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HUSSERL ON MEMORY
"Time
is, time was, time is past." Memory recaptures time past. Edmund
devoted some of his most interesting and challenging, as well as
of memory. Husserl
neglected, analyses to the phenomenon
argued that
every act of consciousness is intentional, that is, directed towards an object,
no
to this
and memory?the
consciousness of what is past?is
exception
rule. Our main concern in this essay will be with Husserl's
understanding
of memory's "constitution":
the way in which memory
specifically, with
intends its object and with the manner in which its object appears. Husserl
devoted no single work to memory. The
fundamental elements of his
1
are found scattered
X in the Husserliana
Volume
series
theory
throughout
and to a lesser extent in Volume XI,2 although brief references to memory
on the two
occur in most of his
writings. Our study will be based mainly
mentioned
texts, especially on Volume X.3
Husserl
I. Memory
and
Its Object:
Preliminary Considerations
heart
of
the
Husserl's
theory of memory is his account of
Although
the constitution or structure of memory's
intentionality, the understanding
of that account presupposes some
appreciation of the way in which memory
and its object are situated with respect to time. We
therefore briefly trace
in this section, first, the main outlines of Husserl's
description of the
of
determinations
and
memory
memory's
object and second,
temporal
as
status
act.
memory's
present experienced
A.
Memory,
Its Object,
and Temporal
Determinations
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HUSSERL
ON MEMORY
41
is that the actually present time "is continually in flux" and thus is
"always
from a new Now"
is Now
becomes past in the
(108). What
next moment, and what
is already past becomes further
re
past. The
membered past, which necessarily appears as something sunk back in rela
"
tion to the Now, also reveals itself as something which
'sinks further and
oriented
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42
JOHN
. BROUGH
"
That past and present, the remembered object and the actual Now,
are related in the ways described accounts for one of the
presuppositions
of memory, which may be summarized under the term "distance." The
in memory, Husserl writes, "has a distance
elapsed present which appears
If that distance were absent,
from the present of the actual Now"
(58).
cease
as
is
and memory would
would
be
remembered
what
Now,
given
if
Put
to be itself and
another
relation
way,
collapse into perception (316).
if
between past and present vanished for my remembering consciousness,
I
the
to
that
the
with
I gave myself
such abandon
present
forgot
past
argues, "this would no longer be memory, rather
entirely, then, Husserl
an
is past, but not as
The
(hallucinatory) perception of what
past!" (182).
if
would
become
would
its
and
sense,
memory
impossible,
past
relinquish
the tension between past and present were relaxed or if their relational
bonds were
snapped.
contentions that memory is present and
We
have discussed Husserl's
its object past, that the object appears in memory as having been present,
of these claims
and that it is past in relation to the actual Now. None
same
not
sense
if
its
did
would make
memory and
object
belong to the
one
is
what
how
take
could
remembered
case,
appear as
unity of time. To
set in relation to the actual Now
if the two were not equally citizens of a
common
if Husserl
and past ex
world? And
claims that Now
temporal
a
one
would
clude
another, the exclusiveness
single temporal frame
imply
work in which the two could not occupy the same position and still be
that
themselves. Accordingly, Husserl writes, "there is no reproduced Now
could be posited and would not have actuality in the unity of time to which
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HUSSERL
ON MEMORY
43
B. Memoras
Status
as Present
Experienced Act
as
we are conscious of
Through memory,
something
past.
present act,
But through what are we conscious of the memory as actually
present?
Surely not through another memory or through external perception. The
answer rests in Husserl's
contention that memory is an immanent temporal
object, a unity constituted in immanent time through what he calls "the
absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness"
(73). We will examine
that contention briefly in this section.
insists, is
Every experience {Erlebnis) or act of consciousness, Husserl
consciousness of something, "but every
is
itself experienced
experience
(erlebt), and thus also 'known' (betvusst)"
(291). Husserl's point is that
an
consciousness
is always implicitly self-consciousness: while
perceiving
event we are aware of our
we
are
while
and
remembering
perceiving it,
conscious that we are remembering. To be sure, in ordinary non-reflective
we are not conscious of the act and of its
same
experience,
object in the
on
car
The
the
remembered
is
the
intended
train,
way.
object, e.g.,
dining
sense of the term
in the
that is, "posited"
(289),
"pregnant"
(gesetzt)
intended thematically. By comparison, the awareness we enjoy of
(126),
the act is implicit and marginal, but nonetheless there.
