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The Four Pillars of Russias Power

Narrative
a

Andrey Makarychev & Alexandra Yatsyk

a

University of Tartu, Estonia

Kazan Federal University, Russia

Published online: 12 Dec 2014.

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Power Narrative, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 49:4, 62-75,
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The Four Pillars of Russias Power Narrative

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Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk

The Winter Olympic Games in Sochi and the annexation of Crimea were
two major international events in which Russia engaged in early 2014. In
spite of all the divergence in the logic underpinning each of them, four
concepts strongly resonate in both cases. First, in hosting the Olympics
and in appropriating Crimea, Russia was motivated by solidifying its sovereignty as the key concept in its foreign and domestic policies. Second,
the scenarios for both Sochi and Crimea were grounded in the idea of
strengthening Russia as a political community through mechanisms of
domestic consolidation (Sochi) and opposition to unfriendly external
forces (the crisis in Ukraine). Third, Sochi and Crimea unveiled two
different facets of the logic of normalisation aimed at proving albeit by
different means Russias great power status. Fourth, one of the major
drivers of Russian policy in both cases were security concerns in Russias
southern anks, though domestic security was also an important part of
the agenda.
Keywords: Russian foreign policy, Sochi Olympics, annexation of Crimea

The crisis in Ukraine and the subsequent critical deterioration of relations between
Moscow and the West have reignited the otherwise diminished interest in Russia
and Eastern Europe all across the world. Most politicians and experts in Europe
and North America have admitted that the Russian offensive in Ukraine was an
eye-opening surprise for their governments, which underestimated the strength of
neo-imperial momentum in the Kremlins strategy. Henceforth, the academic community faces the challenge of understanding Russian intentions and policies properly, and translating the possible explanations into policy relevant language.
Of course, there exists an extensive literature that assesses the rise of the great
power ideology in Russian foreign policy discourse.1 However, the very concept of
power, as well as its variations (soft vs. hard power) remain largely understudied
in the Russian context. The same goes for the question of consistency in Russian
policies, exacerbated by the seemingly contrasting roles played by Russia as the
Andrey Makarychev is Professor at the University of Tartu, Estonia. Email: asmakarychev@gmail.com.
Alexandra Yatsyk is Associate Professor at Kazan Federal University, Russia. Email: ayatsyk@gmail.com
1
See, for example, Nygren, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia; Lucas, The New Cold War.
The International Spectator, Vol. 49, No. 4, December 2014, 6275
2014 Istituto Affari Internazionali

ISSN 0393-2729 print/ISSN 1751-9721 online

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The Four Pillars of Russias Power Narrative

63

Olympic host and as the supporter of armed separatism in Ukraine. Indeed, the
Kremlin started its interference in Crimea in February 2014 without even waiting
for the closure of the Sochi Olympics, an exorbitantly costly project aimed at
improving Russias image in the West and allegedly intended to capitalise on Russias soft power resources.2 These intentions were ruined by the appropriation of
Crimea and the constant military pressure on the government in Kyiv, followed by
the crisis in Russias relations with the West, including Russias expulsion from the
G8, the cancellation of business-as-usual relations between major Western powers
and Moscow, sanctions against Putins top loyalists, and the freezing of many
diplomatic tracks. Thus, attempts to integrate Russia in an international milieu
ended up marginalising and ostracising Russia. Against this background, it would
seem only natural to question any possible adherence of Russia to the prospects of
further international socialisation through the non-coercive soft power mechanisms
that constitute the core of the Wests integrative toolkit.
In the West, Russias policy toward Ukraine is widely perceived as a break with
Russias previous international commitments, and a disruption of the existing international order. The decision by Putin to annex Crimea ended the post-Cold War
era in Europe. Since the late Gorbachev-Reagan years, the era was dened by zigzags of cooperation and disputes between Russia and the West, but always with an
underlying sense that Russia was gradually joining the international order. No
more,3 deems a former US Ambassador to Moscow. However, as shall be argued
in the following analysis, the Russian government perceives its action in Ukraine as
a continuation rather than a cancellation of its previous efforts to rise up from its
knees. Developing approaches that have already been discussed by other Russia
analysts,4 in this article this continuity is interpreted through an analysis of the
ideas of sovereignty, consensus /unity, normalisation and security that are identied
as the four nodal points constitutive of the Kremlins hegemonic discourse. It is
through this prism that we shall explain the common denominators of Russias policies in Sochi and Crimea, two large-scale and far-reaching projects that embody
different facets of Russian power, grandeur and nationalism.
The claim is made that both cases are grounded in a similar type of political
imagery and aesthetics of power. As the Russian political commentator Sergey
Medvedev put it, the Sochi story is propagated as an epic myth from the miraculous award of the winter Games to this sub-tropical city to the even less
expected victory of the Russian team in the overall medal count. This epos, the
argument goes on, has been transformed into the celebration of Russias victory in

