LUZ G. CRISTOBAL, vs.

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (National Science
Development Board), G.R. No. L-49280 April 30, 1980

FACTS: The deceased, Fortunato S. Cristobal was employed as Supervising

Information Officer 11 of the National Science Development Board (NSDB for short)
based in Bicutan, Taguig, Rizal. His original appointment was dated February 26,
1964. On April 8, 1976, he developed loose bowel movement which later worsened
and his excrement was marked with fresh blood. Self-administered medications
were made but symptoms persisted until April 22, 1976 when he was brought to the
Hospital of Infant Jesus and was there treated by Dr. Willie Lagdameo, who
diagnosed his illness as rectal malignancy. On May 28, 1976, he was discharged
with improved conditions but just one year thereafter, he was again confined at the
UST Hospital for the same ailment. A second operation became necessary because
of the recurrence of malignancy in the pelvis. Despite earnest medical efforts, he
succumbed to his illness on May 27, 1977 .
The decedent's widow and beneficiary, filed with the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS for short), a claim for income (death) benefits under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended. The said claim was denied by the GSIS and in a
subsequent request for reconsideration for the reason that the diseases of her
husband are not included in the list of occupational diseases that are compensable.
In th
ISSUE: whether or not the wife of MR. Cristobal can get compensation.
HELD: THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT GSIS IS HEREBY DIRECTED
1.
TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00)
PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS;
2.
TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER MEDICAL, SURGICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES
DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS;
3.
TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SEVEN HUNDRED (P700.00) PESOS AS
FUNERAL EXPENSES; AND
4.
TO PAY THE PETITIONER ATTORNEY'S FEES EQUIVALENT TO TEN (10%)
PERCENT OF THE DEATH BENEFITS.
The court give due consideration to the respondent's application of P.D. 626 in
ruling on the claim since petitioner's husband died on May 27, 1977, after the
effectivity of the provisions of the New Labor Code on Employees' Compensation.
Moreover, medical records did not disclose the date when the deceased employee
actually contracted the disease, rectal malignancy having been discovered only on
April 22, 1976 when the deceased sought hospital confinement. From the above
discussion, it is undeniable that the petitioner is entitled to her claim.

SEBASTIAN C. PALANCA, vs. POTENCIANO PECSON, ETC.,

G.R. Nos. L-6334 and L-6346

February 25, 1954

FACTS: In Special Proceedings No. 12126 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Rafael Dinglasan was the attorney of Sebastian Palanca, one of the heirs and an
oppositor to the probate of the will of his deceased father Carlos Palanca y
Tanguinlay. Due to differences of opinion, Sebastian Palanca did away with the
services of Atty. Dinglasan who in fact withdrew as Palanca's counsel after the
appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila probating the will
had been elevated to the Supreme Court. On July 7, 1952, Atty. Dinglasan filed in
the testate proceedings a notice of attorney's lien, alleging that he was counsel of
Sebastian Palanca from September 1950 until March 1952; that the reasonable
value of his services is at least P20,000; that Palanca had paid upon account only
the sum of P3,083, leaving an unpaid balance of P16,917. On August 16, 1952,
Judge Potenciano Pecson ordered that the notice of attorney's lien be attached to
the record for all legal intents and purposes. Sebastian Palanca moved to dismiss
the foregoing petition, but the motion was denied on August 30, 1952. Palanca's
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied for lack of merit. The action
of Judge Pecson in ordering that Atty. Dinglasan's notice of attorney's lien be
attached to the record and in taking cognizance of the petition to determine his fees
in Special Proceedings No. 12126, is assailed by Sebastian Palanca in a petition for
certiorari filed with this Court against Judge Potenciano Pecson and Rafael Dinglasan
(G.R. No. L-6334).
ISSUE: (1)whether the notice of attorney's lien may be allowed at the stage when it
was filed, namely, before final judgment in favor of Palanca was secured by
respondent attorney.
(2) whether the respondent Judge acted properly in entertaining the petition
to determine Atty. Dinglasan's fees and in holding in abeyance Palanca's petition for
advance inheritance.
HELD: (1). NO. Section 33 provides that an attorney "shall also have a lien to the
same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued
in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client,
from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such
lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing
such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his
client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over
such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and
secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements."
(2) In view of what has been said, it is obvious that the respondent Judge neither
acted without jurisdiction nor abused his discretion in the matters herein
complained of. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-6334 and the petition for
mandamus in G.R. No. L-6346 is hereby dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

PASTOR SALUD vs. JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, 404 scra 411

FACTS:

On October 19, 1998, Pastor Salud filed a Letter Complaint with the OCA praying
that the respondent judge be found administratively liable for delay in rendering
judgment in Civil Case No. LP-96-300. The Salud spouses claimed that the RTC had
the period from May 1997 to August 1997 to decide Civil Case No. LP-96-300, but had
not resolved the matter. They likewise pointed to another case pending before the
respondent, where the litigants had been waiting at least six (6) months for the courts
judgment. The complainants herein asked the OCA to look closely at the docket of
respondent judges sala, as they were of the belief that several cases ripe for decision
remained unacted upon.[14]
The respondent judge made the statement, according to Salud despite the prayer of
the Saluds that a decision be rendered on their unlawful detainer case. According to
respondent, after he decreed the issuance of a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal,
complainant herein filed numerous pleadings not only before the RTC but also with the
Court of Appeals, which sought to thwart the implementation of the writ issued and,
obviously, to harass him. Complainant likewise sought to inhibit him from proceeding
with the hearing of Civil Case No. LP-96-300.

ISSUES: whether or not the judge violates the code of judicial conduct .

HELD: YES. The Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within
ninety (90) days from its submission. Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
judges to administer justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the
courts business promptly within the period prescribed by the law and the rules.

Supreme Court decided ACCORDINGLY, considering all the circumstances in this

case, Hon. Florentino M. Alumbres, former presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Las Pias, Branch 255, is FINED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) for undue
delay in rendering a decision in Civil Case No. LP-96-300. Said amount is
hereby ORDERED deducted from retirement benefits of respondent.

Tan Tek Beng v. David

Facts:
Tan Tek Beng and David, a lawyer, entered into an agreement. A contract was
signed by both parties and it stated that: (1) all commission/attorneys fees
from the clients supplied by Tan will be divided 50-50 between them,
(2)David will not deal directly with their clients without Tans consent, (3) Tan will be
collecting and keeping the said fees/advances, and (4) other clients who are
related Tan and are contacted through him will be his clients. Their business
agreement did not last because there were mutual accusations of double cross. Tan
Tek Beng alleged that David did not honor their agreement. He filed a complaint
against David.
Issues:
1. W/N disciplinary action should be taken against David
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
The agreement between Tan Tek Beng and David was void. Such agreement was
tantamount to malpractice, soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers. The commercialization of the practice
of law is condemned. Remember that the practice of law is a profession, not a
business. Hence, David shouldve known better than to engage in such kind of
agreements. David was reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.

