Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 557, GR No.

49188, January 30, 1990, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 30, 2011
(Civil Procedure Alias Writ of Execution; Civil Law Payment; Commercial Law Check)
THE FACTS:
Amelia Tan commenced a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance against Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). The
Court rendered a judgment in favor of the former and against the latter.
PAL filed its appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA), and the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the lower court with the
modification that PAL is condemned to pay the latter the sum of P25, 000.00 as damages and P5, 000.00 as attorneys fee.
Judgment became final and executory and was correspondingly entered in the case, which was remanded to the trial court for
execution. The trial court upon the motion of Amelia Tan issued an order of execution with the corresponding writ in favor of the
respondent. Said writ was duly referred to Deputy Sheriff Reyes for enforcement.
Four months later, Amelia Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, stating that the judgment rendered by the lower
court, and affirmed with modification by the CA, remained unsatisfied. PAL opposed the motion, stating that it had already fully paid
its obligation to plaintiff through the issuance of checks payable to the deputy sheriff who later did not appear with his return and
instead absconded.
The CA denied the issuance of the alias writ for being premature. After two months the CA granted her an alias writ of execution for
the full satisfaction of the judgment rendered, when she filed another motion. Deputy Sheriff del Rosario is appointed special sheriff
for enforcement thereof.
PAL filed an urgent motion to quash the alias writ of execution stating that no return of the writ had as yet been made by Deputy
Sheriff Reyes and that judgment debt had already been fully satisfied by the former as evidenced by the cash vouchers signed and
received by the executing sheriff.
Deputy Sheriff del Rosario served a notice of garnishment on the depository bank of PAL, through its manager and garnished the
latters deposit. Hence, PAL brought the case to the Supreme Court and filed a petition for certiorari.
THE ISSUES:
1. WON an alias writ of execution can be issued without prior return of the original writ by the implementing officer.
2. WON payment of judgment to the implementing officer as directed in the writ of execution constitutes satisfaction of
judgment.
3. WON payment made in checks to the sheriff and under his name is a valid payment to extinguish judgment of debt.
THE RULING:
1. Affirmative. Technicality cannot be countenanced to defeat the execution of a judgment for execution is the fruit and end of the
suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. A judgment cannot be rendered nugatory by unreasonable application of a strict rule
of procedure. Vested right were never intended to rest on the requirement of a return. So long as judgment is not satisfied, a
plaintiff is entitled to other writs of execution.
2. Negative. In general, a payment, in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper person. Article
1240 of the Civil Code provides:
Payment made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person
authorized to receive it.

Under ordinary circumstances, payment by the judgment debtor in the case at bar, to the sheriff should be valid payment to
extinguish judgment of debt.
However, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the payment to the absconding sheriff by check in his name did not
operate as a satisfaction of the judgment debt.
3. Negative. Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides:
The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency, then in
the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.
Unless authorized to do so by law or by consent of the obligee, a public officer has no authority to accept anything other than
money in payment of an obligation under a judgment being executed. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the
petitioners checks does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment of debt.
A check, whether managers check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid
tender or payment and may be refused receipt by the oblige or creditor. Hence, the obligation is not extinguished.
THE TWIST: Payment in cash is logical, but it was not proper.
Payment in cash to the implementing officer may be deemed absolute payment of judgment debt but the Court has never, in the
least bit, suggested that judgment debtors should settle their obligations by turning over huge amounts of cash or legal tender to
the executing officers. Payment in cash would result in damage or endless litigations each time a sheriff with huge amounts of cash
in his hands decides to abscond.
As a protective measure, the courts encourage the practice of payment of check provided adequate controls are instituted to
prevent wrongful payment and illegal withdrawal or disbursement of funds.
However, in the case at bar, it is out of the ordinary that checks intended for a particular payee are made out in the name of
another. The issuance of the checks in the name of the sheriff clearly made possible the misappropriation of the funds that were
withdrawn.
The Court of Appeals explained:
Knowing as it does that the intended payment was for the respondent Amelia Tan, the petitioner corporation, utilizing the services
of its personnel who are or should be knowledgeable about the accepted procedure and resulting consequences of the checks
drawn, nevertheless, in this instance, without prudence, departed from what is generally observed and done, and placed as payee
in the checks the name of the errant Sheriff and not the name of the rightful payee. Petitioner thereby created a situation which
permitted the said Sheriff to personally encash said checks and misappropriate the proceeds thereof to his exclusive benefit. For
the prejudice that resulted, the petitioner himself must bear the fault
Having failed to employ the proper safeguards to protect itself, the judgment debtor whose act made possible the loss had but itself
to blame.
Spouses Valdez vs Spouses Fabella, GR No. 132424, May 2, 2006
Posted by Pius Morados on November 30, 2011
(Civil Procedure Jurisdiction, Real Action, Unlawful Detainer)
Facts: Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent spouses before the MTC.
The complaint alleges that sometime in November 1992, by virtue of a sales contract, petitioner spouses acquired a residential lot
and respondent spouses , without any color of title whatsoever occupied the said lot by building their house in the same thereby
depriving the former rightful possession thereof.
A formal demand to vacate the premises was sent on July 12, 1994 but it was ignored.

