William J.

Richardson

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought

In: Revue Philosophique de Louvain. Troisime srie, Tome 60, N65, 1962. pp. 58-78.

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Richardson William J. Heidegger and the Problem of Thought. In: Revue Philosophique de Louvain. Troisime srie, Tome 60,
N65, 1962. pp. 58-78.
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/phlou_0035-3841_1962_num_60_65_5144

Heidegger
and

the

Problem

of

Thought

To most English-speaking readers, Martin Heidegger is known

as an existentialist. Yet the term is one that he himself more than
once has repudiated as a betrayal of his own proper intentions. His
purpose, he insists, is and always has been to think Being . Yet
what precisely does he understand by the thinking of Being
(das Denizen des Seins) ? Surely the question is not a superfluous
one, and the remarks which follow would like simply to sketch in
very bold outline the general terms of the problem involved (1).
A. The Problem of Being
I. The Grounding of Metaphysics.
From the very beginning, Heidegger's exclusive preoccupation
has been to lay a foundation for metaphysics. By his own account,
it all began on a summer day in 1907 when, as an eighteen-year-old
gymnasiast in Constance, he received from Dr. Conrad Grber, later
archbishop of Freiburg (1932-48) but at that time pastor of Trinity
Church in Constance, a book that was only gathering dust on Dr.
Grober's shelf. It was Franz Brentano's dissertation, On the Manif
oldSense of Being according to Aristotle (1862), and it served not
only to open Heidegger's eyes to the problem of Being but to intr
oduce him into the philosophical world of the Greeks. In recalling the
fact now, he likes to cite Hlderlin's line from the Rhine Hymn :
As you began, so you will remain (2).
(l> These pages form part of a longer study, now being readied for publi
cation, next fall, which bears the title, Heidegger : From Phenomenology to
Thought (The Hague: Copyright, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).
(>) Wie die anfiengst, wirst du bleiben , cited in Untenoeg* zur Sprache

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought

59

More precisely, the problem of Being arose as soon as Hei

degger
began to meditate with Brentano the meaning of the word
being (5v) for Aristotle. Here he became fascinated by is , the
little word that applies to everything that enjoys an inconceivable
polyvalence (makes world to be world and man to be man), without
detriment to the marvelous unity of itself <3>. Yet what of this unity ?
This must be Being itself, that which renders possible all is .
Well, then, what about Being ? What meaning does it have ? If it
is true, as Aristotle says, that the function of metaphysics is to ask
what are beings ? (xi xb 5v % 8v) then, on the supposition that
Being gives beings their is , should we not first ask about Being
itself (4) ? Such was the beginning of the way.
Aristotle's question was, to be sure, a metaphysical question.
Whatever the post-Aristotelian origin of this word in the libraries
of Rhodes, clearly the question about beings as beings was a pas
sing beyond beings to that which n\akes them be, their beingness (oa(a) (5). Hence even if Aristotle called such an interro
gation first philosophy , we see with what justice may be attr
ibuted
to the word metaphysics itself an interpretation that has
become common currency since Simplicius in the fifth century : a
going beyond (jiei) the physical (ta uaocdt). This going
beyond the Latins would call transcender e, so that metaphysics
always comports in one way or another the processs of transcen
dence
"\ The (puaix must be understood as ta cpuaei Svxa (beings
(Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), pp. 92-93. See Franz BRENTANO, Von der manigfachen
Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1862).
<*> The fascination abides. As in 1929 (Kant und da Problem der Metaphysik,
2nd ed. [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951], p. 205 [Hereafter: KM]), so in 1952
(Was heisst DenJfeen > [Tubingen: Nicmeyer, 1954], pp. 107, 137 [Hereafter:
WD]), the author returns again and again to the strange magic. N. B. We translate
Heidegger's Seiendes (that-which-is) as being and Sein (that by which it is)
as Being .
(4) In 1935, Heidegger meditates the sense of the Greek word for Being
(elvat). After examining first its grammar (pp. 42-54), then its etymology (pp. 5455), he finds the results meager enough, then resorts once more to meditating
is (p. 68), concluding that the primal form of sTvai must be neither the sub
stantive,
nor the infinitive but the third person singular, sc. is itself (p. 70). (EinfUhrung in die Metaphysik [Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1953], pp. 40-70 [Hereafter:
EM]).
<*> The question bi-furcates immediately into the question of what beings are
and that they are, hence the question about essence and existence.
<*> See Zm Seinsfrage (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1956), pp. 18, 36-37 (Herea
fter: SF).

60

William J. Richardson

which are by reason of 93at), where tcn must not be taken

to mean what we would call physical nature but must be under
stood in the sense that this word had for the pre-Socratic thinkers,
as that by which all things emerge into presence as what they are, sc.
Being itself (7). Briefly : metaphysics means the transcendence of
beings to their Being.
If metaphysics be understood thus, however, is Aristotle, in
finding the formula, thereby its genuine founder ? No, metaphysics
as we understand it here emerged initially, Heidegger claims, with
Plato, when he made the distinction between the beings of expe
rience as a world of shadows and the Being of these beings as a
world of Ideas. In the metaphor of the cave (Politeia VII, 514a, 2 to
517a, 7), for example, he speaks of a going beyond the shadows
and over to the Ideas (516c, 3) (8). For all practical purposes,
then, the sense of metaphysics, if not the formula, is here clearly
disengaged.
Yet with this all is not said. For if it is clear that metaphysics
thinks beings as beings, it must be equally clear that they appear as
what they are only by reason of some strange light that renders
them un-concealed (unverborgen) before, to and in the metaphysical
gaze. Furthermore, this light as such, in rendering beings un-con
cealed, remains itself concealed (verborgen) within them, for it is
itself not a being but merely the light by which they shine forth (9>.
What is this light, the concealed source of non-concealment ? This
is the question that metaphysics has never posed. But it is a question
that must be posed, and, indeed, for the sake of metaphysics itself,
since it is only by reason of this light that metaphysics can go about
its task. The lighting-process by which beings are illumined as beings
this is what Heidegger understands by Being.
Let us pause for a moment and savor this, Being, indeed
(r) Heidegger claims that this sense of CpUCJt may still be found even in
Aristotle (Metaphysics Gamma I, 1003 a 27). Moreover, he maintains that, given
this sense of tpVQIC, all metaphysics, whether it conceives Being as Pure Act, Abs
olute
Concept or Will-unto-Power, remains essentially a physics .
() |iT' xeVa... et taOta. [Platon* Lehre von der Wahrheit, 2nd ed.
Ueberlieferung und Auftrag, Band 5 [Bern: Francke, 1954], p. 48 [Hereafter:
PW]).
< Was ist Metaphysik ? 7th ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1955), p. 7. (He
reafter:
WM). See also Ueber den Humanismus (in PW, pp. 53-119), pp. 76-77
(Hereafter: HB).