50 - Conrado Que v. Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (2009)

Doctrine:
- While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as
well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the
bounds of the law.
Facts:
Respondent former Atty. Anastacio Revilla represented numerous clients that lost to
an unlawful detainer case against complainant Conrado Que. However, even before
representing these people, the SC had opportunity to discipline him in two prior
cases: Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia v. Atty Anastacio Revilla, Jr. Now for
this case,respondent is facing a complaint for the following acts, all orchestrated to
stall the execution of the MTCs final judgment in favor of the complainant:

1. Respondents abuse of court processes in remedies: he filed two petitions for

annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for
declaratory relief. He also raised the lack of jurisdiction of the MTC and RTC in these
petitions;
2. Commission of forum-shopping;
3. Lack of candor toward his adversary (Atty. Uy) and the courts by resorting to
numerous falsehoods;
4. The willful insult and maligning of his clients former and deceased counsel Atty.
Catolico;
5. Unauthorized appearance for 15 of his clients, most of whom were deceased;
6. Filing a second and fraudulent petition for annulment of title as counsel for the
Republic of the Philippines when obviously unauthorized to do so (only the Solicitor
General can do this)
Issue:
1. W/N Respondent ought to be disbarred for his numerous infractions of the laws.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The respondent has violated the following:
a. Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
b. Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
c. Rule 12.02, Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
d. Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
e. Rule against forum-shopping;
f. Sections 20(d), 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
Aside from these, respondent also resulted to fraud before the court and even
represented the Republic without its consent. The Court decided it had given
respondent enough opportunities to stop being a pain in the ass, but he didnt
comply, so, its bye-bye for him.

LUALHATI M. LIWANAG vs. JUDGE PATERNO H. LUSTRE,

FACTS: On September 19, 1995, complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag file a complaint to the
Court against the respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre be dismissed from the service due to
gross immorality and grave misconduct unbecoming of his profession. Prior to July, 1994,
my husband, Jose B. Zafra filed twelve (12) counts of violation of B.P. 22 against Oscar
Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua for issuing checks amounting to approximately 3.5
million pesos that were dishonored when presented for payment. The said cases were
assigned at the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided by Judge Paterno
Lustre. The case was set for hearing for November 16, 1994. However, when the date
came, Judge Lustre was not present. Hence, the hearing was reset to December 15, 1994.
She decided to see judge Paterno Lustre to request another date of hearing because of
fear that he might do it again caressing my breast, kissing me and more of that. Mrs.
Liwanag supported her complaint with the photographs. It happened several times he
delayed the hearing he always postponed it.

ISSUE: whether or not the judge committed the gross misconduct.

HELD: Yes. The Respondent is GUILTY of gross misconduct. As he has already retired from
the service and thus could no longer be dismissed nor suspended, the Supreme Court ordered
that a FINE of P40,000.00 be imposed upon him, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Further, he is hereby barred by the Supreme court from any employment in all branches of the
government including government-owned and -controlled corporations.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA

FACTS: On September 8, 1999, the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of
August 13, 1990 decision in these cases. In said resolution, the respondent Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of
August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty.
Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At
that time, sufficient reason was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be
detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for
private respondents detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private
respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as
detention prisoner in said residence. However, he went about his normal activities as
if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our
resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in
Criminal Case No. 4262, the latter accepted cases and continued practicing law
[1]

.
On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the
Supreme Court a motion seeking clarification on the following questions: "(1) Does
the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana
from appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now
(Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it
appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained Atty.
Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a
fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be
issued?"
[2]

In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.

After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court
resumed hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando
Mijares filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion
seeking the revocation of the trial courts custody order and the imprisonment of
private respondent Javellana in the provincial jail.
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an
urgent motion seeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally
terminated or resolved the motion for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on
April 7, 1997.
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases
against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial
court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana
with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosarios residence in his
official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del
Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused
Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the
same undertaking.
In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist.
Thus, the trial courts order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk
of court must be recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at
San Jose, Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent
Javellana is not allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his
status as a detention prisoner. The trial courts order was clear that private respondent
"is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner."
The prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all
other cases as well, except in cases where private respondent would appear in court to
defend himself.
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed
placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be
detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by
the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all
prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office,
elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest
[3]

[4]

and detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must
be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for
more than ten (10) years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12,
San Jose, Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all
deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.
WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo
F. Pacificador are ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose,
Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any
reason or guise, except upon prior written permission of the trial court for a lawful
purpose.
Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique
Provincial Police Office, San Jose, Antique and to the Provincial Jail Warden,
Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.

EFREN JAVIER and PEDRO JAVIER vs. JUDGE SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN,

JR., 192 SCRA 434

FACTS: On 8 August 1989 disbarment proceedings on the ground of "dishonorable conduct"

were instituted before the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar by
complainants Efren Javier (son) and Pedro Javier (father) against respondent Salvador P. de
Guzman, Jr., as a member of the Bar and as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati, Metro Manila. However, pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89, dated 9
February 1989, requiring that complaints filed in the IBP against Justices and Judges of the
lower Courts be promptly referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action, the
Complaint was eventually transmitted to this Court. Respondent filed in Manila two (2)
criminal complaints, the first, for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Efren, who, however, was
acquitted, and the second, for Estafa against Complainants and Lolita Javier, which
complaint was dismissed. The third charge concerns Respondent's alleged act of harassment
in continuing with the criminal prosecution of complainant, Efren, for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 despite his having been informed that Efren was not the owner and
drawer of the check, and, therefore, is not the proper person to be charged. Later , the
complainants filed this administrative charge against Respondent Judge on four counts of
"dishonorable conduct," as follows:
1. Respondent had loaned money to Complainants at usurious interest as can be
gleaned from the fact that after receiving P177,000.00 in installments, he still
seeks to recover the amount of P622,817.67;
2. Respondent took advantage of his position as Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati,
Metro Manila, by filing a collection case against Complainants and Lolita Javier
before the same Court and making false and fraudulent manifestations that
Complainants had failed to pay any amount as of 8 September 1988;
3. Respondent resorted to harassment by filing a criminal complaint for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 against Complainant, Efren, despite knowledge that the latter was
not the drawer of the UCPB check; and

4. Respondent failed to reveal the true facts of the case, in violation of Articles 182
and 183 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing "False testimony," when he filed the
administrative charges with the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Civil Service
Commission against Complainant Pedro notwithstanding knowledge of the fact
that Pedro was not involved in the transaction in question.
: nad

