Key Management
Interoperability Protocol
Usage Guide Version 1.2
31 October 2013
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Specification URIs
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This version:
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.2/cnd01/kmip-ug-v1.2cnd01.doc (Authoritative)
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.2/cnd01/kmip-ug-v1.2cnd01.html
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.2/cnd01/kmip-ug-v1.2cnd01.pdf
Previous version:
N/A
Latest version:
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.2/kmip-ug-v1.2.doc
(Authoritative)
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.2/kmip-ugv1.2.html
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.2/kmip-ug-v1.2.pdf
Technical Committee:
OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC
Chairs:
Robert Griffin (robert.griffin@rsa.com), EMC Corporation
Subhash Sankuratripati
(Subhash.Sankuratripati@netapp.com), NetApp
Editors:
Indra Fitzgerald (indra.fitzgerald@hp.com), HP
Judith Furlong (Judith.Furlong@emc.com), EMC Corporation
Related work:
This document replaces or supersedes:
34
Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version
35
1.1. Latest version. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.1/kmip36
ug-v1.1.html.
37This document is related to:
38
Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version
39
1.2. Latest version. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.2/kmip40
spec-v1.2.html.
41
Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 1.2.
42
Work in progress. To be published at: http://docs.oasis43
open.org/kmip/profiles/.
44
Key Management Interoperability Protocol Test Cases Version 1.2.
45
Latest version. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/testcases/v1.2/kmip46
testcases-v1.2.html.
47
Key Management Interoperability Protocol Use Cases Version 1.2.
48
Work in progress. To be published at: http://docs.oasis49
open.org/kmip/usecases/.
50Abstract:
51This document is intended to complement the Key Management
52Interoperability Protocol Specification by providing guidance on how to
53implement KMIP most effectively to ensure interoperability and to
54address key management usage scenarios.
55KMIP v1.2 enhances the KMIP v1.1 standard (established in February
562013) by
571)
defining new functionality in the protocol to improve
58interoperability;
592)
defining additional Test Cases for verifying and validating the
60new functionality;
613)
providing additional information in the KMIP Usage Guide to
62
assist in effective implementation of KMIP in key management
63
clients and servers; and
644)
defining new profiles for establishing KMIP-compliant
65implementations.
66The Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) is a single,
67comprehensive protocol for communication between clients that
68request any of a wide range of encryption keys and servers that store
69and manage those keys. By replacing redundant, incompatible key
70management protocols, KMIP provides better data security while at the
71same time reducing expenditures on multiple products.
72Status:
73This document was last revised or approved by the OASIS Key
74Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC on the above date. The
75level of approval is also listed above. Check the Latest version
76location noted above for possible later revisions of this document.
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117Table
1181
of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................ 8
Assumptions............................................................................................. 12
3.1.1 Credential........................................................................................ 15
138
139
140 3.2 Authorization for Revoke, Recover, Destroy and Archive Operations....18
141 3.3 Using Notify and Put Operations...........................................................19
142 3.4 Usage Allocation................................................................................... 19
143 3.5 Key State and Times.............................................................................. 20
144 3.6 Template............................................................................................... 21
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176
177 3.31 Using the Same Asymmetric Key Pair in Multiple Algorithms..............39
178 3.32 Cryptographic Length of Asymmetric Keys.........................................39
179 3.33 Discover Versions................................................................................39
180 3.34 Vendor Extensions............................................................................... 40
181 3.35 Certificate Revocation Lists.................................................................40
182 3.36 Using the Raw Key Format Type.......................................................40
183 3.37 Use of Meta-Data Only (MDO) Keys.....................................................41
184 3.38 Cryptographic Service.........................................................................41
185 3.39 Passing Attestation Data.....................................................................42
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2185
Implementation Conformance..................................................................69
223Appendix A. Acknowledgements....................................................................70
224Appendix B. Acronyms...................................................................................73
225Appendix C. Table of Figures and Tables........................................................75
226Appendix D. Revision History.........................................................................76
227
228
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229Introduction
230This Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.2 is intended to
231complement the Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification [KMIP-Spec] by
232providing guidance on how to implement the Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP)
233most effectively to ensure interoperability and to address key management usage scenarios. In
234particular, it includes the following guidance:
242Descriptions of how to use KMIP functionality to address specific key management usage
243scenarios or to solve key management related issues. A selected set of conformance profiles and
244authentication suites are defined in the KMIP Profiles specification [KMIP-Prof].
245Further assistance for implementing KMIP is provided by the KMIP Test Cases
246document [KMIP-TC] that describes a set of recommended test cases and
247provides the TTLV (Tag/Type/Length/Value) format for the message exchanges
248defined by those test cases.
2491.1 References (normative)
250[FIPS 180-4]
265[KMIP-Spec]
266Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.2,
267Committee Specification Draft 01. 12 September 2013. https://www.oasis268open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=50670&wg_abbrev=kmip
269
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236
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241
270[KMIP-Prof]
271Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 1.2. Working Draft 02. 25 June 2013.
272https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=49689&wg_abbrev=kmip
273
274[PKCS#1]
275RSA Laboratories. PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard. June 14, 2002.
276http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125
277
278[PKCS#10]
279RSA Laboratories. PKCS #10 v1.7: Certification Request Syntax Standard. May 26, 2000.
280http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2132
281
282[RFC1321]
283R. Rivest, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1321, Apr 1992,
284http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt
285
286[RFC1421]
287J. Linn, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and
288Authentication Procedures, IETF RFC 1421, Feb 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1421.txt
289
290[RFC3647]
291S. Chokhani, W. Ford, R. Sabett, C. Merrill, and S. Wu. RFC3647: Internet X.509 Public Key
292Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework. November 2003.
293http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3647.txt
294
295[RFC4210]
296C. Adams, S. Farrell, T. Kause and T. Mononen, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
297Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), IETF RFC 2510, Sep 2005,
298http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4210.txt
299
300[RFC4211]
301J. Schaad, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF),
302IETF RFC 4211, Sep 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4211.txt
303
304[RFC4949]
305R. Shirey. RFC4949: Internet Security Glossary, Version 2. August 2007.
306http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt
307
308[RFC4880]
309J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H. Finney, D. Shaw and R. Thayer. RFC4880: OpenPGP Message
310Format. November 2007. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt
311
312[RFC5272]
313J. Schaad and M. Meyers, Certificate Management over CMS (CMC), IETF RFC 5272, Jun 2008,
314http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5272.txt
315
316[RFC5280]
317D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, and W. Polk. RFC5280: Internet
318X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. May
3192008. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt
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320
321[RFC6818]
322P. Yee, Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
323Revocation List (CRL) Profile, IETF RFC6818, January 2013, http://www.rfc324editor.org/rfc/rfc6818.txt
325
326[SP800-38A]
327M. Dworkin. Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques.
328NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Dec 2001. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/80032938a/sp800-38a.pdf
330
331[SP800-38D]
332M. Dworkin. Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
333(GCM) and GMAC. NIST Special Publication 800-38D. Nov 2007.
334http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
335
336[SP800-56A]
337E. Barker, L. Chen, A. Roginsky, and M. Smid, Recommendations for Pair-Wise Key
338Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, NIST Special Publication 80033956A Revision 2, May 2013, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.80034056Ar2.pdf
341
342[SP800-57-1]
343E. Barker, W. Barker, W. Burr, W. Polk and M. Smid, Recommendations for Key Management
344Part 1: General (Revision 3), NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 3, July 2012,
345http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_part1_rev3_general.pdf
346
347[SP800-67]
348W. Barker and E. Barker, Recommendations for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA)
349Block Cipher, NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1, January 2012,
350http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf
351
352[X.509]
353International Telecommunications Union (ITU)-T, X.509: Information technology Open systems
354interconnection The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks, November 2008,
355http://www.itu.int/rec/recommendation.asp?lang=en&parent=T-REC-X.509-200811-I
356
357[X9.31]
358ANSI, X9.31: Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
359Services Industry (rDSA). September 1998.
360
361[X9.42]
362ANSI, X9.42: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Agreement of
363Symmetric Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography. 2003.
364
365[X9 TR-31]
366ANSI, X9 TR-31: Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block Specification for Symmetric
367Algorithms. 2010.
368
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375[KMIP-UC]
376Key Management Interoperability Protocol Use Cases Version 1.2.Working Draft 01. 25 June
3772013. https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?
378document_id=49644&wg_abbrev=kmip
379
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380Assumptions
381The section describes assumptions that underlie the KMIP protocol and the
382implementation of clients and servers that utilize the protocol.
3831.3 Island of Trust
384Clients may be provided key material by the server, but they only use that
385keying material for the purposes explicitly listed in the delivery payload.
386Clients that ignore these instructions and use the keys in ways not explicitly
387allowed by the server are non-compliant. There is no requirement for the key
388management system, however, to enforce this behavior.
390KMIP relies on the chosen authentication suite as specified in [KMIP-Prof] to authenticate the
391client and on the underlying transport protocol to provide confidentiality, integrity, message
392authentication and protection against replay attack. KMIP offers a wrapping mechanism for the
393Key Value that does not rely on the transport mechanism used for the messages; the wrapping
394mechanism is intended for importing or exporting managed cryptographic objects.
Symmetric Keys
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PGP Keys
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Certificates
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Secret Data
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464For requests that could result in large responses, a mechanism in the protocol
465allows a client to specify in a request the maximum allowed size of a
466response or in the case of the Locate operation the maximum number of
467items which should be returned. The server indicates in a response to such a
468request that the response would have been too large and, therefore, is not
469returned.
4701.15 Key Life-cycle and Key State
471[KMIP-Spec]describes the key life-cycle model, based on the [SP800-57-1] key state definitions,
472supported by the KMIP protocol. Particular implications of the key life-cycle model in terms of
473defining time-related attributes of objects are discussed in Section 1.20 below.
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474Using
KMIP Functionality
475This section provides guidance on using the functionality described in the Key
476Management Interoperability Protocol Specification.
4771.16 Authentication
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5131.16.1 Credential
514The Credential object defined in the [KMIP-Spec] is a structure used to convey
515information about the client, but the contents of this object are not managed
516by the key management server. The type of information convey within this
517object varies based on the type of credential. KMIP 1.2 supports three
518credential types: Username and Password, Device Credential and
519Attestation.