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought

61

what is Being ? writes the author in the famous formula of 1947.

... [It] is not God, nor [some] ground of the world. Being is
broader than all beings, whether they be rocks, animals, worksof-art, machines, angels or God. Being is what is nearest [to man] .
Yet [this] near-ness remains farthest removed from him... <10).
Being is not a being, because it is that which enables beings to be
(present) to man and to each other. It is nearest to man, because it
makes him to be what he is and enables him to enter into comport
ment
with other beings. Yet it is farthest removed from him because
it is not a being with which he, structured as he is to deal with beings
as beings, can comport himself. From the point of view of beings,
Being encompasses them all, the way a domain of open-ness encomp
asses what is found within it. This domain is not, of course,
space but rather that dimension out of which even space and
time themselves come-to-presence. Being is the domain of openn
ess, because it is the lighting-process by which beings are lightedup <u>. If these beings be subjects or objects , then the light
itself is neither one nor the other but between them both, ena
bling the encounter to come about (12). It is from Being, then, that
metaphysics derives all its vigor as from its proper element (13).
(It) Doch das Sein was ist das Sein ? ... Das 'Sein' das ist nicht
Gott und nicht ein Weltgrund. Das Sein ist weiter denn ailes Seiende und ist
gleichwohl den Menschen naher als jedes Seiende, sei dies ein Fels, ein Tier,
ein Kunstwerk, eine Maschine, sei es ein Engel oder Gott. Das Sein ist das
Nachste. Doch die Nahe bleibt dem Menschen am weitesten... (HB, p. 76).
(U) This process-character of Being accounts (or the fact that the important
word Weaen has for Heidegger a verbal sense. See: Votn Wesen der Wahrheit,
3rd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1954), pp. 25, 26. (Hereafter: WW) ; Vortrage
und Aufsatze (Pfullingen: Neske. 1954), p. 38 (Hereafter: VA); WD, p. 143. To
underline the process-character, we have been tempted to translate Sein by the
infinitive: To be. We have opted for the more normal form, however: because
Heidegger himself usually uses the definite article da, when by omitting it he
would have drawn attention to the verbal character of Sein; because Being is
more accomodating to the exigencies of readable English than To-be; because the
ambiguity that inevitably results may not be altogether a bad thing.
<12) HB, pp. 77 (Lichtung), 101 (Zwischen). May we say that Being thus con
ceived
is ? If so, then only Being is ; beings, properly speaking, are
not. The essential is to recognize the difference. (See HB, p. 80). In 1957, Hei
degger
will accept the formula being is , provided that is be understood
transitively. See Identiffl und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 62. (He
reafter:
ID).
<u> WM. p. 8.

62

Wliam l Richardson

The author makes much of the metaphor suggested by Descartes

in his letter to Picot, according to which all philosophy is as a tree
whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics and whose
branches are all the other sciences (14). But what, Heidegger asks, is
the ground in which metaphysics is rooted ? The unequivocal an
swer
: Being. Being can be called, then, the ground in which meta
physics
as the root of the philosophy tree, is held fast and nourished.
To interrogate the ground of metaphysics, we must pose the
ground -question, the question about the sense of Being (15). Now
the sense (Sinn) of anything for Heidegger is the non-conceal
ment
by which it appears as itself. Non-concealment, however, i$
the literal meaning of d-X^sta, sc. truth . ... 'Sense of Being*
Being'
and 'truth of
[are] but one <l6). So it happens, then, that
the ground-question of metaphysics becomes the interrogation of
Being in the light of itself, Being in its truth.
The Being-question must, indeed, be posed, but it is not the
task of metaphysics as such to pose it. To be sure, metaphysics talks
about Being, but only in the sense of the total ensemble of beings,
or of being-ness, with all of the ambiguity which, as we shall see,
this implies. The fact is, however, that metaphysics cannot pose
such a question. As long as its gaze is fixed upon beings, it profits
from the light by meditating these beings-as-they-appear, ( ... meta
physics
always presents being (5v) in that [dimension] which as
beings (^ 5v) they themselves have manifested... (17>, but cannot
meditate the light itself, simply because the light does not appear
by itself as a being but only in the beings it enlightens ( ...meta
physics, however, never pays heed to precisely that [dimension]
of V which, to the -extent that 5v becomes un-concealed, was by
that very fact concealed <18). There is no way, then, that metaCM> WM, p. 7 and paasim.
(1*> The c ground -question (Grandi rage) is to be distinguished from the
c guide -question (Leitfrage), the question about beings as beings. See EM, p. 15.
(16) ... 'Sinn von Sein* und 'Wahrheit des Seins' sagen das Selbe (WM,
p. 18). See: HB, p. 84; WM, p. 44; Holzwege, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann,
1952), p. 245 (Hereafter: HW). Cf. Sein und Zeit, 6th ed. (Tubingen: Niemeyer,
1949), p. 151. (Hereafter: SZ).
(17) ... denn sie stellt das Seiende (ov) stets nur in den vor, was sich als
Seiendes (o Ov schon von diesem her gezeigt hat... (WM, p. 20). Cf. p. 8.
<u> c ... Die Metaphysik achtet jedoch dessen nie, was sich in eben diesem oV,
insofern es unverborgen wurde, auch schon verborgen hat . (WM, p. 20). Note
that in speaking here of two dimensions in beings, we have all that is neces-