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge violates the code of judicicial
conduct.
HELD: This is premised on the truism that a Judge's official life cannot simply be detached
or separated from his personal existence and that upon a Judge's attributes depend the
public perception of the Judiciary. Thus:
"Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of
judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the
subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

chanrobles

virtual law library

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private
life should be above suspicion." (Commentaries on Canon, 2.01)
So exacting are the standards of judicial department that a Judge is even enjoined from
making investments in any enterprise that is likely to be involved in litigation.
"A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect
adversely on the court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial
activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the
Court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to
minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification" (Code of Judicial
Conduct, Rule 5.02)
cralaw

The rationale for the rule applies with equal vigor in this case.
While Respondent Judge may have had reasons of convenience for filing his collection suit in
Makati where he sits as one of the Trial Judges, a sense of propriety should have impelled
him to desist. In the eyes of the public, it arouses suspicion, rightly or wrongly, that
advantage is being taken of one's position and that a Judge's adversary is sure to get a raw
deal. As it turned out, Respondent Judge, in his official stationery, upbraided the Sheriff who
enforced the Writ of Preliminary Attachment for not having taken into custody all the items
he had levied upon and "asked" him to do so "within forty eight hours" (Exhibit J,
Complaint, Rollo, p. 44). In this regard, Respondent had exposed the Bench to possible
charges of exertion of undue pressure and influence.
THE SUPREME court finds Respondent Judge, Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. guilty on three (3)
counts, of irresponsible, improper and dishonorable conduct in disregard of the Code of
Judicial Ethics, he is hereby SEVERELY CENSURED, with a stern warning that a repetition of
the said acts or similar acts in the future shall receive graver sanctions.
Let this Decision be spread upon the personal records of Respondent Judge.

MERCEDITA G. LORENZO v. JUDGE PRIMO L. MARQUEZ

FACTS:

On October 11, 1987 executed by Mercedita G. Lorenzo and in an endorsement of

December 2, 1987 of the Chief State Prosecutor transmitting the report of the National Bureau of
Investigation dated November 5, 1987, the herein respondent Judge Primo L. Marquez of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Sariaya, Quezon is charged on three counts, namely: (1) harassment in failing to indorse the
reappointment of complainant Mercedita G. Lorenzo as Municipal Trial Court Aide, such reluctance of the
respondent must be because she was a protegee of the respondents predecessor, former Judge Jose
Parentela, Jr., who reportedly exposed the illegal issuance of the subpoena to Obosa by the Respondent.

Nevertheless, it is the privilege of the respondent as presiding judge of his court to recommend the
employee with whom he will work. If he did not choose to have said complainant reappointed, he cannot
thereby be held administratively liable; (2) for violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court in
deciding Civil Case No. 1202 entitled Kilusang Bayan Pampananalapi ng Sariaya v. Gilda Balid, Et Al., when
he was the former counsel of the plaintiff, the complaint was filed by Crisostomo L. Luna, president and
board chairman of the plaintiff, who is his uncle. 1 The respondent was then a member of the board of
directors of the plaintiff. 2 In an order of November 28, 1986, Judge Parentela declared defendants in
default for failure to file their answer. When the respondent assumed office he issued an order on February
10, 1987 requiring plaintiff to secure the services of another counsel in his place and he set the case for
hearing. On March 9, 1987, he issued an order considering the case submitted for decisionand (3) for
issuing a subpoena for the appearance of Jose D. Obosa, a prison inmate of the National Bilibid Prisons
(NBP) to appear before him when said person has no case pending before him nor is he a witness in any
pending case therein.
ISSUE: 1.whether or not respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct.
2. whether or not the respondent judge violates rules of the court.
HELD: The respondent committed grave and serious misconduct in the performance of his duty. He
demonstrated his unfitness to be a judge as in fact by his behavior he has placed the judiciary in disrepute.
5 He abused the great powers of his office so that he should not stay a moment longer as a member of the
judiciary.
The Supreme Court held that the respondent is cleared of the charge of harassment filed by Mercedita G.
Lorenzo, he is hereby found guilty of grave and serious misconduct for deciding Civil Case No. 1202, entitled
Kilusang Bayan Pampananalapi ng Sariaya (KBPS) v. Gilda Balid, Et Al., wherein he was a former counsel for
plaintiff in violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, and for having illegally issued a subpoena
for the appearance of prison inmate Jose T. Obosa of the NBP before him in Criminal Case No. 8924, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Cesar Salamat;" and as penalty thereof, the respondent is hereby DISMISSED
from the service with prejudice to reinstatement in the government and forfeiture of his retirement benefits,
if any, but without prejudice to the payment of his accrued leave or salaries already earned.

ABRAHAM L. RAMIREZ vs. HON. ANTONIA CORPUZMACANDOG

FACTS:

Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,

Branch CXX, and stands charged in six separate complaints of various forms of misconduct
in the performance of her official duties. These are Administrative Matter No. R-351-RTJ,
Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ, Administrative Matter No. R-621-RTJ, Administrative
Matter No. R-684-RTJ, Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ and Administrative Matter No.
86-4-9987-RTC. In the Administrative Matter No. R-351-RTJ, where the petitioner Abraham
L. Ramirez petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on June 29, 1985 by Deputy Sheriff
Abraham L. Ramirez of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to secure his release from
the Caloocan City jail. Ramirez was ordered arrested on June 27, 1985 by respondent judge
for direct contempt of court consisting in his alleged disobedience to the writ of preliminary
injunction dated January 21, 1985 issued in Civil Case No. 8682 enjoining him from
demolishing the improvements of the intervenors in said case.chanrobles virtual law library
Deputy Sheriff Ramirez had previously been directed by Judge Socorro Tirona-Liwag of
Branch CXXIII of the same court in an order dated January 11, 1985, to demolish the
improvements of the defendants in 9 Civil Cases. Said defendants are the intervenors in
Civil Case No. 8682 on whose motion respondent judge issued the preliminary
injunction.chanrobles virtual law library
The immediate execution of the order of arrest was effected thru a handwritten note of
respondent judge addressed to then superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig.

Gen. Alfredo Lim. Upon orders of this Court, however, Deputy Sheriff Ramirez was released
from jail on July 2, 1985. Thereafter, the court resolved to treat the petition as an
administrative case 1 and to require respondent judge to comment thereon. 2
Respondent judge denied having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in causing the arrest of
Ramirez. She justified the arrest as a means of preserving substantial justice so that any
decision rendered in Civil Case No. 8682 may not be rendered moot and academic and as a
curative measure to preserve the greater interest of social justice. The handwritten note, on
the other hand, was explained as a means to preserve the integrity of courts of justice in
the enforcement of valid and lawful orders. She added that the writ of preliminary injunction
was issued by her in the exercise of her original jurisdiction, while the Order of January 11,
1985 was issued by Judge Liwag in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which the latter
should not have done as she should have remanded the case to the court of origin for
execution.

ISSUE: whether or not Judge Macandog will be dismiss in the service.

