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This document outlines the syllabus for an Industrial Organization course. It lists the methods of evaluation as weekly quizzes, a paper, and a final exam. It then provides extensive reading assignments on topics related to firm behavior and structure, divided into sections on antitrust and vertical/horizontal control, the microeconomics of the firm, and capital structure and control. The readings include academic journal articles and book chapters.
This document outlines the syllabus for an Industrial Organization course. It lists the methods of evaluation as weekly quizzes, a paper, and a final exam. It then provides extensive reading assignments on topics related to firm behavior and structure, divided into sections on antitrust and vertical/horizontal control, the microeconomics of the firm, and capital structure and control. The readings include academic journal articles and book chapters.
This document outlines the syllabus for an Industrial Organization course. It lists the methods of evaluation as weekly quizzes, a paper, and a final exam. It then provides extensive reading assignments on topics related to firm behavior and structure, divided into sections on antitrust and vertical/horizontal control, the microeconomics of the firm, and capital structure and control. The readings include academic journal articles and book chapters.
Organization
I,
Tyler
Cowen
(x2312,
4910),
tcowen@gmu.edu
METHODS
OF
EVALUATION:
There
will
be
weekly
quizzes,
a
paper,
and
a
final
exam.
READINGS:
I.
Firm
behavior,
antitrust,
and
vertical
and
horizontal
control.
Einav,
Lira
and
Levin,
Jonathan,
Empirical
Industrial
Organization:
A
Progress
report,
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives,
(Spring
2010),
145-162.
Asker,
John,
A
Study
of
the
Internal
Organization
of
a
Bidding
Cartel,
American
Economic
Review,
(June
2010),
724-762.
Bresnahan,
Timothy
F.
Competition
and
Collusion
in
the
American
Automobile
Industry:
the
1955
Price
War,
Journal
of
Industrial
Economics,
1987,
35(4),
457- 82.
Bresnahan,
Timothy
and
Reiss,
Peter
C.
Entry
and
Competition
in
Concentrated
Markets,
Journal
of
Political
Economy,
(1991),
99(5),
977-1009.
Timothy
Bresnahan,
Empirical
Studies
of
Industries
with
Concentrated
Power,
Handbook
of
Industrial
Organization,
vol.II.
Tirole,
Jean.
Vertical
Control.
In
Theory
of
Industrial
Organization,
Chapter
4.
Klein,
Benjamin
and
Leffler,
Keith.
The
Role
of
Market
Forces
in
Assuring
Contractual
Performance.
Journal
of
Political
Economy
89
(1981):
615-641.
Breit,
William.
Resale
Price
Maintenance:
What
do
Economists
Know
and
When
Did
They
Know
It?
Journal
of
Institutional
and
Theoretical
Economics
(1991).
McKenzie,
Richard
B.
and
Lee,
Dwight,
In
Defense
of
Monopoly,
chapter
four,
Welfare-Enhancing
Monopolies,
on
reserve.
Tirole,
Jean.
Information
and
Strategic
Behavior:
Reputation,
Limit
Pricing,
and
Predation.
In
Theory
of
Industrial
Organization,
Chapter
9,
on
reserve.
Sproul,
Michael.
Antitrust
and
Prices.
Journal
of
Political
Economy
(August
1993):
741-754.
McCutcheon,
Barbara.
Do
Meetings
in
Smoke-Filled
Rooms
Facilitate
Collusion?
Journal
of
Political
Economy
(April
1997):
336-350.
Hazlett,
Thomas
W.
Is
Antitrust
Anticompetitive?
Harvard
Journal
of
Law
and
Public
Policy,
(Spring
1986).
Crandall,
Robert
and
Whinston,
Clifford,
Does
Antitrust
Improve
Consumer
Welfare?:
Assessing
the
Evidence,
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives
(Fall
2003
),
3-26,
available
at
http://www.brookings.org/views/articles/2003crandallwinston.htm.
II.
The
Microeconomics
of
the
Firm
Holmstrom,
Bengt
and
Tirole,
Jean.
The
Theory
of
the
Firm,
in
Handbook
of
Industrial
Economics,
vol.I.
Holmstrom,
Bengt
and
Roberts,
John.
The
Boundaries
of
the
Firm
Revisited.
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives
12,
4
(Fall
1998):
73-94.
Gibbons,
Robert.
Incentives
in
Organizations.
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives
(Fall
1998):
115-132.
Montgomery,
Cynthia.
Corporate
Diversification,
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives
(Summer
1994):
163-178.
Hansemann,
Henry.
The
Role
of
Non-Profit
Enterprise.
Yale
Law
Journal
(1980):
835-901.
Lazear,
Edward
P.
Leadership:
A
Personnel
Economics
Approach,
NBER
Working
Paper
15918,
2010.
Oyer,
Paul
and
Schaefer,
Scott,
Personnel
Economics:
Hiring
and
Incentives,
NBER
Working
Paper
15977,
2010.
Van
den
Steen,
Eric,
Interpersonal
Authority
in
a
Theory
of
the
Firm,
American
Economic
Review,
2010,
100:1,
466-490.
Ben-David,
Itzhak,
and
John
R.
Graham
and
Campbell
R.
Harvey,
Managerial
Miscalibration,
NBER
working
paper
16215,
July
2010.
AER
Symposium,
May
2010,
starts
with
Why
do
Firms
in
Developing
Countries
Have
Low
Productivity?,
runs
pp.620-633.
