the reformation of instruments or the swapping of
Lot 18 and Lot 19 is no longer feasible considering that plaintiff is no longer the owner of Lot 19, otherwise, defendant will be losing Lot
18 without any substitute therefore. Upon the other hand, plaintiff will be unjustly enriching himself having in its favor both Lot 19
which was earlier mortgaged by him and subsequently foreclosed by SSS, as well as Lot 18 where his house is presently standing. What
plaintiff had bought from the defendant is Lot 19 which parcel of land has been properly indicated in the instruments and not Lot 18 as
claimed by the plaintiff. The contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the parties, besides the plaintiff
failed to assail the contracts on mutual mistake, hence the same need no longer be reformed.
On June 22, 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Thus, on September 17, 1998, petitioners filed an urgent motion to
recall writ of execution, alleging that RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). Conformably, petitioners filed a
new complaint against private respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, on June 30, 1999, petitioner-spouses filed before the CA a
petition for annulment of judgment, on the ground that RTC had no jurisdiction to try and decide the Civil Case.
CA denied the petition for annulment of judgment, relying mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel as laid down in the case of
Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.
Issue: Whether or not the principle of estoppel may be applied even though RTC had no jurisdiction to decide the Civil Case.
Ruling: Yes. While an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active
participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. As
we held in the leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and
for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Xxx It has been
held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because
the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated
obviously for reasons of public policy.
A partys active participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant
affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that same courts jurisdiction.
It was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC by instituting an action for reformation of contract against
private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to
finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for 2
years. It was only after RTC rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the
issue of jurisdiction and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to
question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice
of the private respondent. This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.
Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by
deliberately taking inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of the elementary principles of justice and good faith. There is no denying
that, in this case, petitioners never raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court. Instead, they
voluntarily and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said court. It is now too late in the day for them to repudiate the
jurisdiction they were invoking all along.
Escobal vs Garchitorena: Petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at a beerhouse. He got involved in a
shooting incident, resulting in the death of Rodney Nueca. An amended Information was filed with the RTC charging petitioner with
murder. RTC preventively suspended petitioner from the service under PD No. 971, as amended by PD 1847. General Headquarters of
the PNP preventively suspended the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
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warrant issued by the RTC but he posted bail and was granted temporary liberty. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that as mandated by CA No. 408, in relation to Section 1, PD No. 1822 and
Section 95 of RA No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, petitioner requested the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement. Under RA No. 6975, his
suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be reinstated. Petitioner filed a motion in the RTC
for the lifting of the order of suspension. RTC denied the motion. Trial proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. Petitioner
presented his evidence. He filed an MTC. Citing Republic v. Asuncion, he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance
of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
RTC denied the MTD. It, however, ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was
committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the PNP. The prosecution manifested that it was no longer
presenting any evidence in connection with the petitioners motion. Its evidence showed that the petitioner did not commit the offense
charged in connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the Philippine Constabulary.
RTC declared that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. RTC added that
upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over
the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of 27 as provided for in or by
Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. RTC nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v.
Asuncion and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted in the inclusion of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by
the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.
The petitioner filed a MR of the order. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975 could not be applied retroactively. RTC declared that based on
the petitioners evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a ReAmended Information and to allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his
duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete
records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan.
The Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court to return the records of Criminal Case to the court of
origin. Under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner
had a salary grade of 23. Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his
evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment
therein after trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan properly remanded the case to the RTC.
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was still in
effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against him as he was charged with
homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, and the crime was committed while in the performance of his duties. He
further asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes committed by
members and officers of the PNP with a salary grade below 27 committed in relation to office are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the proper RTC, the amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner asserts,
because under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, only those cases where trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon the effectivity of the
law should be referred to the proper trial court.
The private complainant agrees with the contention of the petitioner. In contrast, the Office of the Special Prosecutor contends that the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC. It asserts that
R.A. No. 7975 should be applied retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime committed by the petitioner
when the amended information was filed with the RTC, by the time it resolved petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995, R.A. No.
7975 had already taken effect. Thus, the law should be given retroactive effect.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the statute in
effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. The
jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information. Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case
continues until the case is terminated.
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving
the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2)
Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .

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However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public
officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the
offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the
Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.
[22] The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation
between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24,
1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in
relation to office. R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the
said RA No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper RTC, MeTC, MTC, and MCTC, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in
BP Blg. 129.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a
salary grade below 27, the proper RTC or MTC, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the
petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade 23. He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal.
Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of BP Blg. 129, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No.
7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.
Asias Emerging Dragon vs DOTC: Doctrines: There is no question as to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City over the subject
matter and parties in Civil Case No. 66213. The RTC can exercise original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance of writs
of certiorari, prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.51 To recall, the Petition of AEDC before the RTC of
Pasig City was for the declaration of nullity of proceedings, mandamus and injunction. The RTC of Pasig City likewise had
jurisdiction over the parties, with the voluntary submission by AEDC and proper service of summons on the DOTC Secretary and the
PBAC Chairman and members.
Special rights granted to original proponent in public biddings. The special rights or privileges of an original proponent
come into play only when there are other proposals submitted during the public bidding of the infrastructure project. As can be
gleaned from the plain language of the statutes and the IRR. The original proponent has: (1) the right to match the lowest or most
advantageous proposal within 30 working days from note thereof, and (2) in the event that the original proponent is able to match
the lowest or most advantageous proposal submitted, then it has the right to be awarded the project. The second right or privilege is
contingent upon the actual exercise by the original proponent of the first right or privilege. Before the project could be awarded to
the Original proponent, he must have been able to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal within the prescribed period.
Hence, when the original proponent is able to timely matched the lowest or most advantageous propos. With all things being equal, it
shall enjoy preference in the awarding of the infrastracture project.
It is without question that in a situation where theres no other competitive bid submitted for the BOT project that the project
would be awarded to the original proponent thereof. However, when there are competitive bids submitted, the original proponent
must be able to match the most advantageous or lowest bid; only when it is able to do so will the original proponent enjoy the
preferential right to the award of the project over the other bidder.
It is already an established fact in AGAN V. PIATCO (2004) that AC failed to match the more advantageous proposal
submitted by PIATCO by the lime the 30-day working period expired on 28 November 1996.8 and since it did not exercise its right to
match the most advantageous proposal within the prescribed period, it cannot assert its right to be awarded the project.
Facts: AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal (original proponent) to the Government through the DOTC/[Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA)] for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operateand-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).
The consortium composed of People's Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS)
and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) also submitted their competitive proposal to the
PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo. AEDC objected.
In Agan Case, SC rules that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of
respondent PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the contract for the construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null
and void.
In Gingoyon Case, Government filed an expropriation case as regards NAIA IPT III, which the Court granted.
Because of these rulings, AEDC claims that, being the recognized and unchallenged original proponent of the NAIA IPT III Project, it
has the exclusive, clear, and vested statutory right to the award thereof.
A petition for mandamus was filed by AEDC.

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Substantial Issue: AEDC is not entitled to a writ of mandamus, there being no specific, certain, and clear legal right to be enforced,
nor duty to be performed that is clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station. While the Court may concede
that AEDC, as the original proponent, already expended resources in its preparation and negotiation of its unsolicited proposal, the
mere fact thereof does not entitle it to the instant award of the NAIA IPT III Project. AEDC was aware that the said project would have
to undergo public bidding, and there existed the possibility that another proponent may submit a more advantageous bid which it
cannot match; in which case, the project shall be awarded to the other proponent and AEDC would then have no means to recover the
costs and expenses it already incurred on its unsolicited proposal. It was a given business risk that AEDC knowingly undertook.
Procedural Issues:
Late filing
The present claim of AEDC is rooted in the Decision of this Court in Agan. However, AEDC filed the Petition at bar only 20 months
after the promulgation of the Decision in Agan on 5 May 2003. As the revised Rules now stand, a petition for certiorari may be filed
within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. 42 Reasonable time for filing a petition
for mandamus should likewise be for the same period. The filing by the AEDC of its petition for mandamus 20 months after its
supposed right to the project arose is evidently beyond reasonable time and negates any claim that the said petition for the
extraordinary writ was the most expeditious and speedy remedy available to AEDC.
Res judicata
AEDC's Petition is that it is already barred by res judicata. AEDC entered into a compromise agreement with the Government.
Because of the compromise agreement among the parties, there was accordingly a judicial settlement of the controversy, and the Order,
dated 30 April 1999, of the RTC of Pasig City was no less a judgment on the merits which may be annulled only upon the ground of
extrinsic fraud. Thus, the RTC of Pasig City, in the same Order, correctly granted the dismissal of Civil Case No. 66213 with prejudice.
AEDC, however, invokes the purported pressure exerted upon it by then President Joseph E. Estrada, the alleged fraud committed by
the DOTC, and paragraph 2 in the afore-quoted Joint Motion to Dismiss to justify the non-application of the doctrine of res judicata to
its present Petition.
There is res judicata because:
First, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City, dismissing Civil Case No. 66213, was issued on 30 April 1999. The Joint Motion to Dismiss,
deemed a compromise agreement, once approved by the court is immediately executory and not appealable.
Second, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing Civil Case No. 66213 pursuant to the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties
constitutes a judgment on the merits.
Third, there is no question as to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City over the subject matter and parties in
Civil Case No. 66213. The RTC can exercise original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance of writs
of certiorari, prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction. To recall, the Petition of AEDC
before the RTC of Pasig City was for the declaration of nullity of proceedings, mandamus and injunction. The RTC
of Pasig City likewise had jurisdiction over the parties, with the voluntary submission by AEDC and proper
service of summons on the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and members.
Lastly, there is, between Civil Case No. 66213 before the RTC of Pasig City and the Petition now pending before this Court, an identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
Agan vs PIATCO: The contract for the construction and operation for the NAIA IPT III was awarded to PIATCO. Petitioners, who are
employees of service providers at the MIAA and NAIA Terminal I and II, and service providers themselves, assail:
a.

the provisions in the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA which grant PIATCO the exclusive right to operate a commercial
international passenger terminal within the Island of Luzon, except those international airports already existing at the time of the
execution of the agreement.

b.

The contracts further provide that upon the commencement of operations at the NAIA IPT III, the Government shall cause the
closure of Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminals I and II as international passenger terminals.

c.

With respect to existing concession agreements between MIAA and international airport service providers regarding certain
services or operations, the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA uniformly provide that such services or operations will not
be carried over to the NAIA IPT III and PIATCO is under no obligation to permit such carry over except through a separate
agreement duly entered into with PIATCO.

d.

With respect to the petitioning service providers and their employees, upon the commencement of operations of the NAIA IPT III,
they allege that they will be effectively barred from providing international airline airport services at the NAIA Terminals I and II
as all international airlines and passengers will be diverted to the NAIA IPT III. The petitioning service providers will thus be
compelled to contract with PIATCO alone for such services, with no assurance that subsisting contracts with MIAA and other
international airlines will be respected.

Respondent PIATCO further alleges that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the instant cases as factual issues are involved
which this Court is ill-equipped to resolve.
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Moreover, PIATCO alleges that submission of this controversy to this Court at the first instance is a violation of the rule on hierarchy of
courts. They contend that trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court with respect to a special civil action for prohibition
and hence, following the rule on hierarchy of courts, resort must first be had before the trial courts. Further, arbitration proceedings
filed by PIATCO have already commenced.
Issue: Whether direct resort to the Supreme Court was a proper remedy;
Ruling:
YES. The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over the cases at
bar. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Courts primary
jurisdiction. It is easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar that call for the relaxation of the rule. Both
petitioners and respondents agree that these cases are of transcendental importance as they involve the construction and operation of
the countrys premier international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues submitted for resolution are of first impression and they entail
the proper legal interpretation of key provisions of the Constitution, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Thus,
considering the nature of the controversy before the Court, procedural bars may be lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the
instant cases.
Liga ng mga Barangay vs Atienza: Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines, which pursuant to
Section 492 of RA No. 7160 (LGC), constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the
metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.
Section 493 of that law provides that the liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels
directly elect a president, a vice-president, and 5 members of the board of directors. All other matters not provided for in the law
affecting the internal organization of the leagues of LGUs shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws, which must
always conform to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws. Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to
govern its internal organization. Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code. Liga came out with its Calendar of Activities and
Guidelines in the Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002, setting the synchronized elections for highly urbanized city
chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of Manila, together with independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters.
Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing for the election of representatives of the
District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters 30 days after the barangay elections. Liga
sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon, or even
assumed, the functions of the Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council.
Mayor signed and approved the city ordinance.
Issue:
Whether or not the Liga properly filed the case directly with the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
No. Although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this
Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.
Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the
hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or
the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed.
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the RTC and CA in certain cases.
People v. Cuaresma: This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. A direct
invocation of the SCs original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon SCs time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts
docket.
Santiago v. Vasquez: the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief
directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and
(2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to
be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
because this Court is not a trier of facts.