J. Radvanyi, Moscou entre jeux dnuence et demonstration de force, Le Monde Diplomatique, May
2014, http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2014/05/RADVANYI/50420.
3
M.A. McFaul, Confronting Putins Russia, New York Times, 24 March 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/03/24/opinion/confronting-putins-russia.html.
4
See, for example, Herd, Security Strategy.
2

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64

A. Makarychev and A. Yatsyk

Crimea a highly mythologised and sacralised territory, blending cultural appeal

with military glory.5
Methodologically, to substantiate the argument, a combination of two
approaches is used. One is based on the analysis of ofcial discourse as exemplied
by the key foreign policy speakers (President and Foreign Minister) and a group of
mainstream policy experts. The second approach intends to add arguments from
cultural studies, presuming that the cases of Sochi and Crimea are two major elements in Russias current identity building, being narrated and performed in a variety of ways. More specically, the focus is on the opening and closing ceremonies
of two major mega-events recently hosted by Russia the 2014 Sochi Winter
Olympics and the 2013 Universiade (World Student Games) in the city of Kazan
in order to identify the key elements of Russias nation-building narrative
addressed to a global audience.
Sovereignty

Bo Petersson rightly inscribes the Kremlins discourse on the Sochi Olympics in a

great power mythology that plays many roles,6 including the legitimation of Putins
autarchic regime and control over the inclusion/exclusion dynamics (i.e. dening
the criteria of belonging and loyalty to the national political community). This
myth of a revived sovereignty is grounded in the culturally archaic mentality7 reminiscent of repressive Soviet isolationism.8
The 2014 Olympics t nicely into the logic of sovereignty and provide additional evidence to support the argument of Russias great power ambitions. As
Angela Stern notes, Sochi has now become a symbol of how Russia is dening
itself as a unique civilization no longer interested in integration with the West.9
Sergey Markedonov adds that Putin considers the event to be a demonstration of
Russias post-Soviet potential and its growing role on the international stage, as
well as visible proof of its success in overcoming the political chaos that followed
the dissolution of the USSR.10 As the Olympic host, Russia was eager to show
itself off as a global player again.11 In a video shown at the opening ceremony of
5
S. Medvedev, Epicheskaya Sila: Dlia Chego v Rossii Voskreshayut Geroicheskiy Mif? [The Epic Force:
Why Russia Revives Its Heroic Myth], Forbes, 16 April 2014, http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/tsen
nosti/254795-epicheskaya-sila-dlya-chego-v-rossii-voskreshayut-geroicheskii-mif.
6
Petersson, Still Embodying the Myth?.
7
M. Berg, Russkaya Kultura Kak Prigovor [Russian Culture as a Verdict], Rufabula Web Portal, 14 April
2014, http://rufabula.com/articles/2014/04/14/russian-culture-as-adjudication.
8
J. Freedman, Russias New Culture War, The Moscow Times, 17 April 2014, http://www.themoscow
times.com/art_n_ideas/article/russias-new-culture-war/498278.html.
9
A. Stent, At Sochi, a High Bar for Putin, New York Times, 27 January 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/01/27/opinion/at-sochi-a-high-bar-for-putin.html?_r=2.
10
Markedonov, The 2014 Sochi Olympics, http://csis.org/publication/2014-sochi-olympics.
11
A. Rahr, Sochi 2014 and the Horizons of Global Politics, Valdai Club Web Portal, 23 January 2014,
http://valdaiclub.com/russia_and_the_world/66345.html.

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the Winter Games, Sochi is celebrated as a project comparable to the construction

