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10/15/2015 12:30 AM

Copyright 2015 by Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal and Vision Research Institute. All
rights reserved. Authors permission is needed for re-producing and/or quoting any portion (except the
quotes from other authors). For referring, the following content should be included: Vimal, R. L. P. (2015).
Extended Dual-Aspect Monism framework: Criticisms addressed. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and
Consciousness
Research
[Available:
http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2015-Vimal-eDAMCriticisms-Addressed-LVCR-7-4.pdf ], 7(4), 1-26. Added to Academia and Research Gate: Added: 2015-10-15
T 04:29:16 UTC. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.4292.6806. [Recent update: Thursday, October 15, 2015, 12:30 AM].
This article started in 2014. Comments and suggestions are most welcome and should be emailed to
rlpvimal@yahoo.co.in .

Extended Dual-Aspect Monism framework: Criticisms addressed

Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal
Vision Research Institute, 25 Rita Street, Lowell, MA 01854 USA

Running head: Discussion of criticisms against eDAM framework

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Abstract
Previously, we proposed an extended version of dual-aspect monism (eDAM) framework
for consciousness. Here, consciousness is defined as the mental aspect of a state of brainsystem or brain-process, which has two sub-aspects: conscious experience and conscious
function from the first person perspective. The eDAM framework has five components: (I)
Dual-aspect monism, where each entity-state has inseparable physical and
qualitative/mental aspects and the potentiality of primary irreducible subjective
experiences (SEs) pre-exists in Nature. (II) Dual-mode: There is a conjugate matching
between stimulus-dependent-feed-forward-signals-related-mode and cognitive-feedbacksignals-related-mode and then the selection of a specific SE by the self. (III) Varying
degrees of manifestation of aspects depending on the levels of entities and contexts. (IV) The
necessary conditions of consciousness, such as the formation of neural-networks,
wakefulness, reentry, attention, information integration, working memory, and so on. (V)
The segregation and integration of dual-aspect information. The eDAM framework: (i) has the
least number of problems, (ii) supports conscious artifacts, (iii) attempts to address the
hard problem of consciousness (how SEs arise), (iv) is consistent with psychophysical,
biological, and physical laws, (v) addresses the objections raised in Biological Naturalism by
traditional views (dualism and materialism), (vi) is parsimonious; and (vii) can be tested
scientifically. In this article, the possible criticisms against the eDAM framework are
addressed rigorously.

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1. Introduction
There are about forty meanings attributed to the term consciousness, which were
identified and categorized according to whether they were principally about function or
about experience (Vimal, 2009). An immediate advantage of this categorization is that it
makes clear what materialism can do and what it cannot do. Materialism may explain
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Keywords: Easy and hard problems of consciousness, functional and experiential aspects
of consciousness, materialism, Biological Naturalism, dual-aspect monism, segregation and
integration (or binding) of information, emergence, functional integration, access and
phenomenal consciousness, necessary conditions of consciousness, reentry, attention,
memory and neural correlates of consciousness

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functions but cannot explain experiences. In other words, this categorization sets the clearcut limit for materialism. The optimal definition (that has the least number of problems) of
consciousness is: consciousness is the mental aspect of a state of the brain-system or a
brain-process, which has two sub-aspects: conscious experience and conscious function
(Vimal, 2010b). In other words, consciousness (a) has functional and experiential aspects
and (b) includes functions and subjective experiences (SEs) (including feelings, emotionand thought-related experiences).

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1.1. The first component of the eDAM framework: Dual-Aspect Monism

This component is detailed in (Vimal, 2008b). Concisely, it was hypothesized that a state
of an entity (from an elementary particle to human brain to whole universe) has two 6
aspects: (i) mental aspect such as SEs from the first person perspective (1pp) for living
systems or qualitative aspect for both living and non-living systems, and (ii) objective
physical aspect such as neural-network and its activities from the third person perspective
(3pp). Moreover, the eDAM framework proposes that the potentiality of primary irreducible
SEs pre-exists in Nature. The 3pp-physical aspect of an entity-state is manifested in both
living and non-living systems. Our hypothesis is that the superposition of relevant potential
experiential eigen-states is a mental-state, which is a part of the mental aspect of a state of
a living system or the qualitative aspect of state of a living/non-living system.

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1.2. The second component of the eDAM framework: the dual mode and conjugate
matching and selection mechanisms
This is elaborated in (Vimal, 2010a). Concisely, the potentialities (possibilities) of SEs are
actualized when neural-networks are formed, and a specific SE is selected by the self via a
matching process through the interactions of two dual-aspect modes. These two modes are:
(1) the non-tilde mode that has the inseparable qualitative/mental aspect and the physical
aspect of a state of feedback signals related to cognition (such as memory and attention)
and the self in a neural-network (that includes self-related brain-areas such as cortical
midline structures), which is the cognitive nearest past approaching towards present; and
(2) the tilde mode that has the inseparable qualitative/mental aspect and the physical
aspect of a state of the feed forward signals due to external environmental input and/or
internal endogenous input, which is approaching towards present (or will become present)
and is a entropy/time reversed representation of the non-tilde mode.
Furthermore, one could argue that there are quantum (such as dendritic-dendritic
microtubule) sub-pathway and non-quantum (such as classical axonal-dendritic neural
and astroglial) sub-pathway in the feed forward pathway and the feedback pathway for
information processing and transfer in the brain dynamics.
We propose that: (i) the quantum conjugate matching (between experiences in the
qualitative/mental aspect of a state of signal in the tilde mode and that in the non-tilde
mode) is related more to the qualitative/mental aspect of a state of the quantum subpathway and less to that of the non-quantum sub-pathways. And (ii) the classical matching
between experiences in the qualitative/mental aspect of a state in the tilde mode and that
of the non-tilde mode is related to the qualitative/mental aspect of a state in the nonquantum sub-pathways.
In all cases, a specific SE is selected by the self (not by any homunculus) (a) when the
tilde mode interacts with the non-tilde mode to match for a specific SE, and (b) when the
necessary conditions of SEs (Section 1.4) are satisfied. When the conjugate match is made
between the two modes, the world-presence (Now) is disclosed; its content is the SE of
subject (self), the SE of objects, and the content of SEs. The self is the 1pp-mental aspect of
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a state of self-related neural network (such as cortical midline structures) and its activities
that is a part of reentrant feedback signals during wakefulness (and to the some extent
during dream). The physical aspects in the tilde mode and that in the non-tilde mode are
matched to link structure with function, whereas the qualitative/mental aspect in the tilde
mode and that in the non-tilde mode are matched to link experience with structure and
function. In all cases, the inseparability between aspects and the 1-1-1 relationship among
structure-function-experience are maintained during the experience and related function.
The concept of functional field is used in (Cacha & Poznanski, 2014). In consciousness
electromagnetic information field (Cemi field) theory, experiences are presumably from the
1pp-mental aspect of a state of dual-aspect electromagnetic (em) field: what Chalmers
terms experience [(Chalmers, 1995).p.201] is what complex information encoded in em
fields feels like from the inside (McFadden, 2002). These fields may have many potential
states related to experiences in superposed form embedded in the field. In that case, it
would still be non-conscious processing and then gap remains. However, if these
frameworks use the essential matching and selection mechanisms of the eDAM framework
to select one specific SE after matching along with necessary conditions of consciousness to
be satisfied (Section 1.4), then the gap will be closed.