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SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction. Petitioners reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre is misplaced because the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was
not an issue therein. Besides, what was sought to be nullified in the petition for certiorari and prohibition therein was an act of the
President, which would have greatly affected all LGUs. When an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. The same is true when what is seriously alleged to be
unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is coequal with Congress.
Hannah Serrana vs Sandiganbayan: Petitioner was a student of the UP-Cebu (government scholar) appointed by President
Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term. Petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC
the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex. Estrada gave P15,000,000 to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds was the
Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner
and her brother Jade Ian Serana for estafa.
Petitioner moved to quash the information: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer
with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in
question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of
the student body, she was never a public officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is
of no moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of RA No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27"
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
x x x x (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations.
Thus, Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g),
irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their
responsibilities and functions.
Issue
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds.
Ruling:
Yes. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended. R.A. No. 3019 is a
penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of
the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their
penalties.
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer. Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
regular tuition fee-paying student. This is bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. While the first part of
Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose
positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a nonstock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606. Moreover, it is
well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. The
administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental
function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical
training. Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.
The offense charged was committed in relation to public office, according to the Information. Petitioner argues that even assuming that
she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to
her office. According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board
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Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body
of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the
pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. Otherwise, jurisdiction
would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.
The information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her
official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring
with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government x x x."
Clarit Garcia vs Sandiganbayan: To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the amount of P143,052,015.29 that
retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark had allegedly amassed
and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to RA 1379, filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on
October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those properties. Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing of another forfeiture
case, docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds and properties amounting to P202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196
would eventually be raffled also to the Fourth Division of the SB. Civil Case No. 0193 shall be referred to as Forfeiture I and Civil Case
No. 0196 as Forfeiture II.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias and 3 others with violation
of RA 7080 (plunder) under an Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the value of the property and funds plundered at
P303,272,005.99. Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information was raffled off to the Second Division of the SB. The plunder
charge, as the parties pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties identified in both forfeiture cases.
Issue 1:
Whether or not SB 4Th Division has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Forfeitures I and II as both cases are covered or included in
the plunder case against the Garcias.
Ruling:
Yes, the plunder case did not absorb the forfeiture cases. Petitioner claims that the filing of the main plunder case, with its automatic
forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4th Division of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture
cases. The inclusion of the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to obviate possible double jeopardy
entanglements and colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of discretion on
the SB 4th Division for not granting its separate motions to dismiss the 2 forfeiture petitions and/or to consolidate them with the
plunder case on the foregoing ground.
Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of
jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are
the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005
Resolution, the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. The action of
forfeiture arises when a public officer or employee [acquires] during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of
proportion of his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x x. Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired. Thus if the respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully
acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such
judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State. x x x
EO 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his
immediate family and business associates, authorizes under its Sec. 3 the filing of forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which will proceed
independently of any criminal proceedings. The Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, interpreted this provision as empowering the
Presidential Commission on Good Government to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.
A forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that
the crime of plunder absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the
criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by
preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate income, it being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. The forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not
proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal
wealth.
Given the foregoing considerations, petitioners thesis on possible double jeopardy entanglements should a judgment of conviction
ensue in Crim. Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense, suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to
repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thus,
the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.
Issue 2:
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Whether or not Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children.
Ruling 2:
No. Petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted
service of summons. Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements of a valid
substituted service of summons, thus: SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
A court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by
whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.
Summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention
Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. Substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were
made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of
summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, we broke down the requirements to be:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot
be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being so much time as is
necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires
that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party. Moreover, the sheriff must show
several attempts for personal service of at least 3 times on at least 2 different dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendants house or residence; or on a competent
person in charge of defendants office or regular place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made on petitioner and her children, as
the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first 2 requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service
of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at
petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age
and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants, however, admits
of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief. In the instant
case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning improper service of summons since the improvident service of
summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases.
The Republic points to the various pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot
subscribe to the Republics views.
Special appearance to question a courts jurisdiction is not voluntary appearance (Sec. 20, Rule 14). The pleadings filed by petitioner in
the subject forfeiture cases do not show that she voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in
Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d)
motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II:
(a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special appearance with the purpose of
challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her 3 children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person and of her 3 children for lack of valid service of summons through improvident substituted service of
summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her motions for
reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth
affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and defense of
lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule
14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or
equivalent to service of summons.
Platinum Tours and Travel, Inc. vs Panlilio: Platinum filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages against Pan Asiatic
Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president Nelida Galvez. Platinum sought to collect payment for the airline tickets which PATC
bought from it. RTC of Makati City, Branch 62, rendered a judgment by default in favor of Platinum and ordered PATC and Galvez to
solidarily pay Platinum. A writ of execution was issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club Proprietary
Membership Certificate in the name of Galvez was levied upon and sold.
Jose Panlilio filed a motion to intervene in the Civil Case claiming that Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over her
shares of stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her loan and that Galvez had already delivered to him the stock certificates. RTC
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denied Panlilios motion for intervention because (1) a decision had already been rendered in this case and that the only matters at
issue is the propriety of the execution; (2) it will only delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties; and, (3)
the Intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate action.
RTC declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities in the conduct thereof.
Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of preliminary attachment of the Manila Polo Club shares. The
case was raffled to Branch 146 of the RTC of Makati City. Panlilio again attempted to intervene in the other Civil Case, this time by
incorporating in his complaint a motion to consolidate both Civil Cases.
Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the motion for consolidation on condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62
would not object thereto. Judge Diokno allowed the consolidation of the 2 cases and setting for hearing Panlilios application for a writ
of preliminary attachment.
Platinum moved to reconsider the order of Judge Diokno but its motion was denied.
Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the CA assailing, among others, the order of Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil
Cases. CA annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to return the Civil Case to Judge Tensuan, or to keep
it in his docket and decide it as a separate case. Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the CA, praying
that the Civil Case be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC Branch of Makati. Said motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC-Branch 62s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over the civil case was extinguished when Judge Dioknos July 23,
1996 order allowing the consolidation of the two cases was annulled and set aside.
Ruling:
No. Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does not depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the
court of that power or on the correctness of its decisions.
Panlilios collection case falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the CA subsequently annulled Judge
Dioknos order granting the consolidation, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order.
Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the
orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in the
instant case, the decision on all questions arising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less
divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, the instant petition is premature and speculative. Had Platinum waited until Judge Diokno decided on what to do with Civil
Case No. 96-365, the parties would have been spared the trouble and the expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in turn
would have had one petition less in its docket. The unfounded fear that Civil Case No. 96-365 would unduly delay the final resolution of
Civil Case No. 94-1634, if the former were retained by Branch 62, made Platinum act with haste.
Manila Bankers vs Ng Kok Wei: Respondent Eddy Ng Kok Wei is a Singaporean businessman who ventured into investing in the
Philippines. On November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to petitioner, expressed his intention to purchase a
condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces. On December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee of P50,000 for the
purchase of a 46-square meter condominium unit valued at P860,922.00. On January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the purchase
price or P729,830.00.
Petitioner executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the respondent. The contract expressly states that the condominium unit shall
substantially be completed and delivered to the respondent within 15 months from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that
(S)hould there be no substantial completion and fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total amount
paid (by respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner).
Considering that the stipulated 15-month period was at hand, respondent returned to the Philippines in April, 1990.
In a letter dated April 5, 1990, petitioner informed respondent of the substantial completion of his condominium unit, however, due to
various uncontrollable forces (such as coup d etat attempts, typhoon and steel and cement shortage), the final turnover is reset to May
31, 1990.
Meanwhile, on July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioners notice of delivery dated May 31, 1990, respondent again flew back to Manila.
He found the unit still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities.
Once more, petitioner issued another notice to move-in addressed to its building administrator advising the latter that respondent is
scheduled to move in on August 22, 1990.
On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his condominium unit was still unlivable. Exasperated, he
was constrained to send petitioner a letter dated November 21, 1990 demanding payment for the damages he sustained. Petitioner
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ignored such demand, prompting respondent to file with the RTC, Makati City, a complaint against the former for specific performance
and damages.
During the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit and on April 12, 1991, occupied the same. Thus,
respondents cause of action has been limited to his claim for damages.
RTC found petitioner liable for payment of damages due to the delay in the performance of its obligation to the respondent. CA
affirmed and denied the MR.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
Yes. On petitioners contention that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the instant case, Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1344, as amended,
provides:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: x x x
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium
units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. x x x.
Thus, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction. We have consistently held that complaints for specific performance with damages by a
lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
While it may be true that the RTC is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners active participation in the proceedings estopped it
from assailing such lack of it. It is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the RTC and CA. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified RTCs
jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the RTCs jurisdiction.
GSIS vs Santiago: Deceased spouses Jose Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various loans secured by 4 real estate mortgages
from GSIS (Period: Sept. 1956 Oct. 1957; Amount: 3.1M). They failed to pay so GSIS foreclosed the mortgages.
Some of these properties were later sold in a public auction at a bid price of 5.2M. 91 lots were expressly excluded from the auction
since the lots were sufficient to pay for all the mortgage debts. The sale was annotated in such a way that the excluded lots from the
auction are specifically indicated.
An Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership was executed by defendant GSIS over Zuluetas lots, including the lots, which as earlier
stated, were already excluded from the foreclosure. GSIS sold these properties to Yorkstown Development Corporation which sale was
disapproved by the Office of the President. The sold properties were returned to GSIS and they began disposing every lot.
Antonio Zulueta and Eduardo Santiago (represented Zulueta) executed an agreement whereby the former transferred all his rights and
interests over the excluded lots. Pursuant to this agreement, Santiago wrote a demand letter to GSIS for the return of 81 excluded lots.
Reconveyance (RTC): GSIS argues that the action was barred by Statute of Limitations and/or Laches, and that the complaint did not
state a cause of action. Santiago died during the pendency of the trial so his wife replaced him. Court decided in favor of Santiago 78
lots (sorry hindi inexplain ng case kung bakit pabawas ng pabawas yung lots). CA affirmed. MR denied.
GSIS argues: (1) that there was no proof of bad faith nor could fraud or malice be attributed to the petitioner when it erroneously
caused the issuance of certificates of title over the subject lots despite the fact that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure
sale; (2) an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the time of its creation or upon
the alleged fraudulent registration of the property, in this case when the ownership was consolidated to GSIS. The action was instituted
more than fourteen years later; (3) the properties were not returned because no such obligation exists under the loan and mortgage
agreement.
SC: At the outset, it bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. Case law has it that the findings of the
trial court especially when affirmed by the CA are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Although there are exceptions to the said
rule, we find no reason to deviate therefrom. By assailing the findings of facts of the trial court as affirmed by the CA, that it acted in
bad faith, the petitioner thereby raised questions of facts in its petition.
Katon vs Palanca: DOCTRINE: Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action

clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio
by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for review on different grounds. Verily, the
dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless litigations.
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Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, ass ailing the December 8, 2000 Decision and
the November 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 57496.
FACTS: On August 2, 1963, herein Petitioner Katon filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island. Then Asst. Director of Forestry informed the
Director of Lands, Manila, that since the subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified and
released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the island.
Records also reveal that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued
Homestead Patent on March 3, 1977 of Sombrero Island. Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their
respective portions and have declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for
twenty years. Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned
because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant and that
petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and
unexplained period of time.
In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor
of the respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island
in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the
whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land."
Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend his Complaint so he
could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the
RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated December 17,
1999, for being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals: Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the CA ruled on the
merits. In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. Nonetheless, the
Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of five members with two justices
dissenting pursuant to its "residual prerogative" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
Issues
1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the merits of the case) in
the Petition?
2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition?"
The Courts Ruling: The Petition has no merit.
Propriety of Ruling on the Merits: This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CAs ruling on
the merits. The CA even corrected itself in its November 20, 2001 Resolution. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra
jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave
abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole
office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence, more so when
no determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case.
IMPORTANT! Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its
"residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts over cases appealed
to the CA. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis
pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four
excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.
On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial
courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved
in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but
prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal.In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called
residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending
appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on residual
jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of
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the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual
prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds
mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought. The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent and certificate
of title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely for reversion? The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case
for any of such actions, over which the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction.
In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must contain the following allegations: 1) that the
contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and 2) that
the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the
plaintiff. In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau
had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.
In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer of the property
or title thereto is sought to be nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendants name. As with
an annulment of title, a complaint must allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land:
(1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the property. Therefore,
the defendant who acquired the property through mistake or fraud is bound to hold and reconvey to the plaintiff the property or the
title thereto.
In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege that he had previously held title to the land in
question. On the contrary, he acknowledged that the disputed island was public land, that it had never been
privately titled in his name, and that he had not applied for a homestead under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
This Court has held that a complaint by a private party who alleges that a homestead patent was obtained by
fraudulent means, and who consequently prays for its annulment, does not state a cause of action; hence, such
complaint must be dismissed.
Neither can petitioners case be one for reversion. Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only
the solicitor general or the officer in his stead may institute such an action. A private person may not bring an action
for reversion or any other action that would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its derivative title, with the
result that the land thereby covered would again form part of the public domain.
Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of lack of jurisdiction, but also because of the
utter absence of a cause of action, a defense raised by respondents in their Answer.(Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court)
Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title or its reconveyance, the case should still
be dismissed for being time-barred. Clearly, the suit was brought way past ten years from the date of the issuance of the
Certificate, the prescriptive period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property.
Pecson vs COMELEC: Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the Municipality of Magalang, Province of
Pampanga in the May 2007 elections. Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate, garnering a total of 12,592 votes as against
Pecsons 12,531, or a margin of 61 votes. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang. Soon thereafter,
Pecson filed an election protest with the RTC.
The RTC rendered a Decision in Pecsons favor. The RTC ruled that Pecson received a total of 14,897 votes as against Cunanans 13,758
a vote margin of 1,139.
Cunanan received a copy of the Decision on November 26, 2007 and filed a Notice of Appeal the day after. The RTC issued on
November 27, 2008 an Order noting the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of appeal fee and directing the transmittal of the
records of the case to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC. Pecson, on the other hand, filed on
November 28, 2007 an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal, claiming that Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials (Rules) allows this remedy.
The RTC granted Pecsons motion for execution pending appeal via a Special Order dated December 3, 2007 (Special Order) but
suspended, pursuant to the Rules, the actual issuance of the writ of execution for twenty (20) days.
Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Status Quo Ante
Order/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with Prayer for Immediate Raffle. He argued in his petition that: (1) the RTC Decision did
not clearly establish Pecsons victory or his (Cunanans) defeat a requirement of Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules; among other
reasons, the number of votes the RTC tallied and tabulated exceeded the number of those who actually voted and the votes cast for the
position of Mayor, and (2) the RTC had constructively relinquished its jurisdiction by the issuance of the Order dated November 27,
2007 directing the transmittal of the records of the case.
The Second Division of the COMELEC issued on January 4, 2008 a 60-day TRO directing: (1) the RTC to cease and desist from issuing
or causing the issuance of a writ of execution or implementing the Special Order; and (2) Cunanan to continue performing the functions
of Mayor of Magalang.
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The COMELECs Second Division denied Cunanans petition in a Resolution dated March 6, 2008. It ruled that: (1) the resolution of
the motion for execution pending appeal is part of the residual jurisdiction of the RTC to settle pending incidents; the motion was filed
prior to the expiration of the period to appeal and while the RTC was still in possession of the original record; and (2) there is good
reason to justify the execution of the Decision pending appeal, as Pecsons victory was clearly and manifestly established.
Pecson thus asked for the issuance of a writ of execution via an Ex-Parte Motion. Despite Cunanans opposition, the RTC granted
Pecsons motion and issued the writ of execution on March 11, 2008. Pecson thereafter assumed the duties and functions of Mayor of
Magalang.
On Cunanans motion, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution dated May 21, 2008 reversing the ruling of the Second Division
insofar as it affirmed the RTCs findings of good reasons to execute the decision pending appeal. It affirmed the authority of the RTC to
order execution pending appeal; it however nullified the March 11, 2008 writ of execution on the ground that the RTC could no longer
issue the writ because it had lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal of the records and the perfection of the appeals of both
Cunanan and Pecson (to be accurate, the lapse of Pecsons period to appeal).
Threatened to be unseated, Pecson asked, as interim relief, for the issuance of a Status Quo Order.
ISSUE
Whether or not the writ of execution the RTC issued on March 11, 2008 was void because the RTC could no longer issue the writ
because of the lapse of the period for appeal, and because the RTC no longer held the records of the election contest which had then
been transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC.
HELD
No. The writ of execution issued by the RTC is a mere administrative enforcement medium of the Special Order the main order
supporting Pecsons motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ itself cannot and does not assume a life of its own
independent from the Special Order on which it is based. Certainly, its nullification does not carry with it the nullification of the Special
Order. This consequence does not of course hold true in the reverse situation the nullification of the Special Order effectively carries
with it the nullification of its implementing writ and removes the basis for the issuance of another implementing writ. In the present
case, the reality is that if and when we ultimately affirm the validity of the Special Order, nothing will thereafter prevent the RTC from
issuing another writ.
Another legal reality is that the COMELEC is wrong in its ruling that the RTC could no longer actually issue the writ on March 11, 2008
because it no longer had jurisdiction to do so after the appeal period lapsed and after the records were transmitted to the ECADCOMELEC. That the RTC is still in possession of the records and that the period to appeal (of both contending parties) must have not
lapsed are important for jurisdictional purposes if the issue is the authority of the RTC to grant a Special Order allowing execution
pending appeal; they are requisite elements for the exercise by the RTC of its residual jurisdiction to validly order an execution pending
appeal, not for the issuance of the writ itself. This is clearly evident from the cited provision of the Rules which does not require the
issuance of the implementing writ within the above limited jurisdictional period. The RTC cannot legally issue the implementing writ
within this limited period for two reasons: (1) the cited twenty-day waiting period under Section 11(b); and (2) the mandatory
immediate transmittal of the records to the ECAD of the COMELEC under Section 10 of the Rules.
Other than the clarity of Pecsons victory under the RTC Decision, the Special Order cited good and special reasons that justified an
execution pending appeal, specifically: (1) the need to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision as that which is
initially given by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers; (2) public interest and/or respect for and giving meaning to
the will of the electorate; and (3) public policy something had to be done to deal a death blow to the pernicious grab-theproclamation-prolong-the-protest technique often, if not invariably, resorted to by unscrupulous politicians who would render
nugatory the peoples verdict against them.
The term for mayor consists of only three (3) years. One year and six months has lapsed since the May 2007 election; thus, less than
two years are left of the elected mayors term. The election protest, while already decided at the RTC level, is still at the executionpending-appeal stage and is still far from the finality of any decision on the merits, given the available appellate remedies and the
recourses available through special civil actions.

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II.

RULES 1 TO 5 (inc. 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure)

A.

