DEWARA vs SPS.

LAMELA
G.R. No. 179010
2011
DOCTRINE:
Even after having classified a property as a conjugal it
does not necessarily follow that it may automatically
be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts,
obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses.
Before debts and obligations may be charged against
the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the
same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations
should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
FACTS:
Eduardo Dewara and petitioner Elenita were married
before the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the
Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband
and wife were separated-in-fact because Elenita went
to work in California, United States of America, while
Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private
jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit respondent
Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case
for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against Eduardo before the MTCC in
Bacolod City. The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of the
charge and to pay civil indemnity P62,598.70 as actual
damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as
moral damages. On appeal, the RTCaffirmed the
decision and it became final and executory.
The writ of execution on the civil liability was served
on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied because he

had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the

City Sheriff to levy on Lot No. 234-C, Psd. 26667 of the
Bacolod Cadastre in the name of ELENITA M.
DEWARA. Ronnie then caused the consolidation of title
in a Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC, which
ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-80054 in the
name of Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate
of title in the name of respondent spouses.
The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of
certificate of sale, and cancellation of title of the lot in
the name of Elenita were done while Elenita was
working in California. Thus, Elenita, represented by her
attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for
annulment of sale and for damages.
On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that
the subject lot was the conjugal property of petitioner
Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that the property
was acquired by Elenita during her marriage to
Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the
money of Eduardo because, at the time of the
acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain
housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident was
registered in the name of petitioner.
RTCs RULING:
The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal
in nature. It arrived at this conclusion by tracing how
Elenita acquired the subject property. Based on the
documentary evidence submitted, Elenitas grandfather
originally owned Lot No. 234-C.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
The CA elucidated that the gross inadequacy of the
price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except

that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the

parties really intended a donation or some other act or
contract. Hence, this petition.

TUBOLA, JR. vs SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 154042
2011

ISSUE:
W/N the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive
property of Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses
Elenita and Eduardo.
RULING:
Conjugal property. All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the
husband or the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption. The separation-in-fact between the
husband and the wife without judicial approval shall
not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of
conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does not appear. The
use of the conjugal funds is not an essential
requirement for the presumption to arise.
However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234C is the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and
Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that it may
automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer
for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of
the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be
charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be
shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts
and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.

DOCTRINE:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming
any public fund or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facieevidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal uses.
FACTS:
Petitioner was the cashier of the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA)-Aganan, Sta. Barbara
River Irrigation System in Iloilo City. On November 8,
1982, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditing
Examiners conducted an audit examination of
petitioners account which indicated a shortage
of P93,051.88.
The examiners thus sent a letter of demand
dated to petitioner directing him to account for the
shortage. Petitioner refused to receive the letter,
however, hence, Gotera and Cajita sent it by
registered mail.
Petitioner was thereupon charged of committing
malversation of public funds before the Sandiganbayan
to which he pleaded not guilty.
By the account of Gotera, the lone witness for the
prosecution, petitioner had an account balance
of P30,162.46 prior to June 25, 1982; that from June
25 to November 8, 1982, the date petitioners account
was
audited,
his
cash
collections

totaled P347,995.64; that his remittances from June

25 to November 8, 1982 totaled P285,105.41; and that
the total collections less total remittances amounted
to P93,051.88 as of November 8, 1982.
Petitioner, who claimed that he was assigned as
cashier since 1978 and was also in charge of payment
of salaries of more than 2,000 field employees in the
NIA Jalaur Project, declared that his task of keeping the
collected irrigation fees was temporarily assigned to
Editha Valeria (Valeria) upon instruction of his superior,
Regional Director Manuel Hicao, for he (petitioner) was
also handling the payroll of around 2,000 employees.
Petitioner further declared that no accounting of
the collected fees was undertaken since he trusted
Valeria, who directly remitted them to the bank, after
he signed the statement of collection without reading
the contents thereof. Sandiganbayan ruled that
petitioner is guilty of malversation. Petitioner now
posits that the Sandiganbayan was unsure whether he
was guilty of malversation intentionally or through
negligence. In fine, petitioner insists that as the
primary task of collecting the irrigation fees was the
responsibility of Valeria, he cannot be faulted for
negligence.
The People goes on to contend that petitioner
may still be convicted of malversation by negligence
even if the Information alleged the commission of
intentional malversation since the dolo or culpa present
in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of
the felony.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of malversation

RULING:
YES.
In Cabello
ratiocinated that:

v.