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought

63

physics can get being, the lighting-process as such, in focus. That is

why ... metaphysics as such is excluded from the experience of
Being by reason of its very essence... <M).
As Heidegger goes about meditating the process of -XVj&eia,
this strange paradox, hidden from the metaphysician, that Being
contracts into the beings it makes manifest and hides by the very
fact that it reveals, never loses its fascination for him. He interro
gatesBeing precisely inasmuch as it is hidden always in 6v (yet
different from 5v), for it is upon the hidden [dimension] of oV that
metaphysics remains grounded... (20>. We find striking confirmation
of this in the inaugural lecture at Freiburg (1929), when, in posing the
question that gives the lecture its title, What is Metaphysics ? , he
meditates the sense of Non-being (NichU). The hiddenness of Being
(in beings) is, then, for Heidegger as essential a part of his expe
rience as Being itself.
What we call here the hiddenness of Being (in beings) may
be understood in terms of a not that contracts iBeing in beings
and at the same time differentiates it from them. Since the function
of Being is simply to en-light-en beings, then this contracting not
is intrinsic to its very nature. For want of a better word, let us call
the not -character of Being negativity . Then the manifestive
power that shines forth in beings as beings we may call positi
vity <21). Once we comprehend this fusion of positivity and negat
ivity into the unity of a single process, we begin to grasp what Hei
degger
understands by Being as the process of truth. For truth, under
stood in the radical sense of -Xifjfreia, is literally non- (-) conceal
ment(Xifjd"!rj) <22). Being as the process of non-concealment is that
which permits beings to become non-concealed (positivity), although
sary to kelp us understand the distinction between ontk > and c ontological >
as it appears in SZ.
(19> ... Als Metaphysik ist sie von der Erfahrung des Seins durch ihr eigenes
Wesen ausgeschlossen... (WM, p. 20).
(*> c Auf dieses Verborgene im V bleibt die Metaphysik gegriindet...
(WM. p. 20).
() The terminology as such is not Heidegger's, although we find a certain
warrant for it in SZ. We are inclined to think of positivity and negativity here
(if images of this kind do not do more harm than good) as two complementary
components in a single movement, as in the composition of forces. In any case,
the words must not be taken in any dialectical sense.
<") WM. p. II.

64

William J. Richardson

the process is so permeated by not that (Being itself remains con

cealed
(negativity). To think Being in its truth, then, is to think it
in terms of both positivity and negativity a once.
In the simplest terms : Heidegger's whole effort is to inter
rogate the positive-negative process of -X^eia., insofar as it gives
rise to metaphysics. The full import of this can be appreciated, howe
ver, only when we watch him at work. He meditates, for example,
the formula xl to oV % oV and endeavors thereby to disengage the
interior structure of metaphysics. Now the formula, he insists, is es
sential y
ambiguous. To be sure, beings as beings means the whole
ensemble (xafrdXov) of beings, considered in terms of that which
makes them be , sc. their being-ness (obola). The being-ness of
the ensemble of beings, however, may be understood in at least two
ways : it may mean the common denominator of all beings (8v
xafrdXov, xoivdv), hence iBeing, as we say, in general ; or it may
mean some ultimate ground which lets the ensemble of beings
be, where this is understood in the sense of some being, supreme
among the rest (8v xafrdXou, axpdtatov), and, because supreme,
often called divine (fretov). Insofar as the task of metaphysics
is to make affirmations (Xdyo) about beings ('vxo) meditated in this
way, it is of its very nature onto-logy. When this word emerges
in the seventeenth century, however, it is usually reserved for meta
physics
in the first sense, sc. the interrogation of Being in general,
whereas metaphysics in the second sense, the interrogation of a
supreme Being (however this be conceived), is properly speaking
a theo-logy, or, as we might better say, a theio-logy. The term
transcendence shares the same ambiguity. It can mean the pas
sage from beings to Being-in-general, from beings to the Supreme
Being, or even the Supreme Being itself (23). What is capital, howe
ver, is to note that, since the formula oV % v itself is ambiguous,
metaphysics necessarily encompasses both these modalities, its i
nnermost
structure is onto-theo-logical (24>.
<3S) SF, p. 18. Thus in Kantian terms one would speak of metaphysics in the
first sense as a reflection upon the transcendental , and in the second sense
upon transcendent Transcendence . See HW, p. 318.
<") WM, pp. 19-20. In ID, p. 51, the author recalls the formula of WM (1929),
p. 38, which says that metaphysics meditates beings-as-such (therefore Being-ingeneral) and in their totality (Being as Supreme Being). We follow here the pro
logue added to fifth edition of WM (1949). The sense is the same. Cf. KM, p. 17.

