Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

Fuzzy fault tree analysis for re and explosion of crude oil tanks
Daqing Wang a, *, Peng Zhang b, Liqiong Chen a
a
b

School of Petroleum Engineering, Southwest Petroleum University, 610500 Chengdu, PR China

School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Southwest Petroleum University, 610500 Chengdu, PR China

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:
Received 9 January 2013
Received in revised form
16 March 2013
Accepted 28 August 2013

Crude oil tank re and explosion (COTFE) is the most frequent type of accident in petroleum reneries,
oil terminals or storage which often results in human fatality, environment pollution and economic loss.
In this paper, with fault tree qualitative analysis technique, various potential causes of the COTFE are
identied and a COTFE fault tree is constructed. Conventional fault tree quantitative analysis calculates
the occurrence probability of the COTFE using exact probability data of the basic events. However, it is
often very difcult to obtain corresponding precise data and information in advance due to insufcient
data, changing environment or new components. Fuzzy set theory has been proven to be effective on
such uncertain problems. Hence, this article investigates a hybrid approach of fuzzy set theory and fault
tree analysis to quantify the COTFE fault tree in fuzzy environment and evaluate the COTFE occurrence
probability. Further, importance analysis for the COTFE fault tree, including the FusselleVesely importance measure of basic events and the cut sets importance measure, is performed to help identifying the
weak links of the crude oil tank system that will provide the most cost-effective mitigation. Also, a case
study and analysis is provided to testify the proposed method.

2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:
Crude oil tank
Fire and explosion
Fuzzy fault tree analysis
Occurrence probability
Importance analysis

1. Introduction
Recent years see sustainable economic growth of China, while the
turbulence in international crude oil market has stimulated Chinas
need for much larger strategic oil reserves. More and more largescale crude oil storage tanks have been designed and constructed
presently. Although most companies follow strict engineering
guidelines and standards for the construction, material selection,
design and safe management of storage tanks and their accessories,
there is always the possibility of re or explosion for various causes.
According to statistics, the crude oil tank re and explosion (COTFE)
is the most frequent type of accident in petroleum reneries, oil
terminals or storage (Fan, 2005). Besides China, yearly losses due to
the COTFE are substantial all over the world (Chang & Lin, 2006).
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a systematic approach to estimate safety
and reliability of a complex system, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. FTA can be applied both to an existing system and a system in
designation. For system in design, FTA can provide an estimate of the
failure probability and contributors using generic data and also can be
used as a supporting tool of a performance-based design. In an existing
system, FTA can identify weaknesses, evaluate possible upgrades,
monitor and predict behavior. For those merits, FTA technique has
been extensively used in many elds, such as nuclear power, electric
* Corresponding author. Tel.: 86 13658001455.
E-mail address: wdqmnn@126.com (D. Wang).
0950-4230/$ e see front matter
2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2013.08.022

power, chemical process, oil and gas transmission, etc (Dong & Yu,
2005; Prugh, 1992; Sadiq, Saint-Martin, & Kleiner, 2008).
In traditional FTA, the failure probabilities of the basic events
(BEs) are expressed by exact values (Dong & Yu, 2005; Ferdous,
Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte, & Veitch, 2009; Sadiq et al., 2008). However, in reality, the vagueness nature of a system, the working environment of a system, and the lack of sufcient statistical inference,
all raise difculties in the estimation of occurrence probabilities of
components or BEs (Dong & Yu, 2005; Liang & Wang, 1993; Pan &
Yun, 1997). And this makes quantitative analysis of a fault tree of a
system questionable by conventional methods. In order to handle
inevitable imprecise failure information in diversied real applications, many researches have taken the uncertain situations into
consideration. Fuzzy set theory has been proven to be effective on
solving problems where there are no sharp boundaries and precise
values, while it is also efcient (Onisawa, 1990; Suresh, Babar, & Raj,
1996; Zadeh, 1965). Chen (1994) and Mon and Cheng (1994) carried
out system reliability analysis by using fuzzy set theory. Dong and Yu
(2005) applied fuzzy theory to estimate the failure probabilities of
BEs. Tanaka, Fan, Lai, and Toguchi (1983), Pan et al. (2007), Suresh
et al. (1996), and Miri Lavasani, Wang, Yang, and Finlay (2011)
implemented fuzzy theory into the FTA technique for certain system safety assessment. In this paper, the imprecise failure data of
BEs of the COTFE fault tree are replaced with fuzzy numbers and an
approach of fuzzy based fault tree analysis (FFTA) is introduced to
estimate the probability of occurrence of the COTFE. Further, the

OR

AND

OR

OR

Electrified
railway

Electric leakage
nearby

Cathodic
protection
Other non-explosion
proof electrical
equipments
Non-explosion
proof monitor
or detector

Lighter

Without installing
lightning protection
facilities
Lightning
induction

Lightning invasion
along pipelines
Direct lightning
flash

Deflector
damaged

Ground rod
damaged

Air terminal
damaged

Breathing
valve open by
breakdown

Gauge hatch
often open

Flexible
connection pipe
rupture

High degree
corrosion of
tank wall

Poor seal around

manhole

Floating metal
debris on oil surface

Oil lashing against

metal materials

Rough inner
wall of pipeline

High oil flow

velocity

Excessive
loading

Wrong valve
opened

Tank wall broken

by external force

Tank top
unattended

Friction between
fiber and human
body
Operator close
to a conductor

Non-standard
apparatus

Not enough
standing time

Friction between
splashing oil and air

Broken
ground wire

Non-standard
ground resistance

Fig. 1. Schematics of the COTFE fault tree.