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that respondent Judge Macandog has shown

herself to be mentally and morally unfit to remain in her office. Her removal must
perforce be effected.chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the disclosure by respondent that the decision in Civil Case No. C-9831
was rendered under undue pressure and influence, the party aggrieved thereby
may take such remedial steps as may be warranted.chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog is hereby ordered
dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and
with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities.chanrobles virtual law library
This Decision is immediately executory.

LEON UMALE vs. HONORABLE ONOFRE VILLALUZ

FACTS:
Petitioner Leon Umale impugns the validity of the order dated April 15, 1971 of
respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court sitting at Pasig, Rizal, disqualifying
or inhibiting himself from trying the robbery charge against sixteen (16) accused including the six (6)
private respondents Eduardo Feliciano, Antonio David, Virgilio Chico, Benjamin Escandor, Rolando
Samson, and Alfonso Co, entitled "People vs. Marina Geronimo. Petitioner Leon Umale is the
complainant in the said robbery case, the robbery having been allegedly committed on September
21, 1970 in his warehouse in Pasig, Rizal from which were assorted textile materials valued at
P229,659.904. The original information was dated January 11, 1971, while the first amended
information was dated March 4, 1971. The case was filed by the acting state prosecutor, who
conducted the preliminary investigation directly with the Circuit Criminal Court presided by
respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz, who from January 19 to April 12, 1971, issued several orders
for the arrest of the accused, fixing their bail bonds, allowing an accused to post cash or surety bond

for his provisional liberty, for their arraignment, or for their commitment to the provincial jail, as well
as issued subpoena duces tecum and contempt citations against certain police officers who failed to
appear on the days set for hearing.
However, on April 15, 1971, without any party moving for his disqualification or inhibition, respondent
Judge Onofre Villaluz voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the case "for the peace of mind of the
parties concerned and to insure an impartial administration of justice" on the ground that before the
criminal case was filed in his court, he already had personal knowledge of the same; and directed
the immediate forwarding of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal, for proper disposition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order
of inhibition was denied on April 16, 1971 by said respondent Judge. Another motion of petitioner for
the deferment of the raffling of the case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was denied by the
Executive Judge, who likewise rejected petitioner's motion for the return of the case to the Circuit
Criminal Court. The case was, after raffling, assigned to Branch VIII of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, then presided by then Judge Benjamin Aquino and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2729.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGE ACTION IN INHIBITING HIMSELF FROM THE CASE
AND TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE REGULAR COURT IS VALID.
HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that the Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court do not prohibit
the raffling or re-raffling among the Judges in the same station and in the same Judicial District of a
case where the Judge to whom it was originally raffled or assigned is disqualified or voluntarily
inhibiting himself for valid and just causes. This has been done in many instances. It was likewise
done in the case at bar after the criminal case transferred to the regular Courts of First Instance
sitting at Pasig, Rizal. The validity of the trial and the decision rendered in the case depends solely
on the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, to whom due
process of law has been accorded.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held respondent Judge committed no abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

VICTOR TUZON vs. JUDGE LORETO CLORIBEL-PURUGGANAN

FACTS:
An administrative complaint[1] against Judge Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan,
Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 3, for illegal practice of law, gross ignorance
of the law, serious misconduct, evident bias and partiality, knowingly rendering unjust judgment,
and willful violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. On June 25, 1998, Victor G. Tuzon filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the order of the Regional Trial Court,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 3, presided over by respondent Judge Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan
in Civil Case No. 4269.[2] The order denied Tuzons motion to allow cross-examination of his
witness and directed that the case be submitted for resolution. On July 2, 1998, the Court of
Appeals issued a resolution directing private respondent Raymundo E. Catral to file the
comment thereon and to show cause why the prayer for injunctive relief should not be granted
both within ten (10) days from notice hereof. [3]On July 22, 1998, respondent judge filed the
comment for Raymundo Catral and herself, and affixed her name and signature on the comment.
[4]
On August 2, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

[5]

On February 14, 2000, Tuzon filed with the Supreme Court an administrative complaint against
respondent judge deploring the act of filing a comment in the civil case as illegal private practice
of law.[6] Tuzon also averred that respondent judge antedated her decision in Civil Case No.
4265, making it appear that the decision was promulgated on June 23, 1999, when in fact it was
issued later.
On March 23, 2000, respondent judge filed with the Supreme Court a comment on the
administrative complaint of Victor G. Tuzon.[7] She admitted authoring the comment filed with
the Court of Appeals in the civil case involving complainant. She stated that she did so because
Atty. Isidro Reyes, counsel for the private respondent Raymundo E. Catral in that civil case, was
sick and unable to perform his work. Respondent judge denied antedating any decision and
alleged that complainant failed to present any evidence to support such accusation.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE PURUGGANAN GUILTY IN VIOLATING THE
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND REVISED RULES OF THE COURT.
RATIO: In filing such comment, respondent judge violated the provision in the Revised Rules
of Court which provides:
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public
respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading
therein. If either party elevates the case to a higher court, the public respondents shall be
included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed, they shall
not appear or participate in the proceedings therein
HELD: YES., the Court hereby finds respondent judge Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan guilty of
illegal practice of law, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Revised Rules
of Court. The Court hereby metes out on her the penalty of suspension from office for a period
of three (3) months, without pay, and to pay a fine of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, with a
warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
This Resolution is effective immediately.

ATTY. DAVID G. OMPOC vs. JUDGE NORITO E. TORRES

September 27, 1989

FACTS: On September 9, 1986 Mr. Ramon J. Liwag, Service Chief,

Technical Staff, Ministry of Justice (now Department of Justice)
referred to the Court Administrator a sworn letter complaint dated
18 June 1986 of Atty. David G. Ompoc against Judge Norito E.
Torres.
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A civil case no. R-26374 for ejectment entitled, Marcos A. Escobar,

plaintiff versus Deco Sales, defendant, was filed sometime in 1984
with the City Court of Cebu. After the usual raffle it was assigned to
Judge Norito Torres, Branch VII. While the case was being tried on
the merits, at one time he invited me to see him at his residence at
Banawa, Cebu City and he instructed me to bring my client, Mr.
Charlie Taguiam, proprietor of Deco Sales along with me.That
meeting at the residence of Judge Torres was actually held with me
and Mr. Taguiam present, and in the course of our intimate
conversation he gave us a guide what evidence and argument we
have to present. Also in that meeting Judge Torres requested Mr.
Charlie Taguiam, who is engage (sic) in the business of Car Decorto
install a brand new airconditioner on his Toyota Hi-Ace and said
airconditioner was installed without Judge Norito Torres paying for
it. Furthermore, judge Torres been requested Mr. Taguiam loans with
a diferrent amounts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Torres violated the code of judicial
conduct.
HELD: YES. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS
respondent Judge from the service, with forfeiture of all his accrued
retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
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The Court also Resolved to REQUIRE respondent to show cause

within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution why he should
not be DISBARRED for gross professional misconduct and violation
of the attorney's oath, consisting of the same acts of which he has
here been found to be guilty.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEJANDRO IBASAN, SR., alias "Loring"; ALEJANDRO
IBASAN, JR., alias "Intsik"; ALEJANDRO IBASAN II, alias "Boy"; and ALEJANDRO IBASAN III
alias "Tito, June 22, 1984

FACTS:
The decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Dagupan City, Third Judicial District,
convicting Alejandro Ibasan, Sr., alias "Loring"; Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. alias "Intsik"; Alejandro Ibasan II
alias "Boy" and Alejandro Ibasan III alias "Tito" of the crime of murder.

