Ricky

Shah

Irans Nuclear Deal: An Analysis of Political Negotiations for Power

Intro
The main issue at the forefront of nuclear talks before 2013 between Iran and P5-plus-1 were
that because of Irans deception, it should forfeit its right to enrich [uranium]1 and allow more
robust inspections by the IAEA. Iran disputed that as a signatory to the NPT it has the right to
enrich uranium for civilian uses 1 and it will not give this right up. These strong positions caused
a stalemate in the many attempts to negotiate an agreement as the negotiations did not address
the underlying interests. After 10 years of effectively no headway, it was the understanding of key
interests of Iran and basing an argument and concessions around it, which would make way for
the framework for a final agreement. This was the result of efforts by both sides to rebuild trust,
facilitating communication and information exchange of significance were the secret
negotiations between Iran-US and the first communication between Presidents in 34 years. In
this essay I will analyse the key negotiations, significant events and negotiation tactics employed
to understand how this framework deal was reached. 1

Synopsis
2002-2004: A dissident group reveals previously undeclared nuclear sites in Iran, whilst the US
claims they have established a nuclear weapons program. Iran later makes a first offer in a
comprehensive proposal of negotiations to the US, who refuses it with contempt on the basis
that Iran has to answer to the international community2. Negotiations ensue after Iran admits
to continuing to develop centrifuges. The IAEA, the UNs nuclear watchdog, wants Iran to
sustain the suspension of uranium enrichment, and concessions are offered. During this period
the Supreme Leader issues a fatwa against nuclear weapons, although it legitimacy is contested.
2005-2008: Tensions escalate as the IAEA votes to report Iran to the UN Security Council
(UNSC). Iran ceases voluntary co-operation with the IAEA and resumes the enrichment of

1 Iran: Where we are today (2009, May 4) http://fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/iran.html
2 In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran's Offer of Dialogue (2006, June 18) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700727_pf.html

Ricky Shah
uranium. The UNSC threatens and subsequently issues sanctions for failure to suspend all
uranium enrichment. Further sanctions are extended on Iran including financial and travel bans
to individuals.
2009-2012: Obama is inaugurated as President of US with intentions for nuclear talks to resume.
Negotiations breakdown as Iran grows its enrichment program; sanctions are put fully in effect.
2013: Secret negotiations take place between US and Iran, whilst the latter elects the new
President, Hassan Rouhani. Obama announces his historic conversation with Irans President and
months later a Joint Plan of Action (JPA) is signed between Iran and P5-plus-1 countries (5
permanent members of the UNSC: China, France, Russia, UK, US, plus Germany).
2014: Several rounds of negotiations ensue and two extensions to deadlines are granted.
2nd April 2015: A general framework for a final agreement is announced, with final details to be
worked out by June 30 2015.

Foundation I: Relationships
In a 2009 Congress report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, it is described in
heavy detail how Irans intentions are not clear with regards to the nature of their nuclear
program. The fundamental reason for this is trust, which is severely deteriorated since the 2002
revelation of a clandestine nuclear program and undeclared nuclear facilities, and is also the main
reason for why negotiations have been so difficult. As Shell points out, trust is at the core of
human relationships and that trust and confidenceeases anxiety and facilitates
communication3.
The relationship between Iran and US over the previous 30 years (1979-2009) had
been seriously affecting the terms on which they had bilateral talks the lack of trust caused for
the previous ineffective bargaining and stalled negotiations. This emulated a situation where the
high stakes were all that mattered i.e. Shells Situational Matrix describes the parties treating this
as a Transaction, where Integrative Bargaining should be used to trade between issues and

