Civpro Cases - Rule 1 To 6

RULE 1
CABRERA VS TIANO JULY 31, 1963

FACTS:
*An action for Partition and Recovery of Real Estate, with Damages was filed by Josefina and
Cresencia against Tiano.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
ISSUES:
Ciriaco Potestas and Gregoria Blanco, were parents of five children, Isabelo, Lourdes,
Clemente, Josefina, and Cresencia. Gregoria died before the second world war, together with
Clemente, single. During their lifetime, the spouses acquired properties, among which was a
parcel of agricultural land, of about seven (7) hectares, located at barrio Manga, municipality
of Tangub, Misamis Occidental, planted to coconuts and fruit-bearing trees.
On July 2, 1947, Ciriaco, the surviving husband and three (3) children (Isabelo, Lourdes and
Cresencia), purportedly sold the above mentioned parcel to herein defendant Mariano T.
Tiano, for P3,500.00.
At the time of the sale, Cresencia was a minor, and the other child, Josefina, did not sign the
deed of sale, and did not know about the transaction.
In the complaint, it was alleged that they were entitled to a portion of the land, since Josefina
did not sign the sale and Crescencia was a minor.
That the plaintiffs commenced this case against the defendant on June 20, 1957 and the
judicial summons was issued by the Clerk of Court on June 21, 1957, but defendant received
the same on July 2, 1957.
WON THE FILING OF THE ACTION EFFECTIVELY STOP THE RUNNING OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD? YES
WON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN BECAUSE OF THE ALMOST 10 YEARS
POSSESSION OF TIANO OF THE PROPERTY? NO
HELD/RATIO:
The 10 year period has not yet elapsed on the filing of the action, it was in fact short of one
day only but still when the action was filed it effectively stop the running of the prescriptive period. It
does not matter that the defendant only received the summons on July 2, 1957.
Defendant-apellant cannot now claime acquisitive prescrioption because he went directly to
the Supreme Court on appeal and the same court generally only rules on questions of law and not of
fact. Tiano should have filed with the Court of Appeals and shown proof that he was with just title, in
good faith, in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted (Arts. 1117 &
1118, N.C.C.). Good faith is a question of fact which must be proved (Art. 1127, N.C.C.). For the
purposes of acquisitive prescription, just title must also be proved, it is never presumed (Art. 1131,
N.C.C.).
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS,
ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Petitioners action in this case involves action for damages and specific performance. In their
original complaint, they failed to indicate the total amount of damages they sought in their
prayer although theyve stated in the body of their complaint the amount of P78,750,000.00.
The docket fee they paid was only P410.00
This under-assessment of filing fee was brought to the attention of the Court and hence the
latter ordered an investigation.
Meanwhile, Manchester (through another counsel) filed an amended complaint : i. for the
inclusion of Philips wire and Cable Corporation as co-palintiff ii. And eliminating any mention
of damages in the body of the complaint. Iii. The prayer in their original complaint was
maintained.
Upon order of the trial court to rectify their complaint by stating the amounts they are asking
for, it was only then that Manchester indicated in the body of their complaint the reduced
6.
amount of P10,000,000. (Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said
amended complaint was admitted.)
The CA ruled that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages
sought in the original complaint.
ISSUE: WoN the basis of the filing fee is the amended complaint
Petitioners contention: that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint
citing the case of Magaspi vs Ramolete
MAGASPI CASE
Action: recovery of ownership and possession of parcel of land + damages
Prayer in the complaint: annulment of the title of defendant to the property,
declaration of ownership etc., payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages
specifying the amounts thereof.
PRESENT CASE
Action: torts and dama
Prayer: issuance of w
contract of purchase o
compensatory and e
specifiying the amo
of 78M in the body of
HELD: Assessment of docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case, the rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fees regardless of the actual date of fling in court. Neither the amended
complaint thereby vest jurisdiction of the complaint, since no such original complaint that was duly
filed which could be amended.
MAGASPI CASE
In Magaspi, there was an honest difference opinion as to the nature of the action.
The damages stated were treated as merely ancillary to the main cause of action.
Thus, the docket fee paid of is only P60.00 and P10 for the sheriffs fee.
PRESENT CASE
No such honest differe
and specific performa
they consider their ac
of pecuniary estimatio
Court held that altho

Petioners indicated in
be the basis of th
intention, that the
filing fee.
Notes: All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed gor and not only in the body of the complaint but also in the prayer thereof,
and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Failure to
comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted or shall otherwise be expunged form
the record.
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.
FACTS:
Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 1
Petitioner-Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. filed a complaint with the RTC Makati
for the
consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy against private respondent
Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
On the other hand, Private Respondent (UY) filed a complaint (Civil Case No. Q-141177) in
the RTC Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against petitioner.
The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral,
exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the
suit. It may be inferred from the body of the complaint that the amount of damages sought is
about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted
petitioners' counsel to raise his objection.
Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding
over said case.
and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the
docket fees.
The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of "not less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket
fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning
the said order of Judge Asuncion.
Private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of

P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October
16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private
respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00. 1
CA: denied the petition filed by Petitioners
Hence, the instant petition.
Court En Banc issued Resolution, directing judges to reassess the docket fees and that in
case of deficiency, to order its payment.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was
temporarily assigned, issued an order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a
certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of
deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.
To forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners.
On August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two
additional defendants aforestated.
ISSUE: WON a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fees
not been paid
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in

the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying
with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private
respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered.
HELD: No.
On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint"
stating therein a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in
the prayer.
In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges
actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about
P44,601,623.70.
Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint and
stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid the amount of
P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and considering that the total amount
sought to be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the
docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less.
Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and
all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled.
in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA,
has
as follows:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi
Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and
reversed.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply
retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there
was no such Manchester ruling as yet.
Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi
v. Ramolete, 5wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case
even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense
and to that extent. 6
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and
the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing
of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until] the case was
decided by this Court on May 7, 1987.
Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the
court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could
not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that,
unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required.
The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on
private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent
court. It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional
docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient
considering the total amount of the claim.
This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket
clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he
must require the private respondent to pay the same.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of
the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that
should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the
original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations
and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any,
without pronouncement as to costs.
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIAS VENTURES, INC., and FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., petitioners vs. THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 145 and THE
SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE SABIO,
FACTS:
Sps. Sabio filed against Ayala Corp:

WHAT: action for specific performance with damages
WHERE: Regional Trial Court of Makati
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the case as private respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee and
to specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the body and prayer of the amended
and supplemental complaint.
Petitioner contends that: the action concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof should
be considered in computing the fees pursuant to Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Spouses paid only the total amount of P l,616.00 as docket fees instead of the amount of
P13,061.35 based on the assessed value of the real properties involved as evidenced by its
tax declaration.
RTC RULING: denied the motion to dismiss stating that the determination of the exemplary
damages is within the sound discretion of the court and that it would be unwarrantedly
presumptuous on the part of the private respondents to fix the amount of exemplary damages
being prayed for. The trial court cited the subsequent case of Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion 2
in support of its ruling.
ISSUE 1: WON the action concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof should be considered in
computing the fees
HELD: NO. This is an action for specific performance with damages although it is in relation to a
transaction involving real estate. Pursuant to Manchester, the amount of the docket fees to be paid
should be computed on the basis of the amount of damages stated in the complaint
ISSUE 2: Re Failure to state amount of Exemplary Damages sought:
Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court wherein it is
stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same
has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there
is a prayer, say for exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of
the Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall
constitute a lien on the judgment.
In the latest case Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, 3 this Court had occasion to make the
clarification that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages
arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading . . . as to which the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount of any claim for
damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading, should be
specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective
damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such
damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper
determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception
contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of
the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount
thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the material
defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for.
HENCE, the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it did not acquire
jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the
amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of the exemplary damages
sought and require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relev
JOE HODGES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF LEON P. GELLADA, ROMEO
MEDIODIA, and HEIRS OF FERNANDO MIRASOL, plaintiff-appellee, respondents.
FACTS:
CF
I
Leon P. Gellada, a practicing lawyer, filed an action for damages against Joe Hodges
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo City, wherein plaintiff claimed damages against
defendant for some alleged defamatory statements of defendant against plaintiff and his
associates thus entitling him to moral damages of P400,000.00, damage to his law practice of
P30,000.00, attorney's fees of P30,000.00, and exemplary damages as well as temperate
damages.
A special appearance questioning the jurisdiction of the court on the subject matter and the
mode of extrajudicial service of summons was filed by defendant.
The defendant pointed out that the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case unless the
corresponding docket fee is paid.
The defendant maintained that considering the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff,
the docket fee to be paid should be no less than P770.00 which is way beyond the P32.00
docket fee paid by plaintiff.
Subsequently, 2 more similar action for damages were filed by Romeo Mendiola and Fernando
Mirasol respectively against John Hodges for alleged defamatory statements. 1
A special appearance questioning the jurisdiction over the subject matter and the mode of
extrajudicial service of summons was filed by defendant in relation to the actions filed by
Mendiola and Mirasol respectively.
He points out that that the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case when Mendiola
claimed damages of P360,000.00 and he paid a docket fee of only P32.00 when it should not
be less than P570.00. In the same way, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case of
claimed damages of P410,000.00 but he paid a docket fee of only P32.00 when it should not
be less than P670.00.
The three cases were ordered consolidated by trial court. On the same date another order
was issued directing the plaintiffs to pay the docket fee commensurate to their respective
demands. This was reiterated in another order.
On March 16, 1982 plaintiff Gellada paid the amount of P168.00 bringing his total payment of
docket fees to P200.00. On September 5, 1972 plaintiff Mediodia paid P168.00 so he had paid
a total of P200.00 for docket fees. Plaintiff Mirasol failed to comply with the said orders.
Ordered Joe Hodges to pay the plaintiffs the following amounts:
Gellada: P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively;
P20,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as expenses of
litigation, plus costs;
Mendiola: P50,000.00 and P10,000 as moral and exemplary damages,
1 Romeo H. Mediodia, also a practicing lawyer, filed in the same court a similar action for damages against Joe Hodges for alleged
defamatory statements of defendant against plaintiff, wherein plaintiff claimed for moral damages of not less than P300,000.00, damage
to his law practice of not less than P20,000.00, attorney's fee of P40,000.00 and exemplary damages as well as temperate
damages.Another complaint for damages was filed by Fernando P. Mirasol, another practicing lawyer, against Joe Hodges, for alleged
defamatory statements of defendant against plaintiff, wherein plaintiff claimed moral damages of not less than P350,000.00, damage to
his law practice of not less than P25,000.00, attorney's fees of P35,000.00, and exemplary damages as well as temperate damages.
respectively; P20,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as

expenses of litigation, plus costs; and
Mirasol: P50,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
respectively; P20,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as
expenses of litigation, plus costs.
CA Affirmed the decision of the CFI.
ISSUE: WON the CFI acquired jurisdiction over the three cases despite the failure of the plaintiffs to
pay in full the prescribed docket fee
HELD: NO
The Supreme Court held in a number of rulings 2 that the well settled rule was that: a case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filling in
court.
At the time that the three (3) cases subject of the herein petition were filed, the rule was
already clear that the court does not acquire jurisdiction over a case until after the prescribed
docket is paid.
In Manchester, this rule was emphasized when this Court stated "The court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading."
The rule in Manchester was relaxed in Sun Insurance vs. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, whereby
this Court declared that the trial court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Nevertheless, in
Sun Insurance, this Court reiterated the rule that it is the payment of the prescribed docket
fee that vests the trial Court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case.
In the present petition, it appears that in the case of Gellada vs. Hodges the total amount of
the claim for damages is about P460,000.00, the estimated docket fee due is P770.00 but
what was paid only was P32.00. Despite the order of the trial court on August 31, 1972 and
another order ten years later, that is on March 11, 1982, requiring plaintiff to pay the correct
docket fee, Gellada paid the amount of P168.00 only. Thus his total payment amounts to just
P200.00, which is still much less than the amount of P770.00 due.
The Supreme Court referred to the case of Mirasol v Hodges, which is very similar to this
present case. 3
No doubt, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter in said three (3)
cases due to the failure to pay in full the prescribed docket fee.
2 Lazaro vs. Endencia,
this Court held that an appeal is not deemed perfected if the appellate court docket fee is not fully paid. Lee vs.
Republic, this Court ruled that a declaration of intention to be a Filipino citizen produced no legal effect until the required filing fee is
paid.
Malimit vs. Degamo, We held that the date of payment of the docket fee must be considered the real date of filing of a petition for quo
warranto and not the date it was mailed.
Magaspi vs. Ramolete, the well-settled rule was reiterated that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless
of the actual date of its filling in court.
3 Similarly, in Mediodia vs. Hodges where the claim is approximately P360,000.00 and the appropriate filing fee would be about
P570.00, the plaintiff paid only P32.00 upon filing the complaint. After the two aforesaid orders of the trial Court were issued, Mediodia
paid on September 5, 1982 the amount of P168.00 bringing his payment to a total of P200.00 which is also much less than the amount
of P570.00 due for docket fee.In the case of Mirasol vs. Hodges, the total claim is for P410,000.00 and the amount of filing fee due is
P670.00. Mirasol paid only P32.00 upon filing the complaint. He did not pay any additional sum even after the two orders of the court
had been issued.
Thus, the entire proceedings undertaken in said cases are null and void.
The plaintiffs in said cases are practicing lawyers who are expected to know this mandatory
requirement in the filing of any complaint or similar pleading. Their non-payment of the
prescribed docket fee was deliberate and inexcusable.
The petition is GRANTED, dismissing the complaints in said three (3) cases.
[G.R. No. 85200. February 19, 1991.]

ARTURO Q. SALIENTES in his capacity as receiver of and representing the Heirs of the
Registered Co-Owners of the Maysilo Estate vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PACITA
CANIZARES-NYE, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92;
DESTILLERIA LIMTUACO & CO. and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY
NATURE: petition for review on certiorari
of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court
may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime. But where as in the case at bar
the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain
related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be
dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property, acquiring
it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not
divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages because of lack of specification thereof.
What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are
stated, . . . or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege
the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within
the relevant prescriptive period."
FACTS:
On September 29, 1987, petitioner Arturo Q. Salientes, in his capacity as receiver of and
representing the heirs of the registered co-owners of Maysilo Estate, filed a complaint before
the Rtc, seeking to recover possession of a portion of said estate allegedly occupied illegally
by Destilleria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. to the extent of 6,885 square meters, more or less, valued
at P500,000.00 and praying among others for an Order to said company to pay Salientes
"actual or compensatory damages in the amount of not less than P500,000.00 and such other
exemplary damages as the Honorable Court may allow . . ."
The company moved to dismiss or suspend the proceedings for failure to pay proper fees
which motion was opposed by Salientes.
Clerk of Court of RTC Quezon City, filed a comment on the motion to dismiss saying that the
"filing fee was assessed and collected based on the value of the land (P500,000.00) and the
damages (P500,000.00) in the total amount of P1,000,000.00
RTC: DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction

CA: DISMISSED
SC: REVERSED. Remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 89747 July 20, 1990

MAERSK-TABACALERA SHIPPING AGENCY (FILIPINAS), INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
MONET'S EXPORT AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND/OR VICENTE TAGLE
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City which awarded damages to Monet's Export and
Manufacturing against the petitioner Maersk- Tabacalera Shipping Agency for breach of a
contract of carriage.
Monets Export is engaged in the export of locally-made handicrafts and products, while Maersk
Line is engaged in furnishing containerized services through which Monet's and New Asia normally
ship their goods.
On May 1985, a complaint for damages was filed by Monets Export against Maersk and New Asia
Enterprises alleging that on March 11, 1984, Monets Export loaded its goods in the Maersks
container to be delivered on or before March 15 to Manila.
Without notice to Monets Export, Maersk unloaded the goods at New Asias factory site in
Daraga, Albay, to give way to the export shipment of New Asia.
RTC: In line with the Manchester Devt Corp case, this court has not acquired jurisdiction. The failure of
the complaint to specify the amount in the phrase in the amount of not less than 500K not being a
fixed amount for purposes of computing the payment of the prescribed docket fee was not proper.
CA: "The doctrine in the Magaspi case relied upon by petitioner is no longer controlling. In the
Manchester case, it was held that 'the ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
ISSUE: WON the court acquires jurisdiction over a case when there is an alleged failure to pay the
proper and correct docket fees.
HELD: YES
RATIO:
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Asuncion, supra, read as follows:
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall
be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related
damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is
accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing
Monets shipment was returned to its warehouse and it had to secure another shipper. Monets
allege that it incurred unnecessary expenses and suffered mental anguish. Monets asked for
actual, moral, and exemplary damages.
MAERSKs CONTENTION
Monets shipment was loaded on March 10 and not on the 11 th. Maersk also said that Monets
knew that the shipment would not be brought to Manila without submitting all the necessary
export papers.
Petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court without question. It filed a
counterclaim seeking affirmative reliefs, and actively took part in the trial. A party who voluntarily
participates in the trial cannot later on raise the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction.
Maersk should have raised its objection to the trial courts jurisdiction when the case
was still in that court. It should not have waited for an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals before waking up to raise the question of jurisdiction. This is in line with the ruling of the
Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
Since this is a case where some of the claims (for moral and exemplary damages) were not
specified in the plaintiff s pleading and were left for determination by the court, the applicable
rule is the third rule set out in the decision of this Court in Sun Insurance Office Ltd., et al. vs.
Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, et al., 170 SCRA 274, to wit:
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility
of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
The Clerk of Court of the trial court shall assess and collect the proper additional fees
on the totality of the judgment for the private respondent.
Monet's counsel in the trial court, Attorney Jesus Salazar, is hereby reprimanded for his unethical
practice of not specifying the amount of damages sought in the body and prayer of his complaint
in order to defraud the Government of the proper fee for docketing said complaint. He is warned
that a repetition of that malpractice will be dealt with more severely.
NEW ASIAS CONTENTION
They are not liable to Monets as the latter has no cause of action against them. New Asia is not being
a party to the contract of carriage between Monet and Maersk
Subsequently, Maersk and New Asia were declared in default for their failure to attend to
the pre-trial conference. The same was lifted, hence, it allowed Maersk to cross-examine all the
witnesses of Monets Export.
RTC OF LEGASPI CITY
On March 1988, the court rendered judgment in favor of Monets. Maersk was required to pay
the plaintiff, Monets damages. New Asia was exonerated from any liability.
CA (acting on an appeal)
CA affirmed the TCs decision. Hence, this petition by Maersk raising among others the issue of
affirming the TCs decision despite the obvious fact that TC never acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action because Monets did not specify their claims for damages
and correct filing fees was not paid.
ISSUE: WON the payment of correct filing fee can be applied in this case.
ORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION
FACTS:
On December 19, 1988, herein petitioner Original Development and Construction Corporation
(ODECOR for brevity) filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages against private
respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) and Caloocan City Public School Teachers Association (CCPSTA) before Regional
Trial Court in Valenzuela.
ODECOR accused the HIGC and NHMFC of divesting its customers which resulted to massive losses for
the corporation.
In ODECORs claim for damages it asserted its claim for actual, consequential, exemplary and moral
damages, the amount of which will be proved at the trial.
HELD: NO. Petition filed by Maersk was denied.
Where the lack of jurisdiction because of non-payment of filing fees was after the adverse
decision of the CA, the payment of filing fees shall constitute a lien on the final judgment. If no
payment of proper docket fee and there was failure to file a motion to dismiss, payment of
docket fees constitute a lien on the judgment.
Unlike Manchester, however, where the jurisdictional issue arising from insufficiency of the docket
fee paid, was seasonably raised in the answer of the defendant in the trial court, in this case the
issue is being raised for the first time in this Court.
That for actual damages its claiming P2,272,193.10 but the rest appears to be unspecified
amount of damages which the trial court could not assess.
ODECOR paid the docket fee for the claim for the actual damages specified as well as the
docket fees for the unspecified damages.
NOTES:
RTC:The trial court did not order the dismissal of the case but rather directed the Clerk of Court
to issue a certificate of reassessment of the proper docket fee and if there is a deficiency
ODECOR should pay the same. In the assessment, the Clerk of Court determined that the
claim for attorneys fee which was stated in the body of the complaint was not reiterated
in the PRAYER of the complaint hence; the docket fees paid by ODECOR could not have included
payment for the fees for the claim of attorneys fee. ODECOR was then ordered to amend its
complaint.
In its amended complaint, ODECOR restated substantially all its allegations in the
first complaint except that it specified its claim for attorneys fees as equivalent to
25% of the total monthly liability and other expenses of litigation and costs of the
suit.
HIGC then moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over it because of non-payment of the proper docket fees.
HIGC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning the jurisdiction of the
trial court.
CA:
The CA ruled in favor HIGC and enjoined the trial court from hearing the
case.
Accordingly, the court may expunge the claims for damages or allow the amendment of the
complaint so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages within the prescriptive
period.
No. The petition is devoid of merit.
Thus, it is evident that the complaint did not state enough facts and sums to enable the Clerk
of Court of the lower court to compute the docket fees payable and left to the judge mere
guesswork as to these amounts, which is fatal.
Where the amount of claim is specified but the docket fees paid were not sufficient,
the pleader is allowed to cure the defect by paying the deficiency. PROVIDED, that in
both cases prescription has not set.
HELD:
While it is not required that the exact amounts be stated, the plaintiff must ascertain, in
his estimation, the sums he wants and the sums required to determine the amount
of such docket and other fees.
If the action involves real property and a related claim for damages and the prescribed fees
for an action involving real property have been paid but the amounts of the unrelated
damages are unspecified, the court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action on the real
property but may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages.
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the complaint does not
specify the amount of damages.
When amended, the pleader shall pay the appropriate docket fees.
INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Presiding Judge of Branch IX, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, C.F. SHARP, INC. and FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING &
INSURANCE
CO.,
INC., Respondents.
FACTS:
ODECOR then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
The claims for the other damages (other than actual) are vague. The terms used by ODECOR
in its claims i.e. the amount of which will be proved at the trial and the demand for
attorneys fees as equivalent to 25% of the total monetary liability and other expenses of
litigation and costs of this suit are not definite enough to be the basis of the computation of
the proper docket fees.
ISSUE:
The court may allow amendment of a pleading (in complaints purely for money and
damages) if such does not specify the amount of claims.
RTC
CFI
(actin
g on
the
MR)
Sharp, Inc., the herein private respondent filed a complaint for prohibition with prayer
for preliminary injunction against the Secretary of Transportation and Communications,
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), E. Razon, Inc., and the International Container Terminal
Services Inc. (CCTSI), the herein petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting by Sharp of a
bond issued by the Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co. in the sum of P10,000,000.00.
On that same day, the petitioner filed an answer with a compulsory counterclaim
against Sharp for its "unfounded and frivolous action." The petitioner claimed that as a
consequence of the complaint and the writ of preliminary injunction, it had suffered injuries
which "if monetized (would) amount to more than P100,000,000.00."
The writ of preliminary injunction was nullified by the SC and held that Sharp was not
a proper party to stop the negotiation and awarding of the contract for the development,
management and operation of the Container Terminal at the Port of Manila. Moreover, the
petition was premature because Sharp had not exhausted the administrative remedies open
to it from "the PPA, the Bidding Committee, and the Office of the President."
the PPA filed a motion to dismiss Sharps complaint on the above-stated grounds.
Dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim.
CCTSI filed a motion for reconsideration of the order insofar as it dismissed its
counterclaim.
Meanwhile, it gave notice to the First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co., Inc. that it was
claiming damages against Sharp for the revoked injunction.
Denied the MR ruling:
indeed a compulsory counterclaim by the nature of its

nomenclature arises out of or is so intertwined with the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the

C
A
complaint so that by the dismissal of the latter, the same has

to be discarded, specially since the complaint was dismissed
without any trial.
The dismissal of the counterclaim was appealed to the respondent court,
Affirmed the RTC ruling:
Petitioners manifestation adopting Philippine Ports Authoritys

motion to dismiss did not contain any reservation. Hence, Sec. 2,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court will not apply. The counterclaim for
damages being compulsory in nature, for which no filing fee has
been paid, was correctly dismissed.
CCTSI has filed the present petition for review alleging that the order of the trial
court dismissing the counterclaim was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
CCTSI CONTENTIONS:
1.
Dismissal of the complaint upon defendants motion did not necessarily entail dismissal
of defendants compulsory counterclaim.
2. A claim for damages arising from a wrongfully obtained injunction may be made in a
counterclaim.
3.
There is no rule requiring a particular form of notice to the surety of petitioners claim
against the injunction bond.
For its part, the private respondent argues that the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim
should be sustained
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the complaint will result to dismissal of counterclaim
HELD: YES
A counterclaim is compulsory where:

1.
it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing partys claim;
2. it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction;
3. the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
The Court notes that, to begin with, the petitioner itself joined the PPA in moving for the
dismissal of the complaint; or put passively, it did not object to the dismissal of the private
respondents complaint.
Secondly, the compulsory counterclaim was so interwined with the complaint that it could not
remain pending for independent adjudication by the court after the dismissal of the complaint
which had provoked the counterclaim in the first place.
As a consequence, the dismissal of the complaint (on the petitioners own motion)
operated to also dismiss the counterclaim questioning that complaint.
The petitioner is correct in contending that the claim for damages caused by the wrongful
issuance of a preliminary injunction can be made in the form of a counterclaim.
However, there is no glossing away the fact that it was the petitioner itself that caused the
dismissal of its counterclaim when it not only did not object to, but actually moved for, the
dismissal of the complaint.
The petitioner cannot undo that act. If it wanted the counterclaim to subsist, it should have
objected to the dismissal of the complaint or at least reserved its right to prosecute it,
assuming this would still be possible. It did neither of these.
The petitioner now claims that there is no law requiring that reservation, but there is no law
presuming it either.
The petitioner cannot simply say now that it intended all the time to preserve its
counterclaim when it knew that under Rule 17, Sec. 2 "if a counterclaim has been pleaded by
a defendant prior to the service upon him of a motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
dismissed against the defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the Court."
A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of nor is it necessarily connected with the
subject matter of the opposing partys claim. It is not barred even if not set up in the action.
The petitioners counterclaim was within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Most importantly, it
had no independent existence, being merely ancillary to the main action.
The rules governing the application for damages against the surety bond posted in support of
the application for a writ of preliminary attachment are also applicable by analogy to
preliminary injunction. (Sec. 20 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.)
A long line of cases has held that these rules are mandatory and failure to observe them
deprives the aggrieved party of the right to proceed against the surety bond.
Due notice to the adverse party and its surety setting forth the facts supporting the
applicants right to damages and the amount thereof under the bond is indispensable. No
judgment for damages may be entered and executed against the surety without giving it an
opportunity to be heard as to the reality or reasonableness of the damages resulting from the
wrongful issuance of the writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
[G.R. No. 35453. September 15, 1989.]

INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. SERGIO A. F. APOSTOL, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City, JUAN DELMENDO and
HONORATA DELMENDO and JOAQUIN PADILLA and SOCORRO PADILLA, respondents.
NATURE: direct appeal from the summary judgment
FACTS:
In 1968, spouses Joaquin Padilla and Socorro Padilla bought on credit three units of Isuzu
trucks from the Industrial Transport and Equipment, Inc.
They executed a promissory note for P159,600, the balance of the purchase price, securing
payment thereof by a chattel mortgage of said trucks and, as additional collateral, a real
estate mortgage on their property in favor of the seller.
Subsequently, Industrial Transport and Equipment, Inc. indorsed the note and assigned the
real estate mortgage to petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation (IFC), which assignment was
duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and annotated on the title of the
mortgaged realty.
Padillas failed to pay several installments on the note
IFC sued Joaquin Padilla in the CFI of Rizal (Quezon City) for the recovery of the unpaid
balance on the note including attorney's fees.
CFI: Granted in favor of IFC.