of St. Petersburg by Peter the Great, a risk-taking challenge to nature and
geography.12
Seen from this perspective, Sochi, as a performative culmination of Russias sovereign comeback to the global scene, facilitated the legitimation of the annexation
of Crimea. This is how Putin himself explained it; in his words, the populace of
Crimea opted for a strong sovereignty that only Russia could provide.13 The
mythology of a retrieved sovereignty extends to the inextricable link between
Russian identity and Crimea and the reiteration of the historical metaphor of Kyiv
as the mother of Russian cities.
It is exactly the cultural underpinnings of the Crimean campaign that can
explain Putins extremely high approval ratings, demonstrating his perfect
understanding of Russias cultural specicity and appeal.14 Performative
dimensions of the idea of sovereignty are translated into the imagery of Putin as a
political super hero,15 an incarnation of strength, stamina and vigour. This representation of the president unveils biopolitical aspects of Russias conception of sovereignty that have dominated in Russian discourse since the commencement of
Putins presidency and that were visible in both Sochi and Crimea. Both narratives
are constructed as adventurous undertakings centred around the gure of the sovereign widely portrayed in the media as piloting a military jet plane, wrestling in
tatami, diving into the sea, playing ice hockey, riding a motocycle, etc. This exaltation of the centrality of the gure of the president, and in a broader sense attempts
to present him as a hero incarnating real masculine values t into a Russian tradition of personality cult and veneration of the national leader that dates back to
tzarist and Soviet times.16
The incremental actualisation of the idea of sovereignty in the Kremlinorchestrated discourse is grounded in its extra-legal characteristics. It is President
Putin himself both as the decision-maker and in his physical capacity who
guarantees and embodies Russias sovereignty. This serves at least two political purposes. First, as the case of Sochi makes clear, the sovereign rhetoric secures space
for exceptional decisions not necessarily driven by the logic of costs/benets
rationality. The fact that the budget of the Sochi Olympics exceeded all expenditures for previous Winter Olympics together did not prevent the Kremlin from
promoting it as a key national project. The incorporation of Crimea continues this
D. Moisi, Avec les JO, Poutine Joue la Place de la Russie Dans le Monde, Les Echos, 27 January 2014.
V. Putin, Obraschenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Address of the President of the Russian Federation], Kremlin.ru Portal, 18 March 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/20603.
14
M. Snegovaya, Kto My? Russkie v Poiske Natsii [Who Are We? Russians in Search of the Nation], Vedomosti, 21 April 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/25602951/russkie-v-poiskah-nacii?full#cut.
15
Y. Melamed, Krym Kak Film, Putin Kak Supergeroi [Crimea as a Movie, Putin as a Super Hero],
Gazeta.ru, 25 April 2014, http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/column/melamed/6003897.shtml.
16
The authors are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these historical parallels.
12
13

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A. Makarychev and A. Yatsyk

exceptionalism: the costs for absorbing this new region in 2014-17 are estimated at
814 billion RUR, that is 2.5 times higher than the 353 billion RUR budget for
the whole Far East of Russia until 2015.17
Second, Putins sovereignty implies a rather frivolous conception of legality. In the
case of Crimea, Russias territorial expansion was explained by the alleged necessity to
revamp the historical mistake made by Nikita Khrushchev, who decided to transfer
this peninsula to the jurisdiction of the Soviet Ukraine. The same goes for another
extra-legal explanation of Russias interventionist policies towards Ukraine: the
broadly understood concept of the Russian world, with the self-ascribed mission of
Moscow to protect Russian-speakers beyond national borders.
As the case of Sochi unveiled, hosting mega-events in Russia is possible only on
the condition of suspending certain legislation, as epitomised by President Putins
decrees which discontinued a number of legal acts during the preparation and hosting of those events. The federal law adopted in December 2007 imposed restrictions
on advertising, public meetings, transportation of vehicles, and movement of people.
It abolished public hearings for Olympic construction works (especially criticised by
environmental groups), rendered unnecessary the submission of regular documentation for the starting phase of technical expertise and for previously agreed infrastructure projects related to the Games, and did not request registration of land decisions
made by state agencies. At the same time, the law introduced exceptional measures
governing the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and its employees, who were
exempted from paying taxes in Russia during the Olympic preparations, and
obtained work permits, visas and residence permits free of charge.18
Finally, it was the word of the sovereign which preceded any economic analysis and in fact replaced it that drew a line of distinction between the future
developmental strategies of Sochi and Crimea. As Putin averred, these two resort
areas rely on different kinds of tourists: the infrastructure in Crimea mainly
accommodates people with small revenues who cant afford the luxurious and
splendid hotels in Sochi.... So they can still spend their vacations in Crimea.19
This speech act makes clear that the reverse side of populism (the acquisition of
Crimea as a support for low-paid Russians) is a de facto recognition of the elitist
nature of the Sochi project, designed from the outset, in spite of the dominant
rhetoric, not to provide a venue for mass sports and recreation, but rather to sustain the triumphalist self-narration of the sovereign power.
17
P. Netreba and D. Butrin, Biudzhetnomu Pravilu Podyskivayut Iskliuchenia [Looking for Exceptions to
Budgetary Rules], Kommersant, 21 April 2014, http://kommersant.ru/doc/2457176.
18
On the Organization and Conduct of the Twenty-Second Olympic Winter Games and the Eleventh Paralympic Winter Games of 2014 in Sochi, the Development of the City of Sochi as a Mountain Climate
Resort, and Changes Introduced into Laws of the Russian Federation, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 2001, 5 December 2007, http://www.rg.ru/2007/12/05/sochi-dok.html.
19
Priamaya linia s Vladimirom Putinym [Direct Line with Vladimir Putin], 7 April 2014, http://www.
kremlin.ru/transcripts/20796.