Respondent spouses contend that the complaint failed to state that petitioner had prior physical possession of the property in
dispute and in the alternative, claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they possess the same for more than thirty
years.
The MTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners and ordered respondents to vacate the property.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.
On a petition for review, the Court of Appeals reverse and set aside the decision of the RTC on the ground that petitioners failed to
make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had given the private respondents the right to occupy the
premises or that they had tolerated private respondents possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer
cases. It added that the allegations in the complaint lack jurisdictional elements of forcible entry which requires an allegation of
prior material possession. Hence, MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: WON the allegations of the complaint made out a case for unlawful detainer and MTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: No.
The three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property are:
First, Accion interdictal comprises forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of
real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.In forcible entry,
the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while
in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper MTC. Both actions must be brought within one
year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
detainer.The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Second, Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper RTC when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title.
Third, Accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding.
Doctrine: Jurisdictional facts establishing a case for ejectment must appear on the face of the complaint
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an
action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal
but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry
or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
Reason:
In the case at bar, the allegations in petitioner spouses complaint did not contain any averment of fact that would substantiate their
claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations
that respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby
depriving petitioners the possession thereof. Nothing has been said on how respondents entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started.
The failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
Leave a comment Posted in Civil Procedures Tagged Civil Procedures, Jurisdiction, Real Action, Unlawful Detainer
Victoriano Encarnacion vs Nieves Amigo, GR No. 169793,September 15, 2006
Posted by Pius Morados on November 29, 2011
(Civil Procedure Jurisdiction, Real Action, Actions for recovery of Real Property)
Facts: On April 11, 1995, petitioner became the owner of a parcel of land by virtue of a waiver of rights executed by his mother-inlaw, which he thereafter subdivided into two lots.
Sometime in 1985, respondent allegedly entered the premise and took possession of a portion of the property without the
permission of the predecessor-in-interest of the said property.
On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment (unlawful detainer) with the MTC after his February 1, 2001 letter to the
respondent demanding that the latter vacate the premises remained unheeded. The letter was received by the respondent on
February 12, 2001.
Respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a portion of the subject land since 1968.
The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but the RTC dismissed the case on appeal, on the ground that the MTC has
no jurisdiction over the case. Hence the latter acquired no appellate jurisdiction over thereof.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, which remanded the case to the RTC for the proper action.
Issue: WON the proper action in this case is unlawful detainer.
Held: No.
The three kinds of actions for recovery of real property are:
1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either forcible or unlawful detainer, which is a summary
action for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be
brought with the MTC.
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession, which should be brought in the
RTC when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year.
3. Accion reinvindicatoria, which is an action for the recovery of ownership which must be brought in the RTC.

The remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are granted to a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person. If the
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the proper MTC acquires jurisdiction.
On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year, the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which
should be brought to the proper RTC.
Petitioner became the owner of the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that time deprived possession of a portion thereof. From
the date of the petitioners dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have
elapsed. The length of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action beyond the ambit of
an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be
commenced in the RTC via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess.

Note: The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof.
Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in
the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice
Leave a comment Posted in Civil Procedures Tagged Accion Publiciana, Civil Procedures, Jurisdiction, Real Action, Unlawful
Detainer
Spouses Huguete vs Spouses Embudo, GR No. 49554, July 1, 2003
Posted by Pius Morados on November 29, 2011
(Civil Procedure Jurisdiction, Real Action)
Facts: Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for the annulment of deed of sale and partition of the 50-square meter portion of land
against respondent spouses in the RTC.
Respondent spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case, arguing that the action is one for annulment of title and the total assessed value of the subject land was only P15,000.00
which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, pursuant to Sec 33(3) of BP Blg 129, as amended by RA 7691.
Petitioner spouses filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss alleging that the subject matter of the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, therefore, is cognizable by the RTC, as provided by Sec 19(1) of BP 129, as amended.
Issue: WON the civil action is one in which the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Held: No. The argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation considering that it is for annulment of
deed of sale and partition is not well-taken.
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought (Caiza vs CA).
And in Singsong vs Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right