The acts which we experience, including memory, are obviously not
cars and
express trains.
empirical objects inhabiting the world of dining
are rather immanent to consciousness and
calls
They
accordingly Husserl
them "immanent" objects (96) or "unities of inner consciousness"
(51)
or "'immanent'
(292).
They are legitimately termed
temporal unities"
the appropriate characteristics: they have
"temporal" because they possess
a duration and
in time, and run off in a succession of
position
phases. "Every
Husserl writes, "is given as something enduring, flowing,
experience,"
(127). Time, then, is the "irreducible form" of
changing in various ways"
both immanent and transcendent realities (274), but the time in which the
act of memory is experienced as present is inner or "immanent time" (292),
the train rushing into the station
not the time of transcendant objects. While
was an event in the world's objective time, the memory of it is a
unity in
a
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44
JOHN
. BROUGH
Without
a
con
Although
thorough discussion of the way in which the absolute
sciousness constitutes immanent unities cannot be undertaken here, certain
will be mentioned,
important features
especially those which will be in
volved in the later discussion of memory's intentionality.
The ultimate time-constituting consciousness may be viewed as a flowing
succession of interrelated phases or segments, one of which will be actual
while others will have elapsed or not yet arrived. Each momentary
phase
will have a threefold intentional structure through which an extended por
tion of the immanent object, in our case, of thememory, will be experienced
or constituted. The way in which this constitution is
accomplished may be
illustrated as follows. Assume an act of memory has begun to run off for
inner consciousness and has already partially
elapsed. The memory will be
to consciousness in a continuum of
with the "fundamental
presented
phases
one
distinctions:
Now,
(211).
past (future)"
temporal
Specifically,
phase
of the memory will be experienced as actually Now,10 others as just past,
still others as future or as yet to come. Correlated with the
phase of the
as
an
will
Now
be
actual
of
the absolute
memory experienced
actually
phase
an
moment
will
That
intentional
consciousness.
possess
ordinarily
phase
or
termed by Husserl
sensation,"
impression"
through
"primal
"primal
which the actual Now
of the memory is constituted. The same phase will
a second intentional moment,
or "retention,"
possess
"primary memory"
are held in
act
which
of
and
the
grasp
through
elapsed phases
experienced
as just
to the actual Now. Finally, the actual
past with respect
phase of the
ultimate flow will possess the moment of
is conscious
"protention" which
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HUSSERL
ON MEMORY
45
in an open way of future phases of the act. "In each primal phase, which
we have retentions of
preceding
originally constitutes the immanent content,
and protentions of coming phases of precisely this content . .
(84).
runs
next moment the
Finally, since memory
of in immanent time, in the
whole process will repeat itself : through a new actual phase of the absolute
flow a new phase of the memory will be experienced as Now while the
will be experienced as just past, and so on.
prior phase
The act of memory, then, is a unity constituted in inner time through
the phases of the absolute time-constituting flow with their impressionai,
retentional, and protentional moments.
1. Retention and Secondary Memory
This essay is focused on what Husserl calls "secondary memory"
(sekun
In
or more
d?re Erinnerung)
(Erinnerung).
frequently simply "memory"
the last section, however, we met "primary memory"
(prim?re Erinnerung)
to Husserl,
or "retention"
secondary memory and
(Retention). According
retention are absolutely distinct modes of consciousness
though also
(35),
inseparable.
refers to secondary memory as "memory in
On some occasions, Husserl
the usual sense" and implies that it intends "something further past" (179)
retention is conscious of the immediate past, usually of the just
while
of an act presently running off for consciousness. Although
elapsed phases
the
this difference ordinarily holds, Husserl
possibility
frequently speaks of
in which case
of actualizing a memory of what is still retained (367),
what is retained and what is remembered would coincide and enjoy the
same distance from the actual Now. Difference in temporal position, then,
not by itself define the distinction between memory and retention.