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543
544F IGURE 1: AGGREGATOR C LIENT EXAMPLE
545The end device identifies itself with a device unique set of identifier values
546that include the device hardware serial number, the network identifier, the
547machine identifier, or the media identifier. For many of the self-encrypting
548devices there is a unique serial number assigned to the device during
549manufacturing. The ability to use network, machine, or media identifier
550explicitly should map to different device types and achieve better
551interoperability since different types of identifier values are explicitly
552enumerated. The device identifier is included for more generic usage. An
553optional password or shared secret may be used to further authenticate the
554device.
555Server implementations may choose to enforce rules for uniqueness for
556different types of identifier values, combinations of TLS certificate used in
557combination with the Device Credential, and optionally enforce the use of a
558Device Credential password.
559Four identifiers are optionally provided but are unique in aggregate:
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1. Serial Number, for example the hardware serial number of the device
2. Network Identifier, for example the MAC address for Ethernet connected
devices
3. Machine Identifier, for example the client aggregator identifier, such as a
tape library aggregating tape drives
4. Media Identifier, for example the volume identifier used for a tape
cartridge
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568The device identifier by choice of server policy may or may not be used in
569conjunction with the above identifiers to insure uniqueness.
570These additional identifiers are generally useful for auditing and monitoring
571encryption and could according to server policy be logged or used in server
572implementation specific validation.
573A specific example for self-encrypting tape drive and tape library would be:
1. the tape drive has a serial number that is unique for that manufacturer
and the vendor has procedures for maintaining and tracking serial
number usage
2. a password optionally is created and stored either on the drive or the
library to help authenticate the drive
3. the tape drives may be connected via fiber channel to the library and
therefore have a World Wide Name assigned
4. a machine identifier can be used to identify the tape library that is
aggregating the device in question
5. the media identifier helps identify the individual media such as a tape
cartridge for proof of encryption reporting
586Another example using self-encrypting disk drives inside of a server would be:
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597Server implementations could control what devices may read and write keys
598and use the device credential fields to influence access control enforcement.
599
600Another example applied to server virtualization and encryption built into
601virtualization would be:
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1. the virtual machine instance has a unique identifier that is used for the
serial number
2. the hypervisor supplies a shared secret that is used as the password to
authenticate the virtual machine
3. the network identifier could be used to identify the MAC address of the
physical server where the virtual machine is running
4. the machine identifier could be used to identify the hypervisor
5. the media identifier could be used to identify the storage volume used by
the virtual machine
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611
612These are examples of usage and are not meant to define all device
613credential usage patterns nor restrict server specific implementations.
614The device credentials may be explicitly added by the administrator or may
615be captured in line with the request and implicitly registered depending upon
616server policy.
617When a server is not able to resolve the identifier values in the device
618credential to a unique client identification, it may choose to reject the request
619with an error code of operation failed and reason code of item not found.
6201.17 Authorization for Revoke, Recover, Destroy and Archive
621
Operations
The client enrolls with the server, so that the server knows how to
locate the client to which a Notify or Put is being sent and which events
for the Notify are supported. However, such registration is outside the
scope of the KMIP protocol. Registration also includes a specification of
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whether a given client supports Put and Notify, and what attributes
may be included in a Put for a particular client.
Initial Date: The date and time when the managed cryptographic
object was first created by or registered at the server.
689
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691
Activation Date: The date and time when the managed cryptographic
object should begin to be used for applying cryptographic protection to
data.
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Process Start Date: The date and time when a managed symmetric key
object should begin to be used for processing cryptographically
protected data. The managed symmetric key object should not be
used prior to this date.
696
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698
Protect Stop Date: The date and time when a managed symmetric key
object should no longer be used for applying cryptographic protection
to data
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706
Destroy Date: The date and time when the managed cryptographic
object was destroyed
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708
Compromise Occurrence Date: The date and time when the managed
cryptographic object was first believed to be compromised.
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712
Archive Date: The date and time when the managed object was placed
in Off-Line storage.
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The Protect Stop Date may be equal to, but may not be later than the
Deactivation Date. Similarly, the Process Start Date may be equal to,
but may not precede, the Activation Date. KMIP implementations
should consider specifying both these attributes, particularly for
symmetric keys, as a key may be needed for processing protected data
(e.g., decryption) long after it is no longer appropriate to use it for
applying cryptographic protection to data (e.g., encryption).
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KMIP does not allow an Active object to be destroyed with the Destroy
operation. The server returns an error, if the client invokes the Destroy
operation on an Active object. To destroy an Active object, clients first
call the Revoke operation or explicitly set the Deactivation Date of the
object. Once the object is in Deactivated state, clients may destroy the
object by calling the Destroy operation. These operations may be
performed in a batch. If other time-related attributes (e.g., Protect Stop
Date) are set to a future date, the server should set these to the
Deactivation Date.
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761
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7721.21 Template
773The usage of templates is an alternative approach for setting attributes in an
774operation request. Instead of individually specifying each attribute, a
775template may be used to provide attribute values.
808
Template-Attribute:
809
810
Attribute
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776A template also has attributes that are applicable to the template itself which
777are referred to in the specification as associated attributes to distinguish
778them from the attributes that are contained within the template managed
779object. When registering a template, the Name attribute for the template
780itself must be set. It is used to identify the template in the Template-Attribute
781structure when attributes for a managed object are set in KMIP operations.
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Template
Attribute
814
815
816
Attribute
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Attribute
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822
Attribute
823
824
Attribute Value: OperationPolicy1
825The Operation Policy OperationPolicy1 applies to the AES key being created
826using the template. It is not used to control operations on the template itself.
827KMIP does not allow operation policies to be specified for controlling
828operations on the template itself. The default policy for template objects is
829used for this purpose and is specified in the KMIP Specification.
8301.21.1.2 Example of Creating a Symmetric Key using a Template
831In this example, the client uses the template created in example 3.6.1 to
832create a 256-bit AES key.
833The following is specified in the Create Request Payload:
834
835
Template-Attribute:
836
Name: Template1
837
Attribute:
838
839
840
841
Attribute:
842
Attribute Value: ID74592
843The Template-Attribute structure specifies both a template name and
844additional associated attributes. It is possible to specify the Custom Attribute
845inside the template when the template is registered; however, this particular
846example sets this attribute separately.
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8821.26 Query
883Query does not explicitly support client requests to determine what
884operations require authentication. To determine whether an operation
885requires authentication, a client should request that operation.
8861.27 Canceling Asynchronous Operations
887If an asynchronous operation is cancelled by the client, no information is
888returned by the server in the result code regarding any operations that may
889have been partially completed. Identification and remediation of partially
890completed operations is the responsibility of the server.
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891It is the responsibility of the server to determine when to discard the status of
892asynchronous operations. The determination of how long a server should
893retain the status of an asynchronous operation is implementation-dependent
894and not defined by KMIP.
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935When processing individual requests within the batch, the server that has
936encountered a Maximum Response Size error should not return attribute
937values or other information as part of the error response.
938The Locate operation also supports the concept of a maximum item count to
939include in the returned list of unique identifiers.
9401.32 Using Offset in Re-key and Re-certify Operations
941The Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, and Re-certify operations allow the specification
942of an offset interval.
943The Re-key and the Re-key Key Pair operations allow the client to specify an
944offset interval for activation of the key. This offset specifies the duration of
945time between the time the request is made and the time when the activation
946of the key occurs. If an offset is specified, all other times for the new key are
947determined from the new Activation Date, based on the intervals used by the
948previous key, i.e., from the Activation Date to the Process Start Date, Protect
949Stop Date, etc.
950The Re-certify operation allows the client to specify an offset interval that
951indicates the difference between the Initial Date of the new certificate and
952the Activation Date of the new certificate. As with the Re-key operation, all
953other times for the certificate are determined using the intervals used for the
954previous certificate.
955Note that in re-key operations if activation date, process start date, protect
956stop date and deactivation date are obtained from the existing key, and the
957initial date is obtained from the current time, then the deactivation/activation
958date/process start date/protect stop date is smaller or less than initial date.
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139
Operation
ID
ID Placeholder upon completion of
Placeholder the operation (in case of operation
at the
failure, a batch using the ID
beginning of Placeholder stops)
the operation
Create
ID of new Object
ID of returned object
Register
Derive Key
- (multiple
ID of new Symmetric Key
Unique
Identifiers may
be specified in
the request)
Locate
ID of located Object
Get
ID of Object
no change
Validate
Get Attributes
ID of Object
List/Modify/Add/Del
ete
no change
Activate
ID of Object
no change
Revoke
ID of Object
no change
Destroy
ID of Object
no change
Archive/Recover
ID of Object
no change
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Certify
Re-certify
ID of
Certificate
Re-key
ID of
ID of new Symmetric Key
Symmetric Key
to be rekeyed
ID of Private
Key to be
rekeyed
Obtain Lease
ID of Object
no change
Get Usage
Allocation
ID of Key
no change
Check
ID of Object
no change
ID of new Certificate
968
T ABLE 1: ID P LACEHOLDER PRIOR TO AND R ESULTING FROM A KMIP
969O PERATION
986
Cryptographic Algorithm (e.g., AES, 3DES, RSA) this attribute is either specified inside
the Key Block structure or the Key Value structure
Cryptographic Length (e.g., 128, 256, 2048) this attribute is either specified inside the
Key Block structure or the Key Value structure
Cryptographic Usage Mask identifies the cryptographic usage of the key (e.g., Encrypt,
Wrap Key, Export)
Cryptographic Parameters provides additional parameters for determining how the key
may be used
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
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143
144
148
149
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
Key Role Type Identifies the functional key role (e.g., DEK, KEK)
1005
1006
Dates (e.g., Activation Date, Process Start Date, Protect Stop Date)
1007
Custom Attribute allows vendors and clients to define vendor-specific attributes; may
also be used to prevent replay attacks by setting a nonce
1008
1010The key management system may specify rules for valid group names which
1011may be created by the client. Clients are informed of such rules by a
1012mechanism that is not specified by [KMIP-Spec]KMIP_Spec. In the protocol,
1013the group names themselves are text strings of no specified format. Specific
1014key management system implementations may choose to support
1015hierarchical naming schemes or other syntax restrictions on the names.