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1.3. The third component of the eDAM framework: the concept of the varying
degrees of the manifestation of aspects depending on the levels of entities and
contexts
This is discussed in (Vimal, 2013). Concisely, the third component is the varying degrees
of the manifestation of physical aspect and qualitative/mental aspect depending on the levels
of entities and contexts. In inert (nonliving) entities at classical level, such as a molecule,
the physical aspect of its state is from the objective 3pp and the degree of its manifestation
is high. The qualitative/mental aspect includes (a) forms, patterns of distribution of
matter/energy in space and time, and/or patterns of vibrations for both living and nonliving systems as qualitative aspect (Pereira Jr., Vimal, & Pregnolato, 2015), and (b)
superposed potential eigen-states related to SEs for living-system. The mental aspect of a
state of a living-system is from the 1pp and the physical aspect is from the objective 3pp.
This implies that (a) the qualitative aspect, such as forms and patterns, can be perceived or
implicitly inferred from 3pp, but (b) the mental aspect of a state of a non-living system is
latent to us from 3pp. This does not mean that nonliving systems have consciousness like
us that is hidden; rather, the qualitative/mental aspect of a state of a nonliving entity
carries potential proto-experiences (PEs) in superposed form as a Natures mechanism for
the pre-existence of potential SEs. We perceive the form, pattern of distribution of
matter/energy in space and time, and/or pattern of vibration (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015)
related to an inert entity, which indicates the existence of its qualitative aspect; so, it is
better to use the term qualitative aspect (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015) in place of mental aspect
for non-living systems to avoid confusion; for the same reason, we use 1pp-mental aspect
for conscious states and mental aspect for non-conscious states.
Both physical and qualitative/mental aspects of the states of nonliving systems (such as
strings, elementary particles, atoms, molecules etc.) need to co-evolve to attain our brainmind system. Biological organisms can be conscious if the organisms evolutionary
development is sufficiently developed or complex and necessary conditions of
consciousness are satisfied (Section 1.4). In living systems, at human level, when we are
awake and conscious, both aspects are present with high degree of manifestation. In other
words, inert nonliving matter, proteins, neurotransmitters and neuromodulators including
all those levels which do not satisfy the necessary conditions of consciousness will not be
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conscious. This does not mean that the eDAM is not sympathetic to quantum
consciousness. In quantum dendritic-dendritic mechanism, quantum Orch OR is
hypothesized to occur in microtubule-network (Hameroff & Penrose, 2014), where a specific
SE say redness is selected from potential SEs embedded in brains spacetime geometry by
objective reduction (collapse) of potential SEs superposed in the qualitative/mental aspect
of a state of neural-network. It is only at the neural-network (NN) level (in living systems), a
specific SE will be realized (experienced) in a specific NN (such as redness will be actualized
in the red-green V8/V4/VO-neural-network) when (a) the necessary conditions of
consciousness (including biological laws, see Section 1.4) are satisfied and (b) a specific SE
(such as redness) is selected by the self via the matching process.
Even the retina is not privileged to have SEs because it does not satisfy the essential
conditions of consciousness, although retina is essential for vision. The retinal opponent
and non-opponent neural-networks (such as red-green and yellow-blue opponent cells and
luminance non-opponent cells and related visual channels), however, will have higher
specificity for potential experiences (mental aspect) than cones and rods, which in turn will
have higher specificity than molecules, atoms, and electrons.
Let us start examining aspects from humans to classical inert entities to quantum
entities to sub-quantum strings. If we assume that a state of entity-in-itself has
inseparable dual (qualitative/mental and physical) aspects, then a state of human-inherself has physical aspect (such as body-brain system and its activities) and mental
aspect (such as SEs, intentions, self, attention, functions, and other cognitions). The states
of animals and birds have physical aspects (such as body-brain system and its activities)
with high degree of manifestation, but their mental aspects seem to be of different degree
() of manifestation compared to humans. The states of plants have physical aspects such
as their roots to branches and activities, and their qualitative/mental aspects in term of
functions; it is unclear if they have experiences, self, attention, and other human-like
cognitions; they may have plant-type PEs, but they are latent to us. The states of dead
bodies (of human, animals, birds, and plants), inert entities, and other classical macro,
micro (such as elementary particles), and ultra-micro (strings) entities have the physical
aspects with high degree of manifestation; they have certain forms, patterns of distribution
of matter/energy in space and time, and/or patterns of vibrations (qualitative aspect)
(Pereira Jr. et al., 2015); but, their mental aspects are latent. By the term latent, we mean
that the aspect is hidden, unexpressed, invisible, recessive (in analogy to recessive gene),
or unmanifested.
For quantum and sub-quantum entities, the manifestation of aspects needs further
clarification: we are puzzled on the 3pp as we are unable to visualize and we depend on our
models and indirect effects. The qualitative aspect of a state of a quantum or a subquantum (such as string) entity is presumably its form and/or patterns of vibration (Pereira
Jr. et al., 2015). Therefore, we propose that a state of a quantum entity has physical aspect
with high degree of manifestation; and qualitative/mental aspect similar to classical inert
objects. However, quantum latent mental aspect is not like human mind; rather, Stapp
(Stapp, 2001, 2007; Stapp, 2009) has proposed that quantum entities are mindlike. We
propose that the quantum or sub-quantum mindlike qualitative aspect (form and/or
patterns (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015)) has to co-evolve with its inseparable physical aspect over
billions of years, and the end product is human mind (mental aspect) and inseparable
human brain (physical aspect), respectively. The above clearly elaborates the difference
between living and nonliving systems.

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1.4. The fourth component of the eDAM framework: necessary conditions of

consciousness
The necessary conditions of consciousness are developed in (Vimal, 2015b).
Consciousness can be either phenomenal (non-reportable) or access (reportable)
consciousness (Block, 2005; Lamme, 2003). For access (reportable) consciousness, the
interactions are between feed forward stimulus dependent signals and fronto-parietal
feedback attentional signals. Attention and the ability to report are not necessary for
phenomenal consciousness.
The necessary conditions for access consciousness are (i) formation of neural-networks,
(ii) wakefulness, (iii) reentrant interactions among neural populations, (iv) fronto-parietal
and thalamic-reticular-nucleus attentional signals that modulate consciousness, (v)
information integration in complex of neural-network, such as thalamocortical complexes
with critical spatiotemporal grain-size (Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) as summarized in
(Vimal, 2015a), (vi) working memory that retains information for consciousness, (vii)
stimulus contrast at or above threshold level, and (viii) neural-network PEs that are
superposed potential SEs embedded in a neural-network as pre-cursors of SEs. Certain
neural-network or brain complex, such as thalamocortical complex, comparatively has
very high integrated information (), so it is a privileged area for consciousness. The
criterion for the selection of necessary conditions is that if any of them is missing, we will
not have consciousness.

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1.5. The fifth component of the eDAM framework: segregation and integration of
dual-aspect information
This is elaborated in (Vimal, 2015a) in detail. Concisely, there are two stages: (i) the
segregation of information for the analysis of specific stimulus attribute and then (ii) the
integration of information for the synthesis of all attributes (related to dimension, submode, and mode), which results unified consciousness. In other words, the first stage of
processing is the segregation of information (such as the information related to physical
and conceptual attributes), which are analyzed and processed for preciseness and
specificity in different specialized neurons of related brain areas. Then, the second stage of
processing is the integration of information (or binding of attributes) (related to different
functions, concepts, experiences and so on) in various neural-network-complexes, which
results unified consciousness.
The integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009;
Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) is based on the materialistic identity theory (consciousness is
integrated information). However, materialism metaphysics has serious problems (Vimal,
2010b, 2013). Therefore, IIT needs to be interpreted in terms of better metaphysics, such as
the eDAM framework; this has the least number of problems; here, information is a dualaspect entity.
In the eDAM framework, consciousness (both experiential aspect such as SEs including
feelings, emotion- and thought-related experiences and functional aspect such as related
functions) is the 1pp-mental aspect of a state of related neural network (neural-network:
such as thalamocortical main complex) that has high amount of integrated mentalinformation mental. The 3pp-physical aspect of this state is this neural-network and its
activity as its neural substrate that has high amount of integrated physical-information
physical, which is close to the term integrated information used in (Tononi, 2004, 2008,
2012) and (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009). Since 1pp-mental and 3pp-physical aspects are
inseparable, mental and physical information related to the same brain-mind state are
also inseparable.
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Furthermore, the quality of consciousness is determined by the set of all the

informational relationships generated by the matching and selection mechanisms of the
eDAM framework. The quantity of unified consciousness as a whole (a) is above and beyond
its parts and (b) is related to the amount of information integrated through the matching
mechanism (Section 1.2) (that involve interaction between feed forward and feedback
signals) in a complex of elements.

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2. Models, Results, and Discussion

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2.1. Quantum superposition, nature of consciousness, pre-Big Bang hypothesis, and

the degree of manifestation of aspects
[1]. Critique could argue that there is no motivation or explanation as to what quantum
superpositions have to do with experiential states and how they would explain anything
about the nature of consciousness.
This can be addressed as follows: A state related to the fundamental irreducible SE (such
as redness: a primary color experience) is a basis or an eigen-state. The superposition of
multiple possible experiential states is motivated by the hypothesis the mental or
qualitative aspect of wave-state is wave-like/mind-like (Bohm, 1990; Stapp, 2009) and is a
function of potential (proto-)experiences, which is based on the hypothesis that a state of
matter (wave/particle) has inseparable physical and qualitative/mental aspects. According
to the principle of superposition, = i ai i, where is a state of an entity and ai is the
probability amplitude of ith basis or eigen-state i. In other words, this is how the preexistence of the potentiality of SEs in Nature is implemented and transmitted across all
manifestations of unmanifested primal entity.
In living system (such as our brain-mind system), the 1pp-mental aspect of an awake
conscious brain-mind state is manifested with high degree () of the manifestation because
we have conscious SEs. However, in non-living system (such as elementary particles) that
has qualitative aspect (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015) in the eDAM framework, the mental aspect
of a state of an entity-state is latent (or unmanifested) to the extent that materialists
assume matter is the only fundamental reality, which eventually leads to serious problems
such as the well-known explanatory gap problem (Levine, 1983). The gap cannot be closed
unless we accept the potentiality of experiences pre-exist in Nature. The living and nonliving systems are all parts of Nature, so this potentiality of experiences must pre-exist in
each of them. If non-living matter does not have qualitative aspect even in
latent/unmanifested form (not a single trace of it in proto-form or not even a potential for
experiences), then it is unclear from where, how, and when living organisms will acquire
the high degree () of the manifestation of 1pp-mental aspect when they are awake and
active. Furthermore, the development of specificity of a SE in a specific neural network
(such as color in V8/V4/VO area) is detailed in (Vimal, 2008b).