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought

65

2. The Ontological Difference.

But the problem lies deeper still. Why is it, after all, that
8v % oV gives rise to the confusion in the first place ? The reason,
we are told, lies in the nature of oV itself. Grammatically, it is a
participle and as such may be used either as a noun (v. g. can a hu
man being live on the moon ?) or as an adjective with a verbal sense
(v. g. being curious, we want to know). More precisely : oV, when
taken as a noun, means that which is, se. a being (Sciendes) ; taken
as a verbal adjective {seiend), it designates that process by which a
being (as noun) is , se. its Being (Sein) (25). The word itself, then,
comporting both senses, is intrinsically ambivalent, and it is because
5v itself can mean either Being, or beings, or both, that the interro
gation of 'v \ V can evolve as a meditation on either Being-ingeneral (onto-logy) or on the ultimate ground (theo-logy) (26). In other
words, the onto-theo-logical structure of metaphysics is rooted ult
imately
in the intrinsic ambivalence of oV.
It would be a grave mistake, however, to think that this ambi
valence
of oV is something peculiar to Aristotle. The fact is it char
acterizes
the entire history of Greek thought. The primitive form
of oV, Heidegger claims, is most probably dv, as the word is found,
for example, in Homer (v. g. Iliad I, 70), or even in Parmenides and
Heraclitus. The I- would indicate the stem a- (hence axtv, est,
i&t, is), in whose dynamic power the participle shares in double
fashion. What is mare, in Parmenides and Heraclitus, lav can mean,
in addition to the ambivalence we have mentioned already, the ult
imate
and unique process that we know as one-in-many ("Evndtvxa) (27). That is why the author, in a much later expose (1957)
of the onto-theo-logical structure of metaphysics, feels free to med
Heraclitus'
itate
the ambivalence of 'v under the guise of
e/Ev,
which in turn is identified with Ad^o, conceived as the process of
grounding beings (28). "Ev, the grounding process, is correlative with
nvxoc, the ensemble of beings that are grounded, and the correlation
is so intimate that one correlate cannot be without the other :
<"> HW, pp. 161-162, 317.
<"> Heidegger claims that the word participium meant precisely taking part
in two senses, sc. of noun and verb, at once. The point, however, is less cogent
in English than in German, for we reserve the word participle to the verbal
adjective, calling the verbal noun a < gerund . See WD, p. 133.
<"> HW, pp. 317-318.
<> ID, p. 67. Cf. VA, pp. 222, 224.

66

William J. Richardson

"Ev can no more serve as ground unless Ilavxa be grounded than

n<fcvta can be grounded without *'Ev. This intimate correlation be
tween
e'Ev and Ildcvta, intrinsic to the Heraclitean Adyo, corr
esponds precisely to the duality of Being and beings that we call the
a ambivalence of oV (29). What is more, out of the ambivalence in
A.-fo arises even for Heraclitus the same ambiguity that we find
later in the structure of metaphysics : e'Ev is unifying one in the
sense of the absolutely primary and universal ; 'TEv is the unifying
one in the sense of the being, supreme among the Hdcvia (for Herac
litus : Zeus), which grounds the rest, because it is in some way or
other the fullness of rfEv in the first sense (30).
Coming again to Plato, we can see that the distinction between
sensible and supra-sensible, sc. between physical and meta-physical worlds, derives from the same ambivalence. In this respect, it
is instructive to recall that this ambivalence is expressed when we
call oV a participium. For the old grammarians, this meant that the
word participates in two meanings at once, that of a noun and
that of a verb. The conception of participation , however, is not
a grammatical but a philosophical one. The Latin grammarians took
it from the Greek grammarians (jteTO)(V)) who took it, Heidegger
claims, from Plato. For Plato, the word describes the relationship
between beings and Being, sc. the Ideas. A table, for example, is
what it is because it offers its visage to us as a table. To the extent
that an individual being offers the visage of a table, Plato maintains
that it participates (jii&ei) in the Idea of table. In other words,
between Being (Idea), the participat-ed, and beings, the participat
ing,
there is a )((i)piaji(5, se. Being and beings abide in different
places (x&pa) in the process of participation. For Heidegger,
however, what accounts for the conception of Being and beings as
abiding in two different places is precisely the ambivalence of ov.
It is this that gives rise to ytopiop. Participation presupposes ambi
valence
(31).
Clearly, then, metaphysics is rooted not merely in the ambiguity
of the formula oV ^ oV but more profoundly still in the ambivalence
of Sv itself. It follows that the process of d-X^eta must be con
ceived
somehow as the coming-to-pass of oV in this peculiar duality.
<">
<">
(">
getetzt

ID, pp. 59. 62. 66-69. Cf. VA. pp. 218-221.

ID. p. 67. Cf. VA, pp. 222. 224.
WD, pp. 134-135. 174-175 taken a* a unit. Heidegger italicizes the voratu(p. 135).

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought

67

and therefore if we are to ground metaphysics, we have no other

choice but to think Being as the process through which this ambi
valence
takes place.
But we must go one step further. What is this ambivalence, after
all ? Nothing else but the correlation in a single word of being
as noun and being as verbal adjective, hence of that which is
(manifest) and the process by which it is (manifest), of beings and
Being. Now we could not speak of ambivalence , of duality ,
or, for that matter, of correlation at all, unless we experienced
some difference between the correlates. The ambivalence in oV,
then, names a difference between Being and beings, and from the
very beginning Heidegger has called it the ontological diff
erence (32>. It follows, then, that whenever we have spoken of the
duality of ov, we could have used the term ontological difference
just as well. The Being, then, whose sense, sc. whose truth, Hei
degger
seeks in order to ground metaphysics, is nothing else than the
emergence of the ontological difference, and conversely, the fo
rgottenness
of one is equivalent to the forgottenness of the other.
... The forgottenness of Being is the forgottenness of the difference
between Being and beings (33>.
Out of this forgottenness, metaphysics is born. Nor need the
forgottenness be conceived as a deficiency in the metaphysician.
Rather it is inherent to metaphysics as such : because metaphysi
cs
interrogates beings as beings, it remains with beings and never
returns to Being as Being... <34). As the word us used in the context
of this citation, metaphysics is still conceived as arising with Plato,
and, thus understood, it is in the strictest sense a going jiex x
uawt. That is why it emerges first with Plato's distinction between
sensible and supra-sensible. When we recall, however, that meta
physics
in this sense is no more than one manner in which the ambi
valence
of oV comes to pass, we realize that its roots go deeper than
<"> Vom Weten de Grandes, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt: Klottermann, 1949), p. 15.
(Hereafter: WG).
<"' ... Die Seinsvergessenheit iat die Vergessenheit des Unterschiedes des
Seins zum Seienden . (HW, p. 336). (Writer italicizes here; Heidegger italicizes
whole). The same point was made in 1929 (KM, p. 212), but it comes into sharp
focus only in retrospect.
(") Weil die Metaphysik das Seiende als das Seiende befragt, bleibt sie
beim Seienden und kehrt sich nicht an das Sein als Sein... (WM, p. 6). Yet
metaphysics profits from the difference constantly, and the transcendence proper
to it must pass through the difference as such (WD, p. 175).