Instead, the two are essentially distinct because they belong to different
dimensions of consciousness. Retention is a moment of the absolute time
is a unity
secondary memory
constituting flow of consciousness, while
from
Retention
differs
flow.
absolute
the
constituted by
memory as what
is
constituted.
what
is constituting differs from
Furthermore, memory is an
can
stand forth as a relatively
therefore
act in immanent time and
enduring
on
from having the status
far
the other hand,
independent unit. Retention,
an
even
to
individual phase of the
of an independent act, is not
equivalent
ultimate flow, since the latter also has impressionai and protentional
would
moments.
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46
JOHN
. BROUGH
it does
Memory's
Constitution
Memory
as Direct
Consciousness
of What
Is Past
tradition have
Interpretations of memory in the philosophical
frequently
some variation of what
be
called
the "image theory".
might
represented
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HUSSERL
ON MEMORY
47
We
of memory. But did he perhaps embrace the theory himself early in his
career? In the following section we review evidence that suggests he did.
1. Husserl's
stitution
. Evidence
Implicit Adherence
That Husserl
Held
to an
an
Image Theory
of Memory's
Con
Image Theory
Husserl
accepted
is pictorial
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48
JOHN
. BROUGH
...
Textual Ambiguities
the hint of an image theory in certain early texts is undeniably
While
strong, ambiguities remain. Significantly, Husserl never offers a developed
version of the theory and does not argue for it explicitly. Furthermore, the
term "image" and its derivatives are often
placed in quotation marks when
occur
in
But
of
of greater importance are indi
discussions
memory.14
they
cations in a few early texts thatHusserl became aware of difficulties associated
with the theory even while he may have remained its adherent.
Husserl's
earlier and later reservations about the image theory are
on his
in
grounded
rejection of what might be called the thesis of the
part
that
what we take as past is really present. Husserl
i.e.,
"pseudo-past":
. . . bestow the
or
argues on the contrary that "where we
predicate past,
as
is
there
the
This
is
another
past
past,
really past"
(152).
apprehend
of the rule that memory and its object have different time
expression
determinations. Yet the image theorymay violate this rule. In a text dating
from around 1901,15 Husserl appears to single out just such a
transgression.
His argument, which we will examine briefly, is of interest because it very
likely paved the way for his later rejection of the image theory.
to the theory, the
According
present memorial
image represents the past
or
content.
It
to do this with absolute
be
that
if
it
is
object
might
argued
b.
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HUSSERL
ON MEMORY
49
itself (159). This view effectively reduces the past to a pseudo-past and
cancels the difference in temporal determination between memory and
remembered object: "the remembered content and the past Now would at
the same time be present, specifically in the sense of the actual Now"
(159,
note 2).
not surrender the image theory at this
Yet Husserl
apparently does
for he writes after outlining the objection we have described: "The
point,
remembered content is 'the same' as the perceived, but it is its image" ( 160).
some version of the image
For a time, then, Husserl probably
accepted
a
after
traditional
in the atmosphere at the
It
view
and
was,
all,
theory.
time. But already in the earliest texts seeds of discontent are detectable, and
so it is not
comes to reject
surprising that Husserl
explicitly the image
theory of memory's
constitution.
but something
We know that the 'past' inmemory's case does not mean that in the present
act of remembering we make ourselves an image of what existed earlier
. . .
(309).
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50
JOHN
. BROUGH
of Husserl's
critique of the image theory is that it cannot
a
as
direct
consciousness
of what is past. The theory is
explain memory
constructed on themodel of the sort of
pictorial representation accomplished
or historical
or statues
in photographs
In such
(180),
paintings
(183).
cases, something is perceived as present which also serves as an image or
repr?sentant of something which is not present. The representative function
is realized insofar as what is perceived is similar or analogous to what is
A painting of the storming of the Bastile, although a
(184).
depicted
different object from the historical event of 1789, functions and is known
to function as an image of that event
a certain relation of
through
similarity.
