REMEDIES OF PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY

REGISTRATION
A. Appeal
An appeal may be taken from a judgment
or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by the Rules of Court to be appealable.
Appeal may be by ordinary appeal, petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of
Court, or appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
An ordinary appeal is an appeal to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. It shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving
a copy thereof upon the adverse party. The
appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice
of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellants shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
A petition for review is appeal to the Court
of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. A
petition for review shall be in accordance with
Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court.
An appeal by certiorari is available in all
cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved. The appeal shall be to the Supreme
Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The appeal shall be taken within
15 days from notice of the judgment or final order
or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of
petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration
duly filed in due time after notice of the judgment.
On motion duly filed and served, with full payment
of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for
justifiable reasons grant an extension of 30 days
only within which to file the petition.
a. Reglementary period

The judgment rendered in land registration

proceedings are appealable to the Court of
Appeals or to the Supreme Court within 15 days
to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of
the judgment.
Section 30, PD 1529 The judgment
rendered in a land registration proceedings
becomes final upon the expiration of 15
days to be counted from the date of receipt
of notice of the judgment.
Section 33, PD 1529 The judgment and
orders of the court hearing the land
registration case are appealable to the
Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court
in the same manner as in ordinary actions.
Section 39, BP Blg. 129 The period for
appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all cases shall be 15 days counted
from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision
appealed from.
The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government in all land registration
and related proceedings. Institute actions for the
reversion to the Government of lands of public
domain and improvements thereon as well as
lands held in violation of the Constitution. (Section
1 (e), PD 478)
i. As against the government
It was error to disregard the Solicitor
General in the execution of the compromise
agreement and its submission to the Court for
approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who
is the principal counsel of the Government; this is
the reason for our holding that "Court orders and
decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the
Solicitor General in land registration cases, are
not binding until they are actually received by the
Solicitor General." (Republic vs. Sayo, 191 SCRA
71)
Reglementary period for appeal should be
reckoned from the time the Solicitor General's
Office was apprised of the order of the court and
not from the time the special counsel or the fiscal
was served with that order. These representatives

of the Solicitor General had no power to decide

whether an appeal should be made. They should
have referred the matter to the Solicitor General.
The question of whether an appeal should be
made could only be decided by the Solicitor
General's Office. Consequently, the Solicitor
General's Office should be served with the final
order disposing of the petition and should not be
bound by the service on his surrogates, the
special counsel and the fiscal. (Republic vs. CA,
135 SCRA 156)
ii. Despite the pendency of the appeal, the
court retains jurisdiction until the expiration of
one year from the issuance of the decree of
registration.
Unlike
ordinary
civil
actions,
the
adjudication of land in a cadastral or land
registration proceeding does not become final, in
the sense of incontrovertibility until after the
expiration of one year after the entry of the final
decree of registration. This Court, in several
decisions, has held that as long as a final decree
has not been entered by the Land Registration
Commission (now LRA) and the period of one
year has not elapsed from date of entry of such
decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration proceeding continues
to be under the control and sound discretion of
the court rendering it. (Gomez vs. CA, 168 SCRA
503)
Hence, the case may still be reopened and
the decision set aside when granted. It has been
held that the adjudication of land in a registration
or cadastral case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year
from entry of the final decree, and that as long as
the final decree is not issued and the period of
one year within which it may be reviewed has not
elapsed, the decision remains under the control
and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may even set
aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the
land to another. (Cayanan vs. Estenzo, 21 SCRA
1348)
b. Requirements
The requirements of Rules of Court relative
to the perfection of an appeal in an ordinary case
apply in the same manner and with equal force
and effect to appeals from a decision of a Court of

First Instance in registration and cadastral

proceedings. Under the provisions of the Rules of
Court then obtaining the period within which to
appeal the decision of the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) to the Supreme Court
was thirty days (now 15 days, Section 1 of Rule
42 and Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules
of Court). (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282)
c. When not deemed perfect
The decision has long become final and
executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. The
certification of the acting provincial land officer of
Masbate, dated March 8, 1960, recites that no
"appeal has been taken by the Director of Lands
or any private oppositors from the decision
rendered." The judgment rendered in a land
registration case becomes final upon the
expiration of thirty days (now 15 days) to be
counted from the date on which the party
appealing receives notice of the decision.
The decision having become final and
executory, it devolved on both the respondent
court and the Land Registration Commission to
cause the issuance of a decree to the person
adjudged entitled to registration. The decision in a
land registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of
the period for perfecting an appeal. (Heirs of
Cristobal Marcos vs. De Banuvar, 25 SCRA 316)
d. Effect of failure to appeal
As a general rule, registration of title under
the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and
indisputable, after the passage of thirty-day period
allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by
the party of a copy of the judgment of the court
adjudicating ownership without any step having
been taken to perfect an appeal. The exception is
the special provision for fraud.
The title of ownership on the land is vested
upon the owner upon the expiration of the period
to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the
cadastral court, without such an appeal having
been perfected. (Nieto vs. Quines, 6 SCRA 74)

e. Execution pending appeal not allowed in

registration proceedings.
Execution pending appeal is not applicable
in a land registration proceeding. It is fraught with
dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers
may be misled into purchasing real properties
upon reliance on a judgment which may be
reversed on appeal.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of a
judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is
violative of the explicit provisions of the Land
Registration Act which requires that a decree shall
be issued only after the decision adjudicating the
title becomes final and executory, and it is on the
basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds
concerned issues the corresponding certificate of
title. (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177)
B. Motion for New Trial/Motion for
Reconsideration
a. What rule governs?
The aggrieved party may move the trial
court to set aside the judgment or final order and
grant a new trial or move for reconsideration.
(Rule 37, Revised Rules of Court)
i.

explained. Appellant claims that the above

decision was received by him on March 25, 1958
and the next day (March 26), a Motion for New
Trial was presented, wherein it was stated that the
failure to appear at the hearing was due to
accident or excusable negligence, counsel having
been ill of influenza from March 9 to 12.
The ends of justice could have been
served more appropriately had the lower court
given appellant the chance to present his
evidence at least. After all, court litigations are
primarily for the search of truth, and in this
present case, to find out the correct liability of
defendant-appellant to appellee. A trial, by which
both parties are given the chance to adduce
proofs, is the best way to find out such truth. A
denial of this chance, would be too technical. The
dispensation of justice and the vindication of
legitimate grievances, should not be barred by
technicalities. Had not the trial court resolved the
motion for new trial, one day before the date set
for its hearing, the defendant-appellant could
have presented the documents (receipts of
payments), itemized in his brief, to counteract
appellant's claim.

Grounds

Section 1 of Rule 37, Revised Rules of Court

1. Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against and by reason of which
such aggrieved party has probably been impaired
in his rights;
2. Newly discovered evidence, which he
could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial, and which if
presented would probably alter the result;
3. Damages awarded are excessive, or the
evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or
final order, or that the decision or final order is
contrary to law.
ii. Failure of partys counsel to attend trial for
lack of advance notice is an accident.
In the case of Talavera vs. Mangoba, 8
SCRA 837, the Supreme Court held that courts
are given the discretion to grant or not, motions
for new trial and appellate courts will not delve
into the reasons for the exercise of such
discretion. In this particular case, however, it was
shown that the absence of counsel was

iii. Failure to attend due to forgetfulness is not

excusable.
The allegation of counsel that he forgot to
note the notice of hearing in his calendar is flimsy.
It does not constitute the accident, mistakes or
excusable negligence, contemplated by the Rules
of Court. The exercise of ordinary prudence on
his part could have guarded against or avoided
such mistake or negligence. Counsel did not
exercise ordinary prudence because he did not
perform his routine job or duty of noting down the
notice of hearing in his calendar.
The court believes the negligence of the
counsel as not excusable in view of his admission
that he received the registry notice from the court
on May 24, 1956, and that it was duly registered
and that its envelope shows it came from the
court which made the envelope and its contents
so important that he should have immediately
opened the same and not just put it aside, that he
misplaced the same is also indicative of his
recklessness Furthermore, counsel for the
defendant Nicolas Francisco has all the time from
March 24, 1956, until the date of the trial on Aug.
20, 1956, to inquire from the Court records or

Clerk of Court about the nature of the registered

notice that was sent to him on March 24, 1956, if
he really misplaced the same. This is what a
diligent counsel should do as required by ordinary
prudence. All he had to do was to examine the
records of this case. This Court noted that since it
reconvened on June 18, 1956, counsel for the
defendant Nicolas Francisco has been appearing
in Court almost every week if not every day. He
had, therefore, ample opportunity to verify the
nature of the said registered notice of hearing
which he allegedly misplaced upon his receipt
thereof on March 24, 1956. (Antonio vs. Ramos, 2
SCRA 731)
b. Requisites for invoking newly-discovered
evidence as a ground for new trial
Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of
Court, a new trial may be granted based on any of
the following grounds:
a) That errors of law or irregularities have
been committed during the trial prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the defendant; and
b) That new and material evidence has
been discovered which the defendant could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial, and which if introduced and
admitted, would probably change the judgment.
(People vs. Dela Cruz. 207 SCRA 632)
c. Who may file?
(Republic vs. Director of Lands, 71 SCRA 426)
C. Petition for Relief from Judgment
a. What rule governs?
Rule 38, Revised Rules of Court When a
judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same case praying that the
judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
i. Grounds
Section 2 of Rule 38, Revised Rules of Court
1. a judgment or final order is rendered
2. a party has been prevented from taking
an appeal
3. a party has been prevented from taking
an appeal by fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence

ii. Form of petition

The petition for relief from judgment must
be verified, filed within 60 days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than 6
months after such judgment entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied
with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon,
and the facts constituting the petitioners good
and substantial cause of action or defense, as the
case may be. (Section 3 of Rule 38, Revised
Rules of Court)
b. Who may avail of the remedy?
A person who has been prevented from
taking an appeal and is a party in the case may
avail a petition for relief from judgment. (Rule 38,
Revised Rules of Court)
D. Petition for Review/Petition for Reopening
of the Decree of Registration
a. Who may avail of the remedy?
The aggrieved party may avail of the
petition for reopening or review of the decree of
registration but the petition will not prosper if an
innocent purchaser for value has acquired the
land. (Section 32, PD 1529)
The essential requisites or elements for the
allowance of the reopening or review of a decree
are: (a) that the petitioner has a real or dominical
right; (b) that he has been deprived thereof; (c)
through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within
one year from the issuance of the decree; and (e)
that the property has not as yet been transferred
to an innocent purchaser.
i.

Aggrieved parties in either ordinary

or
cadastral
land
registration
proceedings may avail of the
remedy.

Sec. 38, Act No. 496, partly provides:

. . . Such decrees shall not be opened by
reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability
of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments
or decrees, subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or

interest therein by decree of registration obtained

by fraud to file in the competent Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) a petition for
review within one year after entry of the decree,
provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said
is in of one year, every decree of certificate of title
issued in accordance with this section shall be
incontrovertible . . . (Garcia vs. Mendoza, 203
SCRA 732)
ii. Defaulted party may avail of the remedy.
Under Section 38 of Act 496, as amended,
"any person" may file the petition, provided the
other requisites are present; and that the
provision does not require that the petitioner be
an original claimant who had filed an answer. A
petitioner for review under Section 38 of Act 496,
as amended, need not be an original claimant in a
cadastral proceeding and need not secure the
lifting of the order of general default with respect
to himself. The aim of the law in giving aggrieved
parties, victimized by registration proceedings of
their estate in land by means of fraud, the
opportunity to review the decree would be
defeated if such parties would be limited to those
who had filed their opposition to the petition for
registration or to first require them to procure the
lifting of the order of general default before they
could file a petition for review. (Rublico vs.
Orellano, 30 SCRA 511)
iii. Those entitled to a review of the decree are
those who were deprived of their opportunity
to be heard in the original registration case.
The person(s) contemplated under Section
38 of Act 496, to be entitled to a review of a
decree of registration, are those who were
fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be
heard in the original registration case. Such is not
the situation of the private respondents here.
They were not denied their day in court by fraud,
which the law provides as the sole ground for
reopening of the decree of registration. In fact
they opposed the registration but failed to
substantiate their opposition. (Crisolo vs. CA, 68
SCRA 435)
iv. A homestead patent applicant may avail of
the remedy. (Cruz vs. Navarro, 54 SCRA 109)

v. A person who does not claim the land to be

his private property but admits that such land
is public cannot avail of the remedy.
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act
(Act No. 496) could not properly be invoked by
petitioner for his unilateral petition for review of
the decree of registration, since the same applies
only when by virtue of a decree of registration
issued by a court in a land registration
proceeding, whether original or compulsory, a
person claims to have been deprived of the land
or an interest therein, in which case within one
year from entry of the decree he may in the same
proceeding ask for review and the issuance of the
decree in his own name and implead the adverse
party. But here, the land is not claimed to be
private property of petitioner nor of his copetitioners but was admittedly formerly a part of
the alienable and disposable public land awarded
under sales patent. (Boniel vs. Reyes, 35 SCRA
218)
b. Where to file?
A petition for reopening or review of the
decree of registration is to be filed in the proper
Regional Trial Court.
Any petition to set aside the decree and
reopen the registration proceedings must be filed
within one year from the issuance thereof, not in
the form of a separate action but in the form of a
motion filed in the same registration proceeding
where the decree was issued. (Baldoz vs. Papa,
14 SCRA 691)
c. When to file?
A petition for reopening or review of the
decree of registration should be filed not later
than one year from and after the date of the entry
of such decree of registration by the Land
Registration Authority. (Section 32, PD 1529)
d. Essential requisites
A decree of registration may be reopened
or renewed by the proper Regional Trial Court
upon the concurrence of five essential requisites:
1. that the petitioner has a real and a
dominical right;
2. that he has been deprived of such right;
3. through actual or extrinsic fraud;

4. that the petition is filed within one year

from the issuance of the decree by the Land
Registration Authority; and
5. that the property has not as yet been
transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.
(Walstrom vs. Mapa, Jr., 181 SCRA 431)

i. Actual or extrinsic fraud

differentiated from intrinsic fraud.

defined;

Only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished

from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a
judgment. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent
act of the successful party in a litigation which is
committed outside the trial of a case against the
defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby said defeated party is
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side
of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud
refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the
trial, such as the use of forged instruments on
perjured testimony, which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair
and just determination of the case. (Sterling
Investment Corp. vs. Ruiz, 30 SCRA 318)
ii. Specific instances of actual or extrinsic
fraud.
The suppression of the fact that the
applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield
merely as antichretic creditors and the fraudulent
concealment and misrepresentation in the
application that no other persons had any claim or
interest in the said land, constitute specific
allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by
competent proof. Failure and intentional omission
of applicants to disclose the facts of actual
physical
possession
by
another
person
constitutes an allegation of actual fraud.
(Ramirez vs. CA, 144 SCRA 292)
e. A petition for reopening of the decree of
registration is different from an action for
reconveyance
Section 32 of the Property Registration
Decree provides that a decree of registration may
be reopened when a person is deprived of land or
an interest therein by such adjudication or

confirmation obtained by actual fraud. On the

other hand, an action for reconveyance respects
the decree of registration as incontrovertible but
seeks the transfer of property, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in other
persons names, to its rightful and legal owners,
or to those who claim to have a better right. In
both instances, the land of which a person was
deprived should be the same land which was
fraudulently or erroneously registered in another
persons name, which is not the case herein.
As previously established, petitioners main
contention is that the subject properties from
which they were forcibly evicted were not covered
by respondents certificates of title. Stated
differently, the subject properties and the land
registered in respondents names are not
identical. Consequently, petitioners do not have
any interest in challenging the registration of the
land in respondents names, even if the same was
procured by fraud.
While petitioners improperly prayed for the
cancellation of respondents TCTs in their
Complaints, there is nothing else in the said
Complaints that would support the conclusion that
they are either petitions for reopening and review
of the decree of registration under Section 32 of
the Property Registration Decree or actions for
reconveyance based on implied trust under Article
1456 of the Civil Code. Instead, petitioners
Complaints may be said to be in the nature of an
accion reivindicatoria, an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of the subject
properties, from which they were evicted
sometime between 1991 and 1994 by
respondents. An accion reivindicatoria may be
availed of within 10 years from dispossession.
There is no showing that prescription had already
set in when petitioners filed their Complaints in
1997. (Heirs of Dolleton vs. Fil-Estate
Management, GR No. 100750)
G. Action for
Assurance Fund

Compensation

from

the

Section 93. Contribution to Assurance Fund.

Upon the entry of a certificate of title in the
name of the registered owner, and also upon
the original registration on the certificate of title
of a building or other improvements on the land

covered by said certificate, as well as upon the

entry of a certificate pursuant to any subsequent
transfer of registered land, there shall be paid to
the Register of Deeds one-fourth of one per
cent of the assessed value of the real estate on
the basis of the last assessment for taxation
purposes, as contribution to the Assurance
Fund. Where the land involved has not yet been
assessed for taxation, its value for purposes of
this decree shall be determined by the sworn
declaration of two disinterested persons to the
effect that the value fixed by them is to their
knowledge, a fair valuation.
Nothing in this section shall in any way
preclude the court from increasing the
valuation of the property should it appear
during the hearing that the value stated is
too small.
Section 94. Custody and investment of
fund. All money received by the Register of
Deeds under the preceding section shall
be paid to the National Treasurer. He shall
keep this money in an Assurance Fund
which may be invested in the manner and
form authorized by law, and shall report
annually to the Commissioner of the
Budget the condition and income thereof.
The income of the Assurance Fund shall
be added to the principal until said fund
amounts to five hundred thousand pesos,
in which event the excess income from
investments as well as from the collections
of such fund shall be paid into the National
Treasury to the account of the Assurance
Fund.
Who may file?
Section 95. Action for compensation from
funds. A person who, without negligence
on his part, sustains loss or damage, or is
deprived of land or any estate or interest
therein in consequence of the bringing of
the land under the operation of the Torrens
system of arising after original registration
of land, through fraud or in consequence of
any
error,
omission,
mistake
or
misdescription in any certificate of title or in
any entry or memorandum in the
registration book, and who by the
provisions of this Decree is barred or

otherwise precluded under the provision of

any law from bringing an action for the
recovery of such land or the estate or
interest therein, may bring an action in any
court of competent jurisdiction for the
recovery of damages to be paid out of the
Assurance Fund.
Requisites:
a. a person who sustains loss or damage, or is
deprived of land;
b. such loss, damage or deprivation is on account
of the bringing of land under the Torrens System;
c. the loss, damage or deprivation was due to
fraud or in consequence of any error, omission,
mistake or misdescription in any certificate of title
or in any entry or memorandum in the registration
book;
d. there was no negligence on his part;
e. he is barred or otherwise precluded under the
provision of any law from bringing an action for
the recovery of such land or the estate or interest
therein.
I. Reversion
Who Institutes; And Grounds For Reversion:
Chapter XII, EO 292
SECTION 35. Powers and Functions.The Office
of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. When
authorized by the President or head of the office
concerned, it shall also represent governmentowned or controlled corporations. The Office of
the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office
of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of a lawyer.
................. (5) Represent the Government in all
land registration and related proceedings. Institute
actions for the reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain and improvements
thereon as well as lands held in violation of the
Constitution.
FACTS:
The subject property is a 65 sq.m. lot located in
the San Pedro Tunasan Homesite. This Homesite
was acquired by the Republic of the Philippines in

1931. Apolinario Hermosilla (Apolinario) was

occupying a lot in such home site until his
death in 1964. He caused the subdivision of
the lots into two, Lot 12 and Lot 19, with the same
area of 341 sq. m. The 65sq.m. subject of this
controversy forms part of Lot 19.In 1962,
Apolinario made a deed of assignment
transferring possession of Lot 19in favor of his
grandson, Jaime Remoquillo. The Land Tenure
Administration later found that Lot 19 is still
available for qualified applicants. Jaime, being its
occupant filed an applicationin 1963.On that same
year, Apolinario conveyed Lot 12 to his son
Salvador. He filed for an application to purchase
the said lot, which the LTA granted in 1971.I n
1972, Jaime and Salvador made a
Kasunduan
whereby
Jaime
transferred
o wne rship o f the 65 sq .m. in Lo t 19 in
fa vo r o f S al va do r. In 1986 , the NHA (then
LTA) awarded Lot 19 to Jaime, for which he and
his wife were issued a title. The petitioners filed
for the annulment of the title on the ground of
fraud because by the virtue of the Kasunduan, the
65 sq.m. in Lot 19 were already conveyed to
Salvador. The trial court held that the
petitioners were co-owners of the subject
property an d all o wed for the action for
speci fi c perfo rmance. The CA re verse d
the tri al co urts decision, rendering the
Kasunduan void because at the time of its
execution (1972), the lot was still owned by the
Republic of the Philippines. Hence, no right was
transferred to Jaime, w h o w a s a w a r d e d t h e
lot
in
1986
and
no
right
was
transferred
by
Salvador
to
the
petitioners. Also, the CA held that the action
had prescribed, it having been filed in
1992,more than four years from the issuance of
the title to the spouses Remoquillo. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
(1)
Whether or not the property was acquired by the
spouses Remoquillo through fraud which by force
of law, considered them trustees of an implied
trusts
(2)Whether or not the prescriptive period to
recover the property obtained by fraud is
applicable in the case at bar
HELD:
(1)

NO. The property was previously a public land,

petitioners have no personality to impute fraud or
misrepresentation against the State or violation of
the law. If the title was in fact fraudulently
obtained, it is the State which should file the suit
to reco ver the prope rt y th rou gh the Offi ce
o f the Solicitor Gen era l. The ti tle
originated from a grant by the government,
hence, its cancellation is a matter between
the grantor and the grantee. At al l e ven ts, for
an action fo r re con ve ya nce ba sed on
fra ud to prosp er, the petitioners must prove
by clear and convincing evidence not only his title
to the property but also the fact of fraud. Fraud is
never presumed. Intentional acts to deceive and
deprive another of his right, or in some manner
injure him must be speci fi cal l y all eged and
p ro ve d b y th e pe ti ti one rs b y cle ar and
con vi nci ng evidence. Petitioners failed to
discharge this burden, however.
(2)
NO. From the allegations of the Complaint,
petitioners seek the reconveyance of the property
based on implied trust. The prescriptive period for
the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real
property is 10 years, reckoned from the date
of the issuance of the certificate of title, if
the plaintiff is not in possession, but
imprescriptible if he is in possession of the
property. It is undisputed that petitioners houses
occupy the questioned property and that
respondents have not been in possession thereof.
Since there was no actual need to reconvey the
property as petitioners remained in possession
thereof, the action took the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, it having been filed to
enforce an alleged implied trust after Jaime
refused to segregate title over Lot 19.One who is
in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to
be the owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right. From
the body of the complaint, this type of action
denotes imprescriptibility.
IMPROPERLY FILED REVERSION SUIT:
Estate of the Late Jesus Yujuico vs. Republic
(537 SCRA 513) Action for reversion which seeks
to cancel a judgment of the RTC awarding lot to
an applicant should be filed before Court of
Appeals under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules on Civil

Procedure
While CA No. 141 did not specify whether judicial
confirmation of titles by a land registration court
can be subject of a reversion suit, the government
availed of such remedy by filing actions with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel titles and
decrees granted in land registration applications,
but the situation changed on 14 August 1981
upon the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
which gave the Intermediate Appellate Court the
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts.
When the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure became
effective on 1 July 1997, it incorporated Rule 47
on annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts. Effective
1 July 1997, any action for reversion of public
land instituted by the Government was already
covered by Rule 47 and the same should be filed
with the Court of Appeals, not the Regional Trial
Court.
Reversion suits were originally utilized to annul
titles/patents administratively issued by the
Director of the Lands Management Bureau or the
Secretary of the DENR.
J.CANCELLATION SUITS

Sec. 2The annulment may be based only on the

grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was
availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Sec. 3. Period for filing action. If based on
extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four
(4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack
of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or
estoppel.
GALICIA VS MANLIQUEZ
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes
laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined
according
to
its
particular
circumstances.
L.QUIETING OF TITLE:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought
to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud
from being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein.
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable
title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. He need not be in
possession of said property.

K.ANNULMENT OF JUDGEMENT
(RULE 74, RULES OF COURT)
WHEN BROUGHT:
Sec. 1 This Rule shall govern the annulment
by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner.

Art. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title

or remove a cloud therefrom when the contract,
instrument or other obligation has been
extinguished or has terminated, or has been
barred by extinctive prescription.
Art. 479. The plaintiff must return to the defendant
all benefits he may have received from the latter,
or reimburse him for expenses that may have
redounded to the plaintiff's benefit.

Art. 480. The principles of the general law on the

quieting of title are hereby adopted insofar as they
are not in conflict with this Code.

by him, shall be punished by a fine from 50 to 100

per centum of the gain which he shall have
obtained, but not less than 75 pesos.

Art. 481. The procedure for the quieting of title or

the removal of a cloud therefrom shall be
governed by such rules of court as the Supreme
Court shall promulgated.

If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a

fine of from 200 to 500 pesos shall be imposed.

M.CRIMINAL ACTION:
Art. 312. Occupation of real property or
usurpation of real rights in property. Any
person who, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, shall take possession of
any real property or shall usurp any real rights in
property belonging to another, in addition to the
penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed

Art. 313. Altering boundaries or landmarks.

Any person who shall alter the boundary
marks or monuments of towns, provinces, or
estates, or any other marks intended to
designate the boundaries of the same, shall
be punished by arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 100 pesos, or both.