68

William J. Richardson

Plato, reach down, as we have seen already, to the very origins of

Greek thought. Hence if we think... the essence of metaphysics in
terms of the duality of [beings and Being], which derives from the
self-concealing ambivalence of 'v, then the beginning of metaphysics
and the beginning of Western thought occur together . If, on the
other hand, we take the essence of metaphysics as the distinction be
tween
a supra-sensible and a sensible world, ... then metaphysics
begins with Socrates and Plato... <35). In probing the gound of meta
physics,
Heidegger meditates its essence , sc. that which lets
it be what it is, in both these senses, and since in each case, though
in different ways, the ontological difference goes un-thought, he
poses as well the question as to why it has been forgotten for
gotten,
indeed, necessarily (38>.
This proposal to ground metaphysics by interrogating the sense
of Being as the process of -X^eta through which the ontological
difference breaks out has been Heidegger's unique pre-occupation
since the first pages of Being and Time (1927). One must admit, of
course, that the focus on the difference as difference becomes sharp
er
in the later years than we find it in the beginning, and the evo
lution
in clarity warrants very special attention. But the fundamental
position is made sufficiently clear as early as the inaugural address
of 1929, when the author formulates the ground-question with Leibn
iz' formula : why are there beings at all and not much rather
Non-being ? (37). For Leibniz, of course, the formula asks effectively
about a Supreme Being that grounds all other beings and is there
foreeminently a metaphysical question. For Heidegger, the question
means : how is it possible that beings (independently of a where
they might have come from, a who or what may have cau
sed them, as metaphysics understands these terms) can be (mani(") c Denken wir ... im Hervorkommen des Zweifachen von Anwesendem
und Anwesen aus der sich verbergenden Zweideutigkeit des V das Wesen der
Metaphysik, dann fallt der Beginn der Metaphysik mit dem Beginn des abendlndischen Denkens zusammen. Nimmt man dagegen als das Wesen der Meta
physik die Trennung zwischen einer iibersinnlichen und einer sinnlichen Welt,...
dann beginnt die Metaphysik mit Sokrates und Platon... (HW, p. 162). Cf HW,
p. 243, where pre-Platonic thought is conceived as a c preparation (vorbereitet)
for metaphysics in the strict sense. A case in point : the correlation of 'EV'IItXVTa
in Heraclitus' Adyo (ID, p. 67; VA, pp. 222. 224).
<> ID, pp. 46-47.
<"> ... Warum ist uberhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts ? (WM,
P. 42).

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought

69

fest) as beings. In other words, it is a question about the coming-topass of the lighting-process of -XV)freia, which we now understand
as the emergence of the ontological difference. What is more, it is
a question about this process as permeated by negativity. Heidegger
himself expands the question thus : ... How does it come about
that everywhere [about us] beings have the primacy ... while that
which is not a being, which is thought of as Non-being in the sense
of Being itself, remains forgotten ?... (38). The ground- question
meditates not only Being but obliviousness to Being, the forgottenness of the ontological difference.
One last word ! Since metaphysics by reason of its nature can
not meditate the Being-process which is its ground, then to ground
metaphysics we must pass beyond it. This is the sense of the over
coming
of metaphysics. By overcoming it in this way, do we vitiate
or destroy it ? Of course not. If we leave metaphysics, it is only to
return to the ground from which it draws vitality. Heidegger explici
tly
does not wish to tear the roots of philosophy out ; he will sim
ply dress the ground, till the soil wherein it finds its strength (89).
This effort to lay bare the foundations of ontology was called in the
early years fundamental ontology <40\ but after 1929 the word
disappears completely. In 1949 we are told why : the word onto
logy , -even with the epithet fundamental to explain it, makes
it too easy to understand the grounding of metaphysics as simply
an ontology of a higher sort, whereas ontology, which is but another
name for metaphysics, must be left behind completely (41). The
'**' c ... Woher kommt es, class iiberall Seiendes den Vorrang hat und jegliches ' ist ' fur sich beansprucht, whrend das, was nicht ein Seiendes ist, das so
verstandene Nichts als das Sein selbst, vergessen bleibt ?... (WM, p. 23).
<"> WM, pp. 9-10 (grabt, pfiugt). Rnckgang appears in the title of the intro
duction
to WM (1949) and passim throughout. Note a discrepancy between text
(1929) and introduction (1949): in 1929, it seems possible to ground metaphysics
while remaining interior to it, for the question of Non-being is a metaphysical
question (WM, pp. 41, 24-27, 38). Similarly in KM, pp. 13-14, we are told that the
foundation of metaphysics must not be conceived as a basis that supports it from
the outside but as the projecting of a blueprint (Entwerfen des Bauplans) for meta
physics,
as discernible in the nature of man. It is the c metaphysics of metaphysics
(v. g. KM, p. 208). In 1949, it is clearly necessary to quit metaphysics entirely in
order to meditate its ground. Latent here is the entire transition from the early to
the late Heidegger.
<40> SZ, p. 13; KM, p. 13.
<**) WM, p. 21 . Thus the word ontological has become for Heidegger