In the eDAM framework (Sections 1.1-1.5), (i) the process of observing involves the
matching and selection mechanisms, (ii) the observer (the self or SE of subject (Bruzzo &
Vimal, 2007)) is the 1pp-mental aspect of the state of self-related integrated information,
and (iii) the observed (SE of object) is the 1pp-mental aspect of the state of object-related
integrated information. Furthermore, the hard problem of consciousness is clearly
addressed in (Vimal, 2015a) using all five components of eDAM framework.

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[2]. My working hypothesis is as follows: (A) The unmanifested state of Nature (primal
entity) had both inseparable (physical and qualitative/mental) aspects latent before Big
Bang in pre-Big Bang cosmology.
However, critiques could argue that according to the standard theory of the Big Bang,
there is no time before the Big Bang, as time itself started with the Big Bang (about 13.72
billion years ago (Krauss, 2012)).
To address this critique, the following justifications are given for the hypothesis of preBig Bang cosmology:
(i) As per Healy, Wheeler [((Wheeler, 1979): p.440)] stresses that in the quantum
domain, spacetime, and hence time itself, cease to exist, except as an [classical]
approximation (Healy, 1984).1 This seems to imply that we need to reconsider the onset
of time.
(ii) In relativity, time can vary from to + similar to spatial dimensions (x, y, z).
This justifies time before Big Bang, where time is assumed to start (t=0) at Big Bang;
this assumption is inserted by hand for our convenience, i.e., it is not from the first
principle.
(iii) One could argue (Vimal, 2010e) that universe is cyclic from quantum BigBounce cyclic universe model (Ashtekar, Pawlowski, & Singh, 2006; Bojowald, Kagan,
Singh, Hernandez, & Skirzewski, 2007; Corichi & Singh, 2008) and may have memory
as some cosmologists hypothesize (Corichi & Singh, 2008), implying for the multiple
cycles of little Big-Bangs, and hence the notion of pre-Big Bang cosmology is justified.
(iv) There are significant recent researches on pre-Big Bang cosmology, such as
(Gasperini & Veneziano, 2007; Veneziano, 1998) and references therein. As per
Veneziano, Time did not have its beginning with the big bang and some pre-big bang
physics cooked up a good big bang from a more generic (less fine-tuned) initial state.
This is the attitude one takes in the so-called pre-big bang scenario. [] The Universe
started its evolution from the most simple initial state conceivable in string theory, its
perturbative vacuum. This corresponds to an (almost) EMPTY, COLD, FLAT, FREE
Universe as opposed to the standard DENSE, HOT, HIGHLY-CURVED initial state of
conventional cosmology. For this assumption to make sense I will have to argue that the
new initial conditions are able to provide, at later times, a hot big bang with the desired
characteristics thanks to a long pre-big bang inflationary phase (Veneziano, 1998).
Thus, the hypothesis of latent physical and mental aspects of unmanifested state of
Nature before Big Bang, and then the manifestations of aspects starting from the Big
Bang are justified.
(B) At the moment of Big Bang, first, the physical aspect of entity-state was manifested
along with its qualitative aspect (that includes form, pattern of distribution of
matter/energy in space and time, and/or pattern of vibration (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015)) via
co-evolution of aspects. The qualitative aspect refers to inert non-living or living system,
from which 1pp-mental aspect in living system evolved when consciousness arose (become
manifested) in the course of evolution. Therefore, we argue that the 1pp-mental aspect
related to the living system was initially not manifested because living systems were not
present. This means that the mental aspect was latent in qualitative aspect, i.e., the degree
of manifestation (or presence) of 1pp-mental aspect was 0 at the time of Big Bang until
life appeared around Cambrian Explosion (~540 million years ago (MYA)). The physical and
qualitative aspects co-evolved and become manifested as needed by evolution, natural
selection and adaptation; at the same time, but extremely slowly, the 1pp-mental aspect,
the part of qualitative aspect, co-evolved with its physical aspect (i.e., the degree of the
manifestation of the mental aspect slowly increased from 0): initially the qualitative aspect
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(that includes form, the pattern of distribution of matter/energy in space and time, and/or
the pattern of vibration (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015)) from string level to macro-inert level
because all entities from string to quantum to classical levels have forms and patterns
(Pereira Jr. et al., 2015) and eventually the 1pp-mental aspect in living systems become
manifested ( 1) such as in us when we are conscious (see Section 1.3 for further detail
for the varying degree of the manifestation of 1pp-mental aspect).

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2.2. Biology: structure, function, experience, and the doctrine of inseparability

between 3pp-aspect and 1pp-aspect
Biologist can ask the following questions: (i) how is the structure and function of biology
related to the 3pp-physical aspect (simply 3pp-aspect) and 1pp-mental aspect (simply 1ppaspect) of the eDAM framework, respectively? And (ii) how can the ecological requirement
of separability between structure and function be consistent with the doctrine of
inseparability between 3pp-aspect and 1pp-aspect?
To address these interesting questions, let us take a few concrete examples: (i) Hand is a
structure that has many functions: picking, destroying, creating, massaging, writing,
cutting, pushing, drawing, and so on: one structure and many functions. These functions
are related to motor action controlled by brain. (ii) On sensory side, for example, the
functions of V5-neural-network (many areas and many cells are involved) are the detection
and discrimination of motion; the functions of V8-neural-network are the detection of long
wavelength light and its discrimination from other wavelength lights: one structure and two
functions. And (iii) on both perception and motor action together: (a) the function of
Wernicke's area (BA22, posterior section of the superior temporal gyrus in the dominant
cerebral hemisphere) is the understanding of written and spoken language: one structure
and one function. (b) The function of Broca area (BA44 and BA45 or inferior frontal gyrus in
the dominant cerebral hemisphere) is speech production: two structures and one function.
A brain has a large number of functions. Thus in general, structure (brain areas) to
function relationship seems to be one-to-many, one-to-one, many-to-one (and perhaps also
many-to-many 2) relationship. Furthermore, although it is unclear, but one could argue for
1-1 relationship for structure-function relationship if a neural-network is considered
(instead of areas) as a structure (that contains one or more brain areas) for a specific state
at specific simultaneous moment.
To make the doctrine of inseparability clearer, consider one worst case example related
to biological function that is known to be separable from its neural correlates because of
the lack of 1-1 relationship and has 1-many relationship (one structure and many
functions as elaborated above in (i)). Consider the function of hand for the function

[3]. Critiques could argue that this is a completely ad hoc stipulation. There is no reason
given why the degree of manifestation (or presence) of one aspect grows. What is the
explanatory gain here?
I argue that this stipulation is motivated by an empirical fact of evolution of our universe
from Big Bang to over billions of years: one could argue for the co-evolution of qualitative
aspect for inert non-living systems over billions of years, but there is no evidence of 1ppmental aspect for living system until around Cambrian Explosion, which is about 540 MYA
(Hameroff, 1998). The qualitative aspect and the 1pp-mental aspect are related, i.e., the
1pp-mental aspect is the subset of and evolved from qualitative aspect, both co-evolved
with the related physical aspect. The explanatory gain is that it explains how our 1ppmental aspect of mind-brain state co-evolved with its physical aspect and manifested from
the qualitative aspects of states of inert-entities along with their physical aspects.

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picking up a coffee cup. Once this function creates a brain-mind state then the 1pp-aspect
(picking up function) and 3pp-aspect (its neural correlates) must remain inseparable until
the function is completed. If we disturb the link, physically, we will never able to pick up
the coffee cup. In other words, the inseparability doctrine is for a specific state of the brainmind state and for the critical time interval needed to complete the required function.
During this interval, the integrity between 1pp and 3pp aspects must be maintained,
otherwise function cannot be completed. In other words, a structure such as a hand can
have many functions, but for a specific function, there is just one specific neural
correlate(s) of function (NCF); this specific NCF (3pp-physical aspect) and related function
(1pp-mental aspect) must remain inseparable, otherwise the function will never be
completed.
On perception side, if detection or discrimination function is considered from 1pp, then
one could argue for perceptual-functional-aspect being a subset of 1pp-aspect, with related
NCF as its 3pp-aspect. In that case, can we say, structure and function (related to
perception) are inseparable for a specific state at specific simultaneous moment? The
answer is yes because a specific function must have its specific NCF that must be tightly
linked; otherwise this specific function will not be completed; and hence in this sense the
1pp and 3pp aspects are inseparable. The ecological requirement of separability between
structure and function is to make the function latent from the structure as if it appears
separate and let ecology to try another function with that structure to find if it fits better;
this can be done when a structure is not engaged in performing a specific function. Ecology
does not require separating function from structure, otherwise function and structure will
become two independently existing entities and ecology then has to solve major association
problem of the interactive substance dualism: how to associate innumerable functions with
innumerable structures?
On other hand, for the experiential aspect of consciousness, the 3pp-aspect and 1ppaspect of a state of brain-mind system related to experiences are always in 1-1 relationship
for a specific brain-mind state at specific simultaneous moment, where the 3pp is now
neural-network that involves many areas active as NCC related to the specific 1pp-aspect
(such as experience redness). Since we cannot find any method to separate 1pp-aspect
and 3pp-aspect, they are inseparable. Thus, we can write:
There is a strong 1-1 relationship between 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect

(1)

There is no empirical method to separate 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect

(2)

