SURNAMES

b.

REPUBLIC V CA AND CYNTHIA VICENCIO

c.
d.

Facts: Pablo Vicencio and Experanza were married. Their daughter was
named Cynthia Vicencio (petitioner). After a marital spat, Pablo
Vicencio left their conjugal abode and never reappeared nor sent
support for the family. Esperanza filed a petition for separation of their
conjugal partnership which was granted. Eventually, Esperanza filed a
petition for change of name and dropped dropped the surname
Vicencio. She also filed a petition for the declaration of Pablo as an
absentee which was granted. Esperanza and Ernesto Yu were married.
The petitioners grounds for change of surname are as follows:
Petitioners known father had been Ernesto Yu despite the fact that
she had been using the family name Vicencio in her school and
other related activities.
Confusion arose as to her parentage and had been subject to
inquiries
She had used the surname Yu on two occassions.
Her stepfather had been consulted and had given consent re: this
petition
Her stepfather testified and confirmed his consent.
The OSG opposed the petition. The RTC ruled that there is no valid
cause for denying the petition. It could not compel the step father to
adopt petitioner as adoption is a voluntary act. Failure to result to
adoption should not be a cause for disallowing petitioner to changer her
name.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and held that it is for the best
interest of the petitioner as it would give her an opportunity to
improve her personality and welfare.
Issue: W/N the CA erred in affirming the RTCs decision allowing the
change of private respondents surname to that of her step-father
Held: In Republic vs. Hernandez, we have recognized inter alia, the
following as sufficient grounds to warrant a change of name:
a. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;

e.
f.

when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or

adoption;
when the change will avoid confusion;
when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage;
when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudice to anybody; and
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or
that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and

reasonable cause to warrant private respondents change of surname.
Such change might even cause confusion and give rise to legal
complications due to the fact that private respondents step-father has
two children with her mother. In the event of her step-fathers death, it
is possible that private respondent may even claim inheritance rights as
a legitimate daughter. The Solicitor General, opines that Ernesto Yu has
no intention of making Cynthia as an heir because despite the
suggestion made before the petition for change of name was heard by
the trial court that the change of family name to Yu could very easily be
achieved by adoption, he has not opted for such a remedy.
We find merit in the Solicitor Generals contention. The touchstone for
the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable
cause for which the change is sought. The assailed decision as affirmed
by the appellate court does not persuade us to depart from the
applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames, specifically the
law which requires that legitimate children shall principally use the
surname of their father
.
Private respondent, might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to
that of her step-fathers legitimate children, a plausible reason the
petition for change of name was filed in the first place. Moreover, it is
laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter,
providing for all her needs as a father would his own flesh and blood.
However, legal constraints lead us to reject private respondents desire
to use her stepfathers surname. Further, there is no assurance the end
result would not be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of

bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name, if granted, could

trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage.
Lastly, when this case was decided by the appellate court, private
respondent was already 18 years old but still considered a minor
because Republic Act 6809,lowering the age of majority, was then in
effect. However, regardless of private respondents age, our conclusion
remains considering the circumstances before us and the lack of any
legally justifiable cause for allowing the change of her surname.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN
LIN CARULASAN WANG
Facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born to parents Anna Lisa
Wang and sing-Foe Wang who was not yet married at the time of his
parents. When they subsequently married, they executed an Affidavit of
Legitimation, hence his name became Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since they plan to stay in Singapore so he can study there and stay with
his sister, Wang Mei Jasmin, born in Singapore, they filed a petition for
change of name/correction/cancellation of entry of Julian to Julian Lin
Wang.
In the petition, Anna averred that in Singapore, they anticipate that
Julian will be anticipated against because surname of a mother is not
carried in a persons name. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore where
the letter R is pronounced as L, Julian and his sister might be asked
why they have different surnames. She thus prayed that the surame
Carulasan be dropped from Julians name.
The RTC, however dismissed the petition, ruling that the State have an
interest in the names of persons, which should not be changed for the
convenience of the bearer. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children are entitled to the use of the surnames of both the
mother and the father, and this right should not be taken away from
Julian who is still a minor.
Anna filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing, among others, that
globalization brought the need of children to adjust to their new
environments, for consistency and harmony, taking into consideration