3 Shell, R. (2006) Bargaining for Advantage. New York, NY: Penguin Group.

Ricky Shah
packages, making small concessions to gauge interests, yet this logrolling did not happen4 5.
This is because of the low trust between parties, low value placed on relationships and the norm
of reciprocity not being pursued, which were all fundamental requirements for moving forward
in this sensitive situation. The use of confidence building measures were illustrative of the need
for P5-plus-1 and Iran to create a level of trust in their nuclear program through making
reciprocated concessions and there was the realization that this would lead to the possibility of
reaching an agreeable deal.6 In this case the norm of reciprocity did not fully develop as these
confidence measures, which included Iran voluntarily allowing more stringent inspections from
the IAEA i.e. the so-called Additional Protocol, were ended in protest to continued demands
that Iran ceases to enrich uranium, whilst sanctions were still being upheld.
The use of a mediator, Sultan Qaboos, was instrumental in establishing productive
communication and developing a relationship based on reciprocity whilst pursuing mutual
interests. The secret talks held in Oman in 2013, which had the the specific goal of advancing
the stalled nuclear talks, transformed the deal closer towards a Balanced Concerns situation, in
which the disparity between the value placed on stakes and relationships narrowed.7 [BBC] Richard
Shell points out that it is when there is higher trust and genuine conflict between people over
their legitimate goals[this] actually helps energize the collaborative problem-solving process in
a Balanced Concerns situation5.
The improved focus on relationship was also a result of a strategic public message
from President Obama as well as Mr. Rouhanis election campaign stating a willingness to engage
with the West8. Obamas well-delivered speech was instrumental in motivating all parties to work
towards coming to a resolution; it touched upon the two sides differences, the challenges they
faced, and most importantly the basis for a solution; the need for renewed trust and cooperation.
Obamas administration shows an understanding of the situation through the concern of

4 Iran offers nuclear 'concession' (2004, Nov 28) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4049967.stm
5 Shell, R. (2006) Bargaining for Advantage. New York, NY: Penguin Group.

6 Inspections: The Weak Link in a Nuclear Agreement with Iran (2014, June 11) Vol. 14, No. 19

http://jcpa.org/article/inspections-nuclear-agreement/
7 Secret talks set stage for Iran nuclear deal (2013, Nov 25) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25086236
8 Secret US-Iran talks cleared way for historic nuclear deal (2013, Nov 24)

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10471030/Secret-US-Iran-talks-cleared-way-for-historic-nucleardeal.html

Ricky Shah
maintaining a good working relationship to facilitate effective communication and information
exchange and enable P5-plus-1 to understand intimately the other partys interests so they can
reach a comprehensive solution.9 What is less obvious is whether the Republican majority
Congress understood that norm of reciprocity could not envelop with their favoring of heavier
measures still.10
The negotiation that takes place here is package bargaining, since there are multiple
interests at stake and all relate to each other. Since November 24 2013, when the JPA was
established there have been two extensions to the initial deadline and fourteen rounds of
negotiations in total. This lengthy process can be attributed to the long development time for
highly sensitive relationships, the issues at hand as well as the time for trust to build, to establish
underlying interests and to test the expectation based on the parties relative leverage.11

Foundation II: The Other Partys Interests

As the crisis group put it in 2014, the deal will ultimately be sustainable only if the
partiesrecognize that their rivals legitimate interests need to be respected. [CRISIS GROUP] This
view is confirmed by Shell who says that understanding what the other party really wants is
critical to Information-Based Bargaining.11
For example, in negotiations pre-2013, the P5-plus-1 insisted on Iran halting its
enrichment of uranium on the basis that their clandestine nuclear facilities meant the
international community could not trust their nuclear program. Iran perceived the US as having
leverage during 2003, which resulted in Iran yielding to pressure and cooperating. Once this
perceived leverage was diminished, however, Iran quickly reversed any concessions made, which
illustrates the previous understanding was not agreeable under ordinary circumstances and thus
did not respect Irans fundamental interests. One could speculate that Irans legitimate interests
were unclear and therefore the US thought it was better than their BATNA to use its leverage to

9 Barack Obama, White House Speech, (2013, Sep 27) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/27/statement-president

10 Wheres the deal? (2013, Feb 2) http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21571142-even-if-direct-negotiations-

between-united-states-and-iran-ensue-few-predict
11 Shell, R. (2006) Bargaining for Advantage. New York, NY: Penguin Group.

Ricky Shah
come up with at least a temporary solution until a more long-term viable one was found.
However, it is clear that if the P5-plus-1 understood Irans needs intimately and concurrently with
establishing trust in the peaceful nature of Irans nuclear program, this would achieve a
sustainable agreement as the Western front reciprocated nuclear concessions.12
In Getting to Yes, one of the books main points is to focus on interests, not
positions. We will not surrender or suspend uranium enrichment in any situationwe will not
allow even a gram of uranium to go out of the country"; this is an illustrative example of Mr.
Araqchi, Irans Deputy Foreign Minister, taking a position an attempt to increase the
perception of his bottom line. Behind this opposing position with the US, lies shared and
compatible interest (as well as conflicting ones)13. Colin H. Kahl described there being a need for
negotiators to trade-off issues, in particular, the number of centrifuges and stockpiles represent
interrelated constraints.14 We can observe how the negotiators were successful in finding shared
interests in this circumstance, by looking at the framework deal that stipulates reducing the
stockpile from 10,000 to 300kg for 15 years and reducing the number of installed centrifuges
from 19,000 to 6,104. These two parameters of the deal represents the creation of inventive
options to solve both parties interests such that the pie is made larger. This idea is fundamental
to an integrative bargaining process where the negotiator identifies the issues most important to
each side and then logrolling interests in exchange for reciprocal accommodations; Shell
describes this strategy as carrying a lower risk of impasse, which was key for the nuclear talks
after the JPA.15
The fundamental issue, as pointed out earlier, was that there was low trust in Irans
claim that its nuclear program was not military related. The mistrust was also directed at Irans
leaders, the true intentions of which remained disquietingly unclear.16 The new President