Thus, Eqs. (1) and (2) hold for both experiences and functions. Furthermore, a higher
level function can be considered as the integration of information related to lower level
functions. For example, the detection of moving red ball can be considered as integration
of information related to the functions such as the detection of motion, the detection of
color, and the detection of shape i.e., integrated information related to micro-functions (f
like Tononis ). Similarly, one could argue for the unified experience of moving red ball
can be considered as the integrated information related to the micro-experiences (e) such
as the experience of motion, the experience of color (redness), and the experience of shape
(roundness). One could argue that the unified experience may not be the integration of
micro-experiences, rather it is the integration of information related to micro-experiences:
try hard to imagine unifying the micro-experiences.
To sum up, (i) 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect of a specific state for experiences and
functions are inseparable because of clear 1-1 relationship; (ii) it is possible to categorize
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1pp-aspect (consciousness) in two sub-aspects: perceptual-function (such as the detection

of long wave-length light) and experience (such as redness); (iii) the unified perceptualfunctional aspect of consciousness can be considered as the integrated information (f)
related to micro-functions; and (iv) the unified experiential aspect of consciousness can be
considered as integrated information (e) related to the micro-experiences. We can
compare biological function and structural aspects with 1pp and 3pp as follows:

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2.3. Conceptual Analysis of 1pp and 3pp

We propose a conceptual (CA) analysis to prove precisely the inseparability of 1pp-aspect
(= 1pp-mental aspect in the eDAM framework as per Eq. (4)) and 3pp-aspect (= 3ppphysical aspect in the eDAM framework as per Eq. (6)) in terms of following premises:
(1). A structure such as brain can have many states. However, at any particular
moment, brain will have a single specific state.
(2). Information in the 1pp and the 3pp is conserved; it is the same information
expressed (viewed) in two different perspectives (in analogy to the same information
interpreted in two different languages).
(3). From Eq. (1), there is a tight and strong 1-1 relationship between 1pp-aspect and
3pp-aspect.
(4). From Eq. (2), there is no empirical method to separate 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect.

Biological function = (1pp perceptual function) + (motor action function)

(3)

1pp aspect = (1pp experiential sub-aspect) + (1pp perceptual functional sub-aspect)

= 1pp-mental aspect in the eDAM framework
(4)
Biological aspect = (1pp aspect) + (motor action functional aspect)

(5)

Structural aspect = (3pp aspect) = 3pp-physical aspect in the eDAM framework

(6)

Some biologists do not like to use the term mental aspect, especially for non-living system.
Therefore, instead, they can use biological aspect as in Eq. (5) for living systems and
qualitative aspect for all systems. In other words, the first component of eDAM can
hypothesize that: (i) the biological 1pp-aspect of a state of an entity is inseparable from the
related 3pp-physical aspect and (ii) SEs potentially pre-exist in Nature. A biological aspect
includes functional and experiential sub-aspects from the 1pp in addition to motor-action
functional aspect; and the related physical aspect is a brain-structure (neural-network) and
its neural activities from the 3pp. Consciousness is defined as the biological 1pp-aspect of a
state of brain-system or brain-process, which has conscious functional and conscious
experiential sub-aspects from 1pp. An aspect represents a concept. Functional concepts
weakly emerge and subjective concepts strongly emerge (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015) from the
above interactions. Moreover, (strong) emergence has been unpacked in terms of the
matching and selection mechanisms of the eDAM framework in (Vimal, 2013). The process
of matching involves the interaction of bottom-up feed forward signals with top-down
reentrant cognitive feedback signals; once the matching is accomplished, the self via the
selection process of the eDAM framework selects a specific SE from all potential experiences
embedded in the correlated neural network; these two processes unpack the mysterious
(strong) emergence. The process of embedding is accomplished through co-evolution, codevelopment, co-tuning between the biological and physical aspects along with neural
Darwinism.

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(5). Each state can be viewed in two perspectives (1pp and 3pp) with the same
information expressed in two different perspectives. Let me make clearer by taking a
concrete example: When I see ripe-tomato, I experience redness in my 1pp. At the same
time, let us suppose that you are measuring my brain-activities in the redness-related
neural-network (NN) specifically area V8 (say using fMRI), which is my 3pp-aspect of the
same redness-related state of my brain. In other words, the 1pp-aspect is redness and the
3pp-aspect is its NCC at a specific moment and at the specific state. From CA-premise (4),
it is not possible to separate these two perspectives 1pp and 3pp, which are for the same
brain-mind state at the same specific moment (1pp and 3pp exist simultaneously). Ecology
(brain-environment interactions) does not separate 1pp and 3pp aspects of a specific brainmind state because it is not needed and these aspects are co-evolved and tightly linked
thorough brain-environment interactions. If we suppose that somehow one is able to
separate, then it would entail two different substances leading to dualism.
(6). If 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect of a specific brain-mind state at a specific moment are
separated, then association problem arises: how to associate 1pp-experiences with the
correct 3pp-NN, whereas there are many 3pp-NNs. The ecosystem ecology must have solved
the huge problem of association by not separating the aspects of a specific brain-mind state
at a specific moment and by doing its job when a structure is not engaged in performing
any of its functions.
(7). Conclusion: from CA-premises (1)-(6), 1pp and 3pp are inseparable.

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2.4. Conceptual (Qualia) space in the eDAM framework

As per Pereira Jr. & Almada (Pereira Jr. & Almada, 2011), conceptual spaces: (i) are
constructed from empirical data, (ii) represent the universe of mental states, (iii) are
semantic structures, (iv) characterize a universal state space of human consciousness,
where all possible kinds of human conscious states could be mapped (Pereira Jr. &
Almada, 2011), (v) provide correlations between dimensions (Grdenfors, 2000), implying
coherent patterns of brain-activity, (vi) are defined as theoretical entities that can be used
to explain and predict various empirical phenomena concerning concept formation

Remarks: (i) In this conceptual analysis, the inseparability between 1pp-aspect and 3ppaspect is for a specific moment and for specific brain-mind state. If we compare the 1ppaspect of brain-mind state A with the 3pp-aspect of brain-mind state B at different times,
then 1pp-A and 3pp-B can be separated.
(ii) Hard problem is how to explain 1pp-experiences.
(iii) Ecology is the study of interactions among organisms and their environment
scientifically; for example, the study related to organisms having interactions with each
other and with their abiotic environment. Ecology does not need to separate 1pp-aspect and
3pp-aspect; rather, it promotes inseparability as useful doctrine. In other words, since 1ppaspect and 3pp-aspect are for the same specific brain-mind state and for the same
simultaneous moment, ecology does not separate 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect. Ecology
takes time to change 3pp-structure depending on the interaction between organism (such
as brain) and the environment. But then 1pp-aspect co-evolves, co-develops, and co-tunes
with its 3pp-structure, while maintaining the integrity of 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect to
solve the association problem and makes sure that 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect are tightly
associated for a specific brain-mind state at a specific moment, otherwise, these evolution
and ecological processes would be unreliable and useless.
(iv) The biological term function is equivalent to the philosophical term 1pp-mental or
1pp in above conceptual analysis and structure is equivalent to 3pp-physical or 3pp.

