The International Journal of Human Rights

ISSN: 1364-2987 (Print) 1744-053X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjhr20

Ten flaws of just wars

Ken Booth
To cite this article: Ken Booth (2000) Ten flaws of just wars, The International Journal of
Human Rights, 4:3-4, 314-324, DOI: 10.1080/13642980008406909
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642980008406909

Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

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Ten Flaws of Just Wars

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KEN BOOTH

The ancient doctrine of the Just War is the ancestor of the very
contemporary notion of 'humanitarian war'. NATO's military campaign
against Serbia in 1999 was justified on ethical grounds, not traditional
national interests. This essay is a critique of the rationale of Just
War/humanitarian war, and of its accompanying political/strategic
mindset. I will argue that the Just War tradition/doctrine is supposed to
restrain war, but that it has not, cannot and will not do so; in practice it
only makes things worse by legitimising and honouring war. In particular,
the construction a universal human rights culture - one of the
foundations for global human security - will be delayed rather than
advanced by militarised humanitarianism.
1. Just Wars justify escalation. Over the centuries, the idea of Just War
was developed to establish restraint in an area of politics in which rules
tend to be weakest. War is seen as the ultimate cockpit of necessity, and
'necessity knows no law'. But instead of becoming a force for restraint,
Just War thinking has often served to excuse or provoke excess.
By the twentieth century, the combination of Westphalian statism,
rampant nationalism, military-technological innovation and industrial
gigantism had produced the potential for absolute war. There seemed no
end to the escalation ladder. During the Cold War a strategic posture
threatening nuclear holocaust was dubbed the 'just deterrent'. Donald A.
Wells, writing in the late 1960s against the background of a recent Total
War and an increasingly violent 'Limited War' in Vietnam in the
foreground, argued that states justify inflicting any horror upon an
enemy as long as they claim their cause is just.1 Because a just cause

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demands unconditional commitment, the desire for justice and the

injunction to respect proportionality are necessarily in tension. The
former pushes towards extremes, the latter towards restraint. In an
ideological age, and with the options opened up by technology, the
ancient doctrine of restraint became a modern justification for totality.
A.J.P. Taylor noted this many years ago when he commented that in the
nineteenth century Bismarck had fought necessary wars and killed
thousands, whereas in the twentieth century we had fought just wars and
killed millions. If one's cause is 'just' it seems any level of escalation can
be justified, even nuclear armageddon.
When governments persuade themselves they are fighting a Just War,
and try to propagandise their populations accordingly, escalation is
inevitable unless the enemy quickly collapses. The danger-signals were
there in 1999 when NATO's leaders discovered that the war would not
be over in the few days they had predicted. The tension between just
cause and proportionality kicked in immediately. Once NATO had so
publicly declared its hand for the refugees, what price justice? Had
Milosevic kept his forces in the field for longer, one wonders just how far
NATO would have escalated. Short of accepting a humiliating
climbdown, or a massive escalation using ground forces, NATO could
only intensify the bombing and expand the target list. Moreover, the
decisive strategic bombardment of Serbia would have become an absolute
imperative had NATO deployed ground forces, in order to reduce NATO
casualties. Then, had body bags been flown home, in dozens, or
hundreds, one wonders what would have represented 'proportionality' in
Serbian blood. Just Wars can be used to justify anything. In, around and
over Kosovo through the summer of 1999, the combination of militant
moralism and democratic desperation was potentially deadly.
2. Just Wars degrade their proponents, as well as destroy their opponents.
Just Wars are dangerous for the targeted enemy and the inevitable victims
of collateral damage, but they also degrade the society that convinces
itself that it is fighting for Right against Evil. This was particularly
evident in Britain in 1999 where Blair's government was loud with Just
War rhetoric.
British public debate about the war was diminished by its
government's crusading. Parliament was sidelined, and domestic critics
pilloried. Democracy was a war aim, but was discouraged among the
allies. 'The Serbs' were demonised. Milosevic's vicious ethnic cleansing
was inflated to be the ultimate crime of 'genocide'. Mindless comparisons
were made between Milosevic's Kosovo and the Nazi Holocaust.
Innocent Serbs were killed, not intentionally but predictably, as a result

