moral evil

morality
tem means that all those to whom it applies must
understand it and that it must not be irrational
for them to use it in deciding what to do and in
judging others to whom the system applies.
Games are the paradigm cases of public systems;
all games have a point and the rules of a game
apply to all who play it. All players know the
point of the game and its rules, and it is not irrational for them to be guided by the point and
rules and to judge the behavior of other players
by them.
To say that morality is informal means that
there is no decision procedure or authority that
can settle all its controversial questions. Morality
thus resembles a backyard game of basketball
more than a professional game. Although there
is overwhelming agreement on most moral matters, certain controversial questions must be settled in an ad hoc fashion or not settled at all. For
example, when, if ever, abortion is acceptable is
an unresolvable moral matter, but each society
and religion can adopt its own position. That
morality has no one in a position of authority is
one of the most important respects in which it
differs from law and religion.
Although morality must include the commonly accepted moral rules such as those prohibiting killing and deceiving, different societies
can interpret these rules somewhat differently.
They can also differ in their views about the
scope of morality, i.e., about whether morality
protects newborns, fetuses, or non-human animals. Thus different societies can have somewhat
different moralities, although this difference has
limits. Also within each society, a person may
have his own view about when it is justified to
break one of the rules, e.g., about how much
harm would have to be prevented in order to justify deceiving someone. Thus one persons
morality may differ somewhat from anothers,
but both will agree on the overwhelming number of non-controversial cases.
A moral theory is an attempt to describe,
explain, and if possible justify, morality. Unfortunately, most moral theories attempt to generate some simplified moral code, rather than to
describe the complex moral system that is
already in use. Morality does not resolve all disputes. Morality does not require one always to
act so as to produce the best consequences or to
act only in those ways that one would will
everyone to act. Rather morality includes both
moral rules that no one should transgress and
moral ideals that all are encouraged to follow,
but much of what one does will not be governed
by morality.

nite regress. If the ultimate principle is self-evident, then the problem may have an answer. But
if it is not it would appear to be arbitrary. The
problem of the justification of an ultimate principle continues to be a leading one in moral epistemology.
Recently there has been much interest in the
status and existence of moral facts. Are there
any, what are they, and how are they established
as facts? This relates to questions about moral
realism. Moral realism maintains that moral
predicates are real and can be known to be so;
anti-realists deny this. This denial links with the
view that moral properties supervene on natural
ones, and the problem of supervenience is
another recent link between ethics and epistemology.
Pragmatism in ethics maintains that a moral
problem is like any problem in that it is the occasion for inquiry and moral judgments are to be
regarded as hypotheses to be tested by how well
they resolve the problem. This amounts to an
attempt to bypass the isought problem and all
such dualisms. So is constructivism, a development owing much to the work of Rawls, which
contrasts with moral realism. Constructivism
maintains that moral ideas are human constructs
and the task is not epistemological or metaphysical but practical and theoretical that of attaining reflective equilibrium between considered
moral judgments and the principles that coordinate and explain them. On this view there are no
moral facts. Opponents maintain that this only
replaces a foundationalist view of ethics with a
coherence conception.
The question whether questions of moral epistemology can in this way be bypassed can be
regarded as itself a question of moral epistemology. And the question of the foundations of
morality, and whether there are foundations,
can still be regarded as a question of moral epistemology, as distinct from a question of the most
convenient and efficient arrangement of our
moral ideas.
See also ETHICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM ,
ETHICS , INTUITION , MORAL REALISM , REFLEC TIVE EQUILIBRIUM .
M.G.S.
moral evil. See PHILOSOPHY

OF RELIGION .

morality, an informal public system applying to

all rational persons, governing behavior that
affects others, having the lessening of evil or
harm as its goal, and including what are commonly known as the moral rules, moral ideals,
and moral virtues. To say that it is a public sys-

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