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((Grdenfors, 2000) p. 31), and (vii) are prepared by the concepts of lived experiences. In
addition, (viii) the properties of objects are regarded as perceptual invariances that are
located in conceptual spaces, and (ix) neuro-astroglial interactions are proposed as the
neural basis of information integration (Pereira Jr. & Almada, 2011).
Moreover, (x) as per Tononi (Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012), each quale corresponds to an
activation of the qualia-space by causal brain mechanisms, i.e., SEs are constructed from
brain activities. This seems to contradict the hypothesis of the pre-existence of potentialities
of all possible experiences (related to brains of all humans, all animals, conscious robots
and so on) in qualia-space (Q) (Stanley, 1999), as also elaborated in the eDAM framework
(Section 1.5 and (Vimal, 2015a, 2015c)).
As per Stanley (Stanley, 1999): (xi) the fact that our physical universe U is itself a
topological space strongly suggests that Q will also be a topological space (Stanley, 1999).
(xii) Qualia-space is connected with respect to the variation of intensity from 0 to maximum
for a specific experience. (xiii) Linearity holds in qualia-space to some extent. (xiv) Any
physical phenomenon has an experiential counterpart (Stanley, 1999). (xv) Qualia-space
has innumerable (uncountably infinite) dimensions/coordinates. (xvi) Qualia-space is
separable; brain-space is also separable; in other words, the points in each space are
separable. (xvii) If two points (conscious mind-states related to redness vs. painfulness) are
of different phenomenal type, they are orthogonal; but redness and blueness (same color
phenomenal type) are not orthogonal although they are linearly independent. (xviii) The
dimension of a space is the minimum number of parameters or coordinates necessary to
specify a point (equivalently, the maximum number of linearly independent elements) in the
space. (xix) Qualia-space has the structure of a closed pointed cone in an infinitedimensional separable real topological vector space (Stanley, 1999). Furthermore, (xx) one
could argue that the International Commission on Illumination (CIE) 1931 RGB (Vimal,
Pokorny, & Smith, 1987) or CIE 1931 XYZ color space for color vision is a color subspace
of qualia-space.
In the eDAM framework, there are two inseparable aspects of a state of an entity (such
as brain-mind system) and hence there are two kinds of spaces, each with a set of
coordinates: first set is related to 3pp-physical aspect in brain-space B of all possible brains
(Stanley, 1999) and second set is for 1pp-mental aspect in qualia-space Q. In other words,
there are two types of conceptual spaces: brain-space and qualia-space. Similarly, a brainmind state has inseparable brain-state and mind-state. Furthermore, (i) the coordinates for
3pp-physical aspect (call it brain-state) in brain-space B are: x, y, z, t; physical properties
(such as mass, charge, spin); frequency, amplitude, and the phase of physical information
related to the 3pp-physical aspect of a state of brain fields (such as electromagnetic and
dendritic fields); neural networks and their activities; and so on. In other words, a point in
brain-space is the 3pp-physical aspect of a brain-mind state, such as a specific neuralnetwork and its activities, which is the NCC of a specific SE. (ii) The coordinates for 1ppmental aspect (call it mind-state) in qualia-space Q are: SEs such as primary color
experiences (redness, greenness, blueness); feelings such as emotional feelings (happiness,
sadness etc.), and so on. In other words, a point in qualia-space is the inseparable 1ppmental aspect of the brain-mind state, such as a specific SE. Since these aspects are
inseparable, the mapping B Q is isomorphic, i.e., 1-1 relationship from brain-space B to
qualia-space Q and vice-versa (see also Appendix 1 of (Stanley, 1999)).
For example, in rightward moving red ball, the dual-aspect brain-mind state has two
inseparable aspects: 3pp-physcial aspect (brain-state) and 1pp-mental aspect (mind-state);
each of them has their own space: (i) The coordinates of the brain-state located as a point
in brain-space are: the cortical representation of x, y, z, t, and the mass of ball in color,
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motion, and shape related neural networks as the 3pp-physical aspect of the brain-mind
state in brain-space B. (ii) The coordinates of the mind-state located as a point in qualiaspace as the inseparable 1pp-mental aspect of the same brain-mind state are: SEs redness,
rightward motion, and roundness of ball in qualia-space Q. There is 1-1 isomorphic
relationship between 3pp-physical aspect (neural-network and its activities) and
inseparable 1pp-mental aspect (the related unified experience).
In other words, there are two kinds of spaces: (i) A brain space contains all different
brain-states (each brain-state has a neural-network and related activities as the 3ppphysical aspect of a brain-mind state). A brain is considered simply as a finite collection of
particles with specified positions and momenta; the position and momentum of these
particles can be described as a single point in a configuration space (Appendix 1 of
(Stanley, 1999)); this represents a brain-state in the brain-space. (ii) A qualia-space is a
quotient space and contains all experiences (mind-states: each is the 1pp-mental aspect of
the same brain-mind state); this represents a mind-state in the qualia-space. There is 1-1
relationship between the elements of these spaces, i.e., 1-1 relationship between a brainstate and related mind-state; brain-state and mind-state are inseparable 3pp-physical and
1pp-mental aspects of the same brain-mind state, respectively. This entails that two brainstates are equivalent if their SEs (mind-states) are identical.
One could argue that the brain-state is composed of sub-states (such as related to
neural-networks for color, motion, and shape); each sub-state corresponds to a point in the
brain-space. Therefore, the state of the brain corresponds to a volume in the brain-space.
Each point of the brain-space represents one and only one sub-state of the brain. Similarly,
one can argue for the mind-state related to unified experience in qualia-space.
This critique is addressed as follows: A macro-brain state can be considered as the
superposition of many potential sub-states (basis- or eigen-states), such as, related to
motion, color, and shape in an example of moving red ball. Even a sub- or eigen-state
(such as related to color experience redness from 1pp) has NCC (such as redness-related
V8-neural-network and its activities from 3pp) and must have its inseparable 1pp-mental
and 3pp-physical aspects.
There are two pertinent cases: the information related to eigen-experiences is integrated
for a single unified experience, which is (a) irreducible if components coincide in spacetime; otherwise, (b) it may be reducible to its components if objects are at different locations
in the visual field.
In case (a), the volume in the brain-space has three sub-states (related to motion, color,
and shape) (3pp-physical aspect), but the experience is a single unified irreducible
experience of moving red ball (1pp-mental aspect). This is related to a macro brain-mind
state, which has (i) macro brain-state located at a separate point in the brain-space and (ii)
inseparable unified experience or macro mind-state located at a separate point in qualiaspace, which may not be reducible to its three components. In other words, the mind-state
for unified experience is also a point in qualia-space, which has its own NCC; i.e., a unique
brain-mind state with 1pp-mental aspect and 3pp-physical aspect because a unified
experience is an irreducible experience.
In case (b), if unified experience is reducible into its components (such as objects being
at different locations in the visual field), the macro brain-mind state is consistent with (b). A
region of a conceptual space (brain-space or qualia-space) is a volume corresponding to an
n-tuple of values for the coordinates. The unified experience is linear sum of its
components in qualia-space; and the macro brain-state is linear sum of its sub-states in
brain-space; the macro brain-state corresponds to a volume in brain-space; and the related
unified experience corresponds to a volume in qualia-space.
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2.5. Non-conscious and conscious processing and the doctrine of inseparability

One could argue that it is unclear how the eDAM framework distinguishes the nonconscious and conscious processing.
Non-conscious processing in a brain related to non-conscious functions and experiences
is a major processing and the consciousness is just a tip of the iceberg. During nonconscious processing, a specific neural network related to a specific function or for a
specific experience is still not yet completely formed; the needed collection or assembly of
various neurons in global workspace (Baars, 2005; Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998)
is still going on; it is not completed yet; the related information integration is still in the
process. When information integration and matching and selection processes are
completed, a conscious brain-mind state is created. Once this state is created then the
inseparability doctrine certainly holds; after that we cannot separate conscious function or
conscious experience from its neural correlates.
The issue of inseparability-separability during non-conscious processing can be
addressed as follows: The mental and physical aspects of each entity-state are inseparable
in the eDAM framework, although the degree of manifestation of the mental aspect varies
with the level of entity or entity-state; qualitative aspect includes form, pattern of
distribution of matter/energy in space and time, and/or pattern of vibration (Pereira Jr. et
al., 2015) and mental aspect; the mental aspect of an inert entity-state is latent to us from
3pp. The degree of manifestation of mental aspect of a state in non-conscious entity may
vary with its level: when we are not conscious during deep sleep, the for the related
mental aspect of the brain-mind state is lower compared to the for a dream-state; the
for the dream-state is lower than that for an active conscious state. In the non-conscious
brain-mind state of a dynamic neural-network at a given moment should also have
inseparable mental and physical aspects, although in the next moment new neurons may
associate to or dissociate from this dynamic unstable network. After all, a state of each of
the components of this network (such as inert electrons and neurotransmitters) has
inseparable qualitative/mental and physical aspect at a given moment. The hard problem is
not present during non-conscious processing; the hard problem of consciousness arises
when we are conscious.
In other words, since a specific conscious state and related neural-network is in the
process of formation during non-conscious processing, neurons come and go in working
memory (global workspace) until the matching of stimulus-dependent feed forward signals
with cognitive feedback signals and then the selection of a specific SE by the self are
completed. This is a part of non-conscious mental aspect-2 of the Triple-Aspect Monism
(TAM)3 (Pereira Jr., 2013, 2014), which, in the eDAM framework, can be considered as the
mental aspect of the non-conscious state of mind-brain system with < 1. There is no need
to postulate it as a separate parameter in a framework (such as in triple aspect
frameworks) because it unnecessarily decreases the degree of parsimony as per Occams
razor. This is where the eDAM framework differs from the TAM: the TAM has three separate
aspects; whereas, the eDAM framework has accommodated them in two aspects. It is just
matter of opinion and terminology in my view. Otherwise, both frameworks are
complementary to each other. The major point is the introduction of a novel feature, such
as the potentiality of experience, in Nature, which traditional sciences (including biology)
have missed that caused the hard problem.
To sum up, the eDAM can easily distinguish between conscious and non-conscious
mental activities as follows: (i) As per eDAM, a conscious brain-mind state has inseparable
qualitative/mental aspect (such as conscious experience redness from 1pp) and 3ppphysical aspect (such as its NCC: V8-neural net); both aspects are manifested. This is
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based on our observation in fMRI experiment, where a subject consciously look at visual
pattern from the 1pp and we, as experimenters, view and record fMRI activations in various
brain areas from the 3pp simultaneously. (ii) A non-conscious brain-mind state also has
inseparable physical aspect and qualitative/mental aspect. The physical aspect is
manifested but the degree of manifestation of its mental aspect varies (degree of
manifestation varies between zero and 1) depending on the levels/states of brain. For
example, in deep sleep, we are mostly unconscious so the degree of manifestation of
mental aspect is lower than that in dream, which is lower than that in wakefulness. This is
based on EEG experiments. At the highest state of consciousness (such as samadhi-state)
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2.6. Functional integration