After the information was filed but before the accused could be arraigned, a motion to amend the
charges to murder and for the presentation of additional evidence convinced the Fiscal to conduct a
reinvestigation. A notice of reinvestigation was issued by the District State Prosecutor, upon proper
authority of the Dagupan City Fiscal, with the advice that he "will conduct a reinvestigation of the
above-entitled case on Wednesday, August 9, 1978,
The motion was granted and accused Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. alias "Intsik" was accordingly arraigned
on July 28, 1978 with a plea of NOT GUILTY to homicide. Subsequently, he left for abroad after
waiving his right to be present during the proceedings. But after the trial, the court found the four
appellants guilty as charged. Hence, this appeal.The accused-appellants interposed the following
assignments of errors:the lower court erred in not dismissing the case as against the accused alejandro
ibasan, jr., on the ground of double jeopardy,the lower court erred in actively participating in and/or
conducting the examination of witnesses as though it were the prosecution; and in depriving the
defense from presenting other material witnesses by giving hope and impressions which turned out
to be false after all, the lower court erred in its appreciation of the facts as presented, and in making
conclusions not supported by the evidence as adduced, the lower court erred in not dismissing the
case as against all the accused after the prosecution had rested its case and upon motion to dismiss
filed by defense based on three valid grounds, the lower court erred in not acquitting the four
remaining accused after the termination of the trial on the ground that the prosecution utterly failed to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the lower court erred in denying the four convicted
accused of their right to bail, their right to have their case transferred to another sala or other court of
competent jurisdiction, and their right to be detained in the local jail pending their appeal instead of in
the national penitentiary at muntinglupa.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE FISCAL COMMITTED AN ERROR WITH THE CASE DECISION.
HELD:
The Court decided At the outset, it is important to note the very peculiar factor
which had given rise to the first issue. First of all, we find quite unusual that the accused Alejandro
Ibasan, Jr., alias "Intsik" was allowed to leave the country while standing charged with the serious
crime of homicide. His claim of innocence did not preclude the possibility of his jumping bail while
abroad and not returning to answer the charges against him. The accused was allowed to be
arraigned earlier than his co-accused even as the circumstances of murder were being
reinvestigated.
Second, it was error for the court to allow the advance arraignment of Intsik for homicide when the
prosecution was still reinvestigating the case to determine the possibility of amending the information
to murder. Intsik should have been arraigned for murder and afterwards could have been convicted
either of homicide or murder as may be proven, the former being an offense necessarily included in
the crime charged.
cannot sanction the conduct of the fiscal and the court. They should be more prudent and cautious in
the performance of their duties.
The records, however, show that the court's questions did not amount to interference as to make the
case for the prosecution and deprive the accused of their defense. The questions of the judge
addressed to the witnesses and the accused were merely to clarify certain points and confirm certain
statements. The number of times that a judge intervenes is not necessarily an indication of bias. It
cannot be taken against a judge if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain
truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
A judge may properly intervene in the trial of a case to promote expedition and avoid unnecessary
waste of time or to clear up some obscurity (People v. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196; Par. 14 Canons of
Judicial Ethics; Administrative Order No. 162 dated August 1, 1946, 42 O.G. 1803). In this respect,
the record shows no irregularity in the conduct of the trial judge.

As to the alleged deprivation of the appellants' right to present other material witnesses, we find the
same without basis.

THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.JUDGE VIRGILIO S. LANSANG, MTC, Clark
Field, Angeles City, June 19, 1990
FACTS:
An administrative complaint, dated February 26, 1990, was filed against Judge
Virgilio S. Lansang, Metropolitan Trial Court, Clark Field, Angeles City, based on the following
findings of the Judiciary Planning Development and Implementation Office and the Deputy Court
Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez in the course of an investigation conducted in his court, that cases
deemed submitted for decision, some of which had been submitted since 1979 and 1982 had
remained undecided as of January 3, 1990, contrary to his monthly certification that he has no
pending civil and criminal cases under submission for decision or determination beyond the 90-day
period, that cases calendared for hearing during the month of June 1989 to December 1989, show
that for the month of October 1989, only one (1) hearing was conducted; for November, only one (1)
hearing also; for December, also one (1) hearing; for the month of January 1990, only two (2) days
have been set for trial hearing; for the month of February 1990, only one (1) and for the month
ofaugust 1989, it appears that no case has been disposed of, that while it has been verified from
reports and records in his office that he has been solemnizing several marriages between Filipino
citizens and Americans or foreigners on an average of about three (3) marriages a day aside from
notarizing public documents for a fee, his monthly reports for 1989 to the Statistic Division of this
Court do not show any marriage solemnized or document notarized by him, that the accumulated
caseload of 182 cases has remained invariably a back log which has not been reduced over the year
despite the few casw that are filed averaging from 4 to 6 cases a month only.
Earlier however, on January 26, 1990, in view of the special visit of Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Leonor Ines Luciano to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Clark Field, prompted by various
complaints against Judge Lansang and the latter being aware of the seriousness of the charges,
respondent Judge submitted his irrevocable resignation to take effect January 31, 1990.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE are guilty of his actuation, practices and
conduct as an judicial officer.
HELD: YES. Considering all the allegations, issues and arguments raised in the complaint and in
the Comment and the resignation letter of respondent Judge dated January 26, 1990, the Court
findsJudge Virgilio S. Lansang GUILTY of the charges complained of. His actuations, practices and
conduct are unbecoming of a judicial officer; his acts of commission and omission having been
committed through admitted negligence on his part, failure to report to the Supreme Court or to the
Court Administrator, his grievances against his own Clerk of Court against whom he never filed any
formal complaints regarding the latter's alleged irregularities; his apparent acceptance of the
accuracy of the reports submitted by his Clerk of Court; and unmitigated failure to ask for
administrative remedies from the Supreme Court and Court Administrator and the existence up to
now of 182 pending cases which according to the Court Administrator had been submitted for
decision, and not merely pending trial. The Court likewise Resolved not to accept such resignation

(acceptance of resignations from the judiciary being a prerogative of the President of the
Philippines), but instead to consider him RETIRED, with all benefits and gratuities forfeited.

