Olympic then filed two cases with the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) for the revocation of
the SSMPs of Platinum, on the ground of Olympics termination of the Operating Agreement because of
the alleged gross violations thereof by Platinum. This was dismissed and POA for the cancellation of the
Operating Agreement and the revocation of the SSMPs of Platinum. This case was subsequently
withdrawn by .
While these two administrative cases were pending, Olympic transferred its applications for mineral
agreements, including its rights under the Operating Agreement, to Citinickel via a Deed of , without the
knowledge or consent of Platinum. This assignment was thereafter approved by the Regional Director of
the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB).
After the assignment, Citinickel filed Civil Case No. 06-0185 before the RTC of Paraaque, on June 21,
2006, seeking to invalidate the Operating Agreement based on Platinums alleged violation of its terms.
This action was also dismissed by the trial court, citing forum shopping and improper venue as among the
grounds for dismissal. Citinickel did not bother to appeal this dismissal, opting instead to find other
remedies.
Citinickel thereafter filed three administrative cases: PMRB Case No. 002-06, DENR Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) Case No. 8253, and POA Case No. 2006-02-B.
Civil Case No. 4199 involved a complaint for quieting of title, damages, breach of contract, and specific
performance filed by Platinum against Olympic before the RTC of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Branch 95
on June 14, 2006.
Olympic sought the dismissal of Platinums Civil Case No. 4199 through a motion to dismiss where
Olympic alleged that the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the issues raised in the case.
Olympic contended that the case involved a mining dispute requiring the technical expertise of the POA;
accordingly, jurisdiction should be with the PO
ISSUE:
Which body has the authority to hear and decide the dispute between Olympic/Citinickel and Platinum, as
parties to the operating agreement.
HELD:
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of
the complaint. It is thus obvious that the complaint falls within the ambit of the RTCs original jurisdiction,
to the exclusion of all other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies.
Although Section 77 (d) of the Mining Act has transferred to the POA jurisdiction over disputes pending
before the Bureau of Mines and the DENR, Section 77 (b) did not adopt the wording of Section 7,
paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281 so as to include all other forms of contracts public or private
involving mining rights; Section 77 (b) in relation to Section 3 (ab) of the Mining Act did not include a
general catch-all phrase to cover other agreements involving mining rights similar to those in Section 7,
paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281. Instead, the Mining Act, through the above-quoted Sections 3 (ab)
and 26, has limited the jurisdiction of the POA, as successor of the adjudicatory functions of the Bureau of
Mines, to mineral agreements between the government and the private contractor. Otherwise stated, while
disputes between parties to any mining contract (including operating agreements) may previously fall
within the Bureau of Mines jurisdiction under Section 7 (a) or (c) of PD No. 1281, it can no longer be so
placed now within the authority of the POA to settle under Section 77 (b) of the Mining Law because its
jurisdiction has been limited to the resolution of disputes involving public mineral agreements.
The controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary objective for which said cases are
filed. Platinums primary objective in filing the complaint is to protect its interest in the subject mining
areas, although it joined its claims of breach of contract, damages, and specific performance in the case.
In any event, the Rules of Court allow joinder of causes of action in the RTC, provided one of the causes
of action (in this case, the cause of action for quieting of title or interest in real property located in
Palawan) falls within the jurisdiction of said court and venue lies therein. In fine, there is absolutely no
reason to disturb the CAs findings that venue was properly laid in the Palawan court.
LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, Inc. vs RAMOS G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004 FACTS:
On March 3, 1995, President Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7942. Section 15 thereof declares that the
Act shall govern the exploration, development, utilization, and processing of all mineral resources. Such
declaration notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7942 does not actually cover all the modes through which the State
may undertake the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources. The State, being the
owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and responsibility in the exploration,
development and utilization thereof. As such, it may undertake these activities through four modes: The
State may directly undertake such activities. (2) The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations. (3) Congress may, by law,
allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. (4) For the large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance. R.A. No. 7942
primarily concerns itself with the second and fourth modes. Petitioners submit that, in accordance with the
text of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, FTAAs should be limited to technical or financial
assistance only. They observe, however, that, contrary to the language of the Constitution, the WMCP
FTAA allows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than mere financial or
technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of the mining
activity On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that
the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days
from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners letter.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order. They allege that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had
already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares, 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-
owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned
mining company over offshore areas.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT Republic Act No. 7942 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. HELD: The Court hereby
declares unconstitutional and void the following: (1) provisions of Republic Act No. 7942: (a) The proviso
in Section 3 (aq), (b) Section 23, (c) Section 33 to 41, (d) Section 56, (e) The second and third
paragraphs of Section 81, and (f) Section 90. (2) All provisions of Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with this Decision, and (3) The
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 contain
provisions that are more favorable to WMCP, hence, these laws, to the extent that they are favorable to
WMCP, govern the FTAA. In addition, R.A. No. 7942 explicitly makes certain provisions apply to preexisting agreements. R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Although
the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987
Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.