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Unity/consensus

The Sochi project was widely perceived as an ideological demonstration of Russias

national supremacy,20 meant basically to constitute a basis for domestic consolidation. The idea of empire as organic unity21 was artistically represented at both
the festivities in Kazans Universiade and the Sochi Games, and took a distinct
political shape with the absorption of Crimea.
Analysis of both narratives, but especially that of the Sochi Olympics, reveals
their strong references to Soviet times. The Olympic teddy bear as a mascot of
Sochi 2014 (resembling the Olympic Misha of the 1980 Games in Moscow), the
early Soviet avangardist aesthetics as a means of representing the achievements of
the 20th century (the industrialisation of the 1930s and the conquest
of space in the 1960s) and the Soviet-styled scene of the baby-boom at the end of
the opening ceremony are the most illustrative of these. Political connotations were
also part of the discourse: The public debate over the Sochi Games compares only
to the political battle that raged prior to the Summer Olympics in Moscow in
1980, a Russian member of parliament (MP) argued.22 In this debate, the 1980
Moscow Olympics were referred to as a vindication for erroneous appeals to boycott sports mega-events, which Russia faced on the eve of the Sochi Games in protest against the human rights situation in general and the anti-gay legislation in
particular.
Interestingly, the narrative of the 2013 Universiade opening ceremony held in
Kazan only half a year before Sochi addressed the Soviet past in a far less politically
explicit way. The similar symbols of the Soviet era the industrialisation and the
rst space ight were represented basically from a technological viewpoint,
mainly as scientic breakthroughs. One of the last images of the 20th century episode, designed in the style of press headings, highlighted a newspaper headline of
Russia joining the G8 ironically, an institution that expelled Russia after the
events in Crimea. The nal scene of the opening ceremony in Kazan represented
the idea of the Internet as a globally unifying force again, something that the
Kremlin soon started questioning by introducing restrictions for political bloggers
in May 2014 and banning some oppositional websites.
These semantic rips can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, they
show how Russia changed from summer 2013 (Universiade in Kazan) to winter/
spring 2014 (the Sochi Games and the inclusion of Crimea into Russia), with a
dominating trend towards an increasingly more pronounced imperial identity and
its anti-Western reverberations. On the other hand, as some writers assume,23
Gorokhov, National Identities in Global Sportive Culture.
M. Yampolskiy, Pogruzhenie v Arkhaiku [Immersion to Archaics], Radio Liberty, 13 April 2014, http://
www.svoboda.org/content/article/25327104.html.
22
S. Markov, Putin Scores Gold With Sochi Miracle, The Moscow Times, 21 February 2014, http://www.
themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putin-scores-gold-with-sochi-miracle/494790.html.
23
See, for example: Tsygankov and Tsygankov, National Ideology and IR Theory.
20
21

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A. Makarychev and A. Yatsyk

Russias hegemonic narrative embraces different interpretations of Russian identity

that are actualised depending on the specic situation and the structural constraints. Different layers of Russian identity discourse envision the co-existence of
different representations of the nation as a more culturally diversied and a more
unied one. In the 2013 Universiade, Russia portrayed itself as a colourful, vivid,
and carnivalesque assemblage of diverse identities, with mythic heroes of ethnic legends and tales sharing the scene with people dressed in traditional ethnic costumes.
Yet in Sochi, the idea of multi-ethnic Russia was in fact substituted by a demonstration of the variety of its physical landscapes, while the human performers were
assembled in a chain of people looking alike. Unlike Kazans ceremony, which
comprehensively presented the local Tatar linguistic, cultural and architectural heritage, the authenticity of Sochi was not duly articulated in the performative part of
the Winter Olympic Games. What is even more telling, one of the pre-Soviet episodes at the Sochi opening ceremony overtly portrayed the imperial Russia of Peter
the Great through a Cyrillic alphabet quiz in which each letter had a particular reference to an important element of the Russian heritage, with the I-letter symbolising Empire (Imperia).
It is argued here that the more unied portrayal of Russia in Sochi was the result
of a peculiar imbrication of two factors. On a global level, the IOC explicitly
demands commodied shows from host nations that necessarily contain references
to easily identiable images which the country is usually associated with in the
world. This simplies the script and standardises the messages through which the
host nation addresses the global audience. It was the imperial imagery that constituted one of the semantic grounds for Russias self-representation in the Olympic
show. On a national level, Russias dominating discourse shifted towards articulation of the ideas of unity and cohesion at the expense of diversity and pluralism.
The paradoxical combination of the two trends produced the effect of a seemingly
consensual, unitary and uncontroversial Russian identity grounded in a number of
nodal points dating back to Soviet and pre-Soviet imperial traditions.
Identication with the Soviet past was also a meaningful point in Russias policy
towards Crimea, where the Soviet myth is still rather strong: its population displays
nostalgic loyalty to Soviet times, and perceives Russia as a contemporary embodiment
of or substitute for the Soviet Union.24 The harsh Russian reaction to the demolition of Lenins statues all across Ukraine in fall 2013 was a perfect testimony to the
Kremlins reciprocal self-identication with the Soviet past. Lenins memorials are
widely perceived by Kremlin loyalists as epitomes of todays Russia, and their
destruction as a symbolic challenge to Russias domination over Ukraine.25 The
Krym Vozvraschaetsa v Sovetskiy Soyuz. Razgovor s Timurom Olevskim [Crimea is Coming Back to
the Soviet Union. A Conversation with Timur Olevsky], TV Dozhd, 9 March 2014, http://tvrain.ru/arti
cles/krym_vozvraschaetsja_v_sovetskij_sojuz_razgovor_s_timurom_olevskim-364667.
25
V. Sorokin, Let the Past Collapse on Time!, The New York Review of Books, 8 May 2014, http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/may/08/let-the-past-collapse-on-time.
24