CA: Affirmed
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1971, private respondents Juan Delmendo and Honorata

Delmendo filed a complaint against petitioner IFC, as principal party, and the Padilla spouses,
as formal parties, in the CFI alleging that they were the transferees of the real property
covered by the subject real property which was mortgaged earlier by the Padillas to the
Industrial Transport and Equipment, Inc. to secure the payment of a promissory note in the
sum of P159,600 and then assigned to petitioner IFC.
The Delmendos prayed for the cancellation of the mortgage lien and the delivery to them by
petitioner of the owner's copy of said title with damages and attorney's fees, considering that
petitioner IFC had waived its rights over the mortgage when it instituted a personal action
against the Padillas in a suit for collection of a sum of money.
IFC moved for the dismissal of the complaint, contending that it had not waived its right over
the mortgage lien. Delmendos filed a motion for summary judgment
CFI: Granted.
SC: Affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: WON by filing a personal action for the recovery of a debt secured by a real estate mortgage,
petitioner is deemed to have abandoned, ipso jure, its mortgage lien on the property in question.
HELD: YES
RATIO:
Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Co Kim and So Tek,
"The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an
ordinary action to recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the
properties of the debtor, including the subject-matter of the mortgage, subject to the qualification that
if he fails in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue further the remedy he has waived."
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal and Oriental Commercial Co., Inc
"For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the
debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security.
In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the
foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the
debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage
constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the
same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that
obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action
by filing a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will
bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously
or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be
authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so
much vexation and oppression to the debtor.
"We hold, therefore, that, in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may
institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election,
his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.
Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for
attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such
personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment
thereon would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties
of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the
deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any
advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all
under his right of election."
Movido v. RFC and the Provincial Sheriff of SamaR -that "a mortgagee who sues and obtains a personal
judgment against a mortgagor upon his credit waives thereby his right to enforce the mortgage
securing it."
Therefore, by instituting the Civil Case to recover the unpaid balance on the promissory note
from the Padilla spouses and by subsequently obtaining a judgment in its favor, petitioner IFC
is considered to have abandoned its mortgage lien on the subject property.
The end result is the discharge of the real estate mortgage and the Delmendos, having
purchased the mortgaged property, automatically step into the shoes of the original
mortgagors with every right to have the title delivered to them free from said encumbrance.
ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
1. The disputed property was acquired by Ching Leng, a resident of #44 Libertad St., Pasay City
by virtue of sale. (PROPERTY: area of 51,852 sq meters situated in Municpality of
Pranaque,Rizal; History: On 1960 the property was owned by Sps Lumandan by virtue of
Decre # N-78716 5/6 portion of it was reconveyed by the spouses to Nofuentes
transferred to Ching Leng by virtue of sale and he was an innocent purchaser)
2. On 1965, Ching Leng died and an intestate proceedings was filed by Petioner Alfredo Ching,
son of Cing Leng before CFI Pasay City.
3. The disputed property was included in the intestate proceedings.
4. Meanwhile, 13 years after the death of Ching Leng, on Dec 1978, Repsondent Pedro Asedillo
filed a reconveyance of the disputed property and cancellation of its title based on possession
before the CFI Rizal.
5. An amended complaint was filed against Ching Leng/Estate of Chign Leng and it was alleged
that since Ching was residing abroad, it is not known whether he is still alive or dead, he or
his may be served by summons and processes by puiblication.
6. It must be noted that Ching Lengs last known address is #44 Libertad St. Pasay City as
indicated in the TCT and not #441 Libertad St., Pasay city as alleged by respondents
complaint.
7. An ex parte decision by CFI Rizal was rendered in favour of respondent and the title registered
under the name Ching Leng was cancelled.
8. Petitioner upon learning the mentioned decision filed e petition to set it aside as null and void
for lack of jurisdiction.
TC & CA: denied petitioner hence, the instant case.
Respondents contention: that an action for cancellation of title is quasi in rem, hence service
of summons may be allowed by publication.
Petitioners contention: that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in
personam and the lower court never acquired jurisdiction over the deceased Chign leng/his
estate by means of service of summons.
ISSUE: WoN an action for reconveyance of property and cancellation of title is in personam
HELD: YES. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action BUT it is an action in personal for
it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an
action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will ; it is an
action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in
personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek
personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person
and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of
land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it
concerns the right to a tangible thing (Ang Lam v. Rosillosa, supra).
Respondents action for the cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in question is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.
Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's death. The decision of
the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with summons. The same
conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching Leng's estate as
co-defendant. Contrary to private respondent's claims, deceased Ching Leng is a resident of
44 Libertad Street, Pasay City as shown in his death certificate and T. C. T. No. 91137 and
there is an on-going intestate proceedings in the same court, Branch III commenced in 1965,
and notice of hearing thereof duly published in the same year. Such misleading and
misstatement of facts demonstrate lack of candor on the part of private respondent and his
counsel, which is censurable.
Petitioner filed an MR of the order denying his Motion to Dismiss.
He contended that while the action did not involve a question of ownership, it was
nevertheless seeking recovery of possession; thus, it was a real action which, consequently,
must be filed in Ozamiz City.
Respondent Judge denied reconsideration. Hence, this present case.

CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES:
JORGE C. PADERANGA, petitioner,

vs.
Hon. DIMALANES B. BUISSAN, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte, Branch III and ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY, represented by its General Manager,
JOSE J. ELUMBA,respondents.
FACTS:
PADERANGA
ELUMBA
PADERANGA
argues
that
inasmuch as ELUMBA seeks to
recover possession of the portion
surrendered to him by the local
manager of private respondent,
as well as to fix the period of
lease at five (5) years, Dipolog
City could not be the proper
venue of the action. it being a
real action, venue is laid in the
court having jurisdiction over the
territory in which the property
lies
ELUMBA counters that the present

action is chiefly for damages arising
from an alleged breach in the lease
contract; hence, the issue of recovery
of possession is merely incidental.
ELUMBA further argues that the action
is one in personam and not in rem.
Therefore venue may be laid in the
place where plaintiff or defendant
resides at the option of plaintiff.
Sometime in 1973, petitioner JORGE C. PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA

INDUSTRIES COMPANY, a partnership represented by its General Manager JOSE J. ELUMBA,
entered into an oral contract of lease for the use of a commercial space within a building
owned by petition in Ozamiz City. 1
The lease was for an indefinite period although the rent of P150.00 per month was paid on a
month-to-month basis.
ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY utilized the area under lease as the Sales Office of Allied Air
Freight in Ozamiz City.
In the case before us, it is indubitable that the action instituted by private respondent against
petitioner affects the parties alone, not the whole world.
On 4 April 1977, PADERANGA subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by constructing a
partition wall in between. He then took possession of the other half, which repossession was
said to have been undertaken with the acquiescence of the local manager of ELUMBA.
Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded. 9
On 18 July 1977, private respondent instituted an action for damages before the then court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City.5
However, this does not automatically mean that the action for damages and to fix the period
of the lease contract is also a personal action. For, a personal action may not at the same
time be an action in rem.
Petitioner, a resident of Ozamiz City, moved for its dismissal contending that the action was a
real action which should have been filed with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental
stationed in Ozamiz City where the property in question was situated.
Consequently, the distinction between an action in personam and an action in rem for
purposes of determining venue is irrelevant. Instead, it is imperative to find out if the action
filed is a personal action or real action.
RTC RULING:
After all, personal actions may be instituted in the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First
Instance) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where
the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. 11 On the other
hand, real actions should be brought before the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over
the territory in which the subject property or part thereof lies. 12
RTC JUDGE BUISSAN denied the Motion to Dismiss and held that Civil Case No. 2901 merely
involved the enforcement of the contract of lease, and while affecting a portion of real
property, there was no question of ownership raised. 6 Hence, venue was properly laid.
SC: ruled in favor of Paderanga
While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery of possession,
such is the necessary consequence thereof. 13 The instant action therefore does not operate
to efface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the case which is to recover
the one-half portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner. 14
Indeed, where the ultimate purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of
possession, partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property, 15 such an action must be deemed a real action and must perforce be commenced
and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies.
Respondent judge, therefore, in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss gravely abused his
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not
capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was
proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141
RTC Makati:
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI

DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their behalf and on behalf of the Class
Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, petitioners,
vs. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137,
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its
court appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court
of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., respondents.
FACTS:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations
during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand
Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations
of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii.
This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the
enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141,
Section 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
They argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme
Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the US
District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in the
Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.
The Estate of Marcos however, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging the non-payment of the correct filing
fees.
It alleged that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and filing fees,
notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of
over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion).
The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and
payment of docket fees.
It dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary
estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the
payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the
value of the foreign judgment.
Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge Ranada denied in an Order
dated 28 July 1999.
From this denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin orders of
respondent judge.
Issue:
Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.
HELD:
Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required for
other actions not involving property.
RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the
total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation.
The Petitioners Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on
a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court.
However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary
estimation because it is so capable.
On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court
would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment.
Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction.
Section 33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter
pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money.
Section 16 of B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement of judgment
even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the
RTCs.
Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of
pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on
judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of
Rule 141.
Hence, what governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the
enforcement of foreign judgments is Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, involving other actions not
involving property.
A MUST NOTE: Docket fees should not be based on the amount of the award in the
foreign judgment because such can no longer be litigated.
RULE 2
HELD: YES.
NICANOR G. DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Fifth
Division, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Br. 48, Manila, and
ENRIQUE KP. TAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant have been friends and in the course of this relationship, they have
exchanged mutual favors and accommodations, including discounting of check for cash.
Around 1981, several checks were issued by plaintiff to defendant in exchange for cash which
probably amounted to P280,900.00. In due time, these checks were either fully paid, settled,
extinguished or condoned by agreement of the parties, and for which reason, plaintiff did not
anymore redeem the checks precisely because they have been close and mutual friends.
Then suddenly, plaintiff received from defendant's lawyer a demand letter dated 1988
supposedly detailing out therein the former's obligation
Principal Amount
P280,900.00
(Value of 66 dishonored checks)

Legal Interest at
235,956.00
1% per Month (For 84 months or 7 years)

Attorney's Collection
TOTAL Amount Due
51,685.00
P568,541.00
Defendant threatened to "institute the proper action and hold (plaintiff liable for the
consequence
On September 15, 1988, petitioner filed a complaint for damages and other equitable reliefs
in the trial court
Petitioner alleges in his complaint that defendant fully knows that there is no sum due. That
he is reluctant to file but was gravely agitated to do so because of a clearly perceived and
palpable injury to him as unequivocally expressed in defendant's letter. That in writing the
letter, and demanding therein an obligation from plaintiff which is not due and owing from
the latter, defendant failed to act with justice, observe honesty and good faith.
Defendant has kept possession of the alleged checks amounting to P280,900.00 at the
expense of plaintiff and since the obligation thereunder has either been fully or wholly paid,
settled, extinguished, or condoned by agreement of the parties, defendant holds them
without just or legal ground and is bound to return them to plaintiff.
Petitioner prayed for:
Actual expenses of 15,000
Exemplary damages of 200,000
Attorneys fees of 75,000
Nominal damages
On October 8, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
cause of action and prescription.
TC
Denied complaint for failure to state a cause of action
CA
Affirmed TC
ISSUE: WON the complaint states a sufficient cause of action
It must be remembered that when a party files a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of
action he is deemed to hypothetically admit the allegations thereof.
From the allegation of the complaint in this case it appears that,
(1) petitioner has a primary right, because of having paid his obligation to private
respondent, to have the checks he issued to cover the amount returned to him or otherwise
cancelled by private respondent; and
(2) the primary right of was violated when private respondent demanded payment of a
settled obligation relying on the very checks of petitioner he had not returned. Consequently,
on account of such demand for payment for an obligation duly settled, the petitioner thereby
suffered damages and should be afforded such relief as prayed for in the complaint.
Re CAUSE OF ACTION vs RIGHT OF ACTION
A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial
interference in his behalf. An action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prosecution or redress of a
wrong. 2
Two Elements of Cause of Action:
(1) the plaintiff's primary right and the defendant's corresponding primary duty, whatever may
be the subject to which they relate person, character, property or contract; and
(2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty
have been violated. 3 The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint
but by the facts alleged. 4
The term right of action is the right to commence and maintain an action.
Cause of Action
formal statement of the operative
facts that give rise to such remedial
right
a matter of statement and is
governed by the law of procedure
Right of Action
remedial right belonging to some
persons
A matter of right and depends on
the substantive law,
The right of action springs from the cause of action, but does not accrue until all the facts which
constitute the cause of action have occurred. When there is an invasion of primary rights, then
and not until then does the adjective or remedial law become operative, and under it arise
rights of action. There can be no right of action until there has been a wrong a violation
of a legal right and it is then given by the adjective law.
Re Prescription:
Contrary to the observation made by the appellate court, the cause of action had not prescribed. The
cause of action accrued only on August 20, 1988 when in a demand letter for payment private
respondent thereby committed a wrongful act against petitioner. The complaint was filed promptly on
September 15, 1988, well within the four (4) year prescriptive period of an action of this nature.
BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. ESTEBAN ICARAGAL and ORIENTAL
COMMERCIAL CO., INC., defendants-appellees
FACTS:
Esteban Icaragal, with one Jacinto Figueroa, executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc., a promissory note for one thousand six hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614) for
value received. Icaragal executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in Pagil,
Laguna as a security for his loan.
Thereafter, promissors defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installments.
Bachrach Motor Co. Inc. instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action
for the collection of the amount due on the note.
Ruled in favor of Bachrach.

A writ of execution was subsequently issued and, in pursuance thereof, the
provincial sheriff of Laguna, at the indication of the plaintiff, levied on the
properties of the defendants, including that which has been mortgaged by
Esteban Icaragal in favor of the plaintiff.
The other defendant herein Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party
claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the municipal court of the City
of Manila, the property which was the subject of the mortgage and which has been levied
upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, 1933.
By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted from the sale of the property.
As a result, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied.
Then, the plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage.
CF
I
CFI
Dismissed the action to foreclose mortgage filed by Bachrach.
Bachrach appealed.
ISSUE: WON Bachrach can file an action to foreclose mortgage after it filed an action for the collection
of the amount due on the note
HELD: NO
Most of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are taken from that of California, and In
that jurisdiction the rule has always been, and still is, that a party who sues and obtains a
personal judgment against a defendant upon a note, waives thereby his right to
foreclose the mortgage securing it.
This rule is founded on express statutory provisions to that effect. In this jurisdiction, section
708 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a creditor holding a claim against the
deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, has to elect between enforcing
such security or abandoning it by presenting his claim before the committee and share in the
general assets of the estate. Under this provision, it has been uniformly held by this court
that, if the plaintiff elects one of the two remedies thus provided, he waives the
other, and if he fails, he fails utterly.
There is indeed no valid reason for not following the same principle of procedure in ordinary
civil actions. With the substitution of the administrator or executor in place of the deceased,
or of the assignee or receiver in place of the insolvent debtor, the position of the parties
plaintiff and' defendant in the litigation is exactly the same in special or insolvency
proceedings as in ordinary civil actions.
Even if section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or section 59 of the Insolvency Law were
not in the attitude books, there is still the rule against splitting a single cause of action. This
rule, though not contained in duly statutory provision, has been applied by this court in all
appropriate cases.
The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated
litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy;
to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and
expenses incident to numerous suits." It comes from that old maximum nemo debet
bis vexare pro una et eadem causa (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same
cause). And it developed, certainly not as an original legal right of the defendant, but as an
interposition of courts upon principles of public policy to prevent inconvenience and hardship
incident to repeated and unnecessary litigations.
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action
against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with
execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands,
the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from
the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single
cause of action.
Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to
the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation.
Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that
obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his
single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter
another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first
complaint will bar the subsequent complaint.
BY allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or
successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, the
court would in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of
contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression
to the debtor.
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the
mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage.
A rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the
debtor and simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged
property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice, but
also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his
residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the
property lies.
The creditor's cause of action is not only single but indivisible, although the agreements of
the parties, evidenced by the note and the deed of mortgage, may give rise to different
remedies.
The cause of action should not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement. And
considering, that one of the two remedies available to the creditor is as complete as the
other, he cannot be allowed to pursue both in violation of those principles of procedure
intended to secure simple, speedy, and inexpensive administration of justice.
Wherefore, Bachrachs appeal is denied. SC affirmed the decision of the CFI, dimissing the
action to foreclose mortgage.
INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR TENSUAN and FILIPINAS CARBON AND
MINING CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
On July 10, 1985, private respondent Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation filed against herein
petitioner and Central Mining Consultants (CMC)
WHAT: action for rescission or annulment of contract with damages
WHERE: Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 146
FCMC prayed among others:
b. On the first and second alternative causes of action, rescinding and/or declaring
rescinded, cancelled or terminated plaintiff's agreement or in the
alternative ordering the defendants to comply with their obligations under the
aforesaid agreement, Annex "A" and in either case, ordering the defendants to
deliver and surrender the Mining Area together with all the infrastructure, facilities,
and equipments found thereon to plaintiff and restore plaintiff in its possession,
operation and administration of these properties without any obligation on the part
of plaintiff to defendants;
c. actual damages in the amount of at least P3,000,000.00;
d. moral damages in the amount of at least P100,000.00;
ISSUE: WON claim of damages must be included in the computation of docket fees although the same
is not the principal relief sought
HELD: YES. The fact that the main action or principal relief sought in the complaint is for specific
performance and/or rescission is only determinative of jurisdiction in the sense that, regardless of the
amount of incidental or additional claims for damages, the case is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. This does not mean, however, that the separate claims for
damages therein are exempt from the payment of docket fees. The prayer in private respondent's
second amended complaint 8reveals that, in addition to the principal relief of specific performance
and/or rescission, it categorically and unconditionally seeks the payment of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, with attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
e. exemplary damages in the amount of at least P200,000.00;

f. attorney's fees in the amount of at least P100,000.00 and other expenses of
litigation in the amount of at least P50,000.00;
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case since the complaint does not specifically state the amount of damages sought
therein by private respondent, thereby rendering the docket fee corresponding thereto
undeterminable and, as a matter of course, unpaid.
Under paragraph 2(c) to (d) of the petitory portion of said second amended complaint, the amount of
damages being claimed as additional relief by private respondent is P3,450,000.00, as set out in the
third to the sixth causes of action. Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 141 then in force, the docket fee
for such additional claims by themselves would be P13,400.00, and it is admitted that only P2,626.00
has been paid by private respondent.
G.R. No. L-3564 February 27, 1987 JUAN BAYANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENIGNO
BIONG
FACTS:
RTC
Denied the motion to dismiss
CA
Denied motion to dismiss. trial court acquired

jurisdiction over the case since the claims for damages
of private respondent as qualified by the phrase "at
least," which is equivalent to "not less than," are
definite enough
Petitioner brings the action to SC praying for: issuance of an order requiring the clerk of court of
the court below to reassess and collect in full the prescribed docket fee in the original case.
Petitioner avers that the aggregate of private respondent's claims amounts to P29,600,000.00,
hence the docket fee due is P118,000.00, allegedly pursuant to Section 5, subsections 7 and 8,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended on September 18, 1984. Since only P2,626.00 was
paid by herein private respondent, the former contends that the latter still has to pay the balance
of P115,374.00.
private respondent contends that considering that its main action is for specific performance
and/or rescission which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the money claim is
purely incidental to or a consequence of the particular relief sought, the docket fee it has paid is
reasonably sufficient.
Sometime in November 1969, Juan Bayang filed a complaint for quieting of title with
damages against Benigno Biong in the CFI of Surigao del Norte, Branch I.
In 1970, while the case was pending, Biong succeeded in dispossessing the plaintiff of the
land in question and remained there until January 25, 1978.
CFI OF SURIGAO DEL NORTE (Branch I)
February 21, 1972 - decided in favor of Biong
COURT OF APPEALS
Reversed the trial court, declaring Bayang the owner of the property. It ordered Biong to pay
P56.40 as his share in the proceeds of the sale of the copra derived from the land and P1,000 as
attorneys fees and costs.
Decision became FINAL.
Bayang filed a second case with the CFI of Surigao del Norte, Branch II, seeking to recover
from Biong the incomes earned from the same land from 1970 until the said land was
delivered to the plaintiff.
At the pre-trial conference, the counsel for Bayang admitted that as of January 25, 1978, Biong
had already surrendered possession of the land in question to Bayang.
On August 16, 1978, Biong filed a motion for summary judgment, raising the affirmative
defense of res judicata in his answer insofar as it related to the incidents concerning the first
case. Bayang opposed.
TRIAL COURT (CFI)
Granted the motion and rendered a summary judgment.

COURT OF APPEALS
Affirmed TC.
Bayang is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45. He contends: (a)
summary judgment was improper, (b) judgment in the first case did not constitute res judicata as
to bar the second case.
point is that he did not make the proper claim at the proper time and in the proper
proceedings, and he cannot do it now. Whatever right he might have had is now deemed
waived because of his neglect.
ELEANOR ERICA STRONG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ REPIDE,
defendant-appellant.
The plaintiff, Eleanor Erica Strong, was the owner of 800 shares of the capital stock of the
Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Limited of the par value of P100 each,
On the said 10th day of October, 1903, the defendant, Francisco Gutierrez Repide, by means
subsequently found and adjudged to have been fraudulent, obtained possession of said shares
and thereafter alleged to be the owner thereof.
The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila asking that the fraudulent sale by means of which the defendant obtained
possession of the said shares be declared null and void and that they be returned to
her.
ISSUE: WON the second case filed by Bayang constitute res judicata
HELD: YES. SC ruled in favor of Biong.
Claim for ownership of land and claim for income thereon arise from a single cause of action
which cannot be split.
A long line of decisions has consistently held that for res judicata to apply: a) the former
judgment must be final; b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and d) there must be
between the first case and the second case identity of parties, identity of subject matter and
Identity of cause of action
The decision in the first case became final and executory on February 2, 1978. The trial court
which rendered that decision had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties to the
proceeding. Said case was tried on the merits. The parties to the first and the subsequent case
are the same petitioner and private respondent now before the SC.
The petitioner says the land in dispute (first case) and the income from that land being claimed
(second case) are different from each other. SC views such as splitting hairs to split a cause
of action.
SC says the subject-matter is essentially the same in both cases as the income is only a
consequence or accessory of the disputed property. There are no two causes of action calling for
two separate cases. The claim for the income from the land was incidental to, and should have
been raised by Bayang in his earlier claim for, ownership of the land.
The court, therefore, declares that the purchase of these shares of stock by the defendant is
fraudulent and void.
The first case was commenced in November 1969 and was finally decided only on February 2,
1978. Biong entered the disputed property in 1970 and left it only in 1978. For about seven years,
petitioner made no move at all to amend his complaint to include a claim for the
income supposedly received by Biong during that period.
Clearly, the second case is barred by the judgment in the first case. TC Judge committed no grave
abuse of discretion in deciding the latter case by summary judgment.
SC is not unmindful of the argument that affirmance of the challenged decision of the respondent
court will result in the unjust enrichment of Biong at the expense of Bayang. This assumes, of
course, that the petitioner could have proved his right to the income he now claims belatedly. The
SC:
This judgment was, on appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, reversed, and
plaintiff's complaint dismissed on the merits.
AS TO THE VALIDITY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Summary judgment is one of the methods

sanctioned in the present Rules of Court for a prompt disposition of civil actions wherein there
exists no serious controversy.
A motion for summary judgment assumes that scrutinizing of the facts will disclose that the
issues presented by the pleadings need not be tried because they are so patently
unsubstantial as not to be genuine issues, or that there is no genuine issue as to any
material facts or where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions and affidavits.
CFI:
SC reversed upon appeal:

Thereupon plaintiff prosecuted an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which
court, on the 3d of May, 1909, rendered its judgment, reversing the decision of the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands and affirming the judgment of the trial court.
The said judgment was satisfied by defendant's returning to the plaintiff 800 shares of stock
of said company.
From the 10th day of October, 1903, the date of the said fraudulent purchase by the
defendant, until the 27th day of July, 1909, the defendant retained said shares in his
possession or under his control and after the rendition of said judgment of April 29, 1904,
collected the dividends earned by said shares for the years 1905, 1906, 1907, and
1908.
After demand upon and refusal by the defendant, the plaintiff began this action for the
recovery of said sum.
On the 24th of March, 1911, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff
He asserts that that judgment is for a sum of money and not for the rescission of a contract
and the return of shares of stock.
Both parties excepted to this judgment and filed motions for a new trial, and the court upon
the hearings modified its judgment by allowing defendant to offset against plaintiff's
judgment
From said judgment as modified the defendant prosecutes this appeal.

o
He maintains that the payment of the sum named in the judgment, whether by
money or by shares of stock, was a complete satisfaction of the judgment in that
case.
The mere fact that it was paid in shares of stock did not indicate that the judgment
of the trial court was for shares of stock but said judgment was, on the contrary, in
reality and in legal effect for a sum of money which could be paid in shares of stock
as well as in coin of the realm.
Basing himself upon this contention appellant asserts that that judgment having
been satisfied by the payment of the sum adjudged to be due, a subsequent action
for dividends on said stock is in effect an action for interest on the said sum found
to be due, that it affects the subject matter of a judgment already paid and
discharged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for recovery for possession of shares of stock should include claim for
dividends to avoid multiplicity of actions.
HELD:
YES. But in the case at bar, the defendant failed to raise the aforementioned issue on
appeal.
Generally speaking, it is not permitted that a plaintiff sue for the recovery of property which
is illegally detained by another, and, after recovering that property, sue in a separate action
for the damages sustained by that illegal detention.
The law seeks to prevent multiplicity of actions, and it is the duty of every person
suing to join in one action every cause of action which he has against the
defendant, to the end that all questions between the parties be litigated in one
suit and multiplicity of actions and resulting expenses prevented.
This is a question, however, which could have been raised in the court below by
the defendant. He did not do so. Neither has he raised the question in this court
directly. We, therefore, do not pass upon it or base any finding upon it.
While the dividends might, in part, have been included in the cause of action set forth in the
complaint in that action and, as far as possible, should have been incorporated therein,
nevertheless they were not so made and, therefore, formed no part of the judgment in which
that action terminated.
When, therefore, after the satisfaction of that judgment, plaintiff began a separate
action to recover the dividends, the only defense available to the defendant was
the plea of multiplicity. That plea not having been made, no question relating
thereto is presented on this appeal.
It is true that plaintiff could have included in her action and recovered at the most only those
dividends which were due at the time judgment in her favor was entered.
It happens in this case that most of the dividends became payable after the plaintiff had
secured her judgment.
o
That being so, they could not have been included by her in the original
complaint, nor could they have been incorporated within the judgment in
that action.
This, then, furnishes another reason why the contention of the appellant in
this regard cannot be sustained. Under such circumstances a plea of
multiplicity, even if made, would not have been available as to those
dividends which became payable after the judgment was entered in that
action.
REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO

BINONGCAL & FERNANDO CALION, respondents.
FACTS:
first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for
refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on
credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to October, 1981;
and the second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing
to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said respondent was only
P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that although another person, Fernando
Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was
separate and distinct from that of the other respondent.
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province dismissed petitioners complaint for lack
of jurisdiction.
Petitioners contention: Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case
following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the
Interim Rules.
Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows:

... Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on
the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money
demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate
claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil
action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.
Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the pertinent portion of the former rule
under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads as follows:
... Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
demand in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out
of the same or different transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a
single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim
shall furnish the jurisdictional test. ...
and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the totality rule was reduced to
clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in each, of the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claims of petitioner may be joined and thus fall within the jurisdiction of
RTC.
HELD: NO.
If plaintiff sues a defendant on two or
more separate causes of action
where two or more plaintiffs having

separate causes of action against a
defendant (or an action against two
or more defendants) join in a single
complaint.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of

Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if
instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties,
the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on
joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that,
after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason
that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of
which falls within its jurisdiction.
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WARNER, BARNES and CO., LTD., REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and/or BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS and/or CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE, defendants-appellees
FACTS:
1.
For Motor Co. shipped a quantity of merchandise, on board the SS Saikyo Maru consigned
to the order of Security Bank and Trust Co., with arrival notice to Manila Trading and Supply
Manila.
2.
Shipment consisted of auto parts and other parts of trucks.
3.
The vessel arrived at the port of Manila and allegedly discharged the shipment into the
custody of Bureau of Customs as arrastre operator.
4.
The good were then delivered to the consignee in damaged condition.
5.
Petitioner Insurance Company of North America as subrogee of the rights of the consignee
sued as alternative defendants, Warner Barnes & Co., (operator of SS Saikyo Maru) and/or
Republic of the Phils and/or Bureau of Cusoms.
the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of 6. The defendants other than Warner Barnes moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground lack of jurisdiction. Contention: That Bureau of Customs as an agency of the
the same or different transactions.
government cannot be sued without its consent (immunity)
if the causes of action are separate and independent, their joinder in one
complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action
where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand pesos or less may
CFI : dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over defendants RP and BD and over the
be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or
subject matter of the suit.
municipal trial court.
Apply totality rule: the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of ISSUE: WoN lower court has jurisdiction over the case
action arose out of the same or different transactions.
Sine qua non:
YES. Only in so far with defendant Warner Barnes and neither over RP nor Bureau of Customs.
a. the causes of action in favor of the two or more
plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should
The cause of action against Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd. as operator of the carrying vessel is one of
arise out of the same transaction or series of
admiralty and hence is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Although the claim against
transactions and
b. there should be a common question of law or fact, as the Bureau of Customs as arrastre operator is an ordinary civil suit which would be outside such
provided in Section 6 of Rule
jurisdiction by virtue of the amount involved, the two may be joined in one action alone. In Rizal
Surety and Insurance Company vs. Manila Railroad Company, the court held:
At the time the complaint was filed, plaintiff did not know at what precise stage of the series
of transactions the loss complained of occurred. Hence, the joinder of causes of action and
parties defendants in the alternative
"Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. Subject to rules regarding jurisdiction,
venue and joinder of parties, a party may in one pleading state, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party (a) if
the said causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
between the parties, or (b) if the causes of action are for demands for money, or are
of the same nature and character."
resident, for a sum of money based on a transaction which was perfected, executed and
consummated abroad." 2
In his answer to the complaint, Respondent Chin San raised as affirmative defenses: lack of
cause of action, incapacity to sue and improper venue. 3
A day before the scheduled Pre-Trial, Chin San filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the
grounds that petitioner had no legal capacity to sue and that venue was improperly laid.
RTC issued an order granting the motion to dismiss filed by Chin San.
"In the cases falling under clause (b) the jurisdiction shall be determined by the
aggregate amount of the demands, if for money, or by their nature and character, if
otherwise."
And, since one of the causes of action is cognizable by the Court of First Instance the suit
should be filed, as was correctly done by the plaintiff, in said court, notwithstanding that
the other cause of action if standing alone would fall within the jurisdiction of the
municipal court, by reason of the amount of the demand.
RULE 3
HANG LUNG BANK, LTD., petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELINTRIYE G. SAULOG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch CXLII, Makati, Metro Manila, and CORDOVA CHIN SAN, respondents.
RTC RULING: Since petitioner is a bank, its capacity to file an action in this jurisdiction is
governed by the Sec. 14, General Banking Law (RA 337) which prohibits foreign bank or
corporation from transacting business in the Phils or maintaining suit for recovery of any
debt, claims or demand until it have obtained a license for that purpose.
Petitioner filed an MR of said order but the same was denied.
Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari seeking the reversal of the said order.
SC: Petitioner has the right to file an action in our courts.
In construing the provision of GB Law, the court adhere to the interpretation to the almost
identical Sec. 69 of Old Corporation Law, which the court has interpreted as not
altogether prohibiting a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines from suing or maintaining an action in Philippine courts.9 What it seeks
to prevent is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a
license from gaining access to Philippine courts.
Petitioner Hang Lung Bank, Ltd.,(not doing business in the Philippines), entered into two (2)
continuing guarantee agreements with Cordova Chin San in Hongkong.
Cordova agreed to pay on demand all sums of money which may be due the bank from
Worlder Enterprises to the extent of the total amount of two hundred fifty thousand Hongkong
dollars (HK $250,000).
We even went further to say that a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines may not be denied the right to file an action in our courts for an isolated
transaction in this country. 15
Worlder Enterprises having defaulted in its payment, petitioner filed in the Supreme Court of
Hongkong a collection suit against Worlder Enterprises and Chin San. Despite serving
summonses, defendants failed to respond thereto.
Since petitioner foreign banking corporation was not doing business in the Philippines, it may
not be denied the privilege of pursuing its claims against private respondent for a contract
which was entered into and consummated outside the Philippines.
Otherwise we will be hampering the growth and development of business relations between
Filipino citizens and foreign nationals. Worse, we will be allowing the law to serve as a
protective shield for unscrupulous Filipino citizens who have business relationships abroad.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of the lower court are hereby set aside.
Civil Case No. 8762 is reinstated and the lower court is directed to proceed with dispatch in
the disposition of said case. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
FACTS:
Supreme Court of Hongkong issued Judgment in favor of Hung Lung Bank and ordered the
defendants to pay the plaintiff.
Thereafter, petitioner through counsel sent a demand letter to Chin San at his Philippine
address but again, no response was made thereto.
Hence, petitioner instituted in the court below (RTC Br. 142 Makati City) an action seeking
"the enforcement of its just and valid claims against private respondent, who is a local
CONVERSE RUBBER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. UNIVERSAL RUBBER PRODUCTS, INC. and
TIBURCIO S. EVALLE, DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, respondents.
Rule 3
FACTS:
Respondent Universal Rubber Products, Inc. filed an application with the Philippine Patent
office for registration of the trademark "UNIVERSAL CONVERSE AND DEVICE" used on rubber
shoes and rubber slippers.
Petitioner Converse Rubber Corp. filed its opposition on the following grounds:
a) Trademark isconfusingly similar to the wordCONVERSE which is a part of
Petitioners corporate name which would likely deceive purshasers and that aid
products may be mistaken by the unwary public to be manufactured by the
petitioner
b) The registration of respondent's trademark will cause great and irreparable injury to
the business reputation and goodwill of petitioner in the Philippines
Respondents filed its answer, among which it averred:
Petitioner is not licensed to do business in the Philippines and it is not doing
business on its own in the Philippines
At trial, titioner's lone witness, Mrs. Carmen B. Pacquing, a duly licensed private merchant
with stores at the Sta. Mesa Market and in Davao City, testified that she had been selling
CONVERSE rubber shoes in the local market since 1956 and that sales of petitioner's rubber
shoes in her stores averaged twelve to twenty pairs a month; She also affirmed that she had
no business connection with the petitioner.
Director of
Patents
ISSUE 2: Re lack of corporate personality to sue:

Contention of Director of Patents: Since the petitioner is not licensed to do business in the country
and is actually not doing business on its own in the Philippines, it has no name to protect iN the forum
and thus, it is futile for it to establish that "CONVERSE" as part of its corporate name identifies its
rubber shoes.
HELD: Foreign corporation has a right to maintain an action in the forum even if it is not licensed to
do business and is not actually doing business on its own therein
a foreign corporation which has never done any business in the Philippines and which is unlicensed and
unregistered to do business here, but is widely and favorably known in the Philippines through the use therein of
its products bearing its corporate and tradename, has a legal right to maintain an action in the Philippines to
restrain the residents and inhabitants thereof from organizing a corporation therein bearing the same name as
the foreign corporation, when it appears that they have personal knowledge of the existence of such a foreign
corporation, and it is apparent that the purpose of the proposed domestic corporation is to deal and trade in the
same goods as those of the foreign corporation.
Re Purpose of the Action:

Sole Purpose of Action is NOT to enforce any legal or control rights arising from or growing out of, any business
which it has transacted in the Philippine Islands.
It is to protect its reputation, its corporate name, its goodwill whenever that reputation, corporate name or
goodwill have, through the natural development of its trade, established themselves.'
Its rights to the use of its corporate and trade name is a property right, a right in rem which it may
assert and protect against all the world, in any of the courts of the world even in jurisdictions where
it does not transact business-just the same as it may protect its tangible property, real or personal
against trespass, or conversion. C
Denied the opposition. Approved the Trademark Application, decision:

Petitioner failed to prove that the single word COnvese has become so identified with the
Corporation. Moreover,
Since it is the trade and not the mark that is to be protected, a trademark acknowledges no territorial boundarie
Opposer's proof of its corporate personality cannot establish the use of the word
of municipalities or states or nations, but extends to every market where the trader's goods have become known
"CONVERSE" in any sense, as it is already stipulated that it is not licensed to do business in and Identified by the use of the mark.
the Philippines, and is not doing business of its own in the Philippines. If so, it will be futile for
it to establish that "CONVERSE" as part of its corporate name Identifies its rubber shoes. Moreover, legal basis: Convention of the Union of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the
Philippines became a party; Sec. 37 of RA No. 166, otherwise known as the Trademark Law
ISSUE 1: whether or not the respondent's partial appropriation of petitioner's corporate name is of
such character that it is calculated to deceive or confuse the public to the injury of the petitioner to
which the name belongs
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. K.M.K. GANI, INDRAPAL & CO., and the
HONORABLE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
HELD:
FACTS:
YES
Boundless choice of words, phrases and symbols is available to one who wishes a trademark sufficient
unto itself to distinguish his product from those of others. When, however, there is no reasonable
explanation for the defendant's choice of such a mark though the field for his selection was so broad,
the inference is inevitable that it was chosen deliberately to deceive.
Re Basis Reputation to protect:

Actual sale of goods in the local market establishes trademark use which serves as the basis for any
action aimed at trademark pre- exemption. It is a corollary logical deduction that while Converse
Rubber Corporation is not licensed to do business in the country and is not actually doing business
here, it does not mean that its goods are not being sold here or that it has not earned a reputation or
goodwill as regards its products.
Two containers loaded with 103 cartons of merchandise covered by eleven (11) airway bills of
several supposedly Singapore-based consignees arrived at the Manila International Airport on
board Philippine Air Lines from Hongkong.
The cargoes were consigned to these different entities all purportedly based in Singapore. (1
and 2 are the respondents in this case):
1. K.M.K Gani (K.M.K.)
2. Indrapal and Company (INDRAPAL),
3. Sin Hong Lee Trading Co., Ltd., AAR TEE Enterprises, and
4. C. Ratilal
A "reliable source" tipped off the Bureau of Customs that the said cargoes were going to be
unloaded in Manila. Forthwith, the Bureau's agency on such matters, the Suspected Cargo
and Anti-Narcotics (SCAN), dispatched an agent to verify the information.
The SCAN agent sequestered the unloaded cargoes after the driver of the van unloading the
cargoes from the plane drove away upon interrogation.
The seized cargoes consisted of 103 cartons "containing Mogadon and Mandrax tablets, Sony
T.V. sets 1 546R/176R kw, Sony Betamax SL5800, and SL5000, Cassette Stereos with
Headphone (ala walkman), Casio Calculators, Pioneer Car Stereos, Yamaha Watches, Eyeglass
Frames, Sunglasses, Plastic Utility Bags, Perfumes, etc."
These goods were transferred to the International Cargo Terminal under Warrant of Seizure
and Detention
Thereafter, the goods were subjected to Seizure and Forfeiture proceedings for "technical
smuggling."
At the hearing, Atty. Armando S. Padilla entered his appearance for the consignees K.M.K. and
INDRAPAL. The records of the case do not show any appearance of the consignees in person.
Atty. Padilla moved for the transshipment of the cargoes consigned to his clients.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General avers that K.M.K. and INDRAPAL did not present any
testimonial or documentary evidence.
Collector of Ruled for the forfeiture of all the cargoes in the said
Customs
containers
Atty. Padilla ostensibly on behalf of his two clients, K.M.K. and INDRAPAL appealed the order
to the Commissioner of Customs.
Commission
er
of
Customs
CT
A
Affirmed the Collector of Customs.

Commissioner concluded that there was an "intent to unload" in
Manila, thus, an attempt to smuggle goods into the country.
Commissioner of Customs found the following facts. 4
Atty. Armando S. Padilla, again as counsel of the consignees K.M.K and Indrapal, appealed to
the respondent Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
ATTY. PADILLA (RESPONDENTS REP)S CONTENTIONS:
1. K.M.K. and INDRAPAL were "entitled to the release of their cargoes for transshipment to
Singapore so manifested and covered by the Airway bills as in transit, . . . contending
that the goods were never intended importations into the Philippines and the
same suffer none of any affiliating breaches allegedly found attributable to the
other shipments under the Customs and related laws."
Reversed the decision of the Commissioner.

The subject ten (10) cartons of Articles are hereby released to the carrying
airline for immediate transshipment to the country of destination under the
terms of the contract of carriage.
Hence this petition.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS CONTENTIONS:

1. CA erred in entertaining the petition for review because respondents failed to establish
their personality to sue in a representative capacity
2. CA erred in ruling that the goods were importations not intended for the Philippines but
for Singapore, thus, not violation the law on technical smuggling under the Tariff and
Customs Code.
4
2.
3.
4.
5.
There is a direct flight from Hongkong to Singapore, thus making the transit through Manila more expensive, tedious, and
circuitous.
The articles were grossly misdeclared, considering that Singapore is a free port.
The television sets and betamax units seized were of the American standard which is popularly used in Manila, and not of
the European standard which is used in Singapore.
One of the shippers is a Filipino national with no business connection with her alleged consignee in Singapore.
The alleged consignee of the prohibited drugs confiscated has no authority to import Mogadon or Mandrax.
ISSUE: WON the private respondents failed to establish their personality to sue in a representative
capacity, hence making their action dismissable,
HELD: YES
"No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its
successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may
be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid
cause of action recognized under Philippine laws."
A foreign corporation not engaged in business in the Philippines may not be denied the right
to file an action in the Philippine courts for an isolated transaction.
Therefore, the issue on whether or not a foreign corporation which does not have a license to
engage in business in this country can seek redress in Philippine courts boils down as to
whether it is doing business or merely entered into an isolated transaction in the
Philippines.
The fact that a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines must be
disclosed if it desires to sue in Philippine courts under the "isolated transaction
rule." Without this disclosure, the court may choose to deny it the right to sue.
In the case at bar, the private respondents K.M.K. and INDRAPAL aver that they are "suing
upon a singular and isolated transaction." But they failed to prove their legal
existence or juridical personality as foreign corporations.
Their unverified petition before the respondent Court of Tax Appeals merely stated: 1. That
petitioner "K.M.K. Gani" is a single proprietorship doing business in accordance
with the laws of Singapore. 2. That the Petitioner's (sic) are suing (sic) upon a singular
and isolated transaction.
Under the "isolated transaction rule," only foreign corporations and not just any
business organization or entity can avail themselves of the privilege of suing
before Philippine courts even without a license.
Counsel Armando S. Padilla stated before the respondent Court of Tax Appeals that his clients
are "suing upon a singular and isolated transaction." But there is no proof to show that
K.M.K. and INDRAPAL are indeed what they are represented to be.
It has been simply stated by Attorney Padilla that K.M.K. Gani is "a single
proprietorship," while INDRAPAL is "a firm," and both are "doing business in
accordance with the laws of Singapore . . .," with specified addresses in Singapore.
In cases of this nature, these allegations are not sufficient to clothe a claimant of suspected
smuggled goods of juridical personality and existence.
The "isolated transaction rule" refers only to foreign corporations. Here the
petitioners are not foreign corporations. They do not even pretend to be so.
The first paragraph of their petition before the Court, containing the allegation of their
identities, does not even aver their corporate character. On the contrary, K.M.K. alleges that
it is a "single proprietorship" while INDRAPAL hides under the vague identification as a "firm,"
although both describe themselves with the phrase "doing business in accordance with the
laws of Singapore."
Absent such proof that the private respondents are corporations (foreign or not), the
respondent Court of Tax Appeals should have barred their invocation of the right
to sue within Philippine jurisdiction under the "isolated transaction rule" since
they do not qualify for the availment of such right.
RE: ATTY PADILLA HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REPRSENT THE RESPONDENTS (SIDE ISSUE)
In this connection, we note also a fatal defect in the pleadings of the private respondents.
There is no allegation as to who is the duly authorized representative or resident
agent in our jurisdiction. All we have on record are the pleadings filed by Attorney
Armando S. Padilla who represents himself as the counsel for the private
respondents.
The appearance of Atty. Armando S. Padilla as counsel for the two claimants would not
suffice.
Generally, a "lawyer is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which
he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court
for his client." 13 Nevertheless, although the authority of an attorney to appear for and on
behalf of a party may be assumed, it can still be questioned or challenged by the adverse
party concerned. 14
The requirement for the production of authority is essential because the client will be bound
by his acquiescence resulting from his knowledge that he was being represented by said
attorney. 16
The Solicitor General, representing the petitioner-appellant, not only questions the
authority of Atty. Armando S. Padilla to represent the private respondents but also
the latter's capacity to sue.
In the case at bar, apart from merely alleging that private respondents are foreign
corporation (sic) and that summons may be served to their counsel, their petition
in the Court of Tax Appeals is bereft of any other factual allegation to show their
capacity to sue or be sued in a representative capacity in his jurisdiction.
The representation and the extent of the authority of Atty. Padilla have thus been expressly
challenged. But he ignored such challenge which leads us to the only conclusion that he has
no authority to appear for such clients if they exist, which we even doubt.
In cases like this, it is the duty of the government officials concerned to require
competent proof of the representation and authority of any claimant of any goods
coming from abroad and seized by our customs authorities or otherwise appearing
to be illegally imported. This desired meticulousness, strictness if you may, should extend
to their representatives and counsel. Our government has lost considerable sums of money
due to such dubious claims or claimants.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is SET ASIDE,
[G.R. No. 97816. July 24, 1992.]

MERRILL LYNCH FUTURES, INC., vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and the SPOUSES PEDRO M.
LARA and ELISA G. LARA,
NATURE: certiorari
The capacity of a foreign corporation to maintain an action in the Philippines against residents thereof,
is the principal question in the appellate proceedings at bar. The issue arises from the undisputed
facts now to be briefly narrated.
"This Commodity Trading Advisor (Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Philippines, Inc.) is prohibited
by the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission from accepting funds in the trading advisor's
name from a client of Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. for trading commodity interest. All funds in this
trading program must be placed with Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc.;"
Therefore, it is a lie for the defendant spouses to assert that they were never informed that Merrill
Lynch Philippines, Inc. had not been licensed to do business in the Philippines; and
RTC: Dismissed
CA: Affirmed
SC: Reversed.
FACTS:
Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City against the Spouses
Pedro M. Lara and Elisa G. Lara for the recovery of a debt and interest thereon, damages, and
attorney's fees.
ML FUTURES described itself as: a foreign corporation, not doing business in the Philippines,
duly organized the laws of the state of Delaware, U.S.A.;" as well as a 'futures commission
merchant' duly licensed to act as such in the futures markets and exchanges in the United
States, . . . essentially functioning as a broker . . . (executing) orders to buy and sell futures
contracts received from its customers on U.S. futures exchanges."
It also defined a "futures contract" as a "contractual commitment to buy and sell a
standardized quantity of a particular item at a specified future settlement date and at a price
agreed upon, with the purchase or sale being executed on a regulated futures exchange."
ML FUTURES alleged that it entered into a Futures Customer Agreement with the Lara
spouses, in which it agreed to act as the latter's broker for the purchase and sale of futures
contracts in the U.S.; that orders to buy and sell futures contracts were transmitted to ML
FUTURES by the Lara Spouses "through the facilities of Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc., a
Philippine corporation and a company servicing plaintiff's customers;"
because of a loss amounting to US $160,749.69 and after setting this off against an amount
of US $75,913.42 then owing by ML FUTURES to the Lara Spouses, said spouses became
indebted to ML FUTURES for the ensuing balance of US $84,836.27, which the latter asked
them to pay;
Lara Spouses however refused to pay this balance, "alleging that the transactions were null
and void because Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc., the Philippine company servicing accounts of
plaintiff, . . . had no license to operate as a 'commodity and/or financial futures broker.'"
ML FUTURES prayed (1) for a preliminary attachment against defendant spouses' properties
"up to the value of at least P2,267,139.50," and (2) for judgment, after trial, sentencing the
spouses to pay ML FUTURES: the Philippine peso equivalent of $84,836.27;
Laras then filed a motion to dismiss dated December 18, 1987 on the grounds that ML
FUTURES had "no legal capacity to sue"
In that motion to dismiss, the defendant spouses averred that ML FUTURES is prohibited by
law "to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative
agency of the Philippines;" and they had never been informed that Merrill Lynch Philippines,
Inc. was not licensed to do business in this country;
ML FUTURES filed an OPPOSITION to the defendant spouses' motion to dismiss saying that
the latter "have been actively trading in futures contracts . . . in U.S. futures exchanges from
1983 to 1987," and ask, "If the trading . . . (was) made in U.S., how could plaintiff be doing
business in the Philippines?": that when they opened an account with ML FUTURES, in order
to supply information about themselves, including their bank's name in which appears
"Account introduced by Merrill Lynch International, Inc.," and the following statements, to wit:
It declared that the Trial Court had seen "through the charade in the representation of MLPI
and the plaintiff that MLPI is only a trading advisor and in fact it is a conduit in the plaintiff's
business transactions in the Philippines as a basis for invoking the provisions of Section 133
of the Corporation Code,"
"SEC. 133.Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the
Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene
in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency in the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on
any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws."
It also declared that the evidence established that plaintiff had in fact been "doing business"
in this country in legal contemplation. adverting to Mentholatum v. Mangaliman, 72 Phil. 524,
528-530, and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5455 reading as follows: 9
"SEC. 1. Definition and scope of this ACT . .AND ANY OTHER ACT OR ACTS THAT IMPLY A CONTINUITY
OF COMMERCIAL DEALINGS OR ARRANGEMENTS AND CONTEMPLATE TO THAT EXTENT THE
PERFORMANCE OF ACTS OR WORKS, OR THE EXERCISE OF SOME FUNCTIONS NORMALLY INCIDENT TO,
AND IN PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION OF COMMERCIAL GAIN OR OF THE PURPOSE AND OBJECT OF THE
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION ."
ISSUE: WON the Lara Spouses are now estopped to impugn ML FUTURES capacity to sue them in the
courts of the forum.
HELD: YES.
The other ground for dismissal relied upon, i.e., that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue
may be understood in two senses: one, that the plaintiff is prohibited or otherwise
incapacitated by law to institute suit in Philippine Courts, or two, although not otherwise
incapacitated in the sense just stated, that it is not a real party in interest.
Now, the Lara Spouses contend that ML Futures has no capacity to sue them because the
transactions subject of the complaint were had by them, not with the plaintiff ML FUTURES,
but with Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc.
The Court is satisfied that the facts on record adequately establish that ML FUTURES,
operating in the United States, had indeed done business with the Lara Spouses in the
Philippines over several years, had done so at all times through Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc.
(MLPI), a corporation organized in this country, and had executed all these transactions
without ML FUTURES being licensed to so transact business here, and without MLPI being
authorized to operate as a commodity futures trading advisor.
The Court is satisfied, too, that the Laras did transact business with ML FUTURES through its
agent corporation organized in the Philippines, it being unnecessary to determine whether
this domestic firm was MLPI (Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc.) or Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith (MLPI's alleged predecessor).
The fact is that ML FUTURES did deal with futures contracts in exchanges in the United States
in behalf and for the account of the Lara Spouses, and that on several occasions the latter
received account documents and money in connection with those transactions.
The rule is that a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having
acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it.
DOCTRINE: "doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to foreign as well as to
domestic corporations;" "one who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate
entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity."
The principle "will be applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporations from
later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases where such
person has received the benefits of the contract where such person has acted as agent for
the corporation and has violated his fiduciary obligations as such, and where the statute does
not provide that the contract shall be void, but merely fixes a special penalty for violation of
the statute. . . ."
Asia Banking Corporation v. Standard Products Co."The general rule that in the absence of
fraud a person who has contracted or otherwise dealt with an association in such a way as to
recognize and in effect admit its legal existence as corporate body is thereby estopped to
deny its corporate existence in any action leading out of or involving such contract or
dealing, unless its existence is attacked for causes which have arisen since making the
contract or other dealing relied on as an estoppel and this applies to foreign as well as
domestic corporations.
There would seem to be no question that the Laras received benefits generated by their
business relations with ML FUTURES. Those business relations, according to the Laras
themselves, spanned a period of seven (7) years; and they evidently found those relations to
be of such profitability as warranted their maintaining them for that not insignificant period of
time; otherwise, it is reasonably certain that they would have terminated their dealings with
ML FUTURES much, much earlier
Given these facts, and assuming that the Lara Spouses were aware from the outset that ML
FUTURES had no license to do business in this country and MLPI, no authority to act as broker
for it, it would appear quite inequitable for the Laras to evade payment of an otherwise
legitimate indebtedness due and owing to ML FUTURES upon the plea that it should not have
done business in this country in the first place, or that its agent in this country, MLPI, had no
license either to operate as a "commodity and/or financial futures broker."
G.R. No. L-58028 April 18, 1989 CHIANG KAI SHEK SCHOOL vs. CA and FAUSTINA FRANCO
OH
FACTS:
One time, as she reported for work in the Chiang Kai Shek School in Sorsogon, Fausta F. Oh was
informed that she had no assignment for the next semester. She had been teaching in the school
since 1932 (almost 33 years) and for no apparent or given reason, she was abruptly dismissed
from her service.
Oh sued. She demanded separation pay, social security benefits, salary differentials, maternity
benefits and moral and exemplary damages.
The original defendant was the Chiang Kai Shek School. When it filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that it could not be sued, the complaint was amended. Certain officials of the school
were also impleaded to make them solidarily liable with the school.
CFI OF SORSOGON
Dismissed the complaint.
COURT OF APPEALS (acting on an appeal)
Set aside the decision of the CFI
CA held the school suable and liable while absolving the other defendants.
CA also denied MR by the petitioner
Petitioner went to SC via petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON a school that has not been incorporated may be sued by reason alone of its long
continued existence and recognition by the government
HELD: YES. SC ruled against the petitioner on this matter.
It is true that Rule 3, Section 1, of the Rules of Court clearly provides that "only natural or juridical
persons may be parties in a civil action." It is also not denied that the school has not been
incorporated. However, this omission should not prejudice Faustina Franco Oh in the
assertion of her claims against the school.
As a school, the petitioner was governed by Act No. 2706 as amended by C.A. No. 180, which
provided as follows:
Unless exempted for special reasons by the Secretary of Public Instruction, any
private school or college recognized by the government shall be incorporated under
the provisions of Act No. 1459 known as the Corporation Law, within 90 days after
the date of recognition, and shall file with the Secretary of Public Instruction a copy
of its incorporation papers and by-laws.
Having been recognized by the government, it was under obligation to incorporate

under the Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition.
It appears that school had not done so at the time the complaint was filed notwithstanding that
it had been in existence even earlier than 1932. The petitioner cannot now invoke its own
non-compliance with the law to immunize it from the private respondent's complaint.
Having contracted with the private respondent every year for 32 years and thus represented itself
as possessed of juridical personality to do so, the petitioner is now estopped from denying
such personality to defeat Faustina Ohs claim against it.
According to Article 1431 of the Civil Code, "through estoppel an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying on it."
As the school itself may be sued in its own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15,
under which the persons joined in an association without any juridical personality may be sued
with such association. Besides, it has been shown that the individual members of the board of
trustees are not liable, having been appointed only after the private respondent's dismissal.
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order was denied in another Order issued by
respondent Judge.
He now seeks to annul the Orders of respondent Judge.
ISSUE:
For the wrongful act of the petitioner, the private respondent is entitled to moral damages. As a
proximate result of her illegal dismissal, she suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and even besmirched reputation as an experienced teacher for more than three decades.
SC also ruled that respondent court did not err in awarding her exemplary damages because the HELD:
petitioner acted in a wanton and oppressive manner when it dismissed her.
1.
Whether or not Juasing Hardware has the capacity to sue.
2.
Whether or not it was right for the respondent Judge to outright dismiss the complaint and
deny the petitioner admission to amend the complaint.
1.
Juasing Hardware has no capacity to sue.
The Supreme Court held that Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
that only natural or juridical persons or entities are authorized by law to be parties
in a civil action.
The petitioner is not a natural person, it cannot also be considered as a juridical person since
Article 44 of the New Civil Code enumerates what are juridical persons and as single
proprietorship, is it not included in the enumeration.
JUASING HARDWARE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, and PILAR DOLLA, respondents.
FACTS:
Juasing Hardware, single proprietorship, represented by its general manager Ong, filed a collection
for money suit before the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Pillar Dolla, alleging in its complaint
that despite repeated demands respondent Dolla refused to pay the purchase price of items, materials
and merchandise which she bought from Juasing Hardware.
"Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law;
their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the
law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner
or member."
In her Answer, defendant stated, among others, that she "has no knowledge about plaintiff's legal
personality and capacity to sue as alleged in ... the complaint."
After plaintiff had completed the presentation of its evidence and rested its case, defendant filed a
Motion for Dismissal of Action (Demurrer to Evidence) praying that the action be dismissed for
plaintiff's lack of legal capacity to sue.
Defendant in said Motion contended that plaintiff Juasing Hardware is a single proprietorship,
not a corporation or a partnership duly registered in accordance with law, and therefore is not
a juridical person with legal capacity to bring an action in court.
CFI:
Respondent Judge Mendoza dismissed the complaint and denied the admission of the
Plaintiff
filed an Opposition
and
moved for the admission of an Amended Complaint.
amended
complaint by
Juasing.
o
The Answer of the defendant to the complaint alleged the lack of legal capacity to
sue of the plaintiff as contained in its affirmative defense.
There is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court.
The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of

business organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the
proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business
name, and pay taxes to the national government.
It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to
file or defend an action in court.
During the trial, it was found out that the affirmative defense of defendant of
plaintiff's lack of legal capacity to sue is very evident for plaintiff Juasing Hardware is
a single proprietorship which is neither a partnership nor a corporation. The
amendment therefore is now too late it being substantial.
RALLA VS RALLA JULY 23, 1991
FACTS:
*The CA upheld the disinheritance of Pablo and denied with finality the MRs.
Rosendo Ralla had two sons, Pablo and Pedro. The father apparently loved the former but not
the latter, Pablo and his family lived with Rosendo, who took care of all the household
expenses.
2. Pablo administered part of the family properties and received a monthly salary of P250.00
plus part of the produce of the land. Pedro lived with his mother, Paz Escarella, in another
town. He was not on good terms with his father.
3. Paz Escarella died in 1957 and the two brothers partitioned 63 parcels of land she left as her
paraphernalia property. The partition was sustained by this Court in G.R. Nos. 63253-54 on
April 27, 1989.
4. Meanwhile, on December 22, 1958, Rosendo executed a will disinheriting Pedro and leaving
everything he owned to Pablo, to whom he said he had earlier sold a part of his property for
P10,000.00. Rosendo himself filed for the probate of the will but pendente lite died on
October 1, 1960.
5. On November 3, 1966, the probate judge converted SP 564 into an intestate proceeding. On
February 28, 1978, a creditor of the deceased filed a petition for the probate of Rosendo's will
in SP 1106, which was heard jointly with SP 564.
6. On August 3, 1979, the order of November 3, 1966, was set aside.
7. The last will and testament of Rosendo Ralla was allowed on June 7, 1982 2 but on October
20, 1982, the disinheritance of Pedro was disapproved. This order was elevated to the Court
of Appeals in AC-G.R. Nos. 00472, 00489.
8. In a decision dated July 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and reinstated
the disinheritance clause after finding that the requisites of a valid disinheritance had been
complied with in the will.
9. The appellate court noted that Pedro had threatened to kill his father, who was afraid of him
and had earlier sued him for slander and grave oral defamation.
10. The motion for reconsideration regarding the upholding of the disinheritance clause of Pedro
was denied with finality by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
WON PEDRO STILL HAS A LEGAL STANDING IN QUESTIONING THE DEED OF SALE EXECUTED
BY ROSENDO RALLA IN FAVOR OF PABLO FOR 149 PARCELS OF LAND? NO
HELD/RATIO:
As a validly disinherited heir, and not claiming to be a creditor of his deceased father, Pedro
Ralla had no legal personality to question the deed of sale dated November 29, 1957, between
Rosendo Ralla and his son Pablo. Legally speaking, Pedro Ralla was a stranger to the transaction as he
did not stand to benefit from its annulment. His disinheritance had rendered him hors de combat.
a. that if the school ceases to operate, ownership of the lots will revert back to the
province
1.
JESUS M. IBONILLA et al petitioners,

vs.
PROVINCE OF CEBU, CEBU STATE COLLEGE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY (College of
Agriculture) formerly Sudlon Agricultural School/Cebu (Sudlon) Agricultural School, its
BOARD OF TRUSTEES and/or members namely, DR. LOURDES QUISUMBING, DR. ATANASCIO
ELMA, DR FRANCISCO B. CONCILLO, MR. TOMAS RAMOS and HON. EMILIO M.R. OSMEA.,
ALQUIN VILLAHERMOSA and the COURT OF APPEALS, Manila, respondents.
FACTS:
1.
Petitioners are composed of officials, faculty and employees of the Cebu agricultural
School, parents of the enrolled student and various school organizations.
2.
In 1960 the Province of Cebu donated 40 parcels of land to Cebu Agricultural School
subject to two conditions:
b. school cannot do any act of disposition in the properties