occur
does
indeed
through pictorial objects of this sort, but
Representation
?and
this is the telling point?"not
with the consciousness of the
object
is given "itself" in these cases is the
itself (Selbst)99 ( 183). What
present
not what it
pictorial object, the image, and
depicts.
in memory, Husserl
Now
insists, "this is not the case"
(184). And
the moment
the image theory attempts to
this
model
of pictorial
import
runs afoul of what we
representation into memory's domain, it
actually
in memory. Suppose, for
a
experience
example, instead of looking at
print
backbone
in the memory
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HUSSERL
ON MEMORY
51
does not suppress the temporal distance between the two. In memory, then,
we do not
as
taken as
directly experience something
present which is then
an
on the basis of a
of
between
image
something past
supposed similarity
the two. If thatwere the case, memory would never be more than an indirect
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52
JOHN
. BROUGH
Husserl rejects the image theory because it does not account for memory
as we
us off from the
past.
experience it and because it effectively seals
is a direct
Husserl's
claim is rather that memory, properly understood,
consciousness of the past in which "the appearing object itself is meant,
just as it appears"
(184).18
3. The Remembered
Object's Mode
of Givenness
The image theory is based on the
implicit assumption that only what is
a sense, it assumes that every form of
can be
In
known.
directly
present
consciousness must be, or be built upon, a perception, and that any getting
beyond what is given perceptually must be by indirection. Husserl snaps the
a direct
spine of the image theory by denying the assumption. Perception is
consciousness of its object, but so too ismemory, and its object is past. Per
does present the object itself, but "in memory the object also appears
ception
itself" (185).19 The
that memory, providing direct access to the
point is
a
past, is mode of consciousness sui generis and is irreducible to any other
kind of experience. "Reproduction," Husserl writes, "is not, as Hume
and
the sensualistic
on
Hume
since
the
order
think,
something
psychologists
a
of a poor imitation of perception or a weaker echo of it, but
precisely
. . ." 20
new
mode
of
consciousness.
fundamentally
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HUSSERL
ON MEMORY
53
Although perception and memory both give their objects directly, they
do so in essentially different ways. Only in
the object given as
perception is
itself"
The
remembered
(Selbst gegenw?rtig)
object, whose
(185).
"present
sense
as
its
is
instead
(vergegen
present,
being given
precludes
"represented"
w?rtigt), though still given itself. Reproductions, Husserl writes, "have the
character of itself-representation" (Selbstvergegenw?rtigung)
and "memory
sense of the
is
the
in
itself-representation
past" (59).
means a re
as
memory's mode of givenness literally
Representation
a
or a crime
sense
not
in
the
that
be
restaged
presentation, though
play might
reenacted. Rather the same event, given perceptually in an earlier Now,
runs off once
as
is remembered is
again for consciousness, but
past?1 What
thus not there to be touched or smelled or actually seen; it is given in a unique
modification which, Husserl
is ultimately indefinable. He
does
implies,
sense of this modifica
attempt, however, to communicate something of the
tion, and his endeavors throw light on the difference between the presenta
tional and representational modes of givenness. For example, a temporal
in memory "as something that
object "hovers before me"
(vorschwebt)
has been and at the same time is quasi-running off . . ." (298). The term
"vorschweben" means to "have a recollection," but also to "float or hover
before," and Husserl seems to play on both meanings. The object of memory,
while not exactly ghostlike in its apparition, lacks the "bodily" presence
characteristic of the object of perception.22 In the same vein, Husserl claims
that the represented object appears as "quasi-running off" and elsewhere
writes that the object stands forth in memory "not as present itself, rather
a for
as
quasi-present"
(290). Husserl's point is that memory regenerates
were
us
it
that
if"
it
stands
"as
such
before
gotten object
(gleichsam)
anew
run off, of course,
not
It
does
itself
engendering
actually
(360).
because it is past. Thus in the memory of the lighted theater, "the theater
comes to givenness 'as if now'
(gleichsam jetzt)'* (59).