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of the decision to fight a zero-casualty campaign; and all the blame for
what happened was shifted to the dictator in Belgrade.
Some in the West during the war suspected that manipulation had
replaced reporting, and they questioned the 'truth' of the situation as
stated by leaders or official spokespersons or uncritical reporters
following press conferences. But critical judgment in society generally
tends to disappear once the bugle blows. Governments encourage it. In a
highly symbolic event, following an attack, in error, by NATO warplanes
on a refugee convoy, the response from Downing Street was to send its
spinmeister to Brussels to ensure better media presentation. NATO was
determined to win not only in the air over Kosovo, but also over the airwaves more generally.
Historically, Just Wars have involved societies being willing to die for
a cause, and not simply kill for one. Kosovo represented a change, and to
many it was chilling. Whatever humanitarian war does to the enemy, we
should also think of how it degrades us - just like nuclear strategy or
torture. In the Kosovo campaign our armed forces were asked to perform
not the traditional heroic role of the warrior, or even of the policeman,
but rather the cold and heartless trade of the executioner.
3. Just Wars are just war. The idea of the Just War is beguiling, because it
ennobles the profession of violence, and offers a set of conditions that
seem to suggest rational control and restraint. However, its defining
conditions - 'just cause', 'right intention', 'proportionality' and the rest have been criticised for as long as the tradition, and rightly so. In practice
they have been broadened, ignored, misused and manipulated.
Just cause is very subjective, including the application of 'self defence',
widely seen as its only authentic case. Right intention is equally
problematic. A decision-maker's reasons may well not be the causes for
action, so how are we to know? What constitutes legitimate authority is
a matter of political preference rather than legal nicety. Last resort sounds
a sensible guide to policy, but how can anybody ever know whether more
effort might work, while in some strategic circumstances a first strike
might be thought to constitute a 'last' resort? The idea of a formal
declaration of war has become increasingly anachronistic, while
reasonable hope is vague. War is a condition of uncertainty, in which even
the most expert can disagree in advance about the prospects, and in
which events have a habit of fooling everybody. Finally, proportionality
sounds more helpful than it is, in an activity in which changing
circumstances, vital interests and group emotion defy ethical arithmetic.
NATO's campaign against Serbia illustrates some of these problems.
The issue of 'just cause' was controversial, as the war was clearly not for

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self-defence, while many believed the campaign to be a breach of

international law, regardless of claims about 'legitimacy' - another term
of politics rather than principle. 'Right intention' was disputed by those
who believed that behind the rhetoric of humanitarianism lay traditional
state interests, especially the US desire to impose its authority on NATO
and hence European affairs. The selectivity of the West's intervention was
seen by critics as a justification for suspecting a masking of reasons and
causes. As is expected these days, war was not declared. Was it a last
resort? Proponents say 'yes' and point to Belgrade's intransigence, but
critics point to the virtual ultimatum delivered at Rambouillet, and argue
that NATO was looking for a rationalisation for war, not a way of
avoiding one. Just War conditions provide a cover which allows power to
do what power can do. If this is true, the Just War is best seen as a
continuation of war by other rhetoric.
4. Just Wars encourage bad strategy. Political leaders with Just War
mindsets are rarely professional specialists in violence. In Just Wars,
strategy is therefore handed to amateurs, and this was the case in 1999.
The campaign was characterised by strategic mishandling on the part of
the political leadership, rather than military incompetence. Misjudged
wars can be fought competently.
When a politician 'wants' war, mistakes are bound to occur. This is
especially the case - to recall Tennyson - if someone believes that their
strength is as the strength of ten because their heart is pure. The desire to
celebrate NATO's fiftieth anniversary in style almost certainly affected
the timing of the war, but by the time they struck they could not protect
the refugees; they could only try to punish the ethnic cleansers, and
thereby imperil the refugees further. It was a short war, but long on
politico-strategic blunders. Long-range air strikes could not achieve the
initial objective declared by NATO. The will of the opponent was
seriously underestimated, while confidence in NATO's capability was
exaggerated. Cruise-missile humanitarianism and bombing from a safe
height could not stop the brutality being carried out against the Albanian
Kosovars on the ground, and almost certainly exacerbated it. The early
and public ruling out of the ground force option was nai've. Strategic
miscalculations were compounded by diplomatic errors, notably the
offending of the Russians, the failure to secure UN support, and the
problems with China following the bombing of its Belgrade Embassy.
To place NATO's 'victory' into context, it is instructive to compare
the relative strengths of the two belligerents: the collective GNPs of the
NATO allies with that of Serbia, and the respective orders-of-battle of the
combatants. When Milosevic (still in power) felt compelled to withdraw