Actions: meaning and commencement

When is an action commenced? Upon the timely payment of the correct docket fees.
Rule 1, Section 5. Commencement of action. A civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court. If an
additional defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the action is commenced with regard to him on the dated of the filing of such
later pleading, irrespective of whether the motion for its admission, if necessary, is denied by the court.
Ruby Shelter Builders & Realty Dev. Corp. vs Formaran: Petitioner obtained a loan from respondents Romeo Tan and Roberto
Obiedo, secured by REM. In a MOA, Tan and Obiedo granted petitioner an extension. In the event that petitioner is able to redeem any
of the parcels of land, the Deed of Absolute Sale covering the said property shall be nullified and have no force and effect; and Tan and
Obiedo shall then return the owners duplicate of the TCT to petitioner and also execute a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage. However, if
petitioner is unable to redeem the parcels of land within the period, Tan and Obiedo could already present the Deeds of Absolute Sale to
the Register of Deeds so Tan and Obiedo could acquire TCTs to the properties in their names.
Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC, petitioner paid P13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of the Clerk
of Court. The Clerk of Court initially considered the case as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and computed the docket and
other legal fees due thereon according to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that the Civil Case involved real properties, the docket fees for
which should be computed in accordance with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 04-2-04-SC. Since petitioner did not pay the appropriate docket fees, RTC did not acquire jurisdiction.
Tan asked the RTC to issue an order requiring petitioner to pay the correct docket fees; and should petitioner fail to do so, to deny and
dismiss the prayer of petitioner for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale for having been executed in contravention of the law or
of the MOA as pactum commisorium. If it was a real action the docket fees would have been P720,392.60.
SC: Real action. To resolve the issue of whether petitioner paid the correct docket fees, it is necessary to determine the true nature of
its Complaint. The nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or Complaint itself, rather than by its
title or heading. However, the Court finds it necessary, in ascertaining the true nature of the Civil Case, to take into account significant
facts and circumstances beyond the Complaint of petitioner, facts and circumstances which petitioner failed to state in its Complaint
but were disclosed in the preliminary proceedings before the court a quo.
Petitioner persistently avers that its Complaint is primarily for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale. Based on the allegations
and reliefs in the Complaint alone, one would get the impression that the titles to the real properties still rest with petitioner; and that
the interest of Tan and Obiedo in the same lies only in the Deeds of Absolute Sale sought to be annulled.
Petitioner failed to mention in its Complaint that Tan and Obiedo already had the MOA, which clearly provided for the execution of the
Deeds of Absolute Sale, registered on the TCTs over the parcels of land, then still in the name of petitioner. After Tan and Obiedo had
the Deeds of Absolute Sale notarized and presented to the Register of Deeds, they were already issued TCTs over the real properties, in
their own names. Tan and Obiedo have also acquired possession of the properties, enabling them to demolish the improvements
thereon.
It is, thus, suspect that petitioner kept mum about these facts and circumstances. Even though the MOA was supposed to have long
been registered on its TCTs over the parcels of land, petitioner did not pray for the removal of the same as a cloud on its title. In the
same vein, although petitioner alleged that Tan and Obiedo forcibly took physical possession of the properties, petitioner did not seek
the restoration of such possession to itself. And despite learning that Tan and Obiedo already secured TCTs over the properties in their
names, petitioner did not ask for the cancellation of said titles. The only logical and reasonable explanation is that petitioner is
reluctant to bring to the attention of the Court certain facts and circumstances, keeping its Complaint safely worded, so as to institute
only an action for annulment of Deeds of Absolute Sale. Petitioner deliberately avoided raising issues on the title and possession of the
real properties that may lead the Court to classify its case as a real action.
The allegations and reliefs petitioner sought in its Complaint appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the recovery by
petitioner of its title to and possession of the parcels of land from Tan and Obiedo. A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of real property; or, as indicated in what is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title
to or recovery of possession of real property.
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property, his action for annulment of sale
and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered
immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real
property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property.
It is a real action. Unfortunately, and evidently to evade payment of the correct amount of filing fee, Manalo never alleged in the body of
his amended petition, much less in the prayer portion thereof, the assessed value of the subject res, or, if there is none, the estimated
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value thereof, to serve as basis for the receiving clerk in computing and arriving at the proper amount of filing fee due thereon, as
required under Section 7 of this Courts en banc resolution of 04 September 1990.
St. Louis University, Inc. vs Cobarrubias: Cobbarubias is an associate professor of petitioner and a member of the Union. She
was placed on forced leave by petitioner pursuant to a provision in the CBA which provides that: Section 7.7. For teaching employees
in college who fail the yearly evaluation, the following provisions shall apply: (a) Teaching employees who are retained for 3 cumulative
years in 5 years shall be on forced leave for 1 regular semester during which period all benefits due them shall be suspended.
Cobbarubias resorted to the grievance machinery, but failed to resolve the dispute. Respondent then filed a case for illegal forced leave
or suspension with the NCMB. Parties eventually submitted the case for VA. VA dismissed the case. Respondent received the VAs
decision on November 20, 2007.
On December 5, 2007, Cobarrubias filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43, but failed to pay the required filing fees and to
attach to the petition copies of the material portions of the record. CA dismissed the petition on January 14, 2008 due to procedural
lapses. Respondent received the CA resolution on January 31, 2008. On February 15, 2008, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and attached to her motion copies of the material portions of the record and the postal money orders for P4,230.00.
She argued that the ground upon which her petition was dismissed was technical. CA reinstated her petition finding that respondent
substantially complied with the rules by paying the appeal fee in full and attaching the proper documents in her motion for
reconsideration. SLU insists that the VA decision had already become final for failure of respondent to pay the docket fees on time.
SC: Whether or not jurisdiction was acquired by the appellate court by virtue of the timely filing and payment of the correct docket
fees. Cobarrubias petition should NOT be reinstated because of her failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period.
Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege. Thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by
law. Rule 43 provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review within 15 days
from the receipt of the notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court
the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the petitions
dismissal. Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on December 5, 2007, 15 days from receipt of the VA decision on November 20, 2007, but paid
her docket fees in full only after 72 days, when she filed her MR on February 15, 2008 and attached the postal money orders
forP4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late, and without payment of the full docket fees, Cobarrubias appeal was not
perfected within the reglementary period.
Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a
party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed. However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict
observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time
from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the
name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge,
guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
No such explanation has been advanced. Other than insisting that the ends of justice and fair play are better served if the case is
decided on its merits, Cobarrubias offered no excuse for her failure to pay the docket fees in full when she filed her petition for review.
Cobarrubias omission is fatal to her cause.
In Ruby Shelter, the focus was the payment of the correct amount of the docket fees; In Cobarrubias, the emphasis was the timely
payment. The court acquires jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of the complaint AND timely payment of the correct docket fees.
Proton Philippines vs Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP): Proton availed of the credit facilities of BNP and executed a corporate
guarantee of the extent of US$2 million to guarantee its obligation. Under their trust agreement, Proton would receive imported motor
vehicles and hold them in trust for BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it in case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return them
to BNP with the documents of title.
Proton failed to deliver the proceeds and to return the unsold motor vehicles. Protons guarantors refused to pay its obligation so BNP
filed a complaint ordering them to pay the initial amount of US$2 million with accrued interest and other related charges. RTC Makati
Clerk of Court assessed the docket fees at P352,000. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by BNP for failure to pay
the correct docket fees thus preventing the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. In addition, the petitioners allege the
prematurity of the complaint since BNP did not priorly send a demand letter.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss and the subsequent MR. The CA denied the appeal by way of certiorari stating that Section 7(a), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court excludes interest accruing from the principal amount being claimed in the pleading in the computation of the
prescribed filing fees. CA denied their MR.
The petitioners argue that pursuant to Administrative Circular 11-94, interests claimed should be included in the computation of the
docket fees. Thus since BNP underpaid, RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
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Issues: Should the computation for payment of docket fees have included the interest claimed by the complainant? Yes.
Did the trial court fail to acquire jurisdiction over the case for insufficient docket fees? No.
SC: When the complaint was filed in 1998, Rule 141 had been amended by Administrative Circular 11-94.
In Manchester Development Corp. vs. CA, this Court held that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fees. However, that the ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd vs. Asuncion when this Court
held that in the former there was an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, whereas in the latter
the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide by paying the additional fees as required.
Respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the Clerk of Court which turned out to be incorrect. Respondent prayed for
accrued interest subsequent to August 15, 1998 until finally fully paid. The complaint having been filed on September 7, 1998,
respondents claim includes the interest from August 16, 1998 until such date of filing. Respondent did not, however, pay the filing fee
corresponding to its claim for interest from August 16, 1998 until the filing of the complaint on September 7, 1998. As priorly discussed,
this is required under Rule 141, as amended by Administrative Circular 11-94, which was the rule applicable at the time. Thus, as the
complaint currently stands, respondent cannot claim the interest from August 16, 1998 until September 7, 1998, unless respondent is
allowed by motion to amend its complaint within a reasonable time and specify the precise amount of interest petitioners owe from
August 16, 1998 to September 7, 1998 and pay the corresponding docket fee.
Rule 2, Section 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of. Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action.
What is a cause of action?
Rule 2, Section 2. Cause of action, defined. A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
Where lies the cause of action? In the defendant. Rule 6, Section 3: The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause or causes
of action. There is a contradiction. How do you resolve this?
If the cause of action is the act or omission in violation of the right of the other, it is in the defendant. But the definition of complaint
says it is the plaintiffs cause of action. Rule 6 pertains to the remedy of the plaintiff; its not really a cause of action but a right of action.
Thus, the right of action is with the plaintiff. But there can never be a right of action without the cause of action. What triggers the right
of action is the defendants cause of action because the plaintiff can only go to court once his right has been violated.
But this has something to do with civil actions. The Rules govern not only civil actions but also criminal actions and special
proceedings. How do you distinguish?
Rule 1, Section 3. Cases governed. These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special
proceedings.
(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific rules
prescribed for a special civil action.
(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law.
(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. (Example: settlement of the
estate)
In civil actions, there are 5 parties: (1) plaintiff, (2) defendant, (3) co-defendant, (4) third- fourth- fifth- party defendant, and (4)
intervenor.
In criminal actions, there can only be 2 parties: (1) Republic of the Philippines, and (2) the accused.
In special proceedings, there is only 1 party: the petitioner. But when one opposes, he becomes an oppositor akin to a defendant.
Exception: In habeas corpus, writ of amparo, writ of habeas data and writ of kalikasan, there must be a respondent.
B.

Rule 2

One suit for a single cause of action

Rule 2, Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action.
Any party to a case can never file 2 cases based on 1 act or omission by the defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff.

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If A, the plaintiff, leases unto B a parcel of land for a period of 5 years. Upon the expiration of the period of 5 years, the obligation of B is
to return the parcel of land to A. B does not return the parcel of land. There is only one violation: failure to return the parcel of land to
A. How may A violate the principle of one suit for a single cause of action? If A files (1) an action for the recovery of the property and (2)
another case for damages for failure to surrender the property.
Splitting a single cause of action
When there is a splitting of a single cause of action, what is the remedy of B? A motion to dismiss under Rule 16.
Rule 16, Section 1, (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
Rule 2, Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
But if judgment has already been rendered, the remedy of B is motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Rule 16, Section 1, (f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment xxx
Joinder of causes vs Joinder of parties
There are 4 requirements for joinder of causes of action:
Rule 2, Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
Rule on joinder of parties: Rule 3, Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom any right to
relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any
question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such
orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no interest.
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed
in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of
jurisdiction. (Note: This is called the totality rule)
B, the defendant, borrowed money from A, the plaintiff, in the amount of P150,000 in January. Again, he borrowed P150,000 from A in
May. By December, B borrowed P1,000,000 from A secured by real estate mortgage (Rule 68). May A join his causes of action against
B? Yes. What action? The 1st and 2nd are for sum of money. The 3rd may be an action for foreclosure or recovery of the sum of money
(P1,000,000).
Suppose A decided to file 3 actions for sums of money, what is the aggregate amount? P1,300,000. Where should it be filed? With the
RTC.
Is that mandatory on the part of A to file 3 cases against B? No.
If A chooses to file 3 cases, where would he file them? 1st and 2nd must be filed with the MTC. The 3rd must be filed with the RTC.
What is the jurisdictional amount under R.A. 7691?
RTC has jurisdiction over:
Real actions:
Assessed value of the property outside Metro Manila > P20,000
Assessed value of the property inside Metro Manila > P50,000
Exception: MTC has jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases.
Personal actions:
Demand or the value of the property outside Metro Manila > P100,000
Demand or the value of the property inside Metro Manila > P200,000
If A joins the causes of action of sum of money, sum of money and foreclosure of real estate mortgage, is that a proper joinder of causes
of action? No, because Rule 2, Section 5 (b) states that the joinder shall not include special civil actions.
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The remedy of B is (NOT A MOTION TO DISMISS) to file a motion to amend (or omit?) or ex parte to drop. Also the court itself can
drop it because the court cannot proceed.
Rule 2, Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A
misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.
A is a resident of QC and B is a resident of Manila. The real property which is offered as security in the real estate mortgage is located in
Baguio. Where should the case be filed/ what is the venue of the action? If 1 st action and 2nd action are for sum of money, 3 rd action is for
recovery of real property, can you join them? Yes. The venue is at the option of the plaintiff. You can join real and personal actions;
there is no prohibition under joinder of causes of action. However, you cannot join an ordinary civil action with a special civil action.
That has to be dropped.
C.

Parties to Civil Actions

Rule 3, Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by
law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the
third (fourth, etc.) party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counter-claim,
the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) party defendant.
Who may be parties? Natural persons (what makes you a natural person is your intellect of will), juridical persons (those which are
created by law like a corporation), entities authorized by law (ex. estate, or the totality of a decedents assets and liabilities). Still, they
cannot sue until they are real parties in interest.
Rule 3, Section 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Who is not a party in interest? A third party in a contract. In an action for breach of contract, only those who are privy to the contract
are real parties in interest.
Under Rule 3, there are only 2 kinds of parties: indispensable parties and necessary parties.
Indispensable parties vs necessary parties
An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of the case while a necessary party is one without
whom there can be no complete determination of the case.
Rule 3, Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may,
except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or
fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just
to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may
have no interest.
Rule 3, Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Rule 3, Section 8. Necessary party. A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if
complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action.
Relucio vs Lopez: Can there be a final determination of the case without Relucio? Yes. Can there be a complete determination of the
case without Relucio? Yes. The allegation of the plaintiff is some names were registered in the name of Relucio. Since they are in the
name of Relucio, then those properties are outside the scope of the action.
Lopez filed a petition for appointment as sole administrator of conjugal properties against Alberto Lopez and Relucio in RTC Makati.
She alleged that she was legally married to Alberto, but he abandoned her and their 4 legitimate children, that he arrogated unto
himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, that he spends such for his sole benefit, and that after
abandoning her, he maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with Relucio. During their cohabitation, they amassed a fortune,
and Lopez alleges that such were acquired principally through the actual contribution of money, property and industry of Alberto, with
minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from Relucio. She alleges that Alberto excluded her and their children from any fruits or income
derived from the conjugal properties. He also allegedly sold, alienated, etc., properties belonging to the conjugal partnership.
Relucio filed a Motion to Dismiss; there was no cause of action against her. MTD was denied; she is impleaded as a necessary or
indispensable party because some of the properties are registered in her name and Alberto, or solely in her name. Relucio filed an MR,
but was denied. She filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, who likewise denied the petition, as well as the subsequent MR.

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SC: Relucio is not an indispensable or necessary party. The first cause of action is for judicial appointment as administratrix. The
administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between the spouses, to the exclusion of all other persons. There is no rightduty relation between Lopez and Relucio that would support a cause of action. The second cause of action is for an accounting, which is
arises from or is an incident of marriage. As Relucio has nothing to do with the marriage, no cause of action can exist. The third cause of
action is for forfeiture of Alberto's share in the property mentioned. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership between
Alberto and Relucio. The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Albertos share, if any there be, in property co-owned by him
with Relucio. The asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto's share alone. Lopez sought support, but a stranger cannot be compelled to
give support. As to the claim for moral damages, the claim is against Alberto. To sustain a cause of action for moral damages, the
complaint must have the character of an action for interference with marital or family relations under the Civil Code.
A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. Relucio would not be affected by any
judgment. If Relucio is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom
there can be no final determination of an action.
Nor can Relucio be a necessary party in the Special Proceedings. A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be
joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim
subject of the action.
China Banking Corp vs Oliver: Pangan Lim, Jr. and Mercedes Oliver (Oliver 1) applied for a loan, offering as collateral a lot covered
by a TCT in the name of Oliver, which Chinabank approved. The mortgage was duly registered and annotated on the original title under
the custody of the Registry of Deeds and on the owners duplicate copy in the banks possession.
Respondent, claiming that she is Mercedes Oliver (Oliver 2), filed an action for annulment of mortgage and cancellation of title with
damages. Respondent claimed that: she was the registered and lawful owner of the land; the owners duplicate copy of the title had
always been in her possession; and she did not apply for a loan or surrender her title to Chinabank. Respondent prayed that: the
owners duplicate copy surrendered to Chinabank as well as the original title with the Registry of Deeds be cancelled; the mortgage be
declared null and void; and the Registry of Deeds be ordered to issue a new and clean title in her name.
Chinabank argues that it was indispensable for Oliver 2 to implead mortgagor Oliver 1. Respondents complaint before the trial court
was one for cancellation of the transfer certificate of title in petitioners possession. According to petitioner, the issue below is the
genuineness of the titles, which is intertwined with the issue of ownership. This being the case, said the petitioner, the mortgagor Oliver
1 must necessarily be impleaded for she is the registered owner. Petitioner argues that mortgagor Oliver 1 is in a better position to
defend her title. She stands to suffer if it is declared fake.
SC: Oliver 1 is not an indispensable party. Oliver 1 is a party in interest, for she will be affected by the outcome of the case. She stands
to be benefited in case the mortgage is declared valid, or injured in case her title is declared fake. However, Oliver 1s absence from the
case does not hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute between Oliver 2 and petitioner.
Oliver 2s allegations in the complaint shows that it was for annulment of mortgage due to petitioners negligence in not determining
the actual ownership of the property, resulting in the mortgages annotation on the TCT in the Registry of Deeds custody. To support
said allegations, Oliver 2 had to prove (1) that she is the real Mercedes Oliver referred to in the TCT, and (2) that she is not the same
person using that name who entered into a deed of mortgage with the petitioner. This, Oliver 2 can do in her complaint without
necessarily impleading the Oliver 1. Hence, Oliver 1 is not an indispensable party in the case filed by Oliver 2.
[T]hat a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the
interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court.
Chinabank has interest in the loan which, however, is distinct and divisible from the mortgagors interest, which involves the land used
as collateral for the loan. Further, a declaration of the mortgages nullity in this case will not necessarily prejudice mortgagor Oliver 1.
The bank still needs to initiate proceedings to go after the mortgagor, who in turn can raise other defenses pertinent to the two of them.
A party is also not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the
action, or will simply avoid multiple litigation, as in the case of Chinabank and Oliver 1. The latters participation in this case will simply
enable Chinabank to make its claim against her in this case, and hence, avoid the institution of another action.
[S]ince Oliver 1 is not an indispensable party, Section 7, Rule 3, which requires compulsory joinder of indispensable parties in a case,
does not apply. Instead, it is Section 11, Rule 3, that applies. Non-joinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties
may be added by order of the court, either on its own initiative or on motion of the parties.
Lotte Philippines Co., Inc. vs De la Cruz: Lotte is a domestic corporation where respondents are among those who were hired and
assigned to the confectionery facility. On 14 December 1995 - and yearly thereafter until the year 2000 - 7J Maintenance and Janitorial
Services (7J) entered into a contract with Lotte. In compliance with the terms and conditions of the service contract, and to
accommodate the needs of Lotte for personnel/workers to do and perform "piece works," respondents, among others, were hired and
assigned to Lotte as repackers or sealers. However, either in October, 1999 or on February 9, 2000, Lotte dispensed with their services
allegedly due to the expiration/termination of the service contract by with 7J.
Respondents lodged a labor complaint against Lotte and 7J where the LA rendered judgment declaring 7J as their employer. On appeal,
NLRC affirmed the LA. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, insisting that their employer is Lotte. Lotte denied that
respondents were its employees and prayed that the petition be dismissed for failure to implead 7J. CA reversed and set aside the
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rulings of the LA and the NLRC thereby declaring Lotte as the real employer and that 7J who engaged in labor-only contracting was
merely the agent of Lotte.
Issue: W/N 7J is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded in respondents petition in the CA.
SC: Yes. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case".
Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest because it will be affected by the outcome of the case. LA and NLRC found 7J solely
liable as the employer. CA rendered Lotte jointly and severally liable with 7J, who was not impleaded, by holding that the former is the
real employer. Its decision directly affected 7J.
Navarro vs Escobido: In September 12, 1998, respondent Karen Go filed 2 complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of
money with damages against Navarro. Karen prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles in Navarros
possession.
Navarro leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle as evidenced by a LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE entered
into by and between KARGO ENTERPRISES, then represented by its Manager, GLENN GO, and ROGER NAVARRO. Navarro issued
post dated checks. All checks bounced.
Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo Enterprises, since it did not have the requisite juridical
personality to sue, the actual parties to the agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it was Karen Go who filed the complaints and
not Glenn Go, she was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to state a cause of action.
Navarro posits that the RTC erred when it ordered the amendment of the complaint to include Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff, instead of
dismissing the complaint outright because a complaint which does not state a cause of action cannot be converted into one with a cause
of action by a mere amendment or a supplemental pleading. In effect, RTC created a cause of action for Karen Go when there was none
at the time she filed the complaints.
Issue: Whether Karen T. Go is the real party in interest, considering that it was her husband who signed the lease agreement and the
lease contracts were in Kargo Enterprises name, a trade name without a juridical personality.
SC: Yes. The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Kargo Enterprises. The name appears
in the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN T. GO doing business under the name KARGO
ENTERPRISES," and this identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint.Paragraph 2 defined the business KARGO
ENTERPRISES undertakes. Paragraph 3 continued with the allegation that the defendant "leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle"
that was thereafter described. Significantly, the Complaint specifies and attaches as its integral part the Lease Agreement that underlies
the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant. Again, the name KARGO ENTERPRISES entered the picture as this Lease
Agreement provides: This agreement, made and entered into by and between: GLENN GO, of legal age, married, herein referred to as
the LESSOR-SELLER; representing KARGO ENTERPRISES as its Manager, thus, expressly pointing to KARGO ENTERPRISES as the
principal that Glenn represented. In other words, by the express terms of this Lease Agreement, Glenn did sign the agreement only as
the manager of Kargo Enterprises and the latter is clearly the real party to the lease agreements.
As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which is neither a natural person, nor a juridical person, as
defined by Article 44 of the Civil Code: The following are juridical persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2) Other
corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
FIRST POINT: pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules, Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action. Who then is the proper
party to file an action based on a contract in the name of Kargo Enterprises?
Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza: Finally, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court. The law
merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual,
and requires the proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to the national
government. It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in
court. Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing Hardware. The allegation in
the body of the complaint would show that the suit is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of the business conducted under
the name and style Juasing Hardware. The descriptive words "doing business as Juasing Hardware" may be added to the title of the
case, as is customarily done.
This conclusion should be read in relation with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules.