3.
Pursuant to BP 412, certain schools in Province of Cebu were consolidated and hence the
Cebu Agricultural School became ab extension of Cebu State College of Agriculture in
1983.
4.
Province of Cebu now is demanding the return of the said lots on the grounds that: I
donation as void ab initio since the School did not have eprsonalit ii. Cebu ceased to
exist
5.
Petitioner opposed the rescission of the donation and hence filed an action to quiet tile to
the lots.
CFI and CA: dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioners are not real parties in interest
Respondents contention: moot and academic since there was a MOA bet the school and the rovince of
Cebu for the allocation of 19 lots over the subject parcels of land to Province of Cebu and the
remaining 23 lots to the school.
ISSUE: WoN petitioners are real parties in interest
HELD: NO. the dismissal is valid. The numerous petitioners are admittedly not the owners of the
lots in question. They do not claim any interest in them that was violated, nor have they suffered any
injury that might warrant a grant of relief. Clearly, the finding of the appellate court and the trial court
that they are not real parties in interest who may sue to quiet the title to the properties in question, is
correct.
Only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court (Sec. 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court).
By "real party in interest" is meant such party who would be benefited or injured
by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit. . . . A real party in interestplaintiff is one who has a legal right, while a real party in interest-defendant is one
who has a correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violates the legal right
of the former, (Lee vs. Romillo, Jr., 161 SCRA 589.)
. . . And by real interest, is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy, or future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest
.
Moreover, CA correctly observed that the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement which the
Board of Trustees of the School ratified, laid to rest the controversy on whether the Province of Cebu
may recover all or only some of the lots it had donated in 1960 to the Cebu (Sudlon) Agricultural
School, now the Cebu State College of Agriculture.
VSC
COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,

ESTOPACE and JOSE SILAPAN, respondents.
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
OSCAR
FACTS:
Private Respondents filed with the RTC Manila a complaint against the Register of Deeds of
Manila and petitioner VSC.
In their complaint, they alleged that:
HELD:
The petition is impressed with merit.
Private respondents do not directly assert title to the thing leased as against
petitioner. Instead, they contend that petitioners title over the subject property is void,
praying that the same should be cancelled and the disputed property should be reverted
back to the State.
We also agree with petitioner that private respondents are not the real parties in interest.
Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real party in interest is defined as the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit.
a.
they are bona-fide stallholders inside the Pamilihang Sentral ng Sta. Mesa, for about ten
(10) years or so prior to the institution of this action.
b.
They have been paying their market fees to defendant VSC Commercial Enterprises,
Inc. under the latters claim that he (sic) was the registered owner of the lot and building
known as the Pamilihang Sentral ng Sta. Mesa
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest.[9]
c.
They came into possession of certain documents which would indicate that TCT No.
153406 of the Register of Deeds of Manila (in the name of VSC), originating from O.C.T.
No. 2863 covers lands not in Sta. Mesa, Manila but lands situated either in Caloocan,
Mariquina Estate or in San Juan, Metro Manila.
The interest of the party must also be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. [10] Real interest, on the other hand,
means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.[11]
d.
They also prayed for the cancellation of defendant VSCs title over the subject property.
In the case at bar, the private respondents are mere lessees of the property in question.
As such, they have no present substantial and personal interest with respect to issues
involving ownership of the disputed property. The only interest they have, in the event that
petitioners title over the subject property is cancelled and ownership reverts to the State, is
the hope that they become qualified buyers of the subject parcel of land. Undoubtedly, such
interest is a mere expectancy.
Even the private respondents themselves claim that in case of reversion of ownership to the
State, they only have pre-emptive rights to buy the subject property; [12] that their real interest
over the said property is contingent upon the governments consideration of their application
as buyers of the same.[13]
Petitioner, instead of filing an answer, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs
are not the real parties in interest and complaint states no cause of action, among others.
RTC: issued an order dismissing the complaint. (ruled in favor of VSC)
Private respondents appealed the said order to the Court of Appeals.
CA: reversed and set aside the Order issued by RTC (ruled for respondents)
VSC filed an MR to CA but the same was denied. Hence, the present case.
No.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in allowing the respondents to prosecute the complaint
despite the allegations that respondents are not the real party in interest to prosecute the
same.
ISSUE:
It is settled that a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed. [14]
It is only the government that has the personality to bring an action for the cancellation of
petitioners title and reversion of ownership of the subject property to the State. Section 101
of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the government may institute an action
to recover ownership of a public land.
WON respondents are the real party in interest
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, dated June 16, 1994 and July 7, 1995 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 21) dated March 15, 1991,
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-55411, is REINSTATED.
J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., represented by it Managing PARTNER, GREGORIA ARANETA, INC.,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. QUIRINO BOLAOS, defendant-appellant.
Rule 3
FACTS: What: Action to Recover possesion of registered land situated in barrio Tatalon, Quezon City
Where: CFI, Rizal, Quezon City
Plaintiff filed a complaint which sseeks to recover disputed lot. The complaint was amended
three times with respect to the extent and description of the land sought to be recovered.
Defendant contends his answer:
o
sets up prescription and title in himself thru "open, continuous, exclusive and public
and notorious possession (of land in dispute) under claim of ownership, adverse to
the entire world by defendant and his predecessor in interest" from "time inmemorial"
o
that registration of the land in dispute was obtained by plaintiff or its predecessors
in interest thru "fraud or error and without knowledge of or interest either personal
or thru publication to defendant and/or predecessors in interest."
Defendant prays that the complaint be dismissed with costs and plaintiff required to reconvey
the land to defendant or pay its value.
CFI in favour
of Plaintiff
It is true that the complaint also states that the plaintiff is "represented herein by its
Managing Partner Gregorio Araneta, Inc.", another corporation, but there is nothing
against one corporation being represented by another person, natural or juridical,
in a suit in court.
The contention that Gregorio Araneta, Inc. cannot act as managing partner for plaintiff on the
theory that it is illegal for two corporations to enter into a partnership is without merit, for the
true rule is that "though a corporation has no power to enter into a partnership, it may
nevertheless enter into a joint venture with another where the nature of that venture is in line
with the business authorized by its charter." (Wyoming-Indiana Oil Gas Co. vs. Weston, 80 A.
L. R., 1043, citing 2 Fletcher Cyc. of Corp., 1082.)
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the venture in which plaintiff is represented by
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. as "its managing partner" is not in line with the corporate business of
either of them.
ISSUE 2: Owner of the Land in Dispute:

Admitting, though his attorney, at the early stage of the trial, that the land in dispute "is that
described or represented in Exhibit A and in Exhibit B enclosed in red pencil with the name Quirino
Bolaos," defendant later changed his lawyer and also his theory and tried to prove that the land in
dispute was not covered by plaintiff's certificate of title. The evidence, however, is against defendant,
for it clearly establishes that plaintiff is the registered owner of lots, both lots having been originally
registered on July 8, 1914 under original certificate of title No. 735.
Re Torrens Title vs Adverse Possession
As the land in dispute is covered by plaintiff's Torrens certificate of title and was registered in 1914,
the decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud, error or lack of notice to
defendant, as more than one year has already elapsed from the issuance and entry of the decree.
Neither court the decree be collaterally attacked by any person claiming title to, or interest in, the
Declaring defendant to be without any right to the land in question and ordering him to restore
land prior to the registration proceedings. Nor could title to that land in derogation of that of plaintiff,
possession thereof to plaintiff and to pay the latter a monthly rent of P132.62 from January,
the registered owner, be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. (Section 46, Act No. 496.)
1940, until he vacates the land, and also to pay the costs.
Adverse, notorious and continuous possession under claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is
ineffective against a Torrens title.
Defendant Appeals with the following assigned errors, inter alia:

I. The trial court erred in not dismissing the case on the ground that the case was not
brought by the real property in interest.
V. The trial court erred in holding that the land in dispute is covered by transfer certificates of Title
Nos. 37686 and 37677.
Vl. The trial court erred in not finding that the defendant is the true and lawful owner of the land.
ISSUE 3: Identity of Cause of Action

Allegation: Bolanos filed a motion to dismiss alleging that there is pending before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal another action between the same parties and for the same cause and seeking to
sustain that allegation with a copy of the complaint filed in said action.
HELD: No same cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case was brought by the real property in interest
HELD: Qualified answer.
There is nothing to the contention that the present action is not brought by the real party in
interest, that is, by J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc.
What the Rules of Court require is that an action be brought in the name of, but
not necessarily by, the real party in interest. (Section 2, Rule 2.) In fact the practice is
for an attorney-at-law to bring the action, that is to file the complaint, in the name of the
plaintiff. That practice appears to have been followed in this case, since the complaint is
signed by the law firm of Araneta and Araneta, "counsel for plaintiff" and commences with
the statement "comes now plaintiff, through its undersigned counsel."
An examination of that complaint reveals that appellant's allegation is not correct, for the pretended
identity of parties and cause of action in the two suits does not appear. That other case is one for
recovery of ownership, while the present one is for recovery of possession. And while appellant claims
that he is also involved in that order action because it is a class suit, the complaint does not show that
such is really the case. On the contrary, it appears that the action seeks relief for each individual
plaintiff and not relief for and on behalf of others. The motion for dismissal is clearly without merit.
BIENVENIDO LIM, plaintiff and appellant, vs. DEE HAO KIM (alias MARIANO MABASA), ET AL.,
defendants and appellees.
FACTS:
Re Another Corporation representing the Real Party in Interest: ALLOWED (Joint Venture)
Dee Chian Hong died intestate in Manila leaving valuable stock in financial and commercial
institutions, Crispina Dee was one of his legitimate children and the other fourteen
defendants were other heirs.
These other heirs executed an extrajudical settlement of the estate, dividing it among
themselves, and in fraud of Crispina, awarded nothing to her.
Bienvenido Lim married Crispina in 1948;
Bienvenido filed his action demanding a new partition, delivery of Crispina's inheritance
together with its income, and attorney's fees in 1954.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of personality and prescription.
Crispina submitted a motion to dismiss, alleging that plaintiff's complaint usurped a cause of
action completely hers, and that she had never authorized him to institute any action
concerning the estate of her deceased father.
CF
I
CFI: Granted. Ordered partition, but dismissed complaint on accounting.

CA: Affirmed
Dismissed the action filed by Bienvenido.
Bienvenido appealed the order of the Manila court of first instance dismissing, upon motion
and without trial, his complaint to recover his wife's share (and its fruits) in the estate left by
her deceased father.
Bienvenido Lim included his wife as codefendant because she was unwilling to sue with him.
ISSUE: WON Bienvenido has an interest in his wifes paraphernal properties

HELD: NO
The contract of partition was not void, but merely voidable in so far as it concerns strangers
who had mistakenly been included in the partition, as alleged by plaintiff.
Consequently, so long as it was not avoided, the contract had its effects; and when plaintiff
married Crispina in 1948 such partition agreement was existing.
Wherefore, to all intents and purposes there was no inheritance brought by her to the
marriage; hence, her husband acquired no rights thereto.
Not only that but the wife objects to the action, and under Article 1382 of the Civil Code
the husband may not maintain actions of any kind whatsoever with respect to the
paraphernal property, without the intervention or consent of the wife.
Anyway, her conduct practically amounts to a renunciation or disposition of her share or
paraphernal property.
Judgment affirmed, with costs against appellant.
[G.R. No. 94005. April 6, 1993.]

LUISA LYON NUAL, herein represented by ALBERT NUAL, and ANITA NUAL HORMIGOS,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and EMMA LYON DE LEON in her behalf and as guardian ad
litem of the minors HELEN SABARRE and KENNY SABARRE, EDUARDO GUZMAN, MERCEDEZ
LYON TAUPAN, WILFREDO GUZMAN, MALLY LYON ENCARNACION and DORA LYON DELAS
PEAS
NATURE: certiorari
FACTS:
Emma Lyon de Leon in her behalf and as guardian ad litem of the minors Helen Sabarre and
Kenny Sabarre, Eduardo Guzman, Mercedes Lyon Taupan, Wilfredo Guzman, Mally Lyon
Encarnacion and Dona Lyon de las Peas, filedagainst Luisa Lyon Nual, now deceased and
herein represented by her heirs, Albert Nual and Anita Nual Hormigos, for partition and
accounting of a parcel of land located in Isabela, Basilan City.
Subject parcel of land was formerly owned by Frank C. Lyon and May Ekstrom Lyon, deceased
parents of Helen, Dona, Luisa, Mary, Frank and William James.
Private respondents claimed that said parcel of land, in the name of Frank C. Lyon, has been
in possession of petitioner Luisa Lyon Nual since 1946 and that she made no accounting of
the income derived therefrom, despite demands made by private respondents for the
partition and delivery of their shares.
On May 17, 1984, an order for the issuance of the writ of execution was issued by the court a
quo. 3
On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom
Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary
injunction.
She contends that not being a party to the above-entitled case her rights, interests,
ownership and participation over the land should not be affected by a judgment in the said
case; that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar as her share, right, ownership and
participation is concerned, said share not having been brought within the Jurisdiction of the
court a quo. TC DENIED.
On September 24, 1986, the Commissioners manifested to the trial court that in view of the
fact that the name of Mary Lyon Martin also appears in the Transfer Certificate of Title, she
could therefore be construed as one of the heirs.
Without ruling on the manifestation, the lower court issued an order directing the Board of
Commissioners to immediately partition the said property.
On January 9, 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary
Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the property
TC: Granted the inclusion

CA: Dismissed. Affirmed TC.
SC: Granted.
Petitioners contend that the trial court's decision dated December 14, 1974 in the suit
ordering the partition of the parcel of land among plaintiffs and defendants has long become
final and executory.
Hence the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue the questioned Order dated January 9, 1987
ordering the Board of Commissioners to include Mary Lyon Martin to share in the partition of
said property despite the fact that she was not a party to the said case. Said Order, therefore,
resulted in an amendment or modification of its decision rendered in Civil Case No. 872.
ISSUE: WON the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to participate
in the partition of the property considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant
in the suit for partition and accounting of the aforesaid property and that the decision rendered in said
case has long become final and executory.
HELD: NO. Granted
RATIO:
Petitioners contend that the trial court's decision dated December 14, 1974 in the suit
ordering the partition of the parcel of land among plaintiffs and defendants has long become
final and executory.
Hence the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue the questioned Order dated January 9, 1987
ordering the Board of Commissioners to include Mary Lyon Martin to share in the partition of
said property despite the fact that she was not a party to the said case. Said Order, therefore,
resulted in an amendment or modification of its decision rendered in Civil Case No. 872.
Manning International Corporation v. NLRC,We held that ". . ., nothing is more settled in the
law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or
by the highest Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical
errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
and, of course, where the judgment is void."
Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and
executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings
held for that purpose."
In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and
executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary
Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority.
The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil Case
No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in
interest can prove their respective claims.
On October 15, 1954, Avila secured a free patent on said lot, by falsely alleging that he and
his predecessors in interest were in possession of said lot, continuously, since July 4, 1925, and by
misrepresenting to the Public Lands inspector that he had complied with the legal requirements.
According to Cortez, in consequence of the aforementioned acts of Avila, he has suffered

damages amounting to P6,400 a year, apart from the sum of P5,000 by way of attorney's fees.
Cortez prays for the the court to (a) order cancellation of the free patent of Avila, (b) register the
Certificate of Title in his name, (c) restore him in possession of the premises, (d) order Avila to pay
him damages and attorneys fees.
AVILAS CONTENTION: Avila filed a MOTION TO DISMISS alleging that Cortez has no legal capacity
to sue, because the land in dispute is part of the public domain; hence, an action to
recover the same may be instituted exclusively by the Government, through the
Solicitor-General.
LOWER COURT
Granted the Motion to Dismiss by Avila
Cortez maintains that the lower court erred in granting said motion because the former is the
equitable owner of the lot in question. Cortez added that the Government could not have
maintained the present action, the same being for the benefit of the plaintiff, in his
private capacity.
ISSUE: WON the State is an indispensable party in this case

G.R. No. L-9782
April 26, 1957
HILARION CORTEZ vs. JUAN AVILA
FACTS:
HELD: YES. Cortez claims a land previously owned by the State. State is an indispensable party.
Obviously, plaintiff Cortez herein has "legal capacity" to sue, which is independent of the
public or private character of the lot in controversy. This does not mean, however, that he
has a cause of action, or that his appeal should prosper.
To begin with, an indispensable party is lacking. The complaint is predicated upon the major
premise that plaintiff is the equitable owner of said lot, for he has fully satisfied the prerequisites
to the issuance of a homestead patent in his favor.
This pretense implies that said lot was a public land; that the legal, as well as the equitable,
title thereto used to be in the State; and that, although still its legal owner, the State has
already been divested of its equitable title, and plaintiff has acquired it, he having fulfilled all the
conditions essential for the issuance of a patent in his name. Thus, the issue raised cannot be
determined without affecting the interest of the State, which is not a party in this
proceeding, and, hence, the State cannot protect and defend therein such interest.
Hilarion Cortez alleged in his complaint that since 1935, he has continuously, publicly and
adversely occupied a parcel of land, of about sixteen (16) hectares in the Barrio of
Conversion, Municipality of Pantabangan, Province of Nueva Ecija.
In the pleading, the land was particularly described: "described in the Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1318 in the name (now) of Juan Avila, the herein defendant.
On November 1946, Cortez applied for a homestead patent on said lot, the same being a public
land. His homestead application was duly approved by the Director of Lands, on June 25,
1947.
The issuance of a homestead patent in his favor was recommended by the investigating
public lands inspector as well as by the District Land Officer of Nueva Ecija.
However, for reasons unknown to Cortez, said homestead patent has not been issued to
him, although he has already become the "equitable owner" of the lot aforementioned.
GR: When a complaint is defective by reason of failure to include an indispensable party,

reasonable opportunity to amend said pleading must be given, and the action should not be
dismissed
EXCEPTION: When plaintiff fails or refuses to include said party, or the latter cannot be sued.
It was alleged that Defendant Avila filed a free patent application for the same lot, knowing that it
had been in continuous and actual possession of the plaintiff since 1935 and despite his (Avila's)
knowledge, actual or presumed, of the plaintiffs application.
In the case at bar, such policy does not apply.
Plaintiff Cortez has not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. Indeed,
he seeks, in effect a review of the decision of the Director of Lands in causing a patent to be
issued to defendant Avila. Yet, plaintiff does not appear to have asked the Director of Lands to
reconsider said decision, or to have appealed therefrom to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Through threat, intimidation and force, Avila succeeded in occupying the lot, on or about June
1953 to the exclusion of the plaintiff Cortez.
Natural Resources, who controls said official and is the "officer charged with carrying out the
provisions" of our revised public land law (C. A. 141, sec. 3).
It is well settled that, before the decision of administrative bodies can be brought to
courts for review, all administrative remedies must first be exhausted, especially in
disputes concerning public lands, where the finding of said administrative bodies, as to questions
of fact, are declared by statute to be conclusive.
The order of the Lower Court was affirmed by SC.
SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs.

ARMANDO CUSTODIO, JR., respondents.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
CA:
The Court of Appeals saw merit in the contention of private respondent that the
dismissal at the instance of petitioner himself of the amended complaint against
Ernesto Dollente after a failure of summons on him, was "fatal to the entire
action". Dollente being, in the considered view of the appellate court, an
indispensable party to the proceedings.
Hence, this present petition fro review.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
The litigation concerns a motor vehicle, a Colt Galant Sigma 1600E, 1977 model, 4-door sedan,
colored Baikal White.
Plaintiff's evidence shows that, on August 29, 1977, Eleuterio Bondoc executed and delivered to
Carmark Philippines a promissory note in the sum of P66,119.04, payable in installments,and in order to
secure payment, a chattel mortgage was executed in favor of Carmark Philippines over the
aforementioned motor vehicle, which was subsequently assigned in favor of Filinvest Corporation, with
the conformity of Eleuterio Bondoc.
On July 27, 1979, Eleuterio Bondoc, as vendor, executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage
of the balance of the account in favor of Cesar Dollente, which, upon approval by Filinvest Corporation,
Cesar Dollente executed and delivered to Filinvest Corporation a promissory note in the amount of
P37,528.83, payable in installments.
On October 26, 1979, Cesar Dollente, as vendor, executed a deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage over the aforementioned vehicle for the balance of his account in favor of Ernesto Dollente,.
On September 28, 1979, Ernesto Dollente executed and delivered to Filinvest Corporation a
promissory note for the sum of P37,528.83, payable in monthly installments. This obligation was
secured by a chattel mortgage executed between Cesar Dollente and Ernesto Dollente, which was
annotated and registered.
Subsequently, Filinvest Corporation assigned all its rights and interests on the promissory note and
chattel mortgage to plaintiff, with notice to Ernesto Dollente.
The original defendant Ernesto Dollente, having defaulted in the payment of the monthly installments
which fell due on June 15, 1979 up to September 15, 1981, plaintiff demanded from said defendant
the payment of the entire balance, which includes interest thereon and to return the motor vehicle in
question.
By reason of the refusal of the original defendant to pay the entire balance and to surrender
possession of the subject motor vehicle, this suit for replevin and damages was filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila and, upon its filing, upon motion, a writ of seizure was
issued and the same was implemented by the sheriff.
A counter-replevin bond having been filed, defendant Armando Custodio, Jr. had obtained possession
of the mortgaged vehicle.
Whether or not an action filed by the mortgagee for replevin to effect a foreclosure of the property
covered by the chattel mortgage would require that the mortgagor be so impleaded as an
indispensable party thereto.
RTC:
-
Finding preponderance of the evidence, it ruled in favor of herein

petitioner, the lower court.
o
The claim of herein defendant that, Ernesto Dollente's breach of
the chattel mortgage should not bind him, because he is not a
privy to such contract, is hardly acceptable, for the reason that
the registration of the chattel mortgage is an effective and
binding notice to him of its existence.
HELD:
YES. Dollente being, in the considered view of the appellate court, an indispensable party to the
proceedings.
Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of possession of
personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is "the owner of
the property claimed . . . or is entitled to the possession thereof." 7
The plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the possession
of the property and his legal basis therefor.
The question then, insofar as the matter finds relation to the instant case, is whether or not
the plaintiff (herein petitioner) who has predicated his right on being the mortgagee of a
chattel mortgage should implead the mortgagor in his complaint that seeks to recover
possession of the encumbered property in order to effect its foreclosure.
In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established.
A foreclosure under a chattel mortgage may properly be commenced only once there is
default on the part of the mortgagor of his obligation secured by the mortgage. The replevin
in the instant case has been sought to pave the way for the foreclosure of the object covered
by the chattel mortgage.
The conditions essential for that foreclosure would be to show, firstly, the existence of the
chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor.
These requirements must be established since the validity of the plaintiffs exercise of the
right of foreclosure are inevitably dependent thereon.
It would thus seem, considering particularly an adverse and independent claim of

ownership by private respondent, that the lower court acted improvidently when it granted
the dismissal of the complaint against Dollente, albeit on petitioner's (then plaintiff) plea, on
the ground that the "non-service of summons upon Ernesto Dollente (would) only delay the
determination of the merits of the case, to the prejudice of the parties."
In Imson v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
. . . An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's
action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are
so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party
to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a
resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete,
or equitable.
Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the

controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the
other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does
complete justice to the parties in court.
He is not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief

between him and those already parties to the action or will simply avoid multiple
litigation.
Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment

of a court cannot attain real finality.
VICTORIANO BORLASA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
VICENTE POLISTICO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
1.
2.
Petiitoners Victoriano Borlasa et al filed against Vicente Polistico and others before the CFI
Laguna on 1917
Their action lodged on: i. securing the dissolution of a voluntary association named Turuhan
Polistico & Co., and ii. To compel the defendants to account for and surrender the money and
property of the association in order that its affairs may be liquidated and its assets applied
according to law.
3.
plaintiffs and defendants, together with several hundred other persons, formed an
association under the name of Turuhan Polistico & Co. Vicente Polistico, the principal
defendant herein, was elected president and treasurer of the association
4.
each member obligated himself to pay to Vicente Polistico 50 centavos every Sunday, except
that on every fifth Sunday the amount was P1.
5.
The inducement to these weekly contributions was found in provisions of the by-laws to the
effect that a lottery should be conducted weekly among the members of the association and
that the successful member should be paid the amount collected each week, from which,
however, the president-treasurer of the society was to receive the sum of P200, to be held by
him as funds of the society.
6.
By virtue of these weekly lotteries, as alleged by the complaint, Vicente Polistico received
sums of money amounting to P74,000.
7.
The defendants in the complaint are the members of the board of directors of the association.
DEFENDANTS CONTENTION: they raised the question of lack of parties and set out a list of
some hundreds of persons whom they alleged should be brought in as parties defendant on
the ground, among others, that they were in default in the payment of their dues to the
association.
8.
TC dismissed the complaint on the ground that all the members of the Turnuhan Polistico &
Co. should be brought in either plaintiffs or defendants.
ISSUE: WoN the TC is correct in ruling that all parties must be impleaded.
HELD: NO. (remand back to lower court for further proccedings ) It would be impossible to make all of
the persons in interest parties to the cases and to require all of the members of the association to be
joined as parties would be tantamount to a denial of justice. The addition of some hundreds of persons
to the number of the plaintiffs, made in the amendment to the complaint of December 13, 1922, was
unnecessary, and as the presence of so many parties is bound to prove embarrassing to the litigation
from death or removal.
The court required the plaintiff to amend their complaint and implead only those sufficient persons
they think are responsible for their complaint and to make it more desirable, that the complaint should
be made to show on its face that the action is intended to be litigated as a class suit. We accordingly
recommend that the plaintiffs further amend by adding after the names of the parties plaintiffs the
words, "in their own behalf and in behalf of other members of Turuhan Polistico & Co."
Note:
GR: With reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all
necessary parties wherever possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and
all conditions, the presence of those latter being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power.
XPN: The class suit contemplates an exceptional situation where there are numerous persons all in
the same plight and all together constituting a constituency whose presence in the litigation is
absolutely indispensable to the administration of justice. Here the strict application of the rule as to
indispensable parties would require that each and every individual in the class should be present. But
at this point the practice is so far relaxed as to permit the suit to proceed, when the class is sufficient
represented to enable the court to deal properly and justly with that interest and with all other interest
involved in the suit. In the class suit, then, representation of a class interest which will be affected by
the judgment is indispensable; but it is not indispensable to make each member of the class an actual
party.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is correct.