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his forces (still largely intact) from the field of battle into the national
heartland (for the moment), it followed one of the most one-sided
military contests in history. On the one side the most economically and
militarily powerful alliance ever, and on the other a small nation with no
capability to strike back militarily. They had only the defenceless
Albanians to lash out against. A Just War encourages bad strategy by
elevating amateur strategists. A zero-casualty victory, however, naturally
discourages criticism.
5. Just Wars feed self-righteousness. Because the politicians leading NATO
believed they were engaged in a just struggle against the demon
Milosevic, they developed a pious certainty of righteousness and an
evident absence of guilt about what they did. Neither of these traits is
conducive to true humanitarian politics. The best of the 'West' is not
represented by the hubris of humanitarian imperialism, expressing itself
as claim to be universal judge, jury and executioner.
First, at the politico-military level the NATO allies claimed
'legitimacy' in acting militarily in what some regarded as the internal
problems of another country. This polarised world politics. The action
was widely seen as illegal, and failed to get unambiguous Security Council
endorsement. NATO thereby dealt a blow to the authority and future of
the UN. This precedent can now be used by every regional hegemon. It
is worth recalling that in the 1930s the League of Nations began to
collapse when great powers disregarded its authority.
NATO's unilateralist posture had other negative consequences. It
increased a West-versus-the-Rest polarisation, encouraging the former to
feel superior, fighting for civilised values, while the latter was made to
feel both inferior and threatened. Only the United States can project
military power across the globe, and in recent years has zeroed in its
missiles and bombs at a growing list of countries. The Pentagon talks of
'full-spectrum dominance 2010' and the Secretary of State, Madeleine
Albright, argues that Americans stand taller than the rest - 'that is why
we can see further'. This mixture of self-righteousness and technological
hubris represents a real and growing threat to those not identified as the
White House's friends from the South. Potential targets will look towards
their defences, including, perhaps, the building of primitive weapons of
mass destruction.
Second, at the tactical level (not to mention their role in the macrosituation) self-righteousness led Western leaders to avoid accepting
responsibility for some events in the war. What happened was blamed on
others. War is always a deadly business and casualties are its first truth.
Technical mistakes and bad luck are one thing when contemplating death