70

William J.Richardson

essential is to realize that whether we speak of fundamental ontology

or the ground of metaphysics, the sense is identical : we are talking
about the ultimate process out of which metaphysics arises, the es
sence
(Wesen) of metaphysics. Conversely, to meditate metaphysics
in terms of its essence will mean always to leave it in order to re
turn
to its ground, sc. to think upon the truth of Being. It is the
truth of Being and this means Being as the process of truth in
beings (-XVj&eia) that alone interests Heidegger. This is the one
star the only that remains constant along the way (43).
B. The Problem of Thought
If anyone wishes to assess Heidegger's philosophical effort, one
would think that the best way would be to measure the success or
failure with which he has been able to answer his own question
about the sense, sc. truth, of the Being-process. But such a project
is unfeasible, not only because he has not yet said his last word
about Being, but because it becomes increasingly clear that for him
a last word probably cannot be said, insofar as the sense of Being
lies in the fact that it is eminently question-able. If he has an impor
tance for his contemporaries, then, this importance must be meas
ured not by the question as answered but by the question as asked.
It is in terms of the very posing of the question, therefore, that one
might seek to assess the originality of his work.
The question about the sense of Being remains through Hei
degger's
entire work an indefatigable effort to think the Being-proc
ess.
The question, then, about the sense of Heidegger ultimately
may reduce itself to this : what does it mean to think. ? Such is the
question that we are endeavoring to pose here : what does Hei
degger
mean by the thinking of Being ? It is a notion that becomes
thematized only in the later work, and if we were to examine it in
its fullness, we would have to trace the shift from the problem of
fundamental ontology in the early period to the search for authentic
thought later on as a metamorphosis that is as much controlled by
suspect. Cf. Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), p. 55. (Hereafter: G). In the
later years, even the ontological difference becomes simply the difference
(Di0erenz, Unter-Schied).
<42> Auf einen Stern... (Aus der Erfahrung de DenJfeens [Pfullingen:
Neske, 1954], p. 7 [Hereafter: ED]).

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought

71

an internal unity as it is dictated by an intrinsic necessity. It would

be a privileged opportunity to watch the interior dynamics of the
so-called reversal in Heidegger's thought. For the present, howe
ver, let us be content with generalities.
To begin with, what shall we call this thought that thinks the
Being^process ? The author himself speaks of it in many ways, but
we settle on one of them for reasons of clarity and consistency. The
thought which interrogates the foundations (Wesen) of metaphysics
we call simply foundational thought (das wesentliche Denken) (43).
How is it to be understood ?
1. Negatively.
We gain best access to the notion of foundational thought if we
first determine what it is not. The thought that overcomes meta
physics
is not a metaphysical thought. But what is metaphysical
thought ? Only a Heidegger-eye of metaphysics in its history can
give us an understanding of it (44).
However oblivious the pre-Socratics may have been to the ontological difference as Heidegger himself thematizes it, they had a
profound sense of the Being-process, for they conceived Being as
qrai. Whatever it is that spontaneously emerges, or opens-up and
unfolds, and, having unfolded, appears in abiding self-manifestation
this is tSat. It is not simply what we call nature , which is
a being like the rest, sc. only one form of emergence. Rather it em
braces
all manner and types of beings : heaven and earth, gods and
men. By reason of this tfai beings arise and stand forth as being
what they are, sc. they become con-stant and observable, able-tobe-encountered. <6ai is emergent-abiding-Power. Whence does it
emerge ? From concealment. Recent philological research finds a
<"> Denken is literally an infinitive. Used as a noun (more often in German
than in English), it implies the activity or process of thinking. In English, this
is more easily rendered by the participle than the infinitive. Hence we translate
it usually as thinking occasionally as c thought , intending this always to
mean c thought in the active sense, sc. as in the process of accomplishing itself.
Wesentliche comports the full verbal sense of Wesen, which oan be appreciated
only as we proceed.
<"> In the rsum which follows, we seek only a simple statement of Hei
degger's
argument. To offer textual justification for every statement made would
expand the present article into book-form. We reduce citations, therefore, to a
minimum.

72

William /. Richardson

relation between the stem (pu- and 9a- of aveoOm, suggesting that
tSai is an emerging-into-light, a shining-forth, an appearing. Hence
by reason of <pi5at, -XV)freta, comes-to-pass (is).
With Plato, this early Greek conception of <pt5ai-dfcX^9-eia ac.
truth conceived as non-concealment, undergoes a transformation,
for, although oh the one hand the Ideas re.tain the original sense
of -XYJO-euz, insofar as they are conceived fundamentally as a
source of light by reason of which, through participation, the
beings of experience shine forth, nevertheless the Ideas become
at the same time something-to-be-seen (elSo ; JSev), and truth comes
gradually to mean the proper viewing of the Ideas, the conformity
(p&dnq) between the being that views and the Ideas (conceived as
beings) that are viewed. Here the Ideas are transformed from a
source of light into that-which-is-viewed. In other words, Being is
reduced to a being. The confusion will mark the entire subsequent
history of metaphysics. Token of the confusion will be the domi
nation henceforth of the conception of truth as conformity and a
disregard of the original sense of truth as non-concealment. Since
truth-as-non-concealment is what Heidegger understands by Being,
it is easy to see in what sense he understands metaphysics as the
perennial forgetfulness of Being.
But if metaphysics begins with Plato, it reaches its term in the
subject- ism of Descartes and the entire modern period. With the
liberation of man unto himself that characterized the epoch, Des
cartes
sought some fundamentwn inconcussum veritatis, by which
man himself could become the arbiter of his own truth. Truth, then,
becomes not only conformity but the verification of this conformity,
sc. certitude. This fundamentum would a underlie all truths, hence
would be the subject of truth, which for Descartes himself was,
of course, the cogito-swn. The fundamentum veritatis becomes the
res (subjectum) co gitans, where cogitatio is to be understood as the
present-ing, or pro-posing, of an object to a subject, in such a way
that the present-ing or pro-posing subject itself can guarantee its
conformity to the object in a manner analogous to the way in which
the subject guarantees to itself its own existence (4*'. Since only that
<"> EM, pp. 11-12 (aufgehenden und verweUenden Walter*), 54, 77 (?Uavsa&at,), 47 (i-X^9-eia).
(4e) Present-ative thinking reaches its fulfillment in the subject-ism of Desoares, but it is a type of thinking that is intrinsic to metaphysics as such. For in
meditating beings as beings it (re)presents these beings in terms of their being-