FELDMERTO M. LONGBOAN vs. HON. EMILIO L. POLIG

June 14, 1990

FACTS: A letter-complaint was addressed to the Court

Administrator on July 18, 1986 charging the respondent judge with
gross negligence of duty or abuse of authority for his failure to
apprise complainant of the status of Civil Case No. 641 despite the
former's registered letters requesting the status.
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Civil Case No. 641 involved a dispute for collection of a sum of

money between the complainant as plaintiff and one Arsenic
Cunaden as defendant. The complainant obtained a favorable
judgment from Municipal Circuit Judge Flora M. Tel-equen of the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Court of Bauko-Sibangan, Mountain Province on
October 26, 1981. It was on appeal when the matter subject of the
letter-complaint came about. The respondent judge further delay
the judgement and lost the record of the 4 cases upon the
investigation of the Office of the Court Administration.
ISSUE: whether or not the judge are guilty of inexcusable
negligence and gross misconduct.
HELD: yes. A judge is expected to ensure that the records of cases
assigned to his sala are intact. There is no justification for missing
records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight records
is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence
unbecoming of a judge. For true professionalism in the bench to
exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards of a
judicial office and whose acts demonstrate unfitness and
unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisites attached to said
office must be weeded out.
ch

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In sum, the Court finds respondent judge guilty of inexcusable

negligence, gross inefficiency and grave and serious misconduct in
the discharge of his functions.
library

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ACCORDINGLY, the COURT RESOLVED to DISMISS RESPONDENT

JUDGE from the service with forfeiture of all his accrued retirement
benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
government, including government owned or controlled
corporations.
January 9, 1987
ATTY. ARTURO A. ROMERO vs. HON. JUDGE GABRIEL O. VALLE, JR
FACTS:
On November 28, 1984, Atty. Arturo A. Romero filed a complaint against Judge
Gabriel O. Valle, Jr;. of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch XII with grave misconduct and
oppression. In the words of complainant himself, the acts complained of consisted in:That instead of
directing complainant to proceed with the marking of exhibits and to continue the direct examination,
respondent continued to utter embarrassing remarks which hurt complainant and, therefore, the
latter tried to make further explanations on said exhibits and to defend his integrity in a controlled
and respectful manner, but his honor, the respondent judge suddenly banged his gavel producing
such a deafening noise that several persons from the adjoining branches of the Court came: that
without declaring a recess, said respondent judge unceremoniously REMOVED his coat and told,
angrily, herein complainant: "You step out and we will finish the matter"; immediately thereafter,
respondent judge stepped down from the rostrum and left;That, shaken and stunned by such sudden
aggressive behaviour of respondent, complainant then stood by his seat, and as some people in the
Courtroom rushed out of the Courtroom, complainant looked around and then saw respondent judge
outside the courtroom holding a gun with his right hand, in front of him, facing towards complainant,
in an angry and menacing manner, and waited for complainant to go outside; confronted by such
alarming and threatening stance of respondent, complainant could not move for a moment, as
complainant was totally unarmed, surprised and shocked; and when complainant saw respondent
Judge briskly walked to and fro still holding a gun, complainant then asked the Court stenographer:
"Please put in the record that the Judge is holding a gun"; that luckily thereafter, Atty. Isidro
Madamba, member of the Sangunian Panlalawigan, succeeded in pacifying respondent judge and
shortly, said respondent returned to the Court; that after some remarks by respondent judge,
complainant moved that the Honorable respondent voluntarily inhibit himself from further trying the
case in the light of the antecedents, but denied it and ordered the resetting of the case; he even
have other four complaint raise by different complainant.
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent judge is guilty in violating the code of judicial conduct.
HELD: YES. the court decide Respondent judge appears to have a valid explanation for gun, but
such explanation cannot be taken as carrying a satisfactory. For his having chosen to carry the same
in plain view of the complainant and other lawyers inside the courtroom when he came out of his
chambers on his way to the stairs. Taken in the light of what had just transpired, the actuation of
respondent judge was not an innocent gesture, but one calculated to instill fear in or intimidate
complainant. We cannot let this pass unnoticed. Respondent judge's behavior constitutes grave
misconduct. It is a serious violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which require that a "judge's
official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not
only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his every day life, should
be beyond reproach." 12 Moreover, it reveals an attitude diametrically opposed to our pronouncement in De la Paz v. Inutan, 64
SCRA 540. that "the judge is the visible representation of law, and more importantly, of justice." Certainly, one who lives by the uncivilized
precept of "might is right," is unworthy of an office entrusted with the duty to uphold the rule of law.

WHEREFORE, Judge Gabriel O. Valle, Jr. is found guilty of grave misconduct and is hereby ordered
DISMISSED from the service, without forfeiture of retirement benefits but with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.
Complainant Atty. Arturo A. Romero is required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court, within fifteen (15) days from
notice.
The decision is immediately executory.

December 14, 1979

EMILIA E. ANDRES vs.STANLEY R. CABRERA
FACTS:
In a resolution of this Court dated October 11, 1979, respondent Stanley R. Cabrera.
a successful bar examine in 1977 and against whom a petition to disqualify him from membership in
the Bar is pending in this Court in the above-entitled case, was required to show cause why he
should not be cited and punished for contempt of court.
The above citation for contempt against the respondent was issued by the Court following the
persistence of the respondent in the use of, abusive and vituperative language despite the Court's
admonition implicit in Our previous resolution of June 5, 1979 deferring the oath-taking of
respondent pending showing that he has amended his ways and conformed to the use of polite,
courteous and civil language.
The petition to disqualify respondent from admission to the Bar was filed by Atty. Emilia F. Andres,
Legal Officer II in the Office of the Minister, Ministry of Labor on the ground of lack of good moral
character as shown by his propensity in using vile, uncouth, and in civil language to the extent of
being reprehensively malicious and criminally libelous and likewise, for his proclivity in filing
baseless, malicious and unfounded criminal cases.
It appears that Atty. Emilia E. Andres, designated as Special Investigator to investigate the
administrative charge filed by Mrs. Presentacion R. Cabrera, mother of the respondent, against one,
Atty. Benjamin Perez, former Hearing Officer of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Unit, Region
IV, Manila, for alleged dishonesty, oppression and discourtesy, recommended the dismissal of the
charge even as the records of two relevant Workmen's Compensation cases were not produced at
the hearing, notwithstanding the request of the respondent. When the Minister of Labor dismissed
the charges upon Atty. Andres' recommendation, respondent filed with the City Fiscal of Manila
criminal charges of infidelity in the custody of documents. falsification of public documents, and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the investigator.
Supporting these criminal charges are affidavits of respondent Stanley R. Cabrera wherein Atty.
Andres. now the petitioner, points to the vile, in civil and uncouth language used by respondent, as
shown in the following excerpts:
9. That the moronic statements of Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres are the
product ofmoronic conspiracy to conceal the said falsified, fraudulent and
unauthorized document in the sense that how can the CARS conduct a diligent
search tor the aforesaid document when according to themoronic excuse of the Chief
of the said office which took over the functions of the defunct WCC considering that it
is easier to resort to the list of the inventory of cases before conducting a diligent
search unless both are morons with regards to their public office ... (emphasis
supplied).