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SECOND POINT: As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a
judgment in this case. Contrary to Navarros contention, Karen is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her
Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf
of Kargo Enterprises.
THIRD POINT: Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under this name;
hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties. Applying Article 484 of the Civil Code, which states that "in
default of contracts, or special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title," we find further support in
Article 487 of the Civil Code that allows any of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment with respect to the co-owned property.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore,
only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party
thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in
the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
Either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they
co-own. This conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code, supporting as it does the position that either spouse may act
on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they do not dispose of or encumber the property in question without the other spouses
consent.
FOURTH POINT: Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only
needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules.
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we have held in a number of cases that the misjoinder or nonjoinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action. The proper remedy when a party is left out is to
implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the
inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If
the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to
obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed.
Rule 3, Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a
necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the
reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be
obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such
party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein
shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
Rule 3, Section 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he
may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Rule 3, Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage
the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
Class suit
Rule 3, Section 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons
so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have
the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
Rule 3, Section 3. Representatives as parties. Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative
or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real
property in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an expert trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized
by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without
joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
Examples: guardian, administrator, executor. They are not the parties in interest. They only filed the case for the parent/the minor
children. The rule provides that when a representative party files a case, it is mandatory that the parties in interest must be named.
Bar question: How do you distinguish a representative party from a class suit? This question is wrong because they have no common
line of distinction. You cannot distinguish a suit from a party. So you have to decipher what is really being asked here. What is being
asked here is: distinguish a representative party from a party in a class suit.
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What are the requirements in a class suit? The cause of action is common to many parties and the parties are so numerous that it is very
impractical to bring them all before the court.
A party in a class suit is one representing a class which has common issues to be threshed out while a representative party is not really a
party in interest. He is only representing one who is the real party in interest.
Death or separation of a party
In a suit, where a party dies, whether he is the plaintiff or the defendant, what does the rule provide during the pendency of the case? It
is the obligation of the lawyer of the decedent to inform the court about the death within thirty days. If he does not, that is not a ground
for the dismissal of the case. The adverse partys counsel is now obligated to do the job of the counsel for the decedent.
In the first case, where the counsel for the decedent has the duty to inform the court, he has to substitute that without the appointment
of an executor or administrator. But when it is the counsel of the adverse party who substitutes, it is required that there must be an
executor or administrator appointed.
The appointment of the executor or administrator cannot be done easily by motion. You have to file a separate petition for that under
settlement of estate proceeding.
There is a sanction on the part of the lawyer who does not comply with this obligation.
To compare that with section 17, it includes resignation and incompetence and it refers to a public officer. The public officer MAY (not
mandatory) substitute or discontinue the case.
Rule 3, Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to
give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30)
days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified
period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for
the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring
such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
Rule 3, Section 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. When a public officer is a party in an action in
his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and
maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the
court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the
successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution
is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the application
therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard.
Transfer of interest
Rule 3, Section 19. Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the
original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or
joined with the original party.
De la Cruz vs Joaquin: Pedro Joaquin filed a Complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership, the cancellation of title, and
damages, against petitioners in the RTC. Joaquin alleged that he had obtained a loan from them on June 29, 1974, payable after 5 years.
To secure the payment of the loan, he executed a Deed of Sale for a parcel of land in favor of petitioners. The parties also executed
another document entitled Kasunduan which showed the Deed of Sale to be actually an equitable mortgage. Sps De la Cruz contended
that this document was merely an accommodation to allow the repurchase of the property, a right he failed to exercise.
RTC ruled in Joaquins favor, declaring that the parties had entered into a sale with a right of repurchase. Joaquin had made a valid
tender of payment on 2 separate occasions to exercise his right of repurchase. Accordingly, petitioners were required to reconvey the
property upon his payment.
Sustaining the RTC, CA noted that the parties executed the Kasunduan to express the terms and conditions of their actual agreement.
CA denied reconsideration and ordered a substitution by legal representatives, in view of Joaquins death on December 24, 1988.
Petitioners assert that the RTCs Decision was invalid for lack of jurisdiction. They claim that Joaquin died during the pendency of the
case. There being no substitution by the heirs, the RTC allegedly lacked jurisdiction over the litigation.
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Issue: Whether RTC lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Pedro Joaquin.
SC: No. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the
deceased (Section 16 of Rule 3). The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every partys right to due process. The
estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative.
Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied.
The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased, but
also the resulting judgments. In those instances, the courts acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or the
heirs upon whom no judgment was binding.
This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate
in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.
In Chittick v. CA, failure of the heirs to substitute for the original plaintiff upon her death led to the nullification of the trial courts
Decision. The latter had sought to recover support in arrears and her share in the conjugal partnership. The children who allegedly
substituted for her refused to continue the case against their father and vehemently objected to their inclusion as parties. Because he
died during the pendency of the case, they were bound to substitute for the defendant also. The substitution effectively merged the
persons of the plaintiff and the defendant and thus extinguished the obligation being sued upon.
The present case is not similar, much less identical, to the factual milieu of Chittick. The rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter
of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. When due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is
recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated
decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial courts decision. The alleging party
must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
The records of the present case contain a Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff dated February 15, 2002, filed before the CA. The
prayer states as follows: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Heirs of the deceased plaintiff-appellee as represented by his
daughter Lourdes dela Cruz be substituted as party-plaintiff for the said Pedro Joaquin.
It is further prayed that henceforth the undersigned counsel for the heirs of Pedro Joaquin be furnished with copies of notices, orders,
resolutions and other pleadings at its address below.
Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntarily appeared and participated. CA had ordered his legal representatives to appear and
substitute for him. The substitution even on appeal had been ordered correctly. In all proceedings, the legal representatives must
appear to protect the interests of the deceased. After the rendition of judgment, further proceedings may be held, such as a motion for
reconsideration or a new trial, an appeal, or an execution.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Motion for Substitution may be deemed to have been granted; and the heirs, to have
substituted for the deceased, Pedro Joaquin. There being no violation of due process, the issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a
ground to nullify the trial courts Decision.
Carabeo vs Dingco: The parties entered into a contract of sale of a parcel of land for P38,000. The respondents paid P10,000 initial
payment upon signing the contract with the balance to be paid in September 1990. Respondents handed in parts P9,100 of the balance
despite the petitioner asking them not to do so yet because the latter had to settle a squabble over the land. After the dispute over the
lands registration was settled, the respondents offered to pay the balance, but the petitioner declined acceptance. The respondents filed
a complaint with the katarungan pambarangay. No settlement was reached so the respondents filed for specific performance with the
RTC. Petitioner stated in his answer that the sale was void for lack of an object certain since the kasunduan did not specify the metes
and bounds of the land. The petitioner also alleged that even if the kasunduan were valid, the respondents failure to comply with their
reciprocal obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price would render the action premature.
Prior to the decision of the case, the petitioner died. Records do not show that his counsel informed the RTC of his death and that the
proper substitution was effected. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents ordering the petitioner to sell his rights over the property. CA
affirmed. The motion for reconsideration was denied so the present petition was filed by the deceaseds son.
Issue: Should the petition of the respondents have been dismissed on the ground of the death of the original petitioner?
SC: No. Respecting the argument that the petitioners death rendered the respondents complaint against him dismissible, Bonilla vs.
Barcena enlightens: The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damages sued
for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained of affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the
injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the
person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.
Respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to
protect his propriety interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of the
petitioner to return the money paid by respondents, and since the action involves property rights, it survives.

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Trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died. Since RTC was not informed of the petitioners death, it may not be
faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering his substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioners
legal representative or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned.
In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioners counsel
of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party
after his death. The trial courts decision had thereby become final and executor, no appeal having been perfected.
Contractual Money claims
Rule 3, Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract,
express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of
such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment
obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the
estate of a deceased person.
When the defendant dies, pendente lite, the case shall not be dismissed but shall move on up to entry of judgment. This is a U-turn
from the 1960 Rules of Court where the case must be dismissed. The reason is to expedite the proceeding.
A final judgment is different from an entered judgment. Even if there is an appeal, the appeal continues. Even if there is a petition for
review after the appeal, the petition continues. It must conclude up to entry of judgment.
After entry of judgment, what is the next move of the judgment obligee? Ordinarily, you avail of Rule 39 (Execution of Judgment).
Here, do you avail of Rule 39? No. there is a cross-reference to Rule 86, which provides the 4 matters claimable under the estate:
1.
2.
3.
4.

All claims for money against the decent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent;
All claims for funeral expenses;
Expense for the last sickness of the decedent, and
Judgment for money against the decent.

Rule 87 is an action for or against executors or administrators. All other actions except those which are claimable against the estate may
be brought for or against the executor or administrator.
Section 20 must always be correlated with Rule 86 and 87 to see a birds eye view of the entire provisions.
So if you file it as a claim against the estate, how do you go about it?
A vs B, this is a contractual money claim. B borrowed P1,000,000 from A. This is a contract of loan. B did not pay so A filed a case for
sum of money based on contract (contractual money claim). B died. The case must continue up to entry of judgment. When there is
already an entry of judgment, what should A do? He cannot avail of Rule 39/ he cannot go to court and file a motion for execution
because the defendant here already died.
He must file it as a claim against the estate. How? You cannot claim against the heirs of the decedent. It must be claimed against the
estate. The heirs are different from the estate. If the heirs would be representing the estate, that would be another matter.
How will the judgment obligee, A, file a claim against the estate of B? There is a procedure under Rule 86.
If there is already a pending settlement of the estate, it would be easier. If there is no pending settlement of the estate of the decedent, A
should file a settlement of estate proceeding. Is A authorized to do that? Yes. Who may file a settlement of the estate? A creditor may do
so.
But if there is already a pending settlement of the estate, A should just submit a copy of the judgment together with the entry of
judgment. Under settlement of estate proceedings, you apply for preference of credits.
A is riding his car along Roxas Boulevard and he collided with another car driven by B, and nobody would like to accept obligation or
liability. A filed a case for sum of money against B. B, pendente lite, dies. Can you apply Section 20? No, Section 20 deals with
contractual money claims. There is no contract in this case.
If B is a taxi driver and A is his passenger, this becomes a contractual money claim (based on the contract of transportation) if A files a
suit.
D.

Venue of actions: real and personal actions

The venue of an action is what the law or rule provides (Example: Give a law providing for the venue of an action: Rule 66 or petition
for quo warranto, where the venue is the residence of the respondent. In a special proceeding for guardianship, the venue is the
residence of the ward. In adoption, the venue is the residence of the prospective adopter. In these cases, you cannot agree otherwise).

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In the absence of any rule, the agreement of the parties will govern. See Pacific Consultants Philippines, Inc. (PPI) vs
Schonfeld
In the absence of any agreement, you distinguish whether the action is real or personal. If it is a personal action, the venue is the
residence of the plaintiff, or any of the plaintiffs, or the residence of the defendant, or any of the defendants, at the option of the
plaintiff. If it is a real action, the venue is where the property is located.
Rule 4, Section 1. Venue of real actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Rule 4, Section 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Rule 4, Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the Philippines, the
action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is
situated or found.
Rule 4, Section 4. When Rule not applicable. This Rule shall not apply.
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
Pacific Consultants Philippines, Inc. (PPI) vs Schonfeld: Venue stipulation is just for the convenience of the parties. It is not
restrictive unless it includes an exclusivity clause. The word shall does not denote that the stipulation is exclusive. A stronger word
than shall must be used. Words that may be used: exclusive, in no other place.
Schonfeld was a non-resident Canadian citizen. He was employed by Pacific Consultants International of Japan (PCIJ) as Sector
Manager of PPI in the Philippines. His salary was paid partly by PPI and PCIJ. Henrichsen, president of PPI and director of PCIJ,
transmitted a letter of employment to Schonfeld requesting him to accept and affix his conformity. The letter provides: in case of any
question of interpretation of the conditions of employment, as well as any question arising between the employee and the company
which is in consequence of or connected with his employment, which cannot be settled amicably, should be finally settled by the Court
of Arbitration in London through written submissions.
Schonfeld arrived in the Philippines and was given the status of a resident alien. Later, Henrichsen informed Schonfeld that his
employment had been terminated effective August 4, 1999. He was, however, informed via email to stay put in his job until even after
August 5 until such time that he would be able to report on certain projects and discuss all the opportunities he had developed. He
continued his work until October 1, 1999.
Schonfeld filed several money claims with PPI, and also filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. PCIJ and PPI filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue: He was a Canadian citizen, employed and dismissed by PCIJ whose principal
office is in Japan, and the letter of employment was executed in Japan. Under lex loci contractus, the complaint should have been filed
in Tokyo. Also, the parties agreed that any employment-related dispute should be brought before the London Court of Arbitration.
LA found that the contract of employment was controlling; the case should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of arbitration in
London. The NLRC likewise agreed with the LA. The CA ruled in favor of PPI and PCIJ. Even under the contract of employment, the
parties were not precluded from bringing a case related thereto in other venues. While there was an agreement, the venue is not
exclusive since there was no stipulation to that effect.
SC: The case may be filed and tried in Philippine courts. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue is that while they are valid
and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the ROC in the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words. Any agreement of venue, without such restrictive words should be considered merely as an
agreement or additional forum, not as a limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the
intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose
and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them.
E.

Summary Procedure

Rule 5, Section 1. Uniform procedure. The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as in the Regional Trial
Courts, except (a) where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either of said courts, or (b) in civil cases governed
by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Uniformity rule the Rules of Court applies in all courts.
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Correlate this with Rule 1, regarding the non-application of the Rules to naturalization cases, land registration cases, cadastral cases,
election cases, insolvency proceedings.
Section 4. In what case not applicable. These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization
and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.
In Ong Chia vs Republic, Ong Chia was the foreigner who applied to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. It was granted by the trial
court. The government, through the OSG, appealed the case. In the appellate court, the Republic offered certain pieces of documentary
evidence which were not offered in the trial court. Ong Chia questioned that, claiming the evidence should not be admitted since they
were never offered. SC: In naturalization cases, applying Rule 1, the Rules of Court are not applicable but only in suppletory character.
Under Rule 5 as well, you have to take note of Summary Procedure.

III. RULES 6 TO 9: PLEADINGS AND DEFAULTS

A Plaintiff
B Defendant
A files a complaint against B. B files an answer. A files a reply.
These are the major pleadings: complaint, answer and reply.
C Co-defendant
B files a cross-claim against C. C can also file a cross-claim against B. B or C may interplead D.
D third-party defendant
In relation to D, C would be a third-party plaintiff.
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If D impleads Y, D would be a fourth-party plaintiff and Y would be a fourth-party defendant.

C can also file a complaint (a third party complaint). D can file a fourth party complaint.
D can answer the third-party complaint through an answer to a third party complaint. When D answers, that is also an answer to the
original complaint because there could be no third-party complaint without the original complaint.
The claim of B against A is a separate and distinct pleading called the counterclaim. The counterclaim is not the answer; it is the
complaint of the defendant against the plaintiff. As answer to the counterclaim is not the reply. The reply is the response to the answer
but the answer to the counterclaim is an answer to the counterclaim of the defendant as against the plaintiff.
E intervenor
E is an outsider; an intervenor under Rule 19. He is never impleaded by any of the parties. He impleads himself. Rule 19 provides that
he must have interest in the subject matter (if the case is for recovery of property, he must have an interest in the property, ex: he may
be the owner/mortgagor/mortgagee/possessor of the property).
You must never confuse an intervention with an interpleader. The basic distinction is that while an intervenor, E, has interest in the
subject matter, an interpleader has no interest in the subject matter.
A.