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and injury to those with some claim to be 'innocent', but in Kosovo (and
Serbia) some of these casualties were directly and predictably the result
of the Blair/Clinton priority of overseeing a UK/US casualty-free war. The
deaths of refugees from friendly fire - and of innocent Serbs from that
which was less friendly if not intentionally deadly - cannot simply be
explained away as one of the unavoidable 'frictions' of war. It was a
direct result of NATO strategy, and any attempt to argue differently is
casuistic spin. To fail to take responsibility for one's actions is not a good
foundation for humanitarian politics. Neither is hypocrisy. And here
there was much, from the gap between the sympathy expressed towards
the Kosovar refugees and the increasing lack of sympathy in Britain
towards asylum-seekers, and the selectivity of the international
community's humanitarian interventions.
Third, at a psychological level, self righteousness begets selfrighteousness. Predictably, cruise-missile humanitarianism could not
protect those being killed and terrorised by the Serb forces and
paramilitaries on the ground. The opposite was the case; the bombing
created circumstances in which they could carry out their ethnic
cleansing with yet greater ferocity. NATO was not responsible for the
Milosevic campaign of ethnic cleansing in 1999, but its strategy did
create the cover of war for the ethnic cleansers, and for inflaming the
latter's desire to extract revenge against the defenceless Albanians they
despised - victims who, unlike NATO's warplanes, were accessible.
NATO's moralising and missiles also had the effect of pushing the
Serbian population behind a leader whose unpopularity had grown in the
space opened up by peace following Dayton.
As piety grows and guilt diminishes, there is an ethic cleansing of the
conscience; this may be the prelude to worse. Instead of taking
responsibility for innocent casualties, for the increased terror inflicted on
the Kosovar Albanians, for the damage done to the region's economy,
and for the failure to prevent the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Serbs all the direct result of NATO's strategy - the blame was shifted to the
offending demon in Belgrade. NATO did have choices. When selfrighteousness expands, and blame is denied, the important still small
voice of conscience is silenced - a necessary element in any true
humanitarian politics.
6. Just Wars promote militarisation. If guilt was silenced during the war,
it had grown in Western minds during the preceding years: for not acting
decisively in Bosnia (and Rwanda), for allowing the massacre at
Srebrenica, and for ignoring the developing Kosovo tragedy.
Furthermore, it was surely not an accident that NATO's most militant

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leaders, Clinton and Blair, felt they had something to prove. In earlier
incarnations, the former was an anti-Vietnam war rebel and the latter a
member of CND. On military matters therefore, neither wanted to be
outflanked in toughness. In addition, when it comes to 'duties beyond
borders' centre-left politicians always have stronger interventionary
instincts than their counterparts on the right. All in all, Kosovo was an
opportunity for feel-good punishment. It was the militarisation of guilt.
Militarised humanitarianism causes a number of problems. First, the
valorisation of military action flies in the face of humanitarianism, which
requires the erosion of the legitimacy of using military force. Second, the
more force is seen to be successful, the more it is likely to be used. The
instrument will shape the will to use it. Third, high-tech, zero-casualty
wars, fought for just causes are a godsend to arms manufacturers: just
profit. Finally, the new humanitarian militarism has promoted a changed
attitude among some sections of society, in which imperialism, strategy,
and warriors are being reinvented for the twenty-first century. We are
seeing the rise of post-modern Midases of militarism: everything they
touch turns to 'new'. But there is more that is old than new in war,
including the soundest lessons of all: military force is always a blunt tool,
often used in error, and best left only to 'supreme emergencies'.
Militant humanitarianism risks leading Western societies down the
dangerous path of ennobling the use of military force. Humanitarian
warriors are providing good copy for recruiting advertisements.
7. Just War thinking distracts attention from human security. As it
intensified through the 1990s, the Kosovo tragedy revealed that the
Anglo-American special relationship did not give priority to human
security. There were rhetorical flourishes, but little in the flourishing of
resources. Old thinking, once again, was caught out in Kosovo. It showed
that human rights are a critical security issue, and that when they are
being massively violated, trouble usually follows. The same will be true
now the war has ended, unless appropriate resources are devoted to
peace-building.
Kosovo for a decade at least had been a humanitarian disaster waiting
to happen. Security via conflict prevention was notable by its absence.
Specialists on the region tried to draw attention to the dangers, but
Western policy-makers avoided the issue(s), at Dayton and on other
occasions. Meanwhile, the non-violent approach represented by Rugova
gave way to the terrorist tactics of the KLA, which ultimately provoked
the desired overreaction on the part of Belgrade, and the recruitment of
the NATO air force. It is not now possible to know whether conflict
prevention measures would have worked, only that opportunities were

