SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18684
BENGZON, C.J.:
Statement of the case. Petitioners request that respondent officials be prevented from
implementing Republic Act 3040 that apportions representative districts in this country. It is
unconstitutional and void, they allege, because: (a) it was passed by the House of
Representatives without printed final copies of the bill having been furnished the Members at
least three calendar days prior to its passage; (b) it was approved more than three years after
the return of the last census of our population; and (c) it apportioned districts without regard to
the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.
Admitting some allegations but denying others, the respondents aver they were merely
complying with their duties under the statute, which they presume and allege to be
constitutional. The respondent National Treasurer further avers that petitioners have no
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personality to bring this action; that a duly certified copy of the law creates the presumption of
its having been passed in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution (distribution of
printed bills included); that the Director of the Census submitted an official report on the
population of the Philippines in November, 1960, which report became the basis of the bill;
and that the Act complies with the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the
Constitution..
After hearing the parties and considering their memoranda, this Court reached the conclusion
that the statute be declared invalid, and, aware of the need of prompt action, issued its brief
resolution of August 23, partly in the following language:
Whereas such Republic Act 3040 clearly violates the said constitutional provision in
several ways namely, (a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger
number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four members, while Cotabato
with a bigger population got three only; . . .;
Whereas such violation of the Constitutional mandate renders the law void;
Therefore, without prejudice to the writing of a more extended opinion passing
additionally on other issues raised in the case, the Court resolved, without any dissent,
forthwith to issue the injunction prayed for by the petitioners. No bond is needed.
What with the reservation announced in the resolution, and what with the motion for
reconsideration, this is now written fully to explain the premises on which our conclusion
rested.
Personality of the petitioners. Petitioners are four members of the House of
Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental, and Bulacan, and the provincial
governor of Negros Oriental. They bring this action in behalf of themselves and of other
residents of their provinces. They allege, and this Court finds, that their provinces had been
discriminated against by Republic Act 3040, because they were given less representative
districts than the number of their inhabitants required or justified: Misamis Oriental having
387,839 inhabitants, was given one district only, whereas Cavite with 379,902 inhabitants,
2
was given two districts; Negros Oriental and Bulacan with 598,783 and 557,691 respectively,
were allotted 2 representative districts each, whereas Albay with 515,961 was assigned 3
districts.
The authorities hold that "citizens who are deprived of as full and effective an elective
franchise as they are entitled to under the Constitution by an apportionment act, have a
sufficient interest to proceed in a court to test the statute. (18 Am. Jur. 199.)
Therefore, petitioners as voters and as congressmen and governor of the aggrieved
provinces have personality to sue.
In Stiglitz vs. Schardien (Ky) 40 S.W. (2d) 315, the right of a citizen to question the validity of
a redistricting statute was upheld. The same right was recognized in Jones vs. Freeman
(Okla.) 146 P. (2d) 564, the court saying that each citizen has the right to have the State
apportioned in accordance with the Constitution and to be governed by a Legislative fairly
representing the whole body of electorate and elected as required by the Constitution.
Colegrove vs. Green, 328 .U.S. 549, on which respondents rely, appear to be inconclusive:
three against three. The seventh justice concurred in the result even supposing the contrary
was justiciable."
The printed-form, three-day requirement. The Constitution provides that "no bill shall be
passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form
furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the
President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment."
Petitioners presented certificates of the Secretary of the House of Representatives to show
that no printed copy had been distributed three days before passage of the bill (on May 10,
1961) and that no certificate of urgency by the President had been received in the House.
The respondents claim in their defense that a statute may not be nullified upon evidence of
failure to print, because "it is conclusively presumed that the details of legislative procedure
leading to the enrollment that are prescribed by the Constitution have been complied with by
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the Legislature." They further claim that the certificates of the Secretary of the House are
inadmissible, in view of the conclusive (enrolled-bill) presumption, which in several instances
have been applied by the courts. In further support of their contention, Sec. 313(2) of Act 190
might be cited.1
On the other hand, it may be said for the petitioners, that such printed bill requirement had a
fundamental purpose to serve2 and was inserted in the Constitution not as a mere procedural
step; and that the enrolled-bill theory, if adopted, would preclude the courts from enforcing
such requirement in proper cases.
We do not deem it necessary to make a definite pronouncement on the question, because the
controversy may be decided upon the issue of districts-in-proportion-toinhabitants.1awphl.nt
Population Census. According to the Constitution, "the Congress shall by law, make an
apportionment (of Members of the House) within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise." It is admitted that the bill, which later became Republic Act
3040, was based upon a report submitted to the President by the Director of the Census on
November 23, 1960. It reads:
I have the honor to submit herewith a preliminary count of the population of the
Philippines as a result of the population enumeration which has just been completed.
This is a report on the total number of inhabitants in this country and does not include
the population characteristics. It is the result of a hand tally and may be subject to
revision when all the population schedules shall have been processed mechanically.
The Census of Population is the first of a series of four censuses which include
housing, agriculture and economics in addition to population. These four censuses
together constitute what is known as the Census of 1960. Like population, the housing
and agricultural censuses are undergoing processing, while the economic census is
now under preparation.
Until the final report is made, these figures should be considered as official for all
purposes.
Petitioners maintain that the apportionment could not legally rest on this report since it is
merely "preliminary" and "may be subject to revision." On the other hand, respondents point
out that the above letter says the report should be considered "official for all purposes." They
also point out that the ascertainment of what constitutes a return of an enumeration is a
matter for Congress action. This issue does not clearly favor petitioners, because there are
authorities sustaining the view that although not final, and still subject to correction, a census
enumeration may be considered official, in the sense that Governmental action may be based
thereon even in matters of apportionment of legislative districts (Cahill vs. Leopold [Conn.]
108 Atl. 2d 818). (See also Elliott vs. State, 1 Pac. 2d 370; Ervin vs. State, 44 S.W. 2d 380;
Herndon vs. Excise Board, 295 Pac. 223; Holcomb vs. Spikes, 232 S.W. 891.)
Apportionment of Members. The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members
of the House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly
as may be according to the member of their respective inhabitants." In our resolution on
August 23, we held that this provision was violated by Republic Act 3040 because (a) it gave
Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it
gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; (c)
Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both, five
members having been assigned to it; (d) Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members
while Davao with 903,224 got three only; (e) Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay
with less inhabitants (515,691) got three, and (f) Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one
member only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two. These were not the only
instances of unequal apportionment. We see that Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela,
Laguna and Cagayan with more inhabitants have 2 each. And then, Capiz, La Union and
Ilocos Norte got 2 each, whereas Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte with
967,323 inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less inhabitants (966,145) was given 5.
Such disproportion of representation has been held sufficient to avoid apportionment laws
enacted in States having Constitutional provisions similar to ours. For instance, in
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authority by the court, on the ground that the question is a political one, but the
constitutionality of the act is purely a judicial question. (State ex rel. Adams County v.
Cunningham, 15 L.R.A. 561, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724.)
The fact that the action may have a political effect, and in that sense effect a political
object, does not make the questions involved in a suit to declare the unconstitutionality
of an apportionment act political instead of judicial. (State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham,
17 L.R.A. 145, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 48.)
An unconstitutional apportionment law may be declared void by the courts,
notwithstanding the fact that such statute is an exercise of political power. (Denney vs.
State ex rel. Basler, 31 L.R.A. 726, 144 Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929.)
The constitutionality of a statute forming a delegate district or apportioning delegates
for the house of delegates is a judicial question for the courts, although the statute is an
exercise of political power. (Harmison v. Ballot Comrs. 42 L.R.A. 591, 45 W. Va. 179, 31
S. E. 394.) [3 L.R.A. Digest, p. 2737.)
Conclusion. For all the foregoing, we hereby reiterate our resolution declaring that
Republic Act 3040 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, De Leon and
Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., is on leave.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San
Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent
congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually
became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The
people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the
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Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675.
The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621
voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed
ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article
VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of
the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections
after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of
San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with
its first representative to be elected at the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes
the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to
wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in
the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter
of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a
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subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not
been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the
Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional
districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of
the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census
showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two
hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative"
proviso in the Constitution:
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. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3),
Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a
separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII,
Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted
by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73
Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI,
Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all
the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated
in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
12
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there
is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had
each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into
two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675.
The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not
required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered
by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article
VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the
latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself
so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have
separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress
to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners
overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and
enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt
itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further
arguments against the validity thereof.
13
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The
contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly
excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of
neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in
"gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular
candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it
should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent
representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both
localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been
diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
14
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress
the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for
election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the
1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter,
from an elective office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March
8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
15
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of
the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent
contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in
Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed
that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of
candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing
the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On
the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of
the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995
deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise
filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of
the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban
City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition
seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of
16
she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has
been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although
she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She
asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the
First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she
can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since
she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and
instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since
on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which
she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City
in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked
was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because
there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in
the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the
CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made,
she cited the case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of
respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the
"inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or
deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly
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19
of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could
not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed
her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places,
including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban
her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several
occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her
school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when
she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile
by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old
domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus
non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have
abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as
her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be
conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that
she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence.
Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year
prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was
evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of
Manila.
21
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First
District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the
First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that
on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that
she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence
in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First
District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing
proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution
declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives
for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission
RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to
warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte
held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on
May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471
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votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat
of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal
issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May
8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion
in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the
COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of
election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
23
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended
for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose
of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on
the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence
in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the
intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One
may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be
to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence.22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place
of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
24
year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to
go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering
that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos
living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence.30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term
residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied
the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what
significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her
residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears
to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render
a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
26
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the
word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa,
Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the
space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's
Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance,
when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her
eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming
that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her
place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she
subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would
reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed
immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election
thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period
of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8
the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
27
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact
were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First
District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April
24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution
additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be
any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to
the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also
registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine
presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she
served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could
not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the
COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if
he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating,
implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or
semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to
the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many
places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions
between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena
vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house
wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the
28
intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family
in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality,
notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in
question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the
saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places,
practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be
held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to
his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for
any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be
one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials
who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of
origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a
voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient
to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This
strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by
positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of
(actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on
residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
29
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed
Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established
her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant
Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school.
She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word
University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to
Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office
in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E.
Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as
a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and
her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In
1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in
San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In
1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there
and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons.
Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers,
30
petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province,
instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent.
These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the
quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the
country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of
origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving
the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could
not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there
again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a
new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
31
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private
respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect
an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with
an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in
1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
"domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the
husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the
term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the
two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence.
Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in
the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as
they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the
32
female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of
residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which
states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia.
Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion
cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article,
which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article
clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family
home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase
"cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the
husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family
to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to
refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place
to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law
to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring
into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family
unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding
Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
33
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together.
This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case
of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the
wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical
to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be
faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional
or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference
to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some
difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the
purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used
synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of
a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place;
on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The
important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one
place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also
established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where
the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed
to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons,
revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina
vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
34
separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband
has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new
residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually
opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be
compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de
Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such
rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can
be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the
same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of
the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the
instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that
court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in
case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and
render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the
judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D.
52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the
English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland,
where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not
be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment
35
against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be
procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the
basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of
alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we
can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of
the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was
ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the
City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70)
was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the
Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently
has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the
American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is
rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have
affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to
return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to
make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession
and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all
income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which
she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear
that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by
any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner
was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual
36
place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several
places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no
showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that
Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained
upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code
of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of
the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the
term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit
from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept
of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of
mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar
as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the
term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's
acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but
expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her
domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the
PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in
Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a
home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992
in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary
37
intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone
straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously
looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of
Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover,
and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse
either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the
marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original
domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where
situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile
different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up
to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor
of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District
of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that
the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the
election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
48
Moreover, petitioner
contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in
accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities,
this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
38
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating
power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning
and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an
individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn
ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995
are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
40
EN BANC
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras,
Eastern Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January
12, 2001.[6] On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he
had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two (2) years.[7]
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras
and who was running for reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioners certificate of
candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in
truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he
took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May
14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes
(6,131) against private respondents 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001,
petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. [8] He
subsequently took his oath of office.
On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondents
petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the basis of the
following findings:
Respondents frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after
his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be considered as a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant . . . of the U.S.A. prior to November 10, 2000 as would
qualify him to acquire the status of residency for purposes of compliance with the one-year
residency requirement of Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to
Sections 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The one (1) year residency requirement
contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he seeks
to be elected.
All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or stayed in Oras,
Eastern Samar since 1985 as an American citizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A.
before November 10, 2000 when he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by [repatriation]
42
cannot be added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001
to cure his deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an
elective office in the Philippines. Under such circumstances, by whatever formula of
computation used, respondent is short of the one-year residence requirement before the May
14, 2001 elections.[9]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.
I.
Two questions must first be resolved before considering the merits of this case: (a)
whether the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by
the filing of a motion for reconsideration by petitioner and (b) whether the COMELEC retained
jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.
A. With respect to the first question, private respondent contends that the petition in this
case should be dismissed because it was filed late; that the COMELEC en banc had denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration for being pro forma; and that, pursuant to Rule 19, 4 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the said motion did not suspend the running of the 30-day
period for filing this petition. He points out that petitioner received a copy of the resolution,
dated July 19, 2001, of the COMELECs Second Division on July 28, 2001, so that he had
only until August 27, 2001 within which to file this petition. Since the petition in this case was
filed on February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as having been filed late and
should be dismissed.
Private respondents contention has no merit.
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the
decision, resolution, order, or ruling.
43
In this case, petitioner received a copy of the resolution of July 19, 2001 of the COMELECs
Second Division on July 28, 2001. Five days later, on August 2, 2001, he filed his motion for
reconsideration. On February 6, 2002, he received a copy of the order, dated January 30,
2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying his motion for reconsideration. Five days later, on
February 11, 2002, he filed this petition for certiorari. There is no question, therefore, that
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, as
well as his petition for certiorari to set aside of the order of the COMELEC en banc, was filed
within the period provided for in Rule 19, 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and in Art.
IX(A), 7 of the Constitution.
It is contended, however, that petitioners motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc did not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because
the motion was pro forma and, consequently, this petition should have been filed on or before
August 27, 2001. It was actually filed, however, only on February 11, 2002. Private
respondent cites the finding of the COMELEC en banc that
An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration shows that the
same [are] a mere rehash of his averments contained in his Verified
Answer and Memorandum. Neither did respondent raise new matters that would sufficiently
warrant a reversal of the assailed resolution of the Second Division. This makes the said
Motion pro forma.[11]
We do not think this contention is correct. The motion for reconsideration was not pro
forma and its filing did suspend the period for filing the petition for certiorari in this case. The
mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed
upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movants remedy would
44
not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other remedy. [12] But, as we
have held in another case:[13]
Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to
convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the
evidence; and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon
by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence
would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only
motions for reopening and new trial.
Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the
motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, [14] or (2) it did not
comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be
contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, [15] or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged
errors,[16] or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, [17] or (5) the
adverse party was not given notice thereof. [18] The 16-page motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was
error for the COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioners motion for reconsideration was pro
forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere rehash of his earlier pleadings or did
not raise new matters. Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day
period to file the petition in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the
reglementary period provided by law.
B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve private respondents petition for
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy before the elections on May 14, 2001. In the
meantime, the votes were canvassed and petitioner was proclaimed elected with a margin of
379 votes over private respondent. Did the COMELEC thereby lose authority to act on the
petition filed by private respondent?
R.A. No. 6646 provides:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
45
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election
shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against
whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and
proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their
proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates
of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for
the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the
elections,
should
continue
even
after
such
elections
and
proclamation
of
the
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect. (Emphasis added)
The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
dwelling or habitation,[21] but rather to domicile or legal residence, [22] that is, the place where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may
be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).[23] A
domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs
parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
(domicile of choice).[24]
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen
after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he
reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a
resident alien.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen.
Title 8, 1427(a) of the United States Code provides:
Requirements of naturalization . Residence
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless
such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his application for
naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preceding
the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least
half of that time, and who has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in
the United States in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) has
47
resided continuously within the United States from the date of the application up to the time of
admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the period referred to in this subsection has been
and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of
the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.
(Emphasis added)
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue
of a greencard, which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a
foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
Nor can petitioner contend that he was compelled to adopt American citizenship only by
reason of his service in the U.S. armed forces. [26] It is noteworthy that petitioner was
repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their
Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, but
under R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides for the repatriation of, among
others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his
Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence
in this country.
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this
country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by
securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by constantly declaring to his
townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001
elections.[27] The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately,
when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at
the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain
an immigrant visa under 13[28] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR)[29] and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other
hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as
amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
48
repatriation or by an act of Congress,[30] in which case he waives not only his status as an
alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the country on
October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement
Philippine Immigration [] Balikbayan in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on
August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription good for one year stay.[31] Under 2 of
R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a
former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to
the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a visa-free entry to the Philippines
for a period of one (1) year (3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the
country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as
such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status
as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. [32] He lacked the requisite residency to qualify
him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections[33] in support of his
contention that the residency requirement in 39(a) of the Local Government Code includes
the residency of one who is not a citizen of the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an
issue in that case and this Court did not make any ruling on the issue now at bar. The
question in Frivaldo was whether petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the same day
that his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995, complied with the citizenship
requirement under 39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship may be possessed
even on the day the candidate assumes office. But in the case of residency, as already noted,
39(a) of the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must have been a resident of
the municipality for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Nor can petitioner invoke this Courts ruling in Bengzon III v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.[34] What the Court held in that case was that, upon repatriation, a former
natural-born Filipino is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.
Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern
Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because 117 of the
49
Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray,[35] however, registration as a
voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidates lack of residency.
Petitioners invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws cannot avail him any. As
held in Aquino v. Commission on Elections:[36]
A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government
those laws are themselves ordained by the people.Through their representatives, they dictate
the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly
lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District
of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his
motion to be allowed to present evidence. Under 5(d), in relation to 7, of R.A. No. 6646
(Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any
event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a
Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the COMELEC in which
he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitioners claim, are
complete and intact in the records.
III.
The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for two years at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
for this reason. We hold that it was. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in
his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. The Omnibus
Election Code provides:
50
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible
for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the
political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twentyfive days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Indeed, it has been held that a candidates statement in her certificate of candidacy for the
position of governor of Leyte that she was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not
so[37] or that the candidate was a natural-born Filipino when in fact he had become an
Australian citizen[38] constitutes a ground for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. On
the other hand, we held in Salcedo II v. COMELEC[39] that a candidate who used her
husbands family name even though their marriage was void was not guilty of
misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false
statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate
of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy in
this case is thus fully justified.
51
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of
the Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of
the Commission on Elections en banc are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
52
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,
MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG
ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON
FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN,
AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS
CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN,
ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN,
ONEWAY
PRINT,
AABANTE
KA
PILIPINAS
--
All
Being
Party-List
KATIPUNAN,
ONEWAY
PRINT,
AABANTE
KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000]
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF
SMALL
COCONUT
FARMERS'
PARTY
FARMERS'
ORGANIZATIONS
(BUTIL), petitioners,
(NCSFCO),
vs. COMMISSION
ON
and
LUZON
ELECTIONS,
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in
the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two
additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be
struck down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated
to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend
them. Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts
of Congress.
54
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election
laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of
parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by unique
Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand
innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn,
anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution [1] of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065; [2] and (2) the January 7,
1999 Resolution[3] of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed
Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives
"to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided
under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector.
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection or election of partylist representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy
declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible. (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this
law (RA 7941) in this wise:
56
57
proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the
votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:[6]
Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of Nominees
Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998,
the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters
Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which
were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first
nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list
representative.[7]
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec
a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the
Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was
mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement
58
and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25
nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should
actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations[8] filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same
grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a
Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior
Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCWUNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed
Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38
respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional [9] seats must be
filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list
representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement
prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the partylist system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled
up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine
society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should
represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage
[the] multi-party system. (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring
the
two
percent
threshold
requirement
of
RA
listgroups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative. It thus disposed
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second
Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to
include those similarly situated.
59
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list
of names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are
PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
60
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its
Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously
promulgated a set of Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List
Representatives Through the Party-List System. Under these Rules and Regulations, one
additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec
61
illustrated in its Annex A. It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14
incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified
parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and
proclaimed, based on its three elements, the Group of 38 private respondents.[10]
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on
the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system,
objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties,
organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system
were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not
exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent
threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said
Section 11.
Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent
Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E.
Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any
party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective
Memoranda in amplification of their verbal arguments.[14]
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners
of the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified
party be determined?
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector.
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats
to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No.
66
sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives
reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said
earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the
election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however
deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the
system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to
be entitled to a party-list seat.Those garnering more than this percentage could have
"additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party,
organization
or
coalition
can
have
more
than
three
seats
in
the
House
of
Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list
seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
mathematical impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to
adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.[17] Our task now, as should
have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely
scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far
as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial
agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared
unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute
67
remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This
is the essence of the rule of law.
party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of
Germany.[19]
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement,
the specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of
votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a
seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half
percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes
nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are
talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking
about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats
in the Assembly because many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is
the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of
sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the system and that
we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize,
should work hard, and should earn their seats within that system.[20]
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them.[21] But to have meaningful representation, the elected
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature
that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which
are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio"[22] to ensure meaningful local representation.
69
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise
and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not
interpretation or circumvention.[23]
under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the
qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no
dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter
collectively referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The
percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast
have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those
garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats
"proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be
entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and
one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of
simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very
lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party
B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be
entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat
limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then
have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by
another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In
effect, proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this
suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
71
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was
developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing
party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which
a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats
to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by
the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the
resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled
to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated No. of additional
--------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of party
Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned
qualified parties (Integer.decimal)
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the
descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998
election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as
follows:
Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
Votes Seats Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
72
74
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to
two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled
to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first
party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number
of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to
which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party
for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than
1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no
such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of
the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient
violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified
parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional
contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales[27] that a fractional membership
cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another
party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is
entitled to x x x.
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the
legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The
Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.
entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes
of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The
formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as
follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at
least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party
shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of
votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent,
then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is
less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to
the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more
than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more
parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the
number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of
party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled
to one additional seat or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional
seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional
seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all
would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party
obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said
party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the
76
first party received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it
the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of
proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an
equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution,
therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent,
additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is
computed as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats ABA No. of additional
for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
Additional seats 321,646
for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since
party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as
follows:
Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional Total
Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1
78
NATCCO
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the
number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result
would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of
additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact
whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not
whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding
off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the
law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the threeseat-per-party limit to a maximum of twoadditional slots. An increase in the maximum number
of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate
proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional
seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides
with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each
for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their
nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say,
however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a
mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA
7941 to make it less strict, then the formula will also be modified to reflect the changes
willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirtyeight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party79
list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold
and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec
effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the
legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the
system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of
the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are
beyond judicial review.[28]
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and
respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion
in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[29]
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,
[30]
cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As
a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its
recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the
legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its
provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of
its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what
the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.[31]
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a
total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the
proportional representation mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted
as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should
not be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly
defeated the implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system,
though already popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential
80
system. We should allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in
the heart of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated
litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives
should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be
more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It
should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system
of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties,
we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with
patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the
Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system,
Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of
the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting
party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified
parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
Puno, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J., dissents.
Kapunan, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. Mendoza.
Consolidated Table
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Group
(1)
(2)
(3)
81
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Actual
Percentag
Guarantee
Addition
Extra
Total
Seats
Total
votes
e of
al
seats
in
number
seat3
seats4
exces of seats
for
s of
allowed
1
1
1
1
5.73
3.66
3.55
3.47
1
1
7
5
4
4
3
4
2
1
1
503,487
321,646
312,500
304,902
party-list2
5.50%
3.51%
3.41%
3.33%
3
3
3
3
N
5. PROMDI
6. AKO
7. NCSFO
8. ABANSE!
255,184
239,042
338,303
235,548
2.79%
2.61%
2.60%
2.57%
1
1
1
1
2.90
2.72
2.71
2.68
1
1
1
1
4
4
4
4
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN!
10 BUTIL
11.
232,376
215,643
194,617
2.54%
2.36%
2.13%
1
1
1
2.64
2.45
2.21
4
3
3
1
-
3
3
3
SANLAKAS
12. COOP-
189,802
2.07%
2.16
NATCCO
13.
186,388
2.04%
2.12
COCOFED
14. SENIOR
143,444
1.57%
CITIZENS
15. Other
5,582,42
Each with
less than
9,155,30
2%
100%
13
32
52
13
39
1. APEC
2. ABA
3. ALAGAD
4.
VETERANS
FEDERATIO
Parties
TOTAL
82
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001]
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented
herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO,petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW
SA
DROGA;
GO!
GO!
PHILIPPINES;
THE
TRUE
MARCOS
LOYALIST
REAL
ESTATE
BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION;
SPORTS
&
HEALTH
others
under
Political
Parties
of
Omnibus
Resolution
No.
3785. respondents.
[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001]
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLES
COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG
MASANG
PILIPINO
(PMP);
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP;
LIBERAL
PARTY;
PLANTERS;
JEEP;
ORGANIZATION, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
83
and
BAGONG
BAYANI
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the
great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed
to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely
passive recipients of the States benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of
representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which
now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list
elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism
into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785[1] issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26,
2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including
those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification
of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the nonmarginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the
Comelec, [v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and
organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as]
heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural
requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in
order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate
Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions
and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the
Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001.[2]
84
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution
No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their
respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other
sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed
Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the
party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the
deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154
parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of
proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the
inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral
window.
It will be noted that as defined, the party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with
the Commission on Elections.
However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that
there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a
manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations
and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions.[3]
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition
praying that the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the Certified List of
Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List
System for the May 14, 2001 Elections and that said certified list be accordingly amended. It
also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or
85
canvassed, and that the latters nominees not be proclaimed.[4] On April 11, 2001, Bayan
Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents.[5]
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases
to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26,
2001,[6] but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. [7] During the hearing, however,
Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.[8]
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party filed a Petition[9] before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No.
147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17,
2001,[10] the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible
period of five days from notice.[11]
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,
[12]
docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In
its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,[13]the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions
before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments
on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17,
2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast
for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further
orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments[14] on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May
17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court,
the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a nonextendible period of five days.[15]
Issues:
86
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is
there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations.
4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.[16]
The Courts Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec
which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper
because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
[17]
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the
Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.[21]
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition
for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. [22] The
Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections,
Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate
recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioners action; to
this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution
may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has
made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the
absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[23] It has been held that certiorari is
available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, where the issue raised is one
purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency. [24] Indeed, the instant
case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially
involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system,
which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.[25]
Finally, procedural requirements may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice,
when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set
aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available.[26]
Second Issue:
88
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that the inclusion of
political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned
Resolution.[27] For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of major
political parties.[28] On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded
political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to
participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.[29]
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties
may be registered under the party-list system.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid,
except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system,
shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors,
boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll
watchers in accordance with law.[30]
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod
pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may be a regional party, a sectoral
party, a national party, UNIDO,[31]Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao."[32] This was
also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:[33]
89
MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO,
PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido.
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to
open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth
in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. [34] He explained: The purpose of
this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups
or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000
votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no
voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially
the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system.
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x. Section 3
expressly states that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties. More to the point, the law defines political party as an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political
parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
x x x
xxx
xxx
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x
xxx
90
x x x
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the
party-list elections.
Third Issue:
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however,
that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The
requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of
the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, provides as follows:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the
Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give
genuine power to our people in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he
exultantly announced: On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new
chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature.[35]
91
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like in accordance with law or as may be provided by law; it was
thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA
7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end,
the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular
district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical
strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the
law; namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list
organization
or
party
must
factually
and
truly
represent
the
marginalized
and
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General
submits that RA No. 7941 does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.[39] In fact, it contends that any party or
group that is not disqualified under Section 6 [40]of RA 7941 may participate in the
elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization
representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the
party-list elections.[41]
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens
specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that
94
the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the
clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate
desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers
cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two
sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSGs position to treat them similarly defies
reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna PatajoKapunan[42] admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and
sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective
sectors.[43]
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority,
they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic
clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally,
political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of ones constituency; indeed, it is
likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of ones bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the
majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list
system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them
the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies;
and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its
noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for
genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the
farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to
come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last
elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating
this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested
95
groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the partylist system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the
seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent,
the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional
district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, [44] in
order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in
the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. [45] Logic shows that the
system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who
cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the simplest scheme
possible to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have
long been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional
district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared
to a student dormitory open house, which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities.
Obviously, the open house is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves
who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open
party-list system is only for the outsiders who cannot get elected through regular elections
otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of
Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats
under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The
party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given
the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by
those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be
96
snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of
political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and
Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the
Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary
source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the
provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained.[46] In other words, verba legis still
prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be
made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true
intent or purpose of the provision being construed.[47]
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary[48] that the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of
the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless
to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating
the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from
what appears upon its face. The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers understanding thereof.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in
clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto,
Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we
97
should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the
use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain
words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing
congressional
representatives
was
designed
to
enable
underrepresented
sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole x x x. The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need
for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any
event, the framers deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best,
only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is
not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and
simply.
Fourth Issue:
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate
fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have
ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted
before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field
candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates
or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.[49] Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial
instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.[50]
98
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and
PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as
the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It
argues that because of this, they have the advantage of getting official Comelec Election
Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x. We note, however, that this
accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district
representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers
under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of
whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have
the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the
Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa
Droga (MAD), because it is a government entity using government resources and privileges.
This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. [51] It is not equipped to receive evidence and
determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before
they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In
this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the
law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
99
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show
-- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government
and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is
likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they are
not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however,
that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of
Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the
Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the
political party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes.[52]
Third, in view of the objections[53] directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional
provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent
of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international
networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to
form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as
100
deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that
also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition,
then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction.[54]
The following discussion is also pertinent:
MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS,
he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say,
the indigenous community sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo,
the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera.[55]
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that religious denominations and sects shall not
be registered.[56] The prohibition was explained by a member [57] of the Constitutional
Commission in this wise: [T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a
political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That
is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party.[58]
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941,
which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
101
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[59]
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or
failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA
7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become
members of the House of Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does
not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the
party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by
citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or
its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal [60] and unfair to other parties,
but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
102
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election,
and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941,
the nominees must be Filipino citizens who belong to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties. Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully
represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to
the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the
bicameral committee proceedings that the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not
going to represent a particular district x x x.[61]
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those
who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended
to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope
103
and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in
the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their
limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other
respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position
does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also
prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating
hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken
them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble
intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not
have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to
immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme
urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to
begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such
number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is
further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice
hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec to refrain from
proclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the
Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections receipt
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
104
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente M.
Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.
105
EN BANC
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar involves the formula for computing the additional seats due, if any, for
winners in party-list elections.
The antecedents are undisputed.
Several party-list participants sent queries to the respondent COMELEC regarding the
formula to be adopted in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners in the May
10, 2004 elections. In response, the respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 6835,
[1]
adopting the simplified formula of "one additional seat per additional two percent of the total
In finding that this simplified formula is the "formula of choice of the Supreme Court,"
respondent Commission quoted the memorandum of Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain,
Commissioner-In-Charge for Party-List concerns, viz:
By way of review, following is a highlight of the legal discourse on the two
[percent] vote requirement for the party-list system and the corollary issue on
additional seat allocation.
Section 11(b) and Section 12 of R.A. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provide that
"the parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each,
provided that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
107
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes xxx. The
COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on
a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system."
These provisions of [the] statute were transformed into the following formulas by
the Supreme Court in Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC (G.R. Nos.
136781, 136786 & 136795, October 6, 2000).
For the party-list candidate garnering the highest number of votes, the following
formula was adopted:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
----------------------------------- = party relative to total votes
Total votes for party-list system for the party-list system
And for the additional seats of other parties who reached the required two
percent mark, the following formula applies:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = --------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of first the first party
party
The applicability of these formulas was reiterated in the June 25, 2003
Resolution of the Supreme Court in Ang BagongBayani-OFW Labor Party vs.
COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No. 147589) and Bayan Muna vs. COMELEC, et al.
(G.R. No. 147613) penned by Justice Artemio Panganiban, wherein the Court
declared that party-list BUHAY was not entitled to an additional seat even if it
garnered
4.46
[percent]
of
the
108
total
party-list
votes,
contrary
the
Supreme
Court,
with
Justices
Jose
Vitug
seat
and
proceeded
to
order
the
COMELEC
to
Party-List Canvass Report No. 20[5] showed that the total number of votes cast for all
the party-list participants in the May 10, 2004 elections was 12,721,952 and the following
parties, organizations and coalitions received at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system, to wit:
Ran
Party-List Group
Votes
Percentage to
Received
Total Votes
Cast (%)
1,203,305
109
9.4585
934,995
7.3495
852,473
6.7008
705,730
5.5473
Cooperatives (APEC)
3
Anakpawis (AP)
538,396
4.2320
495,193
3.8924
464,586
3.6518
Corruption (CIBAC)
7
448,072
3.5220
429,259
3.3742
10
343,498
2.7000
(AVE)
11
Alagad (ALAGAD)
340,977
2.6802
12
340,759
2.6785
13
270,950
2.1298
Party (COOP-NATCCO)
14
269,750
2.1204
15
269,345
2.1172
268,164
2.1079
o (ALIF)
16
Based on the simplified formula, respondent Commission issued Resolution No. NBC
04-004[6] proclaiming the following parties, organizations and coalition as winners and their
qualified nominees as representatives to the House of Representatives:
110
as
elected
representative
to
the
House
of
Representatives."[8]
On June 22, 2004, petitioners PM and BUTIL, together with CIBAC, filed a Joint Motion for
Immediate Proclamation[9] with the respondent Commission en banc. They prayed that they
be declared as entitled to one (1) additional seat each and their respective second nominees
be proclaimed as duly elected members of the House of Representatives. As basis, they
cited the formula used by the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC,[10] viz:
Votes Cast for
112
On June 25, 2004, petitioners and CIBAC filed a Supplement to the Joint Motion (For
Immediate Proclamation)[11] to justify their entitlement to an additional seat, as follows:
5. To compute the additional seats that movants are entitled to using
the Veterans formula
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
the
aforesaid Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna cases, and Party List
Canvass Report No. 20, the following process is done: Bayan Muna is the "First
Party" with 1,203,305 votes. To determine the number of seats allocated to the
first party, we use the Veterans formula, to wit:
Number of votes Proportion of votes
of first party of first party relative
---------------------- = to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system
party-list system
Applying this formula, we arrive at 9.4585%
1,203,305
-------------- = 9.4585%
12,721,952
6. Having obtained 9.4585%, the first party, Bayan Muna, is allotted three
(3) seats.
7. The number of additional seats that the movants are entitled to are
determined as follows:
Votes Cast for
Qualified Party
113
On July 31, 2004, respondent Commission en banc, issued Resolution No. NBC 04-011,
[13]
viz:
This pertains to the 06 July 2004 Memorandum of the Supervisory
Committee,
National
Board
of
Canvassers,
submitting
its
first party
The aforenamed party-list organizations have not obtained the
required additional two (2) percent of the total party-list votes for them to
merit an additional seat.
For your Honors' consideration."
xxx
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to direct the Supervisory Committee to cause the re-tabulation
of the votes for Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Luzon Farmers
Party (BUTIL), Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Gabriela Women's Party
(Gabriela) and to submit its comment/recommendation, together with the
tabulated figures of the foregoing parties, for appropriate action of the
Commission.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution and to furnish
copies hereof to the parties concerned for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.[14] (emphases supplied)
For failure of the respondent Commission to resolve the substantive issues raised by
petitioners and to cause the re-tabulation of the party-list votes despite the lapse of time,
petitioners PM and BUTIL filed the instant petition on August 18, 2004. They seek the
issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent Commission: a) to convene as the
National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List System; b) to declare them as entitled to one
(1) additional seat each; c) to immediately proclaim their respective second nominees; d) to
declare other similarly situated party-list organizations as entitled to one (1) additional seat
each; and e) to immediately proclaim similarly situated parties' second nominees as duly
elected representatives to the House of Representatives.[15]They submit as sole issue:
WHETHER
OR
NOT
RESPONDENT
COMELEC EN
BANC, AS
THE
We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent Commission, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, submits that petitioners' recourse to a petition for mandamus with this
Court is improper. It raises the following procedural issues: (a) the proper remedy from the
assailed resolution of the respondent Commission is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court; (b) the instant action was filed out of time; and (c) failure to file a motion
for reconsideration of the assailed resolution with the respondent Commission is fatal to
petitioners' action.[17]
In assailing petitioners' recourse to a petition for mandamus, respondent Commission
relies on Section 7, Article IX(A) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any decision,
order or ruling" of the respondent Commission "may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." It
contends that in Aratuc v. COMELEC[18] and Dario v. Mison,[19] this provision was construed
as the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 and not the appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45. Respondent Commission further contends that its duty to proclaim the second
nominees of PM and BUTIL is not ministerial but discretionary, hence, it is not subject to the
writ of mandamus.
The arguments fail to impress.
Under the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.[20] We have consistently ruled that where the duty of the
respondent Commission is ministerial, mandamus lies to compel its performance.[21] A purely
ministerial act, as distinguished from a discretionary act, is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
117
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.[22]
The case at bar is one of mandamus over which this Court has jurisdiction for it is
respondent Commission's ministerial duty to apply the formula as decided by this Court after
interpreting the existing law on party-list representation. It is given that this Court has the
ultimate authority to interpret laws and the Constitution. [23] Respondent Commission has no
discretion to refuse enforcement of any decision of this Court under any guise or guile.
118
In any event, it is the averments in the complaint, and not the nomenclature given by
the parties, that determine the nature of the action. [24] Though captioned as a Petition
for Mandamus,
the
same
may
be
treated
as
petition
for certiorari and mandamusconsidering that it alleges that the respondent Commission acted
contrary
to
prevailing
jurisdiction. In previous rulings,[25] we have treated differently labeled actions as special civil
actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as "justice, equity and fairplay"[26] and
"novelty of the issue presented and its far-reaching effects." [27] The petition at bar involves the
rightful representation in the House of Representatives of the marginalized groups by the
party-list winners and their constitutional claim merits more than a disposition based on thin
technicality.
Next, respondent Commission contends that the petition at bar was filed
belatedly. Under Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution and Rule 64, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court, the instant petition must be filed within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
notice of the decision, order or ruling to be reviewed. Since more than 30 days have lapsed
from the time PM and BUTIL allegedly received notice of respondent Commission's
Resolution No. 6835, it is urged that the instant petition was filed out of time.[28]
Again, the contention is without merit.
We have interpreted Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution and Rule 64, Section 3
of the Rules of Court to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the respondent
Commission rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. [29] Before
resolving whether Resolution No. 6835 was rendered in the exercise of respondent
Commission's adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, we recapitulate the pertinent events.
On May 8, 2004, respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 6835. On June 2,
2004, it also issued Resolution No. NBC 04-004 holding petitioners entitled to only one (1)
nominee each on the basis of Resolution No. 6835. On June 22, 2004, petitioners filed a
Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation with party-list co-participant CIBAC, claiming
entitlement to an additional seat using the formula stated in Ang Bagong Bayani. Thereafter,
119
they filed their Supplement to the Joint Motion (For Immediate Proclamation). On July 1,
2004, they filed an Urgent Motion for Resolution (Re: Joint Motion for Immediate
Proclamation dated 22 June 2004) and again, on July 12, 2004, they filed their Motion to
Resolve (Re: Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation filed on 22 June 2004). In response,
respondent Commission en banc issued Resolution No. NBC 04-011 quoted above, which
directed the Supervisory Committee "to cause the re-tabulation of the votes" of CIBAC,
GABRIELA and petitioners PM and BUTIL. The resolution referred to the Memorandum of the
Supervisory Committee which adopted the simplified formula in Resolution No. 6835.Without
further ado, petitioners BUTIL and PM filed the instant petition on August 18, 2004 or
eighteen (18) days after the promulgation of Resolution No. NBC 04-011. Clearly, the instant
petition was timely filed. We hold that Resolution No. 6835 was not rendered in the exercise
of respondent COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers. Its issuance was not brought about by a
matter or case filed before the respondent Commission. Rather, it was issued by the
respondent Commission in the exercise of its administrative function to enforce and
administer election laws to ensure an orderly election.
Finally, respondent Commission contends that petitioners' failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of Resolution No. 6835 is fatal.
Again, the argument is without merit.
Under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling, order or decision of the respondent Commission is not
allowed. Moreover, the issue of what formula applies in determining the additional seats to be
allocated to party-list winners is a pure question of law that is a recognized exception to the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.[30]
We shall now resolve the substantive issue: the formula for computing the additional
seats due, if any, for winners in party-list elections.
Petitioners cite the formula crafted by the Court in the landmark case of Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC.[31]They allege that the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the
Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. COMELEC[32] "reiterated that the additional seats for
120
qualified party-list organizations shall be computed in accordance with the above formula
in Veterans" and thatthe November 20, 2003 Resolution[33] of the Court in the same case
"had not departed from its 25 June 2003 Resolution."[34]
A review of the pertinent legal provisions and jurisprudence on the party-list system is
appropriate.
The Constitution provides:
Art. VI, Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (emphasis
supplied)
Pursuant to the Constitution's mandate, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, also known as the
"Party-List System Act," to "promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system." The law
provides as follows:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.-- xxx
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
121
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion of their total
number of votes:Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section
12. Procedure
in
Allocating
Seats
for
Party-List
Representatives.-- The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to
the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast
for the party-list system. (emphases supplied)
These provisions on the party-list system were put to test in the May 11,
1998 elections. In the landmark case of Veterans,[35] several petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of
preliminary injunction, were filed by some parties and organizations that had obtained at least
two percent of the total party-list votes cast in the May 11, 1998 party-list elections, against
COMELEC and 38 other parties, organizations and coalitions which had been declared by
COMELEC as entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The following
issues
were
raised:
1)
whether
the
twenty
percent
constitutional
allocation
is
mandatory; 2) whether the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit under
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is constitutional; and 3) how the additional seats of a qualified
party should be determined. In said case, the Court set the "four inviolable parameters" of the
party-list system under the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, to wit:
First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of
two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to
have a seat in the House of Representatives.
122
Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
Likewise, the Court spelled out the formula for allocating the seats for party-list winners,
thus:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the
private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is
to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each
received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the
total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at
least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only
these
parties
shall
be
considered
in
the
computation
of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first
party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other
parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the
number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to
which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of
votes.
xxx
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled
to? x x x The formula x x x is as follows:
Number of votes
123
No. of votes of
concerned party
---------------------Total No. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system
for concerned = -------------------------- x No. of additional
party No. of votes of seats allocated
first party to the first party
---------------------Total No. of votes
for party-list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
124
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party
for concerned = ------------------------ x No. of additional
party No. of votes of seats allocated
first party to the first party[36]
(emphases supplied)
Applying this formula, the Court found the outcome of the May 11, 1998 party-list elections as
follows:
Organization Votes %age of Initial Additional Seats Total
Garnered Total No. of
Votes Seats
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646/503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500/503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802/503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184/503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042/503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303/503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
8. ABANSE!PINAY 235,548 2.57% 1 235,548/503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376/503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643/503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1
125
The case of Ang Bagong Bayani arose during the May 14, 2001 party-list elections.
Two petitions for certiorari were filed by several party-list candidates: (a) to challenge a
resolution of the COMELEC approving the participation of some 154 organizations and
parties in the May 14, 2001 party-list elections; and (b) to disqualify certain parties classified
as "political parties" and "organizations/coalitions" by COMELEC. In a Decision dated June
26, 2001, the Court established the eight-point guideline [38]for the screening of party-list
participants. The case was then remanded to the COMELEC for the immediate conduct of
summary evidentiary hearings to implement the eight-point guideline.