Sandiganbayan, the

On the other hand, petitioner

contends that the bulk of said amount
represented "vales" he granted to the
postal employees and the minor portion
consisted of unremitted, unreimbursed or
uncollected
amounts. His
very
own
explanation, therefore, shows that the
embezzlement, as claimed by the
prosecution, or the expenditures, as
posited by him, were not only
unauthorized but intentionally and
voluntarily made. Under no stretch of
legal hermeneutics can it be contended
that these funds were lost through
abandonment
or
negligence
without
petitioner's knowledge as to put the loss
within a merely culpable category. From
the contention of either party, the
misappropriation was intentional and
not through negligence.
Besides, even on the putative
assumption that the evidence against
petitioner yielded a case of malversation
by negligence but the information was for
intentional
malversation,
under
the
circumstances of this case his conviction
under the first mode of misappropriation
would still be in order. Malversation is
committed either intentionally or by
negligence. The dolo or the culpa present
in the offense is only a modality in the
perpetration of the felony. Even if the
mode charged differs from the mode

Court

proved,
the
same
offense
of
malversation
is
involved
and
conviction thereof is proper. A possible
exception would be when the mode of
commission alleged in the particulars of
the indictment is so far removed from the
ultimate categorization of the crime that it
may be said due process was denied by
deluding the accused into an erroneous
comprehension of the charge against him.
That no such prejudice was occasioned on
petitioner nor was he beleaguered in his
defense is apparent from the records of
this case.

Finally, petitioners claim of violation of his right

to due process vis--vis the Sandiganbayan Justices
active participation during the trial fails too. For he has
not specified any instance of supposed bias of the
Justices, or cited what questions adversely affected
him. That a magistrate may propound clarificatory
questions to secure a full and clear understanding of
the facts in the case is not proscribed.

MUNOZ vs YABUT, JR.

G.R. Nos. 142676 & 146718
2011
(EJECTMENT CASE)
DOCTRINES:

The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon

the whole world, such as a judgment in a land
registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a

judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and

their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A
judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a
property to another is in personam; it is binding only
against the parties and their successors-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An
action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of
ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real
action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a
particular individual only although it concerns the right
to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding
only upon the parties properly impleaded.
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is
deprived of physical possession of land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
In such cases, the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has
the prior possession de facto.

FACTS:
First Case
The subject property is a house and lot at No. 48
Scout Madrian St., Diliman, Quezon City, formerly
owned by Yee L. Ching. Yee L. Ching is married to
Emilia M. Ching (spouses Ching), Muozs sister. Muoz
lived at the subject property with the spouses
Ching. As consideration for the valuable services
rendered by Muoz to the spouses Chings family, Yee L.
Ching agreed to have the subject property transferred
to Muoz. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale,
seemingly executed by Yee L. Ching in favor of Muoz.
However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December

28, 1972, Muoz purportedly sold the subject property

to her sister, Emilia M. Ching. As a result, TCT No.
186306 was cancelled and TCT No. 186366 was issued
in Emilia M. Chings name. Emilia M. Ching, in a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979, sold the subject
property to spouses Go Song and Tan Sio Kien
(spouses Go), hence, TCT No. 186366 was cancelled
and replaced by TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos
names.
On October 15, 1979, Muoz registered her
adverse claim to the subject property on TCT No.
258977 of the spouses Go. The next day, on October
16, 1979, Muoz filed a complaint for the annulment of
the deeds of absolute sale.

the RTC-Branch 95 on October 22, 1993 an Urgent

Motion to Stop Execution opposing the writ of
execution. The spouses Chan asserted ownership and
possession of the subject property on the basis of a
clean title.

On July 19, 1991, RTC-Branch 95 rendered its

Decision against Emilia M. Ching, Yee L. Ching, and the
spouses Go (Emilia M. Ching, et al.). It found that
Muozs signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 28, 1972 was forged; that Muoz never sold
the subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching; and
that the spouses Go were not innocent purchasers for
value of the subject property.

Second Case

Emilia M. Ching, et al.s, appealed to the CA. In

its Decision] dated March 4, 1993, the appellate court
not only affirmed the appealed judgment, but also
ordered the spouses Go and their successors-ininterest and assigns and those acting on their behalf to
vacate the subject property.
More than two months later, on September 20,
1993, the RTC-Branch 95 issued a writ of execution.
The spouses Chan, who bought the subject property
from BPI Family, then came forward and filed before

It was only at this point that Muoz, upon her own

inquiry, discovered the cancellation on October 28,
1982 of her adverse claim and notice of lis
pendens annotated on the spouses Gos TCT No.
258977, and the subsequent events that led to the
transfer and registration of the title to the subject
property from the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and
finally, to the spouses Chan.