MR. & MRS. TADEO P. DAEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. BERNARDO TEVES, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, Branch VIII and DIONISIO EDOROT, VIDAL EDOROT, PONCIANO EDOROT, PETRA
EDOROT, DIOSDADA EDOROT, JUANA EDOROT, and the late HERMINIGILDO EDOROT,
represented by his heirs. VICTOR EDOROT, PEDRITO EDOROT and JACOBO
EDOROT, respondents.
HELD: NO.
Private Respondents claim to be the owners and possessors, pro-indiviso by inheritance from
their deceased parents, of the subject litigated parcel.
Necessarily then, deceased defendants Herminigildo Edorot and Petra Edorot have an
undivided interest, right and participation adverse to that of the petitioners' in the property in
litigation.
Since both of them are already dead (Herminigildo died on September 29, 1969 and Petra
died on April 5, 1970) even prior to the filing of the complaint against them in the court below
and their interest in the property in question having inured by intestacy to their heirs, the
latter thereby became the real parties in interest who should be impleaded as defendants
without whom no final determination of Civil Case No. 3531 can be had.
Decidedly then they are indispensable parties who should be compulsory joined as
defendants in the instant case.
Sections 2 and 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides-
FACTS:
Petitioners filed with the CFI Misamis Oriental, a complaint for: "Ownership, Recovery of
Possession & Damages" against the private respondents.
Petitioners in their complaint alleged: that they are the true and absolute owners of a an
18,000 sqm parcel of land in Aplaya, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental, which they from the late
Esteban Edorot and that after the death of Esteban Edorot, the defendants (herein private
respondents) by means of force, threats and intimidation surreptitiously occupied the said
property.
Private respondents, through counsel, filed their Answer with Counterclaim claiming that the
property in question is owned by them pro-indiviso by inheritance from their deceased
parents.
The case was set for Pre-trial in CFI Misamis presided then by Judge Malvar, counsel for
Private respondent and respondent Vidal Edorot (for the other respondents) appeared. 2
other defendants PETRA and HERMINIGILDO died long before the filing of the complaint.
Judge Malvar was transferred to another court and Respondent Judge Teves was appointed to
take his place.
Section 2. Parties in interest. Every action must be prosecuted and defended in

the name of the real party in interest. All persons having an interest in the subject of
the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. All
persons who claim an interest in the controversy or the subject thereof adverse to
the plaintiff, or who are necessary to complete determination or settlement of the
question involved therein shall be joined as defendants.
Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.Parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants.
Judge Teves issued an ORDER: giving the plaintiff a time within which to file an amended
complaint to include the heirs or representatives of said deceased defendants.
Counsel for Private Respondents filed an Ex- Parte Manifestation, praying that the case be
dismissed for failure of petitioners to comply with the aforequoted order of the Court to file an
amended complaint.
RTC: dismissed the complaint of Petitioners for their failure to comply with the said order
issued by Judge Teves.
Petitioners filed an MR but the same was denied, hence the present case.
Petitioners contend that respondent judge acted w/o jurisdiction or acted with GAD in
ordering petitioners to file an amended complaint to include the alleged heirs and
representatives of Deceased Respondents.
The heirs of deceased defendants in the case at bar being clearly indispensable parties,
respondent Judge acted properly in ordering the amendment of the complaint so as to include
the said heirs as defendants.
Petitioners now claim that their failure to amend the complaint was due to the fact that
private respondents' counsel failed to inform the Court of the names of the heirs and/or
representatives of the deceased defendants (Herminigildo and Petra Edorot) pursuant to
Section 16, Rule 3, New Rules of Court which providesSection 16. Duty of attorney upon death incapacity or incompetency of party.
Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated, or incompetent, it
shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death,
incapacity or incompetency and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative (Emphasis supplied)
We find petitioners' reliance on the aforequoted provision as misplaced. Rule 3, Section 16 of

the Rules applies to a situation where a party (whether plaintiff or defendant) dies after the
filing of the complaint and during the pendency of the case. This is not the situation in the
case at bar since the two defendants, whose heirs are to be impleaded died even before the
filing of the complaint.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the lower court's Order of dismissal, which should be understood
to be without prejudice, is AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.
AGUSTIN O. CASEAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CONCEPCION SANCHEZ VDA. DE ROSALES

(Substituted by her heirs), ROMEO S. ROSALES, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Rule 3: Class Suit
FACTS:
Rodolfo Araas i, acquired the rights and interest over a parcel of land covering an area of
more or less than 2,273 square meters and designated as Lot No. 445-A of the Butuan
Cadastre No. 84 from the spouses Jose A. Rosales and Concepcion Sanchez under a deed of
sale executed on March 18, 1939
Terms of the Deed of Sale: the actual transfer of the aforesaid land unto the vendee would be
made only on or before February 18, 1941;
Sometime in 1939, Agustin O. Caseas acquired from Rodolfo Araas under a deed of
assignment, the latter's rights and interest over the said lot.
that despite the above documented transactions, and despite the arrival of the stipulated
period for the execution of the final deed of transfer, the vendors spouses refused to fulfill
their obligation to effect such transfer of the said lot to the vendee, Rodolfo Araas or his
assignee, the herein appellant, Agustin O. Caseas
On August 21, 1952, Rodolfo Araas and Agustin O. Caseas filed:
WHERE: Court of First Instance of Agusan,
WHAT: a complaint for specific performance and enforcement of their alleged right under a
certain deed of sale, and damages against the spouses
Thus, the principal relief prayed for in the above complaint was for an order directing the
defendants-spouses to "execute a deed of absolute sale of the property described in the
complaint in favor of the assignee, plaintiff Agustin O. Caseas.:
Before trial, after defendant-spouses answer, the counsel for the plaintiffs gave notice to the
trial court that plaintiff Rodolfo Araas and defendant Jose A. Rosales had both
died.
Lower Court ordered in April 27, 1956, directed, the surviving plaintiff, Agustin O. Caseas, to
amend the complaint to effect the necessary substitution of parties thereon.
Surviving plaintiff, however, failed altogether to comply with the order of April 27, 1956
On July 18, 1957, the lower court dismissed the complaint for failure to comply.
No appeal was taken.
On April 18, 1960, Agustin Casenas filed with the same court against the widow and heirs of
the late Jose A. Rosales
WHAT: to quiet, and for reconveyance of, title to real property, with damages."
The complaint alleged the same facts as the first case.
"that the plaintiff (Agustin O. Caseas) has acquired the above-described property
by purchase from its previous owner, Rodolfo Araas now deceased, ...; and said
Rodolfo Aranas had in turn acquired the same property by virtue of another deed of
sale executed by Jose A. Rosales, now also deceased;" (Par. 3, Complaint) "that
under the terms and stipulations of paragraph 2 of the deed of sale (between
Rosales and Araas) ... Jose A. Rosales was to hold title to the land in question in
favor of Rodolfo Araas or the latter's signs and successors in interest for a period of
(5) years from February 19, 1936, at the expiration of which said Jose A. Rosales was
to execute a document conveying absolutely the title to the land in question in favor
of the aforementioned Rodolfo Araas or his assigns and successors in interest" (Par.
9, Complaint) ; "despite which obligation the defendants refused, even after the
expiration of the stipulated period to "convey title to the land in question and to
execute the corresponding document covering the same."
Plaintiff prayed for judgment "quieting the title of the plaintiff to the land in question and
ordering the defendants to execute a deed of conveyance of the same in favor of the said
plaintiff" plus costs and damages.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on several gorunds, among others, Res Judicata,
prescription, lack of cause of action, failure to include indispensable parties, and that the
contract subject of the complaint was void ab initio.
CFI RULED: dismissed the complaint:
The Court, however, believes that this action is barred by prior judgment. The
order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 261 was already final and has the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits. The parties in Civil Case No. 261 and in this case are
substantially the same; the subject matter is the same and there is identity of cause
of action. All the elements of res judicata are therefore present.1wph1.t
Moreover, the complaint states no cause of action if its purpose is to quiet title,
because the plaintiff has as yet no title to the land in question. Precisely, this action
is brought in order to acquire or secure title by compelling the defendants to execute
a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff. However, this action for specific performance
cannot also prosper because being based upon an agreement in writing it is already
barred by prescription as the period of ten years has long expired when the present
complaint was filed.
ISSUE: WON there was res judicata in the second case

HELD: NONE.
Re Death of a Party:
When certain of the parties died and due notice thereof was given to the trial court, it devolved on the
said court to order, in accordance with not the amendment of the complaint, but the
appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased the procedure in Rule 3, Section 17 of
the Rules of Court:
SEC. 17. Death of Party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
An order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of parties as directed by
the aforequoted rule has been effected, is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to
comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the said complaint, for such noncompliance, would similarly be void. The continuance of a proceedings during the
pendency of which a party thereto dies, without such party having been validly
substituted in accordance with the rules, amounts to a "lack of jurisdiction."
Consequently, as the dismissal of first civil case was void, it clearly may not be asserted to bar the
subsequent prosecution of the same or identical claim.
As to cause of action, a cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right
or rights of the other and both these elements were clearly alleged in the aforesaid complaint.
JOSE BARRAMEDA, DOLORES B. MAGADIA, and JULIAN BARRAMEDA, JR., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs. PAULINO BARBARA and MARCELA BARBARA, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
The present case stems from the previous case (Civil Case No. R-119)
Paulino and Marcela Barbara (defendants-appellants herein) filed a complaint

against Julian Barrameda (deceased father of the herein plaintiffs- appellees),
alleging that Barrameda refused to allow the redemption of the land in
question herein, which according to them had been mortgaged to Barrameda for the
sum of P270, the original mortgagor and mortgagee being Jacoba Buyet and Juan Reis,
respectively.
Juan Reis assigned his rights as mortgagee to Julian Barrameda.
Jacoba Buyet was succeeded by her heirs Paulino and Marcela Barbara.
Julian Barrameda filed an answer alleging that the transaction between him and Jacoba
Buyet was not a mortgage but a sale with pacto de retro and that neither Jacoba Buyet
nor her heirs had redeemed the land within the stipulated period of six years, and,
consequently, he, Julian Barrameda, had become the absolute owner of the property in
question.
After the above pleadings had been filed and while the case was pending hearing, the
court, after being informed that Julian Barrameda had died, ordered the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint so as to substitute the legal representatives of Julian Barrameda
as defendants.
Although seven months had elapsed since the plaintiffs were notified of said order, they
had failed to comply with it.
Counsel for the deceased defendant Julian Barrameda filed a motion for
dismissal on the ground that in failing to file an amended complaint, the plaintiffs in
said case, R-119 (defendants-appellants herein), showed lack of interest in prosecuting
the case.
The court granted the motion, dismissing the case based on the failure of the
plaintiffs to comply with the order of the court to amend the complaint so as to
substitute as defendants the heirs or representatives of the deceased defendant Julian
Barrameda
The plaintiffs in the present case, Jose and Julian Barrameda, Jr., and Dolores B.
Magadia, heirs of Julian Barrameda, filed a complaint, in the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur, against Paulino and Marcela Barbara (plaintiffs in case No. R-119),
alleging the facts above stated, and praying that they be declared the owners of the
property in question and that the defendants be ordered to indemnify them in the
sum of P200 per annum as damages from May, 1947 until the defendants should vacate the
land.
The defendants herein Paulino and Marcela Barbara filed an answer, alleging in substance,
that the deed which the plaintiffs claim to be of sale with pacto de retro was only of
mortgage, which was null and void because their deceased mother Jacoba Buyet, who
executed it, had no authority to do so, as the property belonged exclusively to their deceased
father Pascual Barbara; that they had been in possession of the land as owners for more than
twenty years.
CF
I
The answer of the defendants ends with the prayer that the document in question be
declared null and void; that if it is declared valid, it be considered only as a mortgage or
guaranty of one-half of the property in question; and that they be ordered to pay to the
plaintiffs only half of the sum of P270 with costs against the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs in the present case filed a motion entitled "Motion to Dismiss the
Counterclaim of the Defendants and Render Judgment in accordance with the
Allegations in the Complaint,"based on the grounds:
1. "That the cause of action stated in said counterclaim is barred by prior judgment.
2. That the said counterclaim states no cause of action.
3. That the answer does not allege any valid defense."
Rendered judgment declaring the plaintiffs owners of the land in question

and ordering the defendants in the present case to deliver the possession
to the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs.
It ruled that the prior dismissal was a final adjudication on the merits.
The defendants herein appealed to the Court of Appeals.
C
Certified the present case to the SC considering that all the questions raised
A
are of law and not of fact
ISSUE: WON the CFI was correct in ruling that the prior dismissal of the Civil Case R-119 was final
because of the failure of the Barbaras to amend their complaint to substiture the legal representatives
of Barrameda
HELD: NO
Under Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court it is the duty of the attorney for the deceased
defendant to inform the Court of his client's death and furnish it with the name and residence
of the executor, administrator, or legal representative of the deceased.
This rule must have taken into consideration the fact that the attorney for the deceased party
is in a better position that the attorney for the other party to ascertain who are the legal
representative or heirs of his deceased client.
This duty should not be shifted to the plaintiff or his attorney.
Although the attorney for the deceased defendant did not furnish the name of the legal
representative of his deceased client, the court directly ordered the plaintiffs to make the
substitution without previously requiring the defendants to do so.
Consequently, the order of the court requiring the plaintiffs to make substitution without
previously ordering the attorney for the defendants to name the legal representative and
ordering the latter to appear, was a violation of Rule 3, sections 16 and 17 5, and was,
therefore, void.
The non-compliance with the order could not be considered as failure to prosecute.
The fault of the defendants should not be attributed to the plaintiffs, making the latter suffer
the serious consequences.
5 Rule 3, section 16, reads as follows:"Duty of attorney upon death or incapacity of a party. Whenever a party to a pending case dies
or becomes insane, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death or insanity and to give the name and
residence of the executor or administrator, guardian, or other legal representatives of the deceased or insane."
Section 17 of the same rule, reads as follows:
"Death of party. After a party dies and the claims is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time
as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs."
As the defendant had died, the attorney representing him could not file a motion to dismiss
for, his client being dead, he had no longer any standing in court; he had no personality and
could not have been represented by an attorney.
But if it had been the heirs of the deceased Barrameda who were represented in filing the
motion to dismiss (which was not so), then instead of filing a motion for dismissal they should
have appeared as defendants in lieu of the deceased Julian Barrameda.
If they had appeared in court to file a motion for dismissal, they could and should have
appeared as defendants as it was their duty to do under sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3, without
shifting this duty to the plaintiffs.
The case is ordered returned to the trial court for further and appropriate proceedings
[G.R. No. L-41107. February 28, 1979.]
ISSUE: WON substitution must still be ordered even if the case is final,
HELD: YES.
1."in entertaining an appeal from the order of the Court of Agrarian Relations, in reversing the decision
of the Court of Agrarian Relations of March 29, 1962, setting aside the same and the auction sale of
July 2, 1969, the certificate of sale dated July 31, 1969, and the final deed of sale of August 17, 1979,"
with respect to Felix Jose, considering that a period of more than eight (8) years had elapsed from the
rendition of the decision of the trial court to the filing of the motion for substitution:
3.
"in finding that the trial was still going on and not yet terminated when Felix Jose died on June
5, 1961, and that the continuance of the trial after the death of defendant, without such partly having
been substituted in accordance with the aforesaid Rule amounts to lack of jurisdiction."
AMANDA L. VDA. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL., vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELO ABAGA,
MARGARITA D. JOSE, MARTINA D. JOSE, QUIRINO D. JOSE, TEOFILO D. JOSE, ET AL.,
NATURE: Certiorari
FACTS:
Plaintiffs filed an action ejectment and collection of unpaid rentals against Felix Jose and 114
other tenants in the Court Agrarian Relations, Tayug, Pangasinan.
Their complaint alleged that Felix Jose is a tenant over a 4.5 ha. landholding in plaintiffs'
hacienda in Tayug, Pangasinan, paying a fixed rental of 850 kilos of palay per hectare per
agricultural year; that he failed to pay in full his rentals and despite plaintiffs' repeated
demands, Felix Jose refused to vacate the landholding and to pay his obligation.
Atty. Fausto G. Cabotaje, defendant Felix Jose and his 114 co-defendants denied the material
averments of the complaint, alleging payment of all the rentals of their respective
landholdings.
Trial was commenced. However, Felix Jose died.
It appears that upon Jose's demise no substitution of defendant was effected.
Trial court rendered judgment against Felix Jose together with the other defendants holding
him liable to plaintiffs for 6,432 kilos of palay as unpaid rentals.
Some of his co-defendants then brought the case to the Supreme Court for review on
certiorari whichwas dismissed due to the petitioners' failure to file their brief.
To satisfy the award of damages under the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the
conjugal properties of the deceased Felix Jose and his wife were sold at public auction.
A certificate of sale dated July 31, 1969 was later issued in favor of plaintiff Amanda L. Vda.
de la Cruz as highest bidder.
On October 27, 1970, the heirs of the deceased defendant, through their new counsel, Atty.
Juan V. Landingin, filed a motion to substitute the deceased and to set aside as null void the
decisions, orders, writ of execution and sale at public auction made and entered against the
latter.
TC: Granted substitution but Denied the motion to set aside the decision and the
sale.
CA: Denied
SC: had no choice but to Affirm
The substituted defendants then appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising mainly the
question of the validity of the lower court's decision on the ground that despite it's awareness
of the death of said defendant, no substitution was ordered before decision was rendered on
March 29, 1962.
Whether defendant died before or after termination of trial is not all that important because
one thing is certain; that he died before the rendition of judgment.
The Court of Appeals took this into consideration when it held that the decision of said court
was a "patent nullity" insofar as Felix Jose was concerned.
As stated by the Appellate Court, no substitution of the deceased was ordered by the trial
court, in disregard of the provisions of Rule 3, Sec. 17, Rules of Court which reed thus:
SEC. 17. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for
the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and
the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The
court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may be appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
Considering the complaint was for ejectment of the tenants, (defendant, being one of them)
the provisions of said section and the rulings in the aforementioned cases are indeed
applicable to the present case, where the action or the claim is not extinguish account of
Section 9, RA 1199, (now RA 6389, Code of Agrarian Reforms) which provides in effect that in
case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee, the leasehold shall continue
between the lessor and the persons enumerated in said Section which include the
descendants of the deceased.
But as noted by the Court of Appeals 4 : "it appears that no legal representative was ever
summoned to appear in court; that no legal representative appeared to be substituted; and
that plaintiffs did not procure the appointment of such legal representatives." As a result, the
"continuance of a proceeding during the pendency of which a party thereto dies, without such
having been validly substituted in accordance with the rules, amounts to lack of jurisdiction."
Assuming that jurisdiction was ever acquired at the outset over defendant Felix Jose, it was
"inevitably impaired on the death of the protestee pending the proceedings below such that
unless and until a legal representative is for him duly named and within the jurisdiction of the
trial court, no adjudication in the cause could have been accorded any validity or binding
effect on any party, in representation of the deceased, without trenching upon the
fundamental right to a day in court which is the very essence of the constitutionally
enshrined guarantee of due process."
The need therefore for substitution is based on the right of a party to due process.
In any case, substitution should be ordered even after judgment has been rendered since
proceedings may still be taken-as was done in this case like an execution; and the legal
representative must appear to protect the interests of the deceased and in all such
proceedings.
In this instance, however, the Court of Appeals found that there is "no showing that the
appellants were notified of the decision dated March 29, 1962 or of the auction sale held
thereafter." Petitioners take issue with the Appellate Court on this point. But since the
present petition is for review on certiorari, where "only questions of law may be raised," (R.
45, Sec. 2, Revised Rules of Court), this Court has held in a number of cases that findings of
facts by the Court of Appeals are; in general, final and conclusive (Chan vs. Court of Appeals,
33 SCRA 737; Ramirez Te. Corp. vs. Bank of America, 32 SCRA 191; Castro vs. Tamporong, 78
Phil. 804 to name a few), except when: 10
1.
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
2.
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3.
there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4.
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5.
the Court of Appeals is making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee.
None of the above exceptions however applies to the case at bar, so there is no reason to disturb the
findings of the Court of Appeals.
Appellants counsel requested for an extension of time within which to file appellant's brief.
Respondent court in a resolution dated June 23, 1975 granted the request and gave appellant a
90-day extension (with warning of no further extension) from receipt on June 27, 1975 or up to
September 25, 1975 within which to file the appellant's printed brief. On June 23, 1975, private
respondent opposed the extension
In the pendency of the case, appellant Florentina died on May 26, 1975. Counsels for appellant
notified CA.
Appellant's counsels asked for the suspension of the running of the period within
which to file the appellant's brief pending the appointment of an executor of the
estate left by their client in the CFI of Quezon City where a petition for the probate of the
alleged will of the deceased had been filed by a lawyer, Atty. Sergio Amante.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The lawyers of the deceased could no longer act for and in her
behalf for the reason that their client-attorney relationship had been automatically terminated.
Respondents asked that the appeal be DISMISSED.
Not certain whether their services would still be retained by the heirs of the deceased, counsel for
the late Florentina reiterated their earlier request in a motion either for an extension of time
to file appellant's brief or for the issuance of a resolution suspending the running of
the period for filing the same, pending the appointment of an administrator or executor of the
estate of the deceased appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS
Denied the appellant counsels request for extension and at the same time dismissed the appeal.
CA considered that appellant has already been given a total of 195 days within which to file brief.
Counsel for the deceased filed urgent MR explaining their predicament that the requests for
extension/suspension of period to file brief was due to the uncertainty that their
services may no longer be retained by the heirs/legal representatives of their
deceased client but they felt obligated to preserve the right of such heirs/successors, pending
the settlement of the question of who among them should be the executor of the deceased's
estate.
CA denied MR
It cited the general principle that "litigants have no right to assume that such extensions
will be granted as a matter of course."
G.R. Nos. L-42699 to L-42709 May 26, 1981

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE FLORENTINA NUGUID VDA. DE HABERER vs. CA
MARTINEZ, ET AL.
** FEDERICO
FACTS:
The late Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer, as the duly registered owner, filed in 1964 and 1965,
11 (eleven) complaints for recovery of possession of the parcel of land before the CFI of
Rizal.
Florentina presented as evidence, a TCT of the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in her name. The
property was situated in Mandaluyong, Rizal. The late Florentina alleged that private respondents
had surreptitiously entered the land and built their houses thereon.
LOWER COURT
Rendered a consolidated decision dismissing all the complaints.
On motion of the late Florentina, the cases were reopened and retried on grounds of newly
discovered evidence.
On September 15, 1972, the lower court order the REVIVAL of its decision dismissing all the
complaints.
COURT OF APPEALS (acting on appeal)

Dismissed the cases on the ground that the appeal was filed out of time.
SUPREME COURT
On January 29, 1975, SC rendered its judgment setting aside CAs dismissal of the appeal.
The cases were remanded to the Court of Appeals upon a finding that petitioner duly and timely
perfected her appeal within the reglementary period.
Appellant was required to file brief in 45 days days from receipt of notice***
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in denying the MR and the admission of the appellants brief
HELD: YES.SC said CA erred in applying the general principle (as mentioned above) and summarily
denying reconsideration and denying admission of the appellant's brief.
***The rule is: ln the absence of a retainer from the heirs or authorized representatives of his
deceased client, the attorney would thereafter have no further power or authority to appear or take
any further action in the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and take the necessary
steps to safeguard the deceased's rights in the case.
This is what the deceased's counsel did in the case at bar: (1) They properly informed
respondent court of the death of the appellant and (2) sought suspension of the proceedings and
of the period for filing appellant's brief pending the appointment of the executor of the
deceased's estate.
A final note: On March 19, 1976, counsels submitted with their Manifestation the written authority
dated January 20, 1976 individually signed by instituted heirs and/or legal representatives of the
testate estate of the deceased Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer granting said counsels full
authority to file and prosecute the case and any other incidental cases for and in their
behalf, 18 which was duly noted in the Court's Resolution of March 26, 1976. Such manifestation
and authority may be deemed the formal substitution of the deceased by her heirs, as in fact they
appear as petitioners in the title of the case at bar. Hence, the proper determination of the
pending appeal may now proceed, as herein directed.
SC granted the petition. The CA resolutions were set aside. The appellant's brief was admitted and
the cases are REMANDED to CA for further proceedings.
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court sets the RULE ON SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES in case of
death of any of the parties.
Under the Rule, it is the court that is called upon, after notice of a party's death and the claim
is not thereby extinguished, to order upon proper notice the legal representative of the
deceased to appear within a period of 30 days or such time as it may grant.
Since no administrator of the estate of the deceased appellant had yet been appointed
as the same was still pending determination in the CFI of Quezon City, the motion of the
deceased's counsel for the suspension of the running of the period within which to file
appellant's brief was well-taken.
Under the Rule, the CA should have set a period for the substitution of the deceased party with
her legal representative or heirs, failing which, the court is called upon to order the opposing
party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased at the cost of the
deceased's estate, and such representative shall then "immediately appear for and on behalf of
the interest of the deceased."
CA gravely erred in not following the Rule and requiring the appearance of the legal
representative of the deceased and instead dismissing the appeal of the deceased who yet had to
be substituted in the pending appeal.
It has been held that when a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued by the
court for the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased in substitution
of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no such substitution has ever been effected, the
trial held by the court without such legal representatives or heirs and the judgment
rendered after such trial are NULL AND VOID because the court acquired no jurisdiction over
the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment
would be binding.
CA erred in ruling: that upon the demise of the party-appellant, the attorney-client relationship
between her and her counsels was automatically severed and terminated, whatever pleadings
filed by said counsel with it after the death of said appellant are mere scraps of paper."
SC said that due to said death on May 25, 1975 and severance of the attorney-client relationship,
further proceedings and specifically the running of the original 45-day period for filing the
appellant's brief should be legally deemed as having been automatically suspended,
until the proper substitution of the deceased appellant by her executor or
administrator or her heirs shall have been effected within the time set by respondent court
pursuant to the cited Rule.
Justice and equity dictate under the circumstances of the case at bar that the rules, while
necessary for the speedy and orderly administration of justice, should not be applied with the
rigidity and inflexibility of respondent court's resolutions. A liberal, rather than a strict and
inflexible adherence to the Rules, is justified not only because appellant (in this case, her estate
and/or heirs) should be given every opportunity to be heard but also because no substantial
injury or prejudice can well be caused to the adverse parties principally, since they are
in actual possession of the disputed land.
The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed does not have the effect of
dismissing the appeal automatically. Rather, CA has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss
appellant's appeal, which discretion must be a sound one to be exercised in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.
SOCORRO SEPULVEDA LAWAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS,
[as Judge, CFI, Cebu, Branch VIII], and PACIFICO PELAEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Pacifico Pelaez filed a Complaint on December 6, 1972 against petitioner's father,
Pedro Sepulveda, for ownership and partition of certain parcels of land.
Defendant Pedro Sepulveda filed his Answer dated December 31, 1972 resisting the claim and raising
the special defenses of laches, prescription and failure to ventilate in a previous special proceeding.
During the presentation of evidence for the plaintiff, the defendant died on March 25, 1975. On May
21, 1975, counsels for the deceased defendant filed a notice of death wherein were enumerated the
thirteen children and surviving spouse of the deceased.
On May 5, 1975, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration and she was appointed judicial
administratrix of the estate of her late father in July, 1976.
At the hearing of the case on November 27, 1975, Attys. Domingo Antigua and Serafin Branzuela,
former counsels for the deceased defendant, manifested in open court that with the death of their client,
their contract with him was also terminated and none of the thirteen children nor the surviving spouse
had renewed the contract, but instead they had engaged the services of other lawyers in the intestate
proceedings.
Notwithstanding the manifestation of the former counsels of the deceased defendant, the respondent
trial judge set the case for hearing on January 13, 1976 and sent the notice of hearing to said counsels.
On January 13, 1976, the respondent trial judge issued three orders.
The first order substituted the heirs of the deceased defendant, namely, his thirteen children and
surviving spouse, as defendants;
o
The second order authorized Atty. Teodoro Almase, counsel for the plaintiff, to present his
evidence in the absence of Attys. Antigua and Branzuela and;
The third order treated the case submitted for decision, after the plaintiff had presented his
evidence and rested his case, and directed that said counsels and the fourteen heirs of the
deceased defendant be furnished copies thereof.
RTC:
-
The former counsels for the deceased defendant, Pedro Sepulveda, complied with this rule by
filing a notice of death on May 21, 1975. They also correctly manifested in open court at the
hearing of the case on November 27, 1975, that with the death of their client their contract
with him was also terminated and none of the heirs of the deceased had renewed the
contract, and the heirs had instead engaged the services of other lawyers in the intestate
proceedings.
On March 9, 1976, the widow and two other children of the deceased defendant, through
their counsel Atty. Delfin Quijano, filed a motion for substitution and for reconsideration of the
decision dated January 28, 1976.
Both the respondent trial judge and the Court of Appeals erred in considering the
former counsels of the deceased defendant as counsels for the heirs of the
deceased.
On April 7, 1976, the respondent trial judge issued an order setting aside his
decision and setting the case in the calendar for cross-examination of the plaintiff,
Pacifico Pelaez, with a proviso that said order was applicable only to the three heirs
who had filed the motion.
The statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals that "the appearance of the
lawyers of their deceased father in court on January 13, 1976 carries the
presumption that they were authorized by the heirs of the deceased defendant" is
erroneous.
On July 14, 1976, the respondent trial judge lifted the order setting aside his
decision, despite the verbal petition for postponement of the hearing made by one
of the three heirs on the ground of the absence of their counsel.
As this Court held in People vs. Florendo (77 Phil. 16), "the attorneys for the offended
party ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the death of the latter, the
principal."
On July 9, 1976, petitioner, who had been appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of
the deceased defendant and who was one of the heirs who had filed an Answer on February
19, 1976, filed a motion to intervene and/or substitute the deceased defendant.
Moreover, such a presumption was not warranted in view of the manifestation of said lawyers
in open court on November 27, 1975 that they were not representing the heirs of the
deceased defendant.
On August 25, 1976, the respondent trial judge denied the motion for the reason
that the decision had already become final.
Consequently, when on the same date, November 27, 1975, the respondent trial judge
issued an order setting the continuation of the trial of the case on January 13,
1976, with notices sent to Atty. Almase for the plaintiff and Attys. Antigua and
Branzuela for the deceased defendant, he acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
The refusal of said former counsels of the deceased defendant to cross-examine

the plaintiff was justified.
Moreover, as above stated, petitioner had as early as May 5, 1975 filed a petition for letters
of administration, and the same was granted in July, 1975.
Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party. Whenever a party to a

pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney
to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the
name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative.
On January 28, 1976, the respondent trial judge rendered a decision against the heirs of
the deceased defendant.
On February 19, 1976, ten of the children of the deceased defendant, who apparently did not know
that a decision had already been rendered, filed an Answer in-substitution of the deceased defendant
through their counsel Atty. Jesus Yray.
Section 16 of Rule 3 provides as follows:
This was denied admission by the respondent trial judge for being already moot and
academic because of the earlier decision.
Petitioner then filed a special civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the
proceedings in the respondent trial court.
CA:
However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Hence, the present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court the proceedings conducted by the respondent trial judge after the
death of the deceased defendant are null and void.
HELD:YES. The appeal is meritorious.
Section 17 of Rule 3 provides as follows:

Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shag
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may
be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order
the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear
for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring
such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of
the de ceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.
In view of the pendency of Special Proceeding No. 37-SF Intestate Estate of Pedro Sepulveda,
and the pending application of petitioner to be appointed judicial administratrix of the estate,
the respondent trial judge should have awaited the appointment of petitioner and
granted her motion to substitute the deceased defendant.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO REGOSO VS CA & BELEN REGOSO JULY 6, 1992

FACTS:
*An action for judicial partition of property with accounting and damages was filed by Belen Regoso
against her husband Maximo Regoso in the RTC of Bulacan. The RTC ruled in favor of Belen Regoso.
inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and
residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for
the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and
the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The
court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian
ad litem for the minor heirs.
RE DEATH OF A PARTY
*The CA dismissed the appeal and the MR with finality.