Kinds of Pleadings

Rule 6, Section 1. Pleadings defined. Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties
submitted to the court for appropriate judgment.
Rule 6, Section 2. Pleadings allowed. The claims of a party are asserted in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth,
etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.
Third-party defendant is someone different from the original parties, for purposes of contribution, indemnification or subrogation. The
answer must already include allegations against the original complaint.
Complaint and Answer
Rule 6, Section 3. Complaint. The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. The names and
residences of the plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint.
Rule 6, Section 4. Answer. An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses.
The complaint constitutes the allegations or the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant. The defendants answer is the response to
the claim of the plaintiff. The answer constitutes defenses.
Defenses: Negative and Affirmative
Rule 6, Section 5. Defenses. Defenses may either be negative or affirmative.
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or
causes of action.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the
pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of
limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by
way of confession and avoidance.
2 modes of negative defense:
(1) specific denial give the reason for your denial
(2) lack of knowledge sufficient to form belief as to the truth of the claim
Affirmative defense admission of the allegation but you put up a new subject matter so as to avoid the claim. Ex: defendant borrowed
P100,000 from the plaintiff. If you invoke an affirmative defense, youll say that you have paid the P100,000 that you borrowed from
the plaintiff. In effect, you are admitting that you borrowed money but you put up a new matter, which is payment, to avoid the claim.
There are several kinds of affirmative defenses: fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel,
former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance. This list is not exclusive.
In the rules of evidence, when you put up an affirmative defense, whether in civil or criminal cases, you have what you call reverse trial.
Reverse trial is a process whereby the defendant puts up an affirmative defense and therefore, there is an admission already on his part
of the allegations in the pleading. That is why you reverse the trial.
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In criminal cases, there are no pleadings, except the information. The information is read, under Rule 116, before the start of the trial
(during arraignment) and then the accused puts up an affirmative defense (ex. self-defense in a murder case). It amounts to saying that
he admits the allegations. When this happens, there is reverse trial. There is no need to prove that the accused killed the victim because
he already admitted it. There is no need to show evidence-in-chief. The trial starts with the accused and he puts up the defense of selfdefense. If it is necessary, the prosecution puts up rebuttal evidence.
Negative pregnant a term in contradiction. When you invoke negative pregnant, in effect, you are admitting what you seek to deny.
Thats why you can never use negative pregnant if the allegation is a simple declarative sentence.
Example: Defendant borrowed money from the plaintiff in the amount of P100,000. This is a simple declarative sentence so you cannot
invoke here negative pregnant.
But if you qualify that in such manner that it becomes a compound, complex declaration, then negative pregnant might come out:
Defendant borrowed money from the plaintiff in the amount of P100,000 when the plaintiff was playing basketball.
I deny that I borrowed money from the plaintiff in the amount of P100,000 when the plaintiff was playing basketball. This is a negative
pregnant because it proves that he did borrow money, but not at the time the plaintiff he was playing basketball.
Republic vs Sandiganbayan: This case involved a negative pregnant. It was alleged that Imelda had 15 Swiss accounts. Imelda said
no, she only had 7 Swiss accounts. So she admitted she had Swiss account.
Republic, through the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand Marcos, represented by his
Estate/Heirs and Imelda Marcos. Republic sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million deposited in escrow in
the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held in 5 account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss
banks. Petitioner filed a complaint and respondent an answer.
Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents' motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged.
SC: This particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant
with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of
the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.
The material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their
answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture
that "Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations
and corporate entities." Paragraph 22 of the respondents' answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following
substantial facts:
Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million,
not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of
the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure
The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents' answer pertained to the creation of five groups of accounts as well as
their respective ending balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republic's petition for forfeiture.
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never specifically denied the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that "the funds involved were
lawfully acquired" was an acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of
the allegation in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of the US$356 million Swiss bank deposits.
Caneland Sugar Corp. vs Alon: Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with respondent. Petitioners bone of contention
before the RTC is that the promissory notes are silent as to whether they were covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage
Participation on its property. It does not categorically deny that these promissory notes are covered by the security documents. These
vague assertions are, in fact, negative pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied.
A negative pregnant is a "form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted."
Petitioners allegations do not make out any justifiable basis for the granting of any injunctive relief. Even when the mortgagors were
disputing the amount being sought from them, upon the non-payment of the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged
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property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale. This is in consonance with the doctrine that to authorize a temporary injunction, the
plaintiff must show, at least prima facie, a right to the final relief.
Counterclaims: Compulsory and Permissive
Rule 6, Section 6. Counterclaim. A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.
Rule 6, Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts
of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a
counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action
before the Regional Trial Court, the counter-claim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
Counterclaim it is neither an answer nor a reply. It is the complaint of the defendant against the plaintiff. It is a totally separate
pleading.
2 kinds of counterclaim:
(1) compulsory is that which arises from the same transaction or series of transactions
(2) permissive does not arise from the same transaction
Alday vs FGU Insurance: What are the indicia of a compulsory counterclaim? Alday was an insurance agent. She was sued by FGU
for non-remittance of premiums. Alday set-up a counterclaim saying FGU didnt pay her bonuses, commissions. And because of the
complaint, she suffered sleepless nights, wounded feelings, etc. FGU said since the counterclaim is permissive and Alday did not pay
the docket fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
SC held that the counterclaim of Alday is of 2 kinds. Some counterclaims are compulsory, and those do not require docket fees. Some
are permissive. Because they did not arise from the complaint, therefore, it is a permissive counterclaim. Alday only had to pay for the
permissive counterclaim.
This doctrine of Alday was overruled in January 2008 by Korea Technologies Incorporated, where the SC said as of August 13,
2004, all kinds of counterclaim must be paid irrespective of whether they are compulsory or permissive. There was a howl of protest. By
October of the same year, SC reversed their own doctrine and went back to Alday vs FGU through Mercado vs CA.
Alday vs FGU Insurance: FGU filed a complaint with the RTC alleging that Alday owed it unliquidated cash advances, unremitted
costs of premiums and other charges she incurred in the course of her work as an insurance agent. FGU also prayed for exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit.
Alday filed her answer and a counterclaim where she asserted her right for the payment of direct commissions, profit commissions,
contingent bonuses and accumulated premium reserves. She also prayed for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and
exemplary damages for the allegedly unfounded action filed by GFU.
FGU filed a motion to strike out answer with compulsory counterclaim and to declare defendant in default because her answer was
allegedly filed out of time. The RTC denied FGUs motion and its MR. FGU then filed a motion to dismiss Aldays counterclaim. It
contended that RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of the non-payment of docket fees. Alday asked the RTC to
declare her counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that respondent be declared in default for
having failed to answer the counterclaim. RTC granted FGUs motion to dismiss the counterclaim and consequently, denied Aldays
motion. The RTC found that the counterclaim is permissive in nature and held that Aldays failure to pay docket fees prevented the
court from acquiring jurisdiction over it. The RTC likewise denied her MR. CA sustained the RTCs order and denied Aldays MR.
SC: A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing partys claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Petitioners counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required
to prove petitioners claims differs from that needed to establish respondents demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from
petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of respondents claims is not contingent or dependent upon
establishing petitioners counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and
effort of the court and the parties. One would search the records in vain for a logical connection between the parties claims. This
conclusion is further reinforced by petitioners own admissions since she declared in her answer that respondents cause of action,
unlike her own, was not based upon the Special Agents Contract. However, petitioners claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a
result of the filing by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.
There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim. On the other hand, in order for the RTC to acquire
jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. The rule on the payment of filing
fees has been laid down by the Court in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests
a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
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accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no
case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing
fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination
by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court
or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automatic
dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Was FGU in default for failing to answer petitioners counterclaim? No. Insofar as the permissive counterclaim of petitioner is
concerned, there is obviously no need to file an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed docket fees for only then shall the court
acquire jurisdiction over such claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the filing by
respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicious suit need not be answered since it is inseparable from the claims of respondent. If
respondent were to answer the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the former pleading the same facts
raised in its complaint.
Criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendants counterclaim? (Evidence test rule)
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? (Logical relationship rule)
Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. (KOGIES) vs Lerma: The rules on the payment of docket fees for counterclaims and cross claims
were amended effective August 16, 2004.
KOGIES strongly argues that when PGSMC filed the counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees and filed a certificate of non-forum
shopping, and that its failure to do so was a fatal defect.
We disagree with KOGIES. The counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in accordance
with Section 8 of Rule 11, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing
counterclaim or cross-claim states, A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his
answer shall be contained therein.
At the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said
counterclaims being compulsory in nature. However, effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-204-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.
Mercado vs CA: Leonides Mercado had been distributing respondent San Miguel Corporations (SMCs) beer products since 1967. In
1991, SMC extended to him a P7.5 million credit line allowing him to withdraw goods on credit. To secure his purchases, Mercado
assigned 3 China Banking Corporation (CBC) certificates of deposit amounting to P5 million to SMC and executed a continuing holdout agreement stating: Any demand made by [SMC] on [CBC], claiming default on my/our part shall be conclusive on [CBC] and shall
serve as absolute authority for [CBC] to encash the [CBC certificates of deposit] xxx, whether or not I/we have in fact defaulted on any
of my/our obligations with [SMC], it being understood that the issue of whether or not there was factual default must be threshed out
solely between me/us and [SMC]. He also submitted 3 surety bonds from Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation (EASCO) for P2.6
million.
SMC notified CBC that Mercado failed to pay for the items he withdrew on credit. Citing the continuing hold-out agreement, it asked
CBC to release the proceeds of the assigned certificates of deposit. CBC approved SMBs request and informed Mercado. Mercado filed
an action to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment in the RTC. He claimed that the continuing hold-out
agreement allowed forfeiture without the benefit of foreclosure. It was therefore void pursuant to Article 2088 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, Mercado argued that he had already settled his recent purchases on credit but SMC erroneously applied the said payments to
his old accounts not covered by the continuing hold-out agreement (i.e., purchases made prior to the extension of the credit line).
SMC filed its answer with counterclaim against Mercado. It contended that Mercado delivered only 2 CBC certificates of deposit
amounting to P4.5 million and asserted that the execution of the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment was a
recognized business practice. Furthermore, because Mercado admitted his outstanding liabilities, SMC sought payment of the lees
products he withdrew (or purchased on credit) worth P7,468,153.75. SMC filed a third-party complaint against EASCO. It sought to
collect the proceeds of the surety bonds submitted by Mercado.
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Mercado filed an urgent manifestation and motion seeking the dismissal of the complaint. He claimed that he was no longer interested
in annulling the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment. RTC denied the motion. Instead, it set the case for pre-trial.
Thereafter, trial ensued. RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered Mercado and EASCO (to the extent of P2.6 million or the value of
its bonds) to jointly and severally pay SMC P7,468,153.75.
Mercado and EASCO appealed to the CA, insisting that Mercado did not default in the payment of his obligations to SMC. CA affirmed
the RTC decision in toto. Mercado and EASCO both moved for reconsideration but their respective motions were denied. EASCO filed a
petition for review on certiorari in this Court but eventually agreed to settle its liability with SMC. The petition was terminated.
Meanwhile, Mercado passed away and was substituted by his heirs, petitioners Racquel, Jimmy, Henry, Louricar and Virgilio Mercado.
Petitioners subsequently filed this petition asserting that the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision in toto. The said decision (insofar
as it ordered Mercado to pay SMC P7,468,153.75) was void. SMCs counterclaim was permissive in nature. Inasmuch as SMC did not
pay docket fees, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
SC: RTC acquired jurisdiction although SMC did not pay docket fees. A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may have
against any party) may be compulsory or permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily connected with) the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing partys claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the court and (3)
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is compulsory.
Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely permissive.
When Mercado sought to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment, he in effect sought to be freed from them.
While he admitted having outstanding obligations, he nevertheless asserted that those were not covered by the assailed accessory
contracts. For its part, aside from invoking the validity of the said agreements, SMC therefore sought to collect the payment for the
value of goods Mercado purchased on credit. Thus, Mercados complaint and SMCs counterclaim both touched the issues of whether
the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment were valid and whether Mercado had outstanding liabilities to SMC. The
same evidence would essentially support or refute Mercados claim and SMCs counterclaim.
Based on the foregoing, had these issues been tried separately, the efforts of the RTC and the parties would have had to be duplicated.
SMCs counterclaim, being logically related to Mercados claim, was compulsory in nature. Consequently, the payment of docket fees
was not necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rule 6, Section 8. Cross-claim. A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Such cross-claim may include a claim
that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against
the cross-claimant.
Cross-claim between the defendants. This is the complaint of the co-defendant against his co-defendant for purposes of contribution,
subrogation or indemnification.
B borrowed money from A in the amount of P500,000. A knows the P500,000 will be used by B and C. B did not pay. A can file a case
impleading alternative defendants. B, in the same case, can file a cross-claim against his co-defendant asking for contribution.
Rule 6, Section 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-crossclaims. A counter-claim may be asserted against an original
counter-claimant.
A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant.
Reply
Rule 6, Section 10. Reply. A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of
new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file such
reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted.
If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters so alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an amended or
supplemental complaint.
Reply response to an answer.
General rule: The reply is not necessary because if you do not put up a reply, it means you controvert the allegations in the answer.
Exceptions: (1) when the answer sets up a new matter, there is a necessity of a reply. (2) When the defendant avails of an actionable
document, you have to file a reply. Otherwise, the authenticity and due execution of the document are deemed admitted.
Rule 8, Section 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument
or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be
attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth
in the pleading.
Rule 8, Section 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied
in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument
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shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts,
but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when
compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
B.

Parts of a Pleading

Rule 7, Section 1. Caption. The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number if assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named in the original complaint or petition; but in
subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with an appropriate indication when
there are other parties.
Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated.
Rule 7, Section 2. The body. The body of the pleading sets fourth its designation, the allegations of the party's claims or defenses,
the relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading.
(a) Paragraphs. The allegations in the body of a pleading shall be divided into paragraphs so numbered to be readily identified, each
of which shall contain a statement of a single set of circumstances so far as that can be done with convenience. A paragraph may be
referred to by its number in all succeeding pleadings.
(b) Headings. When two or more causes of action are joined the statement of the first shall be prefaced by the words "first cause of
action,'' of the second by "second cause of action", and so on for the others.
When one or more paragraphs in the answer are addressed to one of several causes of action in the complaint, they shall be prefaced by
the words "answer to the first cause of action" or "answer to the second cause of action" and so on; and when one or more paragraphs of
the answer are addressed to several causes of action, they shall be prefaced by words to that effect.
(c) Relief. The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add a general prayer for such further or other relief as may be
deemed just or equitable.
(d) Date. Every pleading shall be dated.
Rule 7, Section 3. Signature and address. Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in
either case his address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall
appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or
signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to the court a change
of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
The address must not be a post-office box address. Otherwise, the prescriptive period will not lie because it will depend upon when you
get your mails in your post-office box.
Based on certain circulars of the SC, in every pleading, what is necessary is not only the signature and the address. There are 4 more
items necessary: (1) Roll Number, (2) IBP Number, (3) PTR Number, (4) MCLE Exemption Number.
Verification and Certification
Rule 7, Section 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief", or upon "knowledge, information
and belief", or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Rule 7, Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
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Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of
court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
While verification is not mandatory, certification against forum shopping is mandatory because there are only pleadings that require
verification but all pleadings require certification against forum shopping. While lack of verification is easily remediable by
amendment, certification against forum shopping cannot be remedied so it leads to dismissal of the case.
Who may verify? It should only be the party. Counsel cannot verify. Neither can the counsel sign the certification against forum
shopping. The exception is when the party is a juridical entity and the counsel is an in-house counsel on the basis of the doctrine laid
down in Iglesia ni Cristo vs Ponferrada.
Suppose there are multiple parties, the rule provides all the parties must verify. So if there are 5 plaintiffs, all the 5 plaintiffs must
verify. If only one verifies, that is erroneous but correctible. The exception is in cases of co-ownership and they are the plaintiffs, but
not when they are defendants. So that co-owners, in effect, are indispensable parties defendants. In the case of plaintiffs, they are not
indispensable since only one is an indispensable party co-owner.
De Castro vs CA: The defendants are indispensable parties defendants. SC held that the action was based on the principle of agency.
The principals were only 2 of the 5 sisters who appointed someone as their agent in selling the properties. The indispensability of the
co-owners here is not needed because it is based on the principle of agency.
When an indispensible party is not impleaded, the judgment is null and void not only as to those who were not
impleaded but even as to those who participated in the case.
Francisco Artigo sued Constante and Corazon De Castro to collect the unpaid balance of his brokers commission from them. The De
Castros were co-owners of 4 lots located in QC. They authorized Artigo to act as real estate broker in the sale of the properties. Artigo
found Times Transit Corp. as a prospective buyer which desired to buy 2 lots only. The same was consummated and Artigo received
commission from the De Castros. Artigo felt that his commission should be 5% of the agreed price. He sued to collect the balance after
having received an advance.
The De Castros argue that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to implead all the co-owners of the 2 lots. They claim
that Artigo always knew that the 2 lots were co-owned by the De Castros and their other siblings. They claim that failure to implead
them as indispensable parties is fatal to the complaint since Artigo would be paid with funds co-owned by the siblings.
RTC ruled in favor of Artigo. CA affirmed, ruling that Artigos complaint is not dismissible for failure to implead as indispensable
parties the other co-owners of the 2 lot. It is not necessary to implead the other co-owners since the action is exclusively based on a
contract of agency between Artigo and De Castro.
Issue: Whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure to implead other co-owners as indispensable parties
SC: An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their
presence. Whenever it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty
of the court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party.
However, the rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant case.
Constante signed the note as owner and as representative of the other co-owners. Under this note, a contract of agency was clearly
constituted between Constante and Artigo. Whether Constante appointed Artigo as agent, in Constante's individual or representative
capacity, or both, the De Castros cannot seek the dismissal of the case for failure to implead the other co-owners as indispensable
parties. The De Castros admit that the other co-owners are solidarily liable under the contract of agency, citing Article 1915 of the Civil
Code.
The solidary liability of the 4 co-owners, however, militates against the De Castros' theory that the other co-owners should be
impleaded as indispensable parties. When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability of co-principals
in a contract of agency, each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. The agent may recover the whole compensation
from any one of the co-principals, as in this case. Article 1216 of the Civil Code provides that a creditor may sue any of the solidary
debtors.
Mandawer Galleon Trade vs Isidro: Respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay,
13th month pay, and service incentive leave pay against petitioner with the NLRC. They asserted that they were dismissed from
employment without just cause and without due process. Petitioners averred that the respondents were not their employees but were
independent contractors. LA found respondents illegally dismissed from employment.
Petitioners filed an appeal before the NLRC but failed to attach a certification of non-forum shopping to their notice of appeal, as
required by Section 4, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. NLRC dismissed the appeal for being fatally defective and affirmed LAs
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decision with finality. Petitioners filed an MR but it was denied by the NLRC. An entry for judgment was issued by the NLRC stating
that the resolution had become final and executory.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed NLRC. Their
MR was also denied by the CA. Petitioners aver that the CA should have granted the petition and decided the case on the merits,
considering that they had belatedly complied with the requirement of a certification for non-forum shopping.
Issue: Whether the CA was correct in summarily dismissing the petition for being filed without a certification for non-forum shopping
SC: No. Non-compliance with the required certification is fatal. To curb the malpractice of forum shopping, Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, ordains that a violation thereof would constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary
dismissal of the petition, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned.
The filing of a certificate for non-forum shopping is mandatory in initiatory pleadings. The subsequent compliance with the
requirement does not excuse a partys failure to comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases where the Court excused noncompliance with the requirement to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping, it found special circumstances or compelling reasons
which made the strict application of [Section 5, Rule 7, ROC] clearly unjustified or inequitable. In this case, however, the petitioners
offered no valid justification for their failure to comply with the circular.
Non-compliance with the requirement on, or submission of defective, verification is not necessarily fatally defective.
In Altres v. Empleo:
1) A distinction must be made between:
a. non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and
b. non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court
may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
C.