12 International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 152 (2014, May 9)
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iran/152-iran-and-the-
p5-plus-1-solving-the-nuclear-rubik-s-cube.aspx
13 Fisher, R; Ury, W; Patton, B. (2011) Getting to Yes. New York, NY: Penguin Group

14 In a video on Youtube of a event titled The Rubiks Cube of a Final Agreement Colin H. Kahl discusses

the idea of trading off issues. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9g_z8pDJ34s#t=6m54s

15 Shell, R. (2006) Bargaining for Advantage. New York, NY: Penguin Group.
16 Ben Cohen, The Geneva deal and Irans Nuclear Ambitions (2014) http://fathomjournal.org/the-
geneva-deal-and-irans-nuclear-ambitions/

Ricky Shah
Houssani is known to have boasted as a nuclear negotiator 10 years previous of how he used the
negotiations with the West to buy time to advance Irans programme. The US had two secret
meetings with the newly elected Mr. Rouhani; this is unambiguously a relationship-focused
strategy at establishing Irans intentions going forward with the nuclear talks. The secret nature of
the meetings, I believe, are significant because the goals going into such talks appear more
genuine; there will be a focus on the information exchange rather than a public relations effort
afterwards (in the secret talks this did not take place). Furthermore it signals to the other party
the expectation the P5-plus-1 (in particular the US regarding to the secret meetings) puts on the
relationship aspect, which is an important part of the cooperation effort moving forward.
By analysing the action/communication coming from Irans leadership, much akin to
active listening, key elements of their interests are noticeable, such as their justifiable claim to
preserve a substantial part of its nuclear infrastructure, in view of the enormous cost it has paid
for it. The influential International Crisis Group pointed out in mid-2014 that what should be
achieved is compromise that satisfies both sides irreducible, bottom-line requirements and
thus falls within the ZOPA, and would produce a win-win outcome. Once the ZOPA is
established, a creative and comprehensive agreement can be achieved through the rounds of
negotiations. As a negotiator it is important to understand that the way in which issues are
perceived are key to what they think will be possible; focusing on interests rather than positions
such as the time it takes to break out an analysis which produces plastic numbers - is
important.17
A key interest that Irans leadership have communicated is a mutual interest, is
increased transparency, which many experts and critics believed is more likely to get approved.
This has been voiced by President Rouhani, what we can offer the world is greater
transparency, and with an aim to legitimise the peaceful nature of Irans nuclear program, the
resulting trust will have far reaching ramifications and help on the front of other issues. However,
it is important to be cautious from the negotiators point of view, as US Secretary of State says,

17 International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 152 (2014, May 9)

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iran/152-iran-and-the-
p5-plus-1-solving-the-nuclear-rubik-s-cube.aspx

Ricky Shah
words must be matched with actions effectively pointing out to the vague words of the Iranian
President. The extent to which Iran could follow through with agreeing to unprecedented levels
of transparency should be evaluated i.e. the credibility of their claims are important in building
trust.18
Dr. Heinonen, a Senior Fellow at Harvard University, who spent 30-years working for
the IAEA was concerned that President Rouhani is not the final decision maker on nuclear
policy. Shell says identifying the decision maker and negotiating directly with them will be
instrumental in understanding the other partys needs more intrinsically and bargaining more
effectively.19 Heinonen belief and Shells view that negotiations are hindered by not talking
directly with the decision maker, is somewhat proved by Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei saying a
week after the framework deal was created, that he neither accepts nor rejects it and that he
considers the deal not passable unless all sanctions are lifted immediately, in conflict with the
prospective terms and with President Rouhanis statement saying, will live up to our
promises.20 This highlights the importance of negotiating directly with the decision maker; it will
have an impact on the terms negotiated and the commitment to the deal once reached.

Foundation III: Authoritative Standards & Norms

President Obama announced the historic conversation he had had with President
Rouhani in September 2013, detailing how he is mindful of all the challenges ahead but he
believes [Iran and the P5-plus-1] can reach a comprehensive solution. In addition, he mentions
the Supreme Leader who has ultimate authority on Irans nuclear and foreign policy Ali
Khameneis fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons also stating that President
Rouhani has indicated that Iran will never develop nuclear weapons. This is a powerful message;
this tactic, where he publicly announces what the US and now the entire international community

18 Inspections: The Weak Link in a Nuclear Agreement with Iran (2014, June 11) Vol. 14, No. 19
http://jcpa.org/article/inspections-nuclear-agreement/
19 Ben Cohen, The Geneva deal and Irans Nuclear Ambitions (2014) http://fathomjournal.org/the-
geneva-deal-and-irans-nuclear-ambitions/
20 Iran Supreme Leader Speech (2015, Apr 10) http://www.businessinsider.com/irans-supreme-leader-
just-gave-a-speech-that-could-put-a-nuclear-deal-out-of-reach-2015-4

Ricky Shah
expects of Iran, uses a large international audience to pressurize the opposite party into acting
consistently with their previous statements, and puts P5-plus-1s in a better bargaining position as
well as helping to move talks forward.21
An interesting authoritative standard of significance is the issuance of a fatwa a
ruling by a religious authority, often with judicial implications by Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei, against the development of nuclear weapons. This is particularly of significant
meaning because President Obama refers to it in his speech; the use of the audience is to
Obamas advantage as discussed before. However, in light of this, there is a cloud of controversy
surrounding the legitimacy of the fatwa and whether the Supreme Leader has the authority to
make one and critics argue whether it has had and should have any weighting on discussions and
trust going forward. Furthermore, as an expert on Khamenei at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (CEIP), Karim Sadjadpour suggests, Obama is referencing the fatwa in
order to give the Iranians an easier route to compromise because of their religious beliefs, not
because of U.S.-led sanctions. This infers how Obama is using the power of authority in this
case Khamenei to rally support for working with the P5+1; perhaps then, with Iran claiming
the legitimacy of the fatwa and Obama referring to it as such, its validity does not matter.22
Previously, Iran has used the consistency principle to contend that it is being singled
out and treated exceptionally unjust, and that as a signatory of the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), more over because it has mastered enrichment technology Iran believes it has secured
the right to continue enrichment. The US and other countries have used the supporting
argument that Irans past deception means that it can no longer be trusted with the legal right to
enrich uranium. This argument has rallied support amongst the international community
however Irans leaders have maintained steadfastly that they will not bargain away their
enrichment capability, and upholding this consistent position has seemed to have gained them
an important normative leverage in negotiating this right. Furthermore, there is a concern that the

21 Barack Obama, White House Speech, (2013, Sep 27) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/09/27/statement-president
22 Did Irans supreme leader issue a fatwa? (2013, Nov 27) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-
checker/wp/2013/11/27/did-irans-supreme-leader-issue-a-fatwa-against-the-development-of-nuclear-
weapons/

Ricky Shah
mastering of the enrichment process has already occurred, so the focus should not be on this but
instead in limiting what Iran can do with the process.23 24
Iran had also gained leverage through a standards based argument from an
authoritative figure, Ali Soltanyieh, former Iranian ambassador to the IAEA, who dispelled the
idea of a more robust inspection system as a full contravention of the NPT and the Statute of
the IAEA. The use of these authoritative figures in widely publicized negotiations are common,
particularly in this case, with many people voicing their thoughts; this magnitude of opinions on
either side could have a diminishing effect on the ability for the power of authority principal to
come into play.

Foundation IV: Leverage

Iran makes the first offer in a comprehensive proposal of negotiations to the US, who
refuses it with contempt on the basis that Iran has to answer to the international community.
This large early-on concession seemed to reveal that Iran really wanted a deal, however Middle
East expert at CEIP, Trita Parsi saw how the US had threat-based leverage over Iran, forcing
their cooperation.25
Irans BATNA seemed weaker than the US in 2003, when it sent a proposal including
full cooperation on nuclear programs. The timing was just after Baghdad had been taken over
by US forces, which Parsi says frightened the Iranians who had not been able to defeat the Iraq
army in 8-years of bloody battle compared to the US who had overpowered them in three weeks.
The decision to walk away shows that US had more leverage, since they had the least to lose
from no deal. However, the perception of BATNA, is important too, and many authoritative
figures believed the rejected proposal, which had a comprehensive list of Iranian and US aims for
the talks, represented a major lost opportunity for the US, particularly because it was an
authoritative initiative that had the support of then-President Mohammad Khatami and supreme