the best interest of the child. Convenience of a child is a valid ground

for change of name, as long as it will not prejudice the State. Lastly,
she argues that it is error for the court to rule that Julian should wait for
the age of majority to decide on his change of name, since the Court in
several occasions allowed the change of name of a minor.
Issue: W/N the RTC erred in denying the petition for the change of
name of minor Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
Held: The petition should be denied. The Court has had occasion to
express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change
of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be
authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of
birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the
request should be denied.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be
proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. To justify
a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some
proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as
it does not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and
adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether.
Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered
name? No
A name is said to have the following characteristics:
(1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being
confused with others.
(2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a
name.
(3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and
may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings.
(4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and
intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa.
(5) It is imprescriptible.

c.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a
person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the
same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family
Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname
of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which
case they may bear the fathers surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not
recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers
surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is
only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his
mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such
individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate.
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name,
and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his
middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and
integrate himself into Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v.
Republic and Calderon v. Republic, which, however, are not apropos
both.
In Oshita, the Court granted her petition based on the following
considerations:
a. she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority;
b. her other siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have
been using their mothers surname;

d.

she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still being

ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War;
there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a
fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.

In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner, an illegitimate minor child

acting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to
change her name, taking the surname of her stepfather. The Court held
that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted where
to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into
consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to
eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she
continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic, in arguing that although Article 174
of the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the
surnames of the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the
child could use only one family name, even the family name of the
mother.
In Alfon, the trial court denied her petition but this Court overturned
the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that
she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her
father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of
herm other to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that
there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid
confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name
against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention
would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and
could not warrant favorable action on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are
not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly
distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the
petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for
change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have exercised
their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their
decision to change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably
observed that the reason for the grant of the petitions for change of

name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or compelling

grounds therefore.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous
foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best
that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age,
he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his
name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in
his rights under our laws.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA
Facts:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the
child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate
child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now
known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle
name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her
relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and
preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and
under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.

Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of
the CC merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname
of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal
effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate
child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary
and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in
the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that
it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is
doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to
avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted
by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to
do so.

Issue: W/N an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father,

use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name
REPUBLIC V CAPOTE
Held: Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by
her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
(An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their

Facts:
In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad
litem) filed a petition forchange of name of her ward from Giovanni
Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged that:
Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and
Diosdado Gallamaso; he was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the

effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him use the
surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between
them;from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father
failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial,
physical, emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully
aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his
surname changed to that of his mothers surname; Giovannis mother
might eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his
continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural
father, may complicate his status as natural child; and the change of
name will be for the benefit of the minor.
Having found respondents petition sufficient in form and substance,
the trial court gave due course to the petition. Publication of the
petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to
the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her
evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG,
acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the
lower court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the
trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from
Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an
appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in
granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the
proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred
in affirming the trial courts decision which granted the petition for
change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The
purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected
by the childs change of name should have been made respondents to
make the proceeding adversarial.
Issues: W/N the petition for change of name should be granted.
Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition.
Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the

procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the
appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing
of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of
the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never
recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him
as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was
ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will
facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the
United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification
of mother and son.
W/N a proceeding for change of name adversarial?
The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must
be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the
cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary
proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule
108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from
clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond
correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting
the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the
entry is also required to reflect the change in name.
W/N Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial
proceeding
Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by
posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the
petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof.
Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition
including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not
deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make
the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still
expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is
meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments
propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor
the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity
to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court
were not adversarial enough.

When is a proceeding considered adversarial?