Glenn
Ellison,
Bounded
rationality
in
Industrial
Organization,
http://cemmap.ifs.org.uk/papers/vol2_chap5.pdf
Xavier
Gabaix
and
David
Laibson,
Shrouded
Attributes,
Consumer
Myopia,
and
Information
Suppression
in
Competitive
Markets,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=728545.
Charness,
Gary
and
Kuhn,
Peter
J.
Lab
Labor:
What
Can
Labor
Economists
Learn
From
the
Lab?
NBER
Working
Paper,
15913,
2010.
Cowen,
Tyler,
Google
lecture
on
prizes,
on
YouTube.
III.
Capital
structure
and
control
Miller,
Merton,
and
commentators.
The
Modigliani-Miller
Propositions
After
Thirty
Years,
and
comments,
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives
(Fall
1988):
99- 158.
Myers,
Stewart.
Capital
Structure.
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives
(Spring
2001):
81-102.
Hart,
Oliver.
Financial
Contracting.
Journal
of
Economic
Literature
(December
2001):
1079-1100.
Easterbrook,
Frank
H.
Two
Agency-Cost
Explanations
of
Dividends.
American
Economic
Review
(September
1984).
Baker,
Malcolm
and
Wurgler,
Jeffrey.
A
Catering
Theory
of
Dividends,
Journal
of
Finance
(2004),
available
at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/.
Baker,
Malcolm
and
Ruback,
Richard.
Behavioral
Corporate
Finance:
A
Survey,
found
at
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/seminars/pegroup/BakerRubackWurgler.pdf
MacKinlay,
A.C.
(1997),
Event
Studies
in
Economics
and
Finance,
Journal
of
Economic
Literature
35(1),
13-39.
Andrade,
Gregor,
et.
al.
New
Evidence
and
Perspective
on
Mergers.
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives
(Spring
2001):
103-120.
Holmstrom,
Bengt
and
Kaplan,
Steven.
Corporate
Governance
and
Merger
Activity
in
the
United
States,
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives
(Spring
2001):
121-149.
Gompers,
Paul
and
Lerner,
Josh.
The
Venture
Capital
Revolution.
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives
(Spring
2001):
145-168.
Stein,
Jeremy
C.
Efficient
Capital
Markets,
Inefficient
Firms:
A
Model
of
Myopic
Corporate
Behavior.
Quarterly
Journal
of
Economics
104
(November
1989):
655- 670.
Stein,
Jeremy
C.
Takeover
Threats
and
Managerial
Myopia.
Journal
of
Political
Economy
(1988):
61-80.
Scharfstein,
David
S.
and
Stein,
Jeremy
C.
Herd
Behavior
and
Investment.
American
Economic
Review
80
(June
1990):
465-479.
Hall,
Brian
and
Murphy,
Kevin
J,
The
Trouble
with
Stock
Options,
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives,
Summer
2003,
also
at
http://www- rcf.usc.edu/~kjmurphy/HMTrouble.pdf.
Murphy,
Kevin
J.
and
Zaboznik,
Jan.
CEO
Pay
and
Appointments,
American
Economic
Review,
May
2004,
also
at
http://www- rcf.usc.edu/~kjmurphy/CEOTrends.pdf
Jensen,
Michael,
Murphy,
Kevin
J.,
and
Eric
Wruck.
Remuneration:
Where
We've
Been,
How
We
Got
to
Here,
What
are
the
Problems,
and
How
to
Fix
Them,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=561305#PaperDownloa d.
Robert
J.
Gordon
and
Ian
Dew-Becker,
Unresolved
Issues
in
the
Rise
of
American
Inequality,
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~idew/papers/BPEA_final_ineq .pdf
McKay,
Alisdair
and
Reis,
Ricardo,
The
Brevity
and
Violence
of
Contractions
and
Expansions,
NBER
Working
Paper,
12400,
2010.
Gorton,
Gary
B.
Slapped
in
the
Face
by
the
Invisible
Hand:
Banking
and
the
Panic
of
2007,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1401882,
published
on-line
in
2009.
IV.
Theory
and
Regulation
of
Natural
Monopolies
Sanford
Berg
and
John
Tschirhart,
Natural
Monopoly
Regulation,
Cambridge
University
Press.
pp.
21-275.
Demsetz,
Harold.
Why
Regulate
Utilities?
Journal
of
Law
and
Economics
(April
1968):
347-359.
Williamson,
Oliver.
Franchise
Bidding
for
Natural
Monopolies
in
General
and
with
Respect
to
CATV.
Bell
Journal
of
Economics
(Spring
1976):
73-104.
Crandall,
Robert
W.
An
End
to
Economic
Regulation?
available
at
http://www.brookings.org/views/papers/crandall/20030721.pdf.
Parente,
Stephen
L.
and
Prescott,
Edward.
Monopoly
Rights:
A
Barrier
to
Riches.
American
Economic
Review
89,
5
(December
1999):
1216-1233.
Shleifer,
Andrei.
State
vs.
Private
Ownership.
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives
(Fall
1998):
133-151.
Chang,
Roberto,
Constantino
Hevia,
and
Norman
Loayza,
Privatization
and
Nationalization
Cycles,
NBER
Working
Paper
16126,
June
2010.
Berg
and
Tschirhart,
pp.
480-522.
-
See
more
at:
http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2010/08/my-2010- industrial-organization-reading-list.html#sthash.1CuH4LcM.dpuf
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