VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 164815 February 22, 2008

VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 164815 February 22, 2008

(focusing on PROSPECTIVITY)
Petitioner: PSINSP JERRY C VALEROSO
Respondent: The People of the Philippines
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Section Division,
Central Police District Command received a dispatch order which directed him and three (3)
other personnel to serve a warrant of arrest against petitioner in a case for kidnapping with
ransom. After briefing, team conducted necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his
hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan. Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated National
Police Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board
a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner. They put him under arrest,
informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in his waist
was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five (5) live ammunition.
Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of the subject firearm
at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to the
petitioner but to another person. Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition under PD No. 1866 as amended.
On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitionerguilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine. Petitioner moved to reconsider but his
motion was denied. He appealed to the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the
RTC disposition.
SC affirmed CAs decision.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into account that the commission
of the offense was on July 10, 1996 wherein the governing law was PD 1866 which provides the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
(1) YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial
court. The law looks forward, never backward (prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new
law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor a guilty person,
who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.(Exception and exception to the
exception on effectivity of laws).

SARIO MALINIAS,
petitioner,vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ,ANACLETO TANGILAG and
VICTOR DOMINGUEZ,
respondents.
G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002
FACTS:On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who werecandidates for governor
and congress representative positions,respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's
LawDepartment against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag andothers for their violation of the
following laws:1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg.
881.Dominguez was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion,Sabangan, Mountain
Province. Corpuz was then the ProvincialDirector of the Philippine National Police in Mountain
Province whileTangilag was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc,Mountain
Province.The petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporterswere deprived from
participating in the canvassing of electionreturns as they were blocked by a police checkpoint in
the course of their way to the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building inBontoc,
Mountain Province. Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilagsubmitted their
joint Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted thatthey ordered the establishment of checkpoints
all over the provinceto enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rulespursuant to
COMELEC Res. No. 2968 purposive of themaintenance of peace and order around the vicinity
of thecanvassing site. Also, they said that the presence of the policemen within the saidarea is to
prevent some groups who were reportedly had theintention to disrupt the canvass proceedings.
They claimed thatsuch a response was not unwarranted as this has alreadyhappened in the past,
wherein, in fact, the petitioners were amon gthem.
COMELECs Ruling:
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss thepetition against the
respondents for insufficiency of evidence toestablish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR but it
was alsodenied for failure of adducing additional evidence thereon.Not satisfied with the same,
Malinias filed to SC a petition for reviewon certiorari on this case
.ISSUE:Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable
cause?
RATIO DECIDENDI OF SC:No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and found
theconduct of its investigation and ruling on the case to be in accordwith its jurisdiction and
duties under the law. In this case,COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as
there isnothing capricious or despotic in the manner of their resolution of the said complaint,
hence, SC cannot issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
On the said violations, the only evidence that was successfullypresented by the petitioner is the
mass-affidavits of his supporters,which were considered self-serving and cannot be admitted by
thecourt thus, the same are not enough to prove his claims. Also, the allege violation of the
respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646and Sec. 232 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 are not included in the
actsdefined as punishable criminal election offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261
and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively.Here, Sec. 25 merely highlights one of the rights of a
political partyor candidate during elections whereas, the violation of Sec. 232,which enumerates
the persons who are not allowed inside thecanvassing site, can only be subjected to an
administrativedisciplinary action and cannot be punished by imprisonment asprovided for under

Sec. 264 of the same law.Moreover, it is clear in the defense of the respondents that they didnot
violate Sec. 261 (i), a criminal offense, which prohibits anyofficer or employee of political
offices or police force fromintervening in any election campaign or from engaging in anypartisan
activity except to vote or maintain public order.In the said defense, the respondents said that
setting up thecheckpoints was done to enforce the COMELEC's firearms ban,pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2968 and not to prejudiceany candidate from participating in the
canvassing. As such, theactions of the respondents are deemed lawful and not in excess of their
authority.
Ruling related to Statutory Construction
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius estexclusio alterius, there is no ground
to order the COMELEC toprosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232of
B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act."It is a settled rule of statutory
construction that the express mentionof one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion
of allothers. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio uniusest exclusio alterius.The
rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in anumber of ways. One variation of
the rule is the principle that whatis expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium
facitcessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expresslylimited to certain matters, it
may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.

CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON.
JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and
Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO,
JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and
opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the
DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court
impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon.
Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC
prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is
entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING

PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows
operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the
Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment
of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section
16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated
power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the
rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the

intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property.
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the
Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident
that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure a shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and
moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the
Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys social ills can
be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or
their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to
the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the
community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral
welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it
cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a
nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it
can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any

violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or
revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other
words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its
purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a
persons fundamental right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of
individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking occurs when
the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when
the governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a
taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes
with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3)
months from its approval within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any
place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business
allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure
of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless
the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed business, the structure which
housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the
Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes
with reasonable expectations for use.
to transfer to any place outside of the The second and third options are Ermita-Malate area
or to convert into allowed businesses confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in
cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a
taking of private property.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning
ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a wholesome property to a
use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not,
by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles
of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units which have always
received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending
upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the
city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and
invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could
be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which
establishments tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect
the social and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to
guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without
infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial
establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason
exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other
similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not
rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in
the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become
any less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is one of the hinted ills the
Ordinance also discriminatory as prostitution is not a profession exclusive to women. Both

men and aims to banish women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the
discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1
thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative
thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities
the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of
such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are
injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business.
If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A
motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of
P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential ErmitaMalate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all
kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard,
motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must
not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or
repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July
17, 2012
By LLBe:LawLifeBuzzEtcetera

Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC
as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the
JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of
Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests
the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative
each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that
petitioner has no real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current
composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review
have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the
1987 Constitution.
Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present,
especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in
issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official
nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition
for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the
Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the
nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all
over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very
process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The
claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose,
that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous
to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
IV. Certificate of Title. EMETERIA LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012 FACTS:
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto
Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the
latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision
including the receivables from the lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo
represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said
water facility has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In
September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died.
Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding the
removal of the over headwater tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation,
petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the
respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for water
system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well
and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of
Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an open space as
defined in P. D. 12
16.
RULING:
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an open space.
The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine
whether the area
falls under other similar facilities and amenities since P. D
. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. Ejusdem generis - states
that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of
the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted to
things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned.
Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the
common welfare of the community.
Therefore, the phrase other similar facilities and amenities should be interpreted in like
manner. It is without
a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity,
without which, survival in the community would be impossible