The memorial modification should not be confused with the retentional
to which every temporal object, whether remembered or not,
modification
is subject. In being constituted originally, the object undergoes a modifica
more
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54
JOHN
. BROUGH
into the
vivid Now
modification which is there remembered?the
slipping
not
to
the
memorial
and
obscure?is
modification,
becoming
past
equivalent
which has its own obscurity to contribute: ". . . still other 'obscurities' con
front us there, that is, what is 'clear' in the first sense stands already as if
a veil ...
seen
to be sure, more or less obscurely" (48). The veil
through
which memory drops between present and past is not opaque ?the
past
remains visible through it?but it does cast its shadow unfailingly.
B.
as
of Earlier Perception
stresses that memory is a direct consciousness of the past which
Husserl
a
manner
irreducible to pictorial or perceptual
gives its object in
unique
modes. But he also argues thatmemory and perception are intimately related.
And the relation involves more than the truism that ifwe perceived nothing
we would have nothing to remember, for Husserl
claims that "memory
. . .
a
earlier
of
actually implies
(58).
reproduction
perception"
It will be recalled from the first section of this paper that what is re
is the act
membered
appears as having been present. Since perception
to appear as having been present means
which constitutes the present (182),
to
to appear as
"it belongs
having been perceived. Accordingly,
primarily
the nature of memory that it is consciousness of having-been-perceived
e sen-s
if memory intends its object
(57). Now
ein)"
(Wahrgenommen getv
an
as
act of
will
it
been
carry
having
implicit reference to the
perceived,
was
the
The
which
object
originally presented.
present
perception through
which is given again in memory, re-presented, is therefore "constituted in
. . .a
(58). If the lighted theater,
'representation of earlier perception' ..."
this occurs because the
for example, appears inmemory "as ifNow,"
elapsed
act through which the theater was originally given as Now
is
perceptual
Memory
Representation
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HUSSERL
ON MEMORY
55
have
accomplishes.
The past object is remembered as having been perceived, "but not just
. . ."
anywhere and at any time and not by just anyone
(191). Memory
intends an object which I perceived at a certain place and time. The object
is remembered in terms of the way it entered into my life, became involved
with me as the object of my experience. To remember something is essen
an
in my own history. Memory, then, as memory
tially to remember
episode
of earlier perception, recaptures an elapsed portion of my own stream of
consciousness. In the "present representation of the past consciousness, spe
as my consciousness" I am aware that "at that time I had the
cifically
per
as "a
part of present
ception" (195). Husserl accordingly describes memory
a concrete part from the stream of the
past experience
experience in which
25 It
to the very nature of an
of the same subject is represented."
pertains
act of consciousness that, once past, it can never again be given originally.
Without memory the elapsed experience would be irretrievably lost and so
too its object, and I would be trapped forever in the immediate present.
The sense of the self and of objectivity would never fully
develop.26 But
can reach back to the I which
I
memories
my
through
present
perceived the
theater last night, which enjoyed the sights and sounds of the railroad
station years ago, which cheered at a football game last fall. And this I,
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56
JOHN
. BROUGH
Husserl
Remembered
Horizon
and Memory's
Fulfillment
some occasions,
distinguishes two inseparable aspects of
are related to memory as
of
both
which
memory's intentionality,
representa
tion of earlier
perception.
one of these intentional moments
the object is remembered
Through
with respect to its enduring content (53). Thus I recall the freight train
passing slowly through the station. If the memory represents the object
or
inten
unintuitively, perhaps merely verbally
symbolically, the memorial
tion is described as empty. The fulfillment of the intention would consist in
the intuitive representation of the object. If the past event is in fact to
stand before me in intuitive "full dress," fulfilling the empty intention,
I must explicitly actualize "the
reproduction of the consciousness in which
or in
the past enduring object was given, that is,
general originally
perceived
the object was originally
constituted. . ." (54). When
given in a perception,
it was given intuitively; if the object is to be given
once again
intuitively
in the memorial mode, that
must be recalled.
perception
second intentional moment, always present with the first, is
Memory's
directed towards the temporal context or location of the enduring content
indicated earlier that it is part of the sense of the remembered
( 302 ). We
to
set in relation to the Now,
be
object
specifically, to be apprehended "as
. . ."
to
in
the
actual
relation
some
back
present
lying
(58). Reproducing
more or less
it
entails
to
with
the
thing
locating
definitely
respect
living
Now. This aspect of memory's
intentionality also has its own manner of
fulfillment, which consists in the "production of fulfilled interconnections
up to the actual present" (54). Husserl means that the intention is fulfilled
insofar as we actualize memories which carry us "along the chain of time"
Husserl,
on
(437) from the past event to the livingpresent: "The only possible ful
...
Now,
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HUSSERL
ON MEMORY
57
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58
JOHN
. BROUGH
open, of course, that what I have located in the past does not belong there,
or belongs in a different
Memorial
renewal of the
course of
position.
elapsed
will reveal whether this is the case. It may be discovered, for
experience
that of two conflicting memories only one will fit into the context
example,
of the past stream of consciousness. Such a determination is always available
in
for "a person now has a past, a determinate one" and "there
principle,
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HUSSERL
ON MEMORY
59
Memory
Flow
of Consciousness
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60
JOHN
. BROUGH
sense is
appropriately modified
representational consciousness of the inner
consciousness of the tone) . . ." (96).
But if the textual evidence is ambiguous, the logic of Husserl's
position
seem to be decisive.
would
Just as we cannot recall a past external event
without representing the perception through which itwas originally given,
so we cannot recall the
past perception without representing the elapsed
inner consciousness through which it was originally
I
experienced. When
remember a past transcendent object, I remember it as having been perceived.
as
I recall a past act, I recall it as having been
When
experienced, that is,
am to return
to
in
I
been
constituted
inner
If
time.
the
having
memorially
same act I once
as Now,
then I must implicitly represent that
experienced
segment of the ultimate time-consciousness in which the act was first con
stituted. Furthermore, the past act will be recalled as located at a certain
Since it is the
(307).
position "in the elapsing series of my experiences"
absolute flow with its retentions and protentions which originally orders
the act in inner time, recalling the act's location would entail
representing
the inner consciousness which first located it. Finally, I recall an
elapsed
act as having been
as
experienced by me, specifically,
having been constituted
in the same stream of consciousness to which my
present act of memory
to
act
But
the
recall
without
belongs.
elapsed
representing the flow through
which I first experienced it,would be tantamount to recalling an act which
no one.
belonged to
The claim that in remembering an elapsed act we also recall the absolute
mean that we ever
time-constituting flow does not
represent the flow by
itself. The ultimate flow simply is the experiencing of immanent
temporal
objects. The inner consciousness of the act is inseparable (though distinct)
from what it constitutes. That relationship is not severed when the act
a
it is renewed when the act is remembered.
Recalling
elapses, and
past
act always
the
of
the
ultimate
time-constitut
implies recalling
elapsed portion
was
originally experienced, and remembering a
ing flow in which the act
past segment of the flow always entails remembering the immanent object
it constituted.
we
constitution is now
sketch of memory's
Our
complete. Although
we have
have been able to catch only the broad outlines of Husserl's
theory,
at least
the fundamental role memory plays in conscious life.
glimpsed
is
can be
in time and none of its flowing
Consciousness
steeped
phases
arrested and kept in living actuality. From the perspective of the living
our
has receded into the
present, the main portion of
experience
past
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on
husserl
memory
61
John
University
Georgetown
NOTES
1. Edmund Husserl, Zur Ph?nomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893
1917), ed. Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana, Band X (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1966).
2.
Edmund
Husserl,
serliana, Band XI
3.
of our
most
Since
zur Passiven
Analysen
Synthesis,
will
references
to Husserliana,
ed. Margot
Hus
Fleischer,
X
Volume
(Zeitbewusst
sein), page numbers of texts cited or directly quoted from this volume will be given
in parentheses
immediately
following
4.
I capitalize
the term "Now"
the reference
the English
lower case
"now"
use of the term.
technical
because
Husserl's
is only
5. Memory
one
among
it
whenever
may
several
with
to
respect
the Now.
forms
is also
There
quotation.
is a translation
to draw
fail
or
of
the
for
reader's
representation
"das
Jetzt"
to
attention
(Vergegenw?rti
representation
con
something
temporaneouswith theNow but not perceived (60). And "mere phantasy" is disting
uished frommemory because the formerhas no reference to the actual Now (105).
6.
Husserl
sciousness
and
ever, in that
for example,
does
the
distinguish,
transcendent
as we
will
time of
the latter
see,
an
between
external
immanent
two
The
objects.
the fomer. The
of
time
are
con
how
related,
of perception,
is given
immanent
act
through
is simultaneous
with
the perceived
transcendent
object.
7. The
"world's
time" here
is not "clock
time" but simply
the appearing
time
or remembered
of perceived
transcendent
objects.
8. Husserl
two dimensions
therefore distinguishes
two dimensions
of immanence,
within
consciousness
is constituted.
present
Writings
9.
Husserl
itself,
and
claims
to
that within
advance
this
one
the consciousness
distinction
in
about
of
the other
the
See
of an Absolute
Consciousness
in Husserl's
Emergence
Early
on Time
Man
and World,
5, no. 3 (August
307fT.
Consciousness,"
1972):
. .
even
the most
is
immanent
Representation,
primitive
representation,
writer's
begins
1907.
"The
10.
it has
// it ensues,
retain
(193).
then
But
while
as well
retention passively
as retain we could
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62
12.
Passiven
Husserl,
. BROUGH
JOHN
. 292.
Synthesis,
13. Robert Sokolowski cites this statement in support of his contention that
once
Husserl
an
held
image
theory. Robert
Meditations
Husserlian
Sokolowski,
(Evans
ton:Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 147, note 12. Sokolowski would appear
to be
correct
siderable,
in his
Textual
contention.
as we
however,
will
point
(164),
The
158-160.
7, pp.
out
(166).
text
is probably
concerned
are
the matter
ambiguities
concerning
in the next
section.
with
primary
con
memory,
but the implied criticism of an image theorywould apply to the case of secondary
as well.
memory
16. Explicit critcism first appears inNr. 18, which Boehm, the editor of Hus
serliana X, dates around 1901. But both the language and the content of the sketch
that it was
written
somewhat
later. On Nr.
Husserlian
18, see Sokolowski,
suggest
Meditations,
p. 147, note 12 and p. 149, note 14.
17. Some
of the arguments
in later texts, especially
in Nr.
Nr.
18, others
appear
relied
chiefly
on
Zeithbewusstsein
for Husserl's
arguments
against
the
image theory.A strong and clear (but brief) rejection is found in Passiven Synthesis,
p.
305.
does
however,
"Memory,
a second
is consciously
Ibid., p. 325.
are not two
". . . There
19.
in which
20.
21.
remembered
perceived.
22. Husserl,
contain
in
analogized."
kinds
(289).
The
itself
Husserl,
the perception
of one object
Passiven
p. 305.
Synthesis,
of houses,
houses
perceived
same
house
is represented
or
imagined
as was
earlier
and
Passiven
p. 96.
Synthesis,
remembered
perception
that "every
Husserl
claims
Because
23.
houses
not
the
manent
object,
is immanent"
(96).
24.
"...
A
representational
an
of
memory
modification
of
. . ."
of the perceived
representation
object
(89).
25. Husserl,
Passiven
p. 353.
Synthesis,
is itself an
external
im
object
is . . . also memory
of what
is at
perception
the
same
time
26. According to Husserl, it pertains to the sense of the fully constituted object
that it can be repeated as the same in diverse acts, and this requires memory. See
Passiven
pp. 326-27.
Synthesis,
Passiven
Husserl,
Synthesis,
an act is
28. When
originally
27.
p.
310.
experienced,
intentions
or
directed
protentions
to
wards the future are empty and open. But the elapsed protentionswhich we recall
"have been fulfilled,and we are aware of this in the recollection" (52). In recalling
the past protentions I recall what originally fulfilled them.
29. We
intentions
have
forward movement
memory's
the Now.
Husserl
that
suggests
stressed
towards
the trail of
along
one
can also move
interlocking
backwards
from the horizon of what is actually present towards what is remembered (70). In
either case we move across overlapping temporal fieldswhich are united into a
single
field through their intentional horizons (70).
30.
Husserl
acknowledges
that
there
are
limitations
to what
we
can
remember
p.
82.
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