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought

73

is true which is certifiable, beings are true only insofar as they

enter into the subject-object polarity, sc. are either subjects, or
objects. Hence the Being of beings becomes that by which they
are subjects (subject-ivity) or objects (object-ivity) : their only pre
sence
is found not in their own non-concealment but in the order
or (re)presentation by a subject. With Descartes, then, the transcend
ence
which characterizes all metaphysics becomes not a passage
unto something specifically non-human, whether an Idea or God,
but rather unto a subjectum which in one way or another is related
to human nature itself. It is, then, less a going beyond the hu
man orbit than an exploring of it. Hence for the epoch of subject-ism
Heidegger suggests that we speak not of transcendence but of
rescendence (47).
However this may be, the subject for Descartes is an individ
ual
human ego, but Leibniz extends the notion so that it could
apply to every being. For every monad is endowed with the power
of present-ation, se. perceptio et appetitus. Kant's transcendental
philosophy was an attempt to discern the conditions necessary to
render possible the present-ing of objects to the subject. But the cul
mination
of subject-ism (hence of all metaphysics) arrives with Hegel,
for it was he who explored the absolute character of the certitude
in which Descartes' quest for the fundamentum inconcussum termi
nated, sc. the certitude of self -awareness.
Culminated in Hegel, subject-ist metaphysics reached its ult
imate
consummation in Nietzschean nihilism. On the one hand,
Nietzsche saw that the old supra-sensible (meta-physical) values had
lost their meaning for nineteenth century Europe, and, to the extent
that he took God to be the symbol of these values, God was certainly
dead. On the other hand, his own effort at revaluation remained
itself a metaphysics, for the Will-unto-Power, posing as it did new
values (truth and art), was eminently a subject-ism. The only change
was in the way in which the presentative subject was conceived :
now it was Universal Will. Nietzsche failed, then, to overcome meta
physical
nihilism. In fact, he added to its momentum, for to the
extent that his super-man responds to the exigencies of Being conness, hence present-ative thought simply transposes onto the level of thought
the process of transcendence. It has its origin in Plato to the extent that, in trans
forming
Being into a being (Idea), Plato conceived the being-ness of beings as
see-able (eSo : fsTv), hence present-able through some type of vision.
<"> SF. p. 18 (Reszendenz).

74

' William J. Richardvon.

oeived as Will-unto-Power, he seeks (and must seek) domination

over the earth. This he achieves principally through scientific pro
gress.
Such is the meaning of the technicity which crystallizes for
contemporary society the forgetfulness of the Being-dimension in
beings, of the ontological difference. The mesure of Nietzsche's
failure was his inability to escape the subject-object polarity. This
could be done only by a type of thinking that could transcend sub
ject-ism,
meditate the essence of metaphysics by going beyond it to
think that which metaphysics invariably forgets : the sense of Being
itself.
What is said here of metaphysics may be said for the science
of logic as well, for this formulates the rules of present-ative thought.
Like metaphysics, logic, too, is chained to the conception of truthas-conformity. In similar fashion, Heidegger interprets the tradi
tional conception of humanism. Interpreting the essence of man as
a rational animal, all traditional humanisms, he claims, either spring
from metaphysics or found one.
Foundational thought, then, is of such a nature that it can over
come metaphysics, technicity, logic, humanism. It must be a process
that is non-subjective (better pre-subjective), therefore non-presentative (pre-presentative). By the same token, it is non-logical (prelogical), and as long as we remain in the perspectives of logic and
metaphysics, we will be able to think of Being only as Non-being
(Nichts). If rational (ratio) means the same as logical (X^o),
then this thought must be called non-rational : not irrational, but
pre-rational. As opposed to the tendency to dominate the objects of
thought, the attitude of foundational thinking will be simply to let
beings be, hence render them free unto themselves.
2. Positively.
More positively, foundational thinking tries to meditate Being
as the process of truth, sc. the coming-to-pass of the lighting-process
in beings. What is the fundamental structure of this thought ? It is
brought-to-pass by the nature of man conceived as ek-sistence, sc.
endowed with the prerogative, unique among beings, of an ecstatic
open-ness unto the lighting process of a-Xifj^eta. Ek-sistence thus
understood may be called the There (Da) of Being, because it is
that domain among beings where the lighting-process takes place.
Since the There comes-to-pass in a being, sc. man, this privileged

Heidegger end the Problem of Thought

75

being is the There-being , and conversely, There-*being must be

understood always as the There of Being among beings, nothing
more.
To understand thought, then, we must first see more precisely
the relationship between Being and its There. It is, in fact, a cor
relation.
For on the one hand, Being maintains a primacy over its
There, throwing it out and dominating it at all times, revealing and
concealing itself through its There, according to the necessity proper
to itself. Yet on the other hand, it needs its There in order to be
itself, sc. the coming-to-pass of non-concealment, for unless non-con
cealment comes-to-pass in a There that is found among beings, it
does not come-to-pass at all. To think Being will be to think the
truth of Being in which There-being is ek-sistent.
Being discloses itself to and in its There, but since it is Being
that holds the primacy, Being is conceived as sending itself unto its
There. We may speak of this self-sending as proceeding from Being
and call it a self-emitting , or, if we may be permitted a neolo
gism to designate a completely new concept, a mittence (Geschick) of Being. We may speak of it, too, as terminating in There
and therefore call it a com-mitting or com-mitment (Schiksat)
of There to its privileged destiny as the shepherd of Being. In any
case, one thing is certain : intrinsic to the mittence of Being is a cer
tain negativity, by reason of which Being withdraws even as it
bestows itself, conceals itself even in revealment. The reason is
that even though Being reveals itself in revealing beings, it can never
be seized for itself and by itself (since it is not a being), therefore
it conceals itself in the very beings to which it gives rise. To think
Being, then, will be to think it as a mittence, not only in its positivity but in its negativity.
We must go one step further. Since the mittence of Being is in
trinsical y
negatived, no single mittence exhausts the power of Being
to reveal itself. Hence Being discloses itself to the nature of man
by a plurality of mittences, which we shall call inter-mittence
(Ge-schicke), and it is this that constitutes history (Ge-schichte). Foundational thought must think Being-as-history and therefore is a pro
foundly
historical thought.
All this describes, however, the relation between Being and
its There. What is the precise rle of thought in the process ? It brings
this relationship to fulfillment. If we consider this fulfillment with