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missed. Because we know the end of the story, it is tempting to assume

that it had to be, but we know from other situations that different choices
can result in different outcomes. South Africa, for example, radically
shifted its internal political arrangements without the long-feared
interracial blood bath. Political crossroads are inevitable, whereas conflict
is only inevitable if the key decision-makers approach cross-roads with
the wrong road-maps, and so turn in fateful directions.
Having overlooked human security before March 1999, the signs
subsequently have not been encouraging. Typically, the stabilisation plan
for the Balkans came far too late, when the air war was taking place, and
at a much higher cost than would have been the case before the region
was 'degraded' by NATO air power. It was predictable that it would take
a long time before there could be a satisfactory security situation, and this
remains the case today, with a mono-ethnic Kosovo likely to become
independent, tension on the ground, approximately as many displaced
persons in Serbia as in Kosovo's neighbours a year earlier, and Serbia
joining the region's economic basket-cases. Military victory is easier than
human security, especially when, as some predicted, the allies have
chosen not to give the same attention and resources to the reconstruction
of the Balkans as they gave to the air campaign. Other issues now demand
attention, resources are squeezed, and supplying reinforced doors for
improving the human security of frightened Serbian Kosovars still in the
province does not have the priority that supplying bombs to coerce
Milosevic had a year earlier.
8. Just Wars stimulate self-delusion. Self-delusion occurs when a decisionmaking group deceives itself about what is happening. Self-delusion is
part of the pathology of 'groupthink'; this was evident among NATO
leaders in terms of both ends (jus ad bellum) and means {jus in hello).
The allies claimed that they stood on the moral high ground. This was
self-deception because their action was both selective and illegal. The
former is particularly significant here, being an issue of ethics, not law:
one surely cannot claim the moral high ground if one's moral reach is
selective. Note here humanitarian disasters where the West also had good
cause to act, and reasonable capabilities, but did not. Western
governments do not 'do something' if there are serious costs, be they
commercial (Indonesia/East Timor) or strategic (Turkey/the Kurds). The
West's knee-jerk defence of selectivity asserts: 'Because you cannot do
good everywhere does not mean that you should not do good
somewhere'. This is a consequentialist defence of a particular action, not
a principled defence of one's sense of moral duty. It merely says that on
a particular occasion one acted in accordance with humanitarian

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objectives; not that as a matter of principle one acts out of respect for
them.
Second, when it comes to jus in hello, we should not be deceived by
surface impressions. The allies did try to fight according to the laws of
war, not least because it might be politically beneficial in terms of the
attitudes of wavering watchers. But it does not follow that the ends are
just, because the means attempt to be. We are mistaken if we think that
because we are fighting carefully, with discrimination, that we therefore
have justice on our side. Furthermore, fighting with discrimination is
easier when one has all the technical and economic resources, and
strategic advantages; when the enemy cannot fight back; when one has
no soldiers fighting and dying in the front line; and when one's civilians
are not under attack. This is the war-fighting of the 'culture of
contentment', whose beneficiaries invariably mistake virtue for good
luck.
Hypocrisy and the lack of commitment among the G9 to building a
global Just Peace contradicts the story our governments tell themselves,
and us, about their humanitarian sensibilities and moral imaginations.
The lives of the world's poor tell a different story. Just War is another
deception.
9. Just Wars perpetuate human wrongs. The claim to be motivated by
humanitarian impulses, I believe, necessarily implies a commitment to a
universalist perspective. Humanitarianism has to be universalist, though
there may be contingent reasons why action is not taken in particular
cases. Power differentials, for example, might be overwhelming. When
governments do not act when human rights are being massively abused,
we accept that national interests are determining; I think there is good
reason to think the same when they selectively do act and claim that
humanitarian motives are decisive. If there were selfish reasons why the
West did not act during the genocides in East Timor and Rwanda, then is
it not reasonable to look for selfish motives when the West does
intervene, as in Kosovo?
Just War thinking is yet another example of the way Western elites
connive in perpetuating human wrongs by always privileging the victims
of politics over the victims of economics. In this way the humanitarian
war over Kosovo again revealed a selective moral imagination. If saving
the lives of threatened people was their aim, then the rich governments
of NATO could have saved far more by shifting resources away from
military spending and the victims of Milosevic's politics, towards the
south and the victims of Western-dominated economics. But while
fighting a Just War burnishes the self-image, redistribution is a threat.

