G.R. No.

163553
YUN KWAN BYUNG vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION
FACTS:
Petitioner claims that he accumulated gambling chips worth
$2.1M at the Casino Filipino, and presented the same for
encashment with PAGCOR employees or agents, but PAGCOR
refused to redeem them. PAGCOR claims, upon the other hand,
that petitioner was brought into the Philippines by ABS
Corporation as a junket player who played in the dollar pit
exclusively leased by said Corporation for its junket players. The
trial court dismissed the case, and on appeal, the petitioner takes
the position than an implied agency existed between PAGCOR
and ABS Corporation. The CA disagreed claiming that the Junket
agreement between ABS and PAGCOR is void being contrary to
the latters charter.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in disregarding the creation of
implied agency between PAGCOR and ABS Corporation.
RULING:
No. Article 1869 of the Civil Code states that implied agency
is derived from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack
of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that
another person is acting on his behalf without authority. Implied
agency, being an actual agency, is a fact to be proved by
deductions or inferences from other facts. In an agency by
estoppel, there is no agency at all, but the one assuming to act as
agent has apparent or ostensible, although not real, authority to
represent another. However, the acts and conduct of PAGCOR
negates the existence of an implied agency or an agency by
estoppel. There is no implied agency in this case because
PAGCOR did not hold out to the public as the principal of ABS
Corporation. PAGCORs actions did not mislead the public into
believing that an agency can be implied from the arrangement
with the junket operators, nor did it hold out ABS Corporation

with any apparent authority to represent it in any capacity. The

Junket Agreement was merely a contract of lease of facilities and
services.

G.R No. 148187

PHILIPPINE MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS:
Petitioner Philex entered into an agreement with Baguio
Gold Mining Corp., for the former to manage the latters mining
claim known as the Sto. Mine. The parties agreement was
denominated as Power of Attorney. The mine suffered
continuing losses over the years, which resulted in petitioners
withdrawal as manager of the mind. The parties executed a
Compromise Dation in Payment, wherein the debt of Baguio
amounted to P112,136,000.00 Petitioner deducted said amount
from its gross income in its annual tax income return as loss on
the settlement of receivables from Baguio Gold against reserved
and allowances. BIR disallowed the amount as deduction for bad
debt. Petitioner claims that it entered a contract of agency
evidenced by the power of attorney executed by them, thus, can
be deducted from its gross income. CTA rejected the claim and
held that it is a partnership rather than an agency. CA affirmed
CTAs ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether there is exists an agency.
RULING:
No. The lower courts correctly held that the Power of
Attorney (PA) is the instrument material that is material in

determining the true nature of the business relationship between

petitioner and Baguio. An examination of the said PA reveals that
a partnership or joint venture was indeed intended by the
parties. While a corporation like the petitioner cannot generally
enter into a contract of partnership unless authorized by law or
its charter, it has been held that it may enter into a joint venture,
which is akin to a particular partnership. The PA indicates that
the parties had intended to create a PAT and establish a common
fund for the purpose. They also had a joint interest in the profits
of the business as shown by the 50-50 sharing of income of the
mine.
Moreover, in an agency coupled with interest, it is the
agency that cannot be revoked or withdrawn by the principal due
to an interest of a third party that depends upon it or the
mutual interest of both principal and agent. In this case the nonrevocation or non-withdrawal under the PA applies to the
advances made by the petitioner who is the agent and not the
principal under the contract. Thus, it cannot be inferred from the
stipulation that it is an agency.
G.R No. 174978
SALLY YOSHIZAKI vs. JOY TRAINING CENTER OF
AURORA, INC.
FACTS:
Johnsons were members of Respondents Board of Trustees
who sold the real properties, and other personal properties in
favour of the spouses petitioners. Respondent filed an action for
cancellation of sales alleging that the spouses Johnson is without
the requisite authority from the Board. The RTC ruled in favour
the petitioners. It found that respondent owned the real
properties and it authorized spouses Johnson to sell the real
properties. It recognized that there were only five actual
members of the board of trustees; consequently, a majority of the
board validly authorized the sale. It further ruled that the sale of
personal properties was valid because they were registered in
the spouses Johnsons name. The CA upheld the RTCs

jurisdiction over the case but reversed its ruling with respect to
the sale of real properties. It also ruled that the resolution is void
because it was not approved by a majority of the board.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a contract of agency to sell the real
properties between respondent and spouses Johnson.
RULING:
No. Art. 1868 of the Civil Code defines a contract of agency
as a contract whereby a person binds himself to render some
service or to do something in representation or on behalf of
another, with the consent or authority of the latter. It may be
express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his
silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency,
knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without
authority. In this case, the presented evidence did not convince
the SC of the existence of the contract of agency to sell the real
properties. The certification is a mere general power of attorney
which comprises all of the respondent. Art. 1877 of the same
Code clearly states that an agency couched in general terms
comprises only acts of administration, even if the principal
should state that he withholds no power or that the agent may
execute such acts as he may authorize as general and unlimited
management.

G.R No. 188288

SPS. FERNANDO AND LOURDES VILORIA vs.
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.
FACTS:
In 1997, while the spouses Viloria were in the U.S., they
approached Holiday Travel, a travel agency working for
respondent, to purchase tickets from Netwark to San Diego. The

travel agent, Mager, advised the couple that they cannot travel
by train because it is fully booked; that they have to purchase
plane tickets from respondent; that if they will not purchase
plane tickets they will never reach their destination in time. The
couple believed Magers representation and so they purchased
two plane tickets. Later, however, the spouses found out that the
train trip is not fully booked and so they purchased train tickets
and went to their destination via train. Then they called up
Mager to request for a refund for the plane tickets. Mager
referred the couple to respondent. As the couple are now in the
Philippines, they filed their request with respondent office in
Ayala. The spouses alleged that Mager misled them into
believing that the only to travel was by plane and so they were
fooled into buying expensive tickets. Respondent, however,
refused to refund the amount of the ticket and so the spouses
sued the airline company. Respondent claimed that the ticket
sold to them by Mager is non-refundable, that, if any, they are
not bound by the misrepresentation of Mager because there is no
agency existing between respondent and Mager.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a contract of agency between respondent
and Mager.
RULING:
Yes. All the elements of agency are present, viz; there is
consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the
relationship; the object is the execution of a juridical act in
relation to a third person; the agent acts as a representatives and
not for himself; and the agent acts within the scope of his
authority. Furthermore, respondent never questioned the validity
of the transaction between Mager and the spouses, thus,
respondent is in estoppel/

G.R No. 160488

FELOMINA ABELLANA vs. SPS. PONCE and PONCE and
ROD
FACTS:
Petitioner, the aunt of respondent Ponce, bought a parcel of
agricultural land which the former intended to give to the latter.
By reason of this, the deed of sale showed that it was Ponce who
bought the land. However, petitioner remained in the possession
and developed the same land and continued paying real property

taxes related thereto. Meanwhile, the relationship of the aunt

and niece turned sour, as the latter even threatened petitioner
physically and has become disrespectful. Because of this,
petitioner filed a case for revocation of implied trust to recover
the property and the legal title thereof. The trial court held that
an implied trust existed between the parties, such that the latter
is merely holding the lot for the benefit of the former. On appeal,
CA reversed the lower courts decision finding that petitioner
was not able to prove the implied trust.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that there was no implied
trust existed.
RULING:
No. The CA ruled the case at bar meritoriously. The Court
held that it was petitioner and not Ponce who truly owned the
parcel of land. The lone testimony of petitioner would suffice to
prove her claim if found credible. However, in the instant case, a
donation of an immovable property transpired, and such was
effected not on a public instrument as required by law, owing to
the fact that it was made only orally, thus void. Art. 1448 of the
Civil Code on implied trust finds no application in the case. The
concept of implied trusts is that from the facts and
circumstances of a given case, the existence of a trust
relationship is inferred in order to effect the presumed intention
of the parties. From the testimony of Felomina herself, she
wanted to give the lot to Lucila as a gift. To her mind, the
execution of a deed with Lucila as the buyer and the subsequent
issuance of title in the latters name were the acts that would
effectuate her generosity. In so carrying out what she conceived,
Felomina evidently displayed her unequivocal intention to
transfer ownership of the lot to Lucila and not merely to
constitute her as a trustee thereof. It was only when their
relationship soured that she sought to revoke the donation on the
theory of implied trust, though as previously discussed, there is
nothing to revoke because the donation was never perfected.