1.
2.
3.
Regoso died on January 17, 1985 after the case had been submitted for decision, but he was
not substituted as defendant by his heirs because, apparently, the trial court was not
informed of his death until the decision had been promulgated on November 14, 1988.
On November 29, 1988, Regoso's counsel, Attorney Adriano Javier, Sr., filed a notice of appeal
which the trial court approved. The appeal was docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R.
No. 20183.
The plaintiff, Belen Cruz-Regoso, through counsel, moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that the deceased defendant ceased to have legal personality and that Attorney Javier's
authority to represent him was terminated or expired upon his demise, hence, the notice of
appeal filed by said counsel was invalid, a worthless piece of paper.
RAFAEL S. DIZON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JOSE P.
FERNANDEZ, REDENTOR MELO, ELIODORO C. CRUZ, PIER 8 ARRASTRE & STEVEDORING
SERVICES, INC., COMPAIA MARITIMA, PASIG STEVEDORING COMPANY, INC., and WESTERN
PACIFIC CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PROTACIO C. STO. TOMAS, Judge, RTC, Branch 14, Ligao,
Albay, and JOSE BALDE, respondents.
ISSUE:
WON the notice of Appeal filed by Atty. Javier was valid? NO

HELD/RATIO:
In the case at bar, no such notice of death, nor a motion for substitution of the deceased
defendant, was ever made. Hence, the trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice
of the death of defendant, Maximo Regoso, without the proper manifestation from his counsel. It must
be remembered that the fault or negligence was Attorney Javier's alone.
The supervening death of the defendant, Maximo Regoso, did not extinguish his wife's action
for partition of their conjugal assets, for it is an action that survives. The trial of the case on the merits
was already finished before the defendant died. Since it was not informed about that event, the trial
court may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering the substitution of the
deceased defendant. Its judgment is valid and binding upon the defendant's legal representatives or
successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned.
*RELEVANT LAW:
Under the rules, it is the duty of the attorney for the deceased defendant to inform the court of his
client's death and to furnish the court with the names and residences of the executor, administrator,
or legal representative of the deceased. Sections 16 and 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party. Whenever a party to a
pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to
FACTS:
1.
Jose Balde ,respondent herein, filed for the recovery of damages resulting from the alleged
illegal termination of his employment (as Chief Accountant & Collection Manager of Pier 8
since 1973 and Chief Accountant of Western Pacific Corp since 1974) from the so-called
"Fernandez Companies" effected by Jose P. Fernandez
2.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action, which was essentially a "money claim" arising from an employeremployee relationship exclusively cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission,
and that no official decision had yet been reached regarding termination of Balde's
employment.
3.
Some two weeks afterwards, or more precisely on November 7, 1987, defendant Jose P.
Fernandez died. Notice thereof was given to the Court by his counsel, through a
manifestation dated November 16, 1987.
Note: (interruption of facts muna like what the Court did in this case)
REAL ACTION (one for recovery of personal property or to enforce a lien thereon and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal) under RULE 3 SEC 17
The effects of the death of a defendant in a civil suit are dependent upon:
i.
Nature of the action
ii.
Time of his demise (death before or after judgment)
GR: If defendant dies, the claim against him is NOT thereby extinguished and the action will not be
dismissed but continue against the decedents legal representative.
PERSONAL ACTION (one for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon)

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
BEFORE final judgment of RTC
It shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner
especially provided in these
ru;es (Sec 21 Rule 3)
The especial manner of the
prosecution of said money
claims against the decedent is
set forth in Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court, in connection with the
judicial proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a
deceased person.
RATIO for the dismissal of the case:

that upon the death of the defendant
a testate or intestate proceeding shall
be instituted in the proper court
wherein all his creditors must appear
and file their claims which shall be
paid proportionately out of the
property left by the deceased. It is,
therefore, to avoid useless duplicity of
procedure that the ordinary action
must be wiped out from the ordinary
courts.
AFTER final judgment of RTC
The action is not dismissed,

and an appeal may be taken by
or against the administrator.
BUT, if thejudgment against

the deceased becomes final
and executor , it shall be
enforced not by execution
under Rule 39 but in
accordance with Section 5 of
Rule 86, i.e by presenting as a
claims against the estate.
The court shall order, upon

proper
notice,
the
legal
representative of the deceased
to appear and to be substituted
for the deceased, within a
period of thirty (30) days, or
within such time as may be
granted.
OPPOSING PARTY PROCUREMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE
If the legal representative fails to appear within

said time, the court may order the opposing
party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to
be
specified
by
the
court,
and
the
representative shall immediately appear for and
on behalf of the interest of the deceased.
The court charges involved in procuring such

appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party,
may be recovered as costs.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be

substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs
4.
Record discloses that the lower court did not dismiss the case against the deceased
defendant conformably under Sec 21 of Rule 3 ( why? The action was a personal one: it is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon)but instead required the defendants new
counsel, Justice Dizon, to effectively substitute the said deceased w/in 30 days.
5. Counsel of the deceased failed to appear on the hearings twice due to:
i.
In his first absence, he reasoned out his poor health
ii.
Second absence, due to late reciving of the telegram of the order
TC : did not dismiss the case but ordered the counsel of defendant for substitution of party. Affirmed
by the CA.
ISSUE: WoN the ruling of the TC is correct in not dismissing the case
HELD: NO. The decision of the CA as well as the orders of RTC are reversed for lack of jurisdiction of the
subject matter and against the person of the deceased Jose Fernandez as set forth under Sec 17 Rule 3
of the ROC. "When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules." It was therefore error for the Trial
Court to decline to dismiss the suit as against the deceased Fernandez and to insists on continuing with
the action as to Fernandez by ordering his substitution by his administrator.
Note: (Sub issue re motion to dismiss filed by defendant Fernandez on the ground that NLRC has
jurisdiction)
Court held that the claims in question do not involve "wages, rates of pay hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment." They do constitute, however, a "termination
dispute," and are actually "claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from employer-employee relations," unaccompanied by a prayer for reinstatement. As
such they are, as the law clearly says, within the "original and exclusive jurisdiction" of Labor
Arbiters. In other words, whether under the law at present in force, or that at the time of the
filing of the complaint, Jose Balde's cause falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiters and not of the Regional Trial Court (formerly, Court of First Instance).
August 5, 1973-the accused died
Counsel for accused moved to dismiss the appeal under paragraph 1 of Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides that the death of a convict extinguishes, not only the
personal penalties, but also the "pecuniary penalties" as long as the death occurs before final
judgment.
Complainant Torrijos opposed the said motion to dismiss appeal on the ground that the term
"pecuniary penalty" should not include civil liability in favor of the offended party, which was
decreed by the trial court in this case, as the civil action therefor was not reserved, much less
filed separately from the criminal action.
CA: sustained the motion filed by counsel (ruled against Torrijos)
Hence, this petition.
HELD: SC ruled in favor of petitioner
LAMBERTO V. TORRIJOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal
liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only
basis.
The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither
solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale.
The estafa or swindle existed only after the subsequent sale by the accused of the same
interest in favor of Victor de Guia. There was no crime of estafa until the accused re-sold the
same property to another individual about 5 years after the first sale to Torrijos.
Then again, Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the New Civil Code on human relations establish the
civil liability of the accused in this particular case independently of his criminal liability,
despite his death before final conviction.
Article 19 directs that "every person must, in the exercise of his right and the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give anymore his due, and observe honesty and good faith." The
accused in the case at bar, by executing a second sale of the property which he already sold
to the offended party, certainly did not observe honesty nor good faith, much less act with
justice to the complaining witness.
Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same." Certainly in deliberately selling
again the same property to another person after he had sold the same to the offended party,
the accused willfully or intentionally inflicted damage on the offended party, to whom
indemnification therefor shall be made by him.
Article 21 states that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, shall compensate the latter for the
FACTS:
Wakat Diamnuan and his wife were the registered owners of share of a parcel of land in
Sitio Cacuban, Barrio Gumatdang, Pitogon, Benguet, issued in their names and in the names
of Kangi Erangyas, and the heirs of Komising Tagle, who owned the remaining portions.
On May 11, 1968, Wakat Diamnuan and his wife sold their one-fourth share in favor of
petitioner Torrijos for P7,493.00. the deed of sale, however, was refused registration because
Torrijos, who produced OCT No. O-36, did not have the copies thereof held by the other coowners, Kangi Erangyas and heirs of Komising Tagle.
In 1969, the entire property, together with the share of Wakat Diamnuan and his wife, was
sold to Victor de Guia for P189,379.50.
Hence, Torrijos prosecuted Wakat Diamnuan for estafa before the Baguio Court of First
Instance.
RTC: the trial Judge convicted the accused (WAKAT) in a decision sentencing him to an
imprisonment of 3 months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of P7,493.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment, to indemnify petitioner Lamberto Torrijos in the sum of P7,493.00 and to pay
the costs.
Thereafter, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals.
damage." It is patent that the act of the accused in the case at bar in alienating the same
property which he already sold to the complainant, has violated all the rules of morality and
good customs.
Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability
including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations aforecited, remains.
There is greater reason to allow the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the
accused as the judgment of conviction did not become final by reason of the appeal of the
accused, who died during the pendency of the appeal.
Finally, Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides that if

defendant dies before the final judgment in the Court of First Instance, an action
for the recovery of money, debt or interest thereon "shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner specially provided in these rules," meaning the claim
should be presented in the testate or intestate proceedings over the estate of the
deceased. The implication is that if death supervenes after the judgment of the
Court of First Instance but pending appeal in the appellate court, the action for the
recovery of money may not be dismissed. In such case, the name of the offended
party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
representatives or the heirs of the deceased accused should be substituted as
defendants-appellants.
Fil-invest Credit Corporation) that was merged with the Bank of the Philippine Islands
and consequently it was BPI that should have been notified of the subsequent
proceedings in the case.
It held that notice to BPICC was notice to the BPI, stressing that the merger was made
as early as July 31, 1987, before the decision was promulgated. No corresponding
substitution had been made of the surviving corporation (BPI) in place of the absorbed
defendants (BPICC and FCC)
ISSUE: WON TC decision was binding on BPI given the fact that BPI had not been substituted for the
original defendant and had not been notified of the proceedings against them.
HELD: Binding.
JUDGE ENRIQUE T. JOCSON, EDILBERTO Y. EMPESTAN, and ATTY. PRESTON V. BARBASA,

petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BANK 0F THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BACOLOD
MAIN BRANCH), respondents.
Rule 3: Transfer of Interest
TC: in
On April 26, 1982, petitioner Preston V. Barbasa bought a brand new car from Southern
Motors. Filinvest Finance and Leasing Corp. (FFLC) financied the account. This account was
later assigned to Filinvest Credit Corp. (FCC), FFLC's sister company.
On July 7, 1983, the car was repossessed by FFLC.
On November 8, 1983, the petitioner, claiming that FFLC had acted illegally and maliciously,
filed a complaint for damages against it.
Subsequently, the Bank of the Philippine Islands Credit Corporation (BPICC) having bought
FCC, the complaint was amended to include (BPICC) as co-defendant.
On July 31, 1987, during the pendency of the case, the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
acquired all the assets of its wholly owned subsidiary, BPICC. The merger was made known to
the court by the petitioners, but BPI was not formally impleaded or substituted for BPICC. The
defendants continued to be FFLC and BPICC.
A transferee pendente lite stands in exactly the same position as its predecessor-ininterest, the original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings had in the case before
the property was transferred to it. It is a proper but not an indispensable party as it would
in any event be bound by the judgment against his predecessor. This would follow even if
it is not formally included as a defendant through an amendment of the complaint.
BASIS:
Sec. 4, Art. II, of the Articles of Merger between BPICC and BPI states that:
Sec. 4. BPI shall acquire as liquidating dividends all of the assets of BPICC, it being
understood that in consonance with the pertinent provisions of the Corporation Code, BPI
shall be responsible and liable for all the liabilities and obligations of BPICC in the same
manner as if BPI itself incurred such liabilities or obligations, and any claim, action or
proceeding pending by or against BPICC shall be prosecuted by or against BPI. Neither the
rights of creditors nor any lien upon the property of BPICC shall be impaired by the merger.
Sec. 2. BPI shall take such measures as it may deem necessary or advisable to substitute
itself in all suits and proceedings where BPICC is a party and to substitute its name for BPICC
in all titles, documents, deeds and papers where BPICC appears as a party.
It is clear that the duty to substitute BPI in the proceedings before the trial court fell on BPI itself and
not on any other party. It did not discharge that duty. Consequently, it cannot now claim that it is not
bound by the judgment of February 10, 1988. Whether its failure to do so was due to negligence or to
a desire to evade possible liability, there is no question that BPI should not benefit from such omission.
Re Appeal by the defendants:
Surely, if the judgment is considered binding upon BPI as a transferee pendente lite, it should follow
that the appeal made by the original party would also, by the same token, redound to the transferee's
benefit. As it is the transferee that may ultimately be required to satisfy the judgment if it is affirmed
on appeal, it is only fair that it be deemed to have also appealed, together with its predecessor-infavour of Barbasa
Judge Enrique T. Jocson granted partial execution pending appeal for the sum of interest, from the decision of February 10, 1988.
P400,000.00 upon a bond of P500,000.00.
Re the Final Writ of Execution
In view of the BPI merger, the writ of partial execution was served against the bank. The
bank, under protest, delivered to the petitioner TCT No. 121486 to secure the judgement.
The appeal of Civil Case No. 2567 was perfected on March 15, 1988, and the trial court as a
It then filed several motions to recall the issued writ, arguing that it was null and
consequence lost jurisdiction over the matter. Hence, Judge Jocson had no more authority to order the
void because BPI had never been notified of the proceedings.
issuance of the final writ of execution on October 25, 1988, when the case had already come under
Judge Jocson issued an order holding that since BPI had not appealed to the TC decision, the
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and was, in fact, still pending resolution.
same had become final and executory to BPI.
CA reversed
the writ of final execution could not be issued against BPI since it was BPICC (formerly
FELIPE ACAR, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. INOCENCIO ROSAL, in his capacity as Executive
Judge, Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District, respondent.
FACTS:
CFI
A suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental by ten persons for
their own behalf and that of 9,000 other farm laborers working off and on in sugar
cane plantations at the Bais milling district, Negros Oriental, against Compaia General de
Tabacos de Filipinas, Central Azucarera de Bais, Compaia Celulosa de Filipinas, Ramon
Barata, Aurelio Montinola, Sr., and Miguel Franco.
Plaintiffs sought to recover their alleged participations or shares amounting to the aggregate
sum of P14,031,836.74, in the sugar, molasses, bagasse and other derivatives based on the
provisions of Republic Act 809 (The Sugar Act of 1952), particularly Sections 1 and 9 thereof.
Furthermore, plaintiffs asked thereunder as well as by separate motion, that the
aforementioned court authorize them to sue as pauper litigants, under Sec. 22, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court6
Invoking Sec. 1, subsec. (21) of Art. III of the Constitution of the Philippines 7, They alleged
that they had no means to pay the docket fee of P14,500.00, being laborers dependent solely
on their daily wages for livelihood and possessed of no properties.
And in support of the foregoing, the ten named plaintiffs submitted certificates of the
municipal treasurers of their places of residence stating that they have no real property
declared in their names in said municipalities.
Denied the plaintiffs claim on the ground that the plaintiffs have regular
employment and sources of income and, thus, cannot be classified as poor
or paupers.
Judge adopted the definition of "pauper" in Black's Law Dictionary as "a
person so poor that he must be supported at public expense". And, as
afore-stated, he ruled that petitioners are not that poor
Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of said order but reconsideration was denied
Assailing said two CFI orders and asserting their alleged right not to be denied free access to
the courts by reason of poverty, plaintiffs in said case filed herein, the present special civil
action or certiorari and mandamus. Petition to litigate as pauper in the instant case beforethe
SC was also filed.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners were deprived, by the orders in question, of free access to the courts by
reason of poverty.
HELD: YES
The definition of the respondent judge does not fit with the purpose of the rules on suits in
forma pauperis and the provision of the Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, that: "Free access
to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty."
It has thus been recognized that: "An applicant for leave to sue in forma pauperis need not be
a pauper; the fact that he is able-bodied and may earn the necessary money is no answer to
his statement that he has not sufficient means to prosecute the action or to secure the costs
6 "SECTION 22. Pauper litigant. Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or defense as a pauper upon a proper
showing that he has no means to that effect by affidavits, certificate of the corresponding provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or
otherwise. Such authority once given shall include an exemption from payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond, printed record
and printed brief. The legal fees shall be a lien to any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the pauper, unless the court otherwise
provides."
7 Subsec. 21, Sec. 1 of Art. III: "Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." It is the one involved
It suffices that plaintiff is indigent (Ibid.), tho not a public charge.

And the difference between "paupers" and "indigent" persons is that the latter are "persons
who have no property or source of income sufficient for their support aside from their own
labor, though self-supporting when able to work and in employment
It is therefore in this sense of being indigent that "pauper" is taken when referring to suits in
forma pauperis.
Black's Law Dictionary in fact defines pauper, thus: "A person so poor that he must be
supported at public expense; also a suitor who, on account of poverty, is allowed to sue or
defend without being chargeable with costs"
It is further argued that the docket fee of P14,500 could very well be shouldered by
petitioners since there are around 9,000 of them.
It must be remembered, however, that the action in question was filed by way of a class suit
under Sec. 12, Rule 3 of ROC.8
So that in the suit before respondent Judge the ten named petitioners herein are the ones
suing, albeit for the benefit of all the others.
It follows that the payment of docket fee would be directly charged upon them, not upon the
unnamed "9,000 other laborers." And even if the 9,000 other laborers should later bear the
payment of said docket fee of P14,500, the same would be spread among them at about
P1.60 each. Said cost of pressing their respective average demand of P1.60 each is, to Our
mind, a substantial imposition on a seasonal farm laborer earning barely subsistent wages.
And as pointed out, this is only the initial fee; subsequent fees and charges would have to be
paid.
The philosophy underlying the constitutional mandate of free access to the courts
notwithstanding poverty, therefore, calls for exemption of herein petitioners from payment of
the aforesaid legal fees in their assertion and claim of substantial rights under the Sugar Act
of 1952.
As regards the fact that the supporting certifications of indigence refer only to the ten named
plaintiffs, suffice it to reiterate that this involves a class suit, where it is not practicable to
bring all the other 9,000 laborers before the court.
This Court finds the supporting evidence of indigence adequate, showing in petitioners' favor,
as plaintiffs in the suit before respondent Judge, the right not to be denied free access to the
courts by reason of poverty.
Since they were excluded from the use and enjoyment of said right, mandamus lies to
enforce it. Appeal was unavailing, since they were not even accorded the status of litigants,
for non-payment of docket fee; and perfecting an appeal would have presented the same
question of exemption from legal fees, appeal bond and similar requisites.
Wherefore, petitioners are declared entitled to litigate as paupers in their class suit before
respondent Judge and the latter is hereby ordered to grant their petition to litigate in forma
pauperis.
[G.R. No. L-49247. March 13, 1979.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Samar, Branch V (Calbayog City); BASILIO ROSALES, TRINIDAD D.
ENRIQUEZ, JOSE ROO, CESAR DEAN, MARIA S. QUESADA, AURORA SOLIMAN, JAIME ROCO
and HERMINIGILDO ROSALES,
NATURE: Mandamus
8 "SECTION 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and
the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of
all. But in such case the court shall make sure that the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and representative so that all
interests concerned are fully protected. Any party in interest shall have a right to intervene in protection of his individual interest."
in this case.
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Samar in a decision dated May 10, 1978 in LRC Case granted
the application of Basilio Rosales, Herminigildo Rosales, Trinidad D. Enriquez, Jose Roo, Maria
S. Quesada, Cesar Dean, Aurora Soliman and Jaime Roco for the registration of thirteen lots
(including a small island), with a total area of about seven hectares, located at Barangay
Malahug, Tinambacan, Calbayog City.
A copy of that decision was received in the Solicitor General's Office on May 25, 1978.
Twenty-nine days after service of the said decision, the Solicitor General filed a motion for
reconsideration.
A copy of the order denying that motion was received in the Solicitor General's Office on
August 18, 1978.
On that same date, he filed a notice of appeal and a motion for an extension of thirty days
from August 19 (last day of the thirty-day reglementary period) within which to file the record
on appeal. The motion for extension was not acted upon. The record on appeal was filed on
September 15, 1978 or within the period sought in the motion for extension.
The lower court disapproved the record on appeal and did not give due course to the
Government's appeal because the record on appeal was allegedly filed out of time.
The lower court reasoned out that the thirty-day period should be computed, not from May
25, 1978, when the Solicitor General was served with a copy of the decision, but from May
11, 1978, when the city fiscal of Calbayog City, who represented the Solicitor General at the
hearings, was served with that decision.
ISSUE: Whether the thirty-day period should he reckoned from the service of the decision upon the
fiscal or from the time it was served upon the Solicitor General.
HELD: SolGen.
G.R. No. L-61997 November 15, 1982

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES & TRADERS ROYAL BANK vs. ELFREN PARTISALA and HON.
MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the 2nd Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo
Elfren Partisala was accused of estafa before the CFI of Iloilo upon complaint of his employer
Traders Royal Bank.
Partisala pleaded guilty and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment from 4 years,
2 months and 1 day (minimum) to 6 years of prision correccional (maximum) together with all the
accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.
Partisala was ordered to reimburse to the bank the amount malversed immediately. After he was
sentenced, he filed an application for probation.
Three (3) weeks later, an assistant provincial fiscal and private prosecutor opposed the
application for probation. They argued that Partisala can best be rehabilitated in prison and if
he is set free, he might commit other crimes.
Before the trial judge could act on the application (which appears to have attracted attention), the
Sangguniang Bayan of Calinog, Iloilo, in special session passed a resolution:
RATIO:
We hold that the thirty-day period should be counted from the date when the Solicitor
General received a copy of the decision because the service of the decision upon the city
fiscal did not operate as a service upon the Solicitor General.
It should be clarified that, although the Solicitor General requested the city fiscal to represent
him in the trial court, he, nevertheless, made his own separate appearance as counsel for the
State.
In that "notice of appearance", he expressly requested that he should be served in Manila
with "all notices of hearings, orders, resolutions, decisions and other processes" and that
such service is distinct from the service of notices and other papers on the city fiscal.
The Solicitor General also indicated in his "notice of appearance" that he "retains supervision
and control of the representation in this case and has to approve withdrawal of the case, nonappeal or other actions which appear to compromise the interests of the Government" and
that "only notices of orders, resolutions and decisions served on him will bind" the
Government.
In this case, it is obvious that, strictly speaking, the city fiscal did not directly represent the
Government. He was merely a surrogate of the Solicitor General whose office, "as the law
office of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines", is the entity that is empowered
to "represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings" (Sec. 1[e],
Presidential Decree No. 478).
The trial court in disallowing the Government's appeal relied on the ruling that the service of
the decision in a land registration case on the fiscal is necessarily a service on the Solicitor
General
The private respondents further contend that the Solicitor General's motion for
reconsideration, which was filed on June 23, 1978 or on the twenty-ninth day, did not
interrupt the period for appeal because they were personally served with a copy of the
motion on June 27, 1978 or three days after the expiration of the period. They invoke the
ruling that a motion for reconsideration, which was not served upon the adverse party, could
not be entertained and did not interrupt the period for appeal
The instant case is not a case where there was no service at all of the motion for
reconsideration, It is a case where the service of the motion was late. But the tardiness is
more apparent than real because if the Solicitor General's office, on June 23, 1978, had opted
to send a copy of that motion to the private respondents by registered mail, that copy would
have reached them most likely after June 27, 1978, when they were personally served with a
copy thereof.
WHEREFORE, we hold that the appeal was perfected seasonably. The trial court's order
disallowing petitioner's appeal is reversed and set aside. It is directed to pass upon the record
on appeal, and, if found to be sufficient, to give due course to petitioner's appeal. No costs.
"RESOLVED to manifest, as this Body do hereby manifest, the alarm and vehement
sentiment of the people of this Municipality over reprehensive conduct of Elfren Partisala
for his abstraction and misappropriation of the peoples' savings and deposits and other
funds of the Calinog Branch of the Traders Royal Bank.
The Acting Provincial Fiscal intervened. He sought to educate the trial judge by filing a "MOTION
TO CORRECT ERROR IN COMPUTATION OF PENALTY AND TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE PETITION FOR
PROBATION."
TRIAL COURT
Denied the motion to correct error/to hold in abeyance petition for probation because of the
following:
(a) The motion is in the nature of a motion for reconsideration. It should have been filed
before the sentence of the accused became FINAL.
Under P.D. No. 968, the Probation Law, a convict who files a petition for probation automatically
waives his right to appeal and therefore his conviction becomes final. Therefore, the instant
motion is filed out of time.
(b) The motion, if granted will place the accused in double jeopardy.
The Trial Court also DENIED the MR.
In the meantime, the trial judge GRANTED Partisala's APPLICATION FOR PROBATION.
ISSUE: WON the Acting Provincial Fiscal may properly file the motion in this case
HELD: NO. Only the Solicitor General can represent the Republic.
The Acting Provincial Fiscals contention: Partisala should have been sentenced to a penalty
higher than six years which would then make him ineligible for probation. (Sec. 9, par. a,
Probation Law, as amended.) But even the learned fiscal was not absolutely certain as to the
correct penalty. Firstly, he said the penalty "is between 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years."
But alternatively he said that the imposable penalty can also "be in the medium period of prision
mayor, which has a range of from 8 years, 1 day and 10 years." He asked that the sentenced
imposed on Partisala be "corrected."
The instant petition prays that the orders of the trial judge denying the motion to correct, denying
the motion to reconsider the denial, and granting the application for probation be annulled; that
the correct penalty be imposed on Partisala; and that his application for probation be denied.
The SC ruled that it does not have to decide whether or not the penalty which the trial judge
imposed on Partisala is correct. For correct or not, it is a valid sentence because the trial
judge had jurisdiction to impose it. So for the reasons given by him when he denied the
motion to correct, the sentence was already beyond his reach, including this Court.
It is to be noted the Republic of the Philippines is one of the petitioners herein. The one who
signed the petition for the Republic is a mere second assistant provincial fiscal, albeit
he is the Officer-in-Charge of the Iloilo Provincial Fiscal's Office.
We make it known that ONLY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL can bring or defend actions on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines. Actions filed in the name of the Republic of the Philippines IF NOT
INITIATED BY THE SOLGEN will be summarily dismissed.
The petition was dismissed by SC for lack of merit.
RULE 4
FORTUNE MOTORS PHIL.S VS CA & METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. OCTOBER 16, 1989
FACTS:
*A case was filed by FORTUNE MOTORS for improper venue in the RTC of Manila. The bank filed an
MTD which the RTC reserved its resolution until after trial on the merits has finished because the
grounds relied upon by defendant were unclear, subsequently the bank filed an MR to this but was
denied.
*Thus a petition for certiorari was filed to the CA in which it was granted and the case is dismissed
without prejudice to it being filed in the proper venue. Hence the petition for review in the Supreme
Court.
1. On March 29,1982 up to January 6,1984, private respondent Metropolitan Bank extended
various loans to petitioner Fortune Motors in the total sum of P32,500,000.00 (according to
the borrower; or P34,150,000.00 according to the Bank) which loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage on the Fortune building and lot in Makati, Rizal. (Rollo, pp. 60-62)
2. Due to financial difficulties and the onslaught of economic recession, the petitioner was not
able to pay the loan which became due.
3. For failure of the petitioner to pay the loans, the respondent bank initiated extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings. After notices were served, posted, and published, the mortgaged
property was sold at public auction for the price of P47,899,264.91 to mortgagee Bank as the
highest bidder.
4. The sheriff's certificate of sale was registered on October 24, 1984 with the one-year
redemption period to expire on October 24,1985.
5. On October 21, 1985, three days before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioner
Fortune Motors filed a complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale alleging
that the foreclosure was premature because its obligation to the Bank was not yet due, the
publication of the notice of sale was incomplete, there was no public auction, and the price
for which the property was sold was "shockingly low". (Rollo, pp. 60-68)
6. Before summons could be served private respondent Bank filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the venue of the action was improperly laid in Manila for the
realty covered by the real estate mortgage is situated in Makati, therefore the action to annul
the foreclosure sale should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. (Rollo, pp. 67-71-A )
7. The motion was opposed by petitioner Fortune Motors alleging that its action "is a personal
action" and that "the issue is the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings" so that
it may have a new one year period to redeem.
ISSUE:WON petitioner's action for annulment of the real estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure
sale of Fortune Building is a personal action or a real action for venue purposes. REAL ACTION,
MUST BE FILED WHERE PROPERTY IS LOCATED
HELD/RATIO:
Real actions or actions affecting title to, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition
or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, must be instituted in the Court of
First Instance of the province where the property or any part thereof lies. A prayer for annulment or
rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives and nature of the action which is
to recover real property. An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from
an action to annul a private sale of real property.
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the
property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable
property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an
action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the
fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a
real action. Respondent Court, therefore, did not err in dismissing the case on the ground of improper
venue (Sec. 2, Rule 4) which was timely raised (Sec. 1, Rule 16).
DOMINGA TORRES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. and EUSTAQUIO ALQUIROS, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
1.
Telesfor Deudor was the sole owner of the disputed property situated in Quezon City with an
area of 50 quinones (quinon realengo = 5.7755 hectares). He was succeeded by his son
Tomas Deudor.
2.
Tomas Deudor sole 1 quinines of the land to Juliana de la Cruz, she was succeeded by her
son Eisatquio Alquiros.
That he received from petitioner a letter demanding payment of P7,324.69, representing

arrears in the payment of installments up to April 20, 1960, plus "regular and overdue"
interest, as well as "land taxes
In view of petitioners demand, Cacnio sent thereto a check for P5,824.69, drawn by one
Antonino Bernardo in favor of said petitioner, in payment of the amount due from Cacnio by
way of arrears.
That "without legal and equitable grounds" therefor, petitioner returned said check and
"refused the tender of payment" aforementioned.
That by reason of said illegal act of petitioner, Cacnio is entitled to compensatory damages in
the sum of P5,000, plus P2,000 by way of attorney's fees, Cacnio having been constrained to
engage the services of counsel and bring the action; and that petitioner "is doing threatens,
or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that "venue is improperly laid,"
for the action affects the title to or possession of real property located in Bacolod City, which
was the subject matter of a contract, between petitioner and Cacnio, made in said City.
DOMINGAS CONTENTION: that the nature of the complaint is one of specific performance and
therefore personal and transitory in nature
CFI denied the motion to dismiss upon the ground that the action was in personam.
ISSUE: WoN the action involved is within the jurisdiction if RTC QC
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition praying that said order be set aside and
that a writ of prohibition be issued commanding respondent Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, as
Judge of said Court, to desist from taking cognizance of said Civil Case No. Q-5197.
CA: rendered a decision dismissing said petition.
3.
Eustaquio then sold the portion of 690 meters to plaintiff Dominga.
4.
Meanwhile, the successors in interest of Tomas Deudor filed actions against J/M Tuason & Co.,
for the quieting of title. Plaintiff tried to intervene with the said case but went futile.
5.
A compromise was made among the Deudors, Eustaquio Alquiros and JM Tuason wherein the
disputed property was transferred to JM Tuason & Co., by virtue of sale ,including the portion
of Domingas.
6.
That pursuant to the said agreement, Tuason Co. assumed certain obligations in the sense
that a sort of contractual relation existed between Tuason Co. and the purchasers of land
from the Deudors including Dominga.
7.
Plaintiff Dominga demanded to Tuason Co. the execution of new contract of sale in favour of
her but the Company failed to do so.
TC of MANILA ruling: dismissed the complaint since the property is situated in Quezon City, it shall be
filed there.
YES. The contention of plaintiff is untenable. Although appellant's complaint is entitled to be one for
specific performance, yet the fact that she asked that a deed of sale of a parcel of land situated in
Quezon City be issued in his favor and that a transfer certificate of title covering said land be issued
to her shows that the primary objective and nature of the action is to recover the parcel of land itself
because to execute in favor of appellant the conveyance requested there is need to make a finding
that she is the owner of the land which in the last analysis resolves itself into an issue of ownership.
Hence, the action must be commenced in the province where the property is situated
Hence, this appeal by certiorari taken by petitioner herein.
ISSUE: WON the main case falls under section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court
Note: An action to compel execution of deed of sale of real property is a real action to be brought in
the province or city where land is situated.
DR. ANTONIO A. LIZARES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
and FLAVIANO CACNIO, respondents.
FACTS:
Flaviano Cacnio instituted Civil Case No. Q-5197 of the CFI Rizal, Quezon City Branch, against
said petitioner.
Cacnio alleged in his complaint: that he bought from petitioner, on installment, Lot 4, Block 1
of the Sinkang Subdivision in Bacolod City, making therefor a downpayment of P1,206, and
the balance of P10,858 to be paid in ten (10) yearly installments.
HELD: YES
Section 3, Rule 5 of ROC states, "Actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies."
CA and CFI Rizal held that Civil Case No. Q-5197 of the latter court is an action in
personam, and that, as such, it does not fall within the purview of said section 3, and was
properly instituted in the court of first instance of the province in which Cacnio, as plaintiff in
said case, resided, pursuant to section 1 of said rule 5.
We are unable to share such view. Although the immediate remedy sought by Cacnio is to
compel petitioner to accept the tender of payment allegedly made by the former, it is
obvious that this relief is merely the first step to establish Cacnio's title to the real property
adverted to above.
Moreover, Cacnio's complaint is a means resorted to by him in order that he could retain the
possession of said property.
In short, venue in the main case was improperly laid and the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, should have granted the motion to dismiss. 1wph1.t
CFI BAtangas: Dismiss the complaint
Improper venue
ISSUE: whether the action of the petitioner was properly filed in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas
HELD: Properly filed.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one
shall be entered directing respondent Judge to desist from taking further cognizance of Civil
Case No. Q-5197 of said court, with costs against respondent Flaviano Cacnio. It is so
ordered.
JOSE M. HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, LIPA CITY BRANCH, respondents.
Rule 4: Personal Action
Petitioner Jose M. Hernandez was an employee of private respondent Development Bank of

the Philippines in its Legal Department for 21 years until his retirement on February 28, 1966
due to illness.
On August 12, 1964, he was awarded a lot, identified as Lot No. 15, Block No. W-21, in the
private respondent's Housing Project at No. 1 West Avenue, Quezon City, containing an area
of 810 square meters, in due recognition of his service as Assistant Attorney in DBPs Legal
Department.
On August 31, 1968, after the petitioner received from DBP a statement of account of the
purchase price of the said lot and house amounting to P21,034.56, payable on a monthly
amortization, he sent to the Housing Project Committee a Cashier's Check dated -October 21,
1968 in the name of his wife in the sum of P21,500.00 to cover the cash and full payment of
the purchase price of the lot and house awarded to him.
However, on October 29, 1968, DBP returned to the petitioner ,the aforementioned check,
informing him that the private respondent had cancelled the award of the lot and house
previously awarded to him on the following grounds:
(1) that he has already retired; (2) that he has only an option to purchase said house and lot;
(3) that there are a big number of employees who have no houses or lots; (4) that he has
been given his retirement gratuity; and (5) that the awarding of the aforementioned house
and lot to an employee of DBP would better subserve the objective of its Housing Project.
Petitioner protested against the cancellation of the award of the house and lot in his favor
and demanded from private respondent the restoration of all his rights to said award.
However, private respondent refused.