76

William /. Richardson

reference to Being, thought completes the process of non-conceal

ment
by bringing Being into that form of manifestation that is most
proper to the nature of man : language, through which he says is .
If we consider this fulfillment in terms of the There, thought is that
process by which ek-sistence assumes, therefore achieves, itself as
the There of Being. From either point of view, the fundamental
attitude of thought will be one of acquiescence to Being, of respond
ing
(Entsprechung) to its appeal (Anspruch), of letting Being be
itself.
The structure of this process will take the form of a re-col
lection (Andenken) : the tri-dimensional process by which Being
comes ( future ) to the thinker in and through what already-hasbeen { past ) and is rendered manifest ( present ) by the words
that the thinker himself formulates. Such, too, is the structure of the
thought-ful dialogue. Profoundly a temporal process (future-past-pres
ent),
foundational thought is by this very fact historical, sc. thinks
Being-as-history in continual ad-vent to thought through its dialogue
with the past. Furthermore, thought thinks not only Being-as-history
(inter- mittence), but thinks every mittence of Being in its negativity,
as well as in its positivity, endeavoring to comprehend and express
not what another thinker thought/said, but what he did not think/
say, could not think/say and why he could not think/say it.
But when all is said and done, the function of foundational
thought is to help Being be itself, to dwell in Being as in its element,
just as a fish dwells in water. Thought as the fulfillment of the
There proceeds from Being and belongs to it, for the There is
thrown-out by Being. On the other hand, thought attends to Being,
inasmuch as by it the There assumes itself as the guardian of Being.
This thought that belongs to 'Being and attends to Being is what Hei
degger
in his later period let us call him simply Heidegger II
means by the thinking of Being {das Denken des Seins).
Briefly : foundational thinking is the process by which human eksistence responds to Being, not only in its positivity but in its negativ
ity,as the continual process of truth-as-history. Our first task would
be to see how all this finds its roots in the early Heidegger ( Hei
degger
I ).
Before we conclude this general survey, it is worth-while calling
attention to the fact that an authentic response to the appeal of
Being is precisely what Heidegger understands by philosophy .

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought

77

He develops the point in an address to the philosophers of France in

1955 (48).
The word appears for the first time, the author claims, in Heraclitus, and there as an adjective rather than as a noun, describing
the man who iXe t aocpdv. OiXs is interpreted to mean r
espond
, and oo<pdv to mean frEv-IIvxa, se. Being-as-A^YO (7Ev), in
sofar
as it gathers together beings (Ildcvxa) unto themselves and lets
them be. During the era of sophistry, both appeal and response took
different forms. Then the mystery of Being in beings disclosed itself
to the true thinker as threatened by the crass charlatanism of the
sophists. In such a situation the authentic response was to try to sa
lvage
Being from this fallen condition, hence to strive after Being
in beings beyond the level of every-dayness. The fundamental drive
was an po. To Aristotle, the Being^to-be-sought disclosed itself
as being-ness (oafa), and responding to it he posed the question :
Xl T 'V % 'V ? (49).
Now Heidegger's thesis is that what the occidental man tradi
tionally
has called philosophy is precisely that striving after the
Being of beings that implied a passage beyond the sensible (physic
al)
to the supra-sensible that began with Plato. We can see, then,
that for Western thought philosophy, as we know it, is identified
with metaphysics, so that when Aristotle comes to define philosophy,
the result is the classic definition of metaphysics : 'emaxYJtiY] xv
?cp<j)Ta)V pxv Ka alxiv 'ewpextx1^. Paraphrasing in Heidegger's
sense, we take this to mean : philosophy is that endowment in man
(max^jMf]) by which he can catch and hold in view (d-ewpYjxtx^)
beings in that by which they are as beings (ipx^v, aZxUBv). No one
will doubt, least of all Heidegger, that this conception of philosophy
is a legitimate one. What makes it so, however, is not that it crystal
lizes
once and for all the meaning of metaphysics, but that it is an
authentic response by Aristotle to the address of Being to him. The
author insists, however, that the historic formula is only one way of
conceiving the correlation of address-response between Being and
man. It is helpless, for example, to express this correlation as it
comes-to-pass in Heraclitus and Permenides. Why, then, absolutize
it ? Being remains after Aristotle, as before, eminently free to
<"> Wat Ut da die Philosophie} (Pfullingen: Neake, 1956). (Hereafter:
WP).
<"> WP, pp. 21-22 (Heraclitut), 23-24 (Sophists), 24-25 (Aristotle).

William j. fcicharson

address itself to man in some other type of mittence, articulated in

some other way (s0). If we, for our part, remain docile to Being,
which in the Aristotelian tradition imparted itself as metaphysics,
are we not after all indeed in a very original way still philo
sophical
?
During the course of Heidegger's development, he uses the
word philosophy sometimes in the narrow sense, by which it is
identified with metaphysics, sometimes in the broad sense, as a
response to Being's appeal. In the first case, it shares the same
destiny as metaphysics and must be overcome. In the second, it is
a consummation devoutly to be wished (51). Clearly, to the extent
that we disengage the sense of foundational thought, we delineate
Heidegger's conception of philosophy as well.
William J. RICHARDSON, S. J.
St. Peters College
Jersey City 6, N. J.
U. S. A.
(> WP, pp. 25-27 (manfjlir)...), 28-29 (freie Folge). The word < free
here has a polemical connotation, directed against the Hegelian notion according
to which the mittences of Being would be determined by a dialectical necessity.
Cf. p. 31.
<"> V. g. PW, p. 48 (narrow sense); W, p. 24 (broad sense).