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The willingness to engage in a Just War shows a concern for political

victims (albeit selective) which the Washington Consensus does not reveal
for economic victims. Cruise-missile humanitarianism is a psychological
and material distraction from doing more to alleviate what is still the
biggest division between people(s), that between the haves and have-nots.
The NATO allies could have helped others, elsewhere, but they did
not. The bottom line is that if governments are not passably consistent
when confronted by humanitarian disasters, their claim to be
humanitarian crusaders in any circumstances is compromised. This
selective morality is another version of ethic cleansing.
10. Just Wars legitimise war. NATO chose not to call its armed conflict
with Milosevic's regime a 'war' for a mixture of propaganda and
legalistic reasons, but by any sensible definition it was a war, albeit a
particularly one-sided encounter. Words matter, but so does matter: a
war by any other name hurts as much.
The fundamental flaw, left to the last, is that at the heart of the Just
War tradition is the idea of war in some circumstances being 'just'.
Following Kant, I want to argue that all wars should be regarded as
wrong, though particular wars can be regarded as necessary or
excusable.2 Kant hated war, but believed that a pacifist position was
unrealistic in the world of states then existing and in the 'self-incurred
immaturity' of human society. But he did not believe this situation need
last forever. War for him was not an inevitable feature of human life; it
was a choice. Consequently he rejected those theories of international
relations - such as the doctrine of Just War or the Grotian international
society position - that accepted war as a fatal necessity. War will remain
central to human history, he argued, as long as we keep choosing it. We
could choose for it to be different, based on common reason, and
develop a set of global social relations in which the conditions of civil
society operate. Until this new stage has been reached, Kant believed that
war might sometimes be necessary, but should never be legitimised.
Whatever else it did, NATO's campaign has helped keep alive the idea
of the legitimacy of war. Indeed, the casualty-free victory (for NATO)
probably enhanced the acceptability of such wars as an instrument of
politics. On ethical grounds, I believe that outsiders have a duty to
respond to massive violations of human rights; they should 'do
something', but undertaking actions that legitimise war is not one of
them. The refugees could have been cared for. The resources spent on
military missions could have been used to improve the prospects for
human security generally. Asylum-seekers to the West and the needy
elsewhere could have been treated more humanely. Diplomacy could

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have engaged with creating a security community in south-eastern

Europe. The verdict of the UN could have been respected. For Kant,
choices about war should be made in relation to his belief that creating a
world-wide legal order should be at the basis for actions; NATO did not
choose the unambiguously legal route. A Just War was not fought against
the apartheid South African state, and need not have been in the Balkans.
The construction of a human rights culture globally requires outsiders to
do something in the face of human disasters, but it does not require
making war.
It is a mistake to describe any war as just. Reviving the Just War
tradition for the twenty-first century, as in seeking to use its criteria to
assess a war, represents the legitimisation of a practice the world needs to
marginalise. The presumption should always be against war, both in
general and in particular, though as an instrument of politics it cannot yet
be ruled out. War can be necessary or excusable; it is such when it is
fought clearly in self-defence or with the endorsement of the UN Security
Council. This is not perfect, but it the best that can be done at this stage
of world society. To do other is to continue to legitimise war, and all that
goes with it, at all levels of human society: from nuclear strategies that
threaten environmental and human catastrophe, through the opportunity
costs created by militarised economies, to the daily realities of domestic
violence perpetuated by macho images of man-the-warrior.
NOTES

1. Donald A. Wells, 'How Much Can the "Just War" Justify?', Journal of Philosophy,
Vol.66 (23), December 1969, pp.819-29. On the 'just deterrent', see Rev. Richard
Harries (ed.), What Hope in an Armed World? (London: Pickering and Inglis, 1982)
p.108, and his 'In search of a just deterrent', The Times, 1 Mar. 1984.
2. See Howard Williams and Ken Booth, 'Kant: Theorist beyond Limits', pp.71-98 in Ian
Clark and Iver B. Neumann (eds), Classical Theories of International Relations
(London: Macmillan, 1996).