Petitioner filed:
WHAT: annulment of the cancellation of the award of the lot and house in his favor and the
restoration of all his rights thereto
WHERE: Court of First Instance of Batangas
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: that the cancellation of said award was unwarranted and illegal
for he has already become the owner of said house and lot by virtue of said award on August
12, 1964 and has acquired a vested right thereto, which cannot be unilaterally cancelled
without his consent
DBPS ANSWER: motion to dismiss: improper venue. Petitioner's action affects the title to a
house and lot situated in Quezon City, the same should have been commenced in the CFI
Quezon City where the real property is located and not in the CFI Batangas where petitioner
resides
DOCTRINES:
Venue of actions or the county where the action is triable depends to a great extent on the nature of
the action to be filed, whether it is real or personal. A real action is one brought for the specific
recovery of land, tenements, or hereditaments. A personal action is one brought for the recovery of
personal property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, "actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for
partition, or condemnation of , or foreclosure of mortgage in real property, shall be commenced and
tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or
any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff".
What is sought for in this case is the annulment of the cancellation of the award of the Quezon City lot
and house in his favor originally given him by respondent DBP in service.
This is a PERSONAL ACTION. his action is one to declare null and void the cancellation of the lot and
house in his favor which does not involve title and ownership over said properties but seeks to compel
respondent to recognize that the award is a valid and subsisting one which it cannot arbitrarily and
unilaterally cancel and accordingly to accept the proffered payment in full which it had rejected and
returned to petitioner.
Citing Adamus vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.:
... All the allegations as well as the prayer in the complaint show that this is not a real but a
personal action to compel the defendants to execute the corresponding purchase contracts
in favor of the plaintiffs and to pay damages. The plaintiffs do not claim ownership of the lots
in question: they recognize the title of the defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They do not ask
that possession be delivered to them, for they allege to be in possession. The case cited by
the defendants (Abao, et al. vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. G.R. No. L-16796, Jan. 30, 1962) is
therefore not in point. In that case, as stated by this Court in its decision, the 'plaintiffs' action
is predicated on the theory that they are 'occupants, landholders,' and 'most' of them owners
by purchase' of the residential lots in question; that, in consequence of the compromise
agreement adverted to above, between the Deudors; and defendant corporations, the latter
had acknowledged the right and title of the Deudors in and to said lots; and hence, the right
and title of the plaintiffs, as successors-in-interest of the Deudors; that, by entering into said
agreement, defendant corporations had, also, waived their right to invoke the indefeasibility
of the Torrens title in favor of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.; and that defendants have no right,
therefore, to oust plaintiffs from the lots respectively occupied by them and which they claim
to be entitled to hold. Obviously, this action affects, therefore, not only the possession of real
property, but, also, the title thereto. Accordingly, it should have been instituted in the Court
of First Instance of the Province of Rizal in which said property is situated (Section 3, Rule 5 of
the Rules of Court).
SWEET LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDO TEVES, Presiding Judge, CFI of Misamis
Oriental Branch VII, LEOVIGILDO TANDOG, JR., and ROGELIO TIRO, respondents.
Rule 4: On the exclusivity of venue in contracts of adhesion
FACTS:
Private respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro, a contractor by professions,
bought tickets on December 31, 1971 at the branch office of petitioner, a shipping company
transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City
Respondents were to board petitioner's vessel, M/S "Sweet Hope" bound for Tagbilaran City
via the port of Cebu.
Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to Bohol, since many passengers were
bound for Surigao, private respondents per advice, went to the branch office for proper
relocation to M/S "Sweet Town". Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity, they
were forced to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the
Philippine Coastguard."
Private respondents alleged that they were, during the trip," "exposed to the scorching heat
of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits," and that the tickets they
bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to
pay for other tickets.
Private Respondents then sued petitioner:
WHAT: damages and for breach of contract of carriage in the alleged sum of P10,000.00
WHERE: Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental
PETITIONERs CONTENTIONS: Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the ticket:

14.
It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of the
conditions and provisions of this ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the
competent courts in the City of Cebu.
that the condition of the venue of actions in the City of Cebu is proper since
venue may be validly waived, citing cases;
o
that is an effective waiver of venue, valid and binding as such, since it is
printed in bold and capital letters and not in fine print and merely assigns
the place where the action sing from the contract is institution likewise
citing cases;
o
and that condition No. 14 is unequivocal and mandatory, the words and
phrases "any and all", "irrespective of where it is issued," and "shag" leave
no doubt that the intention of Condition No. 14 is to fix the venue in the
City of Cebu, to the exclusion of other places;
Hence they moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
o
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS:

Condition No. 14 is not valid, that the same is not an essential element of the contract of carriage,
being in itself a different agreement which requires the mutual consent of the parties to it; that they
had no say in its preparation, the existence of which they could not refuse, hence, they had no choice
but to pay for the tickets and to avail of petitioner's shipping facilities out of necessity; that the carrier
"has been exacting too much from the public by inserting impositions in the passage tickets too
burdensome to bear," that the condition which was printed in fine letters is an imposition on the riding
public and does not bind respondents, citing cases; 13 that while venue 6f actions may be transferred
from one province to another, such arrangement requires the "written agreement of the parties", not
to be imposed unilaterally; and that assuming that the condition is valid, it is not exclusive and does
not, therefore, exclude the filing of the action in Misamis Oriental,
ISSUE: Is Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the petitioner's passage tickets purchased by private
respondents, which limits the venue of actions arising from the contract of carriage to theCourt of First
Instance of Cebu, valid and enforceable?
HELD: Void and unenforceable.
There is a dearth of and acute shortage in inter- island vessels plying between the country's several
islands, and the facilities they offer leave much to be desired. It is hardly just and proper to expect the
passengers to examine their tickets received from crowded/congested counters, more often than not
during rush hours, for conditions that may be printed much charge them with having consented to the
conditions. Condition No. 14 was prepared solely by petitioner, respondents had no say in its
preparation. Neither did the latter have the opportunity to take the into account prior to the purpose
chase of their tickets. For, unlike the small print provisions of contracts the common example of
contracts of adherence which are entered into by the insured in his awareness of said conditions,
since the insured is afforded the op to and co the same, passengers of inter-island v do not have the
same chance, since their alleged adhesion is presumed only from the fact that they purpose chased
the tickets.
Re Subversive of Public Policy:
Condition No. 14 is subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions. For, although venue
may be changed or transferred from one province to another by agreement of the parties in writing
Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such an agreement will not be held valid where it
practically negates the action of the claimants, such as the private respondents herein. The
philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs
as well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. Considering the expense and trouble a
passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would
most probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance,
the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has branches or offices in the respective ports of
call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the
CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less
prejudice, petitioner. Clearly, Condition No. 14, if enforced, will be subversive of the public good or
interest, since it will frustrate in meritorious cases, actions of passenger cants outside of Cebu City,
thus placing petitioner company at a decided advantage over said persons, who may have perfectly
legitimate claims against it. The said condition should, therefore, be declared void and unenforceable,
as contrary to public policy to make the courts accessible to all who may have need of their
services.
CARLOS BELL RAYMOND and AGUSTIN ALBA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, etc., and SANTIAGO BITERA, respondents.
FACTS:
CFI denied the motion to dismiss.

RT
A complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo by
Santiago Bitera against Carlos Bell Raymond and Agustin Alba.
Raymond and Alba moved to dismiss the action on the ground of improper venue.
They argued that although Bitera's complaint gives his address as 240-C Jalandoni Street,
Iloilo City, he is, and for many years has been actually residing at the so-called UPSUMCO
Compound, Bais City, he being the officer-in-charge of the business firm known as UPSUMCO,
which has offices at Bais and Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, and that, indeed, his affidavit,
appended to his complaint, contains his affirmation that he is "a resident of the UPSUMCO
Compound, City of Bais," and shows (in the jurat) that his residence certificate had been
issued at Manjuyod, Negros Oriental.
Denied the motion to dismiss
C
They then filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
C
A
Dismissed their petition and ruled the following:
Why Bitera chose to file this action for damages in Iloilo City instead of in
Dumaguete City is beyond this Court, even as the pleadings show that plaintiff is
actually residing at UPSUMCO, the defendants are both residents of UPSUMCO, the cause
of damages arose out of a controversy in the UPSUMCO and because of plaintiff's and
defendant's positions as officer and board members of UPSUMCO.
Plaintiff is given the right to elect where to bring his action. As plaintiff chose his legal
domicile or residence, Court cannot compel him to bring suit in the place where he has
his temporary residence
The petititioners filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC assailing the refusal
of the respondent Judge to dismiss the action filed against petitioners by private respondent
Santiago Bitera on the ground of improper venue
[G.R. No. 53485. February 6, 1991.]

PATRIA ESUERTE and HERMINIA JAYME, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Eleventh Division),
HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge, Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Cebu and MA.
BEVERLY TAN, respondents.
NATURE: Certiorari
FACTS:
ISSUE: WON Bitera correctly filed his personal action (complaint for damages) in Iloilo
HELD: NO
According to Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, personal actions, such as Bitera's,
"may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at
the election of the plaintiff."
The term, where a person "resides," or "residence," may be understood as synonymous with
domicile: as referring to a person's "permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent
for business or pleasure, one intends to return," and it has been held that "a man can have
but one domicile at a time."
The term may also be taken in another sense, and it is this which is germane to the
determination of venue, as meaning a person's actual residence, different and distinct from
his permanent one, or domicile, where he was born and rested, and e.g., where he usually
casts his vote during elections.
SC cited previous rulings to illustrate the effect of a persons actual residence or domicile in
determining the venue.9
It was held in Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, that the doctrinal rule is that the term
"resides" connotes Ex Vi Termini "actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal
residence or domicile."
Even where the statute uses the word "domicile," still it construed as meaning residence and
not "domicile" in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence and "domicile," but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant".
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode.
It therefore clearly appears that both the respondent Judge and the Court of Appeals, the
former in the first instance and the latter on review, committed reversible legal error, if not
grave abuse of discretion, in not dismissing Bitera's action despite the fact that its venue had
clearly been improperly laid, and had been seasonably objected to on that ground by
petitioners in a motion to dismiss.
9 This Court has held that venue was improperly laid in a case where the complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte by the plaintiff who was born and reared in that province, but whose actual residence at time of suit was admittedly at Quezon
City. In another case, where the plaintiffs instituted a personal action 4 in the Court of First Instance at Lipa City, claiming that their
domicile was San Juan, Batangas, the Court declared the venue to be erroneously selected in view of the fact that the plaintiffs' place of
abode, where they actually reside, was at Quezon City.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order of the respondent Judge denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss and the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming said order are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE on the ground that venue has been improperly laid.
An action for damages was filed by Beverly Tan against Patria Esuerte and Herminia Jayme
with the CFI of Cebu.
Ma. Beverly Tan, a Junior Resident Physician of Corazon Locsin-Montelibano Memorial
Hospital, Bacolod City, shouted at, humiliated and insulted Patria Esuerte, Head Nurse,
Medicare Department of the said hospital and as a result of the said incident, said petitioner
complained to the Chief of the Hospital, Dr. Teodoro P. Motus, in writing.
Herminia Jayme, who was one of those who were present at the time of the incident also sent
a letter to the Chief of the Hospital, Dr. Teodoro Motus, informing the latter of what she had
witnessed
Respondent was advised to explain in writing by the Chief of the Hospital, but private
respondent instead of explaining only her side of the incident also complained against the
petitioners.
The Discipline and Grievance Committee, Corazon Locsin-Montelibano Memorial Hospital,
conducted a fact-finding investigation and later, the Chief of the Hospital, Dr. Teodoro P.
Motus, issued A RESOLUTION transmitting the records of the case to the Regional Health
Office, No. 6, Jaro, Iloilo City for appropriate action
Esuerte and Jayme filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue
and for being premature for failure of Tan to exhaust administrative remedies.
CFI: Denied motion to dismiss

CA: Dismissed
SC: Granted. Dismissed for improper venue.
It is the contention of petitioners that the proper venue of the action filed by Tan should be
Bacolod City and not Cebu City.
At the time of the filing of her action in court, Tan was actually residing and may be found in
Bacolod City.
ISSUE: WON the proper venue of the case is in Bacolod City where Tan temporarily resides.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 2.Venue in Courts of First Instance.
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"(b)
Personal Actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendants or
any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at
the election of the plaintiff."
On March 2000, petitioner Irene instituted before the RTC in Batac, Ilocos Norte, two
similar complaints for conveyance of shares of stock, accounting and receivership
against the Benedicto Group with prayer for the issuance of a TRO.
A motion to dismiss was filed for both complaints, alleging among others (a) improper venue, (b)
failure to state a cause of action and (c) that SEC has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes
and not the RTC.
Upon Benedictos motion, both cases were consolidated.
In the preliminary proceedings on the motion to dismiss, a Joint Affidavit of Gilmia B. Valdez,
Catalino A. Bactat, and Conchita R. Rasco (who all attested being employed as
household staff at the Marcos Mansion in Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte) was
presented to support the claim of improper venue.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the Regional Trial Court is given to the
plaintiff but not to the plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of
Court.
The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly
administration of justice or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and
proceeding.
The option of the plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the Regional Trial Court is either
the place where the defendant resides or may be found or the place where the plaintiff
resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.
"Resides" in the rules on venue on personal actions means the place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or defendants as distinguished from "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence
And, in Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., venue of personal actions should be at the
place of abode or place where plaintiffs actually reside, not in domicile or legal residence.
There is no question that private respondent as plaintiff in the Civil Case is a legal resident of
Cebu City. Her parents live there.
However, it cannot also be denied that at the time of her filing of the complaint against
petitioners, she was a temporary resident of Bacolod City.
She was then employed with the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital, Bacolod
City, as resident physician. Moreover, the acts complained of were committed in Bacolod City.
The private respondents were all residents of Bacolod City at the time of the bringing of the
action.
Though Tan's employment was only temporary there was no showing when this employment
will end. Justice would be better served if the complaint were heard and tried in Bacolod City
where all the parties resided.
G.R. No. 154096
August 22, 2008
IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA vs. CA, JULITA C. BENEDICTO and FRANCISCA BENEDICTOPAULINO
The Joint Affidavit states that Irene did not maintain residence in said place as she in
fact only visited the mansion twice in 1999; that she did not vote in Batac in the
1998 national elections; and that she was staying at her husbands house in
Makati City.
Petitioner Irene presented her PhP 5 community tax certificate (CTC) issued on 11/07/99 in
Curimao, Ilocos Norte to support her claimed residency in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
May 15, 2000 - Benedicto died and was substituted by his wife, Julita C. Benedicto, and daughter
Francisca.
RTC
On June 29, 2000, both complaints were dismissed.
Stating that these partly constituted real action, and that Irene did not actually reside in Ilocos
Norte, and, therefore, venue was improperly laid.
Petitioner Irene filed an MR. Pending such MR, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Complaint, putting additional plaintiffs as petitioners new trustees, all from Ilocos Norte.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto, now deceased, and his business
associates (Benedicto Group) organized Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and
Universal Equity Corporation (UEC), respectively.
Petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta alleges that both corporations were organized pursuant to a
contract or arrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name and in the name of his
associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of FEMII and UEC with the obligation to hold
those shares and their fruits in trust and for the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65%
of such shares.
When petitioner requested for the reconveyance of said 65% stockholdings, the Benedicto Group
refused.
MR was DENIED but amended complaint was admitted and defendants were ordered to
answer the complaint.
RTC also denied the Motion to Dismiss the amended complaint filed by Julita and Francisca.
Julita and Francisca filed their answer to avoid being declared in default.
COURT OF APPEALS
Granted petition for certiorari by Julita and Francisca. CA dismissed the amended complaints.
CA denied MR. Petitioner filed petition for review to SC.
Issue: WON venue was properly laid
of the beneficiary who must be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed
to be the real party-in-interest.
In the final analysis, the residences of Irenes co-plaintiffs cannot be made the basis in
determining the venue of the subject suit. ** The real party in interest is still petitioner
Irene Marcos-Araneta.
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal
action case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper
venue. As such, the subject civil cases ought to be commenced and prosecuted at the
place where Irene resides.
Another Issue: There is substantial compliance with the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping in Julita and Franciscas petition. Verification is, under the Rules, not a
jurisdictional but merely a formal requirement which the court may motu proprio direct a party to
comply with or correct. Regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping, the general rule is that
all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case should sign it. As has been ruled by the Court, the
signature of any of the principal petitioners or principal parties, as Francisca is in this case, would
constitute a substantial compliance with the rule on verification and certification of non-forum
shopping.
Another Issue: The CA, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Rule 65, is limited to
reviewing and correcting errors of jurisdiction only. It cannot validly delve into the issue of trust
which, under the premises, cannot be judiciously resolved without first establishing certain facts
based on evidence.
Held: NO. The venue was improperly laid. Petition dismissed.
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a
contract, or the recovery of damages.
In the instant case, petitioners are basically asking Benedicto and his Group, as defendants, to
acknowledge holding in trust Irenes purported 65% stockownership of UEC and FEMII,
inclusive of the fruits of the trust, and to execute in Irenes favor the necessary conveying
deed over the said 65% shareholdings.
In other words, petitioner seeks to compel recognition of the trust arrangement she
has with the Benedicto Group. IT IS AN ACTION IN PERSONAM. The venue of personal
actions is the court where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs reside, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants reside, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
The Court held that as to petitioner, she is not a resident of Batac, as such she cannot opt for
Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint. The CTC she presented is of no moment, anyone
can easily secure a CTC.
As to petitioners co-plaintiffs, although they are residents of Batac Ilocos Norte, the
Court held that venue was still improperly laid. The additional plaintiffs, as new trustees of
petitioner, serve only as mere representatives of petitioner. As trustees, they may be
accorded, by virtue of Sec. 3 of Rule 3, the right to prosecute a suit, but only on behalf
FINAL NOTE:
Irene was a resident during the period material of Forbes Park, Makati City. She was not a resident
of Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence has it that one can have several
residences, if such were the established fact. The Court will not speculate on the reason why
petitioner Irene, for all the inconvenience and expenses she and her adversaries would have to
endure by a Batac trial, preferred that her case be heard and decided by the RTC in Batac. On the
heels of the dismissal of the original complaints on the ground of improper venue, three new
personalities were added to the complaint doubtless to insure, but in vain as it turned out, that
the case stays with the RTC in Batac.
Litigants ought to bank on the righteousness of their causes, the superiority of their cases, and
the persuasiveness of arguments to secure a favorable verdict. It is high time that courts, judges,
and those who come to court for redress keep this ideal in mind.
POLYTRADE CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICTORIANO BLANCO, defendant-appellant.
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
FACTS:
Plaintiff corporation has its principal office and place of business in Makati, Rizal.
Defendant is a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Defendant moved to dismiss upon the ground of improper venue.
He alleges that the suit can only be instituted in the courts of Manila since they had an
agreement stating that the parties agree to sue and be sued in the courts of Manila.
RTRTC:
Suit before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on four causes of action to recover the purchase
price of rawhide delivered by plaintiff to defendant.
The Bulacan court overruled him.

Defendant did not answer the complaint.
Defendant appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not venue was properly laid in the province of Bulacan where defendant is a resident.
HELD:
VIRGILIO CAPATI VS. JESUS OCAMPO APRIL 30, 1982

FACTS:
*Plaintiff filed an action for recovery of consequential damages in the amount of 85,000 in the RTC of
Pampanga. RTC dismissed the case because of improper venue thus the petition to the Supreme
Court.
1. Plaintiff Virgilio Capati a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga, was the contractor of the Feati Bank
for the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. On May 23, 1967, plaintiff entered
into a sub-contract with the defendant Dr. Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga City, whereby
the latter, in consideration of the amount of P2,200.00, undertook to construct the vault
walls, exterior walls and columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the
specifications indicated therein.
2. Defendant further bound himself to complete said construction on or before June 5, 1967
and, to emphasize this time frame for the completion of the construction job, defendant
affixed his signature below the following stipulation written in bold letters in the sub-contract:
"TIME IS ESSENTIAL, TO BE FINISHED 5 JUNE' 67."
3. Claiming that defendant finished the construction in question only on June 20, 1967, plaintiff
filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential
damages in the sum of P85,000.00 with interest, plus attorney's fees and costs. The
complaint alleged inter alia that "due to the long unjustified delay committed by defendant,
in open violation of his express written agreement with plaintiff, the latter has suffered great
irreparable loss and damage ... "
4. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was
improperly laid. The motion was premised on the stipulation printed at the back of the
contract which reads:
14.That all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the Court of
First Instance of the City of Naga.
YES. Venue here was properly laid.
The stipulation that the parties agree to sue and be sued in the courts of Manila, does not preclude
the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties
merely consented to be sued in Manila.
Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the
venue are totally absent therefrom.
For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It simply is permissive.
The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort.
They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of
Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
A MUST NOTE:
o
By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or

transferred from one province to another.
5.
ISSUE:
Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, claiming that their agreement to hold the venue in
the Court of First Instance of Naga City was merely optional to both contracting parties. In
support thereof, plaintiff cited the use of the word "may " in relation with the institution of
any action arising out of the contract.
WON CAPATI CORRECTLY FILED IN THE CFI OR RTC OF PAMPANGA HIS CASE AGAINTS OCAMPO
OR HE SHOULD HAVE FILED IN THE CFI OR RTC OF NAGA AS STATED IN THE CONTRACT? CORRECTLY
FILED IN PAMPANGA.
HELD/RATIO:
Relevant Law:
The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the courts of first instance is found in
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such "actions may be commenced and
tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or
any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." The said section is qualified by the
following provisions of Section 3 of the same rule:
By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred
from one province to another.
The provisions of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions provides that
actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
It is well settled that the word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion
upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be" connotes possibility; it does not
connote certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility.
We hold that the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By
the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the Court of
First Instance of Naga. They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving
their right to seek recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court.
Since the complaint has been filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, where the
plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court.
Tacloban City is proper.
CA ruling
In favour of KUBOTA
the stipulation respecting venue in its Dealership
Agreement with UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the
venue of all suits arising thereunder only and exclusively
to "the proper courts of Quezon City." The Court also
held that the participation of KUBOTA's counsel at the
hearing on the injunction incident did not in the
premises operate as a waiver or abandonment of its
objection to venue; that assuming that KUBOTA's
standard printed invoices provided that the venue of
actions thereunder should be laid at the Court of the
City of Manila, this was inconsequential since such
provision would govern "suits or legal actions between
petitioner and its buyers" but not actions under the
Dealership
Agreement
between
KUBOTA
and
UNIMASTERS, the venue of which was controlled by
paragraph No. 7 thereof; and that no impediment
precludes issuance of a TRO or injunctive writ by the
Quezon City RTC against METROBANK-Tacloban since the
same "may be served on the principal office of
METROBANK in Makati and would be binding on and
enforceable against, METROBANK branch in Tacloban
UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KUBOTA AGRI MACHINERY PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
1.
Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, simply KUBOTA/ respondent) and

Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. (hereafter, simply UNIMASTERS/plaintiff) entered into a
"Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services" of the former's products in Samar and Leyte
Provinces.
2.
The contract contained, among others contain a stipulation reading: i.)". . . All suits arising
out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon City," and ii.) a
provision binding UNIMASTERS to obtain (as it did in fact obtain) a credit line with
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.-Tacloban Branch in the amount of P2,000,000.00 to answer
for its obligations to KUBOTA.
3.
UNIMASTERS filed an action in the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City against KUBOTA, a
certain Reynaldo Go, and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company-Tacloban Branch (hereafter,
simply METROBANK) for damages for breach of contract, and injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order.
4.
KUBOTA filed-two motions. One prayed for dismissal of the case on the ground of improper
venue The other prayed for the transfer of the injunction hearing to January 11, 1994
because its counsel was not available on January 10 due to a prior commitment before
another court.
5.
KUBOTAS CONTENTION: that the stipulation regarding venue was agreed upon and therefore
filing to RTC Tacloban is improper.
TC RULING:
denied KUBOTA's motion to dismiss on the ground that:

The plaintiff UNIMASTERS is holding its principal place of
business in the City of Tacloban while the defendant . .
(KUBOTA) is holding its principal place of business in
Quezon City. The proper venue therefore pursuant to
Rules of Court would either be Quezon City or Tacloban
City at the election of the plaintiff. Quezon City and
Manila (sic), as agreed upon by the parties in the
Dealership Agreement, are additional places other than
the place stated in the Rules of Court. The filing,
therefore, of this complaint in the Regional Trial Court in
ISSUE: WoN the stipulation re venue limit the jurisdiction of the court
HELD:NO. Of the essence is the ascertainment of the parties' intention in their agreement
governing the venue of actions between them. That ascertainment must be done keeping in mind
that convenience is the foundation of venue regulations, and that construction should be adopted
which most conduces thereto. Hence, the invariable construction placed on venue stipulations is
that they do not negate but merely complement or add to the codal standards of Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court. In other words, unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and
suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and
exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue
are not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or complementary of
said rule.
-
The record of the case at bar discloses that UNIMASTERS has its principal place of
business in Tacloban City, and KUBOTA, in Quezon City. Under Rule 4, the venue of
any personal action between them is "where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
resides, at the election of the plaintiff." In other words, Rule 4 gives UNIMASTERS
the option to sue KUBOTA for breach of contract in the Regional Trial Court of either
Tacloban City or Quezon City.
But the contract between them provides that " . . All suits arising out of this
Agreement shall be filed with / in the proper Courts of Quezon City," without
mention of Tacloban City.
The court cited several jurisprudence which involves permissive stipulation and
held that it shall not limit the venue of the actions. Absent additional words and
expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and intention
that actions between them should be ventilated only at the place selected by them,
Quezon City or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and
intention the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits between the
parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon
City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff
Respondent do not deny in their respective answers the clear tenor of the above-quoted
stipulation as to venue in the contract in dispute.
It is further contended in said answer that reading the terms of the contract, it can be
gathered that most likely, it would be petitioner who would have to sue private respondent,
and, therefore, the stipulation as to venue was meant to apply only to suits to be filed by
petitioner.
Finally, it is maintained that there are no words in the contract expressly restricting the venue
to the courts of Rizal.
TORRES CONTENTIONS:
Note: Rule 4 sets forth the principles generally governing the venue of actions, whether real or
personal, or involving persons who neither reside nor are found in the Philippines or otherwise.
Agreements on venue are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an
action may be changed or transferred from one province to another." Parties may by stipulation waive
the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal privilege, which is not
contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third persons. It is a general principle that a person may
renounce any right which the law gives unless such renunciation would be against public policy.
He capitalizes on theory that inasmuch as petitioner is a multinational company, it is against

public policy for it to stipulate in any contract that the venue of actions thereunder should be
in any particular place, much less its place of residence, to the prejudice of small-time
distributors, the private respondent.
It is urged that to give effect to the stipulation in controversy "is to serve the convenience
and the purpose of the petitioner only; its effect is to discourage, to deter to render
expensive and uneconomical and filing of suits by small-time company distributors against
the petitioner even for extremely meritorious cases of latter's breach or violation of such
distribution agreement. "
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the
place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place
agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law (Rule 4, specifically). As in any other agreement, what
is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
Because restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this general policy, the language of the parties
must be so clear and categorical as to leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place or places, or
to fix places other than those indicated in Rule 4, for their actions. This is easier said than done,
however, as an examination of precedents involving venue covenants will immediately disclose.
HOECHST
PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO TORRES and the Honorable PROCORO J. DONATO, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Isabela, respondents.
ISSUE: WON the complaint should be filed in CFI Isabela.