Pending resolution by the RTC-Branch 95 of the

spouses Chans motion for reconsideration and notice
of appeal, a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer
for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Samuel
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut. Muoz alleged in her
complaint that she had been in actual and physical
possession of the subject property since January 10,
1994. She hired a caretaker and two security guards
for the said property. On February 2, 1994, Samuel Go
Chan and Atty. Yabut, along with 20 other men, some
of whom were armed, ousted Muoz of possession of
the subject property by stealth, threat, force, and
intimidation. Muoz prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction directing Samuel Go
Chan and Atty. Yabut and all persons claiming right
under them to vacate the subject property.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut denied Muozs
allegations, insisting that Samuel Go Chan is the valid,

lawful, and true legal owner and possessor of the

subject property. Samuel Go Chan and
In its Order dated June 10, 1994, the RTC-Branch
88 issued a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
implementation of the MeTC Order dated May 16,
1994.
RULINGS:
Civil Case No. Q-28580 is an action for
reconveyance of real property. In Heirs of Eugenio
Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, we described an action for
reconveyance as follows:
An action for reconveyance is
an action in personam available to a
person
whose
property
has
been
wrongfully
registered
under
the Torrens system in anothers name.
Although the decree is recognized as
incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, the registered owner is not
necessarily held free from liens. As a
remedy, an action for reconveyance is
filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary
courts of justice and not with the land
registration court. Reconveyance is
always available as long as the
property has not passed to an
innocent third person for value. A
notice of lis pendens may thus be
annotated on the certificate of title
immediately upon the institution of the
action in court.
The notice of lis
pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent

third person for value and preserve the

claim of the real owner.
The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding
upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land
registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a
judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and
their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A
judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a
property to another is in personam; it is binding only
against the parties and their successors-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the
action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and
recovery of ownership of real property, or reconveyance, is a real action but it is an action in
personam, for it binds a particular individual only
although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any
judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded.
Since they were not impleaded as parties and
given the opportunity to participate in Civil Case No.
Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot bind
BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The effect of the
said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and
the spouses Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of
execution against them. No man shall be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment
rendered by the court.
G.R. No. 142676
G.R. No. 142676 is Muozs appeal of the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry

case she instituted against Samuel Go Chan and Atty.

Yabut before the MeTC.
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is
deprived of physical possession of land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from
the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who
has the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible
entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are
mandatory for the municipal court to acquire
jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical
possession of the property, and second, he must also
allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of
the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, i.e., by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. It is also settled that in the
resolution thereof, what is important is determining
who is entitled to the physical possession of the
property. Indeed, any of the parties who can prove
prior possession de facto may recover such
possession even from the owner himself since
such cases proceed independently of any claim
of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove
prior possession de facto and undue deprivation
thereof.
Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case,
the court should base its decision on who had prior
physical possession. The main thing to be proven in
an action for forcible entry is prior possession and that
same was lost through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, and stealth, so that it behooves the court to
restore possession regardless of title or ownership.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the RTCBranch 88 erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 8286 even before completion of the proceedings
before the MeTC. At the time said case was ordered
dismissed by RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC had only gone
so far as holding a hearing on and eventually granting
Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.

STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC.

G.R. No. 166838
2011
(BOUNDARY CASE)
DOCTRINE:
A certificate of title is conclusive evidence of both its
ownership and location.
FACTS:
Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc.
(Sta. Lucia) is the registered owner of several parcels
of land all of which indicated that the lots were located
in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig.

The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not

segregated, but a commercial building owned by Sta.
Lucia East Commercial Center, Inc., a separate
corporation, was built on it.
Upon Pasigs petition to correct the location
stated in TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the
Land Registration Court, on June 9, 1995, ordered the
amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with
respect to TCT No. 39112 were located in Barrio
Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City.
On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition for
the settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig
before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City (Antipolo
RTC).
On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint,
against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate
taxes, including penalties and interests.
Sta. Lucia alleged that it had been religiously
paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its
predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue of the demands
and assessments made and the Tax Declarations
issued by Cainta on the claim that the subject
properties were within its territorial jurisdiction.
Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the
suspension of the proceedings, and claimed that the
pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for the settlement
of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig,
presented a prejudicial question to the resolution of
the case.
The RTC denied this holding that the TCTs were
conclusive evidence as to its ownership and location.