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The Four Pillars of Russias Power Narrative

69

Kremlins displeasure with the high symbolic value given to the Holodomor (mass
famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine) also attests to the deep Soviet roots of todays Russian
identity.26 This helps to explain the political contexts of Putins remark about
Ukraines not completely legal disengagement from the Soviet Union,27 which casts
doubts on the status of Ukraine as a full-edged sovereign nation in the Kremlins
view.
It was Russias hyper-sensitivity to the memories of the Soviet past that was
exploited by Putins opponents in the West to draw parallels between the Sochi
Games and the 1936 Olympics in Berlin hosted by the Nazi regime.28 These
controversial comparisons were in particular based on Russias restrictive policy
towards the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community, and later
apparently enhanced by the Crimea campaigners29 supported by the pro-Putin
sympathisers in far-right parties across Europe.30 Some of Putins supporters
themselves gave good reason to be lambasted for racist or neo-Nazi gestures. For
example, the former Olympic champion and current MP, Irina Rodnina, who lit
the Olympic torch, tweeted a picture of President Obama likening him to a
monkey being offered a banana.31 The head of the Institute for Democracy and
Development in New York, a pro-Kremlin think tank, Andranik Migranian,
praised Hitler for collecting German lands... without a drop of blood.32 The
Cossack regiments used as a police force during the Sochi Olympics are
sometimes perceived in the West as native Russian neo-Nazis, with an aggressive racist ideology and a history of involvement with anti-Semitic acts. The Kuban Cossacks have a history of negative interactions with indigenous peoples of
the North Caucasus and have cooperated with radical nationalist groups in the
recent past.33
In the meantime, many experts rebuff the Hitler comparisons as vastly
overdrawn and deem that Putins

S. Norris, Ukraines New Sites of Memory: A Candle in Kiev, The Moscow Times, 1 April 2014,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/arts_n_ideas/article/ukraines-new-sites-of-memory-a-candle-in-kiev/
497140.html.
27
Putin: Ukraina Vyshla Iz SSSR Ne Vpolne Zakonno [Putin: Ukraine Seceeded from the USSR not
Completely Legally], Hvilya, 12 March 2014.
28
B. Reitschuster, Sochi is to Putin What Berlin in 1936 Was to Hitler, Says Garry Kasparov, The
Guardian, 7 Feb. 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2014/feb/07/sochi-vladimir-putin-hitler-berlingarry-kasparov.
29
P. Hohnson, Is Vladimir Putin Another Adolf Hitler?, Forbes, 16 April 2014, http://www.forbes.com/
sites/currentevents/2014/04/16/is-vladimir-putin-another-adolf-hitler.
30
A. Shekhovtsov, Italian Fascists Love Putin, Anton Shekhovtsovs Blog, 29 March 2014, networkedblogs.com/Vo03J.
31
V. Shenderovich, Antifashisty s Bananami [Anti-fascists with banana], Ekho Moskvy, 13 February 2014,
http://echo.msk.ru/blog/shenderovich/1257858-echo.
32
A. Migranian, Nashi Peredonovy [Our Peredonovs], Izvestia, 3 April 2014, http://izvestia.ru/news/
568603.
33
Arnold and Foxall, Lord of the (Five) Rings, 7.
26

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motives are related to preservation, not expansion, of the Kremlins inuence. Humiliated by the Wests containment strategy and the collapse of the agreement of February
21, 2014 between the Ukrainian government and the opposition, Putin used Crimea
as a bargaining chip in negotiating the restoration of Russias inuence in Kiev.34