10. That due to the fact that Acting Referee Benjamin R. Perez, Alfredo Antonio, Jr.,
Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres has perpetrated a moronic but criminal
conspiracy to conceal the falsified fraudulent and unauthorized petition ... (emphasis
supplied).
... And to show beyond reasonable doubt that that the letter is a manufactured
evidence respondent Atty. Andres in another demonstration of
her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public functions moronically failed to
affix her signature to further aggravate matters said manufactured evidence
was moronically received upon unlawful inducement by respondents Atty. Cruz and
Atty. Andres in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy by the Idiotic with regards to the
discharge of public functions ... (emphasis supplied)
The same words and phrases are used in respondent's other affidavits supporting the criminal cases
against the petitioner such as the following:
Her moronic but criminal participation as a conspirator
another demonstration of her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public
functions moronically failed to affix her signature
said manufactured evidence was moronically received by unlawful inducement by
respondents
idiotic receiving clerk of CAR
unparalleled stupidity of chief respondent
On April 28, 1977, this Court required respondent to file an answer to the petition to disqualify him
from admission to the Bar and ordered at the same time that his oath-taking be held in abeyance
until further orders. In his answer, respondent admits the filing of criminal cases in the City Fiscal's
Office against the petitioner but he claims that his language was not vile uncouth and un civil due to
the simple reason that the same is the truth and was made with good intentions and justifiable
motives pursuant to respondent's sense of justice as cherished under the New Society, aside from
being absolutely privileged. Respondent's answer, however, repeats his former allegations that "Atty.
Emilia Andres is not only a moron" and reiterates "the moronic discharge of public functions by
complainant Atty. Emilia Andres."
The records show repeated motions of respondent dated October 21, 1977 and February 22, 1978
for the early resolution of his case and in his letter dated April 11, 1978 addressed to then Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, respondent sought, in his very words "some semblance of justice from the
Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines" and another letter to the Chief Justice dated August
17, 1978 making reference to the "avalance of the sadistic resolution en banc," "the cruel and
inhuman punishment the Court has speedily bestowed upon undersigned respondent," "the Court
does not honor its own resolution," and closing his letter thus "A victim of the Court's inhuman and
cruel punishment through its supreme inaction."
We referred the petition of Atty. Emilia Andres to the Legal Investigator of the Court for investigation,
report and recommendation which was submitted on May 24, 1979. Acting on said report, the Court
resolved to defer the oath-taking of respondent pending showing that he has amended his ways and
has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language. Thereafter, respondent filed on
September 3, 1979 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to annul Our resolution of June 5, 1979 and to
reinvestigate the case, preferably giving opportunity to respondent to argue his case orally before
the Court or to allow him to take his oath of office as an attorney. We denied the motion.

On September 11, 1979, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court, praying the
Supreme Court to cite complainant Atty. Emilia Andres for contempt of court, alleging that her false
and malicious accusations coupled with her improper and obnoxious acts during the investigation
impeded, obstructed and degraded the administration of justice. Under paragraph 2 of said motion,
he states:
2. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to
DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his
ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous, and civil language" is
a degradation of the administration of justice due to the fact that the same is bereft of
legal foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J.
Sevilla, whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is
authenticated by his overt partiality to the complainant as authenticated by the
transcript of records of this case thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of
the "Cold and neutral impartiality of a judge" tantamount to lack of due process of
law; (emphasis supplied).
We noted that the above paragraph is a repetition of paragraph 4 in respondent's previous Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion dated September 3, 1979 which also states:
4. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to
DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his
ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language" is a
degradation of the administration of justice due to the fact that same is bereft of legal
foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J. Sevilla,
whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is authenticated by
his overt partiality to the complainant as authenticated by the transcript of records of
this case thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of the "cold and neutral
impartiality of a judge, " tantamount to lack of due process of law: (emphasis
supplied).
We also took note in respondent's Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court the language used by him in
praying this Court "to impose upon said Emilia E. Andres imprisonment commensurate to the
humiliation and vomitting injustice undersigned respondent-movant suffered and still suffering from
this Court due to complainant Atty. Emilia E. Andres' wanton dishonesty."
It is obvious and self-evident that respondent has not amended his conduct despite the Court's
admonition. Respondent persists and keeps on using abusive and vituperative language before the
Court. Accordingly, We resolved in Our resolution of October 11, 1979 to require respondent to show
cause why he should not be cited and punished for contempt of court.
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated September 27, 1979 wherein he tried
to assure the Court that he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous
and civil language and prayed that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. We denied it on October
16, 1979.
Thereafter, respondent submitted a pleading entitled "Subrosa" dated October 22, 1979 and
answered the citation for contempt against him in the following wise and manner:
3. That without prejudice to my Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 27,
1979, undersigned respondent respectfully states to this Court that the respondent
charges that the Court's Resolution of June 5, 1979 is a "degradation of the
administration of justice, " was never intended as a defiance of this Court's authority.
nor to scandalize the integrity, dignity, and respect which this Court enjoys, but was

an statement made with utmost good faith out of frustration out of respondent's
inability to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable indignation at the
illegalities perpetrated by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigator
Victor Sevilla, both members of the Bar which are evident with a cursory perusal of
the typewritten transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearings conducted by
Legal Investigator Sevilla which this Court adopted; (emphasis supplied).
We reject totally respondent's supposed humble apology "for all his non-conformity to the use of
polite, courteous and civil language in all his pleadings filed with the Court and on his solemn word
of honor pledges not to commit the same hereinafter" and his disavowal of intent of "defiance of (the)
Court's authority nor to scandalize (its) integrity, dignity and respect which this Court enjoys." Such
apology and disavowal appear to be in sincere, sham and artful for respondent in the same breadth
contends that his statement calling the Court's resolution of June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the
administration of justice" was made "with utmost, good faith out of frustration of respondent's inability
to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable indignation of the illegalities perpetrated
by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigation Victor Sevilla."
Although respondent is not yet admitted to the legal profession but now stands at the threshold
thereof, having already passed the Bar examinations, it is as much his duty as every attorney-at-law
already admitted to the practice of law to ..observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20, (b), Rule 138, Rules of Court) and "to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged" (Sec. 20, (f), Rule 138). According to
the Canons of Professional Ethics, it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the Judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are
particularly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism and clamor. This duty is
likewise incumbent upon one aspiring to be a lawyer such as the respondent for the attorney's oath
solemnly enjoins him to "conduct myself as a lawyer according to to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the Courts as to my client.
The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt is inherent and extends to suits at law as
well as to administrative proceedings as in the case at bar for it is as necessary to maintain respect
for the courts, in administrative cases as it is in any other class of judicial proceedings. Under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, a person guilty of any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for contempt, and the
reason is that respect for the courts guarantees their stability and permanence Without such
guaranty, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very loose and flimsy foundation, such
power is essential to the proper execution and effective maintenance of judicial authority.
Respondent's use of vile rude and repulsive language is patent and palpable from the very words,
phrases and sentences he has written and which are quoted herein. 'They speak for themselves in
their vulgarity, insolence and calumny. Specifically, respondent's direct reference to the Court on
the ..sadistic resolution en banc, " "the cruel and inhuman punishment the Court has speedily
bestowed" upon him, that "the Court does not honor its own resolution," that he is "a victim of the
Court's inhuman and cruel punishment through its supreme inaction," and that he is suffering
"humiliation and vomitting in justice" from this Court is not only disrespectful but his charges are
false, sham and unfounded.
'There is no excuse, much less plea or pretext to brand ultimately the Court's resolution deferring
oath-taking of the respondent as a new lawyer issued June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the
administration of justice." By his improper conduct in the use of highly disrespectful insolent
language, respondent has tended to degrade the administration of justice; he has disparaged the

dignity and brought to disrepute the integrity and authority of the Court. He has committed contempt
of this Court.
WHEREFORE respondent Stanley Cabrera is found guilty of contempt and he is hereby sentenced
to pay this Court within ten days from notice hereof a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) or
imprisonment of fifty (50) days.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

G.R. No. L-24922

January 2, 1968

MELECIO DOREGO and FELICIDAD DOREGO, petitioners,

vs.
ARISTON PEREZ, THE HONORABLE RAMON BLANCO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo
and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ILOILO, respondents.
S. Palma and A. Defensor for respondents.
Sixto P. Demaisip for petitioners.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Respondent Ariston Perez was plaintiff in Civil Case No. 5568, an action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage,
before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. On March 22, 1961, judgment was rendered against defendants now
petitioners Dorego spouses to pay respondent Perez the sum of P1,000.00, plus 12% interest from May 25, 1959,
and 25% of the total sum as attorney's fees within 90 days from notification thereof or else the mortgaged properties
would be sold at public auction. 1
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1961, petitioners' counsel filed a manifestation in the Court of Appeals withdrawing their appeal on
the allegation that the parties have already amicably settled the case for P1,300.00. 2 The Court of Appeals on
September 29, 1961, issued a resolution requiring petitioners' counsel to present the written conformity of petitioners
themselves to the withdrawal of the appeal, and for them to pay the appeal docket fees first before their manifestation
would be acted upon. 3 Apparently, the resolution was not complied with for on January 26, 1962, the Court of Appeals
resolved to dismiss the appeal for appellants' failure to pay the docket fees. 4
Upon the remand of the records to the court a quo, respondent Perez moved for execution of its judgment. This was
opposed by petitioners. On March 31, 1962, the lower court "disregarded" the opposition filed since the Court of
Appeals' resolution dismissing the appeal did not mention any amicable settlement and forthwith issued the writ of
execution. 5
Petitioners sought an urgent reconsideration of the order of March 31, 1962, annexing to their motion a copy of the
agreement between the attorneys for the parties mentioning the amicable settlement between the latter. 6Respondent
Perez opposed and was sustained by the lower court which, on July 6, 1963, denied petitioners' motion, ruling that
the agreement between the counsels was ineffective to constitute a novation of the rights and obligations of the
parties themselves. It also directed the provincial sheriff to proceed with the sale of the mortgaged properties. 7
Instead of appealing, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 6369 before another branch of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo to annul the decision in Civil Case No. 5568 and enjoin its execution. On September 24, 1964, the case was
dismissed. 8 Also dismissed subsequently was the attempted appeal by petitioners in Civil Case No. 6369, for their
failure to duly perfect the same. 9

On July 8, 1965, the lower court issued an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5568. Accordingly, the mortgaged
properties were advertised by the provincial sheriff for public sale to be held on August 31, 1965.
On August 28, 1965, petitioners instituted the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. We gave due
course to it.
On August 31, 1965, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to respondent Perez for P2,000.00. The
latter then sought to confirm the sale. The petitioners counter-moved to postpone the confirmation of the sale up to
September 20, 1965 since they were "feverishly looking for money with which to redeem the property." 10The lower
court postponed the confirmation of the sale up to October 11, 1965.
On October 12, 1965, respondent Perez filed his answer to the petition.
The only issue here is whether the lower court gravely abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction in denying
petitioners' opposition to the motion for execution by its order of March 31, 1962; in also denying the motion to
reconsider by its order of July 6, 1963, and in allowing, thereafter, the execution of the decision rendered in
respondent's favor.
Petitioners submit that since the decision of March 22, 1961 had already been novated by the amicable settlement
between the parties effected sometime in the second week of September, 1961, the same could no longer be
executed. The only but fatal flaw in the argument is that petitioners have assumed what precisely they had to
establish in the first place, i.e., the fact of amicable settlement. For, respondent denies it.
Petitioners could only fall back on the following documents annexed in their motion to reconsider: (1) the
manifestation their counsel filed in the Court of Appeals on September 23, 1961; (2) the receipt signed by their
counsel and one of respondent's counsels; and (3) the self-serving affidavits of petitioner Melecio Dorego and his
counsel. 11 Of the three, the strongest evidence would be the receipt, which is of the following tenor:
1. In view of the fact that the case of Ariston Perez vs. Melecio Dorego, et al., has been notified [sic] in the
sum of P1,300.00 including attorney's fees, Melecio Dorego has caused to be withdrawn his appeal in the
Court of Appeals by a manifestation dated September 23, 1961;
2. That the attorneys or counsels for Ariston Perez have magnanimously foregone their attorney's fees as
stated in the decision and in its place request for only P150.00.
3. Receipt of P100.00 is acknowledged today, the remainder shall be payable at the end of this month. Atty.
Sixto Demaisip holds himself liable for the payment thereof in the event of non-payment of Melecio Dorego.
September 26, 1961.
(Sgd) SIXTO P. DE MAISIP

(Sgd) ALFREDO LADRIDO

But as the lower court noted, the above receipt could only prove personal agreement between the counsels. And
respondent correctly points out that this could not prove the oral amicable settlement between the parties since
without special authorization, counsels cannot compromise their client's litigation. 12 The special authorization of
respondent's counsel has not been shown.
Considering that there was no satisfactory proof of the alleged amicable settlement between the parties and since the
resolution of the Court of Appeals plainly shows that the appeal was being dismissed for failure of petitioners who
were the ones supposed to be interested in maintaining the appeal to pay the appeal docket fees, We cannot say
that the lower court even erred in granting respondent's motion to execute the judgment which had become final and
executory. Under the Rules of Court, the effect of dismissal or withdrawal of an appeal is for the questioned judgment
to stand as if no appeal had been instituted. 13 Execution, therefore, was proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is, as it is hereby, dismissed. Costs against petitioners. So ordered.

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