Audio-visual or
photographic
equipment
Mobile
telephone

Match

Vehicles without
flame arresters
Fire work
Smoking

Wearing iron
nail-shoes

Without installing
anti-static
grounding device

X27

X26

X29

X24

Stray
current

X43

X28

X30

X36

X35

X32

X31

X42

X41

OR

X25

X34

X37

Measuring
operational
error

Operational
error
X33

Oil leakage
Oil spill

X39

OR

X15
X14
X13

Human body
electrostatic
discharge

X22
X6

Collision of metal tools

and tank wall during
maintenance operation
Using
non-explosion
proof tools

OR

X38

OR

X10

OR
Electrostatic
accumulation

X12
X9

Static
sparks

OR
X11

OR

X19
X2

X21

OR

Arrester
faults

X20
X16

X18

Imperfect
earth

X8

Lightning
stroke

X7

AND
Bad
grounding

X40

OR

X23

AND
AND

OR

Vapor-air
mixtures within
explosive range
Oil tank
electrostatic
discharge

Vapor-air
mixtures within
explosive range

X17
X1

Electrical
apparatus sparks

OR

X5
X4
X3

Lightning
sparks

Open
fires
Static
sparks
Impact
sparks

Ignition
sources

1391
D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398

Tank fire and

explosion

AND

OR

1392

D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398

proposed approach is used to perform importance analysis of the

COTFE fault tree in order to help decision maker determine whether
and where to take preventive or corrective action on the crude oil
tank system in the risk management process.
2. Traditional FTA of COTFE
2.1. Construction of COTFE fault tree
FTA is a deductive method for identifying ways in which hazards
can lead to accidents. The approach starts with a top undesired
event and work backwards towards the various scenarios that can
cause the accident. In a fault tree, the top, intermediate and basic
events are connected together by logic gates. The gates show relationships of input events needed for the occurrence of a fault at
the output of the gate. AND gates combine input events, all of which
must exist simultaneously for the output to occur. OR gates also
combine input events, but any one is sufcient to cause the output.
In present paper, the COTFE accident is considered as the top event
(TE). Two intermediate events must occur together for the COTFE:
ignition sources and vapor-air mixtures within explosive range, so
they must be connected to the TE by an AND gate. Various ignition
sources may exist in the tank park: impact sparks, static sparks, open
res, lighting sparks, electrical apparatus sparks and stray current.
Any one of them could ignite an explosive mixture if contacted, so
these must be connected by an OR gate. Also there are many causes
that can lead to the explosive mixtures, such as oil spill, gauge hatch
often open, breathing valve open by breakdown or oil leakage. Next,
consider these sub-events as the new intermediate events, and then
each of them will be substituted by the lower events. Continue
developing the fault tree until its all branches have been terminated
by basic or undeveloped events. Finally, a complete fault tree of the
COTFE is constructed as shown in Fig. 1. The proposed fault tree includes 43 BEs that contribute to the occurrence of the COTEF accident.

After the COTFE fault tree is fully drawn, both qualitative and
quantitative evaluation can be performed. The aim of qualitative
analysis of a fault tree is to nd out the minimal cut sets (MCSs). The
MCSs relate the TE directly with the basic event causes and a MCS is the
smallest combination of BEs which if they all fail will cause the occurrence of the undesired event. The MCSs are very useful for determining
the various ways in which a top undesired event could occur. In this
study, the MCSs of the COTFE fault tree are obtained by using the
combination of Fussell-Vesely algorithm and the rules of Boolean
algebra (Fussell & Vesely, 1972; Wang, 1999). The proposed fault tree
yields 392 MCSs for just 43 BEs, including 90 MCSs of order 2, 234 MCSs
of order 3 and 68 MCSs of order 4. The MCSs equation is as follows:

XXX
s

Xm Xk Xn X37

XX
i

XX

!
Xs Xr Xn X37

Xi Xn X37

X33 X34 Xn X37

XXX
m

X
j

3.1. Fuzzy numbers to dene probabilities of the BEs

The concept of fuzzy set theory was introduced by L.A Zadeh
(1965) to deal with uncertain or vague information. A fuzzy set
dened on a universe of discourse (U) is characterized by a membership function, m(x), which takes values from the interval [0, 1]. A
membership function provides a measure of the degree of similarity of an element in U to the fuzzy subset. Fuzzy sets are dened
for specic linguistic variables. Each linguistic term can be represented by a triangular, trapezoidal or Gaussian shape membership
function. The selection of a membership function essentially depends on the variable characteristics, available information and
experts opinion. Here, triangular fuzzy numbers (TFNs) and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers (ZFNs) are employed for their simplicity and
efciency to quantify the probabilities of the BEs. The triangular
representation shows the fuzzy possibility of a BE can be denoted
by a triplet (a1, a2, a3) and the corresponding membership function
is written as (Wang, 1997):

0
x  a1 =a2  a1
mA~ x
>
> a3  x=a3  a2
:
0

; x  a1
; a1  x  a2
; a2  x  a3
; x  a3

(2)

A ZFN denoted by a quadruple (a1, a2, a3, a4) is dened as

follows:

8
0
>
>
>
>
< x  a1 =a2  a1
mA~ x
1
>
>
> a4  x=a4  a3
>
:
0

; x  a1
; a1  x  a2
; a2  x  a3
; a3  x  a4
; x  a4

(3)

3.2. Aggregation of fuzzy numbers of the BEs

T MCS1 MCS2 . MCSN

XXX

3. Fuzzy based FTA of COTFE

8
>
>
<

2.2. Evaluation of COTFE fault tree

where 1  i  8 and 16  i  22, 38  j  43, 26  k  32,

23  m  25, 35  n  36, 12  r  15, 9  s  11; N is the serial
number of MCS, 1  N  392; X represents BE.
The aim of quantitative analysis of a developed fault tree is to
provide a measure of the probability of occurrence of the TE and the
major faults contributing to the TE. The quantitative evaluation requires the gathering of exact failure data of BEs for input to the fault
tree. However, for the COTFE fault tree, it is difcult to have a precise
estimation of the BE probability due to insufcient data; in fact many
BEs of the COTFE fault tree may not have quantitative data at all due
to its inherent uncertainty and imprecision. Therefore, it is not
possible to assign a single value of probability to each BE. In order to
overcome such limitations in traditional FTA, a fuzzy based
approach is developed and discussed in the following sections.

X33 X34 Xj

Xm Xk Xj

XXX
s

1
Xs Xr Xj A

Xi Xj
(1)

Since each expert may have a different opinion about the same
BE according to his/her experience and expertise in the relevant
eld, in order to achieve agreement among experts conicted
views, the fuzzy numbers assigned by different experts should be
aggregated to a single one. A consistency aggregation method (Wei,
Qiu, & Wang, 2001) is proposed in this paper. This methodology is a
revised version of the Hsu and Chens algorithm (Hsu & Chen, 1996),
which overcomes the assumed restriction that the opinions of all
experts represented by fuzzy numbers should have a common
intersection. The proposed method is described as follows:
~ ;A
~ of the opinions A
~ and A
~
(1) Calculate the similarity degree sA
i
j
i
j
of a pair of experts Ei and Ej.