Nevertheless, these controversies have turned Nazism into an important gure of

speech for both the Kremlin and its opponents.35 Moscow displays deep sensitivity
to the legitimation of Hitlers name in public debates not only in Ukraine, but also
in other post-Soviet countries. Thus, in April 2014, the Russian Embassy in
Kazakhstan issued a diplomatic note demanding explanations from Astana about
the publication of materials about Hitler in a local journal.36 By the same token,
Putin himself used Nazi-related wording in his blackening of the Maidan leaders
by dubbing them nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes, and anti-Semites. The
gist of this verbal chain of equivalences is to equate Ukrainian nationalism with
Nazism,37 which in many ways reproduces the methods of the Soviet propaganda.38 In particular, Putin portrayed Stepan Bandera as a Nazi collaborator
turned into a symbol of independent Ukraine.39
There are at least three very controversial points in Russias discursive strategy of
history-based consensus-building. First, the actualisation of Soviet memories only
unveils how far from each other Russian and Ukrainian memory politics are. The
contemporary Ukrainian nationhood has its foundation in the memory of the
Holodomor, which created a narrative of Ukraine being victimised by Moscow.
The second pillar of the Ukrainian identity is the Chernobyl tragedy of 1986,
which complemented the memory of the famine with new memories of radioactive
contamination, perceived by many as a symbol of the dysfunctional Soviet system.40 Neither of these events plays an important role in Russian memory politics.
34
A. Tsygankov, Stop the Hitler Comparisons, The Moscow Times, 20 March 2014, http://www.themos
cowtimes.com/opinion/article/stop-the-hitler-comparisons/496495.html.
35
E. Babushkin, Zhizn y Sudba Olympiyskikh Fashistov [Life and Destiny of Olympic Fascists], Snob,
17 February 2014, www.snob.ru/selected/entry/71856; Samaya Protivorechivaya. XI Olimpiada, Berlin,
1936 [The Most Controversial: the 1936 Olympics in Berlin]. 10 Zanimatelnykh Faktov, 16 Feb. 2014,
www.trofmash.ru/2014/02/16/olympiad1936.
36
MID Rossii Poprosil Vlasti Kazakhstana Otreagirovat Na Zhurnalnuyu Statyu o Gitlere [Russian Foreign Ministry Asked Authorities in Kazakhstan to React to a Journal Atricle About Hitler]. Dozhd TV Web
Portal,
21
April
2014,
http://tvrain.ru/articles/mid_rossii_poprosil_vlasti_kazahstana_otreagiro
vat_na_zhurnalnuju_statju_o_gitlere-367260.
37
S. Norris, Ukraines New Sites of Memory, Part III: The Two Banderas, The Moscow Times, 15 April
2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/arts_n_ideas/article/ukraines-new-sites-of-memory-part-iii-the-twobanderas/498069.html.
38
A. Gogun, Zapreschionnyi Bandera [Forbidden Bandera]. Radio Liberty, 20 April 2014, http://www.svo
boda.org/content/article/25355555.html.
39
M. Schoeld, Stepan Bandera is a Hero to Ukrainian Nationalists and a Nazi Collaborator to Russian
Sympathizers, The Toronto Star, 6 April 2014, http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/04/06/uk
raine_vs_russia_inside_the_divisive_myth_of_stepan_bandera.html.
40
S. Norris, Ukraines Sites of Memory: Chernobyl in the Heart, The Moscow Times, 7 April 2014,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/arts_n_ideas/article/ukraines-sites-of-memory-chernobyl-in-the-heart/
497654.html.

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71

Second, the Kremlin criticises the Ukrainian far-right Praviy Sektor group and
the Svoboda Party which have a very limited percentage of electoral support, but at
the same time maintains close relations with many nationalist and jingoist parties
all across Europe (in particular, in France, Hungary, Italy and the UK).41 This
betrays the lack of a consistent ideological frame in the Kremlin, and the instrumental and pragmatic nature of the Kremlins nationalist momentum.
Third, the Kremlin tries to portray the West negatively as a source of gay culture
(which was part of the normative debate before and during the Sochi Games) while
simultaneously accusing it of allegedly supporting pro-Nazi forces (in particular,
the radical groups at the Maidan square revolt). This testies to a dislocated, that
is fragmented and unxed, image of Europe in the Russian hegemonic discourse
that opportunistically combines diametrically opposed ideologies.

Normalisation

The idea of normalisation, another pillar of the Kremlins hegemonic discourse,

could have two different readings. As in the case of the national unity narratives,
the concept of normalisation has a multi-layered structure, with different semantic
strata being actualised in particular circumstances.
On the one hand, as an enthusiastic host of many sports mega-events (including
the forthcoming FIFA World Cup in 2018), Russia inevitably accepts the rules of
the international sport authorities that regulate many aspects of business and nancial operations, advertisement, media coverage, etc. Following the regulations of the
International University Sports Federation (FISU) or IOC regarding the content of
the opening and closing ceremonies, as well as the other sports rituals, Russia has
adjusted its key messages to this universalistic logic, mostly procedure- and marketoriented. For example, the ban on the use of war images during the Olympic
Games ceremonies, or the nal scene of releasing doves at the opening event are
compulsory elements of sports performances. At the same time, as exemplied by
the experience of the Sochi Olympics and the 2013 Universiade, there is still
enough space to construct a nation-specic identity narrative.
It is this inclusion in the global normative standards that explains the essential
role the mega-events play in normalising Russia through their representation of it
as a country that has nalised its post-1991 transition to effective statehood. The
very ability to host high-prole global events reliably and responsibly is an important element of Russias strategy of retrieving its international status. Like other
non-Western hosts of global tournaments and championships (China, Brazil, South
Africa, Qatar, etc.), Moscow wants to (re)position itself as a normal country, no

H. Coynash, East Ukraine Crisis and the Fascist Matrix, Al Jazeera, 17 April 2014, http://www.aljaze
era.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/east-ukraine-crisis-fascist-ma-2014416145823826439.html.
41

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less capable than other world leaders of running large-scale projects and providing
high-level security for them.
Against this background, compliance with international standards is one of the
structural conditions under which Russia can effectively apply its soft power while
hosting these projects and addressing global audiences. As Igor Sivov, deputy director of the Universiade organising committee noted, this event was
the rst project of this sort since the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Most foreigners associate Russia with matrioshkas, bears and winter. Today we aim to show that, beyond
these stereotypes, Russia is a country of extraordinary, creative people, and we are
proud of it In this respect, the ideals of sports and culture coincide. Both showcase tolerance, mutual respect and a desire for perfection.42

Yet, the absorption of Crimea unveiled a different facet of normalisation as seen

by Russian elites. In protecting its sphere of vital interests, including with military
force if necessary, Russia believes to be doing what other great powers (US in
particular) have historically done and are still doing today. By incorporating
Crimea, the ofcial discourse says, Russia returns to the state of historical
normalcy, comparable, for example, with German reunication. This understanding of normalisation ts the idea of national revival, known through Putins famous
metaphor of rising up from its knees.
Against this backdrop, Crimea and Sochi symbolise two different conceptions of
normalisation, although they arguably match each other in some respects. In the
opening ceremony of the Sochi Olympics, Russia did its best to represent itself as
an empire of European culture,43 which implies that one of the pivotal components of its strategy is not ultimately to turn away from Europe, but rather to
resignify the meanings of European identity and adapt them to serve Russian interests. This is what conservative voices relate to Russias policy in the Ukrainian conict as well. As philosopher Boris Mezhuev puts it, having acquired Crimea,
Russia is not leaving Europe, but rather coming back to European civilization,
relying upon those conservative forces that are opposed to the submission of their
nations to neoliberal and cosmopolitan projects.44 Again, the mythic component is
key for comprehending this type of discourse, since the Russian world as a social
construct is rhetorically represented as a community of people who are not afraid
A. Chuprina, I.Sivov v Interviu DK o Tom, Pochemu Na Kulturnuiu Universiadu Ne Bylo Zhalko
Nikakikh Deneg [I.Sivovs Interview: Why There Were No Regrets About Spending Fortunes for the Cultural Universiade], Gorod, 20 September 2013, http://kazan.dk.ru/news/isivov-v-intervyu-dk-o-tom-pochem
u-na-kulturnuyu-universiadu-ne-bylo-zhalko-nikakix-deneg-236763295#ixzz30ZQmBa55.
43
S. Medvedev, Olimpiyskaya Shizofrenia: Pochemu v Rossii Ne Khvataet Gogolia, [Olympic Schizophrenia: Why We in Russia are Missing Gogol], Forbes, 19 February 2014, http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-col
umn/tsennosti/251013-olimpiiskaya-shizofreniya-pochemu-v-sochi-ne-khvataet-gogolya.
44
B. Mezhuev, Russkiy Mir Prikhodit v Evropu [Russian World is Coming to Europe]. Izvestia, 17 April
2014, http://izvestia.ru/news/569452#add_comment.
42

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73

of death and loathe meaningless routine comfort45 declarations that are innitely distant from the dominating consumerist attitudes and social atomisation
taking place all across Russia.