to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this
Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The principal purpose of the petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to the 50-square meter portion of the property
which they purchased from the respondents. Their cause of action is based on their right as purchaser of the subject land from
respondents. They pray that they be declared owners of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or
any interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00, which was within the jurisdiction of
MTC.
The annulment of the deed of sale, were prayed for in the complaint because they were necessary before the lot may be
partitioned and the 50-square meter portion subject thereof may be conveyed to petitioners.
Leave a comment Posted in Civil Procedures Tagged Civil Action, Civil Procedures, Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation,
Jurisdiction, Real Action
De Leon vs Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 94; GR No. 104796, March 6, 1998
Posted by Pius Morados on November 29, 2011
(Civil Procedure Jurisdiction, Civil action not capable of pecuniary estimation, Docket Fees)
Facts: Private respondents filed in the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two
parcels of land against petitioners. Private respondents paid the docket fee of a flat rate of P400.00 as provided in Rule 141, par 7
(b)(1) of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction by the trial court by reason of private
respondents non-payment of the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners argue that an action for annulment or rescission of a
contract of sale of real property is a real action and, therefore, the amount of the docket fees to be paid by private respondent
should be based either on the assessed value of the property, subject matter of the action, or its estimated value as alleged in the
complaint, pursuant to the last paragraph of par 7(b) of Rule 141, as amended.
On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141, par 7(b)(1).
The trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss but required private respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the
estimated value of the parcels of land in litigation as stated in the complaint.
The Court of Appeals held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and,
therefore, the docket fees should not be based on the value of the real property, subject matter of the contract sought to be
annulled or rescinded
Issue: WON in assessing the docket fees to be paid for the filing of an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the
value of the real property, should be used as basis.
Held: No. The action for annulment or rescission is considered as one which is not capable of pecuniary estimation.
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental
to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such

actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance.

Leave a comment Posted in Civil Procedures Tagged Civil Action, Civil Procedures, Docket Fees, Incapable of Pecuniary
Estimation, Jurisdiction
Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999
Posted by Pius Morados on November 28, 2011
(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation)
Facts: Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration of heirs and deed of confirmation of a previous oral
agreement, of partition, affecting the land executed by and among the respondents whereby respondents divided the property
among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are entitled thereto as legal heirs also.
Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION against defendants with the RTC
claiming that the document was false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of
the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void
and an order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the
total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.
No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.
Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the
jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in question. While the complaint
also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the
document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined
by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted therein.
Leave a comment Posted in Civil Procedures Tagged Civil Action, Civil Procedures, Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation, Jurisdiction
Copioso vs Copioso, 391 SCRA 325; GR No. 149243, October 28, 2002

Posted by Pius Morados on November 28, 2011

(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation)
Facts: Respondents filed with the RTC an action for specific performance of reconveyance of two parcels of land having an
assessed value of P3,770.00.
Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased brother were co-owners of the subject property having inherited the
same from their parents, and that through fraud and machination the deceased had the property transferred to his name and that of
spouses Doria who subsequently sold the same to third parties. Thus, they are praying for the reconveyance of the property by
virtue of their being co-owners thereof.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on that ground that it was the MTC and not the RTC that had jurisdiction considering
that the assessed value of the property was lower than P20,000.00 (Section 33 [3] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691). Petitioners argue that the complaint for reconveyance cannot be resolved unless the trial court delves upon the
issues of title, possession and interests of each of the stakeholders over the subject parcels of land.
Respondents claim that the instant complaint for reconveyance is a case of joinder of causes of action which include the annulment
of sale and other instruments of false conveyance incapable of pecuniary estimation thus within the legal competence of the RTC
( Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended).
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss holding that since the subject matter of the action was beyond pecuniary estimation it
was properly within its jurisdiction.
Issue: WON denial of the motion to dismiss was correct.
Held: Yes. Although the assessed value of the two parcels of land involved is P3,770.00, which is within the jurisdiction of the MTC,
the action filed by the respondents is for specific performance of reconveyance, annulment of contracts and claim for damages,
which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
If the action affects the title to or possession of real property then it is a real action and jurisdiction is determined by the assessed
value of the property. It is within the jurisdiction therefore of the Metropolitan Trial Court.