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places and times other than here and now, and to speakers and hearers
other than you or me. So we are back, it seems, to his reform strategy: this
may not be how we now use such terms, but we should change our ways for
the sake of promoting human happiness.
There are at least two things Rorty will have to convince us of if he
expects us to act on this recommendation. First, that it is intelligible, and
second, that it is desirable. As to the first, he has given us no persuasive
account of how it would be to speak a language free of any notions of an
independent reality about which we can make claims that are not just true
or false for us here and now but tout court. He has not even given us an
illustration of this, for all his attempts to do so are invariably rife with
performative contradictions - and that is especially significant in a debate
about unavoidable presuppositions. Nor has he given us good reason to
believe that life would be better if now, having arrived at the dawn of his
postmodern liberalism, we drop the universalist ideas of truth, reason,
justice, right, and the like that are embedded in the very practices and
institutions he wants to promote, and do so just at the moment when the
dynamics of economic, political, and cultural globalization have made
ethnocentric localism hopelessly anachronistic. Supposing that what he
recommends were possible, which is doubtful, why should we want to do it?
It is not enough in this connection to hold out the prospect of getting
beyond all the old, tiresome, philosophical disputes. Letting the fly out of
the fly bottle is hardly a sufficiently persuasive reason for the wholesale
cultural transformation that he proposes. And if he wants to promise more
- a'better world with less suffering and greater happiness - then he has to
convince us that his recipe for this should be preferred to ones proposed on
the basis of much more detailed analyses in our social- and politicaltheore tical traditions.
Rorty denies that the traditional concerns of philosophy with the nature,
scope, a?d limits of human reason are relevant to sociopolitical thinking. It
does not appear to worry him that his playful images of philosophy
professors rushing to the vanguard of revolutionary struggles undercuts not
only critical theory but, by implication, the very tradition of liberal
democratic thought he hopes to advance. The concerns of political
theorists, from Hobbes and Locke to Rawls and Habermas, with conceptions
of practical reason are not peripheral but central to their projects. It would
be an interesting thought experiment to think away such concerns with
reason from modern natural law theories, social contract theories, and the
like, and see what's left of these rich political-theoretical traditions. A
similar thought experiment might be attempted with the social-theoretical
traditions stemming from the Scottish Enlightenment thought of Smith and
Ferguson and the neoKantian thought of Durkheim and Weber, for whom
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Reply to Benhabib
Seyla Benhabib notes the relative absence in Critical Theory of concrete
social analysis and political reflection. She is undoubtedly right about that,
and about the oddity of that absence in a book on this topic. We were, of
course, not unaware of the problems posed by writing a book on critical
social theory for a series of debates in philosophy. Our less than perfect
solution was to focus on what Benhabib calls the metatheoretical issues
that have also occupied the tradition of critical theory from the start.
Though we do indicate from time to time what bearing such issues might
have on more concrete matters, there is no denying the air of abstractness
that this focus lends our discussion. On the other hand, it is just these issues
that are today in a state of great confusion which cries out for clarification.
We did what we could in that regard.
This having been said, however, I dont see that critical theorys unique
blend of philosophical analysis and empirical social research**gets lost in
the shuffle. It is, in fact, a central theme of chapter one, and it recurs
repeatedly thereafter. Nor do I agree that the concern for freedom and
justice gets obscured by a lopsided orientation to problems of rationality. A
main point of chapter one is the Auj7zebung of philosophy, which
Horkheimer and Marcuse envisioned as a realization of reason in a
rational organization of society. As explained there, they understood
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NOTES
1. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1977), 114.
2. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979).
3. Richard Rorty, Putnam and the Relativist Menace, The Journal of Phifosophy 90
(1993): 443-61. See also our earlier exchange in Critical Inquiry 16 (1990); T. McCarthy,
Private Irony and Public Decency: Richard Rortys New Pragmatism, 355-370; R. Rorty,
103
Truth and Freedom: A Reply to Thomas McCarthy, 633-643; and T. McCarthy, Ironist
Theory as a Vocation: A Response to Rorty. 644-655.
4. Rorty, Putnam and the Relativist Menace, 443f.
5. Ibid., 449.
6. Ibid.
7. Indeed, thc trend spotters that Rorty singles out for mention - Marx, Habermas,
and Foucault - are so evidently preoccupied with reason and rationalization that it is not easy
to see how they exemplify his new breed of postheorists.
8. Thus Charles Sanders Peirce reports that at the age of 16 he had already studied Kant
for over three years, and he attributes to that reading his earliest inspiration for pragmatism.
9. Hume. Enquiry, 1 .
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 26.
12. Ibid., 2-3.
13. Ibid., 5.