23 Iran: Where we are today (2009, May 4) http://fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/iran.html

24 International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 152 (2014, May 9) http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-
north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iran/152-iran-and-the-p5-plus-1-solving-the-nuclear-rubik-s-cube.aspx
25 In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran's Offer of Dialogue (2006, June 18) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700727_pf.html

Ricky Shah
religious leader Ali Khamenei. Paul Pillar, the former national intelligence officer for the Near
East and South Asia believes that the US position is inherently weaker now because of Iraq,
whilst the Foreign Relations report notes the failure to find WMD in Iraq after its invasion
damaged its credibility on the issue26. In addition, Parsi reveals that he believes that the US not
curtseying Iran with a response to the offer strengthened the hands of those in Iran as it had an
impact on the government. The action and also inaction by the US affected their leverage, as it
revealed the US underlying interests; they cared more about Iranian power than their politics and
so the only way to compel the US to talk or deal with Iran isby being a nuisance.27
Another key development that changed the balance of leverage is the sudden break
out of North Korea in 2003 leading to the creation of a nuclear weapon 4 years later. Iran, by
following this example and withdrawing from the NPT, throwing out the IAEA inspectors and
reconfiguring the centrifuges could develop a nuclear warhead; this could represent a significant
boost to their BATNA (- if the motivation to break out) and therefore leverage.26
Iran has situational advantage, i.e. they have ultimate decision over the nuclear
program, which makes it harder to bargain with them. This is where the power of coalition is
used perhaps P5-plus-1s most important leverage, which uses the relationships and strong
mutual interests of the 6 countries to support their bargaining position. The use of economic
sanctions as a negative deterrent to breaking away has been successful; a major issue for Iran in
2013 once sanctions had taken full effect, was a currency depreciated by 50% over the year,
depleted forex reserves, and a flat economy the sanctions are inflicting unprecedented
economic pain28 29. This leverage to apply sanctions was somewhat reduced by China and Russia
not fully committed to supporting sanctions that were tough enough deterrents to Iran not
complying with inspections and other requirements because of the potential to cause them
economic harm because of their trade ties with Iran, further more China had veto power and

26 Iran: Where we are today (2009, May 4) http://fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/iran.html

27 In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran's Offer of Dialogue (2006, June 18) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700727_pf.html

28 International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 152 (2014, May 9) http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-
east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iran/152-iran-and-the-p5-plus-1-solving-the-nuclear-rubik-s-cube.aspx
29 Wheres the deal? (2013, Feb 2) http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21571142-
even-if-direct-negotiations-between-united-states-and-iran-ensue-few-predict

Ricky Shah
threatened to use it over the sanctions pre-2009.30 Iran, in anticipation of the sanctions,
attempted to make their economy resistant to them by diversifying their imports and exports and
use international trade relations for diplomatic goals.31

Conclusions
The key lessons I think should be taken away from these negotiations are that trust and
relationships are of upmost significance when attempting to strike a sustainable deal. I enjoy
analysing political negotiations because of the multiple issues, high stakes and high relationship
focused nature of bargaining; analysing helped to distinguish key strategies used successfully in
these situations and gain an understanding of what must be done to negotiate a deal to your
advantage. I believe this type of negotiation, involving multiple issues is perhaps the toughest to
be successful at, and will have a recurrence in my future numerous times a year.
This essay has taught me the importance of the norm of reciprocity, how the perception of
leverage affects the outcome, that trust is fundamental to secure a long-term relationship and
sustainable deal, that finding out the other sides underlying interests early on is paramount for
effective negotiating and that identifying and negotiating with the deal maker is important in
order to decrease the chances of impasse and increase commitment to any negotiated outcome.
On this last point, after all the multiple rounds of negotiation since the JPA, the P5-plus-1
must be cautious with the still fragile framework deal and Iran must realise that more action has
to be demonstrated to secure the trust of the West. With the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei
cautious to accept the deal, the West should maintain its BATNA and therefore that its leverage
is greater. Leverage appears to be with the US since Irans economy is weak as a result of the
isolation from international trade, and the West has threatened to implement sanctions in the
event of an impasse and given P5-plus-1 and Irans history, it is a credible threat.

30 Iran: Where we are today (2009, May 4) http://fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/iran.html
31 The cost of economic sanctions (2006, May 5) http://www.payvand.com/news/06/may/1046.html