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Security

Both Sochi and Crimea can be viewed, each in its own way, as security projects.
Evidently, the Olympics had their own security agenda that basically boiled down
to a series of police measures aimed at cleansing the Olympic venues of undesired
and uncontrolled activity of the citizenry (environmental demonstrators, human
rights protestors, animal protection activists, victims of land grabs sanctioned by
the state, and so forth). Security in this vein is tantamount to the maintenance of
social order, a vision based on a highly securitised model of societal relations. In
this regard Russia shares a lot with Brazil, the country that will host the 2016
Olympics.46
Yet there is at least one common security denominator for Sochi and Crimea:
both are geographically located in the Black Sea region, known for its high level of
conictuality and low institutionalisation of interaction and communication
between regional actors. Against this backdrop, the Olympics became an arena for
Russia to demonstrate its military power in the Black Sea region,47 a policy that
Russia only enhanced with the operation in Crimea largely motivated by Moscows
obsession with NATO enlargement and fears about the future of Russias Black
Sea eet.
Placing the Sochi Olympics in a security context, it is important to note that the
Games took place in the least secure region of Russia, which gave the Kremlin an
opportunity to claim that the stabilisation policy in North Caucasus has produced
palpable results, and that Russia can now effectively deal with terrorist threats. The
Sochi project was also an essential component of the uneasy process of normalising
Russias relations with Georgia after the end of Mikheil Saakashvilis presidency,
and recovering from the harm caused by the August 2008 war between the two
countries. Moscow tried to use the Sochi Olympics to redress its relations with
Georgia damaged by Russias recognition and military protection of the two breakaway territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Yet in Crimea, Moscow went even farther and included this part of Ukraine into
Russia, thus provoking an even deeper crisis in relations not only with Ukraine,
but also with the entire West. This implies that the high demand for security in
Russia as a reverse side of the feeling of existential insecurity may provide
45

Ibid.
S. Savell, Security in Brazil: World Cup 2014 and Beyond, Anthropoliteia, 2 May 2014, http://anthro
politeia.net/category/commentary-forums/security-in-brazil-world-cup-2014-and-beyond.
47
Zhemukhov and Orttung, Munich Syndrome, 26.
46

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74

A. Makarychev and A. Yatsyk

legitimation of the practice of allegedly pre-emptive land grabs and the accompanying ideology of nationalism. This also suggests that the future security policy of
Russia will be inextricably linked to the debates on Russian national identity. To a
large extent, this was the case of the preparation for the Sochi Olympics, marked
by the local governor Alexander Tkachovs appeals to cleanse the Krasnodar krai of
Russian citizens of North Caucasian descent, or the deployment of several hundred
Cossack soldiers as an auxiliary police force during the Games. Yet, if in Sochi the
Cossacks public appearance was limited to the lmed beating of the Pussy Riot
artists during their attempt to stage an anti-Putin performance against the backdrop
of the Sochi logo, in Ukraine they played a more substantial role by not only morally supporting Russias policy, but also being physically transported from the
Krasnodar krai to Crimea.48 The subsequent development of the situation in
Ukraine, with the concentration of Russian troops at the border between the two
countries and much evidence of Russias involvement in coordinating the violence
in the separatist regions of Donbass, makes further securitisation of the identity
debate in Russia inevitable.

Concluding remarks

In this article, the intent was to nd common denominators for comparing two
major and seemingly dissimilar international events in which Russia engaged in
early 2014: the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi and Crimeas reunication with
Russia. In spite of all the divergence in the logic underpinning them, four concepts
were identied that strongly resonate in both cases. First, in hosting the Olympics
and in annexing Crimea, Russia was motivated by solidifying its sovereignty as the
key concept in its foreign and domestic policies. Second, the scenarios for both
Sochi and Crimea were grounded in the idea of strengthening Russia as a political
community through mechanisms of domestic consolidation (Sochi) and opposition
to malign external forces (the crisis in Ukraine). Third, Sochi and Crimea unveiled
two different facets of the logic of normalisation aimed at proving, albeit by different means, Russias great power status. Fourth, one of the major drivers of Russian
policy in both cases were security concerns on Russias southern anks, though
domestic security was also an important part of the agenda.
Based on the analysis of these four nodal points, we conclude that Russian identity discourse has become more cohesive in terms of its internal logic, focusing on
a number of key political signiers. At the same time, each of the discursive blocs
grounded in sovereignty, unity, normalcy and security is composed of different
layers. The actualisation of each of those layers and the meanings attached to them
48
Kubantsy nadeiyutsia na vkhozhdenie kazakov Kryma v sostav Kubanskogo voiska [People in Kuban
Expect the Inclusion of Crimean Cossacks in the Kuban Regiments], RIA Novosti Information Agency, 28
April 2014, http://ria.ru/society/20140428/1005783511.html.

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depend mainly on structural factors that gain primacy in specic situations. Thus,
as demonstrated, in hosting global mega-events, Russia has to comply with stringent regulations that create a product that appeals to the international public with
a set of performative speech acts and communicative actions. Yet in the absence of
structural constraints, or in situations of open disdain for international norms and
principles, Russia switches to a different repertoire of meanings within each of the
aforementioned discursive blocs by reinterpreting sovereignty as an arbitrary revision of the post-Cold War normative order, unity as patriotic enthusiasm about
the retrieval of old territories, normalcy as mimicking the most controversial foreign policy endeavours of the West, and security as pre-emptive appropriation of
territories of high military importance.
Therefore, Russia still has a menu of choices in its discursive arsenal that might
either further alienate it from the West or at least try to redress the damage caused
by the current confrontation over Ukraine. Needless to say, the Sochi model gives
a more optimistic reading of most of these key concepts in terms of Russias potential for international socialisation.

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