Allegations in Pleadings

Rule 8, Section 1. In general. Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement
of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts.
If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their applicability to him shall be clearly and concisely
stated.
Rule 8, Section 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses. A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or
defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense or in separate causes of action or defenses. When two or
more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made
insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements.
Rule 8, Section 3. Conditions precedent. In any pleading a general averment of the performance or occurrence of all
conditions precedent shall be sufficient.
Rule 8, Section 4. Capacity. Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in
a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of person that is made a party, must be averred. A party
desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity,
shall do so by specific denial, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge.
Rule 8, Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, or other condition of the mind of a person
may be averred generally.
Rule 8, Section 6. Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to
render it.
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Actionable Documents
Rule 8, Section 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument
or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be
attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth
in the pleading.
Actionable documents are those which is the basis of ones claim or defense.
How do you allege an actionable document? Section 7 provides the answer. To allege an actionable document, you either (1) copy the
document verbatim in your pleading; or (2) copy the basis of your claim and attach a copy of the document.
Use the first mode if your document is short like a promissory note. Use the second mode if your document is quite lengthy like a
contract of mortgage consisting of 20 pages.
Rule 8, Section 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied
in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument
shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts,
but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when
compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
You contest the actionable document by specifically denying it under oath. The pleading must contain a jurat (subscribed and sworn to
before me). Otherwise, the authenticity and due execution of the document are deemed admitted. Only authenticity and due execution,
not the contents of the document.
Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs CA: Authenticity and due execution constitutes only 4 things: (1) that the document was signed; (2)
that the document complied with all the formalities under the laws; (3) that when the document was signed, it was in the original form
without any alteration; and (4) that the document was delivered.
Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented, i.e., Bill of Lading, Certificate of Loading,
Certificate of Weight, Mates Receipt, were properly established by the testimony of its witness, Ernesto Cayabyab, and that as a result,
there is a prima facie presumption that their contents are true.
This contention has no merit. The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a document simply means that the party whose
signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it
was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any
formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
Genuineness and due execution of the instrument means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of
different import on its face from the one executed.
It is equally true, however, that execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve other matters
without enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a
conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which does not contradict the execution
of the instrument introduced in evidence.
Respondents presented evidence which casts doubt on the veracity of these documents. Switzerland Insurance presented Export
Declaration No. 1131/85 which petitioners own witness, Rogelio Lumibao, prepared, in which it was stated that the copper
concentrates to be transported to Japan had a gross weight of only 2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845 dry metric tons, 10 percent more or
less. On the other hand, Certified Adjusters, Inc., to which Switzerland Insurance had referred petitioners claim, prepared a report
which showed that a total of 2,451.630 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were delivered at Poro Point. As the report stated: It is to
be pointed out that there were no actual weighing made at Benguet Explorations site. The procedure done was that after weighing the
trucks before and after unloading at Poro Point, the weight of the load was determined and entered on Philex Trip Ticket which was
later on copied and entered by the truck driver on Benguet Exploration, Inc.s Transfer Slip.
Considering the discrepancies in the various documents showing the actual amount of copper concentrates transported to Poro Point
and loaded in the vessel, there is no evidence of the exact amount of copper concentrates shipped. Thus, whatever presumption of
regularity in the transactions might have risen from the genuineness and due execution of the Bill of Lading, Certificate of Weight,
Certificate of Loading, and Mates Receipt was successfully rebutted by the evidence presented by Switzerland Insurance which showed
disparities in the actual weight of the cargo transported to Poro Point and loaded on the vessel. This fact is compounded by the
admissions made by Lumibao and Cayabyab that they had no personal knowledge of the actual amount of copper concentrates loaded
on the vessel.
In the face of these admissions, appellants claim of loss or shortage is placed in serious doubt, there being no other way of verifying the
accuracy of the figures indicated in appellants documentary evidence that could confirm the alleged loss of 355.736 MT.
Notwithstanding the figure stated in Bill of Lading No. PP/0-1 that 2,243.496 WMT of copper concentrates was loaded by appellant at
the port of origin, it should be stressed that this is merely prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of said cargo as described in
the bill of lading. Thus, it has been held that recitals in the bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption
that such goods were delivered for shipment and as between the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital.
Resultingly, the admissions elicited from appellants witnesses that they could not confirm the accuracy of the figures indicated in their
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documentary evidence with regard to the actual weight of the cargo loaded at the port of origin and that unloaded at the port of
destination, in effect rebuts the presumption in favor of the figure indicated in the bill of lading.
Rule 8, Section 9. Official document or act. In pleading an official document or official act, it is sufficient to aver that the
document was issued or the act done in compliance with law.
Specific denial
Rule 8, Section 10. Specific denial. A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not
admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a
defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the
remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment
made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.
Rule 8, Section 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. Material averment in the complaint, other than
those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a
complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath.
Rule 8, Section 12. Striking out of pleading or matter contained therein. Upon motion made by a party before responding
to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these Rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty (20) days after the
service of the pleading upon him, or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order any pleading to be stricken out or
that any sham or false, redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter be stricken out therefrom.
D.

Rule 9

Effect of Failure to Plead

Residual prerogatives, as laid down in Katon vs Palanca, is the authority of the appellate court to dismiss a case motu proprio
pursuant to the grounds under Section 1 of Rule 9. They are: res judicata, litis pendentia, prescription, lack of jurisdiction and statute of
limitation.
Rule 9, Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action
is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Tie this up with Section 3, Rule 17: Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear
on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time,
or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.
This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
Thus, the 8 grounds by which the court can dismiss a case motu proprio are:
(1)

res judicata (Section 1, Rule 9)

(2)

litis pendentia (Section 1, Rule 9)

(3)

lack of jurisdiction (Section 1, Rule 9)

(4)

statute of limitation (Section 1, Rule 9)

(5)

failure of any party to appear for the presentation of evidence in chief (Section 3, Rule 17)

(6)

plaintiffs failure to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time (Section 3, Rule 17)

(7)

plaintiffs failure to comply with these Rules or any order of the court (Section 3, Rule 17)

(8)

the rule in summary procedure

Waiver of Defenses and Objections; Default

Rule 9, Section 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set up barred. A compulsory counterclaim, or a crossclaim, not set up shall be barred.
Rule 9, Section 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court
shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in
default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless
the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
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(a) Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial.
(b) Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion
under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and
conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
(c) Effect of partial default. When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties,
some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render
judgment upon the evidence presented.
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind
from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.
(e) Where no defaults allowed. If the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
Under the 1997 Rules of Court, when may a party be declared in default? There is only one ground for declaring a party in default:
failure to file responsive pleading within the required period. Now, there is no more declaration of a party as in default that used to be
in the 1960 Rules of Court that has been deleted by the 1997 Rules of Court.
A files a case against B for unlawful detainer and forcible entry and summons was served upon B on January 5. On February 5, B has
not yet filed an answer. Can B be declared in default for failure to file his answer? No, the case is covered by the Rules of Summary
Procedure and an order of default or a motion to declare defendant in default is a prohibited pleading.
If there is only one ground, the 2 other grounds in the 1960 Rules of Court to declare a party as in default have been eliminated: (1)
when a party fails to appear at the pre-trial; or (2) the party fails to file a pre-trial brief.
Now, if the plaintiff does not appear at the pre-trial, it will be nonsuited and result to a dismissal. Defendant can present evidence ex
parte on his counterclaim. If the defendant fails to appear at the pre-trial or submit a pre-trial brief, the plaintiff can present evidence
ex parte. There is no need to declare them as in default.
To declare a party in default because of failure to file responsive pleading within the required period, the other party must file a motion.
There is no declaration in default motu proprio. It must always be through a litigious/litigated motion.
There are 2 kinds of motions: (1) litigated motion and (2) non-litigated (or oral) motion. Since a motion to declare a party in default is a
litigated motion, it must comply with section 4 (must be in writing, and comply with 3-day notice rule), section 5 (10-day setting rule),
and section 6 (copy of pleading must be served upon the adverse party) of Rule 15.
Rule 15, Section 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the
adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt
by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
Rule 15, Section 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the
time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
Rule 15, Section 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of service thereof.
3-day notice rule a copy of the pleading must be received 3 days before the scheduled hearing (not must be sent). If the motion day is
a Friday, it must be received not later than Tuesday. Under computation of time in Rule 22, you must always exclude the first day and
include the last day.
Rule 22, Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of
the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be
excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday a Sunday, or a legal
holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
10-day setting rule you have to set the hearing within a period of 10 days from the filing of a motion. If there is a conflict between the
2, what should prevail over which? The 3-day notice rule must prevail, because the 10-day setting rule is addressed to the court while
the 3-day notice rule is addressed to the adverse party. The adverse party must not be prejudiced.
When the party is supposed to file a responsive pleading within 15 days from receipt of the summons (ex. defendant receives the
summons with the copy of the complaint) and he fails to file his answer to the complaint within 15 days from receipt thereof, the
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plaintiff can go to the court and file a motion to declare the defendant in default. It is a litigated motion and it must comply with
sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15.
The plaintiff may also be declared in default in a case where the defendant files a permissive counterclaim (thus, the plaintiff must file
an answer). What is the effect if a party is declared in default? He loses his personality before the court. When he loses his personality
before the court, he can no longer participate in the proceedings.
How can he regain his personality before the court? There is only one way according to the SC which was discussed in Banco de Oro
vs Tansipek: Even if you lose your personality before the court because you have been declared in default, you are still entitled to
notices. You are only deprived of participation in the trial but you are still entitled to processes. In this case, the defaulted party filed a
motion for reconsideration. SC held that a motion for reconsideration is not a valid remedy. There is one remedy: a motion to set aside
the order of default. This motion is also a litigated motion and must conform to Sections 4, 5, 6 of Rule 15. When the motion to set aside
the order of default is granted by the court, then you regain your personality before the court.
If you do not regain your personality in court, what follows an order of default? A judgment by default. While there is only one remedy
against an order of default (which is a motion to set aside the order of default), there are several remedies against a judgment by
default. Because it is a judgment, all the remedies against a judgment may be availed of such as motion for reconsideration, motion for
new trial and appeal.
General rule: An order of default must always precede a judgment by default.
Exception: Where a judgment by default may be granted by the court without being preceded by an order of default: refusal to comply
with the modes of discovery (Rule 29, Section 3(c)).
Rule 29, Section 3. Other consequences. If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order made
under section 1 of this Rule requiring him to answer designated questions, or an order under Rule 27 to produce any document or other
thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, or to permit entry upon land or other property or an order
made under Rule 28 requiring him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in regard to the
refusal as are just, and among others the following: xxx
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; xxx
Banco de Oro vs Tansipek: JOCI, a domestic corporation engaged in construction, filed a complaint against PCIB (Bank). JOCI
contracted with Duty Free Phils. to construct a store in Mandaue. Construction went on, and JOCI authorized Tansipek to collect
payments for it. Initial payments were deposited to JOCIs account. However, a check was not deposited to its account. Tansipek
deposited the check to his personal account in PCIB. PCIB allowed it despite the check being crossed for the payees account only, and
that respondent lacked authority to endorse it. PCIB refused to pay. JOCI demanded payment of the check. PCIB filed a motion to
dismiss but RTC denied it. PCIB filed its answer and a third-party complaint against Tansipek. PCIB alleged in the third-party
complaint that Tansipek presented to it a copy of the board resolution allowing him to deposit the check in his personal account.
Tansipek was given extension of time to file his answer, but he failed so he was declared in default. He filed a Motion to Reconsider the
Default Order, but it was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the default order as well as the denial of the
motion for reconsideration. CA dismissed his petition for failure to attach the orders and denied his motion for being filed out of time.
The RTC later promulgated a ruling on the civil case ordering Tansipek and PCIB to pay JOCI. Tansipek appealed it to the CA. CA ruled
that RTC erred in allowing the motion to declare Tansipek in default, and remanded the case to the RTC.
SC: A motion to reconsider the default order is not the proper remedy. He should have filed a motion to lift the default order.
Rule 9, Section 3(b): Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before
judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on
such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must show fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect,
and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur.
Commission on Appointments (COA) vs Paler: Celso Paler was a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II (SG-24) with the
Technical Support Service of the COA. He submitted a request for VL for 74 working days - from August 1 to November 14, 2003. The
Director III of Technical Support Service submitted to the Commission Secretary his comments/recommendation on Palers application
which principally states that said application for Leave may be acted upon depending on the completion of his work load and
submission of the medical certificate.
Since he already had an approved leave from June 9 to July 30, 2003, Paler left for the US on June 8, 2003, without verifying whether
his application for leave (for August 1 November 14, 2003) was approved or denied.