D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398




~ ;A
~ EVi =EVj ;
s A
i
j
EVj =EVi ;

EVi  EVj
EVj  EVi

(4)

~ ;A
~ [0,1] is the similarity function; A
~ and A
~ are two
where sA
i
j
i
j
standard fuzzy numbers, respectively; EVi and EVj separately
~ or A
~ . The EV of a traprepresent the expectancy evaluation for A
i
j
~ a ; a ; a ; a is dened as:
ezoidal fuzzy number A
1 2 3 4

h  
 i
 
~ E A
~
~ 1 E A
EV A
2


n
Y

1

n
Y

1
n

n
X

1

(7)

(3) Calculate the relative agreement degree (RAD) of each expert.

RADi AEi =

n
Y

(11)

~i
1Qp

1  ai2 ;

1  ai3 ; 1 

i1

(12)
!

1  ai4

i1

Q
where
denotes fuzzy multiplication;
subtraction.
For triangular fuzzy number (ai1, ai2, ai3):
n
Y

n
Y

~i
p

i1

isj
j 1

n
X

n
Y

i1
n
Y

~ c ANDFp
~1 ; p
~2 ;:::; p
~n
P



~ ;A
~
sij A
i
j

ai4

i1

1  ai1 ; 1 

~ ;A
~ , if i j, then sij 1. A(Ei) is dened as:
where sij sA
i
j

AEi

ai3 ;

i1

n
Y

i1

i1
n
Y

(6)

ai2 ;

i1

n
Y

~ c ORFp
~1 ; p
~2 ; .; p
~ n 1Q
P

where E (A) (a1 a2)/2, E (A) (a3 a4)/2.

/
B 1 s12 / s1n C
B
M @ s21 1
s C
1 12 A
sn1 sn2
1
/

n
Y

ai1 ;

i1

~i
p

i1

n
Y

~ c ANDFp
~1 ; p
~ 2 ; .; p
~n
P

(5)

(2) Construct the consensus matrix M and calculate the average

agreement degree A(Ei) of the experts.

1393

~ c ORFp
~1 ; p
~ 2 ; :::; p
~ n 1Q
P

ai1 ;

i1
n
Y

Q denotes fuzzy

n
Y

ai2 ;

i1

n
Y

!
ai3

~i
1Qp

i1

1

n
Y

1  ai1 ; 1 

i1

n
Y

(13)

i1

1  ai2 ; 1 

i1

n
Y

!
1  ai3

i1

(14)
AEi

(8)

i1

(4) The aggregation weight (wi) of each expert Ei is the combination of the RADi and the importance degree (EIDi) of experts Ei.

~ TE ) can be calculated
Hence, the fuzzy possibility of the COTFE (P
using the following equation:

~ TE 1 
P

n 
Y

~
1P
ci

i1

wi a$EIDi 1  a$RADi

i 1; 2; .; n

(9)

where a (0a  1) is a relaxation factor which shows the imporP

tance EIDi over RADi; EIDi (0  EIDi  1 and
EIDi 1) can be
determined by using Delphi method (Dong & Yu, 2005) or analytic
hierarchy process (Bryson & Mobolurin, 1994).

1

 


i
h
~
~
~
1P
c1 5 1  P c2 5.5 1  P cn

(15)

~ TE
~c1 ; p
~c2 ; .; p
~cn denote the fuzzy possibilities of all MCSs; P
where p
is the fuzzy COTFE possibility.

3.4. Defuzzication of the fuzzy COTFE possibility

(5) The aggregation result of the experts opinions can be obtained
as follows:

~j
p

n
X

~ ij
wi 5p

j 1; 2; .; m

(10)

i1

~j is the aggregated fuzzy number of BEj; p

~ij is the fuzzy
where p
number of BEj assigned by expert Ei; m is the number of experts; n is
the number of BEs; wi is a weighting factor of the expert Ei.
3.3. The fuzzy COTFE possibility estimation
To minimize the error due to uncertainty in BE probability
data, the present algorithm uses fuzzied possibility data of BE for
quantication of a fault tree. Fuzzy arithmetic operations rules
(Liang & Wang, 1993; Tanaka et al., 1983) are employed to estimate the fuzzy possibility of the MCSs and the same for the
COTFE.
~1 ; p
~2 ; .; p
~n , the fuzzy
Giving the fuzzy possibilities for all BEs, p
~ c ) are estimated using following
possibilities of the MCSs (P
expressions. For trapezoidal fuzzy number (ai1, ai2, ai3, ai4):

To provide a useful outcome for decision making, the fuzzy possibility of the COTFE must be rst mapped to crisp possibility score
(CPS) through defuzzication. A number of defuzzication methods
(Ross, 2004; Wang, 1997) are available, including mean max membership, centroid method, weighted average method, center of
largest area, center of sums and so on. In this paper, the center of area
defuzzication technique (Miri Lavasani et al., 2011; Wang, 1997) is
~
adopted for its simplicity and usefulness. Defuzzication of TFN A
a1 ; a2 ; a3 can be obtained by the following expression:

Z
*
PTE
Z

Za2
xmA~ xdx

mA~ xdx

a1

x  a1
xdx
a2  a1

Za2
a1

x  a1
dx
a2  a1

Za3
a2
Za3
a2

a3  x
xdx
a3  a2
a3  x
dx
a3  a2

1
a1 a2 a3
3
* is the defuzzied output; x is the output variable.
where PTE
~ a ; a ; a ; a is:
Defuzzication of ZFN A
1 2 3 4

(16)

1394

D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398

Za2
*
PTE

a1

x  a1
xdx
a2  a1

Za2
a1

Za3

Za4
xdx

a2

x  a1
dx
a2  a1

a3

Za3

Za4
dx

a2

a3

a4  x
xdx
a4  a3

MCS importance is estimated by calculating the ratio of the MCS

probability to the COTFE probability. The calculation is performed
as follows:

a4  x
dx
a4  a3

IjCS

1 a4 a3 2  a4 a3  a1 a2 2 a1 a2
$
3
a4 a3  a2  a1

(17)

j
PMCS
PTE

(21)

j
where IjCS is the CS-I index of the jth MCS; PMCS
is the occurrence
probability of the jth MCS.

3.5. Convert crisp possibility score (CPS) into probability value (PV)

4. A case study

In traditional FTA the nal result is an exact probability value. In

fuzzy based FTA, however, the output is crisp possibility score (CPS)
because the occurrence probability of each BE is represented by
fuzzy numbers. There is inconsistency between the real probability
data and the possibility score. This issue can be solved by transforming the CPS into the form of probability of occurrence. The
following conversion function (Onisawa, 1988, 1990) is proposed:

The COTFE accident erupted in Hunan oil depot (Fan, 2005),

which result in four people died and two injured, is selected here
as a case study. The proposed fuzzy based FTA is performed to
evaluate the occurrence probability of the COTFE accident. And
the implementation of the proposed approach also provides an
opportunity to reinvestigate the causes of accident, which is
helpful to prevent or reduce the occurrence of such accidents in
the future. One of the other aims of the study is to compare the
results obtained by the fuzzy FTA with the results reached by
traditional FTA.
Considering the COTFE as an undesired top event, the COTFE
tree has been constructed as shown in Fig. 1. Once the fault tree has
been developed, it can be evaluated to identify the possible basic
causes (or BEs) and pathways (minimum combination of BEs) that
would lead to the undesired event. As previously concluded,
quantitative analysis shows there are 43 BEs and 392 MCSs in the
COTFE tree. Subsequently, using the failure probability data of the
BEs, those pathways can be further evaluated to estimate the COTFE
occurrence probability and nd out the most vulnerable pathways
and BEs.

(
PV

1
10m ;

CPSs0

0;

CPS 0

(18)

where


m

1
1  CPS 3
 2:301
CPS

(19)

* CPS, P
and PTE
TE PV; PTE is the probability of occurrence of the
CCOTFE.

3.6. Importance analysis of the COTFE fault tree

At the time of decision making process, it is useful to have the
events sorted according to some criteria. This ranking is enabled by
importance analysis. In this study, the importance analysis of the
COTFE fault tree is carried out based on the investigation of the
importance measures of the BEs and the MCSs in the proposed tree.
3.6.1. FusselleVesely importance of BEs
The FusselleVesely importance (FV-I) is employed to evaluate
the contribution of each BE to the occurrence probability of the
COTFE. This importance measure is sometimes called the top
contribution importance. It provides a numerical signicance of all
the BEs in the COTFE fault tree and allows them to be prioritized.
The FV-I of a BE is calculated by the following equation (Vinod,
Kushwaha, Verma, & Srividya, 2003):

IxFVi

xi 0
PTE  PTE
PTE

(20)

xi 0
where IxFVi is the FV-I index of ith BE; PTE
is the occurrence probability of the COTFE by setting the probability of ith BE to 0. Decision makers use this importance index to improve the safety
features of the analyzed crude oil tanks.

3.6.2. Cut sets importance

Cut sets importance (CS-I) is used to evaluate the contribution of
each MCS to the TE occurrence probability. This importance measure provides a method for ranking the impact of each MCS and
identifying the most likely path that leads to the TE. In order to
measure the CS importance, the output fuzzy possibility of each
MCS of the COTFE fault tree needs to be converted into a probability
value using the methods described in Section 3.4e3.5. Then the

4.1. Fuzzy-based approach

4.1.1. Fuzzy numbers dening probabilities of BEs
Due to lack of the precise probability data of BEs of the COTFE
tree, the approach synthesizing the fuzzy set theory and experts
linguistic judgments is proposed to quantify the occurrence possibilities of the BEs. In this study, three experts, including a reliability analyst and two senior eld engineers, are invited to
perform the assessments. In order to capture experts linguistic
notions of probabilities for the BEs, a seven level linguistic rating
scale, i.e. {Very Low (VL), Low (L), Mildly Low (ML), Medium (M),
Mildly High (MH), High (H) and Very High (VH)}, has been proposed. Then, the linguistic expressions are transformed into fuzzy
numbers using a numerical approximation system as shown in
Fig. 2 (Chen, Hwang, & Hwang, 1992). The result of the expert
judgments for all the BEs is shown in Table 1.
4.1.2. Aggregating fuzzy numbers assigned by different experts
Aggregation provides an agreement among the conicted
knowledge provided by different experts. Here the proposed consistency aggregation method is adopted to achieve it. In addition,
for the ease of analysis, the TFNs dening the BE probabilities
should rst be converted into the corresponding ZFNs; for example,
a TFN (a1, a2, a3) can be expressed as a ZFN (a1, a2, a2, a3). Then,
according to Eqs. (4)e(10), the aggregated fuzzy possibility values
for each BEs involved in COTFE tree are obtained (see Table 1),
which will be taken as the input data for fuzzy COTFE probability
calculation. As an example, the detailed aggregation calculations
for BE36 are given in Table 2, which include the calculations such as
~ ;A
~ , average agreement degree A(Ei), relative
similarity degree sA
i
j
agreement degree (RAD), aggregation weight (wi), etc.

D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398

Membership function,

Very Low

Low

Mildly Low

Medium

Mildly High

High

estimated, which is also a continuous ZFN (0.523, 0.897, 0.995,

1.000). Obviously, the fuzziness of the COTFE event is determined
by that of the BEs. And the information about the real state of the
crude oil tank system is revealed sufciently when such fuzzy
description is reserved.

Very High

1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5
0.6
Possibility, p

0.7

0.8

0.9

1395

1.0

Fig. 2. Fuzzy numbers represent linguistic value.

4.1.3. Estimating fuzzy possibility of the COTFE

Quantitative analysis of the COTFE tree attempts to calculate
occurrence probability of the top event. In this study, the probabilities for all BEs are represented in a form of ZFNs, so calculations
of the fuzzy possibility of the COTFE and the MCSs must follow the
fuzzy arithmetic operation rules (Liang & Wang, 1993; Tanaka et al.,
1983). According to Eqs. (11)e(15) and the fuzzy possibilities of the
BEs in Table 1, the fuzzy possibility of occurrence of the COTFE is

4.1.4. Defuzzifying fuzzy possibility of the COTFE

The result obtained above is a fuzzy variable, which needs to be
further converted into a crisp possibility score (CPS) by defuzzication. The CPS is a single crisp numeric value, which represents the
most likely score that an event may occur (Dong & Yu, 2005). Here,
the centre of area defuzzication method Eq. (17) is adopted to
achieve it. The crisp defuzzed result (as shown in Fig. 3) allows
displaying the percentage contribution of the COTFE fuzzy possibility
number in fuzzy set representing fuzzy possibility range. The CPS
value of the COTFE is 0.833 and belongs to two sets: High (H) with the
membership degree of 67% and Very High (VH) in 33%. The result
makes the decision-making in risk assessment more convenient.
4.1.5. Converting CPS of the COTFE into a probability value
In order to ensure compatibility between the CPS and the exact
probability data obtained from sufcient statistical inference, the

Table 1
Fuzzy possibility values and FV-I measures for BEs in fuzzy COTFE FTA.
BE

X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
X7
X8
X9
X10
X11
X12
X13
X14
X15
X16
X17
X18
X19
X20
X21
X22
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
X30
X31
X32
X33
X34
X35
X36
X37
X38
X39
X40
X41
X42
X43

Description

Using non-explosion proof tools

Collision of metal tools and tank wall during
maintenance operation
Wearing iron nail-shoes
Smoking
Fire work
Vehicles without ame arresters
Match
Lighter
Direct lightning ash
Lightning invasion along pipelines
Lightning induction
Without installing lightning protection facilities
Air terminal damaged
Deector damaged
Ground rod damaged
Mobile telephone
Audio-visual or photographic equipment
Non-explosion proof monitor or detector
Other non-explosion proof electrical equipments
Cathodic protection
Electried railway
Electric leakage nearby
Without installing anti-static grounding device
Non-standard ground resistance
Broken ground wire
Non-standard apparatus
Not enough standing time
Friction between splashing oil and air
Floating metal debris on oil surface
Oil lashing against metal materials
Rough inner wall of pipeline
High oil ow velocity
Operator close to a conductor
Friction between ber and human body
Excessive loading
Wrong valve opened
Tank top unattended
Breathing valve kept open since broke down
Gauge hatch often open
Tank wall broken by external force
Poor seal around manhole
High degree corrosion of tank wall
Flexible connection pipe rupture

Linguistic judgments of experts

Aggregation of fuzzy numbers

FV-I measure

L
L

(0.065, 0.130, 0.165, 0.265)

(0.073, 0.147, 0.173, 0.273)

0.0634
0.0711

9
8

VL
ML
M
VL
VL
L
L
VL
VL
VL
L
L
ML
VL
VL
VL
L
VL
VL
VL
VL
L
L
L
VL
VL
L
VL
VL
L
VL
VL
L
ML
L
ML
ML
VL
L
VL
L

(0.000,
(0.167,
(0.319,
(0.030,
(0.064,
(0.136,
(0.034,
(0.040,
(0.037,
(0.030,
(0.138,
(0.213,
(0.132,
(0.035,
(0.000,
(0.000,
(0.065,
(0.000,
(0.000,
(0.040,
(0.038,
(0.034,
(0.132,
(0.026,
(0.038,
(0.030,
(0.026,
(0.038,
(0.037,
(0.065,
(0.037,
(0.030,
(0.062,
(0.089,
(0.065,
(0.250,
(0.171,
(0.000,
(0.136,
(0.030,
(0.060,

0.0017
0.1536
0.2873
0.0298
0.0623
0.1279
0.0204
0.0238
0.0288
0.0045
0.0182
0.0261
0.0117
0.0346
0.0017
0.0017
0.0634
0.0017
0.0017
0.0396
0.0131
0.0119
0.0414
0.0067
0.0095
0.0077
0.0067
0.0095
0.0094
0.0158
0.0015
0.0015
0.0089
0.0121
0.0212
0.3811
0.2768
0.0046
0.2262
0.0539
0.1044

35
5
2
15
10
6
20
18
16
34
21
17
26
14
35
35
9
35
35
13
23
25
12
32
27
31
32
28
29
22
36
36
30
24
19
1
3
33
4
11
7

Expert 1

Expert 2

Expert 3

L
L

VL
VL

VL
ML
M
L
L
ML
VL
L
VL
L
ML
M
L
VL
VL
VL
L
VL
VL
L
L
VL
ML
L
L
L
VL
L
VL
L
VL
L
VL
VL
L
M
ML
VL
ML
L
ML

VL
L
L
VL
L
L
VL
VL
L
VL
L
L
L
L
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
L
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
L
VL
L
VL
L
L
VL
L
L
VL
L
VL
L

Index

0.000,
0.267,
0.419,
0.059,
0.128,
0.236,
0.068,
0.080,
0.074,
0.059,
0.238,
0.313,
0.232,
0.070,
0.000,
0.000,
0.130,
0.000,
0.000,
0.080,
0.076,
0.068,
0.232,
0.051,
0.076,
0.059,
0.051,
0.076,
0.074,
0.130,
0.074,
0.059,
0.124,
0.147,
0.130,
0.350,
0.271,
0.000,
0.236,
0.059,
0.120,

0.100,
0.333,
0.419,
0.130,
0.164,
0.273,
0.134,
0.140,
0.137,
0.130,
0.277,
0.313,
0.265,
0.135,
0.100,
0.100,
0.165,
0.100,
0.100,
0.140,
0.138,
0.134,
0.265,
0.126,
0.138,
0.130,
0.126,
0.138,
0.137,
0.165,
0.137,
0.130,
0.162,
0.221,
0.165,
0.386,
0.341,
0.100,
0.273,
0.130,
0.160,

0.200)
0.433)
0.519)
0.230)
0.264)
0.373)
0.234)
0.240)
0.237)
0.230)
0.377)
0.413)
0.365)
0.235)
0.200)
0.200)
0.265)
0.200)
0.200)
0.240)
0.238)
0.234)
0.365)
0.226)
0.238)
0.230)
0.226)
0.238)
0.237)
0.265)
0.237)
0.230)
0.262)
0.321)
0.265)
0.486)
0.441)
0.200)
0.373)
0.230)
0.260)

Ranking

1396

D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398

Table 2
The aggregation calculations for the BE36.

Table 3
The CS-I ranking of top 50 MCSs in fuzzy COTFE FTA.

~
A
1
~
A
2
~
A

VL (0, 0, 0.1, 0.2)

L (0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3)
ML (0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5)

EV(1)
EV(2)
EV(3)

0.0750
0.2000
0.3500

S12
S13
S21
S23
S31
S32

2.6667
4.6667
2.6667
0.5714
4.6667
0.5714

A(E1)
A(E2)
A(E3)
RAD1
RAD2
RAD3

3.6667
1.6190
2.6190
0.4639
0.2048
0.3313

EID1
EID2
EID3

0.38
0.32
0.30

w1
w2
w3

0.42
0.26
0.32

MCSs

CS-I
Index

MCSs
Ranking

CPS must be converted into the form of probability data. This can be
achieved by using Eqs. (18) and (19). The corresponding probability
of occurrence for the COTFE is 4.514  102.

Membership function,

4.1.6. Importance measure for the COTFE fault tree

An important aim of many reliability and risk analyses is to
identify the most important BEs and MCSs from a reliability or risk
viewpoint so that they can be given priority for improvements. The
most crucial BEs in the COTFE fault tree for causing the occurrence
of the COTFE can be justied through FV importance (FVeI) measures. Using Eq. (20), The FV-I indexes of all BEs in the COTFE tree
are calculated and ranked as shown in Table 1. The result helps to
conclude that particular attention must be given to the events X38,
X5, X39, X41, X4, X6, X43, X2, {X1; X19} and X7 as these BEs have
the greatest potential to cause the COTFE accident.
The MCS represents the smallest collection of BEs whose failures
are necessary and sufcient to result in the COTFE accident. The
most crucial MCSs for the undesired COTFE event can be measured
by ranking of their CS-I index. Here, the MCS X4X38 is taken as an
example to illustrate the calculation procedure of the CS-I index.
First, the fuzzy possibility of the MCS X4X38 is calculated based on
fuzzy arithmetic operations Eq. (11), which is also a fuzzy number
of (0.042, 0.093, 0.128, 0.210). Next, the CPS of X4X38 is estimated
as 0.120 by the deffuzication technique of Eq. (17). Then, this FPS is
substituted into Eq. (18) and (19) to calculate PV and the PV of
X4X38 is 3.395  105. Finally, using Eq. (21), the CS-I index of
X4X38 is 7.521  104. The CS-I indexes of other MCSs are calculated using the same procedures and the results of ranking top 50
MCSs are provided in Table 3.
As shown in Table 3, the MCSs ranked the top ten crucial contributions to the COTFE probability are X5X38, X5X39, X4X38,
X5X41, X4X39, X8X38, X8X39, X4X41, X8X41 and X5X43 respectively. This reveals that these MCSs are the weakest links of the crude
oil tank system. The path MCS X5X39 (Fire work and Breathing

1.0

Very Low

Low

0.1

0.2

Mildly Low

Medium

Mildly High

High

Very High

0.6

0.8

0.9

0.67

0.5
0.33

0.3

0.4

0.5

Possibility, p

0.7

0.833

Fig. 3. Fuzzy possibility of the COTFE event on fuzzy scale.

1.0

Index

Ranking

X8X43
X16X39
X6X39
X4X42
X22X41
X5X40
X16X41
X6X41; X8X42
X3X38; X17X38;
X18X38; X20X38;
X21X38
X3X39; X17X39;
X18X39; X20X39;
X21X39
X2X43
X4X40

1.083E-05
1.023E-05
8.217E-06
7.421E-06
5.118E-06
4.217E-06
4.089E-06
3.243E-06
2.912E-06

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

1.664E-06

35

1.507E-06
1.487E-06

36
37

1.152E-06
1.103E-06
5.941E-07

38
39
40

4.401E-07
4.233E-07
4.004E-07
3.497E-07
3.282E-07
3.153E-07
2.762E-07
1.852E-07

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

1.346E-07
1.092E-07

49
50

X5X38
X5X39
X4X38
X5X41
X4X39
X8X38
X8X39
X4X41
X8X41

2.300E-03
1.229E-03
7.521E-04
6.165E-04
4.088E-04
4.007E-04
2.126E-04
1.955E-04
9.897E-05

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

X5X43

7.895E-05

10

X2X38
X1X38;
X19X38
X7X38
X2X39
X1X39;
X19X39

7.563E-05
5.928E-05

11
12

5.703E-05
3.862E-05
3.033E-05

13
14
15

2.918E-05
2.433E-05
2.410E-05
2.338E-05
1.956E-05
1.663E-05
1.561E-05
1.290E-05

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

X1X43; X19X43
X7X43
X3X41; X8X40;
X17X41; X18X41;
X20X41; X21X41
X22X43
X2X42
X11X15X38
X16X43
X1X42; X19X42
X7X42
X6X43
X11X15X39

1.264E-05
1.238E-05

24
25

X22X42
X16X42

~ 36 0:089; 0:147; 0:221; 0:321

p

X7X39
X22X38
X5X42
X4X43
X16X38
X2X41
X6X38
X1X41;
X19X41
X22X39
X7X41

CS-I

valve kept open since broke down occur simultaneously) has

maximum probability of occurrence for this COTFE accident, which
corresponds to the ofcial investigation results. In addition, it can be
seen that these weakest MCSs are mainly composed of the top ve
BEs by their FV-I values. The ranking results together open up the
critical importance of the BEs including X38 (Breathing valve kept
open since broke down), X5 (Fire work), X39 (Gauge hatch often
open), X41 (Poor seal around manhole), X4 (Smoking) and X43
(Flexible connection pipe rupture). Such results can help decisionmaker take the targeted preventive measures, such as more
strictly management regulation, security check and maintenance, to
eliminate or mitigate the identied safety deciencies, and hence
prevent or reduce the occurrence of such COTFE accidents.
4.2. Traditional-based approach
During the process of the traditional FTA of the COTFE, due to
absence of accurate probability data for BEs, the generic data are
used to roughly estimate of the COTFE occurrence probability. In
general, BE generic probability data can be derived from reliability
data handbook (SINTEF Industrial Management, 2002), expert
judgments and statistical data in oil depots. These probability data
are used in single-point form and are inherently uncertainty and
imprecise. In this case study, the probability data for some of the
BEs could hardly be obtained from reliability data handbook or
statistical data, such as the BEs X4, X7, X16, X32, X37, etc. Hence, in
order to ensure the consistency among all the BE probabilities and
reasonable comparison with the fuzzy-based approach, the generic
data for the BEs in the COTFE fault tree are also obtained from
expert judgments, but each BE probability data is represented by a
single possibility score as shown in Table 4.

D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398

Since there is no repeated BEs among all MCSs, the possibility of

occurrence of the COTFE is achieved as follows (Wang, 1999):

Table 4
The generic data and FV-I measures for BEs in traditional COTFE FTA.
BE

X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
X7
X8
X9
X10
X11
X12
X13
X14
X15
X16
X17
X18
X19
X20
X21
X22
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
X30
X31
X32
X33
X34
X35
X36
X37
X38
X39
X40
X41
X42
X43

Expert judgment by a single

possibility score
Expert 1

Expert 2

Expert 3

0.14
0.15
0.02
0.26
0.35
0.12
0.14
0.25
0.05
0.10
0.05
0.14
0.26
0.40
0.20
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.16
0.05
0.04
0.15
0.16
0.06
0.30
0.06
0.15
0.16
0.04
0.12
0.05
0.12
0.05
0.14
0.05
0.05
0.12
0.38
0.26
0.02
0.28
0.15
0.05

0.08
0.06
0.05
0.15
0.24
0.06
0.16
0.16
0.05
0.08
0.15
0.05
0.16
0.16
0.20
0.12
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.15
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.15
0.05
0.15
0.05
0.15
0.12
0.08
0.14
0.15
0.02
0.12
0.05
0.15

0.12
0.12
0.02
0.24
0.30
0.06
0.06
0.15
0.12
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.14
0.14
0.35
0.08
0.04
0.03
0.12
0.02
0.02
0.08
0.06
0.15
0.20
0.15
0.06
0.03
0.15
0.05
0.04
0.16
0.04
0.05
0.12
0.28
0.15
0.25
0.25
0.03
0.15
0.04
0.14

Aggregated
possibility
score
0.115
0.112
0.030
0.219
0.300
0.083
0.122
0.191
0.071
0.082
0.085
0.084
0.192
0.245
0.245
0.085
0.034
0.029
0.116
0.035
0.037
0.097
0.095
0.081
0.222
0.084
0.091
0.086
0.076
0.077
0.079
0.110
0.079
0.084
0.103
0.141
0.116
0.264
0.116
0.023
0.190
0.085
0.109

1397

FV-I measures

NG

Index

Ranking

0.1232
0.1177
0.0323
0.2299
0.3284
0.1138
0.1549
0.2248
0.0836
0.0922
0.0750
0.0460
0.0718
0.0845
0.0662
0.0906
0.0373
0.0337
0.1280
0.0385
0.0419
0.1039
0.0749
0.0746
0.1433
0.0327
0.0385
0.0579
0.0543
0.0544
0.0554
0.0667
0.0327
0.0327
0.0498
0.0588
0.0669
0.4608
0.4712
0.0548
0.3952
0.2113
0.2469

12
13
42
6
4
14
9
7
19
16
20
34
23
18
26
17
38
39
11
37
35
15
21
22
10
41
36
28
32
31
29
25
40
40
33
27
24
2
1
30
3
8
5

PTE W

r1

q
xi Gr i

(22)

where PTE denotes the possibility of top event; NG represents the

number of all MCSs; r denotes the ordinal numbers of MCSs;
xi Gr represents the ith BE belongs to rth MCS; qi denotes the
possibility score of the ith BE. Using Eq. (22), the occurrence
possibility of the COTFE event is 0.850. Then, according to the
probability conversion formulas of Eqs. (18) and (19), the occurrence probability of the COTFE is obtained and the result is
5.141  102.
The importance of each BE is also measured based on their FV-I
index using Eq. (20) and results are also shown in Table 4. It shows
that the top ten critical BEs are X39, X38, X41, X5, X43, X4, X8, X42,
X7 and X25 respectively. The FV-I index of all the MCSs are also
calculated by Eq. (21) and the CS-I ranking of top 50 MCSs is listed
in Table 5. As shown in Table 5, the MCSs ranked the top ten leading
contributions to the COTFE probability are X5X38, X5X39, X4X38,
X5X41, X8X38, X4X39, X8X39, X4X41, X8X41 and X5X43 respectively. According to the FV-I and FV-I ranking result by the
traditional-based approach, the most critical BEs which have to be
given utmost attention are X39, X38, X41, X5, X4 and X8.
4.3. Results and discussion
The calculations have been carried out by fuzzy-based
approach and traditional approach. Table 6 presents the nal
important results for comparison between the two approaches.
The results show that: 1) the occurrence probability value of the
COTFE by the fuzzy approach is about 12% lower than the value by
the traditional approach; 2) The fuzzy FTA provides the detailed
information about the contribution of linguistic rating scale (H
and VH) to the COTFE probability, whereas such information is
unknown from traditional FTA; 3) there is slight difference in the
most critical BEs and big difference in the ranking of these BEs.
The main reason for the differences mentioned above is that the
fuzzy FTA approach distributes all BE data uncertainty in the
whole triangular or trapezoidal region and thus attempts to
represent a more realistic scenario as compared to the traditional
approach. In reality, it is unreasonable to evaluate the occurrence
of each BE by using a single-point estimate without considering

Table 5
The CS-I ranking of top 50 MCSs in traditional COTFE FTA.
MCSs

X5X38
X5X39
X4X38
X5X41
X8X38
X4X39
X8X39
X4X41
X8X41
X5X43
X7X38
X19X38
X1X38
X2X38
X7X39
X19X39
X22X38

CS-I

MCSs

Index

Ranking

1.192E-04
5.472E-05
2.851E-05
2.644E-05
1.483E-05
1.215E-05
6.099E-06
5.466E-06
2.655E-06
1.483E-06
1.397E-06
1.028E-06
9.683E-07
8.478E-07
5.045E-07
3.649E-07
3.562E-07

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

X5X42
X1X39
X2X39
X4X43
X7X41
X16X38
X19X41
X6X38
X1X41
X22X39
X2X41
X8X43
X16X39
X4X42
X22X41
X6X39
X8X42

CS-I

MCSs

Index

Ranking

3.441E-07
3.424E-07
2.976E-07
2.286E-07
1.940E-07
1.589E-07
1.380E-07
1.324E-07
1.291E-07
1.190E-07
1.114E-07
9.685E-08
5.070E-08
4.553E-08
4.252E-08
4.181E-08
1.796E-08

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

X16X41
X6X41
X7X43
X19X43
X1X43
X2X43
X22X43
X7X42
X19X42
X21X38
X1X42
X2X42
X16X43
X20X38
X6X43
X17X38

CS-I
Index

Ranking

1.734E-08
1.416E-08
4.272E-09
2.844E-09
2.626E-09
2.201E-09
6.955E-10
6.102E-10
3.924E-10
3.821E-10
3.600E-10
2.973E-10
2.377E-10
2.079E-10
1.865E-10
1.618E-10

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

1398

D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398

References

Table 6
The important results for two approaches.
Fuzzy approach

Traditional
approach

The COTFE probability

4.514  102 (H 67%, VH 33%)

5.141  102

The most critical BEs

X38
X5
X39
X41
X4
X43

X39
X38
X41
X5
X4
X8

the inherent uncertainty and imprecision a state has. Overall the

noteworthy attributes of the fuzzy FTA approach, including the
resilience towards lack of precision in the BE data and more
detailed probability information provided, conrm that the fuzzy
approach enables better probability assessment of the COTFE accident and more reliable identication of the most critical BEs,
and hence provides effective help for risk management and decision making.

5. Conclusions
According to the results of this study, the following conclusions
are drawn:
(1) The fault tree of crude oil tank re and explosion (COTFE) is
constructed, and the qualitative analysis of the tree shows that
it totally includes 43 basic events and 392 minimal cut sets
possibly leading to the accident.
(2) The proposed approach which incorporates the fuzzy set theory and the conventional FTA technique is demonstrated as a
viable and effective method for estimation of the COTFE
occurrence probability when encountered with basic data
uncertainty.
(3) The approach can be used to perform the importance analysis
of the COTFE fault tree which can provide valuable information
for decision maker to improve the safety performance of the
crude oil tank system.

Acknowledgments
Authors gratefully acknowledge the nancial support provided
by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.
50974105) and the Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of
Higher Education of China (Grant No. 20105121110003).

Bryson, N., & Mobolurin, A. (1994). An approach to using the analytic hierarchy
process for solving multiple criteria decision making problems. European
Journal of Operational Research, 76(3), 440e454.
Chang, J. I., & Lin, C. C. (2006). A study of storage tank accidents. Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries, 19(1), 51e59.
Chen, S. M. (1994). Fuzzy system reliability analysis using fuzzy number arithmetic
operations. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 64(1), 31e38.
Chen, S. J., Hwang, C. L., & Hwang, F. P. (1992). Fuzzy multiple attribute decision
making: Methods and applications. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Dong, Y. H., & Yu, D. T. (2005). Estimation of failure probability of oil and gas
transmission pipelines by fuzzy fault tree analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in
the Process Industries, 18(2), 83e88.
Fan, J. Y. (2005). Collection of oil tanks accident analysis. Beijing: China Petrochemical
Press.
Ferdous, R., Khan, F., Sadiq, R., Amyotte, P., & Veitch, B. (2009). Handling data uncertainties in event tree analysis. Process Safety and Environment Protection,
87(5), 283e292.
Fussell, J. B., & Vesely, W. E. (1972). A new method for obtaining cutsets for fault
trees. Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, 15, 262e263.
Hsu, H. M., & Chen, T. C. (1996). Aggregation of fuzzy opinion under group decision
making. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 79(3), 279e285.
Liang, G., & Wang, J. M. (1993). Fuzzy fault tree analysis using failure possibility.
Microelectronics and Reliability, 33(4), 583e597.
Miri Lavasani, M. R., Wang, J., Yang, Z., & Finlay, J. (2011). Application of fuzzy fault
tree analysis on oil and gas offshore pipelines. International Journal of Materials
Science and Engineering, 1(1), 29e42.
Mon, D. L., & Cheng, C. H. (1994). Fuzzy system reliability analysis for components
with different membership functions. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 64(2), 145e157.
Onisawa, T. (1988). An approach to human reliability in man-machine systems
using error possibility. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 27(2), 87e103.
Onisawa, T. (1990). An application of fuzzy concepts to modelling of reliability
analysis. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 37(3), 267e286.
Pan, N., & Wang, H. (2007). Assessing failure of bridge construction using fuzzy fault
tree analysis. 4th International Conference on Fuzzy System and Knowledge Discovery, 1(2), 96e100.
Pan, H., & Yun, Y. W. (1997). Fault tree analysis with fuzzy gates. Computers Industrial Engineering, 33(3e4), 569e572.
Prugh, R. W. (1992). Computer-aided HAZOP and fault tree analysis. Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries, 5(1), 3e9.
Ross, J. T. (2004). Fuzzy logic with engineering applications. West Sussex, England:
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Sadiq, R., Saint-Martin, E., & Kleiner, Y. (2008). Predicting risk of water quality
failures in distribution networks under uncertainties using fault-tree analysis.
Urban Water Journal, 5(4), 287e304.
SINTEF Industrial Management. (2002). OREDA: Offshore reliability data handbook.
Trondheim, Norway: Det Norske Veritas (DNV).
Suresh, P. V., Babar, A. K., & Raj, V. V. (1996). Uncertainty in fault tree analysis: a
fuzzy approach. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 83(2), 135e141.
Tanaka, H., Fan, L. T., Lai, F. S., & Toguchi, K. (1983). Fault-tree analysis by fuzzy
probability. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 32(5), 150e163.
Vinod, G., Kushwaha, H. S., Verma, A. K., & Srividya, A. (2003). Importance measures
in ranking piping components for risk informed in-service inspection. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 80(2), 107e113.
Wang, L. X. (1997). A course in fuzzy system and control. Upper Saddle River, N.J:
Prentice Hall PTR (London).
Wang, Y. H. (1999). Safety system engineering. Tianjin: Tianjin University Press.
Wei, C. P., Qiu, W. H., & Wang, X. Z. (2001). A new approach of group decision
making under fuzzy preference. Systems Engineering Theory and Practice, 7,
81e86.
Zadeh, L. A. (1965). Fuzzy sets. Information and Control, 8(3), 338e353.