A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given
legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity
to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication
as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed
notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment
therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by
serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make
a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties,
including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the
opportunity to contest the petition
REMO V HON. SEC OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Facts:
Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose
passport was then expiring on October 27, 2000. Being married to
Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear:
surname: Rallonza
given name: Maria Virginia
middle name: Remo
Prior to expiry of her passport, the petitioner (marriage still subsists)
applied f or renewal in DFA Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. with a request to
revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.
Petitioners request having been denied (#1), Atty. Manuel Joseph R.
Bretana III, representing petitioner, wrote on the Secretary of DFA
expressing a similar request
DFA through Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota, denied (#2) ther equest,
stating:it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her
husbands name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport
application only if the married name has not been used in previous
application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippines
Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a
woman may revert to her maiden name, that is, of only in cases of
annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos
case does not meet any of these conditions.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution

was denied (#3) in a letter.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President. The Office
of the President dismissed (#4) the appeal with the same argument as
the Asst. Secretary of DFA (RA 8239)
The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict
between a general and special law, the latter will control over the
former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil
Code is a general rule, it should yield to RA 8239.
The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration and the Office of
the President denied (#5) the motion.
Petitioner filed with the court of Appeals for a petition for review and
the Court of Appeals denied (#6) the petition and affirmed the ruling of
the Office of the President.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals
denied (#7 ).
Issue: W/N petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname in her
expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the
replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage
Held: The petition lacks merit. Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the
use of surnames. In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 370. A married woman may use:
1.
2.
3.

HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD

HER HUSBANDS SURNAME, OR
HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S
SURNAME, OR
HER HUSBANDS FULL NAME, BUT PREFIXING A WORD
INDICATING THAT SHE IS HIS WIFE, SUCH AS MRS.

Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the
surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of

the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three
names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon
marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden
name once she is married because when a woman marries, she does not
change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is
in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.
The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable
provision in this case is Section 5(d), which states:
Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. No passport shall be
issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized
representative is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who
has complied with the following requirements: x x x
(D) IN CASE OF A WOMAN WHO IS MARRIED, SEPARATED,
DIVORCED OR WIDOWED OR WHOSE MARRIAGE HAS BEEN
ANNULLED OR DECLARED BY COURT AS VOID, A COPY OF
THE CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGE, COURT DECREE OF
SEPARATION, DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT OR CERTIFICATE
OF DEATH OF THE DECEASED SPOUSE DULY ISSUED AND
AUTHENTICATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL: PROVIDED, THAT IN CASE OF A DIVORCE
DECREE, ANNULMENT OR DECLARATION OF MARRIAGE AS
VOID, THE WOMAN APPLICANT MAY REVERT TO THE USE
OF HER MAIDEN NAME: PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT SUCH
DIVORCE IS RECOGNIZED UNDER EXISTING LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES; X X X

Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case

outside of the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances
when a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), she
may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.
RA 8239, INCLUDING ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, DOES NOT PROHIBIT A MARRIED WOMAN
FROM USING HER MAIDEN NAME IN HER PASSPORT. IN
FACT, IN RECOGNITION OF THIS RIGHT, THE DFA ALLOWS A
MARRIED WOMAN WHO APPLIES FOR A PASSPORT FOR THE
FIRST TIME TO USE HER MAIDEN NAME. SUCH AN
APPLICANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO ADOPT HER HUSBAND'S
SURNAME.
Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport,
which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be
countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the
records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance
purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage
subsists, may not change her family name at will.
As the OSG correctly pointed out:
The issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport
is an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person
intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries. It is issued by the
Philippine government to its citizens requesting other governments to
allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to give
him/her aid and protection. x x x

CIVIL REGISTER
SILVERIO V REPUBLIC
Facts:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. Hes a
biological male who feels trapped in a male body. Being that, he sought
gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was
successful he (she) now has a female body.
Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of his first name
(from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth
certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to
make these changes, among others, so that he can marry his American
fianc.
The RTC granted Silverios petition. The RTC ruled that it should be
granted based on equity; that Silverios misfortune to be trapped in a
mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken
against him; that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG
did not make any basis for opposition at this point); that no harm,
injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring
the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fianc and
the realization of their dreams.

Significantly, Section 1, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and

Regulations of RA 8239 provides:

Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The
CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

The passport can be amended only in the following cases:

Issue: W/N the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth
certificate may be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment

a.
b.
c.

AMENDMENT OF WOMANS NAME DUE TO MARRIAGE;

AMENDMENT OF WOMANS NAME DUE TO DEATH OF
SPOUSE, ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE OR DIVORCE
INITIATED BY A FOREIGN SPOUSE; OR
CHANGE OF SURNAME OF A CHILD WHO IS
LEGITIMATED BY VIRTUE OF A SUBSEQUENT
MARRIAGE OF HIS PARENTS.

Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries
finds no support in existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name

In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY

OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL
TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN
AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME
IN THE CIVILREGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL
ORDER) was passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil
registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions for the change of first names
and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his
first name is concerned is procedurally infirm.
Even assuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still
because the ground upon which it is based (gender re-assignment) is
not one of those provided for by the law. Under the law, a change of
name may only be grounded on the following:
1. The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
3. The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely
alleged gender re-assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular
courts or a petition for the local civil registry. Not with the courts
because there is no law to support it. And not with the civil registry
because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male
hence it was just but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is
that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made
at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the
union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment
(a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions
of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under
the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of
calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These
laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if Silverios petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name
and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that
privilege.

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a

legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

REPUBLIC V CAGANDAHAN
Facts:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff
Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that
Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both
male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan
presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is
issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in
addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically is female but because
her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court
decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed
before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did
not implead the local civil registrar.

But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?

No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant
the changes sought by Silverio will substantially reconfigure and

Held: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the
petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil
registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is
not without merit. It must be stressed that private respondent furnished
the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on
December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course
of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is
substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the
determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view
of the delicate facts present in this case.

Issue: W/N the ruling of the lower court on the change of sex or gender
and name of the respondent is valid

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected

without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving
the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to
elaborate the term intersexuality which is the condition or let us say a
disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is
the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both
male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of
the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a
person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render
judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case,
there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In
determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in
the birth certificate entry for gender.
The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age
of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing
to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither
will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly
currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the
one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the
absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will
harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection
under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the
respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.

his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not."
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded.
While the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not
ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in
relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.
In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.

CORPUZ V STO. TOMAS

Facts:
Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He was married to the
respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He
went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.
Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the
divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the
foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where
respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the petition
on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi.
Issue: W/N the recording of the Pasig Civil Registry of the divorce
decree based on the mere presentation of the decree is proper
Held. We consider the recording to be legally improper. Article 407 of
the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
198237 both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can
be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree.
For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.
A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation
of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares
that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order."
The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil

registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must
be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the
time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the
RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a
foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as
the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of
the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.
IWASAWA V GANGAN
Facts: Petitioner Iwasawa filed a petition for the declaration of
his marriage to private respondent Gangan as null and void on
the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one based on
Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Iwasawa only found out that his wife
was previously married when she explained that her first
husband just died and its the reason why shes feeling
depressed.
Petitioner presented the following evidences from NSO:
(1) Certificate of Marriage of petitioner and private respondent to prove that Iwasawa and Gangan were married
(2) Certificate of Marriage of private respondent and her first
husband (Raymond Arambulo)
(3) Certificate of Death of Raymond Arambulo - to prove the

death
(4) Certiification of NSO to the effect that there are 2 entries of
marriage recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent
- to prove that Gangan in fact contracted 2 marriages, first one
was to Raymond Arambulo and the 2nd to Iwasawa
OSG admitted authenticity and due execution of the
documentary exhibits. RTC ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to prove private respondents prior existing valid
marriage to another man because it was only petitioner who
testified about said marriage and his testimony is unreliable
because he has no personal knowledge of Gangans prior
marriage nor of Arambulos death which makes him a complete
stranger to the marriage certificate between Gangan and
Arambulo and the latters death certificate. Petitioners testimony
about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is
stranger to the preparation of said document. RTC denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by the Petitioner
Petitioner contends that the documentary evidence he presented
are public documents which are considered to be selfauthenticating and thus it was unnecessary to call the NSO
Records Custodian.
Art. 410 of the Civil Code - books making up the civil register
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
The trial prosecutor admitted the authenticity of said documents .
The OSG submits that the findings of RTC are not in accord with
law and established jurisprudence.
RA 3753, Law on Registry of Civil Status, and the Civil Code
elaborated on the character of of documents arising from
records and entries made by the civil register and categorically
declared them as public documents. There is no need for the
NSO custodian or officer to testify. Public documents have
probative value since they are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.

