CHAPTER FOUR

20 But it must be stated next in order whether anyone lacks self-restraint in

an unqualified sense, or whether all who lack self-restraint do so in some
21
Here again and in the next line, to know "scientifically," or in the strict
sense.
22 The eschatos horos: see defining boundary in the glossary. BOOK], CHAPTER
4 [ 143
partial respect, and, if this latter is the case, with what sorts of things the
person lacking self-restraint is concerned.
Now, it is manifest that self-restrained and steadfast people, as well as
those who lack self-restraint or are soft, are concerned with pleasures and
pains. Some things productive of pleasure are necessary, and others are
choiceworthy in themselves but susceptible to excess. The bodily ones are 25
necessary (I mean such sorts of pleasures as those bound up with nourishment and the sexual need, and the sort ofbodily pleasures that we posited
as being the concern oflicentiousness and moderation), whereas the other
pleasures are not necessary but choiceworthy in themselves (I mean, for 30
example, victory, honor, wealth, and the good and pleasant things of that
sort). Given this, when it comes to the people who are excessively concerned with these sorts of pleasures, contrary to the correct reason that is
within them, we do not say that they lack self-restraint in an unqualified
sense, but instead we set down in addition "lacking self-restraint in regard
to money" (or gain, honor, or spiritedness). We do not say that they lack
self-restraint without qualification, on the grounds that they are different and are spoken of as such only in reference to a certain similarity they 35
share, just as with Anthropos ["Human Being"], the Olympic victor: in
his case, the common definition [logos] differed little from the definition t1
4Ba
[logos] peculiar to him, but nonetheless it was different.
23
And there is a
sign of this. For lack of self-restraint is blamed not only on the grounds
that it is an error, but also on the grounds that it is a certain vice, either
without qualification or in some partial way, but none of those who lack
self-restraint in some specific respect are blamed in this way.
Among those who are concerned with such bodily enjoyments as we
say are the concern of the moderate person and the licentious one, there
is the person who pursues the excesses of the pleasures (and avoids the
pains) bound up with hunger, thirst, heat, cold, and all those pleasures
and pains associated with taste and touch; but he acts in this way not
from choice but contrary to his choice and thinking. This person is said
to lack self-restraint not with reference to some additional qualification, 10
to the effect that he is concerned with this or that, as in the case of someone lacking self-restraint when it comes to anger; rather, he is only said to
be lacking self-restraint unqualifiedly. And there is a sign of this: people
23
According to several sources, recorded in Burnet's commentary, there wa
s an
Olympic boxing champion by the name of Anthropos-"Human Being" -in 456. 1441 BO
OK 7, CHAPTER 4
are said to be soft when it comes to these pleasures, but not when it comes
to any of the other ones. On this account too we set down the person lacking self-restraint and the licentious person in the same category, as well
as the self-restrained and moderate-but not so in the case of any of the
15 other [vicious or virtuous types]-and we do so because they are somehow concerned with the same pleasures and pains: they are concerned
with the same things but not in the same way, for the licentious choose
the pleasures in question, those lacking self-restraint do not choose them.
Hence we would call anyone who pursues excessive pleasures, while not
desiring them or desiring them only mildly, and who avoids measured

20 pains, more licentious than someone who acts in these ways on account
of strong desires. For what would the former person do if youthful desire should arise in him and the strong pain associated with the necessary
needs?
Some desires and pleasures fall in the class of noble and serious things
(for some pleasures are by nature choiceworthy), some are the contrary
25 of these, and still others are in the middle between them, just as we defined them earlier-for example, money, gain, victory, and honor. And it
is in regard to all these, both the pleasures of this sort and those of the inbetween kind, that people are blamed, not for undergoing them, desiring
them, and loving them, but rather for doing so in a certain way, namely,
in excess. Hence all those who, contrary to reason, are either overpowered
30 by or pursue something by nature noble and good [are not corrupt]
24
for example, those who are more serious than they ought to be about
honor, or about their offspring and parents, for these concerns are in fact
good and those who are serious about them are praised. But nevertheless there is a certain excess in these things too, if someone, like Niobe,
should fight against even the gods, or as Satyrus, nicknamed "Philopator;'
1148b was disposed toward his father.
25
For he was held to be exceedingly silly.
There is, then, no corruption concerning these things on account of the
point mentioned -that by nature each of them is choiceworthy in itself.
This complex sentence does not have a main verb; we supply what we take to
24
be
missing, following Burnet.
2 5 Accounts of Niobe differ, but she seems to have represented (excessive) mo
urning:
after Niobe boasted of her worth as compared to Leto, Leto's two children, Arte
mis
and Apollo, are said to have killed all of Niobe's many children. Burnet suggest
s that
Satyrus may have been a fourth-century king of the Bosporos who deified his fath
er,
although commentators differ; "Philopater" means literally "father-lover" or "fr
iend
to one's father:' BOOK 7, CHAPTER 5 [ 145
but their excesses are base and to be avoided. Similarly, there is no lack 5
of self-restraint pertaining to them either. For lack of self-restraint is not
only something to be avoided but also blameworthy. But on account of
a similarity to the relevant experience, people say "lack of self-restraint"
while specifying something additional about each case, as people say, for
example, "bad doctor" or "bad actor" about someone they would not say
is bad simply. Just as, then, one would not in these cases speak of their
being bad simply, because each of these conditions is not vice but only 10
similar to it by way of analogy, so it is clear, in this case too, that only tha
t
which is concerned with the same things as are moderation and licentiousness should be supposed to be lack of self-restraint and self-restraint,
whereas we speak about lack of self-restraint in point of spiritedness by
way of a certain similarity only. Hence we assert that someone is lacking
self-restraint, adding also "when it comes to spiritedness;' just as in the
cases of honor and gain as well.
CHAPTER FIVE
Now, some things are pleasant by nature-and of these, some are pleasant 15
without qualification, others are such according to the various kinds of
animals and human beings involved. Certain things, by contrast, are not
pleasant by nature but do become pleasant, some on account of people's

defects, others through habits, and still others on account of people's corrupt natures. Since this is so, it is possible to see, in each of these cases,
characteristics closely resembling them. I mean the brutish characteristics-for example, the human female who, they say, rips open pregnant 20
women and devours the infants; or the sorts of things that, people assert,
certain of the savages living around the Black Sea
26
enjoy, some of whom
enjoy raw meat, others human flesh, and still others trade their children
with one another to feast on them; or what is said about Phalaris.
27
These
are brutish characteristics, and other such characteristics arise through ill- 2
5
ness as well as through madness in some cases, like the man who made a
sacrifice of his mother and ate her, and the person who ate the liver of his
fellow slave; and still others are marked by disease or arise from habit26 More literally, "around Pontus," a region of northern Asia Minor on the sou
th
shore of the Black Sea, famous for the brutality or barbarism of some of its tri
bes; see
also Politics I338b19-24.
27 Phalaris was tyrant of Acragas (ca. 570-549) and notorious for his inventive
cruelties: he was known to have roasted his victims alive in a hollow brazen bull, fo
r example. BOOK], CHAPTER 5
for example, plucking out one's hair and gnawing on one's fingernails, or
even on coal and dirt, and, in addition to these, the pleasure of sex with
30 males. For some of these arise by nature, others from habit-for example,
in those who are wantonly abused
28
from childhood.
As for those people, then, whose condition is caused by nature, no
one would say that they lack self-restraint, just as one would not say it of
women because they are passive rather than active in marital relations;
nor, similarly, would one say it of all those who are in a diseased condition through a given habit. Each of these conditions falls outside the de1149a fining boundaries of vice, as does brutishness as well. And for someone
who has such a condition, overpowering it or being overpowered
29
by it is
not a matter of a simple lack of self-restraint, but this only by way of a certain similarity to it. For just as someone who, when it comes to spiritedness, undergoes this passion may be said to lack self-restraint by way of a
certain similarity, yet he ought not to be said to lack self-restraint simply.
In every instance of excessive foolishness, cowardice, licentiousness, and
harshness, some people are marked by brutishness, others by disease. For
someone who is by nature such as to be afraid of everything, even if a
mouse makes a noise, is a coward whose cowardice is brutish, whereas
that fellow who was afraid of the weasel was a coward through disease.
10 And of the foolish, some who are irrational as a result of nature and live b
y
sense perception alone, like certain tribes of distant barbarians, are brutish; others who are such through disease, for example, epileptics, or
through madness are diseased.
Now, it is sometimes possible for someone just to have one of these
characteristics but not to be overpowered by it-I mean, for example, if
15 Phalaris had kept in check his desire to eat a child or to enjoy a strange
sexual pleasure. But it is also possible to be overpowered by it, not merely
to have it. Just as in the case of corruption too, then, there is the corrup-

tion spoken of in its unqualified sense, in reference to a human being, and

there is the corruption spoken of in reference to some additional qualification-that it is corruption stemming from brutishness or disease, but
not corruption without qualification-so in the same manner there is
clearly also the lack of self-restraint that is brutish and the lack of it that
20 stems from disease. But only that which relates to human licentiousness
is lack of self-restraint in the unqualified sense.
28
Literally "treated with hubris:'
29
Aristotle uses here the active and passive forms of kratein, the verb relate
d to the
terms for "self-restraint" ( enkrateia) and "lack of self-restraint" (akrasia ).
BOOK 7, CHAPTER 6 [ 147
It is clear, then, that lack of self-restraint and self-restraint are concerned only with the matters to which licentiousness and moderation
pertain; and that the lack of self-restraint pertaining to other things is
another form of it, which is spoken of as lack of self-restraint only metaphorically and not unqualifiedly.