PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

1. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals ( Tape Recorder, Anti-Wiretapping)

Facts: A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City alleging that Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood"
and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy." In support of her claim, Ramirez produced
a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and
other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs,
interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation
made by Ramirez. As a result of Ramirez's recording, of the event and alleging that
the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a criminal
case before Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes." Ramirez was charged of violation of
the said Act, in an information dated 6 October 1988. Upon arraignment, in lieu of a
plea, Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200. In an order
dated 3 May 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with
Ramirez that the facts charged do not constitute an offense under RA 4200; and
that the violation punished by RA 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by
a person other than a participant to the communication. From the trial court's Order,
Garcia filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which
forthwith

Issue: Whether the party sought to be penalized by the Anti-wire tapping law ought
to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication.
Held: Section 1 of RA 4200 provides that "It shall be unlawful for any person, not
being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable, or by using, any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described." The provision clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those

involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
"any". Consequently, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify
as a violator" under said provision of RA 4200. Further, the nature of the
conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What RA 4200 penalizes are the
acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by
means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of RA 4200. Furthermore, the
contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of RA 4200 does
not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity.

2. Ople vs.
System)

Torres

(Biometrics,

Computerized Identification

Reference

Facts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to
prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis
considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men."[1] Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No.
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
ISSUE: Does the Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional right to
privacy?

HELD:
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage
among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
"computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the application of statistical methods to
biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data."[45] The term

"biometrics" has now evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide
precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the individual's
own physiological and behavioral characteristics.[46] A physiological characteristic
is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand
geometry or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the
individual's personality and includes voice print, signature and keystroke.[47] Most
biometric identification systems use a card or personal identification number (PIN)
for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the
individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or
PIN.[48]
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes.[60] The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of
A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by
enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against selfincrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[61]
The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer
technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control
over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the
data encoded.[62] They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to
prevent
Yes, the Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy because its
scope is too broad and vague that will put peoples right to privacy in clear
andpresent danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper safeguards for
protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics
another means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individuals liberty of
abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also
enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvents
the right against self-Incrimination; it may pave the way for fishing expeditions by
government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure
3. In RE Laureta (contempt, letters to the Supreme Court)
Facts: In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to Justices
Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter,
dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of
the First Division of the Supreme Court, in a stance of dangling threats to effect a
change of the Court's adverse resolution (in GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. IAC
being dismissed), Eva Maravilla Ilustre/Atty. Wenceslao Laureta wrote in part that
"we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We intend

to hold responsible members of the First Division who participated in the

promulgation of these three minute-resolutions in question. For the members
thereof cannot claim immunity when their action runs afoul with penal sanctions,
even in the performance of official functions; like others, none of the division
members are above the law." True to her threats, after having lost her case before
the Supreme Court, Maravilla-Ilustre filed on 16 December 1986 an AffidavitComplaint before the Tanodbayan, charging some Members of the Supreme Court
with having knowingly and deliberately rendered, with bad faith, an unjust,
extended Minute Resolution "making" her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast
estates; charging some Justices of the Court of Appeals with knowingly rendering
their "unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984 "through manifest and evident bad
faith"; and charging Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoez and Justice Pedro Yap of
the Supreme Court with having used their power and influence in persuading and
inducing the members of the First Division of the Court into promulgating their
"unjust extended Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986." Atty. Laureta reportedly
circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized in
almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, withoutany copy furnished the Supreme
Court nor the members who were charged. The issue of the Daily Express of 23
December 1986 published a banner headline reading: "ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE
GRAFT CHARGES" thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of the
Supreme Court and the other respondents were charged with "graft and corruption"
when the Complaint was actually filed by a disgruntled litigant and her counsel after
having lost her case thrice in the Supreme Court. On 26 December 1986, the
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed Maravilla-Ilustre's Complaint. In the Resolution
of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 20 January 1986, it required (1) Eva Maravilla
Ilustre to show cause, within 10 days from notice, why she should not be held in
contempt for her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court
and/or official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements, unless
satisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds of propriety and
undermine and degrade the administration of justice; and (2) Atty. Wenceslao
Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause, within 10 days from notice, why
no disciplinary action should be taken against him for the statements, conduct, acts
and charges against the Supreme Court and the official actions of the Justices
concerned, and for hiding there from in anonymity behind his client's name, in an
alleged quest for justice but with the manifest intent to bring the Justices into
disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts and the orderly
administration of justice.
Issue: Whether the letters addressed to the Supreme Court justices are matters
shielded bythe constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy.
Held: Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of
their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of
concern for the entire Court. The contumacious character of those letters

constrained the First Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consulta
and so that the Court en banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It
was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it refrained from issuing
immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that after having read the
Resolution of the Court en banc of 28 October 1986, Maravilla-Ilustre and Laureta
would realize the unjustness and unfairness of their accusations. Ilustre has
transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment
of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual
Justices; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan; in her
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official
actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them;
and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from the
Supreme Court. The fact that said letters are not technically considered pleadings,
nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally
resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The
constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a
shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. Also, Atty. Laureta has committed
acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of dangling threats of
bringing the matter to the "proper forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse
Resolution; for his lack of respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest
Courts of the land by challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming that they
knowingly rendered unjust judgments; for authoring, or at the very least, assisting
and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts
and malicious charges of his client, Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer that he
had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find disputed by the facts and
circumstances of record as above stated; for totally disregarding the facts and
circumstances and legal considerations set forth in the Supreme Court's Resolutions
of the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of last resort; for making it appear
that the Justices of the Supreme Court and other respondents before the
Tanodbayan are charged with "graft and corruption" when the complaint before the
Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated
counsel in a case that has been brought thrice before the Supreme Court, and who
would readily accept anything but the soundness of the judgments of the Courts
concerned, all with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and of the
Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts.
4. Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA (Psychological Incapacity, military friends)
Facts:
On May 2 1990, private respondent Raphael S. Ortanez filed with the RTC of Quezon
City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against
petitioner Teresita Salcedo Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage
license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette
tapes of alleged telephone conversation between petitioner and
unidentified person.
The tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his
friends from the military to wiretap his home telephone. Said trial court however,
still admitted such evidence.
A petition for certiorari was then filled by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing
the admission in the evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. The Court of
Appeals affirmed said decision by the Trial court. That is why petitioner filed a
motion for review.
Issue:
Whether respondent violated RA 4200? And whether the cassette tapes are
admissible to the evidence for the said annulment of marriage due to lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner?
Ruling:
Respondent violated RA 4200 entitled, An Act to prohibit and Penalize Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violation of Communication, and for other purposes.
Court of Appeals erred in making said tapes admissible in the case. Absent a clear
showing that both parties to the phone conversations allowed to recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes are inadmissible under Philippine law.
(The other party was invoking the applicability of American Jurisprudence).
Violations made: Republic Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other
purposes expressly makes such recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant
provisions of RA No. 4200 are as follows:
Section 1:It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all parties to any private communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described. . .
Section 4: Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof,
or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person
in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible
in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the
afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in
question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations
allowed to recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under RA No. 4200.

Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned RA in Section

2 thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up
to six (6) years for violation of said act.
Freedom of Expression
5. Adiong vs. Comelec (Decals and stickers, mobile places)
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347
pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the
resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election
propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals Provided, That decals and stickers may be
posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of
Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda
in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC
common posted areas and/or billboards
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections
assails the COMELECs Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him
such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section
11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers
on mobile places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution
No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that decals and stickers may be posted only in
any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof
is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in designated areas
provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The
prohibition unduly infringes on the citizens fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of
expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an

individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince

others to agree with him.
6. Ayer Productions vs. Judge Capulong (EDSA film, Enrile)
Facts: Petitioner
McElroy
an
Australian film
maker,
and
his movie
production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for
commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled
"The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government
agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a
"docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events,
and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David Williamson is
Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales)
is an American historian who has developed a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or
exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema
or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial
exploitation. Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted
from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion
picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC
ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to
plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff
which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to
Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and
produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse
them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of
motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is
not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to
any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what
the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear
and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of
public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the
history
of
the
country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern,
that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such
public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the
constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be
marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be
fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events
7. ABS-CBN vs. Comelec (Exit polls,exit survey)
Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc
Resolution No. 98-1419 1 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body
"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any
other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to
authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same." The Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN
(Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage
of the elections and to make [an] exit survey of the vote during the elections for
national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall
be [broadcast] immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might
conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the
National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
Held:
The Supreme Court grants the petition; the Comelec resolution is nullified.
Freedom of expression a fundamental principle of a democratic government. The
freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It
is a 'preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive
economic or other liberties. Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. At the very least, free
speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public interest without prior restraint. The freedom of expression is a
means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing
participation by the people in social and political decision-making, and of
maintaining the balance between stability and change. It represents a profound
commitment to the principle that debates on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open. 18 It means more than the right to approve existing political
beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to take
refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. And
paraphrasing the eminent Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, we stress that the freedom
encompasses the thought we hate, no less than the thought we agree with.
Freedom of expression; limited by valid exercise of police power. The realities of life
in a complex society, however, preclude an absolute exercise of the freedoms of
speech and of the press. Such freedoms could not remain unfettered and
unrestrained at all times and under all circumstances. They are not immune to
regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power.
Theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to freedom of expression.
There are two theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to freedom
of expression. These are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous

tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be punished. The
danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. The
'dangerous tendency' rule, on the other hand, may be epitomized as follows: If the
words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent,
then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate
acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts
be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It
is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring
about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
Supreme Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. Unquestionably, this
Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. In setting the standard or test
for the "clear and present danger" doctrine, the Court echoed the words of Justice
Holmes: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is
a question of proximity and degree."
In borderline conflict between freedom of expression and state action to ensure
clean and free elections, the Court leans in favor of freedom. Even though the
government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be
upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information
meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. When faced with
borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the
freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to
assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the
ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate
should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the
efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly
curtailed.
Exit polls do not constitute clear and present danger of destroying the credibility
and integrity of the electoral process. The Comelec justifies its assailed Resolution
as having been issued pursuant to its constitutional mandate to ensure a free,
orderly, honest, credible and peaceful election. It contends that "an exit poll has the
tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees,
which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results
of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec
is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of
destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process." Such arguments
are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey,
the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as
much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of
the community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or
be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the

polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on
the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the
credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate
and independent from the exit polls. If at all, the outcome of one can only be
indicative of the other.
8. Soriano vs. La Guardia (Ang Dating Daan. Iglesia ni Kristo)
Facts: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program
Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days
after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark,
was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue: Are Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the
religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?
Held: No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering
the adverse effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as
well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB
properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.
Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an
undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a
subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramountcy
of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the
power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent
language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of
serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by
the use of less offensive language.

9. US. Vs. Kottinger (postcards, obscene and indecent pictures)

Facts: On 24 November 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the premises known
as Camera Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila. He found and confiscated the postcards which subsequently were used as evidenced against J. J. Kottinger, the
manager of the company. The information filed in court charged him with living kept
for sale in the store of the Camera Supply Co., obscene and indecent pictures, in
violation of section 12 of Act 277. To this information, Kottinger interposed a
demurrer based upon the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an
offense and were not contrary to law; but the trial court overruled the demurrer.
Following the presentation of evidence by the Government and the defense,
judgment was rendered finding Kottinger guilty of the offenses charged and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and the costs. Kottinger appealed.

Issue: Whether pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress
and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are obscene
or indecent.
Held: The pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account of being
obscene and indecent, disclose six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of
the Philippines ("Philippines, Bontoc Woman"; a picture of five young boys and
carries the legend "Greetings from the Philippines"; "Ifugao Belle, Philippines.
Greetings from the Philippines"; "Igorrot Girl, Rice Field Costume"; "Kalinga Girls,
Philippines"; and "Moros, Philippines") None of the pictures represented posses
which he had not observed on various occasions, and that the costumes worn by
the people in the pictures are the true costumes regularly worn by them, according
to Dr. H. Otley Beyer, Professor in the University of the Philippines. Although the
Federal statutes prohibits the importation of shipment into the Philippine Islands of
the following: "Articles, books, pamphlets, printed matter, manuscripts, typewritten
matter, paintings, illustrations, or objects of obscene or indecent character or
subversive of public order"; there are, in the record, copies of reputable magazines
which circulate freely thru-out the United States and other countries, and which are
admitted into the Philippines without question, containing illustrations into the
Philippines without question, containing illustrations identical in nature to those in
the present case. Publications of the Philippine Government have also been offered
in evidence such as Barton's "Ifugao Law," the "Philippine Journal of Science" for
October, 1906, and the Reports of the Philippine Commission for 1903, 1912, and
1913, in which are found illustrations either exactly the same or nearly akin to those
which are now impugned. Tested by the standard set up by the Congress of the
United States, it would be extremely doubtful if the pictures here challenged would
be held obscene or indecent by any state of Federal court. It would be particularly
unwise to sanction a different type of censorship in the Philippine than in the United
States, or for that matter in the rest of the world. The pictures in question merely
depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in
unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community,
the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by
photographs of this type. The court is convinced that the post-card pictures in the
present case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy.
10.

MTCRB vs. ABSCBN (Prostiti-tution, Loren Legarda)

Facts: On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired
"Prosti-tuition," an episode of the television (TV) program "The Inside Story"
produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students
moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. In the
course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty
members were interviewed. The Philippine Womens University (PWU) was named
as the school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU Building at
Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode. The
showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia P. de
Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers
Association filed letter-complaints3 with petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants
alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the
harassment of some of its female students.

ISSUE: Is a prior submission to MTRCB a case of prior restraint?

Held: Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: first, all
television programs, including "public affairs programs, news documentaries, or
socio-political editorials," are subject to petitioners power of review under Section 3
(b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this Courts ruling in Iglesiani Cristo vs. Court of
Appeals ;25second, television programs are more accessible to the public than
newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former;
third, petitioners power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D.
No. 1986 does not amount to "prior restraint;" and fourth, Section 3(b) of P. D. No.
1986 does not violate respondents constitutional freedom of expression and of the
press.

11.

Viva Productions vs. CA (vizconde massascre ,

FACTS:
Assailed in the petition before us are the decision and resolution
of respondent Court of Appeals sustaining both the order of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region (Paraaque, Branch 274 hereinafter referred
to as the Paraaque court) restraining "the exhibition of the movie 'The Jessica
Alfaro Story' at its scheduled premiere showing at the New Frontier Theater on
September 11, 1995 at 7:30 in the evening and at its regular public exhibition
beginning September 13,1995, as well as to cease and desist from promoting and
marketing of the said movie. writ of preliminary injunction "enjoining petitioner from
further proceeding, engaging, using or implementing the promotional, advertising
and marketing programs for the movie entitled 'The Jessica Alfaro Story' and from
showing or causing the same to be shown or exhibited in all theaters in the entire
country UNTIL after the final termination and logical conclusion of the trial in the
criminal action now pending before the Paraaque Regional Trial Court. Ma. Jessica
M. Alfaro the star witness of the Vizconde massacre was offered a movie contract by
Viva Productions, Inc. for the filming of her life story, she inked with the latter the
said movie contract while the said case (I.S. 95-402) was under investigation by the
Department of Justice. The private respondent sent separate letters to Viva
Productions, Inc. and Alfaro, warning them that the projected showing of subject
movie on the life story of Alfaro would violate the sub judice rule, and his (Hubert
J.P. Webb's) constitutional rights as an accused in said criminal case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not private respondent committed forum shopping by filing two
(2) cases with exactly the same factual set-up, issues involved and reliefs sought
before two (2) different courts of coordinate jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the Paraaque Court can totally disregard and
indiscriminately curtail the petitioners constitutional right to freedom of expression
and of the press without presence of a clear and present danger.
HELD:

1. The private respondent has committed forum shopping. It is found that a

shrewd and astute maneuverings of private respondent ill-advised. It wont escape
anybody's notice that the act of filing the supposed action for injunction with
damages with the Makati court, albeit a separate and distinct action from the
contempt proceedings then pending before the Paraaque court, is obviously and
solely intended to obtain the preliminary relief of injunction so as to prevent
petitioner from exhibiting the movie on its premiere and on its regular showing. The
alleged relief for damages becomes a mere subterfuge to camouflage private
respondent's real intent and to feign the semblance of a separate and distinct
action from the contempt proceedings already filed and on- going with the
Paraaque court.

2. The assailed decision and order of respondent court are SET ASIDE, and a
new one entered declaring null and void all orders of Branch 58 of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Makati City in its Civil Case
No. 95-1365 and forthwith dismissing said case, and declaring the order of the
Regional Trial Court of the same National Capital Judicial Region stationed in
Paraaque (Branch 274), functus officio insofar as it restrains the public showing of
the movie "The Jessica Alfaro Story.
12.

Lagunzad vs. de Gonzales (Moises Padilla Story)

Facts: Sometime in August 1961, Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the

production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" under the name of his own
business outfit, the "MML Productions." It was based mainly on the copyrighted but
unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in
Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story," the rights to which Lagunzad had
purchased from Atty. Rodriguez in the amount of P2,000.00. The book narrates the
events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla sometime between
November 11 and November 17, 1951. Padilla was then a mayoralty candidate of
the Nacionalista Party (then the minority party) for the Municipality of Magallon,
Negros Occidental, during the November 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a
member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted for
that murder in People vs. Lacson, et al. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a
martyr in contemporary political history." Although the emphasis of the movie was
on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private
and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto
Vda. de Gonzales, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. The movie was scheduled
for a premiere showing on 16 October 1961, or at the very latest, before the
November 1961 elections. On 3 October 1961, Lagunzad received a telephone call
from one Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, objecting to the filming of
the movie and the "exploitation" of his life. Shown the early "rushes" of the picture,
Mrs. Amante and her sister, Mrs. Gavieres, objected to many portions thereof
notwithstanding Lagunzad's explanation that the movie had been supervised by
Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., based on his book "The Long Dark Night in Negros." On 5
October 1961, Mrs. Amante, for and in behalf of her mother, demanded in writing
for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie. Lagunzad contends that
he acceded to the demands because he had already invested heavily in the picture

to the extent of mortgaging his properties, in addition to the fact that he had to
meet the scheduled target date of the premiere showing. On the same date, 5
October 1961, after some bargaining as to the amount to be paid, which was
P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to P20,000.00, Lagunzad and Soto vda. de
Gonzales, represented by her daughters and Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, at the law
office of Jalandoni and Jamir, executed a "Licensing Agreement." Lagunzad takes the
position that he was pressured into signing the Agreement because of Soto vda. de
Gonzales' demand, through Mrs. Amante, for payment for the "exploitation" of the
life story of Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call a press conference declaring
the whole picture as a fake, fraud and a hoax and would denounce the whole thing
in the press, radio, television and that they were going to Court to stop the picture."
On 10 October 1961, Lagunzad paid Soto vda. de Gonzales the amount of P5,000.00
but contends that he did so not pursuant to their Agreement but just to placate the
latter. On 14 October 1961, the filming of the movie was completed. On 16 October
1961, a premiere showing was held at the Hollywood Theatre, Manila, with the
Moises Padilla Society as its sponsor. Subsequently, the movie was shown in
different theaters all over the country. Because Lagunzad refused to pay any
additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on 22 December 1961, Soto vda. de
Gonzales instituted the suit against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering
Lagunzad (1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest from the filing
of the Complaint; (2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and
to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; (3) to pay attorney's fees
equivalent to 20% of the amounts claimed; and (4) to pay the costs. By way of
counterclaim, Lagunzad demanded that the Licensing Agreement be declared null
and void for being without any valid cause; that Soto vda. de Gonzales be ordered
to return to him the amount of P5,000.00; and that he be paid P50,000.00 by way of
moral damages, and P7,500.00 as attorney's fees. On 30 June 1964, the trial Court
rendered a Decision in favor of Soto vda. de Gonzales. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the latter Court affirmed the judgment. Reconsideration having been
denied by the Court, Lagunzad filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari. Initially, or
on 16 June 1970, the Supreme Court denied the Petition for lack of merit, but
resolved subsequently to give it due course after Lagunzad moved for
reconsideration on the additional argument that the movie production was in
exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of expression, and that the Licensing
Agreement is a form of restraint on the freedom of speech and of the press.
Issue: Whether the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman,
Lagunzad had the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises
Padilla without prior restraint.
Held: The right of freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in the
"hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however, without limitations. As held in
Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections (27 SCRA 835, 858 [1969]), "From the
language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however,
a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too
much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for

recognition. The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such
a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of
the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and
the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle "requires a court to
take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in
a given situation or type of situation." Herein, the interests observable are the right
to privacy asserted by Soto vda. de Gonzales and the right of freedom of expression
invoked by Lagunzad. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, the COurt
holds that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the
obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by Lagunzad, the
validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of
freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern. The court denied the petition for review.
13.

People vs. Perez (cut the Governor-generals head with a bolo)

Facts Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato
Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April
1, 1922, in the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion
regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez
shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting
off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has
killed our independence." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers
of the Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has
appealed the case to this court. The question presented for decision is, What
crime, if any, did the accused commit?
A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It
reads in translation as follows:
"That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippine Islands the said accused, Isaac
Perez, while holding a discussion with several persons on political
matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and with knowledge
that Honorable Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands and in the discharge of his functions as such
authority, insult by word, without his presence, said GovernorGeneral, uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of many
persons, and in a public place, the following phrases: 'Asin an
mangna Filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang
asin haleon an payo no Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag
raot can Filipinas,' which in English is as follows: 'and the Filipinos,
like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having
recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.'"Contrary to article 256
of the Penal Code."

At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the
prosecution and three witnesses on behalf of the defense. According to the first
witness for the Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal president of Pilar, what
Perez said on the occasion in question was this: "The Filipinos, like myself, should
get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood, because he has
recommended a bad administration in these Islands and has not made a good
recommendation; on the contrary, he has assassinated the independence of the
Philippines and for this reason, we have not obtained independence and the
head of that Governor-General must be cut off." Higinio J. Angustia, justice of the
peace of Pilar, in a written statement, and Gregorio Cresencio, another witness
for the prosecution, corroborated the testimony of the first witness. Cresencio
understood that Perez invited the Filipinos including himself to get
their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood and throw it into the
sea.
The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place
on the morning of April 1, 1922, in which the accused participated. But they
endeavored to explain that the discussion was between Perez and one Severo
Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista Party,
while Perez argued that the Governor-General was to blame. The accused
testified that the discussion was held in a peaceful manner, and that what he
wished to say was that the Governor-General should be removed and substitued
by another. On the witness stand, he stated that his words were the following:
"We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party which is in power but do not take into
account that above the representatives there is Governor-General Wood who
controls everything, and I told him that the day on which the Democratas may
kill that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos, will install the government we
like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay taxes."
The trial Judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it,
had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made use of the
language stated in the beginning of this decision and set out in the information.
The question of fact thus settled, the question of law recurs as to the crime of
which the accused should be convicted.
It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256
of the Penal Code as having been infringed and the trial Judge so found in his
decision. The first error assigned by counsel for the appellant is addressed to this
conclusion of the lower court and is to the effect that article 256 of the Penal
Code is no longer in force.
In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705 1 ) the
accused was charged with having uttered the following language: "To hell with
the President of the United States and his proclamation!" Mr. Helbig was

prosecuted under article 256, and though the case was eventually sent back to
the court of origin of a new trial, the appellate court by majority vote held as a
question of law that article 256 is still in force.
In case of People vs. Perfecto ([1923], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was
charged with having published an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and
its members in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. In this court, Mr.
Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court
holding that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish
to American sovereignty over the Philippines, and with six members holding that
the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 as relates to
written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the
facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code nor of the Libel Law. In the course of the main opinion in the Perfecto case,
is found this significant sentence: "Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the
Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256, but as to this
point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement."
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who
retain a contrary opinion must bow with as good grace as we can muster, that
until otherwise decided by higher authority, so much of article 256 of the Penal
Code as does not relate to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under
the Libel Law, exists and must be enforced. To which proposition, can properly be
appended a corollary, namely: Seditious words, speeches, or libels, constitute a
violation of Act. No. 292, the Treason and Sedition Law, and to this extent, both
the Penal Code and the Libel Law are modified.

Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of

article 256 of the Penal Code, it is our opinion that the law infringed in this
instance is not this article but rather a portion of the Treason and Sedition Law. In
other words, as will later appear, we think that the words of the accused did not
so much tend to defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to
raise a disturbance in the community.
In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed
primarily against individuals, but rather against the existence of the State, the
authority of the Government, or the general public peace. The offenses created
and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is
sedition, which is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a
revolt against legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a
violation of the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently
engenders it, yet does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or

the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 974; U. S. vs.

Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437; People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.)
It is our course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act. No. 292
must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature,
and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention
and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious,
the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly
and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige
of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the
existence of the State. (III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U. S. vs.
Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto, supra.)
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the
Philippine Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United States
and other high offices, under a democratic form of government instead of
affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive
attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the
furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of
speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which
could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient
to the laws.
The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President
of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the
United States, and holds his office at the pleasure of the President. The Organic
Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be exercised in
accordance with the law. The Governor-General is the representative of
executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A
seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino
people and on American sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil.,
599; U. S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act
No. 1692, appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet
such a situation. This section reads as follows:
"Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or
who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States or against the Government of the

Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish, utter or make any
statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or
obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his
duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious
conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or
the safety or order of the Government, or who shall knowingly
conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United States
currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the
discretion of the court."
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which
suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and
done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He
has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the
community and the safety or order of the Government. All of these various
tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as
penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section
8 of Act No. 292 as amended, is, in effect, responsive to, and based upon, the
offense with which the defendant is charged. The designation of the crime by the
fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the defendant stands charged is that
described by the facts stated in the information. In accordance with our settled
rule, an accused may be found guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that
designated in the information, if such graver offense is included or described in
the body of the information, and is afterwards justified by the proof presented
during the trial. (Guevara's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De Joya's Code of
Criminal Procedure, p. 9.)
The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by
the Treason and Sedition Law, and will, we think, sufficiently punish the accused.
That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be
possible. Our course is justified when it is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief
Justice Taft of the United States Supreme Court, in speaking of an outrageous
libel on the Governor of Porto Rico, observed: "A reading of the two articles
removes the slightest doubt that they go far beyond the 'exuberant expressions
of meridional speech,' to use the expression of this court in a similar case in
Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U. S., 452, 456). Indeed they are so excessive and

outrageous in their character that they suggest the query whether their
superlative vilification has not overleapt itself and become unconsciously
humorous." (Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922], U. S., 298.) While our own sense of
humor is not entirely blunted, we nevertheless entertain the conviction that the
courts should be the first to stamp out the members of insurrection. The fugitive
flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt with
firmly before it endangers the general public peace.
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of the fact, and on
these facts to convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as
amended. With the modification thus indicated, judgment is affirmed, it being
understood that, in accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the
defendant and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and
pay the costs. So ordered

14.

Gonzales vs. Katigbak (For adults, Kapit sa Patalim)

FACTS: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of
Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain
deletions were made and that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner brought
an action, claiming violation of their freedom of expression.
HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of
ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. The power of the Board is limited to
the classification of films. For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the
exception. The power to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the
presumption is against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under the clearest
proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. The Board committed
an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the
movie was classified as "For adults only" without deletion. However there is not
enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there
were reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women erotically dancing
naked and kissing and caressing each other like lesbians. VV.
Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors
wanted to cut in some part and to label "For Adults". The SC rules that movies are
within the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, so that censorship is
presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint. The only case whe the Board of
Censors can order a deletion is when there is a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil against national security or public morals or other public interest.
In all other cases, the Board can only classify.
But a different standard must be followed in television because of the pervasive and
intrusive influence of the medium on people who watch its programs without having
to pay anything.

On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity,
the test being whether, using contemporary community standards, the dominant
appeal us to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California). Thus on this score, it found
abuse of discretion of the part of the Board for subjecting the producer to difficulty
and for entertaining a narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the votes to rules that
the abuse was grave.
15.

National Press Club vs. Comelec

Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media

which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national
and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers
and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of
credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by
petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain
that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because
it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions,
only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political
propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is
in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of
public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners
contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that
the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those
appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio
and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity
or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional.
Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of
Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of
the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to
be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during
the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for
public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at
one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies
given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the
egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The
essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative
provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or
regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during
an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or
regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11
(b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of
media operations during election periods.

Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By

virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is
limited in its applicability in time toelection periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport
in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of
news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political
parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications,
and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs
are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office.
Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular
candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates
themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.

16.

Sanidad vs. Comelec (columnist prohibition, columnist)

Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled
30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent
election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite
on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a
newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or
announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the plebiscite campaign
period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television
time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should
be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods.
Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec
was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public
utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity,
time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor,
for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured.
Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646

(a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any

elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the
campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been
granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners
themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners
exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the
franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite.
Right to Assembly and Petition

17.

JBL Reyes vs. Bagatsing (rally, US EMBASSY)

FACTS: Petitioners sought a permit to hold a peaceful march and rally, requesting
for the removal of the foreign military bases in Manila, starting from Luneta park
to the gates of the US Embassy. Respondent Mayor denied the request as
recommended by the police authorities and suggested another area where the
safety of the participants and the general public may be ensured. Petitioner
contends that said denial was a violation of free speech and assembly.
ISSUE: WON denial of a public rally on a public park and the US Embassy is a
violation of constitutional guarantee to free speech and assembly.
HELD: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries
with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded.
It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets,
there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for
the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection,
absent of clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta
and US Embassy as the place for the peaceful rally. Time immemorial Luneta has
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Moreover, denial of permit for a rally in front of
the US Embassy is justified only in the presence of a clear and present danger to
life or property of the embassy.

18.

Bayan vs. Ermita

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6,
2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No.
880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P.
No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of
the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice
of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time
and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is
sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions
in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or
influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to
assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a
content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and
two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During
the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution
of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as
applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No.
880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the
Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the
people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a
right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this
rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all
the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute.
It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The

power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed
the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus
readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public
places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting,
and influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so
its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and
benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the
rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more
particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to
take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one
suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After
thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance
notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably
assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that
has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated preemptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of
maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN
from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance,
The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of
Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED

19.

Malabanan vs. Ramento (general assembly, basketball court)

Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Respondent

University. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold
a meeting from 8am to 12am. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students,
they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
(VMAS) Basketball Court. The place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball
court as therein stated, but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering, they
manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed
merger of the Institute of Animal Science. They continued their language severely
critical of the university authorities and using megaphones in the process. There
was, as a result, disturbance of classes being held. Also, non academic employees
within hearing distance, stopped their work because of noise created. They were
asked to explain why they should not be held liable for holding an assembly.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was
violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?
Decision: Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or
involving public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent
punishment unless there be a showing of clear and present danger to a substantive
evil that the State has a right to prevent. The peaceable character of an assembly
could be lost, however, by an advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held in
school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities who are devoid
to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the
time and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of
non-academic personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty incurred should not
be disproportionate to the offense.
20.IBP vs. ATIENZA (rally, Mendiola Bridge)
FACTS:
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz,
filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to
rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to
be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral
organizations. Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to
stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue,
instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to free assembly of the petitioners was violated.
HELD:

Yes. The right to free assembly of the petitioners was violated.

The Supreme Court held that in modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor
gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who
should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may
directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit. Respondent mayor
failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against
the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition
to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would,
when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any
judicial scrutiny thereof.