Issue: W/N the testimony of the NSO records custodian

certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public
documents issued by said office is necessary before the
documents could be accorded evidentiary weight
Held: RTC erred when it disregarded said document on the sole
ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian
of the NSO. The documentary evidence presented by Iwasawa
were all public documents and therefore prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein.
Art. 410 - The books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein.
As public documents they are admissible as evidence without
further proof of the due execution. They deserve to be given
evidentiary weight. The facts stated therein remain rebutted
since neither Gangan nor the public prosecutor presented
evidence to the contrary. Documentary exhibits taken together
concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent on the ground that their marriage is
bigamous. Judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage. Otherwise, it is a bigamous marriage
which is void from the beginning.
The documents directly prove that:
a. Private respondent married Arambulo
b. Private respondent married Iwasawa
c. There was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage
with private respondent with Arambulo at the time she
married Iwasawa
d. Arambulo died and that it was only on said date that private
respondents marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have
been dissolved
e. The 2nd marriage of private respondent to petitioner is
bigamous, hence null and void.
REPUBLIC V OLAYBAR

Facts: Petitioner Linda Olaybar requested from the NSO a

Certificate of No Marriage as one of the requirements for her
marriage with her boyfriend of 5 years. She discovered that she
was married to a certain Yu Son Sune, a Korean National. She
filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage
Contract. She impleaded the LCR of Cebu City and her alleged
husband in her petition. She testified on her behalf and deied the
marriage on the ff grounds:
She couldnt be present as she was working in Makati as a
medical distributor in Hansao Pharma
Shecognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she
had met them when she worked as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House
She believes that her name was used by a certain Johnny
Singh who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her
personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport
Petitioner presented as witness Eufrocina Natinga, an employee
of MTCC, Branch 1 who confirmed that the marriage of Yu Son
Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the
wife present at that time was not private respondent. A
document examiner also testified that the signature appearing in
the marriage contract was forged. The RTC granted the petition.
The OSG moved for reconsideration on the grounds that:
1. There was no clerical spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within
the provisions of Rule 108 of Rules of Court
2. Granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion
of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
marriage void ab initio.
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration contending the ff:

It had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction

of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108
Considering that private respondents identity was used by
an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean
national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not
one of the void marriages under Article 35 and 36 of the FC.

Issue: W/N the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract

which in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a
Rule 108 proceeding
Held: Petition denied. It was established that, no such marriage
was celebrated. Olaybar avers that she did not enter into a
marriage with Yu Son Sune. She only found out that she was
married upon her request for a Certificate of No Marriage from
the NSO. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife
portion of the marriage certificate. Olaybar complied with all the
procedural rules of under Rule 108. presented evidences and
testimonies to strenghten her claim 2. As the Court ruled in Fujiki
vs. Marinay, Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of mar r iage. Respondent did not seek the nullification of
her marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth set
forth by the evidence. trial court did not in any way declare the
marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of Rule 108
explained in RP vs. Olaybar Rule 108 of the Rules of Court Cancellation or Correction of entries in the civil registry Sec. 1.
Who may file petitioner Any person interested in any act,
event, order, or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
registrer may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births
(b) marriages
(c) deaths
(d) legal separations
(e) judgements of annulments of marriage
(f) judgments declaring marriage void from the
beginning
(g) legtimations
(h) adoptions
(i) acknowledgements of natural children
(j) naturalization

(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship

(l) civil interdiction
(m) judicial determination of filiation
(n) voluntary emancipation of a minor
(o) changes of name
Sec. 3. Parties When cancellation or corrrection of an entry in
the civil register is sought, the civil register and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding Sec. 4. Notice and
Publication upon the filing of the petii Rule 108 - provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry - may either be summary or adversary - Summary =
clerical - Adversary = substantial; affects civil status, citizenship
or nationality of a party - where the t r ial cour t has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
Considered - not a summary proceeding per se - requires
publication - mandates inclusion as parties of all persons who
may claim interest - requires civil registrar and any person in
interest to file their opposition RP vs. Valencia - even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the par ties
aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate
adversarial proceeding