IntroductionPublicInternationalLaw

1.
W
HATISPUBLICINTERNATIONALLAW?
Internationallawcomprisesasystemofrulesandprinciplesthatgoverntheinternationalrelations
between sovereign states and other institutional subjects of international law such as the United
Nations,theArabLeagueandtheAfricanUnion.Itoperatesalongsideinternationaldiplomacy,politics
andeconomics.
2.
W
HATISMEANTBYTHETERMSOVEREIGNITY?
Sovereigntyistheexclusiverighttoexercisesupremepoliticalauthorityoveradefinedterritory(land,
airspaceandcertainmaritimeareassuchastheterritorialsea)andthepeoplewithinthatterritory.No
other State can have formal political authority withinthat State. Therefore, sovereignty is closely
associatedwiththeconceptofpoliticalindependence.
DuringtheperiodofWesterncolonialexpansionnewterritoriesandislandsweresubjecttoclaimsof
sovereigntybydiscoveryandoccupation.SovereigntycouldalsobetransferredtoanotherStateby
conquest(useofforce)orbycessionwherethesovereigntyovertheterritorywouldbecededbytreaty
fromoneStatetoanother.
SinceaStatehassovereigntyoveritsterritory,theentryintoitsterritorybythearmedforcesofanother
Statewithoutconsentisaprimafaciebreachofinternationallaw.Amongtheattributesofsovereignty
istherighttoexcludeforeignersfromenteringtheterritory,whichistraditionallyreferredtoasthe
righttoexcludealiens.
SinceaStatehassovereigntywithinitsterritorialsea(withsomeexceptionssuchastherightof
innocentpassage),ithastheexclusiveauthoritytoexercisepolicepowerwithinitsterritorysea.For
example,ifforeignshipsareattackedbypiratesintheterritorialseaofaState,theonlyStatethat
canexercisepolicepowerandarrestthepiratesintheterritorialseaisthecoastalState.
3.
W
HATARETHESOURCESOFINTERNATIONALLAW?
The sources for international law have been enumerated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
InternationalCourtofJustice.Itprovidesthatwhilethecourtismakingitsdecision,ithastokeepin
mindthatinternationallawstemsfromthefollowingareas,sinceitisobligedtomakedecisionsin
accordancewithinternationallaw.
(a)Internationalconventions,whethergeneralorparticular,establishingrulesexpresslyrecognizedby
thecontestingstates;
(b)Internationalcustom,asevidenceofageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw;
(c)Thegeneralprinciplesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednations;
(d)SubjecttotheprovisionsofArticle59,judicialdecisionsandtheteachingsofthemosthighly
qualifiedpublicistsofthevariousnations,assubsidiarymeansforthedeterminationofrulesoflaw.

KeepingthisArticleinmind,letustakeadetailedlookatthedifferentwaysinwhichInternationalLaw
isgenerated:

1. CustomaryLaw: TheprincipleofCustomaryLawbasicallydictatesthat adisputeshouldbe

resolvedbyreferringtotheCustomsoftheland,sothatthecustomarypracticesofdifferentnationsare
respectedandadheredto.However,thethresholdforprovingalawascustomaryisquitehigh,sinceit

shouldhaveevidenceofageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw.Inordertoreachthatthreshold,thecourt
mustconsiderboththematerialfactsandtheopiniojurisofstates.
Materialfacts:ThisisconcernedwiththewayinwhichtheCustomarylawisappliedintheCountry
concerned.Thedurationforwhichthepracticehassubsisted,itsconsistency,therepetitionofitsuse
andthegeneralityofthepracticeareallconsideredsubjectivelyindeterminingtheauthenticityand
applicabilityofacustomarypractice.However,eachofthosestandardsareexclusivetoeachother,and
asreiteratedbydifferentCourtsinseveralcases,allofthemneednotbefulfilledineachcaseinorder
todeterminethevalidityofthepractice.Insomecases,likethe ContinentalShelf case,theJudges
reliedmoreonideasofJusticeandEqualitymorethattheotherfactors.
OpinioJuris: ThisisconcernedmorewiththeJurisprudenceofthecountrywhosecustomisbeing
considered.Basically,thisrequirementistoensurethatevenifapracticeiscustomary,theCountry
carryingoutthatpracticemusthavebeenconsciouslyenforcing/allowingthatpractice.Thishasbeen
seeninthe Lotus case,whereFrancewasarguingthatsincecountrieshadabstainedfrominstituting
criminalproceedingsinthepastforthematterthatwasinquestion,thatisnowthecustomarypractice.
However,theCourtheldthatsincetherewasnoclearevidencethattheabstentionwasconsciously
made,itcouldnotbeheldtobecustomarylaw.
Thus,customarylawhastwocriteriaThereshouldbeclearevidenceofthepracticeinquestionbeing
followed, and there shouldalso be evidence to show that thecountry in questionwas consciously
followingit.

2.Treaties:Thisisanothersourceforinternationallawwhichplaysaverybigrole.Thisisbecause
the term treaty means and includes Conventions, International Agreements, Pacts, General Acts,
Charters,Statutes,DeclarationsaswellasCovenants.Therearetwokindsoftreaties:
Lawmakingtreaties:Thesetreatiesareonesthatareintendedtohavegeneralrelevanceastothe
positionoflawinparticularfields.Theyareagreementsbysomeorseveralstateswherebytheydebate
aboutdifferentfieldsininternationallawsoastobroadenthescopeandtogiveclaritytoaparticular
subject.It isconsideredasasourceoflawsinceitreflectstheviewofseveral statesconcerning
particulartopics.TheGenocideconventionandtheAntarcticTreatyareexamplesofthiskindofa
treaty.
Treatycontracts:Thesearebasicallyagreementsbetweentwocountries,whichareinthenatureof
acontractbetweentwoparties;theyareenforceable,andpertainmostlyonlytothecontractingparties.
However,itcanberegardedasasourceoflawincertainsituations.Forexample,ifaseriesoftreaties
between twoorthree countries all have the sameunderlyingprinciple,then that principlecanbe
regardedasthecustomoftheland.

3.Generalprinciplesoflaw:AnothersourceoflawmentionedinArticle38aregeneralprinciplesof
law.Thisisaveryimportantrequirementasasourceoflaw,sinceInternationallawisnotalwaysvery
specific or developed. Therefore, general principles of law would be very helpful in determining

internationallaw,sincethereisalreadystrongproofofitsvalidityanditsusage.Onesuchprinciplethat
wasbroughtoutintheGenocideconventionwastheprincipleof ResJudicata, whichwasusedto
ensurethatdecisionsofinternationalcourtsarefinalandbinding.Anothersuchprincipleisthatof
pactasuntservanda,whichmeansthatinternationalagreementsarebindingonthepartieswhoenter
intothem.Thus,theyareaveryimportantsourceoflaw.
4.PrinciplesofEquity:Equityisaveryimportantsourceifinternationallaw,sinceitallowscourtsto
sometimeslookpastthecustomarylawsinordertomakeanequitabledecision.Thiswasobservedin
theContinentalSeaShelfcase,wheretheCourtlookedpasttheCustomarydrawingofnauticallines
andinsteadlookedatthemostequitableandjustoptionavailable.
5.Judicialdecisions:Article38,mentionedabove,listsjudicialdecisionsasasubsidiarymethodof
determining law. Further, Article 59 says that judicial decisions will have no binding power of
precedent.However,judgessometimesinterpretawholeconceptthatisthenusedbyothersasthe
bindinglawonpoint.Inthisway,itcanbeusedasasourceoflaw.Forexample,intheFisheriescase,
whichsetoutthecriteriafordeterminationofbaselinesforthemeasurementofterritorialsea.This
decisionwaslaterusedbythe1958GenevaConventionontheTerritorialSeaandContiguousZone.
6. Writers:Writersalsoplayabigpart ofdeterminingsourcesoflawsincerenownedworkon
jurisprudenceoftencitedbyStatesintheirpresentationofclaims,nationallawofficials,thevarious
internationaljudicialandarbitralbodies,andthejudgesofmunicipalcourts.
3.
W
HATISTHESIGNIFICANCEOFARTICLE2(7)OFTHEUNCHARTER?
NothingcontainedinthepresentChartershallauthorizetheUnitedNationstointerveneinmatters
whichareessentiallywithinthedomesticjurisdictionofanystateorshallrequiretheMembersto
submitsuchmatterstosettlementunderthepresentCharter;butthisprincipleshallnotprejudicethe
applicationofenforcementmeasuresunderChapterVll.
ItisprincipleofnoninterventionoftheUnitedNationsininternalaffairsofStatesunderArticle2(7)
oftheCharter
4.
W
HATISTHEDIFFERENCEBETWEENINTERNATIONALLAWANDNATIONALLAW?
Nationallawisconcernedprimarilywiththelegalrightsanddutiesoflegalpersons(individualsand
companies)withinabodypoliticthestateorsimilarterritorialentity.
Nationallawcommonlyisderivedfromalegalsuperior(e.g.aparliamentorpersonwithlegislative
power), recognised as legally competent by the society to whom the law is addressed (e.g. in a
constitution), and in situations where the governing power has both the authority and practical
competencetomakeandenforcethatlaw.
Internationallawcomprisesasystemofrulesandprinciplesthatgoverntheinternationalrelations
between sovereign states and other institutional subjects of international law such as the United
Nations,theArabLeagueandtheAfricanUnion
Itisconcernedwiththerightsanddutiesofthestatesthemselves.Intheirrelationswitheachother,
there is no relationship of legal superiority. States are legal equals and the legal system, which
regulatestheiractionsbetweenthemselves,mustreflectthis.
International lawisalegal system must facilitatetheinteractionoftheselegalequalsratherthan
controlorcompelthatnationallawexertsoveritssubjects
5.

HOWWOULDYOURESPONDTOTHECLAIMTHATPILISNOTREALLYLAW?
Ofcourse,PILisalaw,whenthinkaboutwhatlawis,andwhatitspurposeis,thereisnotone
measureandnotoneperfectmodel.PILmightbemoreprescriptiveandlesspermissivehowever,that
doesnotmeanthatitceasestobelaw. Thestoryofinternationallawandtheinternationallegal

system,likesomanyotherlegalsystems,isoneofachievementanddisappointment.So,inmuchthe
samewaythat wewouldnotsuggest that thelawoftheUKissomehownotlawbecauseitis
currentlyprovingimpossibletocontrolcrossborderinternetcrime,itdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthat
internationallawshouldbedismissedasasystemoflawbecausethereareinternationalactorsthat
seemdeterminedtoignoreit.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Internationallawcomprisesasystemofrulesandprinciplesthatgoverntheinternationalrelations
between sovereign states and other institutional subjects of international law such as the United
Nations,theArabLeagueandtheAfricanUnion.Therulesofinternationallawarecreatedprimarily
bystates,eitherfortheirownpurposesorasameansoffacilitatingandcontrollingtheactivitiesof
otheractorsontheinternationalplane.
Rulesofinternationallawcoveralmosteveryfacetofinterstateandinternationalactivity.Thereare
lawsregulatingtheuseofthesea,outerspaceandAntarctica.Therearerulesgoverninginternational
telecommunications,postalservices,thecarriageofgoodsandpassengersbyairandthetransferof
money.Internationallawisaprimarytoolfortheconductofinternationaltrade.
Itisconcernedwithnationality,extradition,theuseofarmedforce,humanrights,protectionofthe
environment,
thedignityoftheindividualandthesecurityofnations.
Inshort,thereisverylittlethatisdoneintheinternationalarenathatisnotregulatedbyinternational
law.
Internationallawisthevitalmechanismwithoutwhichaninterdependentworldcouldnotfunction.In
thissense,internationallawfacilitatesthefunctioningoftheinternationalcommunity,ofwhichweare
allapartandonwhichwealldepend.
Moderninternationallawalsoseekstocontrolstatesbyinhibitingordirectingtheirconductbothin
theirrelationswithotherstates(e.g.thelawprohibitingtheuseofarmedforcetosettledisputes)andin
relationtoindividuals,bothindividualsofotherstates(e.g.issuesconcerningtheexerciseofcriminal
jurisdiction)anditsownnationals(e.g.thelawofhumanrights).
Nevertheless, there have been incidents in International Law where a state may decide to forfeit
legality in favour of selfinterest, expediency or humanity, like the denial of procedural and
substantiverightstothosebeingheldindetentionbytheUSAatGuantanamoBayduringtheBush
Presidency,whichconstitutedaviolationoftheinternationallawofhumanrightsworthy.However,
theseincidentsshouldbecontrastedto
thesuccessfulUNledeffortstobringselfdeterminationandthenindependencetoEastTimorin2002,
thegroundbreakingestablishmentandoperationoftheInternationalCriminalCourtresponsiblefor
prosecutingindividualsforviolationoffundamentalinternationalhumanrights,
theprotectionofcivilianpopulationsduringtheLibyancivilwarof2011and
thecontinuingimpact oftheInternational CourtofJusticeinregulatingstatesuseoftheworlds
oceansandtheirnaturalresources.
Themembersoftheinternationalcommunityrecognisethatthereexistsabodyofrulesbindingupon
themaslaw.Statesbelieveinternationallawexists.WhenIraqinvadedKuwaitin1990,orearlier
when Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1978/79, the great majority of states regarded the action as
unlawful,notmerelyimmoralorunacceptable.
(a)InternationallawispractisedonadailybasisintheForeignOffices,nationalcourtsandother
governmentalorgansofstates,aswellasininternationalorganisationssuchastheUnitedNationsand
the Organisation of American States. These organisations and their members accept that they are
legallyboundtobehaveinacertainwayandwillpursueclaimsagainsteachotherallegingabreach
ofinternationallaw.
(bTheStatesthemostimportantofthesubjectsofinternationallawdonotclaimthattheyare
abovethelaworthatinternationallawdoesnotbindthem.WhenIraqinvadedKuwaititdidnotclaim
thatthelawprohibitingarmedforcedidnotapplytoitorwasirrelevant. Rather,Iraqarguedthat
internationallawjustifieditsaction;inotherwords,thatitwaslegalbyreferencetosomeotherrule
ofinternationallaw.Thisispowerfulevidencethatstatesfollowrulesofinternationallawasamatter
ofobligation,notsimplyasamatterofchoiceormorality.Ifthiswerenotso,therewouldbenoneed
forstatestojustifytheiractioninlegaltermswhentheydepartedfromalegalnorm.
(c)Themajorityofinternationallegalrulesareconsistentlyobeyed.Ofcourse,therewillbeoccasions
whenthelawisignoredorflouted,justastherewillbemurderandtheftinnationallaw.Theoccasions

whenastatedisregardsitstreatyorcustomarylawobligationsarebutasmallfractionoftheoccasions
onwhichthoseobligationsareobserved.
(d)Itisafunctionofalllegalsystemstoresolvedisputedquestionsoffactandlaw.Internationallaw
doesthisand,becauseitcannotnotbecalledalawbecauseitonlyhasalimitednumberofdeveloped
legalinstitutions.
ThewellestablishedEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,theWarCrimesTribunalsforBosnia,Rwanda
andSomaliaandtheInternationalCriminalCourtaregoodexamples.
Itissometimessaidthatinternationallawisnot"true"lawbecauseitisnotgenerallyenforceable.For
example,noformalenforcementactiontakenagainsttheUSAafteritsillegalinvasionofGrenadaand
noformalcondemnationofIsraelforinvadingLebanonin2006.Unlikenationallegalsystems,wereit
isassumedthatthelawwillbeenforced.However,thisargumentcouldbeconsideredasflawedasthe
systemoflawdoesnotdependonthechancesofeffectiveenforcement.Secondly,itisnottruethat
internationallawisnotenforceableoreffective.
Whileinternationallawhasneverbeenwhollydependentonasystemofinstitutionalisedenforcement,
the absence of a police force or compulsory court of general competence does not mean that
internationallawisimpotent.
Itwouldbeamistaketoconcludethatinternationallawisaperfectsystem.Thereismuchthatcould
be reformed and enhanced. There is a general lack of institutions; the content of the rules of
internationallawcanbeuncertain;statesmayelecttoignoreinternationallawwhentheirvitalinterests
areatstake;statesareabletoviolatebasicrules,suchastheprohibitionofviolencewithoutfearof
beingcoerced.
6.
W
HATARETHESOURCESOFINTERNATIONALLAW?
Article38(1)oftheStatuteoftheInternational CourtofJusticeiswidelyrecognizedasthemost
authoritative and complete statement as to the sources of International Law. The sources of
Internationallawcanbedividedinto2maincategories,primarysourcesandsecondarysources.
(a)Internationalconventions,whethergeneralorparticular,establishingrulesexpresslyrecognizedby
thecontestingstates;
(b)Internationalcustom,asevidenceofageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw;
(c)Thegeneralprinciplesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednations;
(d)SubjecttotheprovisionsofArticle59, judicialdecisions andtheteachingsofthemosthighly
qualified publicists of the various nations (academic writers), as subsidiary means for the
determinationofrulesoflaw.
Customshouldconstituteevidenceofageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw. Thus,thereare 2basic
elements which makeupacustom,thefirstelementistheactualbehaviourofstatesandthesecond
elementisthepsychologicalorsubjectivebeliefthatsuchbehaviourislaw.Theyarealsoreferredtoas
theactualpracticeofstatesormaterialfactandtheopinionjurisofstates.
IntheAsylumcase,theICJdeclinedtoorderPerutocomplywithacustomaryruleasthecourtfelt
thatthecustominquestionwasnotaconstantanduniformusagepracticedbytheStatesinquestion'.
Forittobecustom,theCourtheldthatthecustommusthaveledtoarightforonestateandaduty
upontheotherstate. Inthiscase,ColombiahadgrantedasylumtoHayaDeLaTorre,aPeruvian,
however,PerurefusedtoissueasafeconducttopermitTorretoleavethecountry. Thecustomin
question failed to meet the criteria of a constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in
questionasitwasaregionalcustompertainingonlytoLatinAmerica.
IntheAngloNorwegianFisheriescase,thecourtrefusedtoholdaparticularmethodofmeasuringthe
breadthoftheterritorialseaasitfeltthattheactualpracticesofstatesdidnotjustifythecreationof
suchacustom.Thatis,therewasinsufficientuniformityofbehavior.

7.
W
HATISTHEINTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE(ICJ)?
TheInternationalCourtofJustice(ICJ)istheprincipaljudicialorganoftheUnitedNations(UN).It
wasestablishedinJune1945bytheCharteroftheUnitedNationsandbeganworkinApril1946.
TheseatoftheCourtisatthePeacePalaceinTheHague(Netherlands).Ofthesixprincipalorgansof
theUnitedNations,itistheonlyonenotlocatedinNewYork(UnitedStatesofAmerica).
TheCourtsroleistosettle,inaccordancewithinternationallaw,legaldisputessubmittedtoitby
StatesandtogiveadvisoryopinionsonlegalquestionsreferredtoitbyauthorizedUnitedNations
organsandspecializedagencies.
TheCourtiscomposedof15judges,whoareelectedfortermsofofficeofnineyearsbytheUnited
NationsGeneralAssemblyandtheSecurityCouncil.ItisassistedbyaRegistry,itsadministrative
organ.ItsofficiallanguagesareEnglishandFrench.
Jusadbellum(Latinfor"righttowar")isasetofcriteriathataretobeconsultedbeforeengagingin
war,inordertodeterminewhetherenteringintowarispermissible;thatis,whetheritisajustwar.
Jusinbello,concernswithwhetherawarisconductedjustly(regardlessofwhethertheinitiationof
hostilitieswasjust).
8.
W
HATARE THESOURCESOFINTERNATIONALLAW?AREMUNICIPALLEGALSYSTEMSOBLIGEDTO
RECOGNIZE THESE SOURCES WHILE EXERCISING A) DOMESTIC JURISDICTION, B)
EXTRATERRITORIALJURISDICTION?ELUCIDATEWITHCASELAWSANDEXAMPLES.

The sources for international law have been enumerated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
InternationalCourtofJustice.Itprovidesthatwhilethecourtismakingitsdecision,ithastokeepin
mindthatinternationallawstemsfromthefollowingareas,sinceitisobligedtomakedecisionsin
accordancewithinternationallaw:

(a)Internationalconventions,whethergeneralorparticular,establishingrulesexpresslyrecognizedby
thecontestingstates;
(b)Internationalcustom,asevidenceofageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw;
(c)Thegeneralprinciplesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednations;
(d)SubjecttotheprovisionsofArticle59,judicialdecisionsandtheteachingsofthemosthighly
qualifiedpublicistsofthevariousnations,assubsidiarymeansforthedeterminationofrulesoflaw.

KeepingthisArticleinmind,letustakeadetailedlookatthedifferentwaysinwhichInternationalLaw
isgenerated:

1. CustomaryLaw: TheprincipleofCustomaryLawbasicallydictatesthat adisputeshouldbe

resolvedbyreferringtotheCustomsoftheland,sothatthecustomarypracticesofdifferentnationsare
respectedandadheredto.However,thethresholdforprovingalawascustomaryisquitehigh,sinceit
shouldhaveevidenceofageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw.Inordertoreachthatthreshold,thecourt
mustconsiderboththematerialfactsandtheopiniojurisofstates.
Materialfacts:ThisisconcernedwiththewayinwhichtheCustomarylawisappliedinthe

Countryconcerned.Thedurationforwhichthepracticehassubsisted,itsconsistency,therepetitionof
itsuseandthegeneralityofthepracticeareallconsideredsubjectivelyindeterminingtheauthenticity
andapplicabilityofacustomarypractice.However,eachofthosestandardsareexclusivetoeachother,
andasreiteratedbydifferentCourtsinseveralcases,allofthemneednotbefulfilledineachcasein
ordertodeterminethevalidityofthepractice.Insomecases,likethe ContinentalShelf case,the
JudgesreliedmoreonideasofJusticeandEqualitymorethattheotherfactors.
OpinioJuris:ThisisconcernedmorewiththeJurisprudenceofthecountrywhosecustomisbeing
considered.Basically,thisrequirementistoensurethatevenifapracticeiscustomary,theCountry
carryingoutthatpracticemusthavebeenconsciouslyenforcing/allowingthatpractice.Thishasbeen
seeninthe Lotus case,whereFrancewasarguingthatsincecountrieshadabstainedfrominstituting
criminalproceedingsinthepastforthematterthatwasinquestion,thatisnowthecustomarypractice.
However,theCourtheldthatsincetherewasnoclearevidencethattheabstentionwasconsciously
made,itcouldnotbeheldtobecustomarylaw.
Thus,customarylawhastwocriteriaThereshouldbeclearevidenceofthepracticeinquestionbeing
followed, and there shouldalso be evidence to show that thecountry in questionwas consciously
followingit.

2.Treaties:Thisisanothersourceforinternationallawwhichplaysaverybigrole.Thisisbecause
the term treaty means and includes Conventions, International Agreements, Pacts, General Acts,
Charters,Statutes,DeclarationsaswellasCovenants.Therearetwokindsoftreaties:
Lawmakingtreaties:Thesetreatiesareonesthatareintendedtohavegeneralrelevanceastothe
positionoflawinparticularfields.Theyareagreementsbysomeorseveralstateswherebytheydebate
aboutdifferentfieldsininternationallawsoastobroadenthescopeandtogiveclaritytoaparticular
subject.It isconsideredasasourceoflawsinceitreflectstheviewofseveral statesconcerning
particulartopics.TheGenocideconventionandtheAntarcticTreatyareexamplesofthiskindofa
treaty.
Treatycontracts:Thesearebasicallyagreementsbetweentwocountries,whichareinthenatureof
acontractbetweentwoparties;theyareenforceable,andpertainmostlyonlytothecontractingparties.
However,itcanberegardedasasourceoflawincertainsituations.Forexample,ifaseriesoftreaties
between twoorthree countries all have the sameunderlyingprinciple,then that principlecanbe
regardedasthecustomoftheland.

3.Generalprinciplesoflaw:AnothersourceoflawmentionedinArticle38aregeneralprinciplesof
law.Thisisaveryimportantrequirementasasourceoflaw,sinceInternationallawisnotalwaysvery
specific or developed. Therefore, general principles of law would be very helpful in determining
internationallaw,sincethereisalreadystrongproofofitsvalidityanditsusage.Onesuchprinciplethat
wasbroughtoutintheGenocideconventionwastheprincipleof ResJudicata, whichwasusedto
ensurethatdecisionsofinternationalcourtsarefinalandbinding.Anothersuchprincipleisthatof

pactasuntservanda,whichmeansthatinternationalagreementsarebindingonthepartieswhoenter
intothem.Thus,theyareaveryimportantsourceoflaw.
4.PrinciplesofEquity:Equityisaveryimportantsourceifinternationallaw,sinceitallowscourtsto
sometimeslookpastthecustomarylawsinordertomakeanequitabledecision.Thiswasobservedin
theContinentalSeaShelfcase,wheretheCourtlookedpasttheCustomarydrawingofnauticallines
andinsteadlookedatthemostequitableandjustoptionavailable.
5.Judicialdecisions:Article38,mentionedabove,listsjudicialdecisionsasasubsidiarymethodof
determining law. Further, Article 59 says that judicial decisions will have no binding power of
precedent.However,judgessometimesinterpretawholeconceptthatisthenusedbyothersasthe
bindinglawonpoint.Inthisway,itcanbeusedasasourceoflaw.Forexample,intheFisheriescase,
whichsetoutthecriteriafordeterminationofbaselinesforthemeasurementofterritorialsea.This
decisionwaslaterusedbythe1958GenevaConventionontheTerritorialSeaandContiguousZone.
6. Writers:Writersalsoplayabigpart ofdeterminingsourcesoflawsincerenownedworkon
jurisprudenceoftencitedbyStatesintheirpresentationofclaims,nationallawofficials,thevarious
internationaljudicialandarbitralbodies,andthejudgesofmunicipalcourts.
Article38(1)ofStatuteofInternationalCourtofJusticeisthemostcomprehensivelegislationforthe
sourcesofinternationallaw.TheArticleissegregatedintotwodistinctsources.Theprimarysource
which recognizes internationalconventions,customs and generalprinciplesoflaw asexclusivelaw
creating processes and the secondary source which establishes judicial decisions and academic
writings aslawdeterminingagencies.However,thearticleissilentabouttheperemptorynorm(jus
cogens)whichisthefundamentalprincipleofinternationallaw.
CUSTOMS
Theessenceofcustomisthatthereshouldbeevidencetothefactthatthegeneralpracticeshouldbe
adheredtoaslaw.Thus,thebasicelementsthatconstituteacustomarethematerialfacts(thebehavior
ofstates)andthesubjectivebelief(opinionjuris)thatthebehaviorofstatesamountstolaw.
Fordeterminingthe materialfacts, theInternationalCourtofJusticehasopinedthatcustomaryrule
soughttobeacknowledgedaslawhastobeinaccordancewithaconstantanduniformusagepracticed
bythestateandobservedinthe AngloNorwegianFisheries casethat,somedegreeofuniformity
amongst state practices was essential before a custom would be recognized as law. However, in
Nicaragua v. United States, the court expounded further that such uniformity of state practice as
prescribedintheAngloNorwegianFisheriescaseneednotbeinabsoluterigorousconformity.
As far as the subjective belief is concerned, the Court of International Justice in the Lotus case
discussedwhen statepractice wouldconstitutecustomarylaw.Thecourt wasoftheopinionthat,
althoughjurisdictionforcrimescommittedonthehighseasweretriedinthosestateswhoseflagthe
shiphoisteditwaselucidatedthatstatepracticewastoabstainfromholdingthecriminaltrialinstates
otherthantheoneswhoseflagtheshiphoistedandthattherewasnoobligationtodothesame.Hence,
withouttheessentialingredientof obligation,statepractice remainedamerepracticeandwasnot
recognizedascustomarylaw.
INTERNATIONALCONVENTIONS
Are writteninstruments byvirtueofwhichstatesbindthemselvestogetherlegallyandestablisha
relationbetweenthemselves.Partiestotheinstrumentare obligated tocarryouttheconditionsand
arrangementsthatareagreedupon.Theobligatorynatureisbasedontheinternationallawprincipleof
pactasuntservanda(agreementsarebinding).
InternationalConventionsaredividedinto:lawmakingtreatiesandtreatycontracts.Likeacontract,
lawmakingtreatiessetdownaseriesofpropositionsthatestablishnewrulesandguidelinesforfuture
internationalconductandarebindingonallmembersofthecontract.Incontrast,treatycontracts,are
notlawmakinginstrumentsinthemselvesastheyarebetweenalimitednumbersofstates.
GENERALPRINCIPLESOFLAW
Wherethelawisnonliquetthejudgesdeducearulebydrawingananalogyfromtheexistingrulesto
guidethelegalsystemandfillthelacunaeinlaw.
PEREMPTORYNORM(juscogens)

FundamentalprinciplesofInternationallawareacceptedintheinternationalcommunityofstatesasa
norm from which derogation is impermissible. Some instances of these norms are outlawing of
genocideandprotectionfromslavery.
b).Thebroaderissuethatneedstobeaddressediswhethermunicipallegalsystemsareobligedtotake
intoaccountthesesourcesoflawwhileexercisingjurisdiction.
DOMESTICJURISDICTION
Owingtothesovereignnatureofstates,thereisapresumptionthatstatesshouldbesupremewithin
their own internal territorial frontier and other states should not interfere in its domestic affairs.
However,influenceofinternationallawcanberealizednow,inareasofexclusivejurisdictionofstates.
Forinstance,treatmentgiventoanationalofacountryhastonowbeinconformitytointernational
humanrights regulations.The AngloNorwegianFisheriescase,discussesthelimit onexerciseof
domesticjurisdiction,whereitwasstressedthat,althoughthecostalstatewascompetenttoactonits
territorial water unilaterally, the validity of its action with regards to other states depends upon
internationallaw.
EXTRATERRITORIALJURISDICTION
Statesexerciseuniversaljurisdiction/extraterritorialjurisdictionwhere,thecrimescommittedareof
universalconcernandeachStatehasaninteresttoprosecutesuchcrime.Thevalidityofextraterritorial
jurisdictionisderivedfromjuscogens.InthePinochetcase,theHouseofLords,prosecutedthehead
ofChileonthegroundsoftorturecommittedbyhimandinvokeduniversaljurisdiction.However,
diplomaticimmunity,canbeseenasanexceptiontoruleofuniversaljurisdiction.IntheBelgianArrest
Warrantcase,wheretheBelgiancourtissuedanarrestwarrantagainsttheForeignministerofCongo
forincitingracialhatred.TheInternationalCourtofJusticewasoftheopinionthatBelgiumhadfailed
torespecttheimmunityenjoyedbytheforeignministerunderinternationallaw.Thearrestofthe
MinisterofForeignAffairsinaninternationalstatewouldhavepreventedhimorherfromexercising
functionsofoffice.
1.

a)AssesstheconceptofcustomarylawthroughtheNicaraguaMeritsCase,NuclearWeaponsCase
andtheAngloNorwegianFisheriescase.
b)IfyouweretoredraftArticle38oftheICJStatute,howwouldyouembarkonit?
Customary Law, which is based on state practice and opinion juris, at many instances creates
uncertaintyastoestablishcertainstatepractice,holdingthevalueoflaw.Thejurisprudenceevolved
onthisissuehasmadeanattempttoaddresssomeoftheseissues.
ANGLONORWEGIANFISHERIESCASE
This case came before the International Court of Justice to decide whether Norways method of
drawingabaselinetomeasureitsterritorialseawaslegalandinconformitywithexistingstatepractice
incustomarylaw.
Thecourtdealtwiththisissuebyobservingthatalthoughthetenmilerulewasadoptedbycertain
statesintheirnationallawandtreaties,otherstatesdidnotadheretothisrule.Thus,thetenmilerule
didnotacquiretheauthorityofageneralruleofinternationallaw.
Norwayfrom1869,hadfollowed,withoutcontentionfromotherstates,certainmethodsofdelimitation
thatitconsideredapartofitslegalframework.Themethodhadboththeelementsofstatepracticeand
opinionjuris enoughtoestablishitascustomarylawandnoobjectionbyotherstatestosuch state
practicewasenoughtoindicatethatthemethodwasnotcontrarytointernationallaw.

i.

NICARAGUACASE
Inthiscasewhichinvolvedmilitaryandparamilitaryactivitiesconductedby,orwiththeaidof,United
StatesagainstNicaragua,theimportantissuesofcustomarylawdealtbytheInternationalCourtof
Justicewere
ThecompetenceofICJtogiveitsdecisionbasedoncustomarylawinthefaceofexistingVandenberg
convention.

ii.
iii.
iv.

Theconnectionbetweencustomarylawandtreatylaw.
Elementsofcustomarylaw.
Prohibitionofuseofforceasbeingajuscogensnorm.
COMPETENCEOFICJTODECIDETHECASE
Whiledealingwiththefirstissue,thecourtwasoftheopinionthatmultilateraltreatyreservationsdid
notprecludetheCourtsfromdeterminingcasesrelyingoncustomaryinternationallaw.TheCourt
reasonedthatcustomaryinternationallawandtreatylawexistedindependentofeachother.
CONNECTIONBETWEENCUSTOMARYLAWANDTREATYLAW
AddressingthesecondissuetheUnitedStatesraisedthecontentionthatwhentreatylawsupervened
customarylawwhenboththesourcesoflawcontainedthesamecontent.Theirrationalbehindthe
argumentwasthat,principleswhichexistedintheUNCharterruledoutthepossibilityofexistenceof
similarrulesincustomarylaw,eitherbecausesuchruleswereincorporatedintheCharterorbecause
customaryruleswereinfluencedbyadoptionofruleswithsimilarcontent.
Inresponsetothiscontention,thecourtdisagreeingwiththeUnitedStatesobservedthatalthough
principles of customary law are codified into treaties, both the sources of law coexist, this is an
essential element, for when a treaty ceases to apply to members the customary law prevails and
continuestobindmembers.ToassertthisprincipletheCourtreliedontheNorthSeaContinentalShelf
Casewhichlaiddownthesameprincipleof coexistenceofcustomarylawandtreatylaw.Thecourt
furtherelucidatedthatArticle51whichdidnotprovideforinherentrightofselfdefenseincaseof
armedconflict,andselfdefensenotbeingapartoftreatylaw,didnotdisablestatesfrominvoking
sucharight.Itwasthereforenotfeasibletoviewtreatylawassuperveningcustomaryinternational
law.TheCourtconcludedbystating:
TheessentialconsiderationisthatboththeCharterandthecustomaryinternationallawflowfroma
commonfundamentalprincipleoutlawingtheuseofforceininternationalrelations.Thedifferences
whichmayexistbetweenthespecificcontentofeacharenot,intheCourtsview,such,astocausea
judgmentconfinedtothefieldofcustomaryinternationallawtobeineffectiveorinappropriate.
ELEMENTSOFCUSTOMARYINTERNATIONALLAW
Todealwiththisissuethecourtexpoundedthatboththe subjectiveelement (opinionjuris)andthe
objective element (state practice) would be considered as essential elements for the formation of
customarylaw.Thecourtfurtherelucidatedthat,forapracticetobeestablishedascustomarylawit
wasnotnecessaryforittobeinabsoluterigorousconformitywiththerule.Thepracticehadtobe
generallyconsistentwiththerule.Incaseswherestateconductwasinconsistentwiththerule,the
breachwouldnotbetreatedasrecognitionofnewrulebutasabreachoftheexistingrule.
PROHIBITIONOFUSEOFFORCE(juscogens)
Thecourtheldthatprohibitiononuseofforcecouldbefoundincustomaryinternationallawas jus
cogensnorm,whichcouldalsobefoundinArticle2(4)oftheUNCharterwhichprohibitsthethreator
useofforceagainstanotherState.
b)Article38beingoneofthemostextensivearticlesonsourcesoflawhastwodrawbacks:
i)Itdoesnotstatethattreatylawandcustomarylawcoexist;and
ii)Thereisnoprovisionforjuscogensbeingnormswhicharebindingonallmembersoftheworld.
Thus,ifthearticlehadtogounderaredraft,theseamendmentswouldbecrucial togivefurther
meaningtotheArticle.
Statehood,Recognition&theRelationshipbetweenInternationalandNationallaw
Intheinternationallegalsystem,noentitycanimposeinternationallawuponastate.Statesarethe
primaryactorsinPILandtheconceptsofstatesovereigntyandstatehoodareattheheartofthe
internationallegalsystem.Noonecanimposeinternationallawuponstates.Statesmustthemselves
givetheirconsenttobeboundbyinternationallaw(usuallythroughtheratificationofinternational
treaties).Theonlyexceptiontothisruleiscustomaryinternationallaw(tobeexaminedinweek5).PIL
is,therefore,traditionallyastatecentricdiscipline.Althoughwewillsee,nonstateactors(NSA)are
playinganincreasinglyimportantroleinPIL
Recognitionofastateorgovt,isalegalacknowledgmentofafactualstateofaffairs.Sincerecognition
isapoliticalact,itisreservedtotheexecutivebranchofthegovernment.
Recognition2theories
1)Constitutivetheoryactofrecognitionbyotherstatesthatcreatesanewstateandendowsitwith

legalpersonalityandnottheprocessbywhichitactuallyobtainedindependence.
Ashortfallofthistheoryisthatifastatedoesnotrecogniseastate,thenthatstatewouldnotbebound
byinternational law,rulesofnonaggressionandnoninterventionetc.USAdidnotrecognisethe
PeoplesRepublicofChinaforalongtime.Thistheoryofrecognitionisimp.whenaterroristsetsupa
state,thenewentityofgovt.willbeinsecureanditisinthiscontextthatrecognitionplaysavitalrole.
Anotherfactorwhichsupprotstheconstitutiveinterpretationofrecognitionistehpracticenmany
stateswherebyanunrecognisedstateororgovt.cannotclaimrightsavailabletorecognisedstateor
govt.beforethemunicipalcourts.
2)DeclaratorytheoryRecognitionismerelyanacceptancebystatesofanalreadyexistingsituation.A
newstatewillacquirecapacityininternationallawnotbyvirtueoftheconsentofothersbutbyvirtue
ofaparticularfactualsituation.
ThefactorswhichtheUSlooksintoforrecognisingastateare:
1)effectivecontroloveraclearlydefinedterritoryandpopulation
2)anorganisedgovt.administrationofthatterritory
3)capacitytoacteffectivelytoconductforeignrelations&fuflfilinternationalobligations
4)whetheritisrecognisedbyotherstatesoftehinternationalcommunity
eg:Kosovodeclaredindependancein2008.USA,UKandmajorityofEUstatesrecognisedit,however,
statessuchasRussia,Serbia,SpainandGreecedidnotrecogniseit.Forthosewhorecognisedit
Kosovo will be entitled to all th privileges and responsibilities of statehood in the international
communityandwithinthelegalsystemsofrecognisingstates.
RecognisingGovernmentsDifffromfromrecognisingstates,therecognitionwillberelevantonly
wherethechaneingovernmentisunconstitutional.
1)Effectivecontrolofanewgovt.overtheterritoryofthestateimpguidelinetodecidewhetherto
extendrecognitionornot(Thedoctrineofeffectivecontrol)
astatedoesnotceasetobeaninternationallegalpersonbecauseitsgovt.isoverthrown.
sometimes,asinthecaseofanewstate,itwouldrequiretherecognitionofboththestateandthe
govt., in this case, if the govt. is recognised, then it automatically means that the state is also
recognizedbuttheviceversadoesnotfollow.
ifthegovernmentisunrecognisedthenthereisnoexchangeofdiplomaticenvoy.
TobarDoctrineifagovt.hascomeintopowerbyextraconstitutionalmeans,thatstateshouldnotbe
recognisedtillthepeopleacceptthegovernment.
lately,statessuchasUK,France,Belgium,adoptedthestandofnotdistinguishingtherecognitionof
stateandgovt.
Defacto/dejurerecognition
defactorecognitioninvolvesahesitantassessmentofthesituation,anattitudeofwaitandsee.does
notinvolvetheexchangeofdiplomaticrelations.
dejuretherecognisingstateacceptsthattheeffectivecontroldisplayedbythegovt.ispermanent
andfirmlyrootedandnolegalreasonsdetractingfrothis
eg:UKrecognisedtheSovietgovtdefactoin1921anddejurein1924.
Prematurerecognition
whenastaterecognisesanemergingstate,i.e.beforeithaseffectivelycontroloveritsterritory.
eg:therecognitionofCroatiabyEuropeancommunityin1992waspremature
Recognitioncanbeoverduetooi.ewhenrecognitionisgivenlongafterthecriteriaofstatehoodhas
beensatisfied.
ImpliedRecognition
Recognition does not always need to be express, i.e. in an open, unambiguous and formal
communication.Itcoudlbeimpliedtoo.
ConditionalRecognition
Thepracticeofmakingtherecognitionsubjecttofulfillmentofcertainconditions.
CollectiveRecognition
Whenstatesdecidetoextendrecognitioncollectively.
membershiptotheUNconstitutespowerfulevidenceofstatehood,howeveritdoesnotmeanallthe

membersoftheUNrecognisesthisnewstate,thestateshavereservedtherighttoextendrecognitionto
theirownexecutiveauthoritiesandtheyneednotdelegateittoanyinternationalinstitution.
Recognitiononcegivencanbewithdrawn.itiseasiertowithdrawdefactorecognition.However,de
jurecanalsobewithdrawn.UKandFrancewithdrewtheirrecognitiontoCambodiain1979.
Nonrecognition
Thedoctrineofnonrecognitionstatesthatundercertainconditions,afactualsituationwillnotbe
recognisedbecauseofstrongreservationsastothemoralityorlegalityoftheactionsthathavebeen
adoptedinordertobringaboutthefactualsituation.Thisdoctrineisreinforcedbytheprinciplelegal
rightscannotbederivedfromanillegalsituation.
Doctrineofdomesticjurisdiction
Thisconstitutesalegalprohibitiononinterferencewithintheinternalmechanismsofanentityand
emphasizesthesupremacyofastatewithinitsownfrontiers.
2methodsbywhichanewentitymaygainitsindependenceasanewstate:
1)constitutionalmeans,thatisbyagreementwiththeformercontrollingadministrationinanorderly
devolutionofpower.
BurmabecameastatebyalegislationpassedbyBurmeseUnitedKingdomagreementandtreatyand
byBurmaIndependenceActof1947.
2)nonconstitutionalmethodsusuallybyforce,againstthewilloftheprevioussovereign.
Thereare5modesofacquisition:
1)Occupationofterranullius
2)Prescription
3)Cession
4)Accretion
5)Subjugation(orconquest)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

ACQUISITION
Thereare5commonmodesofacquisition.Theyare:
Occupationofterranullius;
Prescription;
Cession;
Accretion;and
Subjugation(orconquest)
Thesearefurtherdividedintooriginalandderivativemodes.
Boundarytreatiesandboundaryawards
Boundarytreaties,wherebyeitheradditionalterritoryisacquiredorlostoruncertainboundariesare
clarifiedbyagreementbetweenthestatesconcerned,constitutearootoftitleinthemselves.They
constituteaspecialkindoftreatyinthattheyestablishanobjectiveterritorialregimevalidergaomnes.
Accordingly,manyboundarydisputesinfactrevolvearoundthequestionoftreatyinterpretation.Itis
acceptedthatatreatyshouldbeinterpretedinthelightofArticles31and32oftheVienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary
meaningtobegiventoitstermsintheircontextandinthelightofitsobjectandpurpose.
Essentially the aim is to find the common will of the parties, a concept which includes
considerationofthesubsequentconductoftheparties.Sincemanyoftheboundarytreatiesthatneedto
be interpreted longpredate thecoming intoforce of the Vienna Convention,the problem of the
applicabilityofitsprovisionshasarisen.CourtshavetakentheviewthattheConventioninthisrespect
atleastrepresentscustomaryinternationallaw,thusapparentlyobviatingtheproblem.
In interpreting a boundary treaty, in particular in seeking to resolve ambiguities, the subsequent
practice of the parties will be relevant. Even where such subsequent practice cannot in the
circumstancesconstituteanauthoritativeinterpretation ofthetreaty,it maybedeemedtobe
useful intheprocessofspecifyingthefrontierinquestion.However,wheretheboundarylineas

specified in the pertinent instrument is clear, it cannot be changed by a court in the process of
interpretingdelimitationprovisions.
Likeboundarytreaties,boundaryawardsmayalsoconstituterootsorsourcesoflegaltitleto
territory. A decision by the International Court or arbitral tribunal allocating title to a particular
territory or determining the boundary line as between two states will constitute establishment or
confirmationoftitlethatwillbebindinguponthepartiesthemselvesandforallpracticalpurposes
uponallstatesintheabsenceofmaintainedprotest.
ACCRETION
Thisdescribesthegeographicalprocessbywhichnewlandisformedandbecomesattachedtoexisting
land,asforexamplethecreationofislandsinarivermouthorthechangeindirectionofaboundary
riverleavingdrylandwhereithadformerlyflowed.Wherenewlandcomesintobeingwithinthe
territoryofastate,itformspartoftheterritoryofthestateandthereisnoproblem.Asregardsa
changeinthecourseofariverformingaboundary,adifferentsituationiscreated,dependingwhether
itisimperceptibleandslightoraviolentshift(avulsion).Inthelattercase,thegeneralruleisthatthe
boundarystaysatthesamepointalongtheoriginalriverbed. 1 However,whereagradualmovehas
takenplacetheboundarymaybeshifted.2
CESSION
Thisinvolvesthepeacefultransferofterritoryfromonesovereigntoanother(withtheintentionthat
sovereigntyshouldpass)andhasoftentakenplacewithintheframeworkofapeacetreatyfollowinga
war.
Becausecessionhastheeffectofreplacingonesovereignbyanotheroveraparticularpieceofterritory,
the acquiring state cannot possess more rights over the land than its predecessor had. This is an
importantpoint,sothatwhereathirdstatehascertainrights,forexample,ofpassageovertheterritory,
thenewsovereignmustrespectthem.Therightsoftheterritorialsovereignarederivedfromaprevious
sovereign,whocouldnot,therefore,disposeofmorethanhehad.Thiscontrastswith,forexample,
accretionwhichistreatedasanoriginaltitle,therehavingbeennopreviouslegalsovereignoverthe
land.
TheIslandofPalmascase3emphasisedthispoint.ItconcernedadisputebetweentheUnitedStatesand
theNetherlands.TheclaimsoftheUnitedStateswerebasedonan1898treatywithSpain,which
involvedthecessionoftheisland.Itwasemphasisedbythearbitratorandacceptedbythepartiesthat
SpaincouldnottherebyconveytotheAmericansgreaterrightsthanititselfpossessed.Thebasisof
cessionliesintheintentionoftherelevantpartiestotransfersovereigntyovertheterritoryinquestion.
Withoutthis,itcannotlegallyoperate.
Althoughinstancesofcessionusuallyoccurinanagreementfollowingtheconclusionofhostilities,it
canbeaccomplishedinothercircumstances,suchasthepurchaseofAlaskabytheUnitedStatesin
1867fromRussiaorthesalebyDenmarkofterritoriesintheWestIndiesin1916totheUnitedStates.
Itmayalsoappearinexchangesofterritoriesorpuregiftsofterritory.
CONQUESTANDTHEUSEOFFORCE
Howfaratitlebasedonforcecanberegardedasavalid,legalrightrecognisablebyotherstatesand
enforceablewithintheinternationalsystemisacrucialquestion.Ethicalconsiderationsarerelevantand
theprinciplethatanillegalactcannotgivebirthtoarightinlawiswellestablishedinmunicipallaw
andisanessentialcomponentofanorderlysociety.

See e.g. Georgia v. South Carolina 111 L.Ed.2d 309, 334; 91 ILR, pp. 439, 458. See also the
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351,
546.

2
3

ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 546.

2 RIAA, p. 829 (1928); 4 AD, p. 103.

Conquest,theactofdefeatinganopponentandoccupyingallorpartofitsterritory,doesnotofitself
constituteabasisoftitletotheland.Conquest,ofcourse,mayresultfromalegaloranillegaluseof
force.BytheKelloggBriandPactof1928,warwasoutlawedasaninstrumentofnationalpolicy,and
byarticle2(4)oftheUnitedNationsCharterallmemberstatesmustrefrainfromthethreatoruseof
forceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofanystate.However,forcewillbe
legitimatewhenexercisedinselfdefence.
TheNurembergWarCrimesTribunalaftertheSecondWorldWar,indiscussingthevariouspurported
German annexations of 1939 and 1940, firmly declared that annexations taking place before the
conclusionofawarwereineffectiveandinvalidininternationallaw.Itis,however,cleartodaythatthe
acquisitionofterritorybyforcealoneisillegalunderinternationallaw.Thismaybestatedinviewof
article 2(4) of the UN Charter and other practice. Security Council resolution 242, for example,
emphasisedtheinadmissibilityoftheacquisitionofterritorybywar,whilethe1970Declarationof
PrinciplesofInternationalLawadoptedbytheUNGeneralAssemblyprovidesthat:theterritoryofa
stateshallnotbetheobjectofacquisitionbyanotherstateresultingfromthethreatoruseofforce.No
territorialacquisitionresultingfromthethreatoruseofforceshallberecognisedaslegal.
InSecurityCouncilresolution662(1990),adoptedunanimously,theCouncildecidedthatthedeclared
Iraqi annexation of Kuwait under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity and is
considerednullandvoid.Allstatesandinstitutionswerecalleduponnottorecognisetheannexation
andtorefrainfromactions,whichmightbeinterpretedasindirectrecognition.Acquisitionofterritory
following an armed conflict would require further action of an international nature in addition to
domesticlegislationtoannex.Suchfurthernecessaryactionwouldbeintheformeitherofatreatyof
cessionbytheformersovereignorofinternationalrecognition.
THEEXERCISEOFEFFECTIVECONTROL
Occupationisamethodofacquiringterritorywhichbelongstonoone(terranullius)andwhichmay
beacquiredbyastateincertainsituations.Theoccupationmustbebyastateandnotbyprivate
individuals,itmustbeeffectiveanditmustbeintendedasaclaimofsovereigntyoverthearea.It
relatesprimarilytouninhabitedterritoriesandislands,butmayalsoapplytocertaininhabitedlands.
TheissuewasraisedintheWesternSaharacasebeforetheInternationalCourtofJustice.Thequestion
wasaskedastowhethertheterritoryinquestionhadbeenterranulliusatthetimeofcolonisation.It
wasemphasisedbytheCourtthattheconceptofterranulliuswasalegaltermofartusedinconnection
withthemodeofacquisitionofterritoryknownasoccupation.Thelattermodewasdefinedlegallyas
anoriginalmeansofpeaceablyacquiringsovereigntyoverterritoryotherwisethanbycessionor
succession.Inanimportantstatement,theCourtunambiguouslyassertedthatthestatepracticeofthe
relevant period (i.e. the period of colonisation) indicated that territories inhabited by tribes or
peopleshavingasocialandpoliticalorganisationwerenotregardedasterraenullius.
Prescriptionisamodeofestablishingtitletoterritorywhichisnotterranulliusandwhichhasbeen
obtained either unlawfully or in circumstances wherein the legality of the acquisition cannot be
demonstrated.Itreflectstheneedforstabilityfeltwithintheinternationalsystembyrecognisingthat
territoryinthepossessionofastateforalongperiodoftimeanduncontestedcannotbetakenaway
fromthatstatewithoutseriousconsequencesfortheinternationalorder.
Prescriptiondiffersfromoccupationinthatitrelatestoterritorywhichhaspreviouslybeenunderthe
sovereigntyofastate.Inspiteofthis,bothconceptsaresimilarinthattheymayrequireevidence
ofsovereignactsbyastateoveraperiodoftime.Andalthoughdistinctintheory,inpracticethese
conceptsareoftenindistinctsincesovereigntyoveranareamaylapseandgiverisetodoubtswhether
abandonmenthastakenplace,renderingtheterritoryterranullius.
Acquiescence in the case of prescription, whether express or implied from all the relevant
circumstances, is essential, whereas in the case of occupation it is merely an evidential point
reinforcingtheexistenceofaneffectiveoccupation,butnotconstitutingtheessenceofthelegalclaim.

ThereisathirdmodeoftheoreticalclassificationthathasbeenoutlinedbyDeVisscherwhoattempted
torenderitmoreconsonantwithpracticalrealitiesbytheintroductionoftheconceptofhistorical
consolidation.Thisideaisfoundedonprovenlonguse,whichreflectsacomplexofinterestsand
relationsresultingintheacquisitionofterritory(includingpartsofthesea). Historicalconsolidation
mayapplytoterranulliusaswellastoterritoriespreviouslyoccupied.Thusitcanbedistinguished
fromprescription.Itdiffersfromoccupationinthattheconcepthasrelevancetotheacquisitionofparts
ofthesea,aswellasofland.Anditmaybebroughtintoexistencenotonlybyacquiescenceand
consent,butalsobytheabsenceofprotestoverareasonableperiodbyrelevantstates.
AftertheAngloNorwegianFisheriescase,itwasfoundthatDeVisschersclassificationfailedtotake
intoaccountofthedistinctionbetweentheacquisitionofterritory inaccordance withtherulesof
internationallaw,andacquisitionofterritory asapermittedexception tointernationallyaccepted
legalprinciples.Effectiveness,therefore,ratherthanconsolidationwouldbetheappropriateterm.Both
occupationandprescriptionrelyprimarilyuponeffectivepossessionandcontrol.Theelementoftime
isherealsorelevantasitaffectstheeffectivenessofcontrol.
INTERTEMPORALLAW
One question that arises is the problem of changing conditions related to particular principles of
internationallaw,inotherwordstherelevanttimeperiodatwhichtoascertainthelegalrightsand
obligationsinquestion.Thegeneralruleinsuchcircumstancesisthatinadisputetheclaimorsituation
inquestion(orrelevanttreaty,forexample)hastobeexaminedaccordingtotheconditionsandrulesin
existenceatthetimeitwasmadeandnotatalaterdate.
CriticalDate
Incertainsituationstheremayexistadeterminingmomentatwhichitmightbeinferredthattherights
ofthepartieshavecrystallisedsothatactsafterthatdatecannotalterthelegalposition.Suchamoment
mightbethedateofaparticulartreatywhereitsprovisionsareatissueorthedateofoccupationof
territory.
Theconceptofacriticaldateisofespecialrelevancewithregard tothedoctrineofutipossidetis,
whichpositsthatanewstatehastheboundariesofthepredecessorentity,sothatthemomentof
independenceitselfisinvariablythecriticaldate.
SOVEREIGNACTIVITIES
Theexerciseofeffectiveauthorityisthecrucialelementtodetermineacquisitionandtitle.
However,control,althoughneedingtobeeffective,doesnotnecessarilyhavetoamounttopossession
andsettlementofalloftheterritoryclaimed.Preciselywhatactsofsovereigntyarenecessarytofound
titlewilldependineachinstanceuponalltherelevantcircumstancesofthecase,includingthenature
oftheterritoryinvolved,theamountofopposition(ifany)thatsuchactsonthepartoftheclaimant
statehavearoused,andinternationalreaction.
Indeedininternationallawmanytitleswillbedeemedtoexistnotasabsolutebutasrelativeconcepts.
Thestatesucceedinginitsclaimforsovereigntyoverterranulliusovertheclaimsofotherstateswillin
most cases have proved not an absolute title, but one relatively better than that maintained by
competing states and one that may take into account issues such as geography and international
responses.
Inthe IslandofPalmas arbitrationthedisputeconcernedsovereigntyoveraparticularislandinthe
Pacific.TheUnitedStatesdeclaredthat,sincebyatreatyof1898SpainhadcededtoitallSpanish
rightspossessedinthatregionandsincethatincludedtheislanddiscoveredbySpain,theUnitedStates
ofAmericathereforehadagoodtitle.TheNetherlands,ontheotherhand,claimedtheterritoryonthe
basis of the exercise of various rights of sovereignty over it since the seventeenth century. The
arbitrator, Max Huber, in a judgment which discussed the whole nature of territorial sovereignty,

dismissedtheAmericanclaimsderivedfromtheSpanishdiscoveryasnoteffectivetofoundtitle. 4
HuberdeclaredthattheNetherlandspossessedsovereigntyonthebasisoftheactualcontinuousand
peaceful display of state functions evidenced by various administrative acts performed over the
centuries.5Itwasalsoemphasisedthatmanifestationsofterritorialsovereigntymayassumedifferent
forms, according to conditions of time and place. Indeed, the intermittence and discontinuity
compatiblewiththemaintenanceoftherightnecessarilydifferaccordingasinhabitedoruninhabited
regionsareinvolved.Additionally,geographicalfactorswererelevant. 6
TheClippertonIslandarbitrationconcernedadisputebetweenFranceandMexicooveranuninhabited
island.Thearbitratoremphasisedthattheactual,andnotthenominal,takingofpossessionwasa
necessaryconditionofoccupation,butnotedthatsuchtakingofpossessionmaybeundertakenin
differentwaysdependinguponthenatureoftheterritoryconcerned.Inthiscase,aproclamationof
sovereigntybyaFrenchnavalofficerlaterpublishedinHonoluluwasdeemedsufficienttocreatea
validtitle.RelevanttothisdecisionwastheweaknessoftheMexicanclaimstotheguanorichisland,
aswellastheuninhabitedandinhospitablenatureoftheterritory.
IntheEasternGreenlandcasebeforethePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice,bothNorwayand
Denmark claimed sovereignty over Eastern Greenland. Denmark had colonies in other parts of
GreenlandandhadgrantedconcessionsintheuninhabitedEasternsector.Inaddition,itproclaimed
thatalltreatiesandlegislationregardingGreenlandcoveredtheterritoryasawhole,asforexampleits
establishmentofthewidthoftheterritorialsea,anditsoughttohaveitstitletoalloftheterritory
recognisedbyotherstates.TheCourtfeltthattheseactsweresufficientuponwhichtobaseagoodtitle
andweresuperiortovariousNorwegianactionssuchasthewinteringofexpeditionsandtheerection
ofawirelessstationinEasternGreenland,againstwhichDenmarkhadprotested.Itisalsotobenoted
thatitwasnotuntil1931thatNorwayactuallyclaimedtheterritory.
Suchactivityinestablishingaclaimtoterritorymustbeperformedbythestateintheexerciseof
sovereign powers or by individuals whose actions are subsequently ratified by their state, or by
corporationsorcompaniespermittedbythestatetoengageinsuchoperationsandthusperformedon
behalfofthesovereign.Anotherrelevantfactor,althoughoneofuncertainstrength,istherequirement
oftheintentionbythestateinperformingvariousactivitiestoassertclaiminitssovereigncapacity.
ThispointwasstressedintheEasternGreenlandcase,7butappearsnottohavebeenconsideredasof
firstimportanceintheIslandofPalmascase.
THEROLEOFSUBSEQUENTCONDUCT
Subsequentconductmayberelevantinanumberofways:first,asamethodofdeterminingthetrue
interpretationoftherelevantboundaryinstrumentinthesenseoftheintentionoftheparties;secondly,
asamethodofresolvinganuncertaindispositionorsituation,forexample,whetheraparticulararea
didordidnotfallwithinthecolonialterritoryinquestionforpurposesofdeterminingtheutipossidetis
lineorthirdly,asamethodofmodifyingsuchaninstrumentorpreexistingarrangement.
Note:Recognition,acquiescenceandestoppelflow,tosomeextent,fromtheprinciplesofgoodfaith
andequity.
While,ofcourse,theconsentofacedingstatetothecessionisessential,theattitudeadoptedbyother
statesispurelyperipheralandwillnotaffectthelegalityofthetransaction.Similarly,incasesofthe
acquisitionoftitleoverterranullius,theacquiescenceofotherstatesisnotstrictlyrelevantalthoughof
usefulevidentialeffect.However,wheretwoormorestateshaveassertedcompetingclaims,theroleof
consent by third parties is much enhanced. In the Eastern Greenland case, the Court noted that
Denmarkwasentitledtorelyupontreatiesmadewithotherstates(apartfromNorway)insofaras
thesewereevidenceofrecognitionofDanishsovereigntyoverallofGreenland.

4
5
6
7

p. 846
pp. 86771.
p. 840.
p. 95.

TheleadingcaseonestoppelistheTempleofPreahVihearwhichconcernedaborderdisputebetween
CambodiaandThailand.Thefrontierwasthesubjectofatreatyin1904betweenThailandandFrance
(assovereignoverFrenchIndoChinawhichincludedCambodia)whichprovidedforadelimitation
commission.TheborderwasdulysurveyedbutwasambiguousastothesitingofthePreahVihear
templearea.ThailandcalledforamapfromtheFrenchauthoritiesandthisplacedtheareawithin
Cambodia.TheThaigovernmentacceptedthemapandaskedforfurthercopies. 8Anumberofother
incidentstookplace,includingavisitbyaThaiprincetothetempleareaforanofficialreceptionwith
theFrenchflagclearlyflyingthere,whichconvincedtheInternationalCourtthatThailandhadtacitly
acceptedFrenchsovereigntyoverthedisputedarea. 9 Inotherwords,Thailandwasestoppedbyits
conductfromclaimingthatitcontestedthefrontierinthetemplearea.However,itistobenotedthat
estoppel in that case was one element in a complexity of relevant principles which included
prescriptionandtreatyinterpretation.Thecasealsoseemedtoshowthatinsituationsofuncertainty
andambiguity,thedoctrinesofacquiescenceandestoppelcomeintotheirown,butitwouldnotappear
correcttorefertoestoppelasaruleofsubstantivelaw.
SUMMARY
Apartfromthemodesofacquisitionthatrelypurelyontheconsentofthestateandtheconsequences
ofsovereignty(cessionoraccretion),themethodofacquiringadditionalterritoryisbythesovereign
exercise of effective control. Both occupation and prescription are primarily based upon effective
possessionand,althoughthetimeelementisafactorinprescription,thisinfactisreallyconcerned
withtheeffectivenessofcontrol.
Theprincipleofeffectivecontrolappliesindifferentwaystodifferentsituations,butitsessenceisthat
thecontinuousandpeacefuldisplayofterritorialsovereignty...isasgoodastitle. 10Suchcontrolhas
tobedeliberatesovereignaction,butwhatwillamounttoeffectivenessisrelativeandwilldepend
upon,forexample,thegeographicalnatureoftheregion,theexistenceornotofcompetingclaimsand
otherrelevantfactors,suchasinternationalreaction.
Effectivenesshasalsoatemporalaswellasaspatialdimensionasthedoctrineofintertemporallaw
hasemphasised,whileclearlythepublicoropennatureofthecontrolisessential.Theacquiescenceof
apartydirectlyinvolvedisalsoaveryimportantfactorinprovidingevidenceoftheeffectivenessof
control.Effectivenessisrelatedtotheinternationalsystemasawhole,sothatmerepossessionbyforce
is not the sole determinant of title. This factor also emphasises and justifies the role played by
recognition.
Bilateralrecognitionisimportantasevidenceofeffectivecontrolandshouldberegardedaspartofthat
principle. International recognition, however, involves not only a means of creating rules of
internationallawintermsofpracticeandconsentofstates,butmayvalidatesituationsofdubious
origin.Aseriesofrecognitionsmaypossiblyvalidateanunlawfulacquisitionofterritoryandcould
similarlypreventeffectivecontrolfromeverhardeningintotitle.ThesignificanceofUNrecognitionis
selfevident,sothattheUNSecurityCouncilitselfcouldadoptabindingresolutionendingaterritorial
disputebydeterminingtheboundaryinquestion.Sovereignterritorymaynotonlybeacquired,itmay
alsobelostinwaysthatessentiallymirrorthemodesofacquisition.Territorymaybelostbyexpress
declarationorconductsuchasatreatyofcessionoracceptanceofsecession;bylossofterritoryby
erosionornaturalgeographicactivityorbyacquiescencethroughprescription.Further,territorymay
beabandoned,butinorderforthistooperateboththephysicalactofabandonmentandtheintentionto
surrendertitlearerequired.
1.
U
NDERINTERNATIONALLAWWHATISTHEDEFINITIONOFASTATE?
Foraunittoberegardedasastateunderinternationallawitmustconformwiththelegalconditionsas
tosettledpopulation,adefinableareaoflandandthecapacitytoenterintolegalrelations.

8 pp. 6, 23; 33 ILR, pp. 48, 62.

9 ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 302; 33 ILR, p. 68.
10 Judge Huber, Island of Palmas case, 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 839 (1928); 4 AD, p. 103.

Undertraditionalinternationallaw,untilonehasastateonecannottalkintermsoftitletotheterritory,
becausetheredoesnotexistanylegalpersoncapableofholdingthelegaltitle.Sotodiscoverthe
processofacquisitionoftitletoterritory,onehastofirstpointtoanestablishedstate.

2.
W
HAT DID THE ICJ DECIDE ABOUT THE LEGALITY OF THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE BYKOSOVO?DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THEICJS DECISION SOLVED THE PROBLEM
OFWHETHERKOSOVOISASTATEUNDERINTERNATIONALLAW?
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of
KosovowasarequestforanadvisoryopinionreferredtotheInternationalCourtofJusticebytheUN
GeneralAssemblyregardingthe2008Kosovodeclarationofindependence.TheterritoryofKosovois
thesubjectofadisputebetween Serbia andthe RepublicofKosovo establishedbythedeclaration.
Thiswasthefirstcaseregardinga unilateral declarationofindependence tobebroughtbeforethe
court.
Thecourtdelivereditsadvisoryopinionon22July2010;byavoteof10to4,itdeclaredthat"the
adoption of the declaration of independence of the 17 February 2008 did not violate general
internationallawbecause
(1)internationallawcontainsno'prohibitionondeclarationsofindependence'":
[2]nordidtheadoptionofthedeclarationofindependenceviolateUNSecurityCouncilResolution
1244,sincethisdidnotdescribeKosovo'sfinalstatus,norhadtheSecurityCouncilreservedforitself
thedecisiononfinalstatus.
There were many reactions to the decision, with most countries which already recognise Kosovo
hailingthedecisionandsayingitwas"unique"anddoesnotsetaprecedent;whilemanycountries
whichdonotrecogniseKosovosaidtheywouldnotbedoingsoastherulingcouldsetaprecedentof
endorsingsecessioninotherplaces.
3.
W
HOARENONSTATEACTORSANDHOWHAVETHEYAFFECTEDTHEEVOLUTIONOFPIL?
1.Theconceptofnonstateactorsisgenerallyunderstoodasincludinganyentitythatisnotactuallya
state,oftenusedtorefertoarmedgroups,terrorists,civilsociety,religiousgroupsorcorporations.Itis
occasionallyusedtoencompassintergovernmentalorganizations.
Inthecontextofpostconflictpeacebuilding,theexpression"nonstateactor"isusedtorefertoarange
ofarmedgroupsthatoperatebeyondstatecontrol.
Itcouldbedefinedasanactorontheinternationalstageotherthanasovereignstate.
Armednonstateactors'(NSAs)aredefinedas'armedgroupsthatoperatebeyondstatecontrol'.It
includes,butisnotlimitedto,thefollowinggroup:
rebeloppositiongroups(groupswithastatedincompatibilitywiththegovt,generallyconcerningthe
controlofgovtorthecontrolofterritory)
localmilitias
vigilantes
warlords
civildefenceforcesandparamilitarygroups
privatecompaniesthatprovidemilitaryandsecurityservices
Certaininternationaltreatiessuchas(UNConventionagainstcorruption,TheContonouAgreement)
obligestatestocooperatewithrelevantNSA.IntheCotonouAgreement,thepartiesaretoinformand
involveNSAwhileformingpoliciesandstrategies,theyaretoevenprovidefinancialresourcesunder
certainconditions,etc.EventreatiesinhumanrightsinvolveNSA's.
Problemsofengagingnonstateactors

1)Theopenendednatureofthetermdefiesarestrictivedefinitionandgivesrisetomisunderstandings
andtensions.Corporationsfindthemselvesbrandedinthesamecategoryasrebelgroups,UNwiththe
paramilitaries.
2)ThereisfearthatengagingwithNSA'swilllegitimizethegroupanddilutethepowerofthestate
3)InternationalsystemneedstoremainstatecentricandbyworkingwithNSAs,itinvolvesswimming
againstthetide!
NSA'sareinstrumentalingeneratingsoftlawandtheyarealsoinfluentialinacceleratingthepolitical
processtomotivatestatestocreatehardlaw.(throughlobbyingefforts,informationalcampaignsand
coordinatingactionamongvariousorganization.
NSA represent interests different than those of state actors and they are primarily accountable to
different topeople.Theyrepresentdifferentinterestsandtherebyreducetheperceiveddemocratic
deficit. NSA's are also participants to international negotiations. Though the states conduct the
negotiation,NGAplayavarietyofinfluentialroles.
BasicPrinciplesofPILII:
StateResponsibility,theInternationalCourtofJustice&DiplomaticPrivileges&Immunities
1.

2.

FROMWHATARESTATESIMMUNE?
The principleofsovereignequalityofStates requiresthat theofficial representativesofoneState
shouldnotbesubjecttothejurisdictionofanotherState.Forexample,thelawoftheseaprovidesthat
warshipsaresubjectonlytothejurisdictionoftheflagState.Evenifwarshipscommitactscontraryto
therightofinnocentpassageorthelawsandregulationsofthecoastalState,thecoastalStatesonly
remedyistoescorttheoffendingwarshipoutoftheterritorialsea.
The principle of State immunity or sovereign immunity provides that foreign sovereigns enjoy
immunityfromthejurisdictionofotherStates.
Sovereignimmunity,orstateimmunity,isaprincipleofcustomaryinternationallaw,byvirtueof
whichonesovereignstatecannot besuedbeforethecourtsofanothersovereignstatewithout its
consent.Putinanotherway,asovereignstateisexemptfromthejurisdictionofforeignnationalcourts.
Thus,thequestionofimmunityisatthesametimeaquestionofjurisdiction:onlywhenthecourt
alreadyhasjurisdictionwillitbecomemeaningfultospeakofimmunityorexemptionfromit.Forthis
reason, sovereign immunity is also referred to as jurisdictional immunity or immunity from
jurisdiction. Because different types of legal proceedings may be brought against foreign states,
sometimescourtsfinditnecessarytorefertojurisdictionalimmunitiesofstates.
Theprincipleofdiplomaticimmunity providesthatthe diplomaticagents ofthesendingStatehave
completeimmunityfromthecriminaljurisdictionofthereceivingState.Sincethisimmunitybelongs
tothesendingStateandnottothediplomat,itcanbewaivedbythesendingState.
Also,thereceivingStatehastherighttoexpelanydiplomaticagentfromitscountrybydeclaringthem
personanongrata.The premisesofanembassyordiplomaticmissionaswellasitsrecordsand
archivesarealsoinviolable. TheauthoritiesofthereceivingState cannotenteraforeignembassy
withouttheexpresspermissionoftheheadofmission,eveninthecaseofanemergency.
WHATDIPLOMATICPRIVILEGESDOSTATESANDCERTAINSTATEREPRESENTATIVESHAVE?
TheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelations1961,codifiedtheexistinglawsandestablishedother
lawsondiplomaticprivilegesandimmunity.
1)A22oftheViennaconventiondeclaresthepremisesofthemissiontobeinviolableandagentsof
thereceivingstatearenottoenterthemwithouttheconsentofthemission.
2)A27providesthatthereceivingstateshallpermitandprotectfreecommunicationonbehalfofthe
missionforallofficialpurposes.
3)Thediplomaticbagcannotbeopenedordetainedandthatthepackagesconstitutingthediplomatic
bagmustbearvisibleexternalmarksoftheircharacterandmaycontainonlydiplomaticdocumentsor
articlesintendedforofficialuse.
4)A23grantsageneralexceptionfromtaxationinrespectofthemissionpremisesisposited.
5)Archivesanddocumentsofthediplomaticmissionarealsoinviolable
6)A29thepersonofadiplomaticagentisinviolable(hecannotbedetainedorarrested)However,in
exceptionalcases,adiplomatmaybearrestedordetainedonthebasisofselfdefenseorintheinterests

ofprotectinghumanlife.
7)A30(1)providesfortheinviolabilityofthepvtresidenceofadiplomaticagent
8)A30(2)providesinviolabilityforthediplomat'spapers,correspondenceandproperty
9)Diplomaticagentsenjoycompleteimmunityfromthecriminaljurisdictionofthereceivingstate
10)Diplomatsarealsoimmunefromcivilandadministrativejurisdictionofthestateinwhichtheyare
serving.exceptin3cases
(1)wheretheactionrelatestopvtimmovableprop.Situatedwithinthehoststate(unlessformission
purposes)
(2)litigationrelatingtosuccessionmattersinwhichheisinvolvedasaprivateperson
(3)w.r.tunofficialprofessionalorcommercialactivityengagedinbytheagent
11)Diplomaticpersonareimmunefromalltaxesexceptindirecttaxes
12)Familymembersofthediplomaticagentformingpartofhishouseholdwouldenjoythe
priviledgesandimmunitiesstatedinA2936,iftheyarenotnationalsofthereceivingstate.
Theonlyremedythehoststatehaswhenadiplomatcommitsanoffence,istodeclarehimpersonanon
grataunderarticle9.

3.

DOSITTINGHEADSOFSTATEHAVEDIPLOMATICIMMUNITYFROMSOMEORALLACTS?WHATDO
THEPINOCHETANDDRCV.BELGIUMCASESINDICATEABOUTDIPLOMATICIMMUNITY?

4.

WHOORWHATCANBEHELDRESPONSIBLEFORAVIOLATIONOFPIL?

5.

UNDERWHATCIRCUMSTANCES,IFANY,COULDTHEACTSOFANINDIVIDUAL,ORINDIVIDUALS,
GIVERISETOSTATERESPONSIBILITY?
Stateresponsibilitywheneveronestatecommitsaninternationallyunlawfulactagainstanotherstate,
internationalresponsibilityisestablishedbetweenthetwo.
InternationalLawCommissionhasworkedonthis,Article1ofILC'sarticlesonstateresponsibility
reiteratestherule.
Theessentialcharacteristicsofresponsibiltyhingeuponcertainbasicfactors:
1)theexistenceofaninternationallegalobligationinforcebetween2particularstates
2)anactoromissionmustoccurwhichviolatestheobligationwhichisimputabletothestate
responsibilty
3)thisunlawfulactoromissionresultedinlossordamage
Itisinternationallawthatdetermineswhatconstitutesaninternationallyunlawfulact,irrespectiveof
anyprovisionsofmunicipallaw.
Thestate'sresponsibilityisstrict,i.e.itfollowstheprincipleofobjectiveresponsibility.Itdoesnot
matteriftehactwasdoneingoodorbadfaith,onceinjuryhasbeencausedbyanagentoftehstate,the
statewouldberesponsible.
Thedoctrineofimputabilityifthereexistsalinkbetweenthestateandthepersonorpersonsactually
committingtheunlawfulactoromission,thenthestateisresponsible.
IntheGenocideConvention(Bosniav.Serbia)casewhichisregardedas'oneofthecornerstonesof
thelawofstateresponsibility,itwasheldthattheconductofanystateorganistobeconsideredanact
ofthestateunderinternationallawandthereforegivesrisetotheresponsibilityofthestateifit
constitutesabreachofanobligationofthestate.
Thestatewouldberesponsibleevenifit'sagentororganactedbeyondtheirscopeofauthority.(I.E.
evenifanactisultravires,thestatewouldstillberesponsible)

theconductofapersonoragroupofpersonswouldbeconsideredasanactofthestateunder
internationallawiftheconductofapersonorgroupofpersonsshallbeconsideredasanactofthe
statewasifitexercisingelementsofauthority.
Thegeneralprincipleisonnonliabilityforactsofmobviolence,insurrectionsandcivilwarsbut
statehastoshowduediligence.
Ifastatecomestopoweraftersomeactsofviolence,onceitcomestopoweritwillberesponsible.
Circumstancesprecludingwrongfulness
1)Countermeasures
Lawfulcountermeasuresmustbeinresponsetoapriorwrongfulactandtakeninlightofrefusalto
remedyit,directedagainstthestatecommittingthewrongfulactandproportionate.
Theinjuredstatemustcallupontheresponsiblestatetofulfillitsobligationsandnotifythatstateof
anydecisiontotakecountermeasuresandshouldoffertonegotiate.
2)ForceMajeureacceptedasprecludingwrongfulnessalthoughthestandardofproofishigh.The
emphasis,therefore,isuponthehappeningofaneventthattakesplacewithoutthestatebeingableto
doanythingtorectifytheeventoravertitsconsequences.Testofapplicabilitywasof"absoluteand
materialimpossibility".
Consequencesofinternationallywrongfulacts:
1)CessationThestateresponsiblefortheinternationallywrongfulactisunderanobligationtocease
theact,ifitiscontinuing,andtoofferappropriateassurancesandguaranteesifnonrepetitionif
circumstancessorequire.
2)ReparationRemedyingthebreachofaninternationalobligationforwhichthestateconcernedis
responsible,
Whenthereisabreachofajuscogensitisconsideredasan"internationalcrime".iscommittedby
astatewhenitcommitsaninternationallywrongfulactwhichconstitutesabreachofaninternational
obligationthatisconsideredtobeafundamentalinteresttotheinternationalcommunity.

Allotherinternationallywrongfulactsaretermedasinternationaldelicts.
Astatecouldberesponsibleforfailingtoprovidediplomaticprotectionandnationalityclaims.Astate
isunderadutytoprotectitsnationalsanditmaytakeu[theirclaimsagainstotherstatestoo.
Customaryinternationallawprovidesthatbeforeinternationalproceedingsareinstitutedorclaimsor
representationsmade,theremediesprovidedbythelocalstateshouldhavebeenexhausted.(The
exhaustionoflocalremedies)
6.
7.
8.
9.

WHATDOESTHEGENOCIDECASETELLUSABOUTSTATERESPONSIBILITY?
WHATISTHEJURISDICTIONOFTHEINTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE(ICJ)?
AREICJDECISIONSBINDINGUPONSTATES?
CANANYOTHERENTITIESEXCEPTFORSTAESGOBEFORETHEICJ?

10. HOWDOESTHECONCEPTOFEXTRADITIONWEAVEINTOIMMUNITY?
PinochetCase(Extracts)
Aformerheadofstateonlyhasimmunitywithregardtohisactsasaheadofstatebutnotwithregard
toactswhichfalloutsidehisroleasheadofstate.Aheadofstatemaybetreatedasthestateitselfand
entitledtothesameimmunities.
Aformerheadofstatecannothaveimmunityforactsofmurdercommittedoutsidehisownterritory.
InternationallawrecognizescrimesagainsthumanityandtheTortureConventionsaysthatno
circumstancescanbeinvokedasjustificationfortorture.Thereforeitcannotbeapartofthefunctionof
aheadofstateunderinternationallawtocommitthosecrimes.
Thereisgeneralagreementbetweenthepartiesastotherulesofstatutoryimmunityandtherationale

whichunderliesthem.Theissueiswhetherinternationallawgrantsstateimmunityinrelationtothe
internationalcrimeoftortureand,ifso,whethertheRepublicofChileisentitledtoclaimsuch
immunityeventhoughChile,SpainandtheUnitedKingdomareallpartiestotheTortureConvention
andthereforecontractuallyboundtogiveeffecttoitsprovisionsfrom8December1988atthelatest.
CURRENTHEADOFSTATE
Itisabasicprincipleofinternationallawthatonesovereignstate(theforumstate)doesnotadjudicate
ontheconductofaforeignstate.Theforeignstateisentitledtoproceduralimmunityfromthe
processesoftheforumstate.Thisimmunityextendstobothcriminalandcivilliability.Stateimmunity
probablygrewfromthehistoricalimmunityofthepersonofthemonarch.Inanyevent,suchpersonal
immunityoftheheadofstatepersiststothepresentday:theheadofstateisentitledtothesame
immunityasthestateitself.Thediplomaticrepresentativeoftheforeignstateintheforumstateisalso
affordedthesameimmunityinrecognitionofthedignityofthestatewhichherepresents.This
immunityenjoyedbyaheadofstateinpowerandanambassadorinpostisacompleteimmunity
attachingtothepersonoftheheadofstateorambassadorandrenderinghimimmunefromallactions
orprosecutionswhetherornottheyrelatetomattersdoneforthebenefitofthestate.Suchimmunityis
saidtobegrantedrationepersonae.
FORMERHEADOFSTATE
Whatthenwhentheambassadorleaveshispostortheheadofstateisdeposed?Thepositionofthe
ambassadoriscoveredbytheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelations(1961).Afterprovidingfor
immunityfromarrest(article29)andfromcriminalandciviljurisdiction(article31),article39(1)
providesthattheambassadorsprivilegesshallbeenjoyedfromthemomenthetakesuppost;and
paragraph(2)provides:
Whenthefunctionsofapersonenjoyingprivilegesandimmunitieshavecometoanend,such
privilegesandimmunitiesshallnormallyceaseatthemomentwhenheleavesthecountry,oronexpiry
ofareasonableperiodinwhichtodoso,butshallsubsistuntilthattime,evenincaseofarmed
conflict.However,withrespecttoactsperformedbysuchapersonintheexerciseofhisfunctionsasa
memberofthemission,immunityshallcontinuetosubsist.
Thecontinuingpartialimmunityoftheambassadorafterleavingpostisofadifferentkindfromthat
enjoyedrationepersonaewhilehewasinpost.Sinceheisnolongertherepresentativeoftheforeign
statehemeritsnoparticularprivilegesorimmunitiesasaperson.Howeverinordertopreservethe
integrityoftheactivitiesoftheforeignstateduringtheperiodwhenhewasambassador,itisnecessary
toprovidethatimmunityisaffordedtohisofficialactsduringhistenureinpost.Ifthiswerenotdone
thesovereignimmunityofthestatecouldbeevadedbycallinginquestionactsdoneduringthe
previousambassadorstime.Accordinglyunderarticle39(2)theambassador,likeanyotherofficialof
thestate,enjoysimmunityinrelationtohisofficialactsdonewhilehewasanofficial.Thislimited
immunity,rationemateriae,istobecontrastedwiththeformerimmunityrationepersonaewhichgave
completeimmunitytoallactivitieswhetherpublicorprivate.
Inmyjudgmentatcommonlawaformerheadofstateenjoyssimilarimmunities,rationemateriae,
onceheceasestobeheadofstate.Hetoolosesimmunityrationepersonaeonceasingtobeheadof
state:seeSirArthurWattsQ.C.,HagueLectures,TheLegalPositioninInternationalLawofHeadsof
States,HeadsofGovernmentandForeignMinisters1994III247Recueildescours,p.88andthe
casestherecited.Hecanbesuedonhisprivateobligations:ExKingFaroukofEgyptv.ChristianDior
(1957)24I.L.R.228;Jimenezv.Aristeguieta(1962)311F.2d547.Asexheadofstatehecannotbe
suedinrespectofactsperformedwhilstheadofstateinhispubliccapacity:Hatchv.Baez(1876)7
Hun596.Thus,atcommonlaw,thepositionoftheformerambassadorandtheformerheadofstate
appearstobemuchthesame:bothenjoyimmunityforactsdoneinperformanceoftheirrespective
functionswhilstinoffice.
Thequestionthenwhichhastobeanswerediswhethertheallegedorganisationofstatetortureby
SenatorPinochet(ifproved)wouldconstituteanactcommittedbySenatorPinochetaspartofhis
officialfunctionsasheadofstate.Itisnotenoughtosaythatitcannotbepartofthefunctionsofthe
headofstatetocommitacrime.Actionswhicharecriminalunderthelocallawcanstillhavebeen
doneofficiallyandthereforegiverisetoimmunityrationemateriae.Thecaseneedstobeanalysed
moreclosely.
Canitbesaidthatthecommissionofacrimewhichisaninternationalcrimeagainsthumanityandjus
cogensisanactdoneinanofficialcapacityonbehalfofthestate?Ibelievetheretobestrongground
forsayingthattheimplementationoftortureasdefinedbytheTortureConventioncannotbeastate

function.ThisistheviewtakenbySirArthurWattsQ.C.inhisHagueLecturewhosaid,atp.82:
[*204]
Whilegenerallyinternationallawdoesnotdirectlyinvolveobligationsonindividualspersonally,
thatisnotalwaysappropriate,particularlyforactsofsuchseriousnessthattheyconstitutenotmerely
internationalwrongs(inthebroadsenseofacivilwrong)butratherinternationalcrimeswhichoffend
againstthepublicorderoftheinternationalcommunity.Statesareartificiallegalpersons:theycanonly
actthroughtheinstitutionsandagenciesofthestate,whichmeans,ultimately,throughitsofficialsand
otherindividualsactingonbehalfofthestate.Forinternationalconductwhichissoseriousastobe
taintedwithcriminalitytoberegardedasattributableonlytotheimpersonalstateandnottothe
individualswhoorderedorperpetrateditisbothunrealisticandoffensivetocommonnotionsof
justice.Theideathatindividualswhocommitinternationalcrimesareinternationallyaccountablefor
themhasnowbecomeanacceptedpartofinternationallaw.Problemsinthisareasuchasthenon
existenceofanystandinginternationaltribunaltohavejurisdictionoversuchcrimes,andthelackof
agreementastowhatactsareinternationallycriminalforthispurposehavenotaffectedthegeneral
acceptanceoftheprincipleofindividualresponsibilityforinternationalcriminalconduct.
Laterhesaid,atp.84:Itcannolongerbedoubtedthatasamatterofgeneralcustomaryinternational
lawaheadofstatewillpersonallybeliabletobecalledtoaccountifthereissufficientevidencethathe
authorisedorperpetratedsuchseriousinternationalcrimes.
ItcanbeobjectedthatSirArthurwaslookingatthosecaseswheretheinternationalcommunityhas
establishedaninternationaltribunalinrelationtowhichtheregulatingdocumentexpresslymakesthe
headofstatesubjecttothetribunalsjurisdiction:see,forexample,theNurembergCharter,article7;
theStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalforFormerYugoslavia;theStatuteofthe
InternationalCriminalTribunalforRwandaandtheStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt.Itis
truethatinthesecasesitisexpresslysaidthattheheadofstateorformerheadofstateissubjecttothe
courtsjurisdiction.Butthosearecasesinwhichanewcourtwithnoexistingjurisdictionisbeing
established.ThejurisdictionbeingestablishedbytheTortureConventionandtheHostagesConvention
isonewhereexistingdomesticcourtsofallthecountriesarebeingauthorisedandrequiredtotake
jurisdictioninternationally.Thequestioniswhether,inthisnewtypeofjurisdiction,theonlypossible
viewisthatthosemadesubjecttothejurisdictionofeachofthestatecourtsoftheworldinrelationto
torturearenotentitledtoclaimimmunity.
Ihavedoubtswhether,beforethecomingintoforceoftheTortureConvention,theexistenceofthe
internationalcrimeoftortureasjuscogenswasenoughtojustifytheconclusionthattheorganisationof
statetorturecouldnotrankforimmunitypurposesasperformanceofanofficialfunction.Atthatstage
therewasnointernationaltribunaltopunishtortureandnogeneraljurisdictiontopermitorrequireits
punishmentindomesticcourts.Notuntiltherewassomeformofuniversaljurisdictionforthe
punishmentofthecrimeoftorturecoulditreallybetalkedaboutasafullyconstitutedinternational
crime.Butinmyjudgment[*205]theTortureConventiondidprovidewhatwasmissing:aworldwide
universaljurisdiction.Further,itrequiredallmemberstatestobanandoutlawtorture:article2.How
canitbeforinternationallawpurposesanofficialfunctiontodosomethingwhichinternationallaw
itselfprohibitsandcriminalises?Thirdly,anessentialfeatureoftheinternationalcrimeoftortureisthat
itmustbecommittedbyorwiththeacquiesenceofapublicofficialorotherpersonactinginan
officialcapacity.Asaresultalldefendantsintorturecaseswillbestateofficials.Yet,iftheformer
headofstatehasimmunity,themanmostresponsiblewillescapeliabilitywhilehisinferiors(the
chiefsofpolice,juniorarmyofficers)whocarriedouthisorderswillbeliable.Ifinditimpossibleto
acceptthatthiswastheintention.
Finally,andtomyminddecisively,iftheimplementationofatortureregimeisapublicfunction
givingrisetoimmunityrationemateriae,thisproducesbizarreresults.Immunityrationemateriae
appliesnotonlytoexheadsofstateandexambassadorsbuttoallstateofficialswhohavebeen
involvedincarryingoutthefunctionsofthestate.Suchimmunityisnecessaryinordertopreventstate
immunitybeingcircumventedbyprosecutingorsuingtheofficialwho,forexample,actuallycarried
outthetorturewhenaclaimagainsttheheadofstatewouldbeprecludedbythedoctrineofimmunity.
Ifthatappliedtothepresentcase,andiftheimplementationofthetortureregimeistobetreatedas
officialbusinesssufficienttofoundanimmunityfortheformerheadofstate,itmustalsobeofficial
businesssufficienttojustifyimmunityforhisinferiorswhoactuallydidthetorturing.Underthe
Conventiontheinternationalcrimeoftorturecanonlybecommittedbyanofficialorsomeoneinan
officialcapacity.Theywouldallbeentitledtoimmunity.Itwouldfollowthattherecanbenocase
outsideChileinwhichasuccessfulprosecutionfortorturecanbebroughtunlesstheStateofChileis

preparedtowaiveitsrighttoitsofficialsimmunity.Thereforethewholeelaboratestructureof
universaljurisdictionovertorturecommittedbyofficialsisrenderedabortiveandoneofthemain
objectivesoftheTortureConventiontoprovideasystemunderwhichthereisnosafehavenfor
torturerswillhavebeenfrustrated.Inmyjudgmentallthesefactorstogetherdemonstratethatthe
notionofcontinuedimmunityforexheadsofstateisinconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheTorture
Convention.
Forthesereasonsinmyjudgmentif,asalleged,SenatorPinochetorganisedandauthorisedtortureafter
8December1988,hewasnotactinginanycapacitywhichgivesrisetoimmunityrationemateriae
becausesuchactionswerecontrarytointernationallaw,Chilehadagreedtooutlawsuchconductand
ChilehadagreedwiththeotherpartiestotheTortureConventionthatallsignatorystatesshouldhave
jurisdictiontotryofficialtorture(asdefinedintheConvention)evenifsuchtorturewerecommittedin
Chile.
Astothechargesofmurderandconspiracytomurder,noonehasadvancedanyreasonwhythe
ordinaryrulesofimmunityshouldnotapplyandSenatorPinochetisentitledtosuchimmunity.
Forthesereasons,Iwouldallowtheappealsoastopermittheextraditionproceedingstoproceedon
theallegationthattortureinpursuanceofaconspiracytocommittorture,includingthesingleactof
[*206]torturewhichisallegedincharge30,wasbeingcommittedbySenatorPinochetafter8
December1988whenhelosthisimmunity.
Reginav.Bartle,BowStreetStipendiaryMagistrateandCommissionerofPolice,ExpartePinochet
ProceduralHistory:
Appealfromarrestandextraditionorder.
Overview:
Pinochet(D)claimedthathecouldnotbeextraditedbecausehewasnotguiltyofanycrimeunder
Englishlaw.AnEnglishmagistrateissuedanarrestwarrantforPinochet(D),theformerheadofstate
ofChile,attherequestofaSpanishinvestigatingjudgeforextradition.
TheHouseofLordsfoundthatPinochet(D)couldnotclaimimmunityinregardtotorturethathad
beenmadeauniversalcrimebytheInternationalConventionAgainstTortureandotherCruel,
Inhuman,orDegradingTreatmentorPunishmentof1984.
Pinochet(D)claimedtorturewasnotstrictlyaninternationalcrimeinthehighestsense.
Issue:
Istortureaninternationalcrime?
Rule:
Yes,tortureisaninternationalcrime.
Analysis:
TheTortureConventioncreatedanexceptiontotheotherwiseapplicableimmunityofpresentand
formerheadsofstatefromcriminalprocess.Pinochet(D)ultimatelywasfoundtobetoosicktostand
trial.HewasallowedtoreturntoChile.
Outcome:
Tortureisaninternationalcrime.TheTortureConventionwasagreednottocreateaninternational
crimethathadnotpreviouslyexistedbuttoprovideaninternationalsystemunderwhichthe
internationalcriminalthetorturercouldfindnosafehaven.
Allstatepartiesarerequiredtoprohibittortureontheirterritoryandtotakejurisdictionoverany
allegedoffenderwhoisfoundwithintheirterritory.
Tortureistobetreatedasanextraditableoffenseandwillbeconsideredtohavebeencommittednot
onlyintheplacewhereitoccurredbutalsointhestatewhereeithertheallegedoffenderorvictimisa
national.
Anystatemayexerciseuniversaljurisdictionovercrimesagainsthumanity

A number of crimes against humanity (such as the practice of systematic or widespread killings,
torture, forced disappearances, and arbitrary detention ) have been the subject of international
conventionsandarerecognizedbyinternationalcustomarylaw.
Thesecrimesagainsthumanityaresubjecttouniversaljurisdiction.
ThisprinciplehasbeenestablishedsincetheInternational MilitaryTribunalofNrembergandits
Judgment.
Crimesagainsthumanityandthenormswhichregulatethemformpartofjuscogens(fundamental
norms)andassuchareperemptorynormsofgeneralinternationallawwhichasrecognizedinthe
ViennaConventionoftheLawofTreaties(1969)cannotbemodifiedorrevokedbytreatyornational
law.
Therulesregulatingcrimesagainsthumanitynoimmunityunderinternationallaw
Those responsible for crimes against humanitycannot invoke immunity or special privileges as a
means of avoiding legal proceedings a principle established within the Statute of Nremberg
InternationalMilitaryTribunal(Article7).
TheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyreaffirmedtheprinciplesarticulatedintheNrembergCharter
andJudgmentinitsResolution95(I)of11December1946.(TheUNInternationalLawCommission
reaffirmed the principles established by the Nremberg Tribunal by which international law may
imposedutiesonindividualsdirectlywithoutanyinterpositionofinternallaw)
Whetherornot crimesagainsthumanity havebeen codifiedintheinternallawsofastate doesnot
exemptastate fromconductingjudicial investigationsintocrimes againsthumanitysincetheseare
alreadycodifiedunderinternationallaw.
Sovereignimmunityisanimportant exceptiontothegeneral ruleofterritorial jurisdiction,andis
probablyoneoftheoldestrulesofpublicinternationallaw.
TherationalebehindthisdoctrineisstatedbyChiefJusticeMarshallinthecaseof TheSchooner
exchangev.McFaddon. Theideaisthatsovereigns,evenwhileexercisingtheirabsoluteimmunity
fromanyprosecutionandfreedomfromprosecution,intheeventofmoreinteractionbetweenstates,
andthegrowingcommunityofinternationallaw,therecanbeanarrangementwheresucharightto
immunitycouldbewaivedbythesovereigninquestion.
Whileearlier,itwasaffordedtothepersonofthesovereigntowhomallegiancewasdue,itnow
appliestothelegalconstructofthestateaswell.ArrestWarrantcaseImmunitiesgrantedtopersons
asofficialsofstatenotgrantedfortheirpersonalbenefit,buttoensuretheeffectiveperformanceof
theirfunctionsonbehalfoftheirrespectivestates.(para53)
2 kinds of immunity from jurisdiction: ratione personae( status of person) and ratione materiae
(inherentlysovereignnatureofconduct)Intheformer,immunitylastsaslongastheofficeorstatus
lastswhilethelatter,theimmunityexistsforalltimetillthestateisinexistence.
Alsoknownasfunctionalimmunityandpersonalimmunity.
Functional immunity: Protects certain senior officials (chiefs of state, prime ministers, foreign
ministers,etc)fromprosecutioninothercountriesforactscommittedwithinthecontextoftheir
officialduties.Thisimmunityisjustifiedundercustomaryinternationallawbythefactthattheactions
ofsuchpersonsare"actofstate.Functionalimmunityislinkedtoapositionratherthanaspecific
person.Whenastateisengagedintrade,thoseactsarenotimmune,thingslikebanklendingisnota
functionalaspectofthestate,thusnoimmunity. Thisimmunityispermanent,whichmeansthatan
officialwhohasthisprotectioncanneverbebroughttojusticeevenaftershehasleftherpost,butwill
onlyendifthestateitselfceasestoexist.Forexample,inNovember2007,aFrenchprosecutorrefused
to indict the former United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld for crimes allegedly
committedduringthe2003invasionofIraqbecausehewasstillprotectedbyfunctionalimmunity.
However, a person benefiting from functional immunity may be brought before a court for acts
committedinhispersonalcapacity.Forexample,anofficialaccusedofhavingstolenfundswouldnot
beprotectedbyfunctionalimmunitybecauseheractswereoutsideofherofficialdutiesandcannotbe
attributedtothestate.Itisnowgenerallyrecognizedthatimmunitydoesnotprotectstateactorsfrom
prosecutionininternationalcourtsforthemostseriousinternationalcrimes(warcrimes,crimesagainst
humanity,tortureandgenocide).Thisisbecausesuchactscanneverbeconsideredaspartofastates
legitimatefunctionsothattheymaynotbeimputedtoit.Thisdefencehasbeendisavowedbythe

NurembergCharter(article7),theGenocideConvention(article4),theStatuteoftheInternational
CriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(article7(2)),theStatuteoftheInternationalCriminal
TribunalforRwanda(article6(2))andtheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt(article
27).
Inoneofthemostfamousdecisionscitedinfavourofalimitedapplicationoffunctionalimmunity,the
HouseofLordsheldonNovember25,1998thatAugustoPinochet,formerpresidentofChile,could
notbenefitfromfunctionalimmunityforinternationalcrimes.(pinochetcasecrime=torture)
PersonalImmunity:Absolute,individualandtemporary.Thisformofimmunityprotectscertainsenior
officials(headsofState,diplomaticagents,ministersofforeignaffairs,etc.)fromalllawsuitswhile
theyareinoffice.Thisimmunityisjustifiedonthebasisthatsuchofficialsanddiplomatsrequirea
certainamountofindependencetobeabletoeffectivelyexercisetheirfunctions.InJune2002,the
International Court of Justice affirmed that absolute immunityof the DRCs Minister for Foreign
AffairsintheCaseConcerningtheArrestWarrant of11April2000(DemocraticRepublicofthe
Congov.Belgium).TheCourtheldthatanarrestwarrantcouldnotbeissuedagainstasittingminister
offoreignaffairsbecausehehadtobeabletotravelfreelyinordertofulfillhismission.Contrasting
this decision with the Pinochet case highlights the difference between functional and personal
immunity.Eventhoughfunctionalimmunitycannotbeinvokedinaninternationalcourtinthecaseof
themostseriousinternationalcrimes,Yerodiawasprotectedbyhispersonalimmunityaslongashe
exercisedthefunctionofministerofforeignaffairs.(casealbasheerscase,sudhanesepresident,
arrestwarrantforinternationalcrimescommitted,hewasthepresidentofSudhanwhenthewarrant
wasissued)
TheProsecutorv.OmarAlBashir,InternationalCriminalCourt(ICC),caseno.02/0501/09ask
someoneforacasesummary!
BriefFactSummary.followingthegenocideofBosniaMuslims,asuitwasbroughtagainstSerbia
andMontenegro(D)byBosniaandHerzegovina(P).
SynopsisofRuleofLaw.theobligationundertheGenocideConventionbindsthecontractingparties
totheConventionnottocommit,throughtheirorgansorpersonsorgroupswhoseconductis
attributabletothem,genocideandtheotheractsenumeratedinArticleII.
Facts.AsuitwasbroughtagainsttheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SerbiaandMontenegro)(D)
undertheGenocideConventionbyBosniaandHerzegovina(P).TheplaintiffsallegedthatSerbia(D)
contravenedtheConventionbycommittinggenocideagainstBosnias(P)Muslimpopulation.The
InternationalCourtofJusticeinthisfirstpartofthecasethrewmorelightontheprovisionsofthe
GenocideConvention,includingtheundertakingtopreventandpunishgenocideinArticleI,the
definitionofgenocideinArticleII,andthephaseresponsibilityofaStateforgenocideinArticleIX.
(SeeChapter8,pages5455foradditionalfactsinthiscase).
Issue.aretheobligationundertheGenocideConventionbindingonthecontractingpartiesanddothey
preventthepartiesfromcommitting,throughtheirorgansorpersonsorgroupswhoseconductsare
attributabletothem,genocideandotheractsenumeratedinArticleII?
Held. yes. The obligation under the Genocide Convention binds the contracting parties to the
Conventionnottocommit,throughtheirorgansorpersonsorgroupwhoseconductisattributableto
them, genocide and other acts enumerated in Article II.The obligation imposed on the parties is
dependentontheordinarymeaningofthetermsoftheConvention,readincontextandinlightofthe
Conventionsobjectandpurpose.Resortingtosupplementarymeansofinterpretation,includingthe
Conventionspreparatoryworkandthecircumstancesofitsconclusionarethemeansofresolvingthe
confusionsassociatedtoterms,contextandpurpose.ThepartiesundertheConventionareunderan
obligation not to commit genocide themselves. This obligation is not imposed expressly by the
ConventionbuttheeffectofArticleIIistoprohibitstatesfromcommittinggenocidethemselves.The
logicbehindtheConventionisthattheprohibitionfollowsfromthefactthattheArticlecategorizes
genocideasaninternationallawcrimeandbyagreeingtosuchacategorization,thepartiesmust
logicallyundertakenottocommittheactdescribed.Italsofollowsfromtheexpresslystatedobligation
topreventthecommissionofactsofgenocide.Serbia(D)furtherpostulatedthatthedraftinghistoryof
theConventionshowsthatthestatesarenotdirectlyresponsibleundertheConventionforactsof
genocide, but heat states have civil responsibility to prevent and punish genocide committed by
individuals. The drafting history also throws more light on the fact the Chairman of the Sixth

CommitteebelievedthatArticleIXasmodifiedprovidedforstateresponsibilityforgenocide.
The IC J rul ed on 2 F ebru ary 2007 t hat geno ci de was com m i t t ed i n S rebreni ca (as
al so found by t he IC TY Appe al s C ham ber i n the K rsti c case, see bel ow). S erbi a
was not found r esponsi bl e for t he genoci de, as t he Bosni an S erb gene ral s wer e not
a ct i ng as st at e agent s and di d not rec ei ve expl i ci t i nst ru ct i ons from S erbi a. The
C ourt al sorul ed t hat S erbi a was not com pl i ci t at that t i m e asi t di d not know t hat a
geno ci dehad been perpet u at ed.
Nev ert hel ess, S erbi a was found t o be brea chi ng i t s obl i gat i ons unde r t he
C onvent i on on t he P rev ent i on and P unishm ent of t he C ri m e of Genoci de by fai l i ng
t o prev ent t he 1995 geno ci de i n S rebr eni c a, and by f ai l i ng t o puni sh t hose
r esponsi bl e. S erbi as fai l ure t o t ransf er R at ko Ml adi c t o the IC TY was hel d t o
am ount t o a cont i nui ng vi ol at i on of the Genoci d e C onvent i on, and t he Court
ord ered S erbi aful l yt ocoop erat ewi t ht heTri bunal .
Week4
TheLawofTreaties
1.WHATISTHEFUNCTIONOFATREATYINPIL?
1)Intheabsenceofaworldgovt.,thetreaties laydownthestandards thatinternationalagentsare
boundtoobserveintheirrelations.Theycreateandimposecertaininternationalcooperativestructures.
2)Treatiescomeinmanyvarieties,someconstituteinternationalorganisationssuchastheUN,others
mightregulateparticularareasofinternationallawsuchasthelawofsea,andsomeothersmightbe
purelycommercialsuchananagreementaboutthesaleofoil,oraboutstudentexchangesbetweenthe
twostatesetc.
3)They help in regulating international relations. It is the law of treaties, which is a body of
internationallegal principles,that regulate, at themost general level,questionsabout conclusion,
validity,interpretationandpracticalapplicationofallsuchinternationalagreements.
4)Treatiesfacilitateinternationalcooperation.Internationaltradeisaproductoftreaties.
Treatieshelptosecurecollectiveinternationalgoodslikeinternationalpeaceandsecurity,byallowing
statestoagreecommonstandardsofconduct.eg: refraintousearmedforceintheirinternational
relationsetc
Treatieshelpinsecuringcommercialbargains(calledsynallagmatictreaties)
2.WHATIS;A)ACOVENANT?B)APROTOCOL?C)ACONVENTION?D)ATREATY?
Acovenant,protocol,conventionarealldifferentnamesgivenforatreaty.
c)CharterThetermcharterisusedforparticularlyformalandsolemninstrumentssuchasthe
treatyfoundinganinternationalorganisationliketheUN(thecharteroftheUnitedNations).
a)ProtocolItisatermusedforanadditionallegalinstrumentthatcomplementsandaddtoa
treaty.Aprotocolmaybeanytopicrelevanttotheoriginaltreatyandisusedeithertofurther
addresssomethingintheoriginaltreaty,addressaneworemergingconcernoraddaprocedure
fortheoperationandenforcementofthetreatysuchasaddinganindividualcomplaints
procedure.

c)Convention
Itisaformal
agreement
betweenstates.
Thegenerictermconventionisthussynonymouswiththegenerictermtreaty.Conventionsare
normallyopenforparticipationbytheinternationalcommunityasawhole,orbyalargeno:of
states.(ConventionontheRightsofThechildadoptedbythegeneralassemblyoftheUNin1989
etc)
d)Treatiesareagreementsgovernedbyinternationallawandconcludedprimarilybetweenstates.A
treatyislegallybindingandpartiestoaninternationaltreatyareabletoholdeachotheraccountablefor
breaches.AgreementsbetweenstatesandPvt..individualsorcorporationsandagreementsthatstates
havedecidedthatshouldnotbegovernedbyinternationallawarenottreaties.
3.WHOMAKESINTERNATIONALTREATIES?HOWARETHEYMADE?

Apersonwhoisentitledtorepresentstatesmakestreaties.Thispersonneedstoproduce'fullpowers'
(i.e.anofficialdocumentdesignatingthatpersonasarepresentative).Alternatively,certainofficials
areconsideredasrepresentingtheirstatewithoutneedingtoproducefullpowers.Theseare:Headsof
Stateorgovernmentandministersofforeignaffairs,headsofdiplomaticmissionsandrepresentatives
ofinternationalorganizationsandconferencesetc.Thearefivestagesinthemakingofatreaty.
1)NegotiationNoprescribedmodeofnegotiation.Thestatesenjoyconsiderablefreedomtousetheir
bargainingpowertoachieveadesirableeffort.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthestatesarefreetowieldtheir
negotiationpower.Theuseofthreatsofarmedforceorfraudinnegotiationmaymakethetreaty
invalid.
2)AdoptionThisisthestagewhenthecontentofthetreatyisfinalizedandstatesbegintoconsider
theirpositiontowardsit.
3)Authentication
4)Expressionofconsenttobebound
somesortofexpressconsentneedstobemade.Asignatureorratification,acceptance,exchangeof
instrumentsetc.
5)Entryintoforce
Thisisthefinalstageinthemakingofanytreaty.Thetreaty'sentryintoforcemakesthetreatybinding
betweenstatesthathaveexpressedsuchconsent.

4.UNDERPILWHICHENTITIESAREABLETOENTERINTOATREATY?

5.WHATISTHEDIFFERENCEBETWEENAUNILATERALANDMULTILATERALTREATY?
Aunilateraltreatybetween2statesarecalledbilateraltreaty.Treatiesbetween2ormorestatesare
calledmultilateraltreaties.
A unilateral treaty is a treaty meant for a single state. Usually done through reservation i.e. by
excludingormodifyingthelegaleffectofcertainprovisionsofthetreatyintheirapplicationtothat
state.
6.

WHATISMEANTBYTHETERMPACTASUNTSERVANDA?

Pactasuntservandameansthattreatiesshouldbeingoodfaith.

7.
WHATISTHEDIFFERENCEBETWEENSIGNATUREANDRATIFICATIONOFATREATY?
Signatureandratificationarebothmethodsofadoption,authenticationandexpressionofconsenttobe
bound of treaties. A signature is simple and direct method of expression of consent where as
ratificationinvolvesthesubmissionofthetreatyforapprovaltotheconstitutionallycompetentbranch
ofgovernment.

8.
HOWARETREATYPROVISIONSINTERPRETED?
VCLTprovides2interpretiverules
1)atreatyshallbeinterpretedingoodfaithinaccordancewiththeordinarymeaningtobegiventothe
termsofthetreatyintheircontext
2)Interpretersmayhaverecoursetothepreparatorymaterialsofatreaty(suchasearlierdraftsor
records of negotiation) and the circumstances of its conclusion when the application of the basic
principleisrequiredtopayforpeacekeepingcostsaspartoftheirnormalcontributionstotheUN
budget.
9.

WHATISARESERVATION?WHENMAYASTATELAWFULLYENTERARESERVATION?

Reservationisaunilateralstatementmadebyastatewiththeintentiontoexcludeormodifythelegal
effectofcertainprovisionsofthetreatyintheirapplicationtothatstate.
Astatecanlawfullyenterareservationwhenwhilesigning,ratifying,accepting,approvingoracceding
toatreaty.Thestatesmayformulatereservationstoatreatyexceptwhen(1)thetreatyprohibitsthem
(2)thereservationisnotamongstthoseallowedbythetreatyand(2)whenreservationisincompatible
withthe'objectandpurpose'ofthetreaty.
10.
WHATEFFECTDOESARESERVATIONHAVEUPONSTATEOBLIGATIONSTOATREATY?

Iftheobjectandpurposeofatreaty,orthelimitedno:ofnegotiatingstatessuggeststhatpreserving
theintegrityofthetreatyisessentialthenthereservingstatecanonlybecomepartytothattreatyifthe
reservationisacceptedbyallotherparties.Inothercases,theVCLTlaysdown5rules,
1)Ifastateacceptsthereservation,thenthereservingstateandtheacceptingstatecanconsidereach
otheraspartiestothetreatyminusthereservedprovisions
2)Justbecauseastateobjectedtoreservationdoesnotmeanthatthestatescannotbepartiestothe
treaty,unlessthelatterclearlystatesanintentiontothecontrary.
3)ifanobjectingstatehasnotexpressedaclearintentionnottobecomeatreatypartnerwiththe
reservingstate,thentheprovisionstowhichthereservationrelateswill notapplyasbetweenthe
objectingstateandthereservingstate.
4)areservationandtheexpressionofconsentitisattachedtobecomeeffectiveassoonasoneother
statehasacceptedthereservation
5)statesaredeemedtohaveacceptedareservationiftheydonotraiseanobjectiontoitwithin12
monthsfromthedatethereservationwasnotifiedtothem.

11.
WHATISTHEPROCEDUREUNDERTHEVCLTFORCHALLENGINGARESERVATION?
12.

HOW MAY A STATE LEGALLY JUSTIFY NONADHERENCE TO AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY

OBLIGATION?

A State may declare its expression of consent to be bound by a treaty invalid in the following
situations:
1)whensuchconsentwasexpressedinviolationofitsinternallawregardingcompetencetoconclude
treatiesbutonlywhentheviolationwasmanifestandconcernedaruleofinternallawoffundamental
importance.(normally,aconstitutionallaw)
2)whenthatstate'sconsentwasbasedonanerrorrelatingtoafactorsituationwhichassumedbythat
statetoexistatthetimethetreatywasconcluded,exceptwhenthatstatecontributedtoitsownerroror
thecircumstancesweresuchastoputitonnoticeofapossibleerror.
3)when consent has been induced by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating state, or by
corruptionofastate'srepresentativebyanothernegotiatingstate.
4) when consent has been induced by the coercion of that state or its representatives by another
negotiatingstate
5)whenthetreatyconflictswithaperemptorynormofinternationallaw(juscogens).

13.

CAN STATES WITHDRAW FROM A TREATY ONCE THEY HAVE RATIFIED IT?WHAT DOES
THEVCLTSAY?
Statesmaylawfullyterminateorsuspendavalidtreatyundercertainconditions.
1)atreatywillterminateonceithasachieveditsobjectives
2)ifthetreatyhadprovidedthatcertaineventsordateswillentailterminationorsuspension.
3)whenallpartiesagreetoterminateorsuspendit
4)ifthetreatydoesnotprovideforarighttoterminateorsuspend,thestatescannotinvokeitunlessit
isestablishedthatpartiesimplicitlyintendedtoallowit.
5)whenthereisamaterialbreachbyoneparty,thepartyhastherighttoterminate/suspendthewhole
treatyortoterminate/suspenditonlyinrelationtothebreachingparty.
6)statescanterminateatreatywhenitsperformancehasbecomeimpossible

15.

WHAT

IS AN OBLIGATION ERGA OMNES? IN WHICH CASES DID THE

ICJ SPEAK

OF

OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES? WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINDING THAT A PARTICULAR
OBLIGATIONHASTHECHARACTEROFANERGAOMNESRULE?

16.

IS IT POSSIBLE FOR STATES TO MAKE RESERVATIONS IN RESPECT OF INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TREATIES? WHAT DO THE GENOCIDE AND THE RAWLE KENNEDY CASES
TELLUSABOUTRESERVATIONSTOHUMANRIGHTSTREATIES?

17.

WHATISTHETESTTODETERMINEWHETHERAPARTICULARRESERVATIONISLAWFULOR
SEVER AN
UNLAWFULRESERVATION?
NOT? IS THERE ANY INTERNATIONAL BODY THAT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO

RESERVATIONSTOTHECONVENTIONONTHEPREVENTIONANDPUNISHMENTOF
THECRIMEOFGENOCIDEICJAdvisoryOpinion
"I.CanthereservingStateberegardedasbeingapartytotheConventionwhilestillmaintainingits
reservationifthereservationisobjectedtobyoneormoreofthepartiestotheConventionbutnot
byothers?
aStatewhichhasmadeandmaintainedareservationwhichhasbeenobjectedtobyoneormoreof
thepartiestotheConventionbutnotbyothers,canberegardedasbeingapartytotheConvention
ifthereservationiscompatiblewiththeobjectandpurposeoftheConvention;otherwise,thatState
cannotberegardedasbeingapartytotheConvention.
"II.IftheanswertoquestionIisintheaffirmative,whatistheeffectofthereservationasbetween
thereservingStateand:
(a)Thepartieswhichobjecttothereservation?
(b)Thosewhichacceptit?
(a)ifapartytotheConventionobjectstoareservationwhichitconsiderstobeincompatiblewith
theobjectandpurposeoftheConvention,itcaninfactconsiderthatthereservingStateisnota
partytotheConvention;
(b)if,ontheotherhand,apartyacceptthereservationasbeingcompatiblewiththeobjectand
purposeoftheConvention,itcaninfactconsiderthatthereservingStateisapartytothe
Convention;
"III.WhatwouldbethelegaleffectasregardstheanswertoquestionIifanobjectiontoa
reservationismade:
(a)Byasignatorywhichhasnotyetratified?
(b)ByaStateentitledtosignoraccedebutwhichhasnotyetdoneso?"
a)anobjectiontoareservationmadebyasignatoryStatewhichhasnotyetratifiedtheConvention
canhavethelegaleffectindicatedinthereplytoQuestionIonlyuponratification.Untilthat
momentitmerelyservesasanoticetotheotherStateoftheeventualattitudeofthesignatoryState;
(b)anobjectiontoareservationmadebyaStatewhichisentitledtosignoraccedebutwhichhas
notyetdonesoiswithoutlegaleffect.
.
ThefirstquestionreferstowhetheraStatewhichhasmadeareservationcan,whilemaintainingit,
beregardedasapartytotheConventiononGenocide,whensomeofthepartiesobjecttothe
reservation.

IntheabsenceofanarticleintheConventionprovidingforreservations,onecannotinferthatthey
areprohibited.
Intheabsenceofanyexpressprovisionsonthesubject,todeterminethepossibilityofmaking
reservationsaswellastheireffects,onemustconsidertheircharacter,theirpurpose,their
provisions,theirmodeofpreparationandadoption.
ThepreparationoftheConventiononGenocideshowsthatanundertakingwasreachedwithinthe
GeneralAssemblyonthefacultytomakereservationsandthatitispermittedtoconcludetherefrom
thatStates,becomingpartiestotheConvention,gavetheirassentthereto.
Whatisthecharacterofthereservationswhichmaybemadeandtheobjectionswhichmaybe
raisedthereto?
ThesolutionmustbefoundinthespecialcharacteristicsoftheConventiononGenocide.The
principlesunderlyingtheConventionarerecognisedbycivilisednationsasbindingonStateseven
withoutanyconventionalobligation.
ItwasintendedthattheConventionwouldbeuniversalinscope.
Itspurposeispurelyhumanitarianandcivilising.
ThecontractingStatesdonothaveanyindividualadvantagesordisadvantagesnorinterestsoftheir
own,butmerelyacommoninterest.
ThisleadstotheconclusionthattheobjectandpurposeoftheConventionimplythatitwasthe
intentionoftheGeneralAssemblyandoftheStateswhichadoptedit,thatasmanyStatesas
possibleshouldparticipate.
Thispurposewouldbedefeatedifanobjectiontoaminorreservationshouldproducecomplete
exclusionfromtheConvention.
Ontheotherhand,thecontractingpartiescouldnothaveintendedtosacrificetheveryobjectofthe
Conventioninfavourofavaguedesiretosecureasmanyparticipantsaspossible.
Itfollowsthatthecompatibilityofthereservationandtheobjectandthepurposeofthe
ConventionisthecriteriontodeterminetheattitudeoftheStatewhichmakesthereservationand
oftheStatewhichobjects.
Consequently,questionI,onaccountofitsabstractcharacter,cannotbegivenanabsoluteanswer.
Theappraisalofareservationandtheeffectofobjectionsdependuponthecircumstancesofeach
individualcase.
TheCourtthenexaminedquestionIIbywhichitwasrequestedtosaywhatwastheeffectofa
reservationasbetweenthereservingStateandthepartieswhichobjecttoitandthosewhichaccept
it.
NoStatecanbeboundbyareservationtowhichithasnotconsented,andthereforeeachState,on
thebasisofitsindividualappraisalsofthereservations,withinthelimitsofthecriterionofthe
objectandpurposestatedabove,willorwillnotconsiderthereservingStatetobeapartytothe
Convention.
Intheordinarycourseofevents,assentwillonlyaffecttherelationshipbetweenthetwoStates.It
mightaim,however,atthecompleteexclusionfromtheConventioninacasewhereitwas
expressedbytheadoptionofapositiononthejurisdictionalplane:certainpartiesmightconsider
theassentasincompatiblewiththepurposeoftheConvention,andmightwishtosettlethedispute
eitherbyspecialagreementorbytheprocedurelaiddownintheConventionitself.
Thedisadvantageswhichresultfromthispossibledivergenceofviewsarereal.Theycouldhave

beenremediedbyanarticleonreservations.Theyaremitigatedbythecommondutyofthe
contractingStatestobeguidedintheirjudgmentbythecompatibilityorincompatibilityofthe
reservationwiththeobjectandpurposeoftheConvention.Itmustclearlybeassumedthatthe
contractingStatesaredesirousofpreservingintactatleastwhatisessentialtotheobjectofthe
Convention.
TheCourtfinallyturnedtoquestionIIIconcerningtheeffectofanobjectionmadebyaState
entitledtosignandratifybutwhichhadnotyetdoneso,orbyaStatewhichhassignedbuthasnot
yetratified.
Intheformercase,itwouldbeinconceivablethataStatepossessingnorightsundertheConvention
couldexcludeanotherState.ThecaseofthesignatoryStatesismorefavourable.Theyhavetaken
certainstepsnecessaryfortheexerciseoftherightofbeingaparty.Thisprovisionalstatusconfers
uponthemarighttoformulateasaprecautionarymeasureobjectionswhichhavethemselvesa
provisionalcharacter.Ifsignatureisfollowedbyratification,theobjectionbecomesfinal.
Otherwise,itdisappears.Therefore,theobjectiondoesnothaveanimmediatelegaleffectbut
expressesandproclaimstheattitudeofeachsignatoryStateonbecomingaparty.
Week5
CustomaryInternationalLaw&OtherSourcesofPIL
1.WhatisCIL?

CILisasystemofrulesanditisderivedfromtheobservablepracticeofstates.
2.WhataretheconstituentelementsofCIL?WhatelementsdidtheICJsetoutindetailinthe
NicaraguaMeritsCase?
ThetwoconstituentelementsofCILarecalled:statepracticeandopiniojuris.IntheNorthSea
ContinentalShelfcase(whichconcernedadisputebetweenGermanyv.Netherlands&Denmark)
theICJheldthatinorderforapracticetobeaCIL,theactconcernedmustnotonlybeasettled
practicebuttheymustbecarriedoutbecauseofabeliefthatthispracticeisobligatorybythe
existenceofaruleoflawrequiringit.
3.Whatkindofactscanbeconsideredtoconstitutestatepractice?Givesomeexamples.
4.Doesstatepracticerequireabsoluteconformitywitharule?WhathastheICJstatedinthis
regard?

5.Whatdoesthetermopinioiurisactuallymean?
6.IstheresuchathingasapersistentobjectorinPIL?Whichcase(s)hastheICJreferredtothe
conceptofthepersistentobjector?Whywouldinternationalhumanrightslawyershaveaproblem
withthisconcept?
Yes,thereisatheorycalledpersistentobjectortheory.Thistheoryclaimsthatstateshavean'opt
out'option,i.e.anindividualstatewhichobjectstoarulepersistentlyandfromtheverybeginning
willnotbeboundbythatrule,evenifitbecomespartofCIL
7.Whatismeantbythetermregionalcustom?Canyouidentifyaruleofregionalcustom?
8.WhatapproachdoestheICJfollowwhenattemptingtoidentifythecreation,changeand
modificationofCIL?

9.WhoisboundbyCIL?
10.WhatistherelationshipbetweentreatylawandCIL?WhathastheICJsaidaboutthis
relationshipandinwhichparticularcases?
Treatiescanbecomecustom,customaryrulescanbecodifiedintotreaties,andsometimesasingle
rulecanhaveforcesimultaneouslybothtreatyandcustomarylaw.
11.Whatdoesthetermjuscogensmean?Whatisthevalueofdeterminingthatarulehasthestatus
ofjuscogens?
Juscogensarehigherorder,nonderogablenorms;theyhavethepowertoannulinternationallaws
thatarecontrary.
12.Whatisanobligationergaomnes?InwhichcasesdidtheICJspeakofobligationsergaomnes?
Whataretheimplicationsoffindingthataparticularobligationhasthecharacterofanergaomnes
rule?

14.Whatisinstantcustom?
Week6
Jurisdiction,InternationalAdjudication&Tribunals
Jurisdictionisthegovernmentsgeneralpowertoexerciseauthorityoverallpersonsandentities
within its territory. Jurisdiction is closely related to, and stems from, the principle of state
sovereigntyandsovereignequalityandindependenceofstatesfromnoninterferenceinitsinternal
affairs.
Jurisdictioncovers
(1)thestatelegislaturesrighttocreate,amendorrepeallegislation:wecalledthis prescriptive
jurisdiction(legislativepowers),
(2) the states rightto enforce this legislation through, for example, the police andpublic
prosecutors, by investigating a crime andarresting a suspect: we called this enforcement
jurisdiction(executivepowers),and
(3)theabilityofnationalcourts,tribunalsandotherbodiesorpersonsexercisingjudicialfunctions
tohearanddecideonmatters:adjudicativejurisdiction.
PrescriptiveandEnforcementJurisdiction:TerritorialandExtraterritorialApplication
AStatehasunlimitedprescriptivejurisdiction:thismeansthatthelegislaturecancreate,amendor
repeallegislationcoveringanysubject oranyperson,irrespectiveofthepersonsnationalityor
location.TheICJstatedthatInthesecircumstancesallthatcanberequiredofaStateisthatit
shouldnotoverstepthelimitswhichinternationallawplacesuponitsjurisdiction;withinthese
limits,itstitletoexercisejurisdictionrestsinitssovereignty(para47oftheLotuscase).
At the same time, international law does notallowastate to enforce its legislation outside its
territorywithoutaninternationalagreementoraruleofcustomaryinternationallawpermittingthe
statetodoso.
Forexample,stateAslawsays:adulteryisanoffencethatispunishablebydeath.Thislawis
enforceableintheterritoryofstateA;but,stateAcannotenforcethatlawinstateBevenagainsta
citizenofstateA.Thismeans,forexample,thatstateAcannotinvestigatethecrimeorarrestthe
accusedinstateBsterritorywithoutstateBsconsent.
The2PrinciplesoftheLotusCase
ThisbringsustothefirstprincipleintheLotuscaseAStatecannot

exerciseitspowerinanyform
intheterritoryofanotherState;unless,unlessaninternationaltreatyorcustomarylawpermitsitto
doso.
ThesecondprincipleoftheLotuscase:withinitsterritory,aStatemayexerciseitsjurisdiction,on

anymatter,evenifthereisnospecificruleofinternationallawpermittingittodoso.Inthese
instances,Stateshaveawidemeasureofdiscretion,whichisonlylimitedbytheprohibitiverulesof
internationallaw.
Inthiscase,thecrimewascommittedabroad,neitherthepersonwhocommittedthecrime,northe
victims,werenationalsofthatState.Universaljurisdictionenablesapersontobetriedbeforea
nationalcourtevenwhenthereisnolinktotheState.Underthisprinciple,jurisdictionisexercised
onthebasisthatthecrimecommittedissoseriousandofuniversalconcernthateachStatehasan
interesttoprosecute.Inotherwords,thesecrimesarepunishablebyanyState.
Universal jurisdiction is a developing concept in international law and its scope, method of
applicationandextendofapplicationiscontroversial.Universaljurisdictionwasexercisedin:
thePinochetCase,HouseofLordsinUKexerciseduniversaljurisdictiononthebasisthatPinochet
wasresponsibleforactsoftortureatthetimehewastheheadofStateinChile.
PublicinternationallawisthebodyofrulesthatislegallybindingonStatesintheirinteractions
withotherStates,individuals,organizationsandotherentities.Itcoversarangeofactivities;such
as,diplomaticrelations,conductofwar,trade,humanrightsandsharingofoceanicresources
Traditionally,internationallawregulatedinteractionsbetweenStates.Forexample,itdetermined
howaStateshouldtreatforeigndiplomatswhoareinitscountryorwhenaStateshoulddeclarewar
againstanotherState.
Internationallawsetsoutlegalobligations,responsibilitiesandrightsofoneStateagainstanother.
Thisaspectofinternationallawisbasedonsovereignequality.Inotherwords,eachStateisa
sovereign and each State is equal and independent of all other States. This means that when
internationallawregulatestherelationsbetweenStates,itappliesequallytoallStates.
International lawalso regulates relations between States and nonState actors; for example,
individuals,international organizationsandmultinational companies.Inthecaseofindividuals,
internationallawgiveseachindividualcertainrights.Forexample,internationalhumanrightslaw
givestheindividualarightnottobetortured.Thismeansthatagovernmentcannottortureeven
someone they deem a terrorist to obtain information. International law also imposes on States
certainobligationsandresponsibilitiestoprotectindividuals.Forexample,whenStatesareatwar,
oneStatecannottargetandkillinnocentciviliansofanotherState.
Itimportanttorememberthatinternationallawisnotstagnant.Itisevolving.Internationallaw
covers diverse subjects and has multiple fields of application. For example, we find that
internationallawapplies,interalia,to:initiationofwars(lawsrelatingtouseofforce);conductof
war(humanitarianlaw);diplomaticrelations(diplomaticlaw);tradeandinvestment;treatmentof
people (human rights law); ocean resources (law of the sea); protecting the environment
(environmentallaw),spacelaw,andtocertaincrimes(internationalcriminallaw).
Subjectsofinternationallaw areStatesandnonStateactorslikeindividualsandinternational
organizations. Some argue that international nongovernmental organizations and multinational
companiesalsofallintothecategoryofsubjectsofinternationallaw.
HOWDOWEDETERMINEIFANENTITYISASUBJECTOFINTERNATIONALLAW?
Anentityisasubjectofinternationallawifithasinternationallegalpersonality.Inotherwords,
subjectsmusthaverights,powersanddutiesunderinternationallawandtheyshouldbeableto
exercisethoserights,powersandduties.Therights,powersanddutiesofdifferentsubjectschange
accordingtotheirstatusandfunctions.Forexample,anindividualhastherightoffreedomfrom
torture under international law and States have a duty under international law not to torture
individualsortosendthemtoacountrywherethereisalikelihoodofthatpersonbeingtortured.
Thisrightisarightundertreatylaw,forexample,theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPolitical
Rightsandundercustomaryinternationallaw.TheConventionagainstTortureandCruel,Inhuman
andDegradingTreatmentplacesobligationsonStatesnottotortureandtoextraditeorprosecute
thosewhotorture.
Legal personality also includes the capacity to enforce ones own rights and to compel other
subjectstoperformtheirdutiesunderinternationallaw.Forexample,thismeansthatasubjectof
internationallawshouldbeableto:

(1)bringclaimsbeforeinternationalandnationalcourtsandtribunalstoenforcetheirrights,for
example,theInternationalCourtofJustice.
(2)havetheabilityorpowertocomeintoagreementsthatarebindingunderinternationallaw,for
example,treaties:
(3)enjoyimmunityfromthejurisdictionofforeigncourts;forexample,immunityforactsofState.
(4)besubjecttoobligationsunderinternationallaw(Dixon).
Remember that all subjects of international law do not have the same rights, duties and
capacities.Foranexample,adiplomathasimmunitybeforeforeigncourtsbecauseheisanagentof
thesendingState.

Week8
TheLawofInternationalOrganisations
CertainExpensesConcerningU.S.MilitaryOperationsAgainstLibya
ThequestionofcertainexpensesoftheUnitedNations(Article17,paragraph2,oftheCharter)
had been put to the Court for an advisory opinion by a resolution adopted by the General
AssemblyoftheUnitedNationsof20December1961.
By nine votes to five the Court declared that the expenditures authorized in certain General
Assembly resolutions enumerated in the request for opinion, relating to the United Nations
operationsintheCongoandintheMiddleEastundertakeninpursuanceofSecurityCounciland
General Assembly resolutions likewise enumerated in the request were "expenses of the
Organization"withinthemeaningofArticle17,paragraph2,oftheCharteroftheUnitedNations.
InitscanonicalCertainExpensesadvisoryopinionof1962,theInternationalCourtofJusticemade
clearthatmilitaryactivitycarriedoutbymemberstatesinthecontextofpeacekeepingoperations
intheCongoandalongtheSuezauthorizedbytheGeneralAssemblyamountedtoUnitedNations
activities, which were therefore to be treated as expenses of the United Nations, funded from
membercontributions.FranceandtheSovietUnionobjectedtoU.N.involvementinpeacekeeping
intheMiddleEastandCongo,buttheycouldnotlegallywithholdtheirrequiredcontributionsto
theUnitedNationsonaccountofthoseobjections.UnitedNationsskepticsmightretortthateven
thoughtheI.C.J.isthejudicialarmoftheUnitedNations,theU.N.hasnoconcretepowerto
enforceanadvisoryopinion,andevenI.C.J.judgmentscannotbeenforcedagainstarecalcitrant
stateabsentaSecurityCouncilResolutionauthorizingsanctionsagainstthatnoncomplyingstate.
AndyetbothFranceandtheSovietUnioneventuallypaidthemoneytheyhadwithheldfromthe
U.N.inprotestagainstU.N.actionintheSuezandCongo,muchastheUnitedStatesfinallypaidits
assessedcontributionsaftermuchprotestagainstU.N.policiesinthelate1970s,the1980s,1990s
and2000s.
Difference relating to the Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
CommissiononHumanRights,
ICJAdvisoryOpinion,1999
HeisanexpertunderS22(b)
Hespokeinthecourseofperforminghismission.Hehadarighttobeimmune.ItcasewhereAVI,
S22ofthegeneralconventiontospecialrapporteurs.Itcouldhaveapplied.
Malayasiahadalegalobligation.ItviolatedA105oftheUNcharterasitfailedtoinformitscourt
ofthepsiitiontakenbythesecretarygeneral.Accordingtothewellestabishedruleofinternational
law,theconductofanyorganofastatemustberegardedasanactofthatState.Malaysiadidnot
complywiththeabovementionedobligation.
TheInternationalLawCommissionwasestablishedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyin
1948forthe"promotionoftheprogressivedevelopmentofinternationallawanditscodification.
OnNovember21,1947,theUNGeneralAssemblypassedResolution174,whichprovidedforthe

creationofan"InternationalLawCommission"inordertofulfilltheobligationsoftheCharter.
Promotingthecodificationofinternationallaw.
Solvingproblemswithinbothpublicandprivateinternationallaw.
The Commission consists of 34 members elected by the General Assembly. Members act as
individualsandnotasofficialsrepresentingtheirrespectivestates. Onevenueofactionforthe
commissioninthecodificationofprinciplesofinternationallawiswhenrequestedtodosobythe
GeneralAssembly.Inthatcase,thecommissionappointsoneofitsmembersasSpecialRapporteur
on that subject and prepares aplan of work regarding the issue in question.Governmentsare
requestedtosubmittothecommissiontheirwrittenopinionsontheissueinquestion,asspecifiedin
theplanofwork.Therapporteurthenwritesareportofhisorherrecommendationsonthesubject
underdiscussionandthereportmustbeapprovedbytherestofthecommissionaswellasbythe
UNSecretaryGeneralbeforeitbecomesanofficialcommissiondocument.Thecommissionthen
reconsidersthereportafterreceivingadditionalwrittenopinionsfromgovernments,andthereport
isbeingsubmittedtotheGeneralAssemblyforapproval.
Anothervenueofactioniswhenthecommissionisrequestedeitherbyagovernment,aninter
governmental organization or a UN agency to draft proposals for international conventions on
variousissues.Inthatcase,thecommissionformulatesaplanofworkandreceiveswrittenopinions
from governments on the issue in question. The final draft is also submitted to the General
Assembly.
TheUnitedNations(UN)isanintergovernmentalorganizationestablishedon24October1945to
promote international cooperation. A replacement for the ineffective League of Nations, the
organizationwascreatedfollowingtheSecondWorldWartopreventanothersuchconflict.Atits
founding,theUNhad51 memberstates;therearenow193.The UNHeadquarters issituatedin
Manhattan, New York City and enjoys extraterritoriality. Further main offices are situated in
Geneva,NairobiandVienna.Theorganizationisfinancedbyassessedandvoluntarycontributions
from its member states. Its objectives include maintaining international peace and security,
promotinghumanrights,fosteringsocialandeconomicdevelopment,protectingtheenvironment,
andprovidinghumanitarianaidincasesoffamine,naturaldisaster,andarmedconflict.TheUNhas
sixprincipalorgans:theGeneralAssembly(themaindeliberativeassembly);theSecurityCouncil
(for deciding certain resolutions for peace and security); the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC)(forpromotinginternationaleconomicandsocialcooperationanddevelopment);the
Secretariat(forprovidingstudies,information,andfacilitiesneededbytheUN);theInternational
CourtofJustice(theprimaryjudicialorgan);andtheUnitedNationsTrusteeshipCouncil(inactive
since1994).TheUNCharteroutlinestherulesformembership:
MembershipintheUnitedNationsisopentoallotherpeacelovingstatesthatacceptthe
obligationscontainedinthepresentCharterand,inthejudgmentoftheOrganization,areableand
willingtocarryouttheseobligations.
TheadmissionofanysuchstatetomembershipintheUnitedNationswillbeeffectedbya
decisionoftheGeneralAssemblyupontherecommendationoftheSecurityCouncil.ChapterII,
Article4
TheUNCharteroutlinestherulesformembership:
MembershipintheUnitedNationsisopentoallotherpeacelovingstatesthatacceptthe
obligationscontainedinthepresentCharterand,inthejudgmentoftheOrganization,areableand
willingtocarryouttheseobligations.
TheadmissionofanysuchstatetomembershipintheUnitedNationswillbeeffectedbya
decisionoftheGeneralAssemblyupontherecommendationoftheSecurityCouncil.ChapterII,
Article4
TheMaastrichtTreatyestablishedtheEuropeanUnionunderitscurrentnamein1993.
TheEUhasdevelopeda singlemarket throughastandardisedsystemoflawsthatapplyinall
memberstates.Withinthe SchengenArea,passportcontrolshavebeenabolished.[17] EUpolicies
aimtoensurethe freemovementofpeople,goods,services,andcapital,[18] enactlegislationin
justiceandhomeaffairs,andmaintaincommonpoliciesontrade, [19] agriculture,[20] fisheries,and
regionaldevelopment.[21]

The monetary union was established in1999 and came intofull force in2002. It is currently
composedof18memberstatesthatusetheeuroastheirlegaltender.EUmemberstatesretainall
powers not explicitly handed to the European Union. In some areas the EU enjoys exclusive
competence. These are areas in which member states have renounced any capacity to enact
legislation.InotherareastheEUanditsmemberstatessharethecompetencetolegislate.While
bothcanlegislate,memberstatescanonlylegislatetotheextenttowhichtheEUhasnot.Inother
policyareastheEUcanonlycoordinate,supportandsupplementmemberstateactionbutcannot
enactlegislationwiththeaimofharmonisingnationallaws.
The InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross (ICRC)isahumanitarianinstitutionbasedin
Geneva,SwitzerlandandathreetimeNobelPrizeLaureate.Statesparties(signatories)tothefour
GenevaConventionsof1949andtheirAdditionalProtocolsof1977(ProtocolI,ProtocolII)and
2005, have given the ICRC a mandate to protect victims of international and internal armed
conflicts. Such victims include war wounded, prisoners, refugees, civilians, and other non
combatants.[3]
The ICRC ispart of the International RedCrossand Red Crescent Movement along with the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and 189 National
Societies.[4] ItistheoldestandmosthonouredorganizationwithintheMovementandoneofthe
mostwidelyrecognizedorganizationsintheworld,havingwonthreeNobelPeacePrizesin1917,
1944,and1963.AllpaymentstotheICRCarevoluntaryandarereceivedasdonationsbasedon
twotypesofappealsissuedbytheCommittee:anannualHeadquartersAppealtocoveritsinternal
costsandEmergencyAppealsforitsindividualmissions.
TheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)isanorganizationthatintendstosuperviseandliberalize
internationaltrade.Theorganizationofficiallycommencedon1January1995undertheMarrakech
Agreement,replacingtheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT),whichcommencedin
1947.[5]Theorganizationdealswithregulationoftradebetweenparticipatingcountries;itprovides
aframeworkfornegotiatingandformalizingtradeagreements,andadisputeresolutionprocess
aimedatenforcingparticipant'sadherencetoWTOagreements,whicharesignedbyrepresentatives
ofmembergovernments[6]:fol.910andratifiedbytheirparliaments.[7]MostoftheissuesthattheWTO
focusesonderivefromprevioustradenegotiations,especiallyfromthe UruguayRound.WTO's
currentDirectorGeneralisRobertoAzevdo,[11][12]wholeadsastaffofover600peopleinGeneva,
Switzerland.[13] A trade facilitation agreement known as the Bali Package was reached by all
memberson7December2013,thefirstcomprehensiveagreementintheorganization'shistory. [14]
[
TheprocessofbecomingaWTOmemberisuniquetoeachapplicantcountry,andthetermsof
accession are dependent upon the country's stage of economic development and current trade
regime.[61]Theprocesstakesaboutfiveyears,onaverage,butitcanlastmoreifthecountryisless
thanfullycommittedtotheprocessorifpoliticalissuesinterfere.Theshortestaccessionnegotiation
wasthatoftheKyrgyzRepublic,whilethelongestwasthatofRussia,which,havingfirstappliedto
joinGATTin1993,wasapprovedformembershipinDecember2011andbecameaWTOmember
on22August2012.TheWTOhas159membersand25observergovernments. [69] Inadditionto
states,theEuropeanUnionisamember.WTOmembersdonothavetobefull sovereignnation
members.Instead,theymustbeacustomsterritorywithfullautonomyintheconductoftheir
externalcommercialrelations.ThusHongKonghasbeenamembersince1995(as"HongKong,
China"since1997)predatingthePeople'sRepublicofChina,whichjoinedin2001after15yearsof
negotiations.

Week11
TheCollectiveSecuritySystemandtheUseofForceUnderInternationalLaw
OneoftheprimarygoalsoftheUN,accordingtoArticle1(1)oftheUNCharter,istomaintain
internationalpeaceandsecurity.Inordertoachievethisaim,Article2(4)containsaprohibitionon
theuseofforce.AsystemofcollectivesanctionsagainstanyoffendingStatethatresortstotheuse
offorceprotectsthisprohibition.ThesesanctionsarefoundinArticles3951oftheUNCharter.
PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE USE OF FORCE: THE PROHIBITION AND THE
EXCEPTIONS
Article1(1)oftheUNChartersaysthatoneofthepurposesoftheCharteristo:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measuresforthepreventionandremovalof(1)threatstothepeace,andforthe(2)suppressionof
actsofaggression or(3) otherbreachesofthepeace,andtobringaboutbypeacefulmeans
adjustmentorsettlementofinternationaldisputesorsituationswhichmightleadtoabreachofthe
peace
Inordertomaintaininternationalpeaceandsecurityandtopreventfuturewars:
(1)Article2(3)placesanobligationonmemberStatestosettletheirdisputespeacefully.
AllMembersshallsettletheirinternationaldisputes bypeacefulmeans insuchamannerthat
internationalpeaceandsecurity,andjustice,arenotendangered.
(2)Article2(4)prohibitsmemberStatesfromusingforceintheirinternationalrelations.
AllMembersshallrefrainintheirinternationalrelationsfromthethreatoruseofforceagainstthe
territorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofanystate,orinanyothermannerinconsistent
withthePurposesoftheUnitedNations.
InNicaraguavUSA,ICJheldthattheprohibitionontheuseofforceiscoveredbytreatylaw(that
istheUNCharter),bycustomaryinternationallawandtheprohibitionwasaJusCogensnorm.
Inthe1970DeclarationonPrinciplesofInternationalLawconcerningFriendlyRelationsthereis:
(1) a general prohibition on the threat or use of force, (2) duty to refrain from organizing,
instigating,assisting or participating inactsofcivilstrifeorterroristactsinanotherStateor
acquiescinginorganizedactivitieswithinitsterritorywhentheseactsinvolvethethreatoruseof
forceagainstanotherState.
(3)TheprohibitionissafeguardedbyasystemofcollectivesanctionsagainstanyoffendingState
thatusesforce.ThisisfoundinArticles3951oftheUNCharter.
3.1.Articles39,40and41operatetooffersanctionsagainstamemberStatethathasthreatenor
usedforceinawaythatitamountstoathreattoorbreachofpeaceoranactofaggression.Article
39says:
TheSecurityCouncilshalldeterminetheexistenceofany threattothepeace, breachofthe
peace,or actofaggression andshallmakerecommendations,ordecidewhatmeasuresshallbe
takeninaccordancewithArticles41and42,tomaintainorrestoreinternationalpeaceandsecurity.
Article41allowstheSecurityCounciltoimposesanctions(tradeandeconomicsanctions,arms
embargoes):
TheSecurityCouncilmaydecidewhatmeasuresnotinvolvingtheuseofarmedforcearetobe
employedtogiveeffecttoitsdecisions,anditmaycallupontheMembersoftheUnitedNationsto
applysuchmeasures.Thesemayincludecompleteorpartialinterruptionofeconomicrelationsand
ofrail,sea,air,postal,telegraphic,radio,andothermeansofcommunication,andtheseverance of
diplomaticrelations.
3.2.Article42givestheSecurityCouncilthepowertoauthorizetheusenecessaryforcetomaintain
internationalpeaceandsecurity.BecausetheSecurityCouncildoesnothaveamilitaryforceofits
own,theSecurityCouncilauthorizesmemberStatestouseforce.
TheSecurityCouncil]maytakesuchactionbyair,sea,orlandforcesasmaybenecessaryto
maintainorrestoreinternationalpeaceandsecurity.
3.3.Article51providesforamemberStatetouseforceinselfdefensewhenthereisanarmed
attackagainstthatState
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self
defence ifanarmedattack occursagainstaMemberoftheUnitedNations, untiltheSecurity
Councilhastakenmeasuresnecessarytomaintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity
TheonlyexceptionstotheprohibitionontheuseofforceintheUNCharterarefoundinArticles
42and51oftheUNCharter(provisionsinArticle53(1)and107arenotrelevantadditiontothis,
Stateshaveinvokedcustomaryinternationallawofselfdefenseandhumanitarianintervention(for
exampleinthe11dayNATObombingofKosovo)andimplicitauthorizationunderSCResolutions
(forexample,NATObombingofKosovoandUSinvasionofIraq)asajustificationtouseforce
againstanotherState.
Article2(4)oftheUNCharterprovides:
AllMembersshallrefrainintheirinternationalrelationsfromthethreatoruseofforceagainstthe

territorial integrity (TI) or political independence (PI) of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistentwiththePurposesoftheUnitedNations
Thefollowingactscanbeconsideredasathreattouseforce:
(1)militaryexercisesontheborder;
(2)hostilestatementsoffutureinvasions
Useofforcecanbeseenin:
(1)directforce:crossbordershootingormilitaryincursions;
(2) indirectforce:Statesareprohibitedfromorganizing,assisting,instigatingorparticipatingin
civilstrifeorterroristactsagainstanotherStateoracquiescinginorganizedactivitieswhenthese
activitiesarethreatenoruseforceagainstanotherState.Forexample,armingandtrainingofrebels
amounttouseofforce,whilefundingtherebelswillnot(Nicaraguacase).
Thechartshowstheproceduretobefollowedwhenastateusesforceagainstanotherstate.

Article24oftheChartersaystheprimaryresponsibilityofmaintaininginternationalpeaceand
securityiswiththeSecurityCouncil.TheSecurityCouncilcantakemeasuresthatarebindingon
memberStates.Article25says:
TheMembersoftheUnitedNationsagreetoacceptandcarryoutthedecisionsoftheSecurity
CouncilinaccordancewiththepresentCharter.
TheGeneralAssembly(GA)cannottakemeasuresthatarebindingonStates.GAcannotmake
recommendationsonadisputeorsituationwhentheSecurityCouncilisdiscussingit(Article12of
theCharter).Article10says:
TheGeneralAssemblymaydiscussanyquestionsoranymatterswithinthescopeofthepresent
CharterorrelatingtothepowersandfunctionsofanyorgansprovidedforinthepresentCharter,
and,exceptasprovidedinArticle12,maymakerecommendationstotheMembersoftheUnited
NationsortotheSecurityCouncilortobothonanysuchquestionsormatters.
In the Palestinian Wall Case, the ICJ held thatthe Security Councils authority tomaintain
internationalpeaceandsecuritywasprimarybutnotexclusive.TheGA,undertheUnitingfor
PeaceResolution, candiscussandmakerecommendationsonmattersevenwhentheSecurity
Councilisdiscussingthem.UnderthisResolution,theGA(1)referredthePalestinianWallCaseto
theICJforanAdvisoryOpinionand(2)sentaPeacekeepingforcetoEgyptaftertheSuezcanal
crisisin1956(eventhoughtheSCwassimultaniouslydiscussingthesematters).
CollectiveuseofforceistheuseofforcefollowingSecurityCouncilauthorization.UnderArticle
53oftheCharterSCcanalsoauthorizeregionalorganizationssuchasNATO,OAS,OAUtotake
enforcementmeasures.E.g.:In1995,SCauthorizedNATOtotakeallnecessarymeasuresto
overseetheGeneralFrameworkAgreementforPeaceinBosniaandHerzegovina.
>1stexceptiontothisgeneralprohibitionofuseofforceArticle42givestheSecurityCouncilthe
powertoauthorizetheusenecessaryforcetomaintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity.
>2ndexception:rightofselfdefence
Rightofselfdefence(SD)canbebothindividualselfdefence(victimStateagainsttheaggressor
State)andcollective(victimState+friendlyStatesagainsttheaggressorState).Therighttoself
defenceisfoundintreatylaw(UNcharter)andinCIL.SelfdefencethattakesplacewithoutSC
authorizationisatypeofunilateraluseofforce(welearntthatthiswouldbecalledcollectiveuse

offorce,ifSCauthorizestheuseofforce,).
Article51providesforamemberStatetouseforceinselfdefensewhenthereisanarmedattack
againstthatState:
NothinginthepresentChartershallimpairtheinherentrightofindividualorcollectiveself
defenceifanarmedattackoccursagainstaMemberoftheUnitedNations,untiltheSecurity
Council(SC)hastakenmeasuresnecessarytomaintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity.
MeasurestakenbyMembersintheexerciseofthisrightofselfdefenceshallbeimmediately
reportedtotheSC
Whatisanarmedattackandwhocancarryoutanarmedattack?
InNicaraguacaseICJsaysanarmedattackis:(1)actionbyregularStatearmedforcesacrossan
internationalborder;(2)armedgroups,irregularforcesandmercenarieswhen(a)theyaresentby
oronbehalfofaStatetocarryoutanarmedattackagainstanotherStateand(b)theattackisof
suchgravitysothatitamountstoanarmedattackifitwasconductedbyregulararmedforcesofa
State(TheCourtreferredtoArticle3(g)oftheGAResolutionontheDefinitionofAggressionand
saidthisreflectedCIL).NotethatStateBdoesnothavearightofSDagainstStateA:evenif
rebelscarriedoutanarmedattackagainstStateB;unless,theserebelswassentbyoronbehalfof
anotherState(StateA).
WhatisnotanarmedattackaccordingtotheICJintheNicaraguacase?
IfStateAsuppliesofweaponsandlogisticaltoarebelgroup,whichtherebelgroupsuseto
attackStateBcanthesupplyofweaponsandlogisticalsupportbeconsideredasanarmed
attackbyStateAagainsttheStateB?InNicaraguaCasethecourtsaidNO.TheCourtsaidthis
mayamounttoathreatoruseofforceorinterventionintheaffairsofanotherStatebutitwasnot
anarmedattack.ThismeansthatStateBdoesnothavetherightofSDagainstStateAunder
Article51oftheCharterbecauseanarmedattackhasnotoccurred.
Merefrontierincidentsarenotarmedattacksifthenecessaryscaleandeffectsarenotthere.
WhencanaStateuseforceinSDaccordingtoArticle51?
AnarmedattackhastohaveoccurredagainstamemberState
SDisonlyavailableagainsttheaggressorState(theonewhocarriedoutoronwhosebehalfan
armedattackwascarriedout)bythevictimState(subjectoftheattack).
TheonlywayathirdStatewillhavearightofSDagainsttheaggressorStateisifthevictimState
asksforthehelpofthethirdState(wecallthiscollectiveselfdefense).(Nicaraguacase)
AnyuseofforceinSDmustbenecessaryandproportionatetothearmedattack.(Nicaraguacase&
advisoryopinionoftheICJonthelegalityofthethreatoruseofforce)
AStatethatusesforceinSDmustimmediatelyinformtheSCandthisStatecanuseforceonly
untiltheSCstepsin.
InadditiontothetreatyrightofSD,somearguethatthereisalsoaCILrighttoSD.Theyarguethat
theCharterneverintendedtorestricttheCILrightofSD(whichismorewiderthantherightunder
A.51)andthatthereferencetotheinherentrightofSDinArticle51bringsintheCILrightof
SDintoArticle5.
CILrightofSD
AStatecanuseSDwhenits(1)necessary:thatistosaythatthethreatoruseofforceisinstant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice (no alternatives) and no moment of deliberation and (2)
proportionatetothethreatoruseofforce.(ThispositionwasformulatedaftertheCarolineIncident
thattookplacein1837whentheBritishsankashipwithinsurgentsinAmericanterritoryandafter
Britishcitizenwaschargedforsinkingtheship.)
UnderCILaStateuseSD:
Whenanarmedattackoccurred
InanticipationofanarmedattackorthreattoStatesecurity:considerwhatwedidontherecentUS
attackonIraqbasedontheallegedexistenceofnuclearweapons(WMD).ThiswasjustifiedbyUS
asanticipatorySD(thisisalsocalledpreemptoryselfdefense)
InresponsetoanattackorthreatofattackagainstStateinterests(nationalsandpropertyofthe
State).
wheretheattackdoesntinvolvetheuseofforceandinvolves,instead,economicaggressionthat

isinstantandoverwhelming.
The Caroline incident is generally regarded as the reference point for any discussion on self
defence,aswellasthecriteriagoverningitsuse.In1837,USSecretaryofStateDanielWebster
articulatedadefinitionofselfdefence,whichevolvedintocustomaryinternationallaw.Websters
definitionfollowedwhathascometobeknownastheCarolineincident.TheCarolinewasaUS
steamboatattemptingtotransportsuppliestoCanadianinsurgents.ABritishforceinterruptedthe
Carolinesvoyage,shotatit,setitonfireandletitwashoverNiagaraFalls.Webstersaidthat
Britainsactdidnotqualifyasselfdefencebecauseselfdefenceisonlyjustifiedifthenecessityof
thatselfdefenceisinstant,overwhelming,andleavingnochoiceofmeans,andnomomentfor
deliberation.Thisincidentisimportantprimarilyforthefollowingreasons:
First, to limit selfdefence to situations where the threat is real, the response is essential and
proportional,andpeacefulmeanshavebeenexhausted.Article51furthernarrowedselfdefence,
permittingitonlyincaseofanarmedattack.Second,it laiddownthegeneral frameworkfor
exercisingselfdefence,includinganticipatoryselfdefence.AcceptancebyBritishandAmerican
governmentsofselfdefenceasrelevantinsituationsofnecessityinanticipationofathreatofattack
whichwasinstant,overwhelming,leavingnochoiceofmeansandnomomentfordeliberation
clearlyindicatesthatanticipatoryselfdefenceformedpart oftraditionalcustomarylaw. Third,
referencetothisgeneralframeworkbytheNurembergandTokyoTribunalsdemonstratethatthey
werestillconsideredcustomarylaw,astheCharterwasbeingframed.
As most authorities accept this as a given and since there is no evidence that the Caroline
frameworkhasbeenreplacedbyconventionallaw,wecansafelyassumethatCarolinestillforms
partofthecustomarylawrelatingtoselfdefence.This,thenpermitsStatestorespondtoathreat
andinfringeontheterritorialsovereigntyofanothernationwhen:(i)itisactinginselfdefence,(ii)
theattackissubstantial,(iii)theoffendingnationisunabletopreventfurtherattacksand(iv)the
attackiswidespreadandimminent
necessityinWebstersformulationdenotessomethinginstant,imminentandchoiceofmeansand
no moment for deliberation they destroyed the American boat Caroline , which had carried
suppliestoCanadianexcessive,sincetheact justifiedbythenecessityofselfdefencemustbe
limitedbygroupofBritishsoldiersenteredtheUnitedStatesfrom Canada,theiraim beingto
immediate,thesetwoelementshavebeenjoinedbyathird,thatofimminence.Inearlynineteenth
centuryCanada,which,atthetime,wasstillunderBritishrule,antiBritishattackswerebeing
conductedthroughoutthecountry.In1837,asmallinsurgentsinthenorth.TheCarolinewasset
alightandlefttodriftdownriver,atinvokingtherightofselfdefence,arguingthattheCaroline
wouldcontinuetoleastoneAmericanbeingkilledintheprocess.TheBritishjustifiedtheiractions
byrighttoselfdefence,eitherinanticipationorotherwise,wouldthereforebevalidSecretaryof
StateDanielWebstersetoutthebasicelementsoftheright,statingstatedfurtherthattheuseof
force should not involve anything unreasonable or supply the Canadian rebels otherwise.
Accepting this explanation, the then American that necessity and kept clearly within it .The
customarythatthereshouldbeanecessityofselfdefence,instant,overwhelming,leavingnowhen
therequirementsofnecessityandproportionalityarefulfilled.
IntheNicaraguacase,theCourtstated,thattheCharteritselftestifiestotheexistenceoftheright
ofcollectiveselfdefenceincustomaryinternationallawandthattheexceptiontotheprohibition
offorceconstitutedbytherightofindividualorcollectiveselfdefence[is]alreadyamatterof
customaryinternationallaw.WhiletheCourtremainedsilentontheissueofpreemptiveor
anticipatoryselfdefence,itscommentsarestillevidencethatWebstersformulationofthe
customarylawrules(whichpermitanticipatoryselfdefence)arestillvalidininternationallaw.A
righttoanticipatoryselfdefencemaythereforeariseundertheCarolineelements,despitebeing
precludedbyArticle51.
3possibleinterpretationsoftherighttoselfdefense
1)strictinterpretation
forastatetobebaletousetherighttoselfdefence,anarmedattackmustactuallyoccur.
>bombmusthittheground
2)2ndinterpretation(preemptiveselfdefense)
Anarmedattackmightnothavehappened,butalltheevidenceshowsthatitwilloccurandwaiting
foritwouldbetoocostly.

3)3rdinterpretation
Theybelievethenotionofpreemptiveselfdefenceincludestherighttodefendthemselvesagainst
potentialthreatstoo.
Forceusedshouldbeproportionaltoo.youcannotdestroyavillageforadestructionofaseavessel.
Dronesarebattlefieldweaponswhichserveaslaunchvehiclesfordeliveringbombsandmissiles.
theyareweaponsformilitaryoperations.
Sincetheyarebattlefieldweapons,lawswhichgoverntheuseofdronesarethelegalregime
govenringthemilitaryforce.Thereare3maincomponents
1)Jusadbellumthelawswhichgoverntheinitialresorttomilitaryforce.ThisistheUNcharter.
Charterlaysdownageneralprohibition,useofmilitaryforceshouldbethelastresort.Couldbe
used only for the exceptions i.e. for the use of self defence or with the security council's
authorization.principlesofnecessityandproportionality.
2)Jusinbelloitgovernstheconductofarmedforce
3)Humanrightslawthatapplyatalltimes(juscogens)
Atarketkillingcan
onlybesomethingotherthananextrajudicialexecutionthatis,amurderif
Ittakesplaceinanarmedconflict;
ThearmedconflictisanactofselfdefensewithinthemeaningoftheUN
Charter,and
ItisalsoanarmedconflictwithinthemeaningofIHL;andfinally,
Even ifit isan armed conflict underIHL, thecircumstances must not permit applicationof
internationalhumanrightslaw,whichwouldrequireanattemptto
arrestratherthantargetingtokill.
Because
DescribethemainfeaturesofthecollectivesecuritysystemenvisagedbytheUNCharter.
WhatistheroleoftheUNSecurityCouncil?
WhatistheroleoftheUNGeneralAssembly?
Article2(4)oftheUNCharterprohibitstheuseofforceininternationalrelations.Arethereany
exceptionstothisgeneralprohibition?
Underwhatcircumstancesmaystateslawfullyuseselfdefense?Isthereadifferencebetweenthe
treatylawandCILrelatingtoselfdefense?
Whatarethepreconditionsforanactofselfdefensetobelawful?Whatfamousdictumwassetout
intheCarolinecase?
Isanticipatoryselfdefenselawful?ExplainitinthecontextofthedronewarfareinPakistanandthe
deathofAnwaralawlakiasaUScitizen.
Istheuseofnuclearweaponslawful? WhatdidtheICJruleinthe NuclearWeapons Advisory
Opinion?
Whatishumanitarianintervention?IsitalawfulexceptiontoArticle2(4)?Shoulditbe?Whatdo
youthinkoftheopinionoftheICJassetoutinthePreliminaryobjectionsintheLegalityoftheUse
ofForce(SerbiaandMontenegrov.Belgium)?
10. Discussthelegalityofthefollowinginterventions:
The1971BangladeshwarandIndiasselfdefense
TheUSinterventionintoNicaragua19791980?

TheNATOinterventioninKosovo(OperationStorm)in1999?
TheNATOinterventionintoAfghanistan(OperationEnduringFreedom),2001present?
TheUS&OthersinvasionofIraq(OperationIraqiFreedom)2003?
ThearmedactivitiesofUgandanforcesandparamilitariesintheterritoryoftheCongo?
The2011militaryinterventionintoLibya?
Week12
InternationalHumanitarianLaw
InternationalHumanitarianLaw(IHL)isthebranchofinternationallawthatprovidestherulesthat
regulatetheconductofarmedconflict.
Itisthebodyoflawthatregulatestheconductofhostilitiesbyallpartiestoaconflictonceanarmed
conflicthascommenced.IHLisalsocalledjusinbello.Itisdifferentfromjustadbellumwhichthe
lawgoverningtheuseofforcewhichconcernsthelegalityofdecisionsaboutgoingtowar.
Itprovidesdetailedrulesthatregulatethemeansandmethodsofwarfareandwhich
aimtoprotectthosepersonsthatarenottakingpartinacon!ict,includingcivilians
andsoldiersthatareoutofaction(alsocalledhorsdecombat).
WhatdoesIHLregulate?
ModernIHLisconcernedwithsixcentraltopics:
1.permissibleuseofweaponsandmilitarytactics;
2.protectionofthosewhocannolongerfight(wounded,sickandshipwreckedtroops,
prisonersofwar);
3.thedutiesandrightsofneutralpartiestoaconflict;
4.rulesregulatingoccupation;
5.theprotectionofpeoplewhodonottakepartinthefighting(e.g.civilians,medics,and
aidworkers);
6.theprotectionofcultural,religioussites,andtheenvironment.
The order of these six topics reflects the historical progression of IHL, which is coined as the
humanizationofIHL(Meron2000).ThehumanizationofIHL,thatistheincreasingfocusonthe
humanitarianprotectionfunctionofIHL,isreflectedbothinthechangesinthenameofthetopicand
the development of its substance. IHL was traditionally referred to as the laws of war or the
internationallawofarmedconflict.
theIHLtreaties,theHagueRegulations,thefourGenevaConventions,and
twoAdditionalProtocolsof1977togetherstandout.
CustomaryIHLisimportantbecauseitestablisheswhichrulesapplytoallstatesregardless
oftheirratificationstatusofthemyriadofIHLtreaties
InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)
ThenatureofIHLasabodyofinternationallawisuniqueduetoanumberofitsinstitutionalfeatures.
Theseare,theactorcentricnatureofIHL;theexistenceoftwosetsofrulesforinternationaland
internalconflicts;andtheincorporationofanonstateactors,andtheInternationalReviewoftheRed
Cross,initsimplementation.
IHL challenges international relations and law approaches that view states as unitary actors and
international lawas only regulating relationships between states. IHL regulates the conduct of all
actorsthatareinvolvedanarmedconflict:theseactorsmaybestates(beitas"fightingpartiesor
neutralobservers),buttheymayalsobeanyindividualorgroupofindividualsofanynationalitythat
are involved in an armed conflicte.g. rebel groups, soldiers, medical officers, civilians, or non
governmentalhumanitarianorganizations.
IHL challenges international relations and law approaches that view states as unitary actors and
international lawas only regulating relationships between states. IHL regulates the conduct of all

actorsthatareinvolvedanarmedconflict:theseactorsmaybestates(beitasfightingpartiesorneutral
observers),buttheymayalsobeanyindividualorgroupofindividualsofanynationalitythatare
involved in an armed conflicte.g. rebel groups, soldiers, medical officers, civilians, or non
governmental
humanitarianorganizations.
ThefactthatIHLcreatesobligationsnotonlyforstates,butalsoforindividuals.
Internationalandinternalarmedconflicts
Due to the resistance to regulate internal conflicts, IHL has different rules that are applicable in
internationalandnoninternational(internal)armedconflicts.Inparticular,statesregarddissidentsas
criminalsratherthancombatants.Itisforthisreasonthatnoprisonerofwarstatusexistsininternal
armedconflicts.therulesthatgovernnoninternationalcon!ictsarelessdevelopedandweakerthan
thoseapplicabletointernationalarmedcon!icts.
IHLandtheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)
AnotheruniqueelementofIHListhatitistheonlybodyofinternationallawthatprovidesaspecial
statusandroletoaninternationalhumanitarianorganization.The1949GenevaConventionstaskthe
InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)toplayamajorroleinencouragingcompliancewith
IHL and it is recognized in treaty law as having the authority to visit prisoners, organize relief
operations, reunite separated families, and carry out other humanitarian activities during armed
conflicts.ManystatesrecognizetheinternationallegalpersonalityoftheICRCandaccorditprivileges
andimmunitiesundertheirdomesticlaws.
IHLbasicprinciples:militarynecessity
Partiestoaconflictareallowedtodowhateverisnecessarytowinthewar(inline
withIHL).
Theonlylegitimateobjectofwaristoweakenthemilitaryforceoftheenemy.
MilitarynecessitycannotbeinvokedasareasonforviolatingIHL.
Theremustbeabalancestruckbetweenhumanityandmilitarynecessity.
OneofthecentralpurposesandfeaturesofIHListolimithumansufferingandprotectinnocent
victimsofconflictandoutofactionfighters(horsdecombat).
IHLbasicprinciples:protectionofhumanityandtheprohibitionofsuperfluousinjuryandunnecessary
suffering
All human beings must be treated with humanity and parties must respect human dignity. The
principleofhumanitymeansthatpartiestoaconflictarenot,forexample,abletokillandmainat
random,ethnicallycleansepopulations,forciblydisplacecivilians,burndownreligiousmonuments,
torture,usesexualviolenceasaweaponofwar,orusecruel,inhumane,ordegradingtreatmentofany
kindagainstanyhumanbeing.
Althoughthekillingofcombatantsisallowed,IHLprohibitsinhumaneandpainfulwaysofkilling
(e.g.drowningandtorture).
Someweaponshavebeenoutlawedastheycausesuperfluousinjuryandunnecessary
suffering(e.g.chemical,biological,andpoisonousweapons,expandingandexplodingbullets,and
weaponsprimarilycausinginjurybynondetectablefragments).
IHLbasicprinciples:theprincipleofdistinctionandproportionality
Inordertoprotecthumanityarmedforcesarerequiredtodistinguishbetweenmilitaryandcivilian
targetsandtheyareonlyallowedtodirecttheiroperationsagainstmilitaryobjectives.
IHLprohibitsthedirecttargetingofciviliansandciviliantargetssuchasschools,religiousbuildings,
patrimonialsites,andhospitals.
Apartytotheconflictmayonlytargetacivilianobjectinexceptionalcircumstanceswherethereis
clearevidencethatacivilianobjectisbeingusedformilitarypurposesandwhereitcanjustifyan
attackonthebasisofmilitarynecessity.Anysuchattackmustbeproportionatetotheaim.

Inmodernnoninternationalconflicts,civiliansandmilitarytargetsareoftennoteasytodistinguish,
forexample,wherefightingiscarriedoutbyrebelsthatoperateoutofdenselypopulatedcivilianareas.
IHLobligesallpartiestoaconflicttoensurethattheiractionsareproportionaltothemilitaryaim.
Adisproportionateattackisanattackwhichmaybeexpectedtocauseincidentallossofcivilianlife,
injurytocivilians,damagetocivilianobjects,oracombination
thereof,whichwouldbeexcessiveinrelationtotheconcreteanddirectmilitary
advantageanticipated(Protocol1Article51).
THEHIERARCHYOFRULESININTERNATIONALLAW:JUSCOGENS

Differencesbetweennationalandinternationallegalorder
Nationalsystems
hierarchyofsources(usually:constitution,laws,regulations)
hierarchyoflegalrulesproducedthroughsuchsources(alawmaynotcontradictthe
constitution,aregulationmaynotcontradictalaw,andafortiori,theconstitution)
Traditionalinternationallaw
customandtreatiesareonanequalfooting
lackofhierarchyofsourcesandrulesderivingfromsuchsources
freedomofStatestoaltercustomortreatyrulestosuittheirinterests
Today,thereisstillnohierarchy,butaclassofgeneralcustomaryruleshasacquiredthespecialstatus
ofperemptorynorms.

JusCogens
Emergenceofjuscogenscanbetracedtothelate60sandrestsupontheideathatacertain
categoryoflawthatderivesfromreasonandhumanity(naturallaw)shouldprevailovermanmadelaw
(consentbasedlaw)
theestablishmentforperemptorynormswasaresultoftheinitiativesofsocialistand
developingcountries
Thecompromisereachedbetweentheproponentsofjuscogensandthecountriesthatopposed
theidearesultedintheaffirmationofjuscogensnorms,subjecttothestrictconditionthatajudicial
mechanismfordeterminationofperemptorynormsbeestablished.Thismechanismwasimbeddedin
theI.C.J.andtheresultwasthatanyStateinvokingjuscogensshouldbereadytosubmittheissuefor
determinationstotheI.C.J.
EstablishmentandScopeofJusCogens
ViennaConvention1969,Art.53andArt.64donotexactlydefinejuscogensbutdo
establishitscharacterofaperemptorynormwiththeeffectthatnootherruleofinternationallawmay
derogatetoit(Art.53)andifaperemptoryruleemergesthatiscontrarytoanexistingcustomortreaty,
suchcustomortreatybecomevoidandterminate(Art.64)
ViennaConvention1986,Articles66(a)and66.2providethatincasesofdisputeregarding
theactualcontentof

juscogens

and,wherepartiesmaynotresolvetheirdifferencesthrough
negotiationoragreetoarbitration,partiesshallsubmittheirdisputetotheI.C.J..
Isuniversalacceptanceofanormasbeingperemptorynecessaryforitsformation?(Itis
enoughforalargemajorityofrepresentativeStatestorecognizesuchruleaspartofjuscogens.Itis
safetocontendthatallMajorPowersshouldassenttosuchrule).

ExamplesofPeremptoryNorms
Thecurrentstateofaffairsshowsnostatepractice,withtheaccompanyingopiniojurisofthe
peremptorycharacterofcertainnorms,althoughthereisconsensusamongStates,atthelevelofopinio
jurisoropinionecessitasregardingtheexistenceofperemptoryinternationalrules
Art.19ICLDraftArticlesonStateResponsibilitygivessomecluesastowhichprinciplesor
rulesmightbelongtojuscogens(referstointernationalobligationssoessentialfortheprotectionof
fundamentalinterestsoftheinternationalcommunitythattheirbreachshallberecognizedasacrime
bythatcommunityasawhole;e.g.prohibitionofaggression;slavery,genocide,apartheid;forceful
colonization;massiveenvironmentalpollution)

ProhibitionofuseorthreatofforcecanbeinferredfromUNSCresolutioncondemningthe
annexationofKuwaitbyIraqbydeclaringitnullandvoid
Banonracialdiscrimination(customaryrule);banontortureseeProsecutorv.

Furundzija
(ICTY,1998);generalrulesofselfdetermination.
Mostnormsofhumanitarianlaw(esp.warcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity).SeeZoran
Kupreskicetal..
1)LimitationsforJusCogensasEnvisagedintheViennaConvention
TheprovisionsoftheViennaConventiononjuscogenscanbeinvokedonlybyStatesthatareparties
toboththeVCandtoatreatythatallegedascontrarytotheseperemptorynorms.
2)RemediestotheLimitedApplicabilityoftheVCprovisionsonjuscogens
AftertheadoptionoftheVC,somecustomaryrulesregardingtheinvalidityoftreatieshaveevolvedto
theeffectthatanyStateconcerned(i.e.directlyaffectedbyatreatythatiscontrarytojuscogens),
whetherornotapartytotheVC,mayinvoketheinvalidityofthetreatyifsuchtreatyiscontrarytojus
cogensortherulesprohibitingcoercionofaStateorofaStaterepresentative.
Whatcanalsobeobservedistheemergenceofacustomaryruleontheexistenceofperemptorylaw.
Theprevailingview,sharedbythemajorityofStates,isthatcertainrulesareperemptoryinnature(i.e.
possessspeciallegalforceinthatitrendersnullnormsthatarecontrarytoit)andbecauseofitswide
acceptancethiscustomaryruleonjuscogensalsoappliestonormativeactsbyotherinternational
subjects(insurgentsagreements)andtolegalstandardsotherthanthoselaiddowninthetreaties(e.g.
SCresolutions).ThiscustomaryruleoperatesagainststatesthatarenotpartytotheVC.
Howdidthisruleevolveinsuchashortperiodoftime?1969showedbroadconsentonjuscogensas
expressedintheConvention,butalsobasedonthecommentsmadeduringtheConference.Many
nationalcourtshavebroughtattentiontoperemptorynorms.Internationalarbitralcourtsimplicitly
upheldthenotionofjuscogens.
Note:
Thecustomaryruleonjuscogensdoesnot,however,embodyreferencetothecompulsory
jurisdictioninthecaseofdispute,soaState,notpartytotheVC,whileitcaninvokethe
invalidityofatreatyascontrarytojuscogens,maynothavemuchofarecourseagainsttheother
Stateifthelatterrefusestosubmitthecasetojudicialdetermination.ThecontestantStatewill
havetofallbackontraditionalmechanismsofsettlingdisputes.

-
-

LegalEffectsofJusCogens:
treatiesandcustomaryrulesthatarecontraryto

juscogens

areinvalid

abinitio
possibly,acourtwilldeclarenullandvoidonlytheprovisionsofthetreatythatarecontraryto
juscogens,butupholdthevalidityofallotherprovisions(ifsucharenottaintedbyillegality);VC,Art.
44.5doesnotprovideforthiseffect,andmayevenbeconstruedasexcludingit.IfArt.44.5istobe
construedliterally,asnullifytheentiretreaty,suchconsequencewillaffectonlyStatesthatarepartyto
theVC,butthepossibilityremainsthatastononpartiestotheVCthecustomaryruleofjuscogens
mayhavetheeffecttovoidonlythosetreatyprovisionsthatarecontrarytoperemptorynorms
Withrespecttoconstruction:incaseofdoubt,internationalnormsshouldbeconstruedsoas
tobeconsistentwithperemptorynorms
JuscogensisbindingonUNSC,aswellasICTYandtheirresolutionsorjudgments
respectivelyshallbeconstruedastobeconsistentwithjuscogens;andifthatisimpossible,i.e.ifthey
arebluntlycontradictory,theyshallbeviewedasinvalid
seeexampleregardingthereconciliationofSCRes.1497whichprovidedfortheexclusive
jurisdictionoftheStateofthecriminalwhofallsunderthegravebreachesprovisionsoftheGeneva
Conventions(gravebreachesofhumanitarianlawbelongtojuscogensandareintransgressibleasthe
I.C.J.heldinThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons)andtheGenevaConventionswhichprovidedfor
universaljurisdiction.Howcanthisinconsistencybesolved?StrictinterpretationoftheSCResolution
soastogivethenationalstateprimaryjurisdiction(afirstshot),unlesstheStatewherethecriminal
wasapprehendedisnotsatisfiedthatthenationalstatewillpursueagenuinetrial,inwhichcasesit

maydecidetotryititself,orextraditeittoaforeigncountrythathasanexus(aconnection)tothe
crime
Deterrenteffect.SeeFurundzija
BearingontherecognitionofStates.SeeArbitrationCommissiononYugoslavia,Opinion10:
recognitionisadiscretionaryactbyeachstate,subjectonlytocompliancewiththeimperativerulesof
internationallaw.Itfollowsthatwhensuchrulesareviolated(e.g.entitythatmeetstherequirements
forstatehoodemergesasaresultofaggression),otherStatesshouldwithholdrecognition.
Areservationthatiscontrarytojuscogensisinadmissible
Effectonextraditiontreaties:AStatemaynotcomplywithitsobligationsunderanextradition
treatyifdoingsomayleadtoapossibleviolationofjuscogens(i.e.ifcompliancewiththeextradition
treatywillexposethepersontotheriskoffacingtorture,persecutiononethnic,religiousorracial
grounds).
Stateimmunityfromforeignjurisdictionperemptorynormsmayremovesuchimmunity
SeeFurnundzijaperemptorynormsmayproducelegaleffectsatthemunicipallevel,by
renderinginternationallyinvalidanynationalnormscontrarytothem.
Accordingtosomecourts,theperemptorycharacterofcertainnormsmaybegrantingtoState
courtsuniversalcriminaljurisdictionovertheallegedauthorsofthosecrimes.Inotherwords,the
allegedauthorofcrimescouldfaceprosecutioninanycountryintheworld(evenacountrythathasno
nexustothecrimes).
ThelimitedrelianceonJusCogensinInternationalDealings
thesenormshavebeenusedonlyindissentingopinions,orbiterdicta,Statepronouncements,
declarationsofinternationalbodies,bylitigants.
Notyetinvokedtoinvalidateatreatyprovision
I.C.J.hasavoidedtheterm
Statesrefraintoinvokesuchrulesoutofprinciple,becausetheyarestillinclinedtoactoutof
selfinterestandwillnotinvokearuleunlesstheyareaffected
However,juscogensrulesdohaveadeterrenteffectandcanbesaidtoshapeStateconduct.Still,in
bilateralrelations,juscogensnormsstillremainapotentiality.

JusCogensattheNationalLevel
juscogenswasusedastherationaleforinvalidatingtreatyprovisionsthatweredeterminedto
becontrarytoit.SeeBufano(SwissSupremeCourt,1982)refusedtocomplywithitsobligations
undertheextraditiontreatyithadconcludedwithArgentina,statingthattheprovisionsoftheEuropean
ConventiononExtraditionandtheECHR(EuropeanConventionofHumanRights)applytoArgentina
asgeneralprinciplesofinternationallawandjustifySwitzerlandsrefusaltoextraditeinthecaseat
issuebecausethecrimesmayqualifyaspoliticalcrimesandalsobecausetheaccusedwerelikelyto
facetorture,whichwasaperemptorynormofinternationallawandassuchrequiredSwitzerlandfrom
refrainingtofulfillitstreatyobligations.
InlaterdecisionstheSwissSupremeCourtreliedonBufanoandreliedonjuscogens,by
explicitlystatingtheArt.3oftheECHRbelongedtojuscogens.Notionofjuscogenswasenshrinedin
SwissConstitutionin1999.
- Persistentobjector
- Thecourtinthe AngloNorwegianFisheriescase heldthat evenifacustomarylawrule
existed(onatenmilerulerelatingtostraightbaselines),
- thetenmilerulewouldappeartobeinapplicableasagainstNorwayinasmuchasshehas
alwaysopposedanyattempttoapplyittotheNorwegiancoast.
- Ontheotherhand,intheAsylumcasethecourtfoundthatastateisnotboundbyacustomary
lawrulewhenthestaterefrainedfrombecomingapartytoaconventionthatwasthefirstto
introducetherulethathadcrystallizedintocustom.
- ButevenifitcouldbesupposedthatsuchacustomexistedbetweencertainLatinAmerican
Statesonly,itcouldnotbeinvokedagainstPeruwhich,farfromhavingbyitsattitudeadhered
to it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it by refraining from ratifying the Montevideo
Conventions of 1933 and 1939, which were the first to include a rule concerning the
qualificationoftheoffenceinmattersofdiplomaticasylum.

NB:Itisarguablewhetherthiscanapplyasageneralrulebecausetherearemanyreasonsthat
astatemayrefusetosignaconventionforexample,political,moraloreconomicreasons.
We also know that the state has the option to enter into a treaty and reserve out of the
objectionabletreatyprovision.Onecannotalwaysassume,unlessthestatehasexpresseditself
onthematter,thatastaterefusestosignaparticulartreatybecauseitrefutesthelegalityofa
particularprovisionwithinthetreaty.
Inboththesecases,thecourtdidnotsetoutthecriteriatodetermineifastateisapersistent
objector.It did,however,allude tocertaincriteriainthe AngloNorwegianfisheriescase
jurisprudence. The jurisprudence of the case appears to support the idea that an existing
customarylawrulewouldnotapplytoastateif
(1)itobjectedtoanyoutsideattemptstoapplytheruletoitself(a)attheinitialstagesand
(b)inaconsistentmanner,and
(2)ifotherstatesdidnotobjecttoherresistance(readmoreinthecasesummaryavailable
here).
Commentatorshavestated,ontheotherhand,thatforastatetobecomeapersistentobjector,
thestatemust
(1)objecttothepracticeattheinitialstagesoftheformationofcustomarylawandcontinueto
objectinasustainedmanner;or
(2) adopt a contrary practice at the initial stages of the formation of customary law and
continuetodosoasustainedmanner.
Theobjectionmustbeexpressedeitherverballyorascontrarypractice.Thereisnorulethat
States have to take physical action to preserve their rights (see the commentary (15) to
theILAcustomarylawstudy).
The absurdityof a persistent objector continuing to benefit from its objector status is
demonstratedinthefollowingexamples:
(1)Consideralsothispossibility.Acustomarylawruleisformedwithregardtothe12mile
territoriallimitwithinwhichthestatescitizenshavetheexclusiverighttoengageinfishing.
IfcountryBconsidersthemselvesaspersistentobjectorstothisrulethