Berezoschi Roxana

A landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 7
10, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964), extended the First
Amendment's guarantee of freespeech to LIBEL cases brought by public officials. The Supreme C
ourt sought to encourage public debate by changing the rules involving libel that had previously b
een the province ofstate law and state courts.
New York Times v. Sullivan grew out of events occurring during the 1960s Civil Rights
Movement in Alabama. In 1960, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., and other Civil
Rights leadersconducted protests against Segregation in Montgomery, Alabama. Their efforts m
et fierce resistance from Montgomery public officials. Civil rights leaders placed a fullpageadvertisement in the New York Times seeking contributions for civil rights causes in the Sout
h. Signed by sixty-four prominent leaders in public affairs, religion, trade unions, and theperformin
g arts, the advertisement, entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," stated that thousands of southern
African American students were engaging in nonviolent demonstrations inpositive affirmation of th
e right to live in human dignity. The ad went on to charge that these demonstrations had been me
t with a "wave of terror" by state and local governments.Alleged events that backed up this charg
e were described, but no particular public official was named.
L.B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner responsible for supervising the city police depar
tment, filed a libel suit against four African American clergyman and the New YorkTimes in Alaba
ma state court. Sullivan alleged that the advertisement implicitly libeled him. Libel is a civil TORT a
nd consists of injuring someone's reputation by reporting falsehoodsabout that person.
At trial Sullivan proved that the advertisement contained a number of minor inaccuracies about de
scribed incidents. The jury had to determine whether the statements in theadvertisement were "of
and concerning" Commissioner Sullivan. The judge instructed the jury that under Alabama law, if t
he statements were found libelous, falsity and malice werepresumed, and damages could be awa
rded without direct proof of financial loss. The jury concluded that the statements did concern Sull
ivan and awarded him $500,000 for injuries tohis reputation and profession.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Rule of
Law applied by Alabama violated the First Amendment. Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAN JR., in his maj
ority opinion, placed thelegal issues in the context of "a profound national commitment to the prin
ciple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may w
ell includevehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and publ
ic officials." Brennan maintained that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate andmust
be protected if freedom of expression is to have the "breathing space" it needs to survive.
The advertisement was squarely a public expression and protest, and fell within constitutional pro
tection. Neither the allegedly defamatory content of the ad, nor the falsity of some ofits factual sta
tements, nor the Negligence of anyone in preparing or publishing it forfeited this protection. Bren
nan dismissed the idea that courts were free to conclude that libelousstatements were made "of a
nd concerning" a particular person when the statements on their face did not make even an obliq
ue reference to the individual. Brennan stated that thereis "no legal alchemy" by which a court co

nstitutionally can establish that "an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations was
a libel of an official responsible for thoseoperations."
Brennan then set out the rule that reshaped libel law. A public official could recover in a libel actio
n only if and when a court found that the libelous statement about the official wasmade with " 'act
ual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was fals
e or not." As long as the press has an "absence of malice,"public officials are barred from recover
ing damages for the publication of false statements about them.
In separate concurring opinions, Justices HUGO L. BLACK and WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS differed with Jus
tice Brennan over whether the press should ever be held liable in Defamation of publicofficials. T
hey concluded that the First Amendment provided an absolute Immunity for criticism of the way
public officials do their public duty. Anything less than absolute immunityencourages "deadly dang
er" to a free press by state libel laws that harass, punish, and ultimately destroy critics.
In the years since New York Times, some critics have argued that Black and Douglas were right.
The "reckless disregard" requirement has allowed highly intrusive inquiries into thereportorial and
editorial processes of the mass media. In addition, the "chilling effect" of libel suits has not been d
iminished because of the case. If a jury finds reckless disregard, itcan award enormous damage
awards against the press.
Other critics of the decision believe it affords too much protection to the press. Public officials unf
airly libeled by the press rarely file libel suits because of the difficulty of provingactual malice. This
prevents them from establishing in a court of law the falsity of the statements at issue.