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In a letter dated September 16, 2003, the Commission Chairman informed Paler that he was being dropped from the roll of employees
effective said date, due to his continuous 30-day absence without leave and in accordance with Section 63, Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 14, s. 1999. Paler's son received the letter on September 23, 2003.
Paler moved for reconsideration but this was denied on February 20, 2004, on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period. The denial was received by Paler's son on March 18, 2004.
On appeal, the CSC reversed and set aside the Commission Chairman's decision. The Commission filed a motion for reconsideration
but this was denied by the CSC. This constrained petitioner to file with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Since Paler had in the meantime already reached the compulsory age of retirement on July 28, 2005 and was no longer entitled to
reinstatement, the CA affirmed with modification CSC resolutions. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by
the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the CSC was correct to entertain Palers appeal despite it being filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
SC: Yes. Section 72 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999, provides for the period of appeal for non- disciplinary actions, to wit:
Section 72. When and Where to File. - A decision or ruling of a department or agency may be appealed within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof by the party adversely affected to the Civil Service Regional Office and finally, to the Commission Proper within the
same period. xxx
Paler's son received the letter from the Commission Chairman denying Palers MR on March 18, 2004. Thus, Palers had until April 2,
2004 within which to file his appeal with the CSC. It was filed, however, only on April 5, 2004. Nevertheless, the CSC entertained the
appeal in the interest of substantial justice.
We agree with the CSC. We uphold its decision to relax the procedural rules because Paler's appeal was meritorious. When substantial
justice dictates it, procedural rules may be relaxed in order to arrive at a just disposition of a case. The purpose behind limiting the
period of appeal is to avoid unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. A one-day delay, as
in this case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to delay justice on the part of Paler and
the pleading is meritorious on its face. It bears stressing that the case before the CSC involves the security of tenure of a public officer
sacrosanctly protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a resolution of the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the
same based on a strained and inordinate application of Section 49 (a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure.
Oaminal vs Castillo: Henry Oaminal filed a complaint for collection against Respondents Pablito and Guia Castillo with the RTC.
The summons together with the complaint was served upon Ester Fraginal, secretary of Mrs. Castillo. Respondents filed their Urgent
Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective alleging that the Sheriff's Return has failed to comply with
Section (1), Rule 14 of the Rules of Court or substituted service of summons.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Declare Respondents in Default and to Render Judgment because no answer was filed by the
latter. Respondents filed the following: a. Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory
Counter-claim; b. Urgent Motion to Dismiss; and c. Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim. The judge denied the Motion to Dismiss,
admitted their Answer, and set the pre-trial. Respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit Ad Cautelam against Judge [Zapatos].
Judge [Zapatos] denied the motion. [Respondents] filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. Judge [Zapatos] ruled that
[respondents] Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim was filed outside the period
to file answer, hence he (1) denied the Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer; (2) declared [respondents] in default; and (3)
ordered Oaminal to present evidence ex-parte, [failing] which, the case will be dismissed.
Judge [Zapatos] ruled in favor of the petitioner. Respondents filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari. CA ruled that RTC did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over respondents, because the summons had been improperly served on them. It based its finding on the
Sheriffs Return, which did not contain any averment that effort had been exerted to personally serve the summons on them before
substituted service was resorted to.
Issue: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondents, although summons was served upon the secretary.
SC: Yes. The receipt of the summons by the legal secretary of the respondents is deemed proper, because they admit the actual receipt
thereof, but merely question the manner of service. Moreover, when they asked for affirmative reliefs in several motions and thereby
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, whatever defects the service of summons may have had were cured.
In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of summons or by the latters
voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the
Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for by Sections 6 and
7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service. Resort to the latter is permitted when the summons cannot be
promptly served on the defendant in person and after stringent formal and substantive requirements have been complied with.
For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is necessary to establish the following circumstances: (a) personal service of
summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the partys residence or upon a competent person in charge of the partys office or
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regular place of business. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances are stated in the proof of service or
officers return.
The Sheriffs Return failed to state that efforts had been made to personally serve the summons on respondents. Neither did the Return
indicate that it was impossible to do so within a reasonable time.
Nonetheless, nothing in the records shows that respondents denied actual receipt of the summons through their secretary. Their
Urgent Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective did not deny receipt thereof; it merely assailed the
manner of its service. In fact, they admitted in their Motion that the summons, together with the complaint, was served by the Sheriff
on Ester Fraginal, secretary of the defendants at No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City on 30 May 2000.
There is likewise no showing that respondents had heretofore pursued the issue of lack of jurisdiction; neither did they reserve their
right to invoke it in their subsequent pleadings. If at all, what they avoided forfeiting and waiving -- both in their Omnibus Motion ad
Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim and in their Motion to Dismiss -- was their right to
invoke the grounds of improper venue and litis pendentia.
Verily, respondents did not raise in their MTD the issue of jurisdiction over their persons; they raised only improper venue and litis
pendentia. Hence, whatever defect there was in the manner of service should be deemed waived.
Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such flaw was cured and respondents are deemed to have submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an Omnibus Motion to Admit the Motion to Dismiss and Answer with
Counterclaim, an Answer with Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration and Plea to Reset Pre-trial. The
filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief -- to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration -- are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court. Having invoked the trial courts jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief, respondents cannot -- after failing to obtain the relief
prayed for -- repudiate the very same authority they have invoked.
Asia Const. & Dev. Corp. (ACDC) vs CA: ACDC leased Caterpillar generator sets and Amida mobile floodlighting systems from
Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC) during the period of March 13 to July 15, 1998 but failed, despite demands, to pay the rentals in
the amount of P4, 313,935.00. From July 14 to August 25, 1998, various equipment from MEC were, likewise, leased by ACDC for the
latters power plant in Mauban, Quezon, and that there was still a balance of P456,666.67. ACDC also purchased and took custody of
various equipment parts from MEC for P237,336.20 which, despite demands, ACDC failed to pay. With all these allegations, MEC filed
a complaint for sum of money with damages (RTC QC) against ACDC.
ACDC filed a motion to file and admit answer with third party complaint against Becthel Overseas Corporation. It admitted its
indebtedness to MEC but imposes the special and affirmative defense that Becthel failed and refused to pay its overdue obligation in
connection with the leased equipment used by ACDC to comply with its contracted services. Apparently, Becthel used all the equipment
covered by lease for a construction project and ACDC was not yet paid for its services. ACDC also reiterated this in the 3rd party
complaint praying for dismissal of MECs claim and order for Becthel to pay its obligation.
MEC opposed this motion on the ground that ACDC already admitted its obligation to MEC which is independent from the transaction
with Becthel. The third party complaint will only cause undue delays. MEC filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that
there was no genuine issue on ACDCs obligation and that the 3rd party complaint must be litigated separately. In MECs reply to the
special affirmative defense, it argued that this was a negative pregnant.
TC: motion for leave to file 3rd party complaint is denied; motion for summary judgment granted trial court considered this as
motion for judgment on the pleadings. DECISION IN FAVOR OF MEC. CA: AFFIRMED
ACDC argues that although it admitted the obligation to MEC, the 3rd party complaint tendered an issue of whether the MECs claim is
connected with the third-party claim. This is a genuine issue that must be litigated.
Issue: Whether or not the third party complaint was proper.
SC: No. The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a thirdparty which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the parties concerned
would then be adjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of procedure and does not create a substantial right.
Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights of any litigant. This right to file a third-party complaint against a thirdparty rests in the discretion of the trial court. The third-party complaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct from the
plaintiffs complaint, such that were it not for the rule, it would have to be filed separately from the original complaint.
A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be
one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. The bringing of a third-party defendant is proper if he would be
liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the thirdparty defendants liability arises out of another transaction. The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant (a) on an
allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of
direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the
defendant. There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for contribution,
indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the third-party defendant.
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Common liability is the very essence for contribution. Contribution is a payment made by each, or by any of several having a common
liability of his share in the damage suffered or in the money necessarily paid by one of the parties in behalf of the other or others. The
rule on common liability is fundamental in the action for contribution. The test to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a
third-party complaint is, whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based, or the third-party
plaintiffs claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim.
The claims of the respondent, as plaintiff in the RTC, against the petitioner as defendant therein, arose out of the contracts of lease and
sale; such transactions are different and separate from those between Becthel and the petitioner as third-party plaintiff for the
construction of the latters project in Mauban, Quezon, where the equipment leased from the respondent was used by the petitioner.
The controversy between the respondent and the petitioner, on one hand, and that between the petitioner and Becthel, on the other, are
thus entirely distinct from each other. There is no showing in the proposed third-party complaint that the respondent knew or
approved the use of the leased equipment by the petitioner for the said project in Quezon. Becthel cannot invoke any defense the
petitioner had or may have against the claims of the respondent in its complaint, because the petitioner admitted its liabilities to the
respondent for the amount of P5,075,335.86. The barefaced fact that the petitioner used the equipment it leased from the respondent in
connection with its project with Becthel does not provide a substantive basis for the filing of a third-party complaint against the latter.
There is no causal connection between the claim of the respondent for the rental and the balance of the purchase price of the equipment
and parts sold and leased to the petitioner, and the failure of Becthel to pay the balance of its account to the petitioner after the
completion of the project in Quezon.

IV. RULES 10 TO 14: AMENDMENTS TO SUMMONS

A.

Rule 10 - Amendments and Supplemental Pleadings

Section 1. Amendments in general. Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party,
or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the
actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner.
Kinds of Amendments
There are 2 sets of classifications of amendments both in civil and criminal cases.

Substantial vs Formal

Substantial amendment when such amendment would be prejudicial to a party

Formal amendment is not prejudicial to a party because it is only amended as to the form

Section 4. Formal amendments. A defect in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or typographical errors may
be summarily corrected by the court at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to
the adverse party.

As a matter of right vs by leave of court (applies in both civil and criminal but the time frame differs)

In civil cases, amendment is a matter of right before the responsive pleading is served

Section 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
o

In criminal cases, amendment is a matter of right before arraignment

Thereafter, it is already by leave of court. If you seek amendment, you have to precede it with a motion for leave to admit amended
pleading.

Whether it is a matter of right or by leave of court, it can be both formal or substantive.

Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be
made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.
Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse
party, and an opportunity to be heard.
A files a case against B. Summons was served upon B. Two days after receiving the summons, B files his answer. Can A still amend the
complaint as a matter of right? Yes. The Rules says before the responsive pleading is served, not filed.
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Remington Industrial Sales Corp vs CA: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from breach of
contract. Among the defendants is respondent British Steel. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it
failed to state a cause of action against it. RTC denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the MR. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before CA, claiming that the complaint did not contain a single averment that respondent committed any act or is guilty
of any omission in violation of petitioners legal rights. Apart from the allegation in the complaints Jurisdictional Facts that:
1.05. Defendants British Steel (Asia) Ltd. and Ferro Trading Gmbh, while understood by the plaintiff as mere suppliers of goods for
defendant ISL, are impleaded as party defendants pursuant to Section 13, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
no other reference was made to respondent that would constitute a valid cause of action against it. Since petitioner failed to plead any
cause of action against respondent as alternative defendant under Section 13, Rule 3, RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the
complaint insofar as respondent was concerned.
Petitioner sought to amend its complaint by incorporating therein additional factual allegations constitutive of its cause of action
against respondent. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10, petitioner maintained that it can amend the complaint as a matter of right because
respondent has not yet filed a responsive pleading thereto. Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion with the CA stating that it had
filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint together with said Amended Complaint before the RTC. Hence, petitioner prayed that the
proceedings in the special civil action be suspended.
RTC granted petitioners Motion to Admit Amended Complaint. CA granted the writ of certiorari and ordered the respondent judge to
dismiss without prejudice the Complaint against respondent.
Can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its
dismissal before the higher court?
SC: Yes. Section 2, Rule 10 explicitly states that a pleading may be amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served.
This only means that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of
action or change in theory is introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this
provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served, because any
material change in the allegations contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his
defense in the answer.
Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendants rights have been violated by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file an
answer thereto. In such an event, the defendant has not presented any defense that can be altered or affected by the amendment of the
complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still retains the unqualified opportunity to address the allegations
against him by properly setting up his defense in the answer. Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint
once, as a matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by the defendant.
The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an answer has been served is not precluded by
the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise, the right to amend a
pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do to foreclose this
remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he files an answer.
Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine every
case as far as possible on its merits without regard to technicalities. This principle is generally recognized to speed up trial and save
party litigants from incurring unnecessary expense, so that a full hearing on the merits of every case may be had and multiplicity of
suits avoided.
The remedy espoused by the CA in its assailed judgment will precisely result in multiple suits, involving the same set of facts and to
which the defendants would likely raise the same or, at least, related defenses. Plainly stated, we find no practical advantage in ordering
the dismissal of the complaint against respondent and for petitioner to re-file the same, when the latter can still clearly amend the
complaint as a matter of right. The amendment of the complaint would not prejudice respondents or delay the action, as this would, in
fact, simplify the case and expedite its disposition.
Furthermore, we do not agree with respondents claim that it will be prejudiced by the admission of the Amended Complaint because it
had spent time, money and effort to file its petition before the appellate court. We cannot see how the result could be any different for
respondent, if petitioner merely re-filed the complaint instead of being allowed to amend it. As adverted to earlier, amendment would
even work to respondents advantage since it will undoubtedly speed up the proceedings before the trial court. Consequently, the
amendment should be allowed in the case at bar as a matter of right in accordance with the rules.
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried with the express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not effect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice
will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
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Amendments vs Supplemental Pleadings

Section 6. Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are
just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date
of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting
the supplemental pleading.
Regarding supplemental pleadings, these are availed of after the fact.
after the fact if something new transpired after the pleadings have been already in the hands of the court, then you dont file an
amended pleading but rather a supplemental pleading.
Under the Rules of Evidence, Rule 129 (What Need Not Be Proved), judicial notice and judicial admissions need not be proved. As to
the latter, they are admissions in the pleadings.
Rule 129, Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
When you amend the pleading, what happens to the admissions there in the original pleading? They become extra judicial admissions.
Therefore, evidence must be offered. Only admissions in the pleadings, not extra judicial admissions.
Section 7. Filing of amended pleadings. When any pleading is amended, a new copy of the entire pleading, incorporating the
amendments, which shall be indicated by appropriate marks, shall be filed.
Section 8. Effect of amended pleadings. An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in
superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader, and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the
amended pleading shall be deemed waived.
Rule on Amendments in Criminal Procedure is more taxing. There is only one pleading in criminal actions, the information; in civil
actions, there are a lot of pleadings that can be amended. In civil actions, we have amendatory pleadings and suppletory pleadings. In
criminal procedure, there are no suppletory pleadings; instead, they have amendments and substitutions.
B.

Rule 11 - Time/Period for Filing Responsive Pleadings

Answer
Section 1. Answer to the complaint. The defendant shall file his answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days after service of
summons, unless a different period is fixed by the court.
Section 2. Answer of a defendant foreign private juridical entity. Where the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity
and service of summons is made on the government official designated by law to receive the same, the answer shall be filed within
thirty (30) days after receipt of summons by such entity.
Section 3. Answer to amended complaint. When the plaintiff files an amended complaint as a matter of right, the defendant
shall answer the same within fifteen (15) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Where its filing is not a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the amended complaint within ten (10) days from notice of the order
admitting the same. An answer earlier filed may serve as the answer to the amended complaint if no new answer is filed.
This Rule shall apply to the answer to an amended counterclaim, amended cross-claim, amended third (fourth, etc.)party complaint,
and amended complaint-in-intervention.
Section 4. Answer to counterclaim or cross-claim. A counterclaim or cross-claim must be answered within ten (10) days
from service.
Section 5. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. The time to answer a third (fourth, etc.)party complaint shall be
governed by the same rule as the answer to the complaint.
Section 7. Answer to supplemental complain. A supplemental complaint may be answered within ten (10) days from notice of
the order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. The answer to the complaint shall serve as the answer to
the supplemental complaint if no new or supplemental answer is filed.
Reply
Section 6. Reply. A reply may be filed within ten (10) days from service of the pleading responded to.
Section 8. Existing counterclaim or cross-claim. A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at
the time he files his answer shall be contained therein.
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Section 9. Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after answer. A counterclaim or a cross-claim which either matured or was
acquired by a party after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim or a cross-claim by
supplemental pleading before judgment.
Section 10. Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim or a cross-claim through
oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up the counterclaim or cross-claim
by amendment before judgment.
Section 11. Extension of time to plead. Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead
provided in these Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these Rules.
4 periods under Rule 11: 10, 15, 30 and 60 days.
10 (incomplete)
Bill of particulars
Filing an answer to
amended complaint
when amendment
is NOT a matter of
right
Filing an answer
under Rules of
Summary
Procedure
Filing an answer to
a
supplemental
complaint
Counterclaim
or
cross-claim
Reply
C.

15 (incomplete)
Filing an answer
Filing an answer
to
amended
complaint when
amendment is a
matter of right
Filing an answer
to a third-, fourthparty complaint

30
When
defendant is a
foreign juridical
entity
and
summons
is
served upon the
government
official
designated by
law (Section 12,
Rule 14)

60
Extraterritorial
service
of
summons under
Section 15, Rule
14.

Rule 12 - Bill of Particulars

Section 1. When applied for; purpose. Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a definite statement or for a bill
of particulars of any matter which is not averted with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his
responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten (10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall
point out the defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired.
Section 2. Action by the court. Upon the filing of the motion, the clerk of court must immediately bring it to the attention of the
court which may either deny or grant it outright, or allow the parties the opportunity to be heard.
Section 3. Compliance with order. If the motion is granted, either in whole or in part, the compliance therewith must be
effected within ten (10) days from notice of the order, unless a different period is fixed by the court. The bill of particulars or a more
definite statement ordered by the court may be filed either in a separate or in an amended pleading, serving a copy thereof on the
adverse party.
Section 4. Effect of non-compliance. If the order is not obeyed, or in case of insufficient compliance therewith, the court may
order the striking out of the pleading or the portions thereof to which the order was directed or make such other order as it deems just.
Section 5. Stay of period to file responsive pleading. After service of the bill of particulars or of a more definite pleading, or
after notice of denial of his motion, the moving party may file his responsive pleading within the period to which he was entitled at the
time of filing his motion, which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event.
Section 6. Bill a part of pleading. A bill of particulars becomes part of the pleading for which it is intended.
Bill of particular particularization of the allegation for the purpose that the adverse party may be able to respond thoroughly or
correctly to the allegations in the pleading.
Example: The complaint states that the defendant borrowed P100,000 from the plaintiff on 3 occasions.
When was this?! Instead of filing an answer, file a motion for bill of particulars. Particularize on what occasions defendant borrowed
money. If the motion is granted, within 10 days from receipt of the order granting motion for the bill of particular, the plaintiff will now
particularize. The plaintiff will say, what I meant by 3 occasions are: on Valentines Day, on your birthday, and on Christmas day.
So the defendant can answer: on Valentines Day, I was not here. I was in Boracay. On my birthday, I wasnt here too.
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If it is granted, the plaintiff has 10 days within which to file the bill of particular.
If it is denied, the defendant only has the balance of the period, but the period shall not be less than 5 days. Hence, the doctrine laid
down in Domingo Neypes vs CA or the fresh day period rule does not apply in Rule 12. The same doctrine does not apply as well in
Rule 16 or Motion to Dismiss and Rule 64 or Review of the judgment of COA or COMELEC. These are the only instances when the fresh
day period rule does not apply.
The defendant received a copy of the summons on March 1. He has until March 16 within which to file the answer. Instead of filing the
answer, on March 2, he filed a bill of particulars. It was denied. When should the defendant file his answer? Within 14 days from his
receipt of the notice of the denial of the order. If you receive it on April, then start counting 14 days in April.
Suppose instead of filing it on March 2, you file it on March 15 (1 day before the expiration of the period to file the answer) and it was
denied. He has 5 days. If he receives it on April 5, he still has 5 days within which to file or up to April 10.
D.