HELD: No.
Change or transfer of venue from that fixed in the rules may be effected upon written
agreement of the parties not only before the actual filing of the action but even after the
same has been filed.
The settled rule of jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is that a written agreement of the parties
as to venue, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 4, is not only binding between the parties but
also enforceable by the courts. 1
It is only after the action has been filed already that change or transfer of venue by
agreement of the parties is understandably controllable in the discretion of the court. 2
The agreement in this case was entered into long before the petitioner's action was filed. It is
clear and unequivocal. The parties therein stipulated that "(I)n case of any litigation arising
out of this agreement, the venue of any action shall be in the competent courts of the
Province of Rizal." No further stipulations are necessary to elicit the thought that both parties
agreed that any action by either of them would be filed only in the competent courts of Rizal
province exclusively.
We have given due attention to this posture of respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent, Francisco Torres, filed with CFI Isabela a complaint in Civil Case
No. V-296 alleging breach of a distributorship contract on the part of petitioner, Hoechst
Philippines, Inc.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss said complaint based on the ground that as the contract,
the very actionable document invoked in the complaint, provides that "(I)n case of any
litigation arising out of this agreement, the venue of any action shall be in the
competent courts of the Province of Rizal", venue has been improperly laid in
respondent court.
CFI Isabela (ruled for Private Respondent)--denied the said motion to dismiss as well as the
motion for reconsideration of that denial, hence the present petition.
Indeed, there may be instances when an agreement as to venue may be so oppressive as to

effectively deny to the party concerned access to the courts by reason of poverty.
C
A
The difficulties pictured y respondents that a poor plaintiff from a distant province may have
to encounter in filing suit in a particular place ran indeed happen. In such an eventuality and
depending on the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Court may declare the agreement
as to venue to be in effect contrary to public policy, despite that in general, changes and
transfers of venue by written agreement of the parties is allowable whenever it is shown
that a stipulation as to venue works injustice by practically denying to the party concerned a
fair opportunity to file suit in the place designated by the rules.
ISSUE: WON the provision in the adhesion contract (Mobiline service agreements) regarding the
venue of all suits arising from the agreement is binding to the parties
But a cursory inquiry into the respective economic conditions of the parties herein as
reflected in the record before Us does not show that private respondent Francisco Torres is
really in no position to carry on a litigation in the Province of Rizal, because of his residence
or place of business being in Isabela province.
affirmed the RTC in denying PILTELS motion
It anchors its decision on the thesis that the subscription

agreement, being a mere contract of adhesion, does not bind
respondent on the venue stipulation.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but the appellate court, denied the motion.
HELD: YES
Considering the nature and volume of the business he has with petitioner, there is nothing
oppressive in his being required to litigate out of his province. After all, for practical reasons,
there seems to justification also for petitioner to see to it that all suits against it be
concentrated in the Province of Rizal, as otherwise, considering the nationwide extent of its
business, it would be greatly inconvenienced if it has to appear in so many provinces
everytime an action is filed against it. We are convinced both parties agreed to the venue in
controversy with eyes wide open.
DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, the orders of
respondent judge of May 13, 1976 and July 12, 1976 are hereby set aside, and petitioner's
motion to dismiss private respondent's complaint in question is granted. Costs against
private respondent Francisco Torres.
PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DELFINO TECSON, respondent.

FACTS:
RT
C
Denied petitioners motion to dismiss
10
Delfino C. Tecson applied for six (6) cellular phone subscriptions with petitioner Pilipino
Telephone Corporation (PILTEL), a company engaged in the telecommunications business,
which applications were each approved and covered, respectively, by six mobiline service
agreements.
Tecson filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Lanao Del Norte, a
complaint against petitioner for a Sum of Money and Damages.
PILTEL moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue,
citing a common provision in the mobiline service agreements 10
Petitioner PILTEL filed a motion for the reconsideration, through registered mail, of the
order of the trial court.
Trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Court of Appeals.
Venue of all suits arising from this Agreement or any other suit directly or indirectly arising from the relationship between PILTEL
and subscriber shall be in the proper courts of Makati, Metro Manila. Subscriber hereby expressly waives any other venues.
Section 4, Rule 4, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure [2] allows the parties to agree and
stipulate in writing, before the filing of an action, on the exclusive venue of any litigation
between them.
Such an agreement would be valid and binding provided that the stipulation on the chosen
venue is exclusive in nature or in intent, that it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto,
and that it is entered into before the filing of the suit.
The provision contained in paragraph 22 of the Mobile Service Agreement, a standard
contract made out by petitioner PILTEL to its subscribers, apparently accepted and signed by
respondent, states that the venue of all suits arising from the agreement, or any other suit
directly or indirectly arising from the relationship between PILTEL and subscriber, shall be in
the proper courts of Makati, Metro Manila.
The added stipulation that the subscriber expressly waives any other venue [3] should
indicate, clearly enough, the intent of the parties to consider the venue stipulation as being
preclusive in character.
Indeed, the contract herein involved is a contract of adhesion.
But such an agreement is not per se inefficacious.
The rule instead is that, should there be ambiguities in a contract of adhesion, such
ambiguities are to be construed against the party that prepared it.
If, however, the stipulations are not obscure, but are clear and leave no doubt on the
intention of the parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations must be held controlling.
A contract of adhesion is just as binding as ordinary contracts.
It is true that this Court has, on occasion, struck down such contracts as being assailable
when the weaker party is left with no choice by the dominant bargaining party and is thus
completely deprived of an opportunity to bargain effectively.
Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion are not prohibited even as the courts remain careful in
scrutinizing the factual circumstances underlying each case to determine the respective
claims of contending parties on their efficacy.
In the case at bar, respondent secured six (6) subscription contracts for cellular phones on
various dates. It would be difficult to assume that, during each of those times, respondent
had no sufficient opportunity to read and go over the terms and conditions embodied in the
agreements. Respondent continued, in fact, to acquire in the pursuit of his business
subsequent subscriptions and remained a subscriber of petitioner for quite sometime.
In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. National Merchandising Corporation,[ the
contracting parties, being of age and businessmen of experience, were presumed to have
acted with due care and to have signed the assailed documents with full knowledge of their
import. The situation would be no less true than that which obtains in the instant suit.
The circumstances in Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves,[wherein this Court invalidated the venue
stipulation contained in the passage ticket, would appear to be rather peculiar to that
case. There, the Court took note of an acute shortage in inter-island vessels that left
passengers literally scrambling to secure accommodations and tickets from crowded and
congested counters. Hardly, therefore, were the passengers accorded a real opportunity to
examine the fine prints contained in the tickets, let alone reject them.
A contract duly executed is the law between the parties, and they are obliged to
comply fully and not selectively with its terms. A contract of adhesion is no
exception.[
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the case in the RTC is DISMISSED without
prejudice to the filing of an appropriate complaint by respondent against petitioner with the
court of proper venue.
[G.R. No. 74854. April 2, 1991.]

JESUS DACOYCOY, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO V.
BENEDICTO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal, and
RUFINO DE GUZMAN,
FACTS:
In this petition for review, petitioner faults the appellate court in affirming what he calls an
equally erroneous finding of the trial court that the venue was improperly laid when the
defendant, now private respondent, has not even answered the complaint nor waived the
venue.
Petitioner claims that the right to question the venue of an action belongs solely to the
defendant and that the court or its magistrate does not possess the authority to confront the
plaintiff and tell him that the venue was improperly laid, as venue is waivable.
In other words, petitioner asserts, without the defendant objecting that the venue was
improperly laid, the trial court is powerless to dismiss the case motu proprio.
ISSUE: May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue?
HELD: NO. Venue may be waived expressly or impliedly.
RATIO:
Rule 4, Section 2, of the Rules of Court requiring that an action involving real property shall be brought
in the Court of First Instance of the province where the land lies is a rule on venue of actions, which
may be waived expressly or by implication."
On March 22, 1983, petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta, Rizal, filed before
the RTC,Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint against private respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for
the annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a parcel of riceland situated in Barrio
Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce thereof
On May 25, 1983, before summons could be served on private respondent as defendant
therein, the RTC Executive Judge issued an order requiring counsel for petitioner to confer
with respondent trial judge on the matter of venue.
After said conference, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper
venue. It found, based on the allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's action is a real
action as it sought not only the annulment of the aforestated deeds of sale but also the
recovery of ownership of the subject parcel of riceland located in Estanza, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
TC: Dismissed for improper venue

CA: Affirmed the dismissal
SC: Granted.
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondent trial court on the ground
of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between
jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than
substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject
matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the
defendant and not between the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to
jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the
case.
Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the merits; while venue deals
on the locality, the place where the suit may be had.
In the instant case, even granting for a moment that the action of petitioner is a real action,
respondent trial court would still have jurisdiction over the case, it being a regional trial court
vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions which involve the title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein . . ." in accordance with Section 19 (2)
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. With respect to the parties, there is no dispute that it acquired
jurisdiction over the plaintiff Jesus Dacoycoy, now petitioner, the moment he filed his
complaint for annulment and damages.
Although petitioner contends that on April 28, 1963, he requested the City Sheriff of Olongapo City or
his deputy to serve the summons on defendant Rufino de Guzman at his residence at 117 Irving St.,
Tapinac, Olongapo City, 8 it does not appear that said service had been properly effected or that
private respondent had appeared voluntarily in court 9 or filed his answer to the complaint. 10 At this
stage, respondent trial court should have required petitioner to exhaust the various alternative modes
of service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, i.e., personal service under Section 7,
substituted service under Section 8, or service by publication under Section 16 when the address of
the defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate
course of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as
well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly.
Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by
Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the
wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue
cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes,
the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose
convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the
defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio
dismissing the case.
RULE 6
G.R. No. L-22485
March 13, 1968CONSUELO V. CALO, doing business under the
trade name CVC Lumber Industries, assisted by MARCOS M. CALO vs. AJAX
INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED
FACTS:
Sometime on May 1959, plaintiff-appellant Consuelo Calo ordered from defendant-appellee Ajax
International, Inc., 1,200 ft. of John Shaw wire rope at P2.85 per foot. The transaction was
evidenced by Charge Order No. 37071, for P3,420.00.
According to plaintiff Calo, when the wire rope was delivered to Butuan City, the same
was found short of 300 ft.
Plaintiff wrote two letters to defendant asking for either (1) completion of delivery or (2) account
adjustment of the alleged undelivered 300 ft. of wire rope.
November 20, 1961- a complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila by one Adolfo
Benavides who claimed to have acquired the outstanding credit account of Calo from
defendant Ajax International, Inc. Charge Order No. 37071 was among those included
in the assigned account.
Subsequently, a JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT was entered, and a WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED,

AGAINST PLAINTIFF CALO.***
Consuelo Calo went to SC on a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
filed with the municipal court which it is prohibited from taking cognizance of, being beyond its
jurisdiction.
Besides, the reason underlying the rule, which is to settle all related controversies in one sitting only,
does not obtain. For, even if the counterclaim in excess of the amount cognizable by the inferior court
is set up, the defendant cannot obtain positive relief. The Rules allow this only for the defendant to
prevent plaintiff from recovering from him.
This means that should the court find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclaim (for an
amount exceeding said court's jurisdiction) meritorious, it will simply dismiss the complaint on the
ground that defendant has a bigger credit. Since defendant still has to institute a separate action for
the remaining balance of his counterclaim, the previous litigation did not really settle all related
controversies.
Plaintiff Calo's claim of P12,000.00 not being a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No.
VI-93062, it need not be filed there. The pendency then of said civil case could not be
pleaded in abatement of Civil Case No. 860. Consequently, the lower court erred in
dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
The order of dismissal appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the case REMANDED for further
proceedings. Costs against appellee Ajax International, Inc.
FLORENTINO NAVARRO and BEATRIZ VINOYA, petitioners, vs. HON. ELOY BELLO, Judge of the Court
SC
of First Instance of Pangasinan, JUAN CABUANG, FLORENTINA BAUTISTA, FLORENCIO GALICIA and
Set aside the judgment of default and writ of execution issued against plaintiff Calo and remanded CONSOLACION BAUTISTA, respondents.
the case for further proceedings.
FACTS:
January 23, 1962 - plaintiff Calo, assisted by her husband, Marcos Calo, filed in the CFI of
Petitioners-plaintiffs filed a complaint on September 30, 1954, with the Court of First Instance of
Agusan a complaint against defendant asking: (1) that the latter either effect complete
delivery of Charge Order No. 37071 or that she be relieved from paying P855.00 and; (2) that the
Pangasinan praying for the annulment of transfer certificates of titleand the corresponding
latter indemnify her for P12,000 as attorney's fees, damages and expenses of litigation.
deeds of sale executed by respondents Florencio Galicia and Consolacion Bautista in favor of
respondents Juan Cabuang and Florentino Bautista over lots of the San Carlos Cadastre, claiming
Instead of filing an answer, defendant Ajax moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ownership of said parcels of land, and alleging actual possession.
ground that the subject thereof was involved and intimately related to the civil case in
the Municipal Court of Manila.
Respondents filed their answer to the amended complaint, also claiming ownership over the
questioned lots with a counterclaim for the damages allegedly arising out of the unlawful
CFI OF AGUSAN
usurpation of the possession of the above described parcels of land by the petitioners through force
Sustained the motion and DISMISSED the case filed by Calo.

and intimidation.
It also denied Calos MR and Motion for New Trial.
Thus, herein petition.
No answer to the counterclaim having been filed within the time prescribed by the Rules, the
petitioners (plaintiffs below) were declared in default in an order of the lower court.
ISSUE: WON the case filed in the CFI Agusan is a compulsory counter-claim
HELD:
The dismissal of the Civil case filed in the CFI of Agusan because of the pendency of another Civil case
in the Municipal Court of Manila is predicated on the supposition that plaintiff's claim is a
compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the latter case.
However, plaintiff's claim is NOT A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM for the simple reason that the
amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
The rule that a compulsory counterclaim not set up is barred, when applied to the municipal court,
presupposes that the amount involved is within the said court's jurisdiction. Otherwise, as this Court
had already noted in Yu Lay v. Galmes 3 we would come to the absurd situation where a claim must be
CFI:
The court rendered decision adjudicating the defendant's counterclaim for damages, declaring the
respondents owners of the disputed parcels of land, and dismissing the complaint.
Petitioners filed their first motion for reconsideration to set aside the decision and order of default; it
was denied. A second motion for reconsideration filed on October 3, 1956, having been also denied by
the lower court.
Notice of appeal was filed by petitioners and with the notice of appeal they asked for a fifteen-day
extension within which to file the record on appeal and appeal bond, which was granted.
But upon objection interposed by the respondents, the court in its order denied the approval of
the record on appeal on the ground that the decision sought to be reviewed has become
final and that the plaintiffs having been declared in default, they have no right to appeal
unless and until the order of default is revoked and set aside.
Petitioners contention:
Declaration of default is null and void, because the issues raised in the counterclaim, particularly
those contained in the second and third causes of action, are so inextricably linked with those raised
by the complaint, that an answer would merely require a repleading of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an answer or reply is necessary to the counterclaim in the case at bar.
HELD:NO. To answer such counterclaim would require plaintiffs to replead the same facts
already alleged in their complaint.
The lower court, even in the case of a true default on the counterclaim, could not deny the
petitioners-palintiffs the right to be heard and produce evidence in support of their complaint, as
that pleading was valid and had not been stricken from the records.
Their having defaulted on the counterclaim, if they did so at all, did not operate to deprive the
plaintiffs from any standing or remedy in court in connection with their complaint.
FELICISIMA
BALLECER
and
JOSE
S.
AGAWIN, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE BERNARDO, The Hon. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge, Branch XIII of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and the Sheriff of Manila, respondents.
FACTS:
1.
Petitioners SPS. Jose S. Agawin and Felicisima Ballecer instituted against respondent Jose
Bernardo, to recover damages allegedly caused by him in consequence of the destruction
and demolition of a portion of a wall of the petitioners, along the common boundary line of
their lot and that of Bernardo, at Felix Huertas Street, Manila, as well as to recover possession
of a portion of petitioners' aforementioned lot, with an area of 0.80 square meters, which was
allegedly encroached upon by the wall subsequently erected by Bernardo in place of the one
he had destroyed.
2.
By way of counterclaim, Bernardo set up two (2) causes of action, namely: (1) that petitioners
were the parties who had encroached upon and occupied a portion of Bernardo's property (2)
that petitioners' complaint is premature, uncalled for, capricious and without any justifiable
cause, for which reason Bernardo prayed that they be sentenced to vacate his
aforementioned portion of land allegedly encroached upon by them and to turn it over to him,
and to pay damages aggregating P48,000.00
3.
Petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to answer the counterclaim but RTC denied
and ordered the petioners in default.
4.
TC ruling: in favour of defendant
5.
A reconsideration of this order having been denied, the Clerk of Court issued an alias writ of
execution and, in pursuance thereof, the Sheriff of Manila caused to be published a notice of
sale at public auction of a property of petitioners herein. Hence, the present case against
Bernardo, the Judge of the lower court and the Sheriff of Manila.
It is plain from the records that the complaint and the answer have not as yet been set for trial in the
court below.
Only after the issues of the complaint and answer are tried, and the parties heard, may the court
resolve the defendants' counterclaim for damages.
If the court finds for plaintiffs, defendants' defenses, and counterclaim, must necessarily fail.
On the other hand, if the court finds for the defendants, then plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed,
defendants would be declared owners of the lands in question, and they would be awarded
damages under their counterclaim.
But until and unless the whole case is heard on the merits, the court a quo cannot decide on
defendants' counterclaim, without depriving plaintiffs their day in court
Even if plaintiffs had really defaulted on the counterclaim, still the court was bound to limit its decision
to the specific reliefs ask for. Sec. 9, Rule 35, of the Rules of Court provides:
A judgment entered by default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that
prayed for in the demand for judgment . . .
Since the counterclaim was set to recover damages caused by the petitioners alleged entering
the land in question through force and intimidation, the court could, at most, award the damages
sought; hence, in adjudging also the defendants, Juan Cabuang and Florentina Bautista, to be the
owners of thetwo parcels of land described in the complaint, when what was tried was
thecounterclaim, the court below exceeded its jurisdiction.
Since the ownership of the disputed land was put in issued by the allegations of the complaint
and the special defenses in the answer, the correct procedure, assuming that the declaration of
default was properly entered, should have been for the trial court to set the complaint and answer
for the hearing.
ISSUE: WoN the lower court erred in declaring petiitoners in default and in rendering judgment
against them on Bernardos counterclaim after an ex parte hearing
HELD: YES. a motion for extension of time to file an answer to the counterclaim had been filed within
the reglementary period and plausible reasons were given in support thereof: counsel for petitioners
had been unable to contact them owing to a typhoon that had just hit Manila, and the flood and
inclement weather that had followed.
-
Bernardo's counterclaim was predicated upon allegations of fact which are

inconsistent with, and, hence, controverted by, the allegations in petitioners'
complaint. In this connection, it should be noted that Bernardo had, according to

the complaint, encroached upon petitioners' property, whereas Bernardo
maintained the exact opposite in his counterclaim not only that petitioners'
allegation was not true, but, also, that they were the ones encroaching upon the
property of Bernardo. Certainly, this contention, of Bernardo can not be decided
without passing upon the truth of the allegations in the complaint, which
petitioners are entitled to prove, whether they had answered Bernardo's
counterclaim or not.
Mortgage
payment
to
secure
Far East filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim admitting the genuineness and due
execution of the promissory notes, it raised the affirmative defenses of prescription and lack
of cause of action as it denied the allegation of the complaint that BPI had made previous
repeated requests and demands for payment.
G.R. No. 94093 August 10, 1993FAR EAST MARBLE (PHILS.), INC., LUIS R. TABUENA, JR. and
RAMON
A.
TABUENA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents.
Far East claimed that during the more than 10 years which elapsed from the dates of
maturity of said obligations up to the time the action for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
securing said obligations was filed, it had not received from BPI or its predecessor any
demand for payment and thus, it had "labored under the belief that they [the obligations]
have already been written off" in the books of BPI.
BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear affirmative defenses, alleging that its cause of
action against Far East have not prescribed.
FACTS:
BPI also filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that since Far East had admitted
the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes and the deed of chattel
mortgage annexed to its complaint, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, thus
entitling BPI to a favorable judgment as a matter of law in regard to its causes of action and
on its right to foreclose the chattel mortgage.
RTC (ruled in favor of Far East)- dismissed the complaint against Far East for lack of cause of
action and on grounds of prescription
CA (ruled in favor of BPI)- set aside the decision rendered by RTC
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Far East.
In other words, the issues raised in the counterclaim were inseparable from those
posed in the complaint, and so it was not absolutely necessary for the petitioners
to file an answer to the counterclaim.
On February 5, 1987, herein respondent Bank of the Philippines Islands (BPI) filed a complaint
for foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin against petitioner Far East Marble (Phils.),
Inc. (Far East), Ramon A. Tabuena and Luis R. Tabuena, Jr. before RTC Br 14 Manila.
The complaint alleges:

1st cause of Action
against Far East
2nd cause of action

against Far East
-that on various dates, Far

East received several
loans
evidenced
by
promissory
notes
executed by said Far East
-that on various dates, Far

East received and was
extended by BPI credit
facilities in the form of
Trust Receipts
-that
said
PN
long
matured
but
despite
demands Far East failed
and refused to pay
-that said Trust Receipts

have long matured and
despite
demands
for
payment, Far East failed
and refused
-that because of said

refusal,
plaintiff
was
constrained to file this
suit
-that because of said

refusal,
plaintiff
was
constrained to file this
suit.
-that Far East executed in
favor of BPI a Chattel
Cause of Action
against individual
defendants
-that defendants executed
in
favor
of
BPI
a
continuing guaranty
ISSUE: WON the complaint filed by BPI lacks cause of action

HELD:
-that despite demands for

their payment, they have
failed and refused to pay
said Far East accounts
No.
Section 3 of Rule 6 state that a "complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action." Further elaborating thereon, Section 1
of Rule 8 declares that every pleading, including, of course, a complaint, "shall contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts . . .
omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts."
"Ultimate facts" are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the
primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant while "evidentiary facts" are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate
facts.
-That because of failure,

plaintiff was constrained
to file this suit.
Basically, a cause of action consists of three elements, namely: (1) the legal right of the
plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right
These elements are manifest in BPI's complaint, particularly when it was therein alleged that:
(1) for valuable consideration, BPI granted several loans, evidenced by promissory notes, and
extended credit facilities in the form of trust receipts to Far East (photocopies of said notes
and receipts were duly attached to the Complaint); (2) said promissory notes and trust
receipts had matured; and (3) despite repeated requests and demands for payment thereof,
Far East had failed and refused to pay.
Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that "despite repeated requests and demands for
payment, Far East has failed to pay" is sufficient to establish BPI's cause of action.
Besides, prescription is not a cause of action; it is a defense which, having been raised,
should, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, be supported by competent evidence. But
even as Far East raised the defense of prescription, BPI countered to the effect that the
prescriptive period was interrupted and renewed by written extrajudicial demands for
payment and acknowledgment by Far East of the debt.
the allegations are sufficiently clear and definite as to give the defendants notice of what the plaintiffs
are complaining against them. Not only specific wrong complained of but also the particular acts
constituting the same are intelligibly stated. The damages which the plaintiffs demand for the alleged
invasion of their property rights have been fixed at P150,000. The defendants cannot be misled in
making their defense, and the court may render a definite judgment upon the subject matter involved.
"While a complaint may be awkwardly drafted, and for this reason be subject to criticism with respect
to incidental particulars, it will be held sufficient if it fairly apprises the defendant of the plaintiff's real
claims and contentions in such manner that the defendant is not misled to his surprise or injury,"
(Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil., 504.)
Re (b) failure to state facts sufficient to constitute cause of action:
Allegations of plaintiffs:
o
A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the
allegation may be vague or indefinite, for in such case, the recourse of the defendant would
be to file a motion for a bill of particulars.
In the case at bar, the circumstances of BPI extending loans and credits to Far East and the
failure of the latter to pay and discharge the same upon maturity are the only ultimate facts
which have to be pleaded, although the facts necessary to make the mortgage valid
enforceable must be proven during the trial.
MATIAS DE LOS SANTOS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants, vs. THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF

RIZAL, his deputies and delegates, RAFAEL LARA, EDUARDO TATCO, and THE BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, in its a capacity-appellees.
FACTS:
Four complaints were successively filed. Demurrers were sustained as to each of the first 3
complaints.
On October 29, 1934, defendant filed a Demurrer to the 3 rd amended complaint on the following
grounds: (a) ambiguity, (b) failure to state facts sufficient to constitute cause of action, and (c)
defect of parties. On October 30, the trial court issued an order sustaining the demurrer to the
third amended complaint of October 5 and directing the plaintiffs to amend the complaint within
ten days from receipt of notice of the order.
Plaintiff received notice of the order on November 3, 1934, but filed their last amended complaint
only on November 14, 1934, after the expiration of the ten-day period allowed.
they and their predecessors in interest have been in the peaceful and continuous
possession, in good faith under a claim of ownership, of the two parcel of land
described in the complaint even before 1890;
that they have constructed on said lands about 150 houses belonging to them, and
have made other improvements thereon consisting of fruit trees, cane, palay and
other plantations;
and, that the defendants, in conspiracy with one another, were demolishing said 150
houses of the plaintiffs and were destroying the other improvements on the land
thereby causing to plaintiff's damages amounting to P150,000;
that the peace of land over which the defendants might levy on execution by virtue
of the final judgment in the case of Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Acua (59 Phil.,
183), is different from, and not included within any portion of the two parcel of land
claimed by the plaintiffs in this case.
These averment, taken for granted in the demurrer, are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. They plainly show the substantial facts which form the basis of the primary right of
the plaintiffs and the culpatory acts of the defendants. The rules of pleading limit the
statement of the cause of action only to such operative facts as give rise to the right of action of the
plaintiff to obtain relief against the wrong doer. The details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence, statements of law, inferences and arguments need not be stated
DEFENDANTs CONTENTION: the plaintiffs should set forth the specific extent of their respective
share in the parcels of land claimed by them as well as the specific nature of their title
HELD: not well taken. They are merely matter of evidence which the plaintiffs under the rules
herein above referred to need not allege and which they may prove at the trial on the merits in
support of their claim of ownership.
A general allegation of ownership is a sufficient averment of the ultimate fact, and a
complaint containing it sufficiently pleads plaintiff's ownership
The facts involved in a demurrer are only those set out in the pleading demurred to, and the demurrer
merely raises a question of law as to the insufficiency of those facts to constitute a cause of action.
The defendants assume pro re nata the truth of the plaintiff's allegations and submit to the court the
question of law whether they are obliged to proceed further in the suit upon the assumed state of
facts (Sutherland, Code Pleading and Practice, sec. 237)
ISSUE: whether the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the third amended complaint of October
5, 1934.
Re (a) Ambiguity:

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RULE 1

CABRERA VS TIANO JULY 31, 1963

Court held that altho

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 1

Private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of

CA: denied the petition filed by Petitioners

Hence, the instant petition.

To forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners.

Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in

in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA,

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 2

Sps. Sabio filed against Ayala Corp:

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 3

respectively; P20,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as

2 Lazaro vs. Endencia,

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 4

[G.R. No. 85200. February 19, 1991.]

RTC: DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction

G.R. No. 89747 July 20, 1990

Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Asuncion, supra, read as follows:

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 5

NEW ASIAS CONTENTION

RTC OF LEGASPI CITY

ORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

HELD: NO. Petition filed by Maersk was denied.

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 6

No. The petition is devoid of merit.

INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF

indeed a compulsory counterclaim by the nature of its

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 7

complaint so that by the dismissal of the latter, the same has

Petitioners manifestation adopting Philippine Ports Authoritys

A counterclaim is compulsory where:

[G.R. No. 35453. September 15, 1989.]

CFI: Granted in favor of IFC.

Meanwhile, on September 9, 1971, private respondents Juan Delmendo and Honorata

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 8

ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 9

Petitioner filed an MR of the order denying his Motion to Dismiss.

Respondent Judge denied reconsideration. Hence, this present case.

JORGE C. PADERANGA, petitioner,

ELUMBA counters that the present

Sometime in 1973, petitioner JORGE C. PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA

SC: ruled in favor of Paderanga

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 10

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI

This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 11

(Value of 66 dishonored checks)

1% per Month (For 84 months or 7 years)

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 12

Ruled in favor of Bachrach.

As a result, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied.

Then, the plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage.

Dismissed the action to foreclose mortgage filed by Bachrach.

INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

FCMC prayed among others:

Charles Angels Digest Bank - BVTC| 13

e. exemplary damages in the amount of at least P200,000.00;

Denied the motion to dismiss

Denied motion to dismiss. trial court acquired

TRIAL COURT (CFI)