In due time, COMELEC submitted its compliance reports to the Court. Based on the
compliance reports, the Court issued several resolutions proclaiming BAYAN MUNA with its
three nominees and AKBAYAN!, BUTIL, APEC and CIBAC, with one nominee each, as partylist winners.[39]
Subsequently, several motions for proclamation were filed by other party-list
participants. In resolving the motions, the Court had to consider, among others, the effect of
the disqualification after the elections of many party-list participants to the total votes cast for
the party-list elections. In the previous case of Labo v. COMELEC,[40] this Court ruled that the
votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified candidate cannot be considered "stray" except
when the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to
bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but nonetheless cast their votes in favor of
the ineligible candidate. In its Resolution dated June 25, 2003, the Court held that
the Labo doctrine cannot be applied to the party-list system in view of Sec. 10 of R.A.
No. 7941 which expressly provides that the votes cast for a party, a sectoral organization or a
coalition "not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted." The Court then proceeded to
determine the number of nominees the party-list winners were entitled, thus:[41]
126
127
= 0.51
Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat. It is
entitled to only one qualifying seat like all the other qualified parties that are
ranked below it, as shown in Table No. 3:
Table No. 3
Ran
k
Party-list
Votes
Percentag Additiona
e
(%)
Seats
APEC
802,060
12.29
n/c
AKBAYAN!
377,852
5.79
n/c
BUTIL
330,282
5.06
n/c
CIBAC
323,810
4.96
n/c
BUHAY
290,760
4.46
0.51
AMIN
252,051
3.86
0.44
ABA
242,199
3.71
0.42
COCOFED
229,165
3.51
0.40
10
PM
216,823
3.32
0.38
11
SANLAKAS
151,017
2.31
0.26
12
ABANSE!
135,211
2.07
0.24
PINAY
The additional seats for APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC, if any, were not determined in
the Court's Resolution dated June 25, 2003, as there was a separate pending motion filed by
128
BAYAN MUNA to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC proclaiming APEC, AKBAYAN!,
BUTIL and CIBAC's respective additional nominees.
Dissatisfied by the Court's June 25, 2003 Resolution, BUHAY filed a motion to have it
declared as entitled to one (1) additional seat. On November 20, 2003, in the same case
of Ang Bagong Bayani,[42] the Court computed the additional seats for APEC, AKBAYAN!,
BUTIL and CIBAC in accordance with the formula stated in the Court's Resolution dated June
25, 2003, and found the results as follows:
APEC -- 1.40
AKBAYAN -- 0.66
BUTIL -- 0.58
CIBAC -- 0.56
Then, the Court resolved pro hac vice to grant BUHAY's motion, reasoning that:
It is thus established in the Resolution of 25 June 2003 that, like APEC, BUTIL,
CIBAC and AKBAYAN, BUHAY had obtained more than four percent (4%) of the
total number of votes validly cast for the party-list system and obtained more
than 0.50 for the additional seats. Accordingly, just like the first four whose
additional nominees are now holding office as member of the House of
Representatives, BUHAY should be declared entitled to additional seat.[43]
conform
to
the
principle
of
proportional
Second, in the November 20, 2003 Resolution in Ang Bagong Bayani, the Court gave
an additional seat to BUHAY only because it was similarly situated to APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC
and AKBAYAN which "had obtained more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes
validly cast for the party-list system and obtained more than 0.50 for the additional
seats." Well to note, the grant of an additional seat to BUHAY was pro hac vice, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby RESOLVES, pro hac vice
1. To consider closed and terminated the issue regarding the proclamation
by the COMELEC of the additional nominees of APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and
AKBAYAN, such nominees having taken their oath and assumed office;
2. To DECLARE that BUHAY is entitled to one (1) additional seat in the
party-list system in the elections of May 2001 and;
3. To ORDER the COMELEC to proclaim BUHAY's second nominee.
SO ORDERED.[46] (emphasis supplied)
Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular occasion." [47] A ruling
expressly qualified as pro hac vicecannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other
cases. It was therefore erroneous for respondent Commission to apply theNovember 20,
2003 Resolution and rule that the formula in Veterans has been abandoned.
130
The confusion in the petition at bar must have been created by the way
the Veterans formula was cited in the June 25, 2003Resolution of the Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani.[48] Be that as it may, we reiterate that the prevailing formula for the
computation of additional seats for party-list winners is the formula stated in the landmark
case of Veterans, viz:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party[49] first party
Applying said formula to the undisputed figures in Party-List Canvass Report No. 20,
we do not find petitioners entitled to any additional seat. Thus:
448,072
Additional seats = ------------ x 2
for PM 1,203,305
= 0.74
429,259
Additional seats = ------------ x 2
for BUTIL 1,203,305
= 0.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
131
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms the Auditor-General's decision
that petitioner as a Congressman whose term of office expired on December 30, 1969 and
qualified for retirement benefits by virtue of a minimum of twenty years of government service
is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on the salary actually received by him as a member
of Congress of P7,200.00 per annum. To grant petitioner's contention that the retirement
gratuity of members of Congress; such as himself whose terms expired on December 30,
1969 should be computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
under Republic Act 4134 which could only by operative with incoming members of Congress
whose terms of office would commence on December 30, 1969, by virtue of the Constitutional
mandate that such salary increases could take effect only upon the expiration of the full term
of all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such increased salary, (since
132
petitioner and other outgoing members of Congress were constitutionally prohibited from
receiving such salary increase during their term of office) would be a subtle way of going
around the constitutional prohibition and increasing in effect their compensation during their
term of office and of doing indirectly what could not be done directly.
Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December
30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the salaries of
constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government" was enacted into
law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of
Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to
P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases "shall take effect in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution." (section 1)
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was
held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this
Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay 1 "that the increased compensation
provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969when the full term
of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired"
by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which
provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such increase."
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his term having
expired on December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186,
section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any
official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the
last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided "in case of employees
133
based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as
provided by law." 2
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of
P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress which he never received during his
incumbency and which under this Court's above-quoted decision in Philconsa vs.
Mathay could become operative only on December 30, 1969 with the expiration of the full
terms of all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such increased salary.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant, however, pending
resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T.
Singson, whose term as Congressman likewise expired on December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the
warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim, enclosing
therewith copy of the Auditor General's adverse decision on ex-Congressman Singson's claim
for retirement gratuity as computed on the basis of the salary increase of P32,000.00 per
annum for members of Congress under Republic Act No. 4134.
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due course on January 20, 1972, by the
Auditor General through respondent Auditor who further advised petitioner and furnished him
with copy of the 2nd indorsement of June 29, 1971, of the Office of the President, dismissing
the appeal of Congressman Singson from the Auditor General's adverse decision disallowing
the claim for retirement gratuity, computed on a salary basis of P32,000.00 per annum.
Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal from the adverse decision of the
Auditor General.
The thrust of petitioner's appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis
of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not
applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held
in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of
134
Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of
Congress "as provided by law" (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per
annum.
Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under
Republic Act 4134 could be operative only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members of
Congress when the full term of all members of Congress (House and Senate) that approved
the increase (such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of the constitutional mandate of
Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is self-evident that the "rate of pay as
provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as petitioner
must necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they received "as provided by
law" and the Constitution during their term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December
30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they
were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were
permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor
General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson,
"(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited
result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what can not be done directly." 3
The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not escape notice that during his
entire tenure as Congressman (Dec. 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) comprising the last four
years of his government service, the herein claimant-retiree was unable to receive the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for Members of Congress precisely because of the
,constitutional ban. To allow him now to collect such amount in the guise of retirement gratuity
defies logic. Nor does it stand to reason that while he could not legally receive such rate as
135
salary while still in the service, he would now be allowed to enjoy it thereafter by virtue of his
retirement." 4
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum was
already operative when his retirement took effect on December 30, 1969, his retirement
gratuity should be based on such increased salary cannot be sustained as far as he and other
members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969
are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of
compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation
and "other emoluments" to their salary as provided by law.
This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez. 5 In striking down Republic Act No.
3836 as null and void insofar as it referred to the retirement of members of Congress and the
elected officials thereof for being violative of the Constitution, this Court held that "it is evident
that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of
compensation for services of one possessing any office" and that "Republic Act No. 3836
provides for an increase in theemoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22,
1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
section 14 of the Constitution." 6
It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o allow petitioner a retirement
gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing
his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain
directly."
4. The other ancillary contentions of petitioner in pressing his claim were amply refuted by the
Office of the President in dismissing the appeal in the similar case of ex-Congressman
Singson and therefore likewise serve to show the untenability of petitioner's stand in this
appeal, mutatis mutandis, as follows:
136
rendered by him not only as a member of Congress but in other branches of the
government as well. The foregoing contention carries its own refutation.
Retirement benefit is compensation for services rendered (PHILCONSA VS.
GIMENEZ, supra). Since Mr. Singson applied for retirement as an "elected
official," it is evident that he seeks compensation not only for services rendered in
other branches of the Government but also for his services as member of
Congress using P32,000, an amount prohibited for him but allowed for his
successor, in the computation of his retirement gratuity." 7
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.
138
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accusedappellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and
acts of lasciviousness on six counts[1] is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this
motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted
in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to
validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to
balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in
the context of penal law.
The accused-appellants "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House
of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
1. Accused-appellants reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be
rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not even the
police power of the State.
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We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive,
legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate
misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by
itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted
by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the
requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of
the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; xxx.
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only
to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the
Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to
the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were
pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the
same.
141
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from
arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully
defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or
for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of
Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement
that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For
relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress function to attend sessions is
underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of
absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one.
The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of
more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellants reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[2], which states, inter alia,
that
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be
142
assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling
that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the
enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not
removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless
expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public
self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,[3] it is the injury to the public which State action in
criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the
Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if
there is risk of his absconding.[4]
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office
cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if
permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants arrest was issued, he fled and
evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to
attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the
same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his
present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being
contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the
States penal system.
143
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or
medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan
Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the
House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in
Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati
City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accusedappellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1)
establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the
NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to
use his own vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his place
of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart
condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
144
of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.
He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to
discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when
he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of
Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North
Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a
full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he
is also provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa
City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under
detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving
his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been
discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the
restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant
should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National Pentientiary to
perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is
suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve
his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws."[6] This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in
146
rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of government may not show any
undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accusedappellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people"
are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President
or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance
of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is
most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the
lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular
duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained
by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.[8]
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.[9]
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
147
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.[10]
Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to
prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion.[11]
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of ones liberty. As a
punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the
accused.[12] The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention
of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and
will.[13] Imprisonment is the detention of another against his willdepriving him of his power of
locomotion[14] and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion
of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."[15]
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individuals
status in society.[16] Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the
security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that
prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands
require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights.[17]
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellants claim that reelection to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power
of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the main and
separate opinion.
148
149
150
134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,2 threw his hat in the
political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on
June 30, 2007.3
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC,
Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend
Senate Sessions and Related Requests"4(Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the
Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in
session, and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee
hearings, committee meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of
legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate of the
Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to
Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig,
Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer
and the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet
access) in order that he may be able to work there when there are no sessions,
meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session. The costs of
setting up the said working area and the related equipment and utility costs can be
charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate;
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of
detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at
reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings,
briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists
(sic) him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;
151
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions
to the press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the
public while at the Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to
help shape public policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate in
maintaining the system of checks and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches
of Government;
(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to
be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the
media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or
opinion at his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at
the Senate or when the Senate is not in session; and
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the
Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July
2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City.5
By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c)
and (f) to thus trim them down to three.7The trial court just the same denied the motion by
Order of September 18, 2007.8
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and
for prohibition andmandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff,
resource persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his
capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff,
resource persons and guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the
Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of having
been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and guests9 at the Marine Brig.
Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navys Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral
152
Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and
Marine Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obea (Obea).
Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since November
30, 2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center
following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel10 the day before or on November
29, 2007.
Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against the
above-named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased
to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination thereof would be without practical
value and use. Meanwhile, against those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask
for reliefs from this Court.11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police
officers currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily
show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former custodians.12
Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his Motion
for Reconsideration filed with the trial court:
I.
THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY
INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:
A.
UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS
ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE
INSTANT CASE, ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND,
THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
B.
153
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2)
COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN
ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP
DETAT", A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL
OFFENSE;
C.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO
BEING ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY
SURRENDERED TO THE AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;
II.
GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE
BRIGS COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE
SENATE SESSIONS;
III.
ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR
SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE
REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO
WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;
- AND IV.
MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL
TREATMENT OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN
154
155
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be
detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by
the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention.26 (Underscoring supplied)
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that
confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting
that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized
that the accused could somehow accomplish legislative results.27
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with
it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption
of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The
Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no longer operates in
favor of the accused pending the review on appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule
stands that until a promulgation of final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate
of presumption of innocence prevails.28
In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor
disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should
cease after his proclamation by the Commission on Elections.29
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight
risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the
numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on
November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from
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the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as
the "Manila Pen Incident,"30 proves that petitioners argument bites the dust. The risk that he
would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding
became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in
ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail.31 In
cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is
neither a matter of right nor of discretion.32
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for leeway because
unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged
with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence
for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Courts pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail
is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the
defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury."35 At
the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were non-bailable where evidence
of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the obvious reason that "one who faces a probable death
sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee."37 Petitioners petition for bail having
earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to
bailing him out.
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial courts findings, Esperon did not overrule
Obeas recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the
Comment38 of Obea that he interposed no objection to such request but recommended that
he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate Senate security. And
petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to
the performance of petitioners duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only
disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military installation owing to AFPs
apolitical nature.39
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The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective
that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention.40 The officer
with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as
may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape of the
detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers provide guidance on
security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner that pleadings
are not impositions upon a court.
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his
mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that
denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people
of proper representation, denying the peoples will, repudiating the peoples choice, and
overruling the mandate of the people.
Petitioners contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can
not be removed foradministrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent
of cutting off the right to remove him therefor."42
The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And
there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases,43 the Court categorically held that
the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, reelection to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioners electoral victory only
signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison."44
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,45 it is opportune to wipe out the
lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder
than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence.
The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the
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people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under
the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate
of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in
the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.46 (Underscoring supplied)
Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners
who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph
Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions."
Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious request to perform the duties
of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners,
petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form
of being placed under Senate custody or house arrest,47 yet he at the same time, gripes about
the granting of house arrest to others.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at
the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.48 That this discretion was gravely
abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to
register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast
his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office49 on
June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be
accused of taking a complete turn-around,50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to
him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
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Petitioners position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone,
petitioners case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly
expounds:
x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all
the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.51
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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