Rule 13 - Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and other papers

Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the filing of all pleadings and other papers, as well as the service thereof, except those
for which a different mode of service is prescribed.
Distinction between Filing and Service
Section 2. Filing and service, defined. Filing is the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court.
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel, service
upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one
counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side.
Filing: Manner, completeness, proof
Section 3. Manner of filing. The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall
be made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by
registered mail. In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second case, the date
of the mailing of motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or
the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the
record of the case.
Service: Mode, completeness, proof
Section 4. Papers required to be filed and served. Every judgment, resolution, order, pleading subsequent to the complaint,
written motion, notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall be filed with the court, and served upon the
parties affected.
Section 5. Modes of service. Service of pleadings motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers shall be made either
personally or by mail.
Section 6. Personal service. Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by
leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known,
or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party's or counsel's
residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.
Section 7. Service by mail. Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the post office in a sealed envelope,
plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and
with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available
in the locality of either the senders or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail.
Section 8. Substituted service. If service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and other papers cannot be made
under the two preceding sections, the office and place of residence of the party or his counsel being unknown, service may be made by
delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. The service is complete at the
time of such delivery.
Section 9. Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions. Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either
personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or
resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.
Section 10. Completeness of service. Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete
upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon
actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is
earlier.
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Priorities in Modes of Service

When you serve a copy of the pleading to the adverse party, it is preferred that you do it personally. If you dont, you have to state your
explanation why you are not availing of personal service. What is the explanation? Any explanation for that matter. Why is this so? This
is new in the 1997 Rules of Court. There are a lot of lawyers abusing such provision. Instead of personally serving, they serve by mail to
buy time.
Illustration of this abuse: The counsel of the plaintiff has his law office at Pacific Land Building on the 44 th floor. The defendants
counsel is on the 4th floor of the same building. Yet they do it by mail.
Section 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other
papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied
by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as
not filed.
Section 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the
defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the
property is situated notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action
or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a
purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and
only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is
for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the rights of the party who caused it to
be recorded.
There are 2 general issues: filing and service. Under those 2 issues, there are 3 sub-issues:
Modes
manner

or

Completeness

Proof

Filing
Personal filing
By
registered
mail
(registered mail only!)
If filed personally, it is
complete upon receipt
by the Clerk of Court
If filed by mail, it is
complete only upon the
expiration of 5 days
from receipt of first
registry notice

If it is personally filed,
the
proof
is
the
stamp***
If it is service by
registered mail, prove:
(1) the time of mailing
and
(2)
time
of
receipt****

Service
Personal service
Service by mail
Registered
Ordinary*
If personal, it is complete upon
receipt
If by registered If by ordinary
mail,
it
is mail,
upon
complete only expiration of the
upon
the 10 days from
expiration of 5 mailing**
days
from
receipt of first
registry notice
If personal service, proof is by
written admission of the party
served, or the official return of the
server, or the affidavit of the party
serving
If service by If
service
by
registered
ordinary
mail,
mail, proof is proof is by an
by an affidavit affidavit of the
of the person person mailing of
mailing
of facts
facts and the
registry receipt

* When it comes to filing, only registered mail is accepted. When it comes to service, it may be either registered or ordinary mail. What
is the rationale? First, the service may be through ordinary mail because it comes from the residence of the party. In some parts of the
country there are no registry services. Second, with regard to the prescriptive period, filing can only be done through registered mail
because it is difficult to count for the court if it is by ordinary mail. Although the rule regarding completeness already provides as to
when it is complete.
** If you mail it on March 1, when is it complete? March 12 (expiration of 10 days).
*** What if there is no stamp (as what happens in actual practice)? A filed. The pleading A filed could no longer be located by the Clerk
or Court. How do you prove it? Through the stamp on your own copy.
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**** You are given a registry receipt as proof of mailing, and then you attach that to a return card as proof of receipt.
Section 12. Proof of filing. The filing of a pleading or paper shall be proved by its existence in the record of the case. If it is not in
the record, but is claimed to have been filed personally, the filing shall be proved by the written or stamped acknowledgment of its filing
by the clerk of court on a copy of the same; if filed by registered mail, by the registry receipt and by the affidavit of the person
who did the mailing, containing a full statement of the date and place of depositing the mail in the post office in a sealed envelope
addressed to the court, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10)
days if not delivered.
The affidavit refers to the affidavit of the sender, not the one who mailed. In proof of filing, it says registry receipt and affidavit; in
proof service, it says or. Make a distinction there.
Section 13. Proof of Service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the official
return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the
service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of
this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together
with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
An SC Circular says that when you file before the SC and the CA, you have to attach a copy of the affidavit of service (not filing). The SC
or the CA will not accept any pleading that does not include an affidavit of service.
E.

Rule 14- Summons

1.

What is summons?

Alias summons is one which is the second or third or fourth summons prepared.
2.

Who issues, to whom addressed?

After the complaint was filed by the plaintiff, summons was served upon the defendant. The defendant, in reading the summons,
contested it and threw it away saying it is not signed by the judge. Is that error on the part of the court? No, the judge never signs nor
issues the summons. It is the clerk of court that signs, issues and serves the summons, not the judge.
Section 1. Clerk to issue summons. Upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of
court shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the defendants.
Section 2. Contents. The summons shall be directed to the defendant, signed by the clerk of court under seal and contain (a) the
name of the court and the names of the parties to the action; (b) a direction that the defendant answer within the time fixed by these
Rules; (c) a notice that unless the defendant so answers plaintiff will take judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for.
A copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem if any, shall be attached to the original and each copy of the
summons.
3.

Who serves?

Only three people are qualified to serve the summons: the sheriff, deputy sheriff, or any other person authorized by the court.
Example of a person authorized by the Rules is Section 9. When the defendant is a prisoner, to whom should it be served? It should be
served to the prisoner by the warden. The warden is authorized by the Rule.
Can the plaintiff serve the summons to the defendant? Only if he has been authorized by the court. He has to ask for leave to do that
and only for justifiable reasons.
Example: If after several tries, the sheriff cannot find the whereabouts of the defendant. Only the plaintiff knows because the defendant
keeps transferring from one residence to another. The plaintiff should move to leave for service of summons. In actual practice, you do
not go to such lengths; you simply accompany the sheriff.
Section 3. By whom served. The summons may be served by the sheriff, his deputy, or other proper court officer, or for
justifiable reasons by any suitable person authorized by the court issuing the summons.
Section 4. Return. When the service has been completed, the server shall, within five (5) days therefrom, serve a copy of the
return, personally or by registered mail, to the plaintiff's counsel, and shall return the summons to the clerk, who issued it,
accompanied by proof of service.
Section 5. Issuance of alias summons. If a summons is returned without being served on any or all of the defendants, the
server shall also serve a copy of the return on the plaintiff's counsel, stating the reasons for the failure of service, within five (5) days
therefrom. In such a case, or if the summons has been lost, the clerk, on demand of the plaintiff, may issue an alias summons.
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4.

Kinds of summons

What are the modes of service of summons? (must be distinguished from modes of service of pleadings)
a.

service in person on the defendant (dont say personal service, to distinguish it from service of pleadings)

There are 2 ways: delivering it to the defendant himself; and if he refuses to accept it, by leaving it with him as laid down in Valmonte
vs CA.
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handling a copy thereof to
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Valmonte vs CA: Rosita Dimalanta filed a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of rentals against her sister
Lourdes Valmonte and her husband Alfredo Valmonte. Lourdes and Alfredo are residents of Seattle, Washington, USA. Alfredo has a
law office in Mabini, Ermita, Manila and divides his time between the USA and the Philippines.
Rositas complaint stated that summons may be served in the Ermita address where Alfredo, as Lourdes spouse, holds office and where
he can be found. This was based on a letter Lourdes sent to Rositas lawyer wherein she referred to her husband as the party to whom
all communications regarding the partition of the property intended for her should be sent.
Service of summons was made upon Alfredo who was at his office in Manila. He accepted the summons insofar as he was concerned. He
refused to accept the summons for his wife, Lourdes, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. The
process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for Lourdes.
Alfredo filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Lourdes did not file an Answer. Rosita moved to declare Lourdes in default. Alfredo
entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed Rositas motion. The RTC denied the motion to declare Lourdes in
default. The trial court likewise denied Rositas motion for reconsideration.
Rosita file a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the CA. The appellate court granted the petition and declared
Lourdes in default.
SC: There was no valid service of summons upon the petitioner Lourdes Valmonte. The rules on service of summons apply according to
whether an action is an action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted
service, as provided in Rule 14, 7-82 is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who
does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is
temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication.
Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned
either by means of substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, 8 or by publication as provided in 17 and 18 of the same Rule.
In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be
brought because jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a binding decision.
On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the
court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the
country, summons may be served exterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, 17.
In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the
personal status of the plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached.
Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private respondent's action, which is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in
the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant's interest in a specific
property and not to render a judgment against him.
Service of summons on her attorney cannot be justified under the third mode provided for by Section 17, Rule 14.
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in
accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other
manner which the court may deem sufficient.
This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign
country where the defendant resides. Moreover, there are several reasons why the service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte
cannot be considered a valid service of summons on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte:

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1.
Service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, 17
and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and on that basis
declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.
2.
Service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, 17.
As provided in 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his
behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.
3.
Because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to file her Answer
which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice. It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an
action against a resident defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against a nonresident defendant who is not found in
the Philippines. In the former, the period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days
from notice.
b.

substituted service

Substituted service of summons is upon the person residing in the residence of the defendant who must be of age and discretion. If he
cannot be found there, at the office of the defendant, to a person in charge therein of age and discretion.
Section 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in
the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.
Manotoc vs CA: Agapita Trajano sought the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the US District Court of Hawaii against
Ma. Imelda Manotoc (Imee Marcos) for the wrongful death of Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence in the Philippines
allegedly working for Manotoc. RTC issued summons for Manotoc addressed at Alexandra Homes, Pasig. It was served on a Macky dela
Cruz described as a caretaker of her unit. Manotoc failed to file her answer and was declared in default.
Manotoc filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person, stating that she is not a resident of the said
condo and that she does not hold office there, and dela Cruz is not her representative or employee. Thus no valid service was made.
Further, she states that she is a resident of Singapore.
RTC denied the motion and the subsequent MR. Manotoc filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, that was denied.
MR was also denied.
Issue: Whether there was valid substituted service.
SC: No. In actions strictly in perosnam jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is mandatory and can be complied with valid
service of summons. If defendant cannot be served, for excusable reason, within a reasonable time, substituted service can be resorted
to. It is extraordinary in character and a derogation of the usual method of service thus rules for such must be faithfully complied with.
The requirements of valid substituted service if there is impossibility of prompt personal service which is 15-30 days for the sheriff are:
1) By leaving copies of summons at defendants residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein or by leaving
copies at the defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge.
2) The sheriff must narrate in specific details how service in person became impossible.
3) The attempt must be extraordinary and at least 3 times. The person of suitable age and discretion must be at least 18 years old, able
to read the summons written in English, and must be with confidential relation to defendant. A competent person in charge can be the
president or manager.
The substituted service was invalid because the sheriff did not comply with the requirements. dela Cruz was not a representative of
Manotoc. Therefore, since there was no valid service of summons, there was no jurisdiction acquired.
Jose vs Boyon: Petitioners Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance against respondents Helen and
Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. Respondent
judge issued summons to the [respondents]. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server
allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the [respondents] failed. [Petitioners] filed before the trial court an Exparte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. The Judge issued an Order granting the Ex-parte Motion for Leave
of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. The judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring [respondents] in default for
failure to file their respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were allowed to submit their
evidence ex-parte.
Helen , who was then residing in the United States of America, was surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth , of the resolution issued
by the respondent court. [Respondents] filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons
effected by the court a quo. The public respondent issued an Order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted [respondents]
supposed loss of standing in court. The [respondents] once again raised the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion for
reconsideration, which was also denied. The [petitioners] moved for the execution of the controverted judgment which the respondent
judge ultimately granted.
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Respondents filed before the CA a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65, questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. CA held that RTC had
no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and Orders since it never acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid
service of summons upon them. First, the sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of substituted service of summons, because he
did not specify in the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate them and the impossibility of promptly serving the
summons upon them by personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by publication was equally infirm, because the Complaint
was a suit for specific performance and therefore an action in personam.
Issue: Whether the service of summons on respondents was valid
SC: No. [P]ersonal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process
server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within
a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of
sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the
defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers
return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service
of summons ineffective.
The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process
server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the
alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof.
Without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a
general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of
substituted service of summons.
Mason vs CA: Spouses Efren and Digna Mason owned 2 parcels of land. Petitioners and private respondent Columbus Philippines
Bus Corporation entered into a lease contract, under which Columbus undertook to construct a building worth P10,000,000 at the end
of the 3rd year of the lease. Because Columbus failed to comply with this stipulation, the petitioners, filed a complaint for rescission of
contract with damages against Columbus before the RTC.
Summons was served upon Columbus through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons described Rejalde as
a secretary of Columbus, the sheriffs return described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal
processes.
Columbus failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading, hence petitioners filed a motion to declare Columbus in default. The
motion was granted and petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex-parte. The case was submitted for decision. RTC ruled in favor
of the plaintiffs and against Columbus. That decision became final on May 12, 1999. The following day, Columbus filed a motion to lift
order of default, which was opposed by petitioners. RTC ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, without
waiting for the same, RTC on May 26, 1999, denied the motion to lift order of default. Columbus filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied. Undaunted, Columbus filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution. It suffered the same fate as the
motion for reconsideration for being dilatory. The branch sheriff was directed to proceed with the enforcement of the decision.
Columbus appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ruled in its favour. Columbus was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot
be faulted if it failed to file an Answer. Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 requires that service of summons upon domestic private juridical
entity shall be made through its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel.
Since service upon Columbus was made through a certain Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk in Columbus office, as
evidenced by the latters employment record, such service cannot be considered valid. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
to no avail. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether there was valid service of summons on private respondent.
SC: No. Petitioners contend that while Section 11, Rule 14 clearly specifies the persons authorized to receive summons on behalf of a
private juridical entity, said provision did not abandon or render inapplicable the substantial compliance rule. The case law applicable,
contends Columbus, is Villarosa which squarely provides for the proper interpretation of the new rule on the service of summons upon
domestic corporation, thus: The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation
or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now
states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of
"cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule. Service through Ayreen Rejalde, a
mere filing clerk of private respondent and not one of those enumerated above, is invalid.
We find private respondents submission on this issue meritorious.
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present
evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a
vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. We will deprive Columbus of its right to present its defense in this multimillion peso suit, if we disregard compliance with the rules on service of summons.
E.B. Villarosa vs Benito: Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the
former agreed to develop parcels of land belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing
units. Private respondent filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against petitioner before the RTC allegedly for failure
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of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial
developments. Summons, with the complaint, were served upon the petitioner, through its Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero
at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro (CdO) City but the Sheriffs Return of Service stated that the summons
was duly served upon petitioner thru SALBULBERO at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, CdO City.
Petitioner filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss alleging that the summons was served upon Sabulbero, who is not one of
those persons upon whom service of summons may be made. Private respondent filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default
alleging that petitioner has failed to file an Answer. Private respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. RTC denied the
Motion to Dismiss as well as the Motion to Declare in Default, stating that since the summons and copy of the complaint were in fact
received by the corporation through its branch manager, there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons and
consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is restricted, limited and exclusive following
the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
Issue: Whether or not the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of
upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City was proper.
SC: No. Under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The cases cited by private
respondent are therefore not in point. The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14. The rule now states general manager
instead of only manager; corporate secretary instead of secretary; and treasurer instead of cashier. The phrase agent, or any
of its directors is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
The particular revision was explained by retired SC Justice Florenz Regalado, thus: x x x the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service
upon a defendant corporation to be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. The terms were
obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word agent of the corporation.
The Filoil case, involving the litigation lawyer of the corporation who precisely appeared to challenge the validity of service of summons
but whose very appearance for that purpose was seized upon to validate the defective service, is an illustration of the need for this
revised section with limited scope and specific terminology. Thus the absurd result in the Filoil case necessitated the amendment
permitting service only on the in-house counsel of the corporation who is in effect an employee of the corporation, as distinguished
from an independent practitioner.
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to
insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with
the legal papers served on him. In other words, to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. x x x.
The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which
summons should be served on a domestic corporation. x x x.
Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a firms branch office has been held as improper as
summons should have been served at the firms principal office.
The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer jurisdiction upon its person. There is no question
that the defendants voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. Before, the rule was that a party may
challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person by making a special appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in the same
motion, the movant raised other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves the exercise of the jurisdiction of the
court, the party is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This doctrine has been abandoned in the case of La
Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., which became the basis of the adoption of a new provision in the former Section 23,
which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules. The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict
enforcement of the rules on summons. Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the
defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
c.

extraterritorial

Section 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding
the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by
leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be
sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order
granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant
must answer. (17a)
Section 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When any action is commenced against a defendant who
ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the
Philippines, as under the preceding section.
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i.
ii.
iii.
5.

personal
by publication
any mode

On whom served

There are specific kinds of defendants.

a.

on corporations: public or private, domestic or foreign

Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Section 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entities. When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has
transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose,
or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines.
Section 13. Service upon public corporations. When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected
on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive
head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct.
b.

on natural persons: prisoners; minors/incompetents; unknown; entities without juridical personality

Section 8. Service upon entity without juridical personality. When persons associated in an entity without juridical
personality are sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly known, service may be effected upon all the defendants
by serving upon any one of them, or upon the person in charge of the office or place of business maintained in such name. But such
service shall not bind individually any person whose connection with the entity has, upon due notice, been severed before the action
was brought.
Section 9. Service upon prisoners. When the defendant is a prisoner confined in a jail or institution, service shall be effected
upon him by the officer having the management of such jail or institution who is deemed deputized as a special sheriff for said purpose.
Section 10. Service upon minors and incompetents. When the defendant is a minor, insane or otherwise an incompetent,
service shall be made upon him personally and on his legal guardian if he has one, or if none his guardian ad litem whose appointment
shall be applied for by the plaintiff. In the case of a minor, service may also be made on his father or mother.
If the defendant is a minor, it is definitely by representative party. To whom do you serve the summons? Serve the summons upon the
minor OR (not AND) the parent. But if it is an incompetent, you serve it on the incompetent AND the parent or guardian or guardian ad
litem. If it is a minor, service of summons upon the parent is sufficient. But if it an incompetent, it must be served on both the
incompetent and the parent/guardian/guardian ad litem.
Dont apply the word incompetent here to those who are incompetent under settlement of estate (ex. drunkards). Thats a different
matter.
Section 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry,
service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such
time as the court may order.
6.

Proofs of service

Section 17. Leave of court. Any application to the court under this Rule for leave to effect service in any manner for which leave
of court is necessary shall be made by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf, setting
forth the grounds for the application.
Section 18. Proof of service. The proof of service of a summons shall be made in writing by the server and shall set forth the
manner, place, and date of service; shall specify any papers which have been served with the process and the name of the person who
received the same; and shall be sworn to when made by a person other than a sheriff or his deputy.
Section 19. Proof of service by publication. If the service has been made by publication, service may be proved by the affidavit
of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager, to which affidavit a copy of the
publication shall be attached and by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post
office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
F.
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Section 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Biglang-awa vs Phil. Trust Co:
Asean Pacific Planners vs City of Urdaneta:
De Dios vs CA:
Millenium Ind. & Com. Corp. vs Tan:
Ramos vs Ramos:
Teh vs CA:
Santos vs PNOC Exp.:
Dole Phil vs Quilala:
Pascual vs Pascual:

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