Author(s): H. Rashdall
Source: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Jul., 1894), pp. 459-480
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2375665 .
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International Journal of Ethics.
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459
OF NAPLES.
THE
LIMITS
OF CASUISTRY.*
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and wrong is equally arbitraryand unaccountable. The comparison betweenlogic and ethics can be at best an illustration,
not an argument. And afterall, is thereany real analogy between the two cases? Though we cannot give any reason
why A. follows from B., while D. does not follow,yet the
mind does actually see a connection between the two ideas
which it pronouncesto be thus connected. There is a movement from one idea to another. That is exactly what we
understandby reasoning. But in the region of morals we
are, it appears, absolutelyforbiddento move fromone idea to
another. Moral judgments, we are explicitly told, are not
discursive; and yet we are also told that moraljudgments are
an affairof the reason. Yet we are, it would seem, forbidden
to argue that if A. is moral,B. must also be moral, unless we
can point out some relevantdifferencebetweenthe two cases.
To take a concrete instance. I might,it would appear, according to Mr. Bradley, reasonablymaintain that to hunt a
tame stag to death with dogs is lawfulsport,while to do the
same thingwitha cat is crueltyto animals. I could not be
convicted of an inconsistency or unreasonableness in so
judging, even though I might be quite unable to specifyany
materialdifferencebetween the two cases. Such, as faras I
can understand,are the consequences of adopting the ethics
of reason.
It would really, I think,be a waste of time to point out
how utterlyinconsistentthis way of thinking is with the
actual procedure of mankind or the actual historyof moral
ideas. As a matterof fact,men endowed with reason have
always reasoned or argued about mattersof conduct,and the
accepted code of right and wrong has been evolved as the
result of such moral reasonings. I do not, of course, maintain that all moral progress can be explained as the resultof
increasingintellectualdiscernmentas to the interdependence
of moral ideas or the applicationto particularcases of principles already admitted. I am not concerned even to argue
that men have consistentlyapplied, or do consistentlyapply,
or ought to apply, chains of reasoning to the wholeof their
conduct. It is enough formy purpose to point out that they
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467
Second, and the second answer to the objection that casuistry may be left to the professorsof the particularpractical
sciences is this, that,though certain departmentsof life are
treated of by special sciences and their professors,there is a
large neutralzone of conductwhichis entirelyunappropriated.
My duties as a teacher are no doubt dealt with by pedagogy
(though I must confessto never having systematicallystudied
a single workwiththatformidabletitle),my dutiesas a clergyman by pastoral theology, my duties as a wealth-producing
animal by chrematisticsor whateverbe its modernequivalent,
my duties as a citizenby politics; but what of my duties as a
man? To deny that there may be a systematictreatmentof
that subject seems to me to amount to the denial of the
propositionthatone oughtto thinkbeforeone acts. Wherever
it is possible to think,it is possible to think systematically.
And systematicthoughtis science.
There is, then,a science of conduct,and, in a sense, an art
of conduct,even according to those who will not admit that
all actions are to be judged according to theirforeseenconsequences. From this point,however,I shall say no more of
this, to me, unintelligibleview of ethics, and consider the
question of the possibility of a scientificdeterminationof
ethical problems frommy own point of view. It would lead
me too far from my subject were I to attempthere to argue
the question of the ethical criterion; so I must be allowed
merelyto state that I am one of those who do hold thatevery
action is rightor wrongaccording as it tends or does not tend
to produce general well-being,but that I do not assent to the
hedonisticinterpretation
which is usually given to evoaeuovc'a
or
well-beingby avowed Utilitarians. I hold that pleasure is a
part of the supremelydesirable state of consciousness which
the good man seeks to promoteforall mankind,though it is
not the only elementin that supremegood. I hold thatpleasures are not all equally desirable; that some pleasures are intrinsicallybetterthan otherswithoutbeing necessarilygreater
in amount,and (withAristotle) I hold that some pleasures are
bad. I quite recognize that this is a merelypopular way of
statingthe case. In strictnessof speech,pleasure (that is,the
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the hedonisticcalculus. It is clearlyimpossible to prove empiricallythat the discoveryof truthalways increases pleasure.
And yet the case of truth-speakinghas always been one of the
great difficultiesof the thorough-goingintuitionist. Every
one in practice admits that there are certain rare and fairly
well recognized rare occasions on which it is right to lie;
while as to the active propagation of truth,nobody but a
madman really does go about proclaiming the truth on all
subjects to all persons on all occasions. Once recognize that
the intuitionsays merely," Truth is a good and intrinsically
valuable thing,"or,to speak more exactly," the consciousness
that knows, reveres,pursues,and wills to make known the
is experitruthpossesses intrinsicvalue,"-and no difficulty
enced in reconcilingthe theorywiththe practiceof good men.
Truth is a good thing; but so is pleasure, and still more emphatically so is humanity. Hence, in a case of collision, I
must choose which is most valuable. I cannot (with Dr.
Martineau) assign to the love of truth a fixed and definite
place in a hierarchyof motivesor ends of action. For we all
in practicejudge that a littletruthmay have to be sacrificed
to much humanity,while it may equally be rightto sacrifice
a littlepleasure in othersand a littlebenevolence in ourselves
to truth.
Estimatingthe bearing of all this upon our immediatesubject, we may, I think,lay down the followingproposition: A
scientifictreatmentof casuistical questions is possible as between persons agreed in their ultimateideal or conceptionof
human good. Where people hold differentconceptions of
human good, therewill be certaindepartmentsof moralityin
which theirresultswill differ,
though therewill remain a part
-on the whole by farthe largerpart-of the whole sphere of
conduct in which no such differenceis practicallylikely to
arise between well-meaningmodern men.
And if any one is inclined to object to what may seem so
large a surrenderto subjective caprice, I should like to emphasize the fact that people's ideals of human life really do
and have differedeven more. So long as that is the
differ,
case, therecan be no advantage eithertheoreticalor practical
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