Topicality - Curtail
Curtail = Decrease
1nc
Curtail means to prohibit
principal concerns of legislators familiar with the program. Senators have consistently expressed unease
Topicality - Domestic
1nc
Domestic surveillance means that it must target US persons not
just be collected within the US
McCarthy, 6 former assistant U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York. (Andrew, Its Not
Domestic Spying; Its Foreign Intelligence Collection National Review, 5/15, Read more at:
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/122556/its-not-domestic-spying-its-foreign-intelligence-collectionandrew-c-mccarthy
Eggen also continues the mainstream medias propagandistic use of the term domestic surveillance [or
'spying'] program. In actuality, the electronic surveillance that the NSA is doing i.e., eavesdropping on
understand but what the media, civil libertarians and many members of Congress refuse to acknowledge:
it is important to distinguish
between informational control, monitoring and surveillance so
that the problem can be better understood. We consider
control to be the supervision of activities, or actions normally associated with
government and authority over people, actions and processes. Monitoring can be
considered a form of observation to gather information with a view
Although they often appear to be synonymous,
to making projections or constructing scenarios and historical records, i.e., the action of following up and
evaluating data.
English and French the two words vigilant and surveillance, each of which is spelt the same way and
has the same meaning in both languages, are applied to someone who is particularly watchful and to acts
associated with legal action or action by the police intended to provide protection against crime,
quite specific as the intentional observation of someone's actions or the intentional gathering of personal
information in order to observe actions taken in the past or future" (Gow. 2005. p. 8).
Litt and Joel 14 (Robert Litt, he second General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and Alexander W. Joel, the first Civil Liberties Protection Officer for the U.S. Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, Interim Progress Report on Implementing PPD-28, October 17, 2014,
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-and-publications/204-reports-publications-2014/1126interim-progress-report-on-implementing-ppd-28) // AW
Verizon 14 (Amicus Brief: U.S. Search Warrants Do Not Apply to Data Stored Overseas, 12/15/14,
http://publicpolicy.verizon.com/blog/entry/us-search-warrants-do-not-apply-to-data-stored-overseas )//LP
Today, Verizon filed an amicus brief in support of Microsofts appeal to reverse a federal courts decision
that allowed the U.S. government to use a warrant to compel Microsoft to produce a customers email
stored overseas. We were joined on our brief by Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, eBay, salesforce.com and Infor.
The case does not involve Verizon or any Verizon customers data. Indeed, Verizon has not received any
warrants from the U.S. government for customer data stored in our enterprise data centers outside the
United States and we do not expect to receive such demands. Still, we have submitted this brief in order to
turn back an unlawful overreach by the U.S. government. The law does not allow the U.S. government to
use a search warrant to obtain customer data stored overseas. The U.S. Supreme Court has reiterated
many times that U.S. statutes are presumed not to have extraterritorial application unless Congress
clearly expressed its affirmative intention to the contrary.Congress
Domestic = In US Territory
1nc
domestic in the context of surveillance means collection of data in
US territory
Thompson, 13 -- Legislative Attorney (Richard M. Thompson II is writing for the congressional
research service, 4/3/13, http://www.pennyhill.com/jmsfileseller/docs/R42701.pdf) LP
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, as the areas surveilled were open to public view.
Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai 6/12/14 http://mashable.com/2014/06/12/microsoft-u-s-government-dataforeign-servers/ Microsoft Fights U.S. Government Over Rights to Data on Foreign Servers Lorenzo
Franceschi-Bicchierai is a reporter at Mashable's New York headquarters, where he covers cybersecurity,
tech policy, privacy and surveillance, hackers, drones, and, more in general, the intersection of technology
and civil liberties. Before Mashable, Lorenzo was an intern at Wired.com, where he wrote for Danger Room,
and Threat Level. A recent graduate of Columbia's Graduate School of Journalism Lorenzo is also a Law
graduate at University of Barcelona.
Microsoft is challenging a data request from the U.S. government in an unprecedented case that could
have sweeping ramifications for online privacy around the world. In December 2013, the U.S. government
obtained a search warrant requesting information about an email user for an investigation apparently
involving drugs and money laundering. But Microsoft is refusing to cooperate because the data in question
is stored in Ireland, and the company argues the U.S. can't force it to hand over data stored outside
American soil. The case is a perfect example of how new technologies like cloud computing clash with preInternet laws. These are the answers to the most basic questions about the case. What is the government
information of the account, according to the search warrant sent to Microsoft. The actual email address is
redacted in court documents, and the details of the case are still unclear. What did Microsoft say to the
request? Microsoft responded providing some information related to the account, but declined to turn over
What are Microsoft's arguments? In a court filing made public on Monday, Microsoft argued that a search
warrant doesn't apply overseas. Since it doesn't give authority to "break down the doors of Microsoft's
Dublin facility," it shouldn't give the government authority to access data within that facility, Microsoft
argued. Moreover, the company argued, the warrant is too broad and vague, as it requests all content in
the user's account. "It is, in a sense, the broadest possible warrant that one literally can imagine in the
21st century," Brad Smith, Microsoft's general counsel, said at a conference in New York last week. Lastly,
Microsoft says that the government should use another, legal way to access this kind of data: a so-called
mutual legal assistance treaty, or MLAT. Thanks to this legal agreement with Ireland as well as many
other countries U.S. authorities can access data in that country but, in turn, have to comply with local
laws. Law enforcement authorities routinely use this kind of assistance to obtain evidence held in another
country. Whart are the government's arguments? The U.S. government argues that companies can't refuse
to comply legal requests "simply by storing the data abroad," as Preet Bharara, United States attorney for
the Southern District of New York, said in a court filing. The danger, Bharara continued, is that criminals
could skirt investigations by lying about their locations and thus forcing Microsoft to store data outside the
U.S., and far from American law enforcement's reach. The judge in the case, James Francis, agreed with the
government, arguing that the
interpretation. The relevant law in the case, the oft-maligned 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), clearly requires warrants when accessing content information, and subpoenas have different
requirements. "It's a bad interpretation
professor at New York University,told Mashable.
to local data centres, such as those based in Ireland, which will take them
outside the NSA's jurisdiction. "People should have the ability to know whether their data are being
subjected to the laws and access of governments in some other country and should have the ability to
make an informed choice of where their data resides," Brad Smith, general counsel at Microsoft, told the
Financial Times. Surveillance shake-up Revelations over the past year about the NSA's widespread internet
and phone surveillance have strained relationships between the US and its allies. Some countries that were
the victims of spying, such as Brazil, are now bringing in new laws to prevent citizen data from being
stored outside their own country. Many rival companies are opposed to the idea of letting customers
choose where data is stored, which will likely be cost prohibitive, but Microsoft's decision will possibly
cause some to change their minds.
Ex Post CP
1nc
Text: The United States federal government should require ex post
review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of NSA
surveillance targeting criteria, establish a public advocate at the
FISC, and establish a cabinet-level privacy agency.
The CP restore domestic and international confidence in US
surveillance without restricting the scope of NSA activities instead
it conducts post-surveillance minimization
Margulies, 14 - Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law (CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION,
AND NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER 9/11: THE NSA IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: SURVEILLANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2137, April, lexis)
While I have concluded that U.S. surveillance policy does not violate the ICCPR, further reforms
could highlight this point and silence persistent doubts here and abroad. These
reforms could also remove any barriers to cooperation
between the United States and foreign states, such as those in Europe, which are
subject to the European Convention on Human Rights. This section identifies reforms
that would add a public advocate to FISC proceedings, enhance
FISC review of the criteria used for overseas surveillance,
establish a U.S. privacy agency that would handle complaints
from individuals here and overseas, and require greater
minimization of non-U.S. person communications. These
reforms would signal U.S. support of evolving global norms of
digital privacy.
Although President Obama's speech in January 2014 proposed a panel of independent lawyers who could
A
public advocate would scrutinize and, when necessary, challenge the
NSA's targeting criteria on a regular basis. n162 Challenges
would be brought in the FISC, after the NSA's implementation
of criteria. The NSA would be able to adapt the criteria on an
exigent basis, subject to ex post review by the FISC at the public advocate's
behest. A public advocate and enhanced FISC review would serve
three valuable functions: (1) ensure that the FISC received the
best arguments on both sides; (2) serve as a valuable ex ante
check on the government, encouraging the government to
adopt those criteria that could withstand subsequent scrutiny;
and (3) promote domestic and global confidence in the
participate in important FISC cases, n161 further institutionalization of this role would be useful.
knowing that their views would also have a champion in a free-standing executive department
independent [*2166] of the national security bureaucracy. There are downsides to this proposal, of
course. A new agency would add expense, and create some redundancy in government functions.
Moreover, current models that provide recourse, such as the approach currently taken by the Department
preserving
cooperation with Europe and enhancing the overall legitimacy
of U.S. surveillance provides a compelling justification.
Each of these instrumentalities - a public advocate at the FISC and a new
privacy agency - could also work to strengthen minimization
requirements for foreign communications. The NSA says that it disposes of all
of Homeland Security, n163 have been criticized as unduly burdensome. n164 However,
irrelevant communications within five years. There may be ways to shorten this time and require even
more rigorous controls on sharing of information that lacks a clear link to terrorism or other foreign
legitimacy .
Net benefit is terrorism the plan restricts the collection of 702
surveillance data to individualized and specific threat categories.
That prevents the programmatic surveillance necessary for pattern
analysis that can identify future terrorist threats
Sales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan, I/S: A Journal of Law
and Policy for the Information Society, Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the
NSA Controversy 10 ISJLP 523, Summer, lexis)
Programmatic surveillance is a
potentially
powerful
claims at least one success from the telephony metadata program, though it has been coy about the
specifics: "The NSA, using the business record FISA, tipped [the FBI] off that [an] individual had indirect
contacts with a known terrorist overseas. . . . We were able to reopen this investigation, identify additional
individuals through a legal process and were able to disrupt this terrorist activity." n30 Quite apart from
foiling attacks, the government also argues that the
Solvency Legitmacy
Incorporating oversight in the surveillance process boosts U.S. cred
and legitimacy and also gives a voice to U.S. citizens
Sales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan Alexander,
Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy, 8/12/14,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf, pg. 16-17 , accessed: 6/23/15, JR)
checks thus operate together as a system; the two types of restraints are rough substitutes for one
another. If outside players like Congress and the courts are subjecting the executives programmatic
surveillance activities to especially rigorous scrutiny, the need for comparably robust safeguards within
regimes like FISA: officials cant surveil unless they show that the target is a spy or terrorist, but
resolutions on counterterrorism. To reconcile Article 17 with these norms and with sovereign prerogatives, I
certain reforms
of NSA surveillance, such as a public advocate, would further
strengthen compliance, affirming that NSA programs are consistent
with the ICCPR. President Obamas initiatives, including a clearer
articulation of the bases for U.S. surveillance abroad, buttress this
case.
surveillance, that are not radically different from U.S. practice. I note, however, that
foreign states, such as those in Europe, which are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights.
January 2014 proposed a panel of independent lawyers who could participate in important FISC cases,161
national agency would also work hand in hand with privacy officers in executive departments. It would
increase the leverage of those officials, who could advocate vigorously in internal debates, knowing that
their views would also have a champion in a free-standing executive department independent of the
national security bureaucracy. There are downsides to this proposal, of course. A new agency would add
expense, and create some redundancy in government functions. Moreover, current models that provide
recourse, such as the approach currently taken by the Department of Homeland Security,163 have been
criticized as unduly burdensome.164 However, preserving cooperation with Europe and enhancing the
Each of these
instrumentalitiesa public advocate at the FISC and a new privacy agencycould also
work to strengthen minimization requirements for foreign
communications. The NSA says that it disposes of all irrelevant
communications within five years. There may be ways to
shorten this time and require even more rigorous controls on
sharing of information that lacks a clear link to terrorism or other foreign intelligence matters. More
exacting minimization would also promote U.S.-European
overall legitimacy of U.S. surveillance provides a compelling justification.
Sales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan, I/S: A Journal of Law
and Policy for the Information Society, Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the
NSA Controversy, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/
08/12-Sales.pdf)//MR
straightforward task when the targets identity is already knowne.g., a diplomat at the Soviet embassy in
you convince the FISA court that Smith is an agent of a foreign power when you know nothing about Smith
his name, nationality, date of birth, location, or even whether he is a single person or several dozen? The
government typically wont know those things unless it has collected some information about Smithsuch
Sales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan, I/S: A Journal of Law
and Policy for the Information Society, Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the
NSA Controversy, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf)//MR
Programmatic surveillance initiatives like these differ in simple yet fundamental ways from the traditional
forms of monitoring with which many people are familiari.e., individualized or particularized surveillance.
Individualized surveillance takes place when authorities have some reason to think that a specific, known
person is breaking the law. Investigators will then obtain a court order authorizing them to collect
information about the target, with the goal of assembling evidence that can be used to establish guilt in
subsequent criminal proceedings. Individualized surveillance is common in the world of law enforcement,
as under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.23 It is also used in national
security investigations. FISA allows authorities to obtain a court order to engage in wiretapping if they
demonstrate, among other things, probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power.24 By contrast, programmatic surveillance has very different objectives and is
conducted in a very different manner. It usually involves the government collecting bulk data and then
examining it to identify previously unknown terrorists, spies, and other national security threats. A good
example of the practice is link analysis, in which authorities compile large amounts of information, use it to
map the social networks of known terroristshas anyone else used the same credit card as Mohamed
Atta?and thus identify associates with whom they may be conspiring.25 (It is also possible, at least in
theory, to subject these large databases to pattern analysis, in which automated systems search for
patterns of behavior that are thought to be indicative of terrorist activity, but its not clear that the NSA is
doing so here.) Suspects who have been so identified can then be subjected to further forms of monitoring
to determine their intentions and capabilities, such as wiretaps under FISA or other authorities. In a sense,
programmatic surveillance is the mirror image of individualized surveillance. With individualized
monitoring, authorities begin by identifying a suspect and go on to collect information; with programmatic
monitoring, authorities begin by collecting information and go on to identify a suspect. Programmatic
surveillance is a potentially powerful counterterrorism tool. The Raed al-Banna incident is a useful
illustration of how the technique, when coupled with old-fashioned police work, can identify possible
threats who otherwise might escape detection. Another example comes from a 2002 Markle Foundation
study, which found that authorities could have identified the ties among all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers if they
had assembled a large database of airline reservation information and subjected it to link analysis.26 In
particular, two of the terroristsNawaf al-Hamzi and Khalid al-Mihdharwere on a government watchlist
after attending a January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia. So they could have been flagged when they
bought their tickets. Querying the database to see if any other passengers had used the pairs mailing
addresses would have led investigators to three more hijackers, including Mohamed Atta, the plots
operational leader. Six others could have been found by searching for passengers who used the same
frequent-flyer and telephone numbers as these suspects. And so on. Again, the Markle study concerns
airline reservation data, not the communications data that are the NSAs focus. But it is still a useful
illustration of the techniques potential. The government claims that programmatic surveillance has been
responsible for concrete and actual counterterrorism benefits, not just hypothetical ones. Officials report
that PRISM has helped detect and disrupt about 50 terrorist plots worldwide, including ten in the United
States.27 Those numbers include Najibullah Zazi, who attempted to bomb New York Citys subway system
in 2009, and Khalid Ouazzani, who plotted to blow up the New York Stock Exchange.28 Authorities further
report that PRISM played an important role in tracking down David Headley, an American who aided the
2008 terrorist atrocities in Bombay, and later planned to attack the offices of a Danish newspaper that
printed cartoons of Mohamed.29 The government also claims at least one success from the telephony
metadata program, though it has been coy about the specifics: The NSA, using the business record FISA,
tipped [the FBI] off that [an] individual had indirect contacts with a known terrorist overseas. . . . We were
able to reopen this investigation, identify additional individuals through a legal process and were able to
disrupt this terrorist activity.30 Quite apart from foiling attacks, the government also argues that the NSA
programs can conserve scarce investigative resources by helping officials quickly spot or rule out any
foreign involvement in a domestic plot, as after the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.31 These claims have
to be taken with a few grains of salt. Some observers believe that the government could have discovered
the plots using standard investigative techniques, and without resorting to extraordinary methods like
programmatic surveillance.32 The metadata program has elicited special skepticism: The Presidents
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies bluntly concluded that the information
contributed to terrorist investigations by the use of section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to
preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional section
215 orders.33 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reached the same conclusion.34 (Judicial
opinion is split on the programs value. One judge has expressed serious doubts about its utility,35 while
another has concluded that its effectiveness cannot be seriously disputed.)36 Furthermore, we should
always be cautious when evaluating the merits of classified intelligence initiatives on the basis of selective
and piecemeal revelations, as officials might tailor the information they release in a bid to shape public
opinion.37 But even if specific claimed successes remain contested, programmatic surveillance in general
can still be a useful counterterrorism technique.
While the NSA programs feature several important safeguards to help protect privacy and civil liberties,
there is room for improvement. Policymakers should consider altering the minimization rules to better
prevent mission creep, adding an adversarial element to certain aspects of the FISA courts proceedings,
and enacting new legislation to place the telephony metadata program on a more stable statutory footing.
First, the minimization rules that govern the section 702 program allow intelligence officials to share
information with federal law enforcement if it contains evidence [of] a crime.96 The government ecently
has clarified that nonpublicly available signals intelligence that the United States collects in bulk may
only be used to counter certain enumerated national security threats, as well as [t]ransnational criminal
threats.97 Even with that restriction, however, the rules seem too permissive. On their face, the
minimization rules permit the fruits of PRISM surveillance to be used in investigations of even minor
federal offenses, such as mail fraud and theft, so long as they have some [t]ransnational aspect. The
problem is that the relative costs and benefits of surveillance depend on the magnitude of the offense
under investigation. Just because were willing to countenance the use of extraordinary methods to
prevent terrorism, it doesnt mean the same techniques should be used to combat tax delinquency.
Policymakers should tighten the list of crimes for which sharing is allowed. Of course, intelligence officials
certainly should be able to tell their law enforcement counterparts when they come across evidence of
terrorism, espionage, and other national security threatsthe need for cops and spies to share more
counterterrorism information is one of the enduring lessons of 9/11.98 And other serious crimes like those
involving risk of death or serious bodily injury, or child exploitation, should be on the list as well. At the
same time, we should not overestimate the NSAs enthusiasm for sharing the intelligence it gathers.
Regardless of what the minimization rules permit, the NSA will have strong incentives to resist sharing
information with or otherwise helping its bureaucratic rivals.99 Indeed, the New York Times recently
reported widespread frustration among law enforcement officials over the NSAs reluctance to assist their
investigations of routine offenses like money laundering, counterfeiting and even copyright infringement;
their requests are usually denied because the links to terrorism or foreign intelligence are considered too
tenuous.100 (Note that the story addresses NSA resources in general, not telephony metadata and
PRISM data in particular.) In short, institutional self-interest and legal restrictions on sharing can be rough
substitutes. And while self- interest will often lead the NSA to refuse access to sensitive intelligence in
garden-variety criminal cases, these naturally occurring bureaucratic incentives should be supplemented
with strong minimization rules that prevent inappropriate mission creep.
A2: Perm do CP
Perm is severance severance illegit makes the aff a moving target
destroying CP and DA ground
a) Public advocate requirement is outside PPD authority
Lawfare 2014 (Benjamin Wittes; chief of Lawfare, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings
Institution, member of the Hoover Institution's Task Force on National Security and Law, The President's
Speech and PPD-28: A Guide for the Perplexed, 1/20/2014, http://www.lawfareblog.com/presidentsspeech-and-ppd-28-guide-perplexed)//MR
White House 14 (Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Policy Directive -- Signals Intelligence
Activities, 1/17/14, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directivesignals-intelligence-activities)
The limitations contained in this section do not apply to signals intelligence data that is temporarily
acquired to facilitate targeted collection. References to signals intelligence collected in "bulk" mean the
authorized collection of large quantities of signals intelligence data which, due to technical or operational
considerations, is acquired without the use of discriminants (e.g., specific identifiers, selection terms, etc.).
only for the purposes of detecting and countering: (1) espionage and other threats and activities directed
by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the United States and its interests; (2) threats to
the United States and its interests from terrorism; (3) threats to the United States and its interests from the
development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity threats;
(5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other U.S or allied personnel; and (6) transnational criminal
threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to the other purposes named in this section.
In no event may signals intelligence collected in bulk be used for the purpose of suppressing or burdening
criticism or dissent; disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or
religion; affording a competitive advantage to U.S. companies and U.S. business sectors commercially; or
achieving any purpose other than those identified in this section.
Case Debate
Solvency
General
No solvency - Cant get data from overseas servers major
companies have information on servers abroad
No solvency- 702 still allows for overreach- vague implementation
LoConte 10. (FISA Amendments Act 2008: Protecting Americans by Monitoring International
Communications - Is It Reasonable; LoConte, Jessica. 2010 Pace Int'l L. Rev. Online Companion 6 (2010) Vol
I:6. Pg 6. http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?
men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/piliewco2010&id=7&size=2&collection=journals&terms=702&
termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=)//LP
The procedures used are consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.20
in order
to obtain a warrant from the FISA court, it is not necessary for the
Attorney General or the DNI to specify who the target of surveillance
will be. In fact, the statute specifically states that any "certification
made under this subsection [section 702] is not required to identify the
specific facilities, places, premises or property at which an
acquisition ... will be directed or conducted.'22 Nor does the statute state that the
If the FISC finds that the above requirements are met, then it will issue a warrant.21 Note that
government must have a reasonable belief that the targets of surveillance have a connection to criminal or
Circumvention
No solvency multiple reasons -a) TFA language in 702 allows NSA to bypass restrictions against
domestic surveillance
Donohue 15 --From the Georgetown university of law.(Laura K., Section 702 and the Collection of
International Telephone and Internet Content, Georgetown Law. n/a date.
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2364&context=facpub)//TS
principal concerns of legislators familiar with the program. Senators have consistently expressed unease
What is clear is that the inclusion of about communications significantly expands the volume of Internet
intercepts under Section 702. By 2011, NSA was acquiring approximately 26.5 million Internet transactions
per year as part of its upstream collection.179 Three points related to the volume and intrusiveness of the
collect not just e-mail to or from the targets e-mail account (badguy@ISP.com), but, in addition, other
communications happening to mention badguy@ISP.com that pass through the collection point, then the
NSA is monitoring a significant amount of traffic.181 And the agency is not just considering envelope
information (for example, messages in which the selector is sending, receiving, or copied on the
communication) but the actual content of messages. 182
In this manner,
a student in Chicago may send an e-mail to a student in Boston
that gets routed through a server in Canada. Through no intent
or design of the individual in Chicago, the message becomes
international and thus subject to NSA surveillance. Third, further
domestic conversations by nature of them being routed through foreign servers.
collection of domestic conversations takes place through the NSAs intercept of what are called
multicommunication transactions, or MCTs. It is important to distinguish here between a transaction and a
communication. Some transactions have only single communications associated with them. These are
referred to as SCTs. Other transactions contain multiple communications. If even one of the
communications in an MCT falls within the NSAs surveillance, all of the communications bundled into the
MCT are collected. The consequence is of significant import. FISC estimated in 2011 that somewhere
reasonably believed to be outside U.S.; and (b) to prevent the acquisition of domestic communications.186
In other words, the statute only requires that the NSA not know (a) that the target is in the U.S.; or (b) that
what must be done to ascertain the targets location. Sections 703 and 704, which are designed to deal
with U.S. persons, say nothing in turn about what is required to demonstrate whether a target either is or
is not a U.S. person.187 Instead, these provisions address situations where the applicant has probable
databases or other surveillance systems that could be consulted to determine whether the target is a U.S.
a functional meaning to the resultant clausespecifically, in the case of may, to intone possibility in a
TFA has allowed the NSA to collect data beyond what might
otherwise be considered incidental. Congress may not have
anticipated this possibility in 2008. But by 2012 the
information had been made available to any Members inclined
to read it. The legislature, however, did not take steps to end
programmatic collection. Nor did FISC play a strong role with regard to the legality of
knowingly collecting entirely domestic conversations. The courts decision encouraged willful blindness: as
long as the NSA did not develop sophisticated technologies, it could collect more information and fit within
the statutory bounds. Critique of these developments could be read as simply a complaint that the law
went the other way. After all, three branches of government appear to have given the NSA their blessing:
Congress through renewal of the FAA, the FISA Court of Review via its approval of certification, targeting,
and minimization procedures, and the AG and DNI in their oversight capacities. But the burden borne by
the government in the realm of national security is one that requires the public authorities to be consistent
FAA
provides inadequate civil liberties protections for Americans.
This proposal says nothing about the adequacy of that statute
in this respect. What it says is that for data held by an American company about a target that is
intelligence agencies, as U.S. law cannot bind a foreign government. And some may argue that
not a U.S. person, the checks within FAA are stronger than those solely under E.O. 12333.
Some developing
nations have a legitimate beef with the multi-stakeholder
model of Internet governance that the U.S. champions, the
State Departments ambassador to the Internet acknowledged
yesterday. The current slate of stakeholders just isnt diverse
enough, Daniel Sepulveda said. In theory, the multi-stakeholder model
means major decisions about how the Internet is organized are
made by technical specialists at ICANN and other consensusbased non-profits rather than by national governments or
multi-national organizations such as the United Nations. In practice,
however, those non-profits are inordinately filled with Western
government representatives, Western companies and Western
civil society members, Sepulveda said on the sidelines of yesterdays Internet Governance
THE WEST DOMINATES INTERNET GOVERNANCE, BUT THAT CAN CHANGE
Mozur and Jie 14(Jun 23, 2014 Paul Mozur writes about technology from The Wall Street Journal's Beijing
bureau and Yang Jie computer scientist whose research interests include multimodal human-computer
interaction (modeling and learning), computer vision, and pattern
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/06/23/chinas-lays-out-argument-for-internet-sovereigntyconvinced/ China Argues for Internet Sovereignty. Is It a Good Idea? accessed 06/28/15)PA
control over the Internet, and the revelations of former National Security Agency contractor
Edward Snowden exposes U.S. hypocrisy in calling for a more open Internet while simultaneously
Still, a number of U.S. hardware and Internet companies continue to control huge swathes of the globes
Internet traffic. Internet
a
problem appears, the current multi-stakeholder approach fails to
address it, and governments seek other solutions using their
national authorities. There will be no rush to a global treaty, where
the UN suddenly takes control of the Internet. Instead, nations will
take steps to establish rules and penalties for behaviour on
the Internet that are consistent with their national laws; over
time this will aggregate into a new sovereign framework .
The extension of Westphalian sovereignty into cyberspace has been incremental and gradual:
Governments are unlikely to be involved in the day-to-day operations of the Internet, but they will put new
rules in place for its operation. The process will leave proponents of the current governance structure
confused and complaining as they are increasingly hemmed in by a range of national controls .
This
extension of sovereignty is not the balkanization of the
Internet a pejorative term coined by defenders of the status
quo. The definition of borders in cyberspace is no more a balkanization
than the existence of borders in the physical world; only those who still believe in
the one-world global commons could interpret this as such. There will still be a global
network where the primary motives Internet Governance: Inevitable
Transitions for design and architecture are commercial and the primary differences among nations will be
import tariffs and preferential taxation. Brazilian President Rousseff has on numerous occasions stated that
her government intends to make Brazil a regional technology and innovation leader; in recent years the
government has proposed measures to increase domestic Internet bandwidth production, expand
international Internet connectivity, encourage domestic content production, and promote the use of
domestically produced network equipment.82 India, more controversially, has at times required foreign
corporations to enter into joint ventures to sell ecommerce products, and has compelled foreign companies
Brazil
and India are, of course, not alone in this respect. Indonesian firms
are constructing domestic cloud service facilities with the help of
government grants, 84 while Korea is offering similar support to its own firms. 85 For the
governments and corporations of these nations, long
frustrated by their inability to develop a domestic IT industry
that can compete on an even playing field with the U.S.
technology giants, data localization is one means to confront,
and perhaps overcome, the American Internet hegemony.
to transfer proprietary technology to domestic firms after a predetermined amount of time.83
combination of anti-American populism, a desire for greater ease of foreign (and domestic) surveillance,
in their home marketsold-fashioned protectionism tailored for the digital age. A quick look at four select
U.S.
technology firms as well as those organizations and individuals abroad who also recognize the
problems data localization laws would introduce are having such a difficult time
arguing their case, despite the logic working in their favor and
against the policies they are contesting.
localization studies25 reveals this complex mix of purposes, and helps to explain why
Upon first glance, the preceding case studies present a consistent narrative:
for the nations now considering localization for data, the Snowden
revelations exposed an NSA that had overstepped the boundaries of
acceptable surveillance, violated citizen privacy, and catalyzed public and government
opinion in favor of forceful action in response. For policymakers, data
localization offers a seemingly simple and effective solution. Under
Gross 15 (Grant Gross, Two years after Snowden leaks, US tech firms still feel the backlash, Channel
World, 6-10-15. http://www.channelworld.in/news/two-years-after-snowden-leaks,-us-tech-firms-still-feelthe-backlash#sthash.lhuYY7rA.dpuf)//TS
Credibility/Soft Power
General
FAA solves perception - Any evidence about U.S. legitimacy before
June 15 is irrelevant the U.S. already restoring its legitimacy
Legitimacy K
The Vietnam War proves that adopting the false mindset of
credibility leads to bad decision making, resulting in useless
conflicts with harmful consequences.
Fettweis 07. Assistant professor of national security affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department at
the U.S. Naval War College. ( Christopher J. Credibility and the War on Terror, winter, vol.122, no. 4. Blackwell
Publishing Ltd.)//TS
way, expressing moral outrage that a war would be fought primarily for the messages it would send to our
from the survival of an anti-communist South Vietnam. To prominent realists such as Hans Morgenthau and
Kenneth Waltz, intervention in isolated, resource-poor Vietnam was irrational, moralistic, and mistaken.
Only if developments in Vietnam might indeed tilt the worlds balance in Americas disfavor, argued
Waltz, would the war be worthwhile.27They did not, of course, since from a purely material perspective,
a loss t o U .S. credibility, however, appeared incalculable. The war in Vietnam marked the beginning of the
current debate over the importance of credibility, and the point of divergence between scholars and
Vietnamese troops overrun Saigon in 19 75.Since this cut-an d-run and subsequent loss of an ally were
presumably a
string of foreign policy setbacks should have followed. If
undoubtedly unmitigated disasters for the credibility of the United States,
international actions are truly interdependent, as policymakers believe, then the 1970s would probably
have seen evidence of allies beginning to question U.S. commitments, dominoes falling where the
reputation of the United States maintained the status quo, an d increased levels of Soviet activity in the
third world. The conventional wisdom suggests that the humiliating rooftop helicopter evacuation of the
However, no
such string of catastrophes took place. Perhaps most
obviously, there is no evidence that any allies of the United
States were significantly demoralized, or that any questioned the wisdom of
U.S. embassy in Saigon should have heralded a dark period for U.S. foreign policy.
their allegiance. If anything, many of Washingtons closest allies seemed relieved when the war ended,
since many of them had doubted its importance in the first place and had feared that it distracted the
United States from other, more pressingissues.28Certainly no state, not even any client states in the
fell were two countries that were even less relevant than Vietnam to the global balance of power
Cambodia and Laos, both of which were hardly major losses for the West, especially given the tragedies
that followed. Nationalism proved to be a bulwark against the spread of communism that could not be
overcome by any loss of confidence in U.S. commitments.
fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed
from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence
theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and,
their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise.
This divergence in
conventional wisdom between policy and scholarship would not be a
major issue for twenty-first-century international politics if policies
that are primarily based upon the need to appear credible were not
often counterproductive, costly, and dangerous. The imperative has
clear effects upon policy, and is employed in debates in predictable,
measurable, and uniformly unhelpful ways.
would challenge the wisdom of the policymakers obsession with reputation.
Warming
No impact and its not anthropogenic
Lupo 08 (NAPSA, Anthony R. assistant professor of atmospheric science at the University of Missouri
at Columbia and served as an expert reviewer for the UNs Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Global Warming Is Natural, Not Man-Made, 2008,
http://www.napsnet.com/pdf_archive/34/50144.pdf) //AW
One of the fundamental tenets of our justice system is one is innocent until proven guilty. While that
doesnt apply to scientific discovery, in the global warming debate the prevailing attitude is that human
induced global warming is already a fact of life and it is up to doubters to prove otherwise. To
come back with a guilty verdict convicting humanity of forcing recent climatological changes. Even
the most ardent supporters of global warming will not argue this point. Instead, they argue that
much as 11 degrees Fahrenheit over the next century. One should be careful when looking at model
using models and interpreting their output. No one advocates destruction of the environment, and
indeed we have an obligation to take care of our environment for future generations. At the same time,
we need to make sound decisions based on scientific facts. My research leads me to believe that we
will not be able to state conclusively that global warming is or is not occurring for another 30 to 70
Cyberterror
Congressional oversight prevents NSA backdoors already - no link to
cyber terrorism.
Mazmanian June 6, 2015. ( Adam, CJS funding bill would limit high-tech surveillance, 6-6-15. The
Business of federal technology. http://fcw.com/articles/2015/06/04/cjs-funding-bill.aspx) // TS
The House passed a $51.4 billion Commerce, Justice and Science funding bill for fiscal 2016
on June 3 that would pare back the government's authority to
conduct surveillance on communications. Taken together, they constitute
something of a follow-on to the USA Freedom Act, just signed into law, which put new rules on the bulk
the brakes on efforts by FBI Director James Comey to guarantee that law enforcement agencies have
access to encrypted communications. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. * An amendment by
Darrell Issa (R-Calif.) that would bar funding of efforts by federal law enforcement to use "stingray"
devices, which simulate the activity of cell towers to capture location and identifying information from
mobile phones, to collect data in bulk without a court order. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. *
An amendment by Jared Polis (D-Colo.) that would ban the Drug Enforcement Administration from
An amendment
by Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) that would bar the National Institute of Standards and
Technology from coordinating on encryption or computer security
standards with the CIA and the National Security Agency, except for
the purposes of improving information security. The Massie amendment was a
response to revelations from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and other
sources about collaboration between NIST and the intelligence
community to insert flaws into highly complex encryption
standards revelations that led NIST to ultimately disavow the standards. The amendment was
collecting phone records in bulk. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. *
adopted 383-43. "Don't you want the best security available that the minds in this country can create ... to
safeguard your health records, maybe to safeguard your gun records, maybe to safeguard your bank
accounts and your credit cards? We are more safe when we have better security and better encryption, so
it makes no sense for [NIST] to work with the NSA to weaken our encryption software," Massie said.
Supply chain, census, other IT measures The bill would renew federal policy requiring supply-chain
vetting for the acquisition of high-impact and moderate-impact IT systems, including an assessment from
the FBI or other appropriate agency to evaluate cyber risks posed by any system whose manufacture is
touched by firms controlled or subsidized by the Chinese government, or other sources identified by the
U.S. as posing a cybersecurity threat. The House bill would extend the language of the measure to
encompass the renewal as well as the acquisition of systems. Appropriators are worried about the looming
2020 census. The bill includes $848 million in funding for the count, but there are some strings attached
related to IT delivery. The bill would mandate that half the IT funding for the 2020 census be withheld
pending the Census Bureau's delivery of a spending plan for the large-scale Census Enterprise Data
Collection and Processing project, which would put all the census data gathering, analytics and
dissemination technology under a single system for the first time. The bill would deliver drastic cuts to the
National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, a Commerce Department program designed to fund
pilot projects to create new methods of online authentication that go beyond simple usernames and
passwords. Under the bill, funding of new grants would cease, and second-year awards under 2015 grants
would be canceled, with the allowed funding being used to wind up the program. The White House issued a
veto threat before the bill went up for a vote. On the IT side, the Obama administration is particularly
concerned about census IT funding, the NIST appropriation, Internet governance transition work being
performed by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration at Commerce, funding for
Commerces digital service team, and budget requests by NASA and the National Science Foundation to
comply with the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act.
Greenwald who won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on the topic said was motivated by the fear of
losing customers rather than care for data privacy. "I don't (Think) they suddenly care about privacy,"
Greenwald said. "Ifyou're a Facebook executive or an Apple executive, you're extremely worried that the
next generation of usersare going to be vulnerable to the pitch from Brazilian, and Korean and German
social media companies where they advertise and say don't use Facebook and Google because they'll give
your data to the NSA." Snowden is due to address CeBIT later today. Glenn Greenwald, the man who
The United States is engaged in a proxy war with its enemies, a war
where cyberspace is the battlefield, cyber experts say. Because
of that, the National Security Agency's expansion of
warrantless surveillance of Americans' international Internet
traffic is necessary, said Tom Kellermann, chief cybersecurity officer with Trend Micro, a TexasSAN FRANCISCO
based computer security company. "Let's be fair. The National Security Agency's role is to protect national
scoop up Americans' Internet activities coincided with the government's disclosure that Chinese hackers
had breached the computer system of the Office of Personnel Management, potentially compromising the
data of 4 million current and former federal workers. "The
technical director at NSA for 15 years. Black-and-white distinction between criminal hackers and the
intelligence wings of other countries can be difficult to make. It's common in some nations for hackers to
be allowed to operate with impunity as long as they don't hack anything within their own country, experts
say. They're also expected to share information they come across that might be useful to their nation, and
to be "patriotic" and aid the state when called upon, Kellerman said. Intrusions often have multiple targets
and happen on multiple levels. Graham offered a hypothetical example: If a government wanted
information about specific types of employees at the Defense Department, it could hire or encourage a
hacking group to attack a financial institution or health care system in the Washington, D. C., area. That
would get them personal information about hundreds of thousands of individuals, some of whom may work
at the Defense Department. "They're hiding one attack in the noise of another, and everybody writes it off
as cyber-crime," Graham said. That's where looking at hacking activity broadly can pay off, Graham said.
"You don't know until you work your way up the food chain if they're working independently or they're a
small hacking group working with a government." For Herbert Lin, a Stanford University cyber-policy
expert, whether the NSA program was an effective strategy for detecting and stopping hacking by foreign
governments is the wrong question. "The question is really if the NSA program was helpful enough that it is
worth the expense and the cost," Lin said. "Personally I wish we didn't have to do it, but I think it's an
understandable response" given the current threat environment, he said. Other experts have their doubts
about whether the NSA program is helpful. "One need only open up a newspaper" to see that it's not
working, said Amit Yoran, CEO of the computer security company RSA. The needs of the intelligence and
law enforcement communities are often at odds with what businesses want and need, he said.
"Intelligence wants to monitor, to learn about the threat and how they work. Law enforcement wants to
collect information so they can prosecute," Yoran said. Victims of hacks want to rush in and clean up their
knows that others might come to different conclusions if they don't trust the U.S. government to do what's
right. "If you fundamentally don't trust, you fundamentally don't trust. I can't prove a negative," he said.
For privacy advocate Marc Rotenberg, with the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington D.C.,
trust and oversight form the crux of the matter. " The
Valeriano and Manus 15 -- Brandon Valeriano has a Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University in Political Science
and Ryan C. Maness has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois in Chicago. (Brandon and
Ryan C., Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System 5/26/15. Oxford
University Press, Pg.20-21) //AHS
potential for the fear invoked to translate to the securitization notion of forthcoming conflict, exploiting this
weakness.
that the Internet and cyber interactions are more stable than
most believe and therefore this domain can be a source of
cooperation. Cyberspace will become the domain of conflict
only if we let the fear process take hold and dominate the
discourse; the perception of fear then becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The CNBC network in the United States produced a documentary on cyber warfare that
documents the typical securitized discourse in this arena. Their introductory statement is a typical
example of the hyperbolic statements associated with cyber conflict. In the United States, we are Internet
dependent. Our financial system, power grids, telecommunications, water supplies, flight controls and
military communications are all online making them vulnerable to countless cyber incidents by cyber
criminals. The goal could be a 10-minute blackout, a breach of national security, a stock trading glitch or
the theft of millions of dollars worth of intellectual property. In short, everything from our money to our
Valeriano and Manus 15 -- Brandon Valeriano has a Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University in Political Science
and Ryan C. Maness has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois in Chicago. (Brandon and
Ryan C., Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System 5/26/15. Oxford
University Press. Pg.137) //AHS
Gartzke and Lindsay 6/22/15 (Eric Gartzke is an associate professor at UC San Diego in the in the
Department of Political Science and Jon Lindsay is an assistant adjunct professor at UC San Diego and an
Oxford Martin Associate with the Oxford Global Cyber Security Capacity Center. (Eric and Jon R., Weaving
Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace,6-22-2015. Taylor and Francis group.
Pg323-324. Security Studies Vol 24, Issue 2.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2015.1038188)//AHS
yet actual cyber disputes from 2001 to 2011 remain restrained and regionalized, not disruptive and
principle that the same tools used for computer-network exploitation may one day be leveraged for more
destructive strikes. Yet even if the nontrivial operational challenges of cyber war can be overcome,
Bilateral Talks
Pakistan/Proliferation Scenario
No Indo-Pak war - deterrence prevents
Ganguly 2008, Professor of Political at Indiana University, (Sumit Nuclear Stability in South Asia,
International Security, Volume 33, Number 2, 11/21/8, Muse AS)
capability may well have emboldened its leadership, secure in the belief that India had no good options to
respond. India, in turn, has been grappling with an effort to forge a new military doctrine and strategy to
enable it to respond to Pakistani needling while containing the possibilities of conflict escalation, especially
to the nuclear level.78 Whether Indian military planners [End Page 65] can fashion such a calibrated
strategy to cope with Pakistani probes remains an open question. This article's analysis of the 1999 and
forms of evidence can be adduced to argue the case for the strength of nuclear deterrence. First, there is a
serious problem of conflation in the arguments of both Hoyt and Kapur. Undeniably, Pakistan's willingness
to provoke India has increased commensurate with its steady acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. This period
from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, however, also coincided with two parallel developments that
equipped Pakistan with the motives, opportunities, and means to meddle in India's internal affairs
particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. The most important change that occurred was the end of the conflict
with the Soviet Union, which freed up military resources for use in a new jihad in Kashmir. This jihad, in
turn, was made possible by the emergence of an indigenous uprising within the state as a result of Indian
political malfeasance.79 Once the jihadis were organized, trained, armed, and unleashed, it is far from
clear whether Pakistan could control the behavior and actions of every resulting jihadist organization.80
Consequently, although the number of attacks on India did multiply during the 1990s, it is difficult to
establish a firm causal connection between the growth of Pakistani boldness and its gradual acquisition of
Pakistani ground fire.82 The Indian military exercised such restraint to avoid provoking Pakistani fears of a
wider attack into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and then into Pakistan itself. Indian restraint was also evident
at another level. During the last war in [End Page 66] Kashmir in 1965, within a week of its onset, the
Indian Army horizontally escalated with an attack into Pakistani Punjab. In fact, in the Punjab, Indian forces
successfully breached the international border and reached the outskirts of the regional capital, Lahore.
The Indian military resorted to this strategy under conditions that were not especially propitious for the
country. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, had died in late 1964. His successor,
Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a relatively unknown politician of uncertain stature and standing, and the Indian
military was still recovering from the trauma of the 1962 border war with the People's Republic of China.83
Finally, because of its role in the Cold War, the Pakistani military was armed with more sophisticated, U.S.supplied weaponry, including the F-86 Sabre and the F-104 Starfighter aircraft. India, on the other hand,
had few supersonic aircraft in its inventory, barring a small number of Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and the
indigenously built HF-24.84 Furthermore, the Indian military remained concerned that China might open a
second front along the Himalayan border. Such concerns were not entirely chimerical, because a SinoPakistani entente was under way. Despite these limitations, the Indian political leadership responded to
Pakistani aggression with vigor and granted the Indian military the necessary authority to expand the
scope of the war. In marked contrast to the politico-military context of 1965, in 1999 India had a selfconfident (if belligerent) political leadership and a substantially more powerful military apparatus.
Moreover, the country had overcome most of its Nehruvian inhibitions about the use of force to resolve
disputes.85 Furthermore, unlike in 1965, India had at least two reserve strike corps in the Punjab in a state
of military readiness and poised to attack across the border if given the political nod.86 Despite these
significant differences and advantages, the Indian political leadership chose to scrupulously limit the scope
of the conflict to the Kargil region. As K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian defense analyst and political
In 1965, when Pakistan carried out its "Operation Gibraltar" and sent in
infiltrators, India sent its army across the cease-fire line to destroy the assembly
points of the infiltrators. That escalated into a full-scale war. In 1990, when Pakistan once
again carried out a massive infiltration of terrorists trained in Pakistan,
India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not send
its army into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.87 Subrahmanyam's argument takes on
additional significance in light of the overt acquisition of nuclear
weapons by both India and Pakistan.
India.
General Khalid
Kidwai, a top advisor to the Pakistani government, said this week that Pakistan needed shortrange tactical nuclear weapons, also known as battlefield nukes to deter
nuclear archrival India. Kidwai said that having tactical weapons would make
war less likely, at a conference on nuclear security organized by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Washington. Kidwai administered Pakistans nuclear and
missile weapons program for fifteen years. Pakistans tactical weapon
development includes the Nasr Missile, which has a range of around 37 miles
dangerous nuclear rivalrybetween India and Pakistangrows ever more deadly.
(60 kilometers) and reflects concerns in Pakistan that Indias larger military could still wage a
conventional war against the country, thinking Pakistan would not risk retaliation with a bigger nuclear
weapon.Pakistan especially fears and aims to neutralize Indias Cold Start doctrine, a type of blitzkrieg
that aims to advance fast enough into Pakistan to seize key installations before a retaliatory nuclear strike
US-China Scenario
China wont accept US-centric stakeholder model based in human
rights agenda
Lindsay 15 (Jon R. Lindsay holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and an MS in computer science and BS in symbolic systems from Stanford University. He is an officer in the
U.S. naval reserve with seventeen years of experience including assignments in Asia, Europe, Latin
America, and the Middle East., Tai Ming Cheung director of the University of California Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation, is a long-time analyst of Chinese and East Asian defense and national security
affairs with particular expertise on the political economy of science, technology, and innovation and their
impact on national security matters. Dr. Cheung was based in Asia from the mid-1980s to 2002 covering
political, economic and strategic developments in greater China., Derek S. Reveron is a professor of
national security affairs and the EMC Informationist Chair at the U.S. Naval War College. He specializes in
strategy development, non-state security challenges, and U.S. defense policy. China and Cybersecurity,
4/1/15, Google Books, pg343)PA
volume appear more optimistic about the potential for the international cooperation than many of the
Western authors. Li Yuxiao and Xu Lu write that a China-U.S. cybersecurity communication mechanism is
important to improve mutual trust and enhance research and defense capabilities and recommend
working toward a set of common rules for the network society in order to promote the process of global
informatization. Senior Colonel Ye similarly writes that we have to reject the logic that there must be
fierce hostilities between the traditional, established superpowers and rising powers, and instead
recognize that mutual respect, mutual understanding and cooperation between nations should be the
International
cooperation on cybersecurity is desirable, but there are certain
obstacles. Any notion of a cyber arms control treaty or the
establishment of cyber norms must be reconciled with actual
cyber activities and government interests in promoting or
tolerating them. Sarah McKune points out the cyber exploitation of ethnic
minorities and Internet censorship by the Chinese state stand
in stark contrast to cosmopolitan visions of an open Internet
with string normative protection for human rights. The US
Department of State Internet freedom agenda works to
advance Internet freedom as an aspect of universal rights of
freedom of expression and the free flow of information. As part
of the initiative, the US government and activists from nongovernmental organizations develop and deploy technologies
that dissidents can use to subvert controls on Internet
content. This essentially means hacking the Great Firewall.
China perceives this to be provocative interference in its
domestic affairs and an attack on its information security
architecture. China, together with Russia, would prefer to shift
governance of the Internet to the United Nations with the
stronger norms of Internet Sovereignty and noninterference;
foundation of Asia-Pacific and world security, including cybersecurity.
connection to the U.S. Department of Commerce. In addition, as more and more nations join the Internet,
Lindsay 15 (01 April 2015 Jon R. Lindsay holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and an MS in computer science and BS in symbolic systems from Stanford University. He is
an officer in the U.S. naval reserve with seventeen years of experience including assignments in Asia,
Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East., Tai Ming Cheung director of the University of California
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, is a long-time analyst of Chinese and East Asian defense and
national security affairs with particular expertise on the political economy of science, technology, and
innovation and their impact on national security matters. Dr. Cheung was based in Asia from the mid1980s to 2002 covering political, economic and strategic developments in greater China., Derek S. Reveron
is a professor of national security affairs and the EMC Informationist Chair at the U.S. Naval War College.
He specializes in strategy development, non-state security challenges, and U.S. defense policy. China and
Cybersecurity (Google Books) pg343)PA
American espionage against China, to include Chinese information technology companies, is unlikely to
abate just because of public indignation in Chinese media or diplomatic protest without more serious
consequences. Likewise, the cybersercurity firm Mandiant notes that recent observations of China-based
despite the
Obama administrations specific warning that Chinas
continued cyber espionage was going to be [a] very difficult
problem in the economic relationship between the two
countries. This situation highlights a major obstacle to the establishment of international norms .
It is hard to establish an agreement over activities that the
parties do not admit conducting. It is hard to enforce
compliance with an agreement when the proscribed activity is
intentionally designed to be undetectable. Many governments
have the technical means and expertise to conduct covert
operations online and have thus far shown little restraint in
doing so both the incentives espionage and the inability of
liberal norms and institutions to contain it.
APT activity indicate that the PRC has no intention of abandoning its cyber campaigns,
Activism
General
Data localization wont prevent coalition building- people will find a
way to communicate
Coldewey 11. (People, Not Things, Are The Tools Of Revolution Feb 11, 2011 by Devin Coldewey- a
Seattle-based writer and photographer. He has written for TechCrunch since 2007 and is currently a
contributor at NBC News. http://techcrunch.com/2011/02/11/tools-of-revolution/)//LP
the Egyptians, should justly be proud of, is not just those qualities which set Egypts revolution apart from
the last hundred, but those which are fundamental to all of them. Malcom Gladwell has become the
whipping boy of the internet for having suggested however long ago it was that the social web is
something that breeds weak connections and requires only a minimum of participation. He was right then,
and hes right now; he wrote a short post the other day defying the gloating masses (sensibly, but
haughtily), and concluded with something commentators of the Egyptian revolution should take to heart:
Its another thing to ascribe to these things powers they dont have,
powers that rest in the people who use them. It sounds like quibbling, but its an
important distinction. Facebook greased the gears, but it isnt the gears, and
never will be. The revolution has been brewing for decades, and these
same protesters have been in the streets countless times, after
organizing by phone, by word of mouth, or simply as a shared reaction
to some fresh enormity.
Larison 12. (DANIEL LARISON- published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News,
Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and is a columnist for The Week.
He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago. April 17, 2012. Democratic Peace Theory Is
False http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/democratic-peace-theory-is-false/)//LP
Fabio Rojas invokes democratic peace theory in his comment on Rachel Maddows new book, Drift: The
Unmooring of American Military Power (via Wilkinson): The idea is simple for whatever reason,
democracies almost never fight each other. Of course, democracies go to war against non-democracies.
But for some reason, democracies just dont fight each other. Whats the policy implication of all this? First,
the sorts of rules that Maddow proposes are useless. People will just ignore the rules when they want to
when they want war. Second, you have to reduce the population of non-democracies. Thus, if the Federal
government wants to protect the United States by preventing war, the best, and cheapest, way to do it is
to provide support and assistance for indigenous movements for democracy and tolerance. Once people
have a genuine democracy at work, they just dont want to fight with each other. They just dont. Rojas
claim depends entirely on the meaning of genuine democracy. Even though there are numerous
examples of wars between states with universal male suffrage and elected governments (including that
little dust-up known as WWI), the states in question probably dont qualify as genuine democracies and
democratic states from waging wars against one another because of the built-in electoral and institutional
checks on government power.
Middle East
Plan cant solve outside influence not needed and alt causes to
effective transitions
KHOURI 2011 (THE LONG REVOLT BY RAMI G. KHOURI. Wilson Quarterly, SUMMER 2011.
http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/summer-2011-a-changing-middle-east/the-long-revolt/)//LP
possibilities before them: tribal values, pan-Arab sentiment, narrow nationalism, corporate globalism,
Harsanyi 15 (David Harsanyi- a Senior Editor at The Federalist FEBRUARY 19, 2015 Obama Is Wrong.
Democracy Is The Last Thing The Middle East Needs Right Now
http://thefederalist.com/2015/02/19/obama-is-wrong-democracy-is-the-last-thing-the-middle-east-needsright-now/)//LP
President Barack Obama gave a speech at White Houses Countering Violent Extremism summit
yesterday crammed with predictable feel-good ideas for combating the imaginary root causes of Islamic
in the Los Angeles Times: Efforts to counter violent extremism will only succeed if citizens can address
legitimate grievances through the democratic process and express themselves through strong civil
curiously, not from the slums of Rio or Beijing) concerned that France doesnt offer a strong enough civil
society? Are the radicals beheading Christians in North Africa ticked off over a lack of womens rights in
Yemen? Are extremists who target Jews and free-speech enthusiasts in Copenhagen worried about the
and Alawites fare in a democratic Syria, do you think? Perhaps as well as minorities do in a democratic
Libya, a place Obama argued Americans had to intervene militarily or the democratic impulses that are
dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship. Turns out that
the
administration punishes the Egyptian government for putting an end to
the extremism empowered by democratic impulses. It is Egypts al-Sisi no great
friend of liberty, granted whos spoken out most forcefully about the future of Islam . Yet the
administration has withheld aid from that government until it can
certify that Egypt is taking steps toward democracy. As if insuring a
larger role for the Muslim Brotherhood was in the U.S.s or the worlds
best interests. To put our confused priorities in perspective, the United States condemned the
implicit approval of that war) that was meant to help facilitate democracy. At the same time,
Egyptians for bombing ISIS targets in Libya over the summer, complaining that outside interference in
Libya exacerbates current divisions and undermines Libyas democratic transition. (Incredulous italics
mine)
us, democracy is shorthand for all the things we like about liberalism, but overwhelming percentages of
Muslims believe that Islamic law should be the official law of their own nations, which, as weve seen, does
not coexist with our notions of self-determination. With apologies to the president, this knotty situation
does not exist because Americans arent sensitive enough. But Im sympathetic to Michael Gersons
contention that presidents dont have the freedom to be honest, constrained by sensitivities and realities
of the world. He writes: Most of those urging Obama to assert that Islam is somehow especially flawed
among the great faiths have never been closer to power than a fuse box. There is no possible circumstance
in which a president could say such a thing. It would cause a global firestorm, immediately alienating
Muslim allies and proxies whom we depend on to help fight the Islamic State and other enemies. The
problem is that the president goes far beyond niceties. For starters, Im not sure anyone has ever implored
him to say Islam is inherently flawed or doomed. But shouldnt we non-politicians be more sympathetic to
derives its philosophy from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam the credibility of being
DARPA project to facilitate the secure sharing of classified information. No one in DARPA, the Defense
Department, or anywhere else in America was thinking about how to flatten hierarchies or challenge the
social status quo everywhere in the world once the technology went commercial. The concern was about
how to communicate effectively, how a company could use a corporate website to its competitive
advantage, and so on. But the internet turned out to be a profoundly revolutionary force in politics around
the world, and it poses huge problems to cultures and governments with foundations different from our
own. Technology is not and has never been socially or politically neutral; it embodies and usually transmits
the attitudes, economic endowments, moral priorities, and even the aesthetics of the societies that create
it. It is very hard to simply adopt the machine and not the less tangible biases that go with it.In the same
way, Hollywood movies have helped to create a situation in which many young people, for instance, no
longer think they should marry whomever their parents tell them to marry. There are all kinds of ways in
which the American presence in the world has been and remains culturally subversive. In the 19th century
we were seen on the Continent as a dangerous nation. The United States wasnt sending armies out into
the world to overthrow other regimes, but the mere existence of a successful, stable, large, powerful, and
economically effective democratic society was a terrible example from the perspective of Europes rulers
and religious traditionalists, who argued that their hierarchical positions were necessary to the effective
governance of society as a whole. The United States was a living, thriving reproach to the political
legitimacy of autocracies abroad. Inevitably, therefore, the friends of stability and authority around the
world tended increasingly to be as anti-American as they were formerly anti-British, and for similar
reasons. The British, of course, did send military forces out into the world, but their real disruptive power
derived from the revolutionary impact of a wider and eventually more market-based global trading system
that rewarded efficiency and creativity and punished institutionalized privilege and all related arguments
from authority. Forces that wanted to see social change in their countries tended to be pro-American. We
still see this pattern today. The United States is revolutionary by being as well as by acting.The United
States is revolutionary by being as well as by acting. Any foreign policy that doesnt take this into account
will run into trouble. Consider Google and other major Silicon Valley companies, whose business models
depend on a relatively open internet, with freedom of association and freedom of communication. In
important ways the boundaries of Chinese, Iranian, or Russian power are the boundaries that limit where
United States must prioritize questions like contract law in foreign relations; the contracts that American
companies have entered into abroad must be enforceable in transparent and honest courts of law.
All
Miranda 4/23 (Alba Benito Miranda- Intern at the Elcano Royal Institute. International Relations and
Translation & Interpreting (Comillas Pontifical University). 23/04/2015 Sectarianism in Bahrain and the
Manamas Pearl Roundabout is particularly illustrative, since it involved the use of a sectarian discourse by
Although democratic and crosssectarian in nature, Bahrains Arab Spring was immediately depicted as
sectarian and portrayed as part of an Iranian plot to overthrow the AlKhalifa regime and threaten the balance of power in the Gulf. It was
perceived both as an external and internal threat to the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states due to the risk of contagion and
spillover. Shia-led calls for reforms challenged not only the sovereignty
of the autocratic leaders, but also Sunni hegemony in the region, since
they empowered both Iran and the Shia communities in the Gulf. Saudi
the governments of both the Al-Khalifa and the Al-Saud.
Arabia was the most affected state, given its animosity towards Iran and the outbreak of Shia unrests in its
oil-rich Eastern Province. In order to suppress Bahrains February 2011 uprising, Saudi Arabia led the
military intervention of the Joint Peninsula Shield Force within a month of the outburst of the protests. It
was the first time that the GCC intervened militarily in one of its member states to suppress an internal
revolt, as its founding treaty only considers intervention in the case of a foreign threat. Sectarianism made
possible the externalization of the threat posed by the Pearl Roundabout uprising, as it was used by the
accusing Iran of participating in the revolts, they triggered a quick response and a joint pre-emptive action
by the GCC, thus protecting Saudi and Sunni hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. Both Saudi Arabia and
Iran have taken advantage of this sectarian discourse to preserve their power in the region. Given the
strong ties between Manama and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia has promoted the use of sectarianism in Bahrain (a
close ally) in order to protect its own internal political and economic stability (especially in the Eastern
Province) and its hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. Iran has also benefitted from this portrait of the
Bahraini uprising. Even though there is no evidence of direct Iranian meddling in the unrest, Iran has made
no efforts to deny these claims. In fact, it has strongly criticized Saudi military intervention and has
provided media coverage favourable to the protestors. It has done so motivated by the possibility of
to be a double-edged sword and its overuse is giving rise to important security concerns, as identity is
easier to exacerbate than to control. Given the existing transnational identities in the Gulf and the role of
sectarian sensitivities in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran should be more careful when using sectarianism
as a means to justify their pursuit of realpolitik interests, since the over-empowerment of identity may end
up blurring state boundaries and changing the perception of security threats in the Middle East.
unaware, and it was this that stimulated the Tamarrud movement which the Egyptian army command
adroitly exploited to remove it from power.
China
Chinas human rights improving already Chinas National Human
Rights Action Plan
PRC 15 (June 08, 2015 Progress in China's Human Rights in 2014
http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0608/c90785-8903658.html)//LP
The basic rights of the Chinese people became better protected, and
China's constitutional principle of "respecting and safeguarding human
rights" was implemented in a better way. In 2014, China made steady progress in
comprehensively completing the building of a moderately prosperous society. By the end of the year,
among all the 29 countable or measurable indicators for economic and social development set forth in the
12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), 12 had been over-fulfilled, three had been nearly fulfilled and 11 had
law-based governance reached a new take-off stage. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central
Committee of the CPC approved the Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on Certain Major Issues
Concerning Comprehensively Advancing the Law-Based Governance of China, drawing up a clear blueprint
The fundamental
purposes of the blueprint are to protect civic rights, to defend human
dignity and to put basic human rights into practice.
for building a socialist law-based country with Chinese characteristics.
Li 2000. (Women s Movement and Change of Women s Status in China Journal of International
Womens Studies: Vol. 1 Issue 1. January 2000. Yuhui Li. http://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1626&context=jiws)
This study examines history of womens movement and gender stratification in urban areas in
Womens Movements
Internet activism wont succeed on a large scale- opposition and
internal fights
Carmon 15 (IRIN CARMON - a national reporter at MSNBC, covering gender and politics. FEBRUARY 17,
2015 What Women Need http://prospect.org/article/what-women-need)//LP
Something on the surface, if not in the structures of things, has shifted in recent years. Until a few years
ago, even sympathetic celebrities and politicians cringed at anything feminist or even tangentially insistent
on womens rights. Perhaps things needed to get worsewith right-wingers talking about legitimate rape
and everything suggested by itbefore they could get better, particularly for the female voters courted by
the parties.
Vagianos 14 (Alanna Vagianos- an Associate Editor for HuffPost Women. She graduated from Elon
University in North Carolina. 10/03/2014 This Is What It's Like To Be A Woman Online
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/19/what-its-like-to-be-a-woman-onlinebuzzfeed_n_5849052.html)//LP
comments on appearance such as Ugly Jewish whore and For your age, youre looking great, to
mansplaining, rarely can a woman publish a few words on the Internet without receiving unsolicited,
irrelevant commentary from the world's biggest peanut gallery .
UN 2005 (Women2000 and Beyond. Gender equality and empowerment of women through ICT
September 2005. UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/w2000-09.05-ict-e.pdf)//LP
The
needs of people. And nearly 70 per cent of the worlds websites are in
English, at times crowding out local voices and views. There is a
gender divide, with women and girls enjoying less access to
information technology than men and boys. This can be true of rich
and poor countries alike. United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan Statement to the
World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva, 10 December 2003. While the potential of
ICT for stimulating economic growth, socioeconomic development and effective governance is well
recognized, the benefits of ICT have been unevenly distributed within
and between countries. The term digital divide refers to the
differences in resources and capabilities to access and effectively
utilize ICT for development that exist within and between countries,
regions, sectors and socio-economic groups. The digital divide is often
characterized by low levels of access to technologies. Poverty,
illiteracy, lack of computer literacy and language barriers are among
the factors impeding access to ICT infrastructure, especially in developing
countries. Internet usage figures collected by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in 2003
The continuous
innovation and global spreading of Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs) appear like a fundamental resource in order to
reach these goals and inaugurate a change of era known as Information Society
or Knowledge Society. However, in its current phase of development, we must
clearly differentiate the potentialities (informative, educational, cultural, political,
economic, etc.) offered by these technologies, from their manifestations and
actual impact on the various contexts and social groups. This type of analysis
is still at a beginning stage in the LAC Region. Therefore , the understanding of the role
currently played by these technologies in our societies is usually based
on impressions, good wishes and, in the best of cases, on some
partial studies.
Economy
Ferguson 6
Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most
familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the
outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in
Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were
no general
relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for
the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of
growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences
of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises
were not followed by wars.Many trace responsibility for the butchery to extreme
taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact,
ideologies. The Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm calls the years between 1914 and 1991 "an era of
religious wars" but argues that "the most militant and bloodthirsty religions were secular ideologies." At
the other end of the political spectrum, the conservative historian Paul Johnson blames the violence on
"the rise of moral relativism, the decline of personal responsibility [and] the repudiation of Judeo-Christian
values." But the rise of new ideologies or the decline of old values cannot be regarded as causes of
bloodletting, to do so is to repeat the error on which Leo Tolstoy heaped so much scorn in War and Peace.
Megalomaniacs may order men to invade Russia, but why do the men obey? Some historians have
attempted to answer the novelist's question by indicting the modern nation-state. The nation-state does
indeed possess unprecedented capabilities for mobilizing masses of people, but those means could just as
easily be harnessed, and have been, to peaceful ends.Others
become fashionable among political scientists to posit a causal link between democracy and peace,
extrapolating from the observation that democracies tend not to go to war with one another. The corollary,
of course, is that dictatorships generally are more bellicose. By that logic, the rise of democracy during the
twentieth century should have made the world more peaceful. Democratization may well have reduced the
incidence of war between states. But waves of democratization in the 1920s, 1960s, and 1980s seem to
have multiplied the number of civil wars. Some of those (such as the conflicts in Afghanistan, Burundi,
China, Korea, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, and Vietnam) were among the deadliest
conflicts of the century. Horrendous numbers of fatalities were also caused by genocidal or "politicidal"
campaigns waged against civilian populations, such as those carried out by the Young Turks against the
Armenians and the Greeks during World War I, the Soviet government from the 1920s until the 1950s,
and the Nazis between 1933 and 1945 -- to say nothing of those perpetrated by the communist tyrannies
of Mao in China and Pol Pot in Cambodia. Indeed, such civil strife has been the most common form of
conflict during the past 50 years. Of the 24 armed conflicts recorded as "ongoing" by the University of
Maryland's Ted Robert Gurr and George Mason University's Monty Marshall in early 2005, nearly all were
civil wars.
AFF Answers
Donohue 15 (Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 38.1 (Winter 2015): 117-265. Laura K, Professor of
Law A.B., Dartmouth; M.A., University of Ulster, Northern Ireland; Ph.D., Cambridge University; J.D.,
Stanford,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqrl/docview/1658465073/341393F9D9AC4223PQ/2?
accountid=14667) // AW
FISA Section 702 empowers the Attorney General (AG) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
jointly to authorize, for up to one year, "the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside
the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information."64 Five limitations apply. Acquisition may not
intentionally (a) target a person known to be located in the United States;65 (b) target an individual
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, if the actual purpose is to target an individual
reasonably believed to be located in domestic bounds;66 (c) target a U.S. person reasonably believed to be
outside domestic bounds;67 or (d) obtain wholly domestic communications.68 In addition, (e), all
acquisition must be conducted consistent with the Fourth Amendment.69 Procedurally, five steps must be
followed for acquisition to commence. First, the AG and DNI must adopt targeting and minimization
procedures consistent with the statutory requirements.70 Second, the two officials must provide FISC with
a written certification and any supporting affidavits, attesting that there are procedures in place
reasonably designed to ensure that the acquisition is limited to targeting individuals outside of the United
States and to prevent the intentional acquisition of domestic communications, and that the minimization
procedures meet the requirements of the statute.71 They must guarantee that guidelines have been
adopted to ensure compliance with the statutory limitations.72 They also must attest that "a significant
purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information."73 Third, the targeting and
minimization procedures must be provided to the Congressional intelligence committees, as well as the
Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives.74 FISC is limited in the role
it can play with regard to reviewing the certification, as well as the targeting and minimization procedures.
As long as the certification elements are present, the targeting procedures are reasonably designed to
ensure that acquisition targets persons are reasonably believed to be outside the United States and do not
knowingly intercept domestic communications, the minimization procedures are statutorily consistent, and
the procedures are consistent with the Fourth Amendment, "the Court shall enter an order approving the
certification and the use, or continued use ..." of an acquisition.75 The FAA created numerous reporting
requirements. At least twice a year, the Attorney General and DNI must assess compliance with the
targeting and minimization procedures and submit the assessments to FISC, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), and the House
and Senate Committees on the Judiciary.76 The inspectors general of DOJ and the IC agency using Section
702 authorities are authorized to review compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures, and
required to review (a) the number of intelligence reports containing U.S. persons' identities disseminated
to other agencies; and (b) the number of targets later determined to be located in the United States.77
The IG reports are provided to the AG, the DNI, and the same Congressional committees receiving the AG
and DNI targeting and minimization reports.78 In addition, the head of each IC agency obtaining
information under Section 702 must annually review the programs to ascertain whether foreign
information has been, or will be, obtained from the acquisition.79 The annual review must also consider
the number of intelligence reports disseminated to other agencies containing references to U.S. persons,
the number of targets later ascertained to be located within the United States, and a description of any
procedures approved by the DNI relevant to the acquisition, the adequacy of the minimization
procedures.80 This review must then be provided to FISC, the Attorney General, the DNI, the Congressional
intelligence committees, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the
Senate.81 Finally, every six months, the Attorney General must inform the intelligence and judiciary
committees of any certifications submitted consistent with Section 702, the reasons for exercising the
authority, any directives issued in conjunction with the acquisition, a description of the judicial review
during the reporting period of the certifications as well as targeting and minimization procedures (including
copies of orders or pleadings submitted in connection with such reviews that contain a significant legal
interpretation of the law), any actions taken to challenge or enforce a directive issued, any compliance
reviews, and a description of any incidents of noncompliance.
FYI- IC Procedures
Office of the Press Secretary (The White House, Presidential Policy Directive -- Signals Intelligence
Activities, January 17, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policydirective-signals-intelligence-activities) // AW
The IC has long recognized that effective oversight is necessary to ensure that we are protecting our
national security in a manner consistent with our interests and values. Accordingly, the policies and
procedures of IC elements, and departments and agencies containing IC elements, shall include
appropriate measures to facilitate oversight over the implementation of safeguards protecting personal
information, to include periodic auditing against the standards required by this section. The policies and
procedures shall also recognize and facilitate the performance of oversight by the Inspectors General of IC
elements, and departments and agencies containing IC elements, and other relevant oversight entities, as
appropriate and consistent with their responsibilities. When a significant compliance issue occurs involving
personal information of any person, regardless of nationality, collected as a result of signals intelligence
activities, the issue shall, in addition to any existing reporting requirements, be reported promptly to the
DNI, who shall determine what, if any, corrective actions are necessary. If the issue involves a non-United
States person, the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the head of the notifying
department or agency, shall determine whether steps should be taken to notify the relevant foreign
government, consistent with the protection of sources and methods and of U.S. personnel.
Topicality
Domestic
Domestic refers to only internal affairs of a country
Wild 06 (SUSAN ELLIS WILD has been a practicing attorney since 1982, when she graduated with honors
from George Washington University Law School. Webster's New World Law Dictionary p. 128 accessed
06/24/15)PA
Domestic adj.
domestic : of, relating to, or made in your own country : relating to or involving
someone's home or family : relating to the work (such as cooking and cleaning) that is done in a person's
home
Curtail
Empirically, curtail means a decrease in surveillance measures
United States v. United States District Court (No. 70-153) 1972
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/407/297 LP
In that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised President Truman of the necessity of using wiretaps "in
cases vitally affecting the domestic security." In May 1940 President Roosevelt had authorized Attorney
General Jackson to utilize wiretapping in matters "involving the defense of the nation," but it is
questionable whether this language was meant to apply to solely domestic subversion. The nature and
extent of wiretapping apparently varied under different administrations and Attorneys General, but,
except for the sharp curtailment under Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the latter
years of the Johnson administration, electronic surveillance has been used both
against organized crime and in domestic security cases at least since
the 1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman.
Merriam-webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/curtail)PA
Curtail :
Dictionary.com (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/curtail)PA
Curtail. To cut off the end or any part of; hence to shorten, abridge, diminish, lessen,
or reduce; and term has no such meaning as abolish. State v. Edwards, 207 La. 506, 21 So.2d 624, 625.
The Illicit Global Economy and State Power. Google Books p. 76)
Indeed, the link between decisions to liberalize capital controls and regulatory initiatives to
curtail illicit transactions in the new liberal environment has often been very close. In the
European Community, for example, initiatives to curtail tax evasion and
money laundering began to be pursued at the very same time that member
University.
(James Clapper and Eric Holder, DNI and AG. 2/8/2012. A letter too
Speaker Boehner and Leaders Reid, Pelosi, and McConnell.
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ola/legacy/2012/11/08/02-08-12-fisa-reauthorization.pdf)//LP
provides a comprehensive regime of oversight by all three branches of Government to protect the privacy
and civil liberties of U.S . persons.
A2: Legitimacy K
Reputation matters its embedded in crisis analysis
Yarhi-Milo 2010. Assistant professor of politics and Internet affairs. (Keren, Revisiting Reputation: How
Past Actions Matter in International Politics, August. Princeton.
http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~weisiger/reputation.pdf)//TS
that backing down is always the wrong thing to do, leaders who contemplate doing so should be aware of
the associated costs.
Yarhi-Milo 2010. Assistant professor of politics and Internet affairs. (Keren, Revisiting Reputation: How
Past Actions Matter in International Politics, August. Princeton.
http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~weisiger/reputation.pdf)//TS
for the political issue at stake or a relatively high subjective cost of fighting. To the
extent that lessons about an actors resolve from one crisis carry over to another, then, they do so in the
form of statements about that actors interests. Once this lesson is learned, however, there is no
guarantee that leaders will refer back to the prior incident that led them to conclude that their opponent
was resolved, instead merely observing that it has high interests in the political stake. In short,
past actions
affect beliefs about interests, which in turn affect predictions about future behavior.
Game theoretic models of reputation formation indicate, however, that this indirect path in
fact should be the primary route by which past actions should
influence current behavior, and hence by which reputations
should operate.
Legitimacys created through reviewing past actions deterrence
proves countries that information to determine reactions
Yarhi-Milo 2010. Assistant professor of politics and Internet affairs. (Keren, Revisiting Reputation: How
Past Actions Matter in International Politics, August. Princeton.
http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~weisiger/reputation.pdf)//TS
Moreover, there is the problem, noted most prominently by Fearon (1994, 2002), that within crises leaders
are likely to focus primarily on new information, such as that gleaned from crisis negotiations or military
Good reputation reduces conflict risks --- loss of reputation reduces negotiating power
Yarhi-Milo 2010. Assistant professor of politics and Internet affairs. (Keren, Revisiting Reputation: How
Past Actions Matter in International Politics, August. Princeton.
http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~weisiger/reputation.pdf)//TS
What then are the implications of these arguments for international politics? The clearest prediction
anyway now ask for more than they otherwise would have, and countries that would not have initiated a
testing predictions about the size of demands (especially relative to an unobservable counterfactual in
which the target had behaved differently in the past) is not possible, predictions about the frequency of
challenges are more straightforward to examine.