The RTC granted Pasigs motion in an Order and

modified its earlier decision to include the realty taxes
due on the improvements on the subject lots. The
Court of Appeals added that the boundary dispute
case presented a prejudicial question which must be
decided before x x x Pasig can collect the realty taxes
due over the subject properties.
In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals
declared that there was no proper legal basis to
suspend the proceedings. Elucidating on the legal
meaning of a prejudicial question, it held that there
can be no prejudicial question when the cases involved
are both civil.
ISSUE:
W/N the resolution of the boundary dispute between
Pasig and Cainta would determine which local
government unit is entitled to collect realty taxes from
Sta. Lucia
RULING: YES.
The Local Government Unit entitled
To Collect Real Property Taxes
The Court of Appeals held that the resolution of
the complaint lodged before the Pasig RTC did not
necessitate the assessment of the parties evidence on
the metes and bounds of their respective territories. It
cited our ruling in Odsigue v. Court of Appeals wherein
we said that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence
of both its ownership and location.
Certificates of Title as
Conclusive Evidence of Location

While we fully agree that a certificate of title is

conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does
not preclude the filing of an action for the very
purpose of attacking the statements therein. Although
it is true that Pasig is the locality stated in the TCTs of
the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta aver
that the metes and bounds of the subject properties,
as they are described in the TCTs, reveal that they are
within Caintas boundaries.

CASTILLO vs REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 182980
2011
(LAND REGISTRATION CASE)
DOCTRINE:
The non-compliance with the requirements prescribed
in Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26 is fatal. Hence, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition
for reconstitution.

On 3 October 2003, the trial court promulgated its

Decision in favor of Bienvenido. The RTC ordered the
Register of Deeds for the province of Bulacan, upon
payment of the prescribed fees, to reconstitute the
original copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 16755
and to issue another owners duplicate copy thereof, in
the name of the registered owner and in the same
terms and conditions as the original thereof, pursuant
to the provisions of R.A. No. 26, as amended by P.D.
No. 1529, in lieu of the lost original copy. The new
original copy shall in all respects be accorded the
same validity and legal effect as the lost original copy
for all intents and purposes. Provided, that no
certificate of title covering the same parcel of land
exists in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned.

Bienvenido filed on 7 March 2002 a Petition for

Reconstitution and Issuance of Second Owners Copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16755. (Facts of the
case contain contents of petition (exhibits, etc.)

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its

Notice of Appeal. The OSG stated that it was grave
error for the trial court to order reconstitution despite
absence of any prayer seeking such relief in the
petition and on the basis of a mere photocopy of TCT
No. T-16755. Counsel for Bienvenido filed a motion for
early resolution on 25 January 2006.

The Trial Courts Ruling

The Appellate Courts Ruling

FACTS:

On 23 October 2007, the appellate court rendered its

Decision which reversed the 3 October 2003 Decision
of the trial court. Bienvenidos counsel withdrew from
the case on 11 October 2007 and was substituted by
Mondragon and Montoya Law Offices.

NO.

The appellate court ruled that even if Bienvenido failed

to specifically include a prayer for the reconstitution of
TCT No. T-16755, the petition is captioned as In re:
Petition for Reconstitution and Issuance of Second
Owners Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T16755, Bienvenido Castillo, Petitioner. The prayer for
such other reliefs and remedies just and proper under
the premises is broad and comprehensive enough to
justify the extension of a remedy different from that
prayed for.

Process of Reconstitution of

ISSUE:

W/N the RTCs order of reconstitution was valid

RULING:

The petition must fail. There can be no reconstitution

as the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
present case.

Transfer Certificates of Title under R.A. No. 26

Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 enumerates the sources from

which transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted

Bienvenido already admitted that he cannot comply

with Section 3(a) to 3(e), and that 3(f) is his last
recourse. Bienvenido, through Fernandos testimony,
presented a photocopy of TCT No. T-16755 before the
trial court. The owners original duplicate copy was lost,
while the original title on file with the Register of
Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan was burned in a fire on 7
March 1987. The property was neither mortgaged nor
leased at the time of Bienvenidos loss of the owners
original duplicate copy.

The non-compliance with the requirements prescribed

in Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26 is fatal. Hence, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition
for reconstitution. We cannot stress enough that our
jurisprudence is replete with rulings regarding the
mandatory character of the requirements of R.A. No.
26. As early as 1982, we ruled:

Republic Act No. 26 entitled An act providing a special

procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates
of Title lost or destroyed approved on September 25,
1946 confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of
First Instance to hear and decide petitions for judicial
reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the special
requirements and mode of procedure that must be
followed before the court can properly act, assume and
acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and

grant
the
reconstitution
prayed
for.
These
requirements and procedure are mandatory. The
Petition for Reconstitution must allege certain specific
jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must be
published in the Official Gazette and posted in
particular places and the same sent or notified to
specified persons. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act
provide specifically the mandatory requirements and
procedure to be followed.

We cannot simply dismiss these defects as technical.

Liberal construction of the Rules of Court does not
apply to land registration cases. Indeed, to further
underscore the mandatory character of these
jurisdictional requirements, the Rules of Court do not
apply to land registration cases.