Traditional biologists view: Since traditional biology deals only with structure and
function, some biologists can hypothesize that functions or integration of functions are
experiences because they may think that both (functions such as the detection of long
wavelength light) and SEs (such as redness) are functions of the related structures.
Poznanski (personal communication) agrees this traditional view but he proposes that
biology cannot explain SE per se through the standard structure and function dichotomy.
What is required is a mathematical or abstract link. This link is based on the idea that SE
is a functional field (with matching and selection mechanisms: Section 1.2), i.e., SE is not
a function.
Alternatively, both the eDAM and TAM frameworks propose a novel feature that the
potentiality of primary irreducible SEs pre-exists in Nature. Currently, this feature is
missing in biology and that is why biology cannot address the hard problem to the
satisfaction of everybody. The mathematical link/separation seems equivalent to the mental
aspect being latent and the physical aspect manifested with high degree of manifestation
for non-living and non-conscious systems in the eDAM framework.
Furthermore, a function or functional integration can create only functions, but it
cannot create an experience. This is because primary experiences are not derived entities;
they are primary irreducible entities; they are realized from the potentiality of SEs that preexist in Nature through the matching and selection mechanisms (Section 1.2). For example,
the function such as the detection of a wavelength of light can be accomplished at
photoreceptor level in retina (Vimal, Pokorny, Smith, & Shevell, 1989). We know that retina
does not experience color. Color experience is accomplished at higher cortical level such as
visual area V8 (Hadjikhani, Liu, Dale, Cavanagh, & Tootell, 1998). Thus, different neural
correlates may be involved for a function and for the related experience; this implies that
the detection-function is not going to create the related experience. In other words, retina
can integrate the information related to function such as detection of lights (such as long
wavelength light); this function detection does not create experience (such as redness) in
retina. This is because retina does not satisfy all the necessary conditions of consciousness
(Section 1.4). Moreover, there is a contradiction in the hypothesis that a function or the
integration of functions can create experiences: for example, retinal cells (such as +L-M
ganglion cells) can integrate information embedded in neural signals related to functions
(such as detections of long wavelength (L) and middle wavelength (M) lights by L and M
retinal cones) but cannot create experiences (such as redness or greenness) in the retina.
Moreover, one could argue the functions such as detection and discrimination are
accomplished at cortical level depending on the functions; for example, orientation selective
cells are at cortical level (Gur, Kagan, & Snodderly, 2005; Vimal, 1997), but the related
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experience may involve different mechanisms, such as matching and selection mechanisms
(Section 1.2).
Biologists can argue that we all know that the brain creates experiences not the retina.
However, if an experience is the integration of related function, it should be true anywhere
in biological system unless one agrees that necessary conditions of consciousness (Section
1.4) need to be satisfied as well. I am just trying to make a point that materialistic nonreductive functionalism (an experience is the related functional integration, where matter is
assumed to be non-experiential) has serious problem unless we interpret it in dual-aspect
or triple-aspect frameworks such as in the eDAM or in the TAM frameworks.
One needs to understand that our frameworks (such as eDAM and TAM) assume the
potentiality of experiences in Nature, i.e., in the mental aspect of an entity-state in the
eDAM framework or in the non-conscious and conscious mental aspects in the TAM. This is
something novel we are trying to introduce that is not present in the traditional biology,
chemistry and physics. This fact should be taken seriously then only we will be able to
address the hard problem of consciousness.
Let us unpack functional integration with an example. It seems that there are many
micro-functions and we want to integrate them to get a unified macro-function. For
example, the detection functional task of moving red ball has three micro-functions
(motion, color, and shape) each with its own neural-network (NN). Our goal is integrate
these three functions to detect the unified function of moving red ball. How do we integrate
these three functions? It seems that integrating functions does not make much sense. It is
the dual-aspect information that needs to be integrated: for example, the dynamic physical
information for functions related to color, motion, and shape in neural signals need to be
integrated. The mental aspect of information carries information related to the potentiality
of 1pp-SEs. The physical aspect of information is carried by neural signals, which is
integrated through neural signal interactions. In IIT (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2008), the system
is functionally integrated if it does not decompose into weakly connected modules or into
disconnected pieces and the elements are tightly and optimally bound by the recurrent
architecture with multiple feedback loops embedded in the system; architectures that
balance functional specialization with functional integration generate complex dynamics for
high information integration. Furthermore, both aspects co-evolve, co-develop, and co-tune
to keep inseparability intact. In other words, the neural signals from neural-networks of
color, motion, and shape need to interact in reentrant manner until the integrated
information (Tononis f for function) related to this detection function is above critical
threshold value. This is what I mean when I say it is the information in neural signals
related to functions needs to be integrated, not functions themselves. Since we cannot
integrate consciousness, we cannot integrate functional and experiential sub-aspects of
consciousness either. Integrating functional interactions may create only a unified function,
but not an experience. The story is same for experiences.
I distinguish functions from experiences because I believe that science needs to include
the novel feature of potentiality of experience in Nature. Traditional biology has only
structure and function, but does not have experiences. Poznanski is also moving beyond
the traditional biologist viewpoint and he calls it integrationist view point that uses
functional field with matching and selection mechanisms (Section 1.2), which involves the
integration of functional interactions ((Cacha & Poznanski, 2014)). We, however, propose
that biologists should consider the pre-existing potentiality of SEs in Nature: this is the
major proposal of both the eDAM and the TAM frameworks. Without this proposal and
without inseparability doctrine for conscious brain-mind state, it is not possible to address
the hard problem because the gap will never be closed.
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2.7. The eDAM framework for both non-living and living systems, and the doctrine of
inseparability
Some biologists could comment that the eDAM framework applies only to nonliving
matter because the qualitative/mental and physical aspects are inseparable. This is
because the aspects need to be separable in living matter (for ecology ecosystem); and in
nonliving matter the dual-aspect is non-existent because (a) we do not feel its mental
aspect in non-living systems as we do for living systems and (b) structure and function are
inseparable in non-living systems; so the eDAM framework is pure mysticism to a biologist.
This is incorrect. Let me ask: when we are awake and conscious, can we separate the
1pp-mental aspect (such as SE redness) from its 3pp-physical aspect (its NCC: redness
related V8/V4/VO color neural-network and its activities) of a state of color neuralnetwork? The answer is certainly NO. The physical and qualitative/mental aspects are
inseparable in both living and nonliving systems. To avoid criticism from biology and
physics, the terms mental aspect is used for living systems, 1pp-mental aspect when the
living system is conscious, mental aspect when the living system is non-conscious, and
qualitative aspect instead of mental aspect is used for nonliving systems. The physical
and qualitative/mental aspects are for looking the same information in two different
perspectives: 1pp and 3pp. For example, while I experience the redness of ripe-tomato in
1pp, if you open up my brain or if you do fMRI you will see my V8/V4/VO color neuralnetwork and its activities in 3pp, but you will never see the ripe-tomato or its redness in
my brain. How can you separate them out? This is impossible. The mental aspect, in
nonliving system, is latent. The meaning of latent is hidden (that is why it may be
mysterious to those who do not understand the eDAM framework fully), in analogy to
recessive gene is hidden when it is not expressed; when it becomes manifested then its
related trait is visible; we can only perceive qualitative forms/patterns of nonliving systems
in 3pp. There should be consistency between nonliving and living entities as in evolution.
For this, we use an index related to the degree of the manifestation of aspects, which
varies with the levels of entities and contexts (Section 1.3). We propose that the mental
aspect is latent in nonliving entities and manifested when we are awake and conscious. The
variation of the degree of manifestation of mental aspect from latent in nonliving systems
to high degree of manifestation in conscious living systems shows continuity between
entities as expected in evolution.
The latent qualitative/mental aspect of a state of a nonliving system carries essential
information: it carries the eigen-states and eigen-values related to potential PEs/feelings,
and proto-cognitions (that are precursors of real primary SEs/feelings, and real primary
cognitions, respectively) in superposed form; without these indispensable information, we
cannot have consciousness.
Some biologists may argue: since structures (such as brain-neural-networks and their
activities) are matter, they follow physical laws; whereas their related functions are
biological so functions obey biological laws; therefore, a structure and the related function
are separable based on obeying different laws. However, this is different from the doctrine
of inseparability, where both a brain-structure and the related function follow biological
laws because they are correlated and tightly linked over billion years of co-evolution, so
1pp-function and 3pp-structure of the same brain-mind state within critical temporal
interval are inseparable. In other words, a brain-mind state at any moment has two
perspectives or aspects: 1pp-mental and 3pp-physical aspects; these two aspects are
inseparable because the 1pp-mental aspect must be inseparably linked to 3pp-physcial
activities (3pp-physical aspect) in a brain for proper brain-functioning. This is achieved
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through co-evolution, neural Darwinism, sensory-motor interaction with environment

during development; they better be inseparable; otherwise, all these evolutionary and
developmental processes will be unreliable.

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2.8. Materialistic emergence framework vs. eDAM framework

As per materialistic emergence framework (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Neves, 2010;
LaRock, 2013), the experiential aspect of consciousness is an emergent phenomenon, closer
to neuroscience, which is the result of dynamic interactions between widely distributed
neuronal groups in thalamocortical neural-networks (Edelman, 2003). One could also
argue that consciousness is simply neural activity or integrated information (identity
framework), so mysterious emergent phenomenon is not needed. However, both these
materialistic frameworks have the problem of explanatory gap (Levine, 1983): how
experience can emerge from or identical with non-experiential matter such as brain and its
activities, processing, or integrated information.
Furthermore, in materialistic emergentism (Fingelkurts et al., 2010; LaRock, 2013), the
hypothesis is that SEs somehow emerge in neural-networks (Vimal, 2008a); but, precisely
how SEs emerge is not clear. We have tried to unpack emergence in the eDAM framework
in (Vimal, 2013), which hypothesizes that a specific SE does not really emerge from nonexperiential matter such as brain; rather, it is selected from the potential SEs embedded in
a specific neural-network (as memory traces formed during neural Darwinism) by the self
during the interaction between feed-forward and feedback signals in the neural-network by
the matching process (Section 1.2) and experienced by the self. This is extended in terms of
information integration (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009; Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) in a complex
of neural-network, where the measure or degree of integration () is higher than critical
threshold for consciousness as summarized in (Vimal, 2015a).

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2.9. Information integration for linking structure, function, and experience

One could argue that although consciousness is unified it is not a process and so
consciousness as a biological phenomenon cannot be integrated.
To address this critique, we need to be clear about the term integration. In my view, we
have many brain-areas, many signals related to many attributes of stimuli, many
representations in many brain-areas, many sensory modes (such as visual, auditory, and
so on), many sub-modes (such as color, motion in visual mode) in a mode, and many
dimensions (such as red, green in color) in a sub-mode; they all need to interact for spatialtemporal-modal unification; these interactions entails the integration of related
information. If we turn our eyes around, we see many features in our visual field in space
and time, which have representations in many areas; they all need to be integrated for

Furthermore, some investigators criticize that aspects in dual-aspect monism framework

are context dependent and hence they could be infinite: the aspects in dual-aspect
monism are not a priori given, but depend on epistemic issues and contexts. Distinctions of
aspects are generated by epistemic splits of the distinction-free, unseparated domain, and
there are as many aspects as there are contexts. It should also be mentioned that the
restriction to two aspects is a matter of simplicity rather than canonical. For instance, for
Spinoza the number of possible aspects is infinite (Atmanspacher, 2012). In the eDAM
framework, this problem is addressed by eDAM-component (III) (Vimal, 2013): the degrees
of manifestation of aspects varies depending on the levels of entities and contexts; however,
the number of aspects in a specific entity and a specific context always remains two, and
both qualitative/mental and physical aspects are inseparable.

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unified conscious SEs and functions. This also includes the first-person experience of time
or phenomenal time and its biological correlates that are elaborated in (Vimal & Davia,
2008, 2010). In this sense, the information related to functional and experiential aspects of
consciousness (Section 1; see also (Vimal, 2009, 2010b)) are integrated in the brainstructure (Vimal, 2015a) for proper linking of the triad: structure, function, and experience.
Some biologists can argue that only biological organisms (not robots) can be conscious
(Cacha & Poznanski, 2014) because it is the evolutionary development of biological
organism that is sufficiently developed or complex. Let us look at this claim more closely.
By consciousness, we mean SEs (including feelings, emotion- and thought-related
experiences) and functions. As per materialism based functional integration hypothesis,
biological organisms evolved from non-experiential matter that does not even have potential
for experiences. So how can these biological organisms have experiences? It will be gross
violation of the fundamental assumption of materialism. Therefore, we need to reject all
materialism-based frameworks. If we assume matter has potential for experiences (such as
in consciousness as functional integration) then we are implicitly accepting dual-aspect
monism.
Some biologists can then further argue: how can these biological organisms have
experiences through functional interactions, where functional interactions represent the
ontological embodiment of epistemological aspects of complex adaptive systems like our
brains? My reply is: if we interpret functional interactions and integration in terms of the
eDAM framework then biological organisms can have experiences without any problem as
elaborated in Section 2.6.
If we consider consciousness as independent entity and brain another independent
entity (as in interactive substance dualism metaphysics), then again the integration of
information is needed, but leads to serious association problem as elaborated in (Vimal,
2010b, 2013). Materialism also needs the integration of information embedded in physical
signals and assumes that somehow experiences emerge from or identical with integrated
information, but then the serious explanatory gap problem arises as discussed before.
Idealism metaphysics (mind is the fundamental reality) implies mental integration of
information related to many mental features in 1pp and then assumes that 3pp-physical
features somehow arise from them; this has problems reverse of materialism. Only in the
eDAM framework, problems do not arise because the mental aspect of a state of an entity is
inseparable from the physical aspect of the same entity-state. Thus, physical integration
immediately and faithfully entails mental (functional) information integration and vice
versa. In other words, all types of metaphysics require information-integration.
Furthermore, a complete theory of everything should also include consciousness, which
can be accomplished in the eDAM framework as elaborated in (Vimal, 2010c, 2010d,
2010e).

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2.10. Quantum mechanics (QM) and consciousness

Can we use wave-particle duality and other principles of QM to explain consciousness?
Wave-particle duality description in QM is controversial at present time; some reject
particle theory, some reject wave theory, and some use wavicle theory (wave-particle as two
sub-aspects of wavicle).
Pessoa Jr. (Pessoa Jr., 2001) seems reluctant to accept the hypothesis of consciousness
is an essentially quantum effect based on materialism due to the lack of evidence. However,
if it is correct, then it may be through the wave-particle duality (or collapse) criterion
because the decoherence washes out entanglement of many particles, biological condensate
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lacks strong evidence of its existence, and quantum field theory is speculative. On the other
hand, the collapse of the wave function as an actualization of potentialities may be useful.
In my view, both wave and particle are sub-aspects of energy/matter in current QM,
which is just the part of 3pp-physical aspect of a state of an entity in the eDAM framework.
We are proposing to change the materialistic view of QM (Pessoa Jr., 2001) that is based on
non-experiential quantum entities, by introducing the pre-existence of the potentiality of
experiences in Nature (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015). The eDAM framework introduces this
through the inseparable 1pp-mental aspect of the state of the same entity. The potentiality
of experiences is introduced: (a) in the functional field for the biophoton field theory (Cacha
& Poznanski, 2014), (b) in the electromagnetic (em) field for Cemi field theory (McFadden,
2002), and (c) in the spacetime geometry, where local field potentials generated by
dendriticsomatic membranes give rise to EEG and coherent gamma synchrony, or
mitochondrial electromagnetic fields for Orch OR framework (Hameroff & Penrose, 2014).
All kinds of entities are parts of Nature. It seems that different frameworks are telling (more
or less) the same or similar story in different ways. The QMs superposition principle and
quantum conjugate matching are used in Section 1.2 and (Vimal, 2010a) because they are
less controversial.
Currently, QM has over 50 interpretations (Pessoa Jr., 2001) (based on materialism,
interactive substance dualism, or idealism) and there is no consensus; however, so far,
there is no interpretation based on dual-aspect monism (especially based on the eDAM
framework) or triple aspect frameworks. Similarly, there are many frameworks of
consciousness, which are trying their best to address the hard problem of consciousness
and there is no consensus either. Since one controversy cannot be used to explain another
controversy, it is unclear if QM cannot explain consciousness and vice-versa. A better
strategy is: first, address the hard problem by a framework that has the least number of
problems and that is scientifically parsimonious, reliable, credible, and viable (Vimal,
2015c) and also scientifically testable (Vimal, 2015a), such as the eDAM framework
(Sections 1.1-1.5). Then, interpret QM based on this framework. While doing that, we may
encounter problems in such framework for consciousness; then resolve those problems and
try again. By this process of trial and error (going back and forth many times), we may have
a better chance to understand the fundamental truth about both QM and consciousness.

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2.11. Information processing, interactionism, Tononis IIT, and the eDAM framework
Critiques can argue that consciousness in artificial constructs based on information
theory with algorithmic information processing is unlikely to occur because (i) the
subcellular interactions of energy fields do not process information, (ii) biological laws are
non-computational in nature, (iii) 'information processing' assumes algorithms exist
that can replace interaction with computation, and (iv) IIT does not disclose how this
integration comes about.4 Instead, the integration is through the interaction () between
feed forward (FF) and feedback signals (FB); this interaction entails consciousness (C) as an
integrated version of FF and FB. In other words, FFFB = C cannot be traced back to
FFFB; C takes on a new form that is integrated through interaction; this can be called
interactionism (Cacha & Poznanski, 2014). It does not follow that C > FF+FB (whole is
greater than sum of its parts), but FFFB C where the arrow is one way. Once integrated
it is not possible to get back FF or FB as it remains as a new form C. One could further
argue that the framework of (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008), based on the integrated
information in discrete dynamical systems, seems incompatible with the physics of
consciousness (Cacha & Poznanski, 2014). For example, a continuous electrically charged
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flow of information is carried by the neuro-electromagnetic field across synapses and within
neurons.
The above critique revolves around the irreducibility of conscious SEs. The IIT of Tononi
and colleagues ((Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009; Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012)) is the materialism
based identity theory (integrated information is consciousness), which certainly has
problems including explanatory gap problem. However, I have interpreted IIT in the eDAM
framework (Vimal, 2015a), where the irreducibility of SEs is always maintained because (a)
the eDAM proposes that the potentiality of primary irreducible SEs pre-exists in Nature
(Section 1.1) and (b) the brain processes such as matching (involved in interactionism) and
selection mechanisms further elaborate how a specific irreducible SE is matched and
selected (Section 1.2). Furthermore, information is everywhere including information in
subcellular interactions of energy fields, electromagnetic fields, functional fields, conscious
fields, and both living and nonliving systems. Information is processed in both feed forward
(FF) and feedback (FB) systems, which then matched during interaction. The interaction
between FF and FB signals implies that there is information transfer and processing
between FF and FB systems. In the eDAM framework, information is a dual-aspect entity;
this implies physical information as its physical aspect, and mental information as its
mental aspect. The matching and selection brain processes of the eDAM framework explain
how C (consciousness such as a SE) arises from the interaction of FF and FB as
summarized in (Vimal, 2015a) without violating any biological laws. One could argue that
when brain processing becomes clearer, we are able to think better how C arises. And
hence we can write a sort of flow-chart in step-by-step fashion (as done in (Vimal, 2015a)),
which is a sort of algorithmic computation involving information processing. In this way, we
can try making conscious robots (Vimal, 2015c) to test the framework if it is correct. The
term non-computational seems to entail strong emergence as well and has the mystery of
how consciousness can occur. Once this mystery is uncovered then we can write computer
program. One such mystery is the potentiality of pre-existence of experiences in Nature that
was not present in previous materialistic computational theories and created controversy
over computational and non-computational views. However, if all mysteries behind noncomputational are disclosed, non-computational argument can be addressed and conscious
artifacts can be made as long as they satisfy the necessary conditions of consciousness
(Section 1.4). One could argue that engineers do not have to worry about noncomputationality of consciousness too much because a state of a silicon chip is also a dualaspect entity, which is a part of Nature as well and hence has the potentiality of preexistence of experiences.
Furthermore, (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008)s framework, as they seem to acknowledge,
certainly needs to be extended to continuous dynamical systems. Moreover, the
requirement of dynamic (temporal) continuity (analog type signal) is somewhat misleading
concept because it is classical physics concept. We have quantum physics underlying
classical physics, which is, by definition, quantum or digital; below quantum physics, we
have Planck level physics (which is considered bottom most level), which is also digital with
Planck time as the digital unit of time; below this level, time is unclear. In a brain, the
temporal information processing is in msec range, which is digital unit of time. As per
Persinger (personal communication), the occurrence of a discrete amount of energy (~21020 J) within an about 1 msec duration has stimulated the concept of digital information
within the brain. Here, the term digital is used as an equivalent of all-or-none
characteristics of the axon potential, which can be argued to be the discrete energies of the
action potential coupled to punctate vesicle release. Furthermore, temporal continuity can
be approximated by digital signals with appropriate temporal interval of critical temporal
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grain-size (threshold); within this interval, information usefully keeps on integrating (Vimal,
2015a). Thus, the eDAM based IIT addresses the criticisms of this Section.

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3. Conclusions
(1) Consciousness is defined as the mental aspect of a state of mind-brain system or
brain-process, which has two sub-aspects: conscious experience and conscious function from
the 1pp.
(2) A materialism based framework for consciousness (Crick & Koch, 2003) does not
solve the hard problem, but makes the problem clearer.
(3) An alternative to materialism is the eDAM based framework for subjective conscious
experience, which has five components:
(I) Dual-aspect monism: The qualitative/mental and the physical aspect of a state of
any entity (elementary particle to neural-network to whole universe) are inseparable in
dual-aspect monism (Section 1.1 and (Vimal, 2008b)). The qualitative/mental aspect of an
entity-state includes (a) forms, patterns of distribution of matter/energy in space and time,
and/or patterns of vibrations for both living and non-living systems as qualitative aspect,
and (b) superposed potential eigen-states related to the potential primary irreducible SEs in
superposed form as a medium for the indispensable pre-existence of the potentiality of
experiences for living-system and/or conscious artifacts.
(II) Dual-mode and matching and selection mechanisms: There is a conjugate
matching between stimulus-dependent-feed-forward-signals-related-mode and cognitivefeedback-signals-related-mode and then the selection of a specific SE occurs and
experienced by the self (Section 1.2 and (Vimal, 2010a)).
(III) Varying degrees of manifestation of aspects depending on the levels of entities and
contexts: The degrees of manifestation of aspects vary depending on the levels of entities
(from human living system to nonliving inert entities) and contexts (Section 1.3 and (Vimal,
2013)). The qualitative/mental aspect includes (a) forms, patterns of distribution of
matter/energy in space and time, and/or patterns of vibrations for both living and nonliving systems as qualitative aspect, and (b) superposed potential eigen-states related to SEs
for living-system. This implies that (a) the qualitative aspect, such as forms and patterns,
can be perceived or implicitly inferred from 3pp, but (b) the mental aspect of a state of a
non-living system is latent to us from 3pp. The mental aspect is from 1pp (for living
systems) and the physical aspect is from the objective 3pp.
(IV) The necessary conditions of consciousness: The necessary conditions for access
(reportable) consciousness are: the formation of neural-networks, wakefulness, reentry,
attention, information integration, working memory, stimulus contrast at or above
threshold, and potential experiences embedded in neural-network (Section 1.4 and (Vimal,
2015b)). Attention is not necessary for phenomenal (non-reportable) consciousness.
(V) The segregation and integration of dual-aspect information: The materialisms
identity theory based information integration theory is interpreted in terms of the eDAM
framework, where information is a dual-aspect entity (Section 1.5 and (Vimal, 2015a)).
(4) This eDAM framework is parsimonious and has the least number of problems
compared to all other frameworks (Vimal, 2015c).
(5) The eDAM framework is consistent with psychophysical, biological, and physical laws
(Section 2.2).
(6) The eDAM framework attempts to address the hard problem of consciousness (how
to explain SEs) (Vimal, 2015a).
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(7) (a) The eDAM framework can unpack Biological Naturalisms claims (such as brain
processes cause irreducible experiences, and consciousness can influence brain processes)
using the matching and selection mechanisms and the doctrine of inseparability,
respectively; and (b) hence it can address the objections raised in Biological Naturalism by
traditional views (dualism and materialism) without making category mistake (Vimal,
2015c).
(8) The eDAM framework can be scientifically tested: if we are empirically able to
separate the mental aspect (such as an experience) of a conscious brain-mind state and the
related physical aspect (its neural correlates) of the same conscious brain-mind state at a
specific moment of time or within critical temporal integration grain-size, then the doctrine
of inseparability will be rejected, and then the eDAM framework needs major modification
(Vimal, 2015a).

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Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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Acknowledgments

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References

The work was supported by VP-Research Foundation Trust and Vision Research Institute research Fund.
Author would like to thank anonymous reviewers, John R. Searle for email discussion on Biological
Naturalism and traditional views, Michael A. Persinger for reviewing his information in Section 2.11, Sisir Roy
for comments on information theory, Alfredo Pereira Jr., Roman R. Poznanski, Max Velmans, Nathan Faivre,
Marc H.E. de Lussanet, and Pankhuri Singhal for critical comments, discussion, and suggestions. Author is
also affiliated with Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, A-60 Umed Park, Sola Road, Ahmedabad-61, Gujrat,
India; Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, c/o NiceTech Computer Education Institute, Pendra, Bilaspur, C.G.
495119, India; and Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, Sai Niwas, East of Hanuman Mandir, Betiahata,
Gorakhpur,
U.P.
273001
India.
URL:
http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home.
Email:
rlpvimal@yahoo.co.in.

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Endnotes
1

As per Wheeler, the concepts of spacetime and time itself are not primary but secondary
ideas in the structure of physical theory. These concepts are valid in the classical
approximation. However, they have neither meaning nor application under circumstances
when quantum geometrodynamical effects become important. The one has to forego that
view of Nature in which every extent past, present, or future, occupies its preordained
position in a grand catalog called spacetime. There is no spacetime, there is no time, there
is no before, there is no after. The question what happens next is without meaning
((Wheeler, 1979): p.440).
2

As per Kelso (Kelso, 2012), Degeneracy means that at every conceivable level of
description, the same outcome or function can be achieved in many ways using different
components. [] The complement of degeneracy or functional equivalence is
multifunctionality: the same anatomical structures can play multiple functional roles. []
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Degeneracy and multifunctionality imply that there is no one-to-one mapping between

structure and function. This implies that many-to-many relationship is possible.
3

The Triple Aspect Monism (TAM) has three aspects: physical aspect (aspect-1), nonconscious mental aspect (aspect-2), and conscious mental aspect (aspect-3): At the lower
level, the system can be described as an ordinary physical-chemical-biological one, ruled by
causal relations that ultimately reduce to the four fundamental physical forces. At the
middle level, the system can be described as an information-processing system obeying the
rules of information theory. At the higher level, the system can be phenomenologically
described in terms of conscious experiences or presentations, which can be symbolically
represented (Pereira Jr., 2013).(p.321-2).

One could argue that information theory which people use in the context of biological
systems raise a lot of controversy for last decade or so. Shannon measure of information is
normally used but there are some serious conceptual problems, which are not solved yet.
Edelman and Tononi (Edelman & Tononi, 2000) deal with mutual information. However,
one should be careful before using Shannon or Fisher type of information measure in biosystems and consciousness studies.

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