1016Groups may be used to associate objects for a variety of purposes. A set of
1017keys used for a common purpose, but for different time intervals, may be
1018linked by a common Object Group. Servers may create predefined groups and
1019add objects to them independently of client requests.
1020KMIP allows clients to specify whether it wants a fresh or default object
1021from a common Object Group. Fresh is an indication of whether a member of
1022a group has been retrieved by a client with the Get operation. The value of
1023fresh may be set as an attribute when creating or registering an object.
1024Subsequently, the Fresh attribute is modifiable only by the server. For
1025example, a set of symmetric keys belong to the Object Group
1026SymmetricKeyGroup1 and the Fresh attribute is set to true for members of
1027the group at the time of creating or registering the member. To add a new
1028symmetric key to the group, the Object Group attribute is set to
1029SymmetricKeyGroup1 and the Fresh attribute is set to true when creating or
1030registering the symmetric key object.
1031The definition of a default object in a group is based on server policy. One
1032example of server policy is to use round robin selection to serve a key from a
1033group. In this case when a client requests the default key from a group, the
1034server uses round robin selection to serve the key.
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154
1035An object may be removed from a group by deleting the Object Group
1036attribute, as long as server policy permits it. A client would need to delete
1037each individual member of a group to remove all members of a group.
1038The Object Group Member flag is specified in the Locate request to indicate
1039the type of group member to return. Object Group Member is an enumeration
1040that can take the value Group Member Fresh or Group Member Default.
1041Following are examples of how the Object Group Member flag is used:
1048When a Locate request is made by specifying the Object Group attribute (e.g.,
1049"symmetricKeyGroup2) and setting the Object Group Member flag to "Group
1050Member Default", a default object is returned from the group. In this example,
1051the server policy defines default to be the next key in the group
1052"symmetricKeyGroup2; the group has three group members whose Unique
1053Identifiers are uuid1, uuid2, uuid3. If the client performs four consecutive
1054batched Locate and Get operations with Object Group set to
1055"symmetricKeyGroup2" and Object Group Member set to Group Member
1056Default in the Locate request, the server returns uuid1, uuid2, uuid3, and
1057uuid1 (restarting from the beginning with uuid1 for the fourth request) in the
1058four Get responses.
10591.36 Certify and Re-certify
1060The key management system may contain multiple embedded CAs or may
1061have access to multiple external CAs. How the server routes a certificate
1062request to a CA is vendor-specific and outside the scope of KMIP. If the server
1063requires and supports the capability for clients to specify the CA to be used
1064for signing a Certificate Request, then this information may be provided by
1065including the X.509 Certificate Issuer attribute in the Certify or Re-certify
1066request.
1067[KMIP-Spec]KMIP_Spec supports multiple options for submitting a certificate
1068request to the key management server within a Certify or Re-Certify
1069operation. It is a vendor decision as to whether the key management server
1070offers certification authority (CA) functionality or proxies the certificate
1071request onto a separate CA for processing. The type of certificate request
1072formats supported is also a vendor decision, and this may, in part, be based
1073upon the request formats supported by any CA to which the server proxies
1074the certificate requests.
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1042When a Locate request is made by specifying the Object Group attribute (e.g.,
1043"symmetricKeyGroup1) and setting the Object Group Member flag to "Group
1044Member Fresh", matching objects from the specified group (e.g.,
1045"symmetricKeyGroup1") have the Fresh attribute set to true. If there are no
1046fresh objects remaining in the group, the server may generate a new object
1047on the fly based on server policy.
158
159
1088The Create Key Pair and the Re-key Key Pair operations allow clients to
1089specify attributes using the Common Template-Attribute, Private Key
1090Template-Attribute, and Public Key Template-Attribute. The Common
1091Template-Attribute object includes a list of attributes that apply to both the
1092public and private key. Attributes that are not common to both keys may be
1093specified using the Private Key Template-Attribute or Public Key Template1094Attribute. If a single-instance attribute is specified in multiple Template1095Attribute objects, the server obeys the following order of precedence:
1096
1097
1098
1099
1. Attributes specified explicitly in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then
2. Attributes specified via templates in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then
3. Attributes specified explicitly in the Common Template-Attribute, then
4. Attributes specified via templates in the Common Template-Attribute
Template
Attribute
1108
1109
1110
Attribute
1111
1112
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163
164
1113
Attribute
1114
1115
Attribute Value:
1116
1117
Attribute:
1118
1119
1120
Attribute:
1121
1122
1123
1124Common Template-Attribute
Name
1126
1127
1128
Attribute
1129
1130
1131
Attribute
1132
1133
Attribute Value:
1134
1135
Attribute
1136
1137
Attribute Value: 56789
1138
1139The Private Key Template-Attribute includes a reference to the template name
1140RSAPriv and other explicitly-specified private key attributes:
1141RSAPriv Template
1142
1143
1144
Template
Attribute
1145
Attribute Value: Key encryption group 2
1146Private Key Template-Attribute
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1125
168
169
1147
Name
1148
1149
1150
Attribute
1151
1152
1153
Attribute
1154
1155
Attribute Value:
1156
Attribute
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
Attribute
Attribute Value:
1168
1169
Name Type: Uninterpreted Text String
1170
1171Following the attribute precedence rule, the server creates a 4096-bit RSA
1172key. The following client-specified attributes are set:
1173Private Key
1174
1175
1176
Cryptographic Parameters:
1177
1178
Cryptographic Parameters:
1179
1180
1181
x-Serial: 1234
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1157
Name Type: Uninterpreted Text String
1158
1159The Public Key Template Attribute includes explicitly-specified public key
1160attributes:
173
174
1182
x-ID: 56789
1183
1184
1185
Name:
1186
1187
Name Type: Uninterpreted Text String
1188Public Key
1189
1190
1191
Cryptographic Parameters:
1193
Cryptographic Parameters:
1194
1195
1196
x-Serial: 1234
1197
x-ID: 56789
1198
1199
Name:
1200
1201
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1192
178
179
1218
c. Cryptographic Usage Mask
1219 5. Register the private key and set all associated attributes
1220
a. Cryptographic Algorithm is the same for both public and private key
1221
b. Cryptographic Length is the same for both public and private key
1222
c. Cryptographic Parameters may be set; if set, the value is the same for both the public
1223
and private key
1224
d. Cryptographic Usage Mask is set, but does not contain the same value for both the
1225
public and private key
1226
e. Link is set for the Private Key with Link Type Public Key Link and the Linked Object
1227
Identifier of the corresponding Public Key
1228
f. Link is set for the Public Key with Link Type Private Key Link and the Linked Object
1229
Identifier of the corresponding Private Key
12301.39 Non-Cryptographic Objects
1233KMIP defines Secret Data as cryptographic objects. Even if the object is not
1234used for cryptographic purposes, clients may still set certain attributes, such
1235as the Cryptographic Usage Mask, for this object unless otherwise stated.
1236Similarly, servers set certain attributes for this object, including the Digest,
1237State, and certain Date attributes, even if the attributes may seem relevant
1238only for other types of cryptographic objects.
1239When registering a Secret Data object, the following attributes are set by the
1240server:
1241
Unique Identifier
1242
Object Type
1243
Digest
1244
State
1245
Initial Date
1246
Last Change Date
1247When registering a Secret Data object for non-cryptographic purposes, the
1248following attributes are set by either the client or the server:
1249
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1231The KMIP protocol allows clients to register Secret Data objects. Secret Data
1232objects may include passwords or data that are used to derive keys.
183
184
1255only generate cryptographic tokens using this key (the MAC) and the other
1256end may only verify tokens. The security of the system fails if the verifying
1257end is able to use the key to perform generation operations.
1261
In some of these operations, such as MAC generation and verification,
1262
the same cryptographic primitive is used in both of the complementary
1263
operations. MAC generation involves computing and returning the MAC,
1264
while MAC verification involves computing that same MAC and
1265
comparing it to a supplied value to determine if they are the same.
1266
Thus, both generation and verification use the encrypt operation,
1267
and the two usages are not able to be distinguished by considering
1268
only encrypt vs. decrypt.
1269
Some operations which require separate key types use the same
1270
fundamental cryptographic primitives. For example, encryption of data,
1271
encryption of a key, and computation of a MAC all use the fundamental
1272
operation encrypt, but in many applications, securely differentiated
1273
keys are used for these three operations. Simply looking for an
1274
attribute that permits encrypt is not sufficient.
1275Allowing the use of these keys outside of their specialized purposes may
1276compromise security. Instead, specialized application-level permissions are
1277necessary to control the use of these keys. KMIP provides several pairs of
1278such permissions in the Cryptographic Usage Mask (3.14), such as:
MAC GENERATE
MAC VERIFY
GENERATE CRYPTOGRAM
VALIDATE CRYPTOGRAM
TRANSLATE ENCRYPT
TRANSLATE DECRYPT
TRANSLATE WRAP
TRANSLATE UNWRAP
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1258In these cases it is not sufficient to describe the usage policy on the keys in
1259terms of cryptographic primitives like encrypt vs. decrypt or sign vs.
1260verify. There are two reasons why this is the case.
188
189
SMIME, 'someuser@company.com'
1299
TLS, 'some.domain.name'
1300
1301
1302
Client Generated Key ID, 450994003'
1303The following Application Namespaces are recommended:
1304
SMIME
1305
TLS
1306
IPSEC
1307
HTTPS
1308
PGP
1309
Volume Identification
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193
194
1310
File Name
1311
1312
LIBRARY-LTO, LIBRARY-LTO4, LIBRARY-LTO5 and LIBRARY-LTO6
1313KMIP provides optional support for server-generated Application Data. Clients
1314may request the server to generate the Application Data for the client by
1315omitting Application Data while setting or modifying the Application Specific
1316Information attribute. A server only generates the Application Data if the
1317Application Data is completely omitted from the request, and the client1318specified Application Namespace is recognized and supported by the server.
1319An example for requesting the server to generate the Application Data is
1320shown below:
1321
AddAttribute(Unique ID, AppSpecInfo{AppNameSpace=LIBRARY1322LTO4});
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1323If the server does not recognize the namespace, the Application Namespace
1324Not Supported error is returned to the client.
198
199
1349would implicitly set the date for the client. For example, instead of explicitly
1350setting the Activation Date, clients could issue the Activate operation. This
1351would require the server to set the Activation Date to the current date and
1352time as perceived by the server.
1353If it is not possible to set a date attribute via an operation, and the server
1354does not support backdated attributes, clients need to take into account that
1355potential clock skew issues may cause the server to return an error even if a
1356date attribute is set to the clients current date and time.
1357For additional information, refer to the sections describing the State attribute
1358and the Time Stamp field in [KMIP-Spec].
1360The enumerations for the Revocation Reason attribute specified in KMIP (see table 9.1.3.2.19 in
1361[KMIP-Spec]) are aligned with the Reason Code specified in [X.509] and referenced in [RFC5280]
1362with the following exceptions. The certificateHold and removeFromCRL reason codes have been
1363excluded from [KMIP-Spec] since KMIP does not support certificate suspension (putting a
1364certificate hold) or unsuspension (removing a certificate from hold). The aaCompromise reason
1365code has been excluded from [KMIP-Spec] since it only applies to attribute certificates, which are
1366out-of-scope for [KMIP-Spec]. The privilegeWithdrawn reason code is included in [KMIP-Spec]
1367since it may be used for either attribute or public key certificates. In the context of its use within
1368KMIP it is assumed to only apply to public key certificates.
1375
Certificate Renewal: The issuance of a new certificate to the subject without changing
the subject public key or other information (except the serial number and certificate
validity dates) in the certificate.
Certificate Update: The issuance of a new certificate, due to changes in the information
in the certificate other than the subject public key.
Certificate Rekey: The generation of a new key pair for the subject and the issuance of a
new certificate that certifies the new public key.
1376
1377
1378
1379
1380
1381
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203
204
1392defines how the key is used. The next sections establish that correspondence for the algorithms
1393AES [FIPS197] and Triple-DES [SP800-67].
1394
1395AES Key Encoding [FIPS197] section 5.2, titled Key Expansion, uses the input key as an array of
1396bytes indexed starting at 0. The first byte of the Key becomes the key byte in AES that is labeled
1397index 0 in [FIPS197] and the other key bytes follow in index order.
1398
1399Proper parsing and key load of the contents of the Key for AES is determined by using the
1400following Key byte string to generate and match the key expansion test vectors in [FIPS197]
1401Appendix A for the 128-bit (16 byte) AES Cipher Key: 2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 A6 AB F7 15 88 09
1402CF 4F 3C.
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1404A Triple-DES key consists of three keys for the cryptographic engine (Key1,
1405Key2, and Key3) that are each 64 bits (even though only 56 are used); the
1406three keys are also referred to as a key bundle (KEY) [SP800-67].SP800_67 A
1407key bundle may employ either two or three mutually independent keys. When
1408only two are employed (called two-key Triple-DES), then Key1 = Key3.
208
209
14334], ANSI [X9.42], etc.) from which the key formats are obtained and the best practice documents
1434(e.g., NIST [SP800-57-1], NIST [SP800-56A] etc.) which recommend that a key pair only be used
1435for one purpose.
1444The RSA public key is comprised of a modulus (n) and an (public) exponent
1445(e). When one indicates that the RSA public key is 2048 bits in length that is
1446a reference to the bit length of the modulus (n) only. So the full length of the
1447RSA public key is actually longer than 2048 bits, since it also includes the
1448length of the exponent (e) and the overhead of the encoding (e.g., ASN.1) of
1449the key material.
1450The RSA private key is comprised of a modulus (n), the public exponent (e),
1451the private exponent (d), prime 1 (p), prime 2 (q), exponent 1 (d mod (p-1)),
1452exponent 2 (d mod (p-1)), and coefficient ((inverse of q) mod p). Once again
1453the 2048 bit key length is referring only to the length of the modulus (n), so
1454the overall length of the private key would be longer given the number of
1455additional components which comprise the key and the overhead of encoding
1456(e.g., ASN.1) of the key material.
1457KMIP implementations need to ensure they do not make assumptions about
1458the actual length of asymmetric (public and private) key material based on
1459the value specified in the Cryptographic Length attribute.
14601.48 Discover Versions
1461The Discover Versions operation allows clients and servers to identify a KMIP
1462protocol version that both client and server understand. The operation was
1463added to KMIP 1.1. KMIP 1.0 clients and servers may therefore not support
1464this operation. If the Discover Versions request is sent to a KMIP 1.0 server
1465and the server does not support the operation, the server returns the
1466Operation Not Supported error.
1467 The operation addresses both the dumb and smart client scenarios.
1468Dumb clients may simply pick the first protocol version that is returned by the
1469server, assuming that the client provides the server with a list of supported
1470protocol version. Smart clients may request the server to return a complete
1471list of supported protocol versions by sending an empty request payload and
1472picking a protocol version that is supported by both client and server.
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1437The value (e.g., 2048 bits) referred to in the KMIP Cryptographic Length
1438attribute for an asymmetric (public or private) key may be misleading, since
1439this length only refers to certain portions of the mathematical values that
1440comprise the key. The actual length of all the mathematical values
1441comprising the public or the private key is longer than the referenced value.
1442This point may be illustrated by looking at the components of a RSA public
1443and private key.
213
214
1473Clients specify the protocol version in the request header and optionally
1474provide a list of protocol versions in the request payload. If the protocol
1475version in the request header is not specified in the request payload and the
1476server does not support any protocol version specified in the request payload,
1477the server returns an empty list in the response payload. In this scenario,
1478clients are aware that the request did not result in an error and could
1479communicate with the server using the protocol version specified in the
1480request header.
14811.49 Vendor Extensions
1483 1. Enumerations have specific ranges which are noted as extensions
1484 2. Item Tag values of the form 0x54xxxx are reserved for vendor extensions
1485 3. Attributes may be defined by the client with a x- prefix or by the server
1486
with a y- prefix
1487Extensions may be used by vendors to communicate information between a
1488KMIP client and a KMIP server that is not currently defined within the KMIP
1489specification.
1490A common use of extensions is to allow for the structured definition of
1491attributes using KMIP TTLV encoding rather than encoding vendor specific
1492information in opaque byte strings.
14931.50 Certificate Revocation Lists
1494Any Certificate Revocation List (CRL) checking which may be required for
1495certificate-related operations such as register and re-key should be performed
1496by the client prior to requesting the operation from a server.
14971.51 Using the Raw Key Format Type
1498As defined in Section 2.1.3 of the KMIP Specification V1.1, the raw key
1499format is intended to be used for a key that contains only cryptographic key
1500material, encoded as a string of bytes. The raw key format supports
1501situations such as non-KMIP-aware end-clients are aware how wrapped
1502cryptographic objects (possibly Raw keys) from the KMIP server should be
1503used without having to rely on the attributes provided by the Get Attributes
1504operation and in that regard is similar to the Opaque key format type.
1505 Raw key format is intended to be applied to symmetric keys and not
1506asymmetric keys; therefore, this format is not specified in the asymmetric
1507key profiles included in KMIP V1.1.
15081.52 Use of Meta-Data Only (MDO) Keys
1509Meta-Data Only ( MDO) keys are those Managed Key Objects for which no Key
1510Value is present, as introduced in version 1.2 of [KMIP-Spec] MDO objects can
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218
219
1511be one of the following: Symmetric Keys, Private Keys, Split Keys, or Secret
1512Data.
1513This may be a result of the KMIP client only wanting to register information
1514(Meta-Data) about the key with a Key Management System, without having
1515the key itself leave the clients physical boundary. One such example could be
1516for keys created and stored within a Hardware Security Module (HSM), with a
1517policy that does not allow for the keys to leave its hardware. In such cases,
1518the KMIP client will not include a Key Value within the Key Block during a
1519Register operation, although it may optionally include a Key Value Location
1520attribute indicating the location of the Key Value instead. For such keys, as
1521part of the Register operation, the server will create a Key Value Present
1522attribute and set it to false to indicate the key value is not stored on the
1523server.
1528Finally, because there is no Key Value associated with an MDO key on the
1529server, KMIP operations for Re-key, Re-key Key Pair and Derive Key cannot be
1530carried out on an MDO key object. An attempt to do so will return an
1531appropriate error as specified in the Error Handling section of [KMIP-Spec].
15321.53 Cryptographic Service
1533KMIP supports creation and registration of managed objects and retrieval of
1534managed objects in both plaintext and optionally wrapped with another
1535managed object. KMIP also includes support for a subset of the operations
1536necessary for certificate management (certifying certificate requests and
1537validating certificate hierarchies). KMIP defines a range of Hash-based and
1538MAC-based key derivation options.
1539There are certain situations in which having capability for a KMIP client to
1540request cryptographic operations from a KMIP server is beneficial in terms of
1541simplifying the client implementation, strengthening the integration between
1542the key management and cryptographic operations, or improving the overall
1543security of a solution.
1544KMIP 1.2 adds support for cryptographic services in the form of client-to1545server operations for cryptographic services using managed objects for
1546encryption, decryption, signature generation, signature verification, MAC
1547generation, MAC verification, random number generation, and general
1548hashing.
1549This support for cryptographic services is similar to the approach taken in
1550KMIP for certificates. The protocol supports a base set of operations on
1551certificates that enable a key manager to act as a proxy for a Certification
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1524The KMIP protocol does not support the addition of a Key Value to an existing
1525MDO key object on the server. If for some reason the client wanted to do this,
1526it would have to carry out another Register operation and create a new
1527managed object with the Key Value.
223
224
1562Similarly, server policy regarding accepting random from a client (see section
15631.7 regarding server policy) should reflect the level of confidence that that
1564server has in a particular client or all clients. Issues in the quality or integrity
1565of random provided in RNG Seed can affect key creation, nonce and IV
1566generation, client-server TLS session key creation, and the random delivered
1567to clients with the RNG Retrieve Operation. KMIP, as a protocol, does not
1568itself enforce restrictions on the quality or nature of the random provided by a
1569client in the RNG Seed operation.
1570A KMIP server that supports the RNG Retrieve and RNG Seed operations may
1571have a single RNG for the server, an RNG which is shared in an unspecified
1572manner by KMIP clients or a separate RNG for each KMIP client. There is no
1573requirement for the KMIP server to implement any specific RNG model.
15741.54 Passing Attestation Data
1575In some scenarios the server may want assurance of the integrity of the
1576clients system before honoring a clients request. Additionally, the server
1577may want a guarantee of the freshness of the attestation computation in the
1578integrity measurement.
1579Generally, the process takes four passes:
1580
1581
1582
1583
1584
1585
1586
1587
1588
1589
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1556KMIP clients and KMIP servers using cryptographic services operations should
1557be mindful of selecting a level of protection for the communication channel
1558(the TLS connection) that provides sufficient protection of the plaintext data
1559included in cryptographic operations and commensurate with the security
1560strength of the operation. There is no requirement for the KMIP server to
1561enforce selection of a level of protection.
1592
1593
1. The client sends a request to the server with the Attestation Capable
Indicator set to True in the request header.
1594
1595
1596
1597
1598
1599
3. The client uses the nonce received from the server in the attestation
computation that will be used in the measurement.
1600
1601
1602
1603
1604
1605
1606
1607
1608
1609
1610
1611
1612
1613
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228
229
233
234
1631operation and Join Split Key operation are added to KMIP v1.2 to provide a
1632more complete set of split key functionality.
1641The client may want to add link attributes to more easily locate the complete
1642set of related Split Keys as follows. The client adds a Previous Link from the
1643Split Key with Key Part Identifier K to the Split Key with Key Part Identifier K-1
1644and a Next Link to the Split Key with Key Part Identifier K+1. Denoting the
1645value of Split Key Parts by N, the client adds a Previous Link from the Split
1646Key with Key Part Identifier 1 to the Split Key with Key Part Identifier N and a
1647Next Link from the Split Key with Key Part Identifier N to the Split Key with Key
1648Part Identifier 1. If the client supplies the Unique Identifier of an existing base
1649key in a Create Split Key request, the client may want to add a Parent Link
1650attribute from each newly generated Split Key to the base key that was
1651supplied in the Create Split Key request.
1652To request the server recombine a set of split keys, the client sends a Join
1653Split Key request that includes the type of object to be returned (e.g.
1654Symmetric Key, Private Key, or Secret Data) and a list of Unique Identifiers of
1655the Split Keys to be combined. The number of Unique Identifiers in the
1656request needs to be at least the value of Split Key Threshold in the Split Keys
1657to ensure the server will be able to combine the keys according to the Split
1658Key Method. The server will respond with the Unique Identifier of the key
1659obtained by combining the provided Split Keys.
16601.56 Compromised Objects
1661A Cryptographic Object or Opaque Object may be compromised for a variety
1662of reasons. In KMIP, a client indicates to the server that a Cryptographic
1663Object is to be considered compromised by performing a Revoke Operation
1664with a Revocation Reason of Key Compromise or CA Compromise. The KMIP
1665client must provide a Compromise Occurrence Date (if the Revocation Reason
1666is Key Compromise) and if it is unable to estimate when the compromise
1667occurred then it should provide a Compromise Occurrence Date equal to the
1668Initial Date.
1669The KMIP specification [KMIP-Spec] places no requirements on a KMIP server
1670to perform any action on any Managed Object that references (i.e., via Link
1671attributes) a Cryptographic Object or Opaque Object that a client has
1672performed a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Key Compromise
235kmip-ug-v1.2-cnd01
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1633To request the server generate a split key, the client sends a Create Split Key
1634request that includes the Split Key parameters (Split Key Parts, Split Key
1635Threshold, Split Key Method) and desired key attributes (e.g. Object Type,
1636Cryptographic Length). If the client supplies the Unique Identifier of an
1637existing base key in a Create Split Key request, the server will use the
1638supplied key in the key splitting operation instead of generating a new one.
1639The server will respond with a list of Unique Identifiers for the newly created
1640Split Keys.
238
239
1673or CA Compromise. However, KMIP users should be aware that there may be
1674security relevant implications in continuing to use a Managed Cryptographic
1675Object in the following circumstances:
1676
For a compromised Private Key, the linked Public Key and/or Certificate;
1677
For a compromised Public Key, the linked Private Key and/or Certificate;
1678
1679
For a compromised Derived Key, the linked derived key and/or Secret
Data Object
1680In these circumstances, it is the responsibility of the client to either check the
1681state of the referenced Managed Object or to also perform a Revoke
1682operation on the referenced Managed Object.
1683
KMIP
Enumeration
Value
OID
Algorithm
Synonym(s)
secp192r1
NIST P-192
00000001
1.2.840.10045.3.1.1
NIST K-163
00000002
1.3.132.0.1
sect163k1
NIST B-163
00000003
1.3.132.0.15
sect163r2
NIST P-224
00000004
1.3.132.0.33
secp224r1
NIST K-233
00000005
1.3.132.0.26
sect233k1
NIST B-233
00000006
1.3.132.0.27
sect233r1
NIST P-256
00000007
1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
NIST K-283
00000008
1.3.132.0.16
240kmip-ug-v1.2-cnd01
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242
ansix9p192v1
secp256r1
ansix9p256v1
sect283k1
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NIST B-283
00000009
1.3.132.0.17
sect283r1
NIST P-384
0000000A
1.3.132.0.34
secp384r1
NIST K-409
0000000B
1.3.132.0.36
sect409k1
NIST B-409
0000000C
1.3.132.0.37
sect409r1
NIST P-521
0000000D
1.3.132.0.35
secp521r1
NIST K-571
0000000E
1.3.132.0.38
sect571k1
NIST B-571
0000000F
1.3.132.0.39
sect571r1
secp112r1
00000010
1.3.132.0.6
secp112r2
00000011
1.3.132.0.7
secp128r1
00000012
1.3.132.0.28
secp128r2
00000013
1.3.132.0.29
secp160k1
00000014
1.3.132.0.9
secp160r1
00000015
1.3.132.0.8
secp160r2
00000016
1.3.132.0.30
secp192k1
00000017
1.3.132.0.31
secp192r1
00000001
1.2.840.10045.3.1.1
secp224k1
00000018
1.3.132.0.32
secp224r1
00000004
1.3.132.0.33
secp256k1
00000019
1.3.132.0.10
secp256r1
00000007
1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
secp384r1
0000000A
1.3.132.0.34
NIST P-384
secp521r1
0000000D
1.3.132.0.35
NIST P-521
sect113r1
0000001A
1.3.132.0.4
sect113r2
0000001B
1.3.132.0.5
sect131r1
0000001C
1.3.132.0.22
sect131r2
0000001D
1.3.132.0.23
sect163k1
00000002
1.3.132.0.1
sect163r1
0000001E
1.3.132.0.2
245kmip-ug-v1.2-cnd01
246Non-Standards Track
247
NIST P-192
ansix9p192v1
NIST P-224
NIST P-256
ansix9p256v1
NIST K-163
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243
244
sect163r2
00000003
1.3.132.0.15
sect193r1
0000001F
1.3.132.0.24
sect193r2
00000020
1.3.132.0.25
sect233k1
00000005
1.3.132.0.26
NIST K-233
sect233r1
00000006
1.3.132.0.27
NIST B-233
sect239k1
00000021
1.3.132.0.3
sect283k1
00000008
1.3.132.0.16
NIST K-283
sect283r1
00000009
1.3.132.0.17
NIST B-283
sect409k1
0000000B
1.3.132.0.36
NIST K-409
sect409r1
0000000C
1.3.132.0.37
NIST B-409
sect571k1
0000000E
1.3.132.0.38
NIST K-571
sect571r1
0000000F
1.3.132.0.39
NIST B-571
ansix9p192v1
00000001
1.2.840.10045.3.1.1
ansix9p192v2
00000022
1.2.840.10045.3.1.2
ansix9p192v3
00000023
1.2.840.10045.3.1.3
ansix9p239v1
00000024
1.2.840.10045.3.1.4
ansix9p239v2
00000025
1.2.840.10045.3.1.5
ansix9p239v3
00000026
1.2.840.10045.3.1.6
ansix9p256v1
00000007
1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
ansix9c2pnb16
3v1
00000027
ansix9c2pnb16
3v2
00000028
ansix9c2pnb16
3v3
00000029
ansix9c2pnb17
6v1
0000002A
ansix9c2tnb19
1v1
0000002B
ansix9c2tnb19
0000002C
250kmip-ug-v1.2-cnd01
251Non-Standards Track
252
NIST B-163
NIST P-192
secp192r1
NIST P-256
secp256r1
1.2.840.10045.3.0.1
1.2.840.10045.3.0.2
1.2.840.10045.3.0.3
1.2.840.10045.3.0.4
1.2.840.10045.3.0.5
1.2.840.10045.3.0.6
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248
249
253
254
1v2
ansix9c2tnb19
1v3
0000002D
ansix9c2pnb20
8w1
0000002E
1.2.840.10045.3.0.1
0
ansix9c2tnb23
9v1
0000002F
1.2.840.10045.3.0.1
1
ansix9c2tnb23
9v2
00000030
1.2.840.10045.3.0.1
2
ansix9c2tnb23
9v3
00000031
1.2.840.10045.3.0.1
3
ansix9c2pnb27
2w1
00000032
1.2.840.10045.3.0.1
6
ansix9c2pnb30
4w1
00000033
1.2.840.10045.3.0.1
7
ansix9c2tnb35
9v1
00000034
1.2.840.10045.3.0.1
8
ansix9c2pnb36
8w1
00000035
1.2.840.10045.3.0.1
9
ansix9c2tnb43
1r1
00000036
1.2.840.10045.3.0.2
0
Brainpool_P160
r1
00000037
Brainpool_P160
t1
00000038
Brainpool_P192
r1
00000039
Brainpool_P192
t1
0000003A
Brainpool_P224
r1
0000003B
Brainpool_P224
t1
0000003C
Brainpool_P256
r1
0000003D
Brainpool_P256
0000003E
255kmip-ug-v1.2-cnd01
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257
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.1
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.2
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.3
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.4
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.5
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.6
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.8
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1.2.840.10045.3.0.7
258
259
t1
Brainpool_P320
r1
0000003F
Brainpool_P320
t1
00000040
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.1
0
Brainpool_P384
r1
00000041
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.1
1
Brainpool_P384
t1
00000042
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.1
2
Brainpool_P512
r1
00000043
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.1
3
Brainpool_P512
t1
00000044
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.1
4
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.9
1694
1695T ABLE 3: ECC A LGORITHM MAPPING
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263
264
1696Applying
KMIP Functionality
1697This section describes how to apply the functionality described in the Key
1698Management Interoperability Protocol Specification to address specific key
1699management usage scenarios or to solve key management related issues.
17001.58 Locate Queries
1703
Exact match of a transition to a given state. Locate the key(s) with a
1704
transition to a certain state at a specified time (t).
1705
Range match of a transition to a given state. Locate the key(s) with a
1706
transition to a certain state at any time at or between two specified
1707
times (t and t).
1708
Exact match of a state at a specified time. Locate the key(s) that are in
1709
a certain state at a specified time (t).
1710
Match of a state during an entire time range. Locate the key(s) that are
1711
in a certain state during an entire time specified with times (t and t).
1712
Note that the Activation Date could occur at or before t and that the
1713
Deactivation Date could occur at or after t+1.
1714
Match of a state at some point during a time range. Locate the key(s)
1715
that are in a certain state at some time at or between two specified
1716
times (t and t). In this case, the transition to that state could be before
1717
the start of the specified time range.
1718This is accomplished by allowing any date/time attribute to be present either
1719once (for an exact match) or at most twice (for a range match).
1720For instance, if the state we are interested in is Active, the Locate queries
1721would be the following (corresponding to the bulleted list above):
1722
1723
1724
1725
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732
1733
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268
269
1749In the case of the Destroyed-Compromise state, there are two dates
1750recorded: the Destroy Date and the Compromise Date. For this state, the
1751Locate operation would be expressed as follows:
1752
1753
1754
1755
1756
1757
1758
1759
1760
1761
1762
1763
1764
1765
1766
1767
1768
1769
1770
1771
1772
1773
1774
1775
1776
1777
1778
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1734
without a DeactivationDate or CompromiseDate is equivalent to
1735
MAX_INT (i.e., infinite).
1736
Match of a state during an entire time range: Locate
1737
(ActivationDate(0), ActivationDate(t), DeactivationDate(t'+1),
1738
DeactivationDate(MAX_INT), CompromiseDate(t'+1),
1739
CompromiseDate(MAX_INT) ). Locate keys in the Active state during
1740
the entire time from t to t.
1741
Match of a state at some point during a time range: Locate
1742
(ActivationDate(0), ActivationDate(t'-1), DeactivationDate(t+1),
1743
DeactivationDate(MAX_INT), CompromiseDate(t+1),
1744
CompromiseDate(MAX_INT)). Locate keys in the Active state at some
1745
time from t to t, by looking for keys with a transition to Active between
1746
0 and t-1 and exit out of Active on or after t+1.
1747The queries would be similar for Initial Date, Deactivation Date, Compromise
1748Date and Destroy Date.
273
274
1779
1780
1781
1794The Key Value includes both the Key Material and, optionally, attributes of the
1795key; these may be provided by the client in the Register Request Payload; the
1796server only includes attributes when requested in the Key Wrapping
1797Specification of the Get Request Payload. The Key Value may be encrypted,
1798signed/MACed, or both encrypted and signed/MACed (and vice versa). In
1799addition, clients have the option to request or import a wrapped Key Block
1800according to standards, such as ANSI TR-31, or vendor-specific key wrapping
1801methods.
1802It is important to note that if the Key Wrapping Specification is included in the
1803Get Request Payload, the Key Value may not necessarily be encrypted. If the
1804Wrapping Method is MAC/sign, the returned Key Value is in plaintext, and the
1805Key Wrapping Data includes the MAC or Signature of the Key Value.
1806Prior to wrapping or unwrapping a key, the server should verify that the
1807wrapping key is allowed to be used for the specified purpose. For example, if
1808the Unique ID of a symmetric key is specified in the Key Wrapping
1809Specification inside the Get request, the symmetric key should have the
1810Wrap Key bit set in its Cryptographic Usage Mask. Similarly, if the client
1811registers a signed key, the server should verify that the Signature Key, as
1812specified by the client inside the Key Wrapping Data, has the Verify bit set
1813in the Cryptographic Usage Mask. If the wrapping key is not permitted to be
1814used for the requested purpose (e.g., when the Cryptographic Usage Mask is
1815not set), the server should return the Operation Failed result status.
18161.59.1 Encrypt-only Example with a Symmetric Key as an
1817
Encryption Key for a Get Request and Response
1818The client sends a Get request to obtain a key that is stored on the server.
1819When the client sends a Get request to the server, a Key Wrapping
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1783KMIP provides the option to register and get keys in wrapped format. Clients
1784request the server to return a wrapped key by including the Key Wrapping
1785Specification in the Get Request Payload. Similarly, clients register a wrapped
1786key by including the Key Wrapping Data in the Register Request Payload. The
1787Wrapping Method identifies the type of mechanism used to wrap the key, but
1788does not identify the algorithm or block cipher mode. It is possible to
1789determine these from the attributes set for the specified Encryption Key or
1790MAC/Signing Key. If a key has multiple Cryptographic Parameters set, clients
1791may include the applicable parameters in Key Wrapping Specification. If
1792omitted, the server chooses the Cryptographic Parameter attribute with the
1793lowest index.
278
279
1825
1827
Cryptographic Parameters: The Block Cipher Mode is NISTKeyWrap
1828
(not necessary if default block cipher mode for wrapping key is
1829
NISTKeyWrap)
1830
Attribute Name: Cryptographic Usage Mask
1831The server uses the Unique Key ID specified by the client to determine the
1832attributes set for the proposed wrapping key. For example, the algorithm of
1833the wrapping key is not explicitly specified inside the Key Wrapping
1834Specification. The server determines the algorithm to be used for wrapping
1835the key by identifying the Algorithm attribute set for the specified Encryption
1836Key.
1837The Cryptographic Parameters attribute should be specified by the client if
1838multiple instances of the Cryptographic Parameters exist, and the lowest
1839index does not correspond to the NIST key wrap mode of operation. The
1840server should verify that the AES wrapping key has NISTKeyWrap set as an
1841allowable Block Cipher Mode, and that the Wrap Key bit is set in the
1842Cryptographic Usage Mask.
1843If the correct data was provided to the server, and no conflicts exist, the
1844server AES key wraps the Key Value (both the Key Material and the
1845Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute) for the requested key with the wrapping
1846key specified in the Encryption Key Information. The wrapped key (byte
1847string) is returned in the servers response inside the Key Value of the Key
1848Block.
1849The Key Wrapping Data of the Key Block in the Get Response Payload
1850includes the same data as specified in the Key Wrapping Specification of the
1851Get Request Payload except for the Attribute Name.
18521.59.2 Encrypt-only Example with a Symmetric Key as an
1853
Encryption Key for a Register Request and Response
1854The client sends a Register request to the server and includes the wrapped
1855key and the Unique ID of the wrapping key inside the Request Payload. The
1856wrapped key is provided to the server inside the Key Block. The Key Block
1857includes the Key Value Type, the Key Value, and the Key Wrapping Data. The
1858Key Value Type identifies the format of the Key Material, the Key Value
1859consists of the Key Material and optional attributes that may be included to
1860cryptographically bind the attributes to the Key Material, and the Key
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1826
283
284
1861Wrapping Data identifies the wrapping mechanism and the encryption key
1862used to wrap the object and the wrapping mechanism.
1863Similar to the example in 4.2.1 the key is wrapped using the AES key wrap.
1864The Key Value includes four attributes: Cryptographic Algorithm,
1865Cryptographic Length, Cryptographic Parameters, and Cryptographic Usage
1866Mask.
1867The Key Wrapping Data includes the following information:
1868
1869
1871
Cryptographic Parameters: The Block Cipher Mode is NISTKeyWrap
1872
(not necessary if default block cipher mode for wrapping key is
1873
NISTKeyWrap)
1874Attributes do not need to be specified in the Key Wrapping Data. When
1875registering a wrapped Key Value with attributes, clients may include these
1876attributes inside the Key Value without specifying them inside the Template1877Attribute.
1878Prior to unwrapping the key, the server determines the wrapping algorithm
1879from the Algorithm attribute set for the specified Unique ID in the Encryption
1880Key Information. The server verifies that the wrapping key may be used for
1881the specified purpose. In particular, if the client includes the Cryptographic
1882Parameters in the Encryption Key Information, the server verifies that the
1883specified Block Cipher Mode is set for the wrapping key. The server also
1884verifies that the wrapping key has the Unwrap Key bit set in the
1885Cryptographic Usage Mask.
1886The Register Response Payload includes the Unique ID of the newly registered
1887key and an optional list of attributes that were implicitly set by the server.
18881.59.3 Encrypt-only Example with an Asymmetric Key as an
1889
Encryption Key for a Get Request and Response
1890The client sends a Get request to obtain a key (either symmetric or
1891asymmetric) that is stored on the server. When the client sends a Get request
1892to the server, a Key Wrapping Specification may be included. If a Key
1893Wrapping Specification is included, and the key is to be wrapped with an RSA
1894public key using the OAEP encryption scheme, the client includes the
1895following information in the Key Wrapping Specification. Note that for this
1896example, attributes for the requested key are not requested.
1897
1898
1899
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1870
288
289
1900
1901
1902
Cryptographic Parameters:
Padding Method: OAEP
Hashing Algorithm: SHA-256
1924
1925
Unique Key ID: Key ID of the MACing key (note that the algorithm
1926
associated with this key would be HMAC-SHA256)
1927
Attribute Name: x-Nonce
1928For HMAC, no Cryptographic Parameters need to be specified, since the
1929algorithm, including the hash function, may be determined from the
1930Algorithm attribute set for the specified MAC Key. The server should verify
1931that the HMAC key has the MAC Generate bit set in the Cryptographic
1932Usage Mask. Note that an HMAC key does not require the Wrap Key bit to
1933be set in the Cryptographic Usage Mask.
1934The server creates an HMAC value over the Key Value if the specified MACing
1935key may be used for the specified purpose and no conflicts exist. The Key
1936Value is returned in plaintext, and the Key Block includes the following Key
1937Wrapping Data:
1938
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1912For both OAEP and PSS, KMIP assumes that the Hashing Algorithm specified in
1913the Cryptographic Parameters of the Get request is used for both the Mask
1914Generation Function (MGF) and hashing data. The example above requires
1915the server to use SHA-256 for both purposes.
293
294
1939
1940
1941
MAC/Signature: HMAC result of the Key Value
1942In the example, the custom attribute x-Nonce was included to help clients,
1943who are relying on the proxy model, to detect replay attacks. End-clients, who
1944communicate with the key management server, may not support TLS and
1945may not be able to rely on the message protection mechanisms provided by a
1946security protocol. An alternative approach for these clients would be to use
1947the custom attribute to hold a random number, counter, nonce, date, or time.
1948The custom attribute needs to be created before requesting the server to
1949return a wrapped key and is recommended to be set if clients frequently
1950wrap/sign the same key with the same wrapping/signing key.
1953Clients may want to register and store a wrapped key on the server without
1954the server being able to unwrap the key (i.e., the wrapping key is not known
1955to the server). Instead of storing the wrapped key as an opaque object,
1956clients have the option to store the wrapped key inside the Key Block as an
1957opaque cryptographic object, i.e., the wrapped key is registered as a
1958managed cryptographic object, but the encoding of the key is unknown to the
1959server. Registering an opaque cryptographic object allows clients to set all
1960the applicable attributes that apply to cryptographic objects (e.g.,
1961Cryptographic Algorithm and Cryptographic Length),
1962Opaque cryptographic objects are set by specifying the following inside the
1963Key Block structure:
1964
1965
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298
299
1979by default, the complete TTLV-encoded Key Value content, as shown in the
1980example below, is wrapped:
1981Key Material || Byte String
|| Length
1982420043
|| 00000010 || 0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF
|| 08
1991It is important to be aware of the risks involved when excluding the attributes
1992from the Key Value. Binding the attributes to the key material in certain
1993environments is essential to the security of the end-client. An untrusted proxy
1994could change the attributes (provided separately via the Get Attributes
1995operation) that determine how the key is being used (e.g., Cryptographic
1996Usage). Including the attributes inside the Key Value and cryptographically
1997binding it to the Key Material could prevent potential misuse of the
1998cryptographic object and may prevent a replay attack if, for example, a nonce
1999is included as a custom attribute. The exclusion of attributes and therefore
2000the usage of the Encoding Option are only recommended in at least one of
2001the following scenarios:
2002 1. End-clients are registered with the KMIP server and are communicating
2003
with the server directly (i.e., the TLS connection is between the server and
2004
client).
2005 2. The environment is controlled and non-KMIP-aware end-clients are aware
2006
how wrapped cryptographic objects (possibly Raw keys) from the KMIP
2007
server should be used without having to rely on the attributes provided by
2008
the Get Attributes operation.
2009 3. The wrapped cryptographic object consists of attributes inside the Key
2010
Material value. These attributes are not interpreted by the KMIP server,
2011
but are understood by the end-client. This may be the case if the Key
2012
Format Type is opaque or vendor-specific.
2013 4. The proxy communicating with the KMIP server on behalf of the end-client
2014
is considered to be trusted and is operating in a secure environment.
2015Registering a wrapped object without attributes is not recommended in a
2016proxy environment, unless scenario 4 is met.
20171.60 Interoperable Key Naming for Tape
2018This section describes methods and provides examples for creating and
2019storing key identifiers that are interoperable across multi-vendor KMIP clients,
2020using the KMIP Tape Library Profile Version 1.0.
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1983Some end-clients may not understand or have the space for anything more
1984than the actual key material (i.e., 0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF in
1985the above example). To wrap only the Key Material value during a Get
1986operation, the Encoding Option (00001 for no encoding) should be specified
1987inside the Key Wrapping Specification. The same Encoding Option should be
1988specified in the Key Wrapping Data when returning the non-TTLV encoded
1989wrapped object inside the Get Response Payload or when registering a
1990wrapped object in non-TTLV encoded format.
303
304
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308
309
First, copy the tape formats unauthenticated KAD data (if any) to the
input buffer. Next, bytes from the authenticated KAD are concatenated,
after the unauthenticated bytes. In many implementations the
unauthenticated KAD is empty, and in those cases the entire input buffer
will be populated with bytes from authenticated KAD.
310kmip-ug-v1.2-cnd01
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20641.
2065
2066
2067
2068
2069
20702.
2071
2072
2073
2074
20753.
2076
20774.
2078
2079
20805.
2081
2082
313
314
21005. For each byte in the input buffer, convert to US-ASCII as follows:
21016.
2102
2103
2104
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2110The reverse translation from KAD bytes to the KMIP key identifier is not
2111shown, but would be accomplished via algorithm 2. This re-constructed key
2112identifier string would be used to Locate the key via ASI.
2135
2136
FOR
LTO4
2137Each square is 1 byte (8 bits). The contents of each square is the 8 bit value
2138which represents a pair of hexadecimal numeric characters in the KMIP key
2139identifier string.
2140Every 8th byte of KAD is shaded.
2141The KAD was populated by converting the rightmost 24 characters (12
2142character pairs) of the identifier string into bytes of authenticated KAD. The
2143remaining characters of the identifier were written to unauthenticated KAD.
2144Translating the key identifier to KAD bytes (LTO5). The corresponding
2145KAD for use with an LTO5 and later tape cartridge is shown in the following
2146figure.
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318
319
2147
FIGURE 3: KAD C ONTENT
2148
FOR
LTO5
2149Each square is 1 byte (8 bits). The contents of each square is the 8 bit value
2150which represents a pair of hexadecimal numeric characters in the key
2151identifier string.
2152Every 8th byte of KAD is shaded.
2153The KAD was populated by converting the rightmost 80 characters (40
2154character pairs) of the identifier string into bytes of authenticated KAD. The
2155unauthenticated KAD is not used because all of the data fits within
2156authenticated KAD.
21571.61 Query Extension Information
2158The Extension Information structure added to KMIP 1.1 and the Query
2159Extension List and Query Extension Map functions of the Query Operation
2160provide a mechanism for a KMIP client to be able to determine which
2161extensions a KMIP server supports.
2162A client may request the list of Extensions supported by a KMIP 1.1 server by
2163specifying the Query Extension List value in the Query Function field. This
2164provides the names of the supported extensions.
2165Example output:
2166
Extension Information
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323
324
328
329
2167
2168
2169
2171A client may request the details of Extensions supported by a KMIP 1.1 server
2172by specifying the Query Extension Map value in the Query Function field. This
2173provides the names of the supported extensions.
2174Example output:
Extension Information
2176
2177
2178
2179
Extension Information
2180
2181
2182
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2175
333
334
2215The PGP Key managed object contains a PGP key (specified in [RFC4880]) as an opaque blob.
2216KMIP compliant servers do not need to understand the fine structure of PGP keys. The intention
2217here is that PGP-enabled clients be able to discover the PGP Key managed cryptographic
2218objects by searching for one of the various names contained within the block. The Alternative
2219Name attribute can be used to specify one or more names (e.g. User IDs) that are attached to the
2220PGP Key object. The PGP-enabled clients are expected to digest the PGP Key object and
2221properly assign these Alternative Name attributes on to the cryptographic managed object. The
2222KMIP server does not have to do this work.
2223Internally, PGP keys may contain many public-private key pairs, each tied to a
2224specific type of encryption operations (one key for signing, one for
2225encryption, and one to tie the other two together in a trust relationship is one
2226typical arrangement.) The Link attribute supports new values that enable the
2227description of this set of PGP Key relationships. The new values are parent,
2228child, previous and next. For example, the private and public keys associated
2229with a PGP Key can be pointed to from the PGP Key with the child link
2230attribute. Additional Decryption Keys (ADK) can be pointed to from the PGP
2231Key with the child link attribute and can be point to each other with the
2232previous and next link attributes. In this way, the link attributes can be
2233used to define the structural relationships required to establish the web of
2234trust for a PGP Key.
2235As mentioned above, KMIP does not attempt to represent all the information
2236about PGP keys that would be managed within a PGP implementation. For
2237example, policies such as algorithms supported, by a PGP key are not
2238expressed within KMIP. Instead, KMIP enables the specification of these
2239attributes, if necessary, as information enclosed within the opaque value
2240defined for a given PGP key. This information would be handled by security
2241administration and out-of-band coordination between the PGP environments
2242that participate in the KMIP exchanges related to PGP keys.
2243KMIP complaint servers are not expected to be able to create PGP Key objects
2244from scratch. PGP-enabled clients will do the key creation and pass the
2245resulting information up to KMIP.
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2212
2213
2214
338
339
2251
2252As described in that document, the goal of these three use cases is to
2253establish the KMIP-interoperable secure channel or channels between KMIP
2254servers and clients, such as a mutually-authenticated TLS channel.
2260Reflecting common usage for KMIP, all three of the scenarios described below
2261discuss the use of X.509 certificates for trust establishment; other
2262mechanisms, such as quantum key distribution, may be used instead but are
2263not described here. Similarly, all three scenarios describe the establishment
2264of a mutually-authenticated TLS connection as the basis trusted exchange of
2265KMIP messages, corresponding to the published KMIP authentication suite
2266profiles; other authentication mechanisms can be used with KMIP, but are not
2267described here.
22681.64.1 Manual Client Registration
2269The use case process flow in section 7.1 of the KMIP Use Cases [KMIP-UC]
2270document describes the interaction between human actors responsible for
2271the client and server systems, resulting in the client administrator receiving a
2272registration packet that can be used to authenticate the client to the server
2273and to confirm the authentication of the server by the client.
2274In this approach, there is no assumption of pre-population of authentication
2275credentials in the client, such as by installing an X.509 certificate into a tape
2276library or drive during the manufacturing process. Rather, a credential is
2277propagated out-of-band to the client administrator, who installs it into the
2278client environment. The credential is then used on initial and subsequent
2279contact between the client and server systems.
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2255The use cases establish high-level process flows for these three approaches
2256to establishing the mutually-authenticated TLS channel described in the KMIP
2257authentication suite profiles. In order to support the goal of establishing an
2258interoperable approach to establishing this channel, this section provides
2259more detailed information about these approaches to client registration.
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344
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2296In this model, KMIP is not used to transmit the X.509 certificate and server
2297information used in establishing the secure channel. There is nothing to
2298prevent KMIP being used to send this information; but commonly this is done
2299using mechanisms other than KMIP, nor is there any expectation that KMIP is
2300a required or default mechanism for propagating the credential and the
2301information. The distribution mechanism, therefore, may well vary across
2302vendors.
348
349
2328scenario above assumes that the return of the servers packet of registration
2329is immediate and automatic; alternatively, the return of the packet of
2330information may be done manually by the server administrator, as in section
23311.64.1 above; or the return of the packet of server information may be done
2332by the server, but only after that action has been approved by an
2333administrator.
2334As discussed in section 1.64.1, KMIP can be used by the client in sending the
2335X.509 certificates to the server. However, this is not required and is currently
2336not typical. If it is sent to the server using a KMIP register operation, the
2337server must be able to distinguish that this operation is intended not only to
2338register the cryptographic object, but also to initiate the registration of the
2339client as a legitimate participant in KMIP message exchange.
2341The third use case described in the KMIP Use Cases [KMIP-UC] document
2342contains additional information about setting up the KMIP server to
2343participate in automatic client registration described in section 1.64.2,
2344particularly in terms of the distribution of the service ID for the server.
2345Although not described in this use case, it does point to a third common
2346model for registering sub-clients of a trusted client. In this model, the
2347establishment of trust between the client and server can be accomplished
2348using either of the approaches in section 1.64.1 or 1.64.2. However, the
2349server may also send additional information to the client, such as a tenant
2350identifier, which it will have to provide to sub-clients for them to use they
2351attempt to register individually. The individual sub-clients would follow a
2352registration model such a s that described in section 1.64.2, but would also
2353provide the tenant identifier along with the X.509 certificate so that the
2354server can decide whether to accept the client, based on such criteria as the
2355TCP/IP address of the sub-client relative to that of the primary client.
2356This approach is common for tiered clients such as virtual machines that
2357need to be grouped based on their association with a larger trusted entity,
2358but that also need individual identities and trust relationships established
2359based on those identities.
2360KMIP can be used for sending both the client certificate and the tenant
2361identifier to the server. But again this is no currently common practice.
2362
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353
354
2363Deprecated
KMIP Functionality
Certificate Identifier
420014
Certificate Issuer
420015
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358
359
420016
2393T ABLE
Certificate Subject
42001A
42001B
Certificate Subject
Distinguished Name
42001C
Issuer
42003B
Serial Number
420087
4: D EPRECATED C ERTIFICATE R ELATED ATTRIBUTES
AND
FIELDS
Certificate Identifier
Certificate Issuer
Certificate Subject
Deprecated V1.0
Field
Issuer
Serial Number
Certificate Serial
Number
Certificate Issuer
X.509 Certificate
Distinguished Name Issuer
Issuer Distinguished
Name
Certificate Issuer
Alternative Name
Issuer Alternative
Name
Certificate Subject
X.509 Certificate
Distinguished Name Subject
Subject
Distinguished Name
Certificate Subject
Subject Alternative
Alternative Name
Name
V 1.0 TO V 1.1 C ERTIFICATE R ELATED A TTRIBUTES AND F IELDS
2408Table 6 lists the PGP Certificate Type enumeration which has been deprecated
2409as of KMIP 1.2.
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Deprecated V1.0
Attribute
363
364
Certificate Type
Name
Value
PGP
00000002(deprecated)
2411Table 7 lists the PGP Certificate Request Type enumeration which has been
2412deprecated as of KMIP 1.2
Certificate Request Type
Name
Value
PGP
00000004(deprecated)
2414
2415
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368
369
2416Implementation
Conformance
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373
374
2421
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
2426
2427
2428
2429
2430
2431
2432
2433
2434
2435
2436
2437
2438
2439
2440
2441
2442
2443
2444
2445
2446
2447
2448
2449
2450
2451
2452
2453
2454
2455
2456
2457
2458
2459
2460
2461
2462
2463
2464
2465
2466
2467
2468
2469
2470
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2471
2472
2473
2474
2475
2476
2477
2478
2479
2480
2481
2482
2483
2484
2485
2486
2487
2488
2489
2490
2491
2492
2493
2494
2495
2496
2497
2498
2499
2500
2501
2502
2503
2504
2505
2506
2507
2508
2509
2510
2511
2512
2513
2514
2515
2516
2517
2518
2519
2520
2521
2522
2523
2524
2525
2526
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378
379
383
384
2527
2528
2529
2530
2531
2532
2533
385kmip-ug-v1.2-cnd01
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387
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388
389
2534Appendix
B.
Acronyms
25363DES
2537ADK
2538AES
2539ANSI
2540ARQC
2541ASCII
2542ASI
2543ASN.1
2544CA
- Certification Authority
2545CBC
2546CMC
- Certificate Management Messages over CMS specified in
2547[RFC5272]
2548CMP
2549CRL
2550CRMF
2551CVC
2552DEK
2553DH
2554DSA
2555DSS
2556ECC
2557ECDH
2558ECDSA
2559FIPS
2560GCM
2561HMAC
2562HSM
2563HTTP
2564HTTPS
2565ID
- Identification
390kmip-ug-v1.2-cnd01
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2566IP
- Internet Protocol
2567IPSec
2568ITU
2569KAD
2570KEK
2571KMIP
2572LTO4
2573LTO5
2574LTO6
2575MAC
2576MD5
2577MDO
- Meta-Data Only
2578MGF
2579NIST
2581OID
- Object Identifier
2582PEM
2583PGP
2584PKCS
2585POP
- Proof of Possession
2586POSIX
2587PSS
2588RNG
2589RSA
2590SEMS
2591SHA
2592SP
- Special Publication
2593SMIME
2594TCP
2595TDEA
2596TLS
2597TTLV
2598URI
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393
394
398
399
2599Appendix
C.
2600Table of Figures
2601Figure 1: Aggregator Client Example............................................................................................17
2602Table 1: ID Placeholder Prior to and Resulting from a KMIP Operation........................................27
2603Table 2: Cryptographic Usage Masks Pairs..................................................................................35
2604Table 3: ECC Algorithm Mapping.................................................................................................. 48
2605Figure 2: KAD Content for LTO4................................................................................................... 59
2606Figure 3: KAD Content for LTO5................................................................................................... 60
2607Table 4: Deprecated Certificate Related Attributes and Fields......................................................67
2608Table 5: Mapping of v1.0 to v1.1 Certificate Related Attributes and Fields...................................67
2609Table 6: Deprecated PGP Certificate Type....................................................................................67
2611Table of Tables
2612Figure 1: Aggregator Client Example............................................................................................17
2613Table 1: ID Placeholder Prior to and Resulting from a KMIP Operation........................................27
2614Table 2: Cryptographic Usage Masks Pairs..................................................................................35
2615Table 3: ECC Algorithm Mapping.................................................................................................. 48
2616Figure 2: KAD Content for LTO4................................................................................................... 59
2617Figure 3: KAD Content for LTO5................................................................................................... 60
2618Table 4: Deprecated Certificate Related Attributes and Fields......................................................67
2619Table 5: Mapping of v1.0 to v1.1 Certificate Related Attributes and Fields...................................67
2620Table 6: Deprecated PGP Certificate Type....................................................................................67
2621Table 7: Deprecated PGP-Certificate Request Type.....................................................................68
2622
2623Figure 1: Aggregator Client Example............................................................................................17
2624Table 1: ID Placeholder Prior to and Resulting from a KMIP Operation........................................27
2625Table 2: Cryptographic Usage Masks Pairs..................................................................................35
2626Table 3: ECC Algorithm Mapping.................................................................................................. 48
2627Figure 2: KAD Content for LTO4................................................................................................... 59
2628Figure 3: KAD Content for LTO5................................................................................................... 60
2629Table 4: Deprecated Certificate Related Attributes and Fields......................................................67
2630Table 5: Mapping of v1.0 to v1.1 Certificate Related Attributes and Fields...................................67
2631Table 6: Deprecated PGP Certificate Type....................................................................................67
2632Table 7: Deprecated PGP-Certificate Request Type.....................................................................68
2633
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2634Appendix
D.
Revision
Date
Revision History
Editor
Changes Made
V1.2wd01-01
3/18/13
Indra Fitzgerald
V1.2wd01-02
5/9/13
Judy Furlong
Restructuring of UG
5/16/13
Judy Furlong
V1.2-wd02
5/30/13
405kmip-ug-v1.2-cnd01
406Non-Standards Track
407
Judy Furlong
Compromised State of
Linked Objects
Client Registration
PGP Cert and Cert Type
Deprecation
Incorporation of the UG text for
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403
404
408
409
Templates
Cryptographic Services
V1.2-wd03
6/27/13
Judy Furlong
Application Specification
Information
Removed Compromised
State of Linked Objects
section until wording can be
agreed upon
Incorporated 1.1 Errata for
the Usage Guide
Other UG related content changes:
V1.2-wd04
V1.2-wd05
7/11/13
8/19/13
410kmip-ug-v1.2-cnd01
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412
Judy Furlong
Judy Furlong
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413
414
V1.2-wd06
V1.2cnd01
8/22/13
9/13/13
Judy Furlong
Judy Furlong
Updated References
[Rev
Date]
[Modified By]
[Summary of Changes]
[Type the document title]
[Rev
number]
2635
2636
415kmip-ug-v1.2-cnd01
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417
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