G.R. No.

93833 | September 28, 1995 |

RAMIREZ vs. CA
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro
Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the
private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in
the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a
manner
offensive
to
petitioners
dignity
and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought damages. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and
alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and
penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information,
which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly
a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and
denied the petitioners MR, hence the instant petition.
Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by
one of the parties in the conversation
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to
Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly
overhear,
intercept,
or
record
such
communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought
to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statutes
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, even a (person) privy to
a communication who records his private conversation
with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records,
moreover, supports the respondent courts conclusion

that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed

contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications
taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a
secret recording of a private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator,
the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private
communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include private conversations narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word communication to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning to share or to impart. In
its ordinary signification, communication connotes the
act
of
sharing
or
imparting
signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the
process by which meanings or thoughts are shared
between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or
non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
meanings or thoughts which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latters office. Any doubts about the
legislative bodys meaning of the phrase private
communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the
fact
that
the
terms
conversation
and
communication were interchangeably used by
Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

G.R. No. 84240

PASCUAL VS. PASCUAL et al.
FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the
acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
Pascual, the latter being a full blood brother of the
decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died intestate
without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural,
adopted or spurious children.. Adela Soldevilla Pascual
the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes Pascual
filed w/ the RTC Branch 162, a special proceeding case
no.7554 for administration of the intestate estate of
her late husband. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate
children of Eligio Pascual (although they contend that
the term illegitimate children as described in art 992
should be construed as spurious children).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized
natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab

intestato between the illegitimate child and the

legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law
for
the
purposes
of
Article
992.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are
his
illegitimate
children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar,
respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners
herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in
the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of
the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their
father.

G.R. No. L-22301

PEOPLE VS. MAPA
Facts:
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in
connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and
further amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the
accused was discovered to have in its possession and
control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license
permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted
that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no
license. The accused further stated that he is a secret
agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and
showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the
accused
presented
the
case
of
People
vs.
Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because
he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace
officers equivalent to municipal police which is covered
by
Art.
879.

Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the
Governor is a proper defense to illegal possession of
firearms.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower
courts decision. It stated that the law is explicit that
except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or
any instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms,
or ammunition." The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued
to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary,
guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners
and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use
in the performance of their official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the
secret agent; including it in the list therefore the
accused is not exempted.

Director of Lands vs. CA [G.R. No. 102858.

July 28, 1997]
15 Aug

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of his title over 648 square meters of
land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
The land registration court in its decision dated
June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction, in compliance with the mandatory
provision requiring publication of the notice of
initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation. The case was elevated to respondent
Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of
the trial court and ordered the registration of the
title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court
of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural
and that the failure to cause such publication did
not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant
the application. The Director of Lands
represented by the Solicitor General thus
elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct
that newspaper publication of the notice of initial
hearing in an original land registration case is
mandatory.
HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO:
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the
notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further
that land registration is a proceeding in
rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as
against all persons, including the state, who have
rights to or interests in the property. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must
strictly be complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense
with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and
again, this Court has declared that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for
application. There is no alternative. Thus, the
application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed without prejudice
to reapplication in the future, after all the legal
requisites shall have been duly complied with.

Albino Co vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.

100776. October 28, 1993)
31 May
ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,
vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
Ponente: NARVASA
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
company against petitioner with the Regional Trial
Court. The case eventuated in petitioners
conviction of the crime charged on the basis that
a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless
covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Pending litigation,
Ministry of Justice Circular No. 4 (which excludes
guarantee check from application of B.P. Blg. 22)
was subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular
No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he
sought exoneration upon the theory that it was
reversible error for the Regional Trial Court
but the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated
August 8, 1984 declaring the guarantee check
will no longer be considered as a valid defense be
retroactively applied.
HELD:
NO. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC
were set aside. Criminal prosecution against
accused-petitioner was dismissed.
RATIO:
It would seem that the weight of authority is
decidedly in favor of the proposition that the
Courts decision of September 21, 1987 in Que
v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of
an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg.
22 should not be given retrospective effect to
the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
situated, who relied on the official opinion of the
Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall
within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in
which,
pursuant
to
familiar,
fundamental
doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Everything considered, the Court sees
no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of
prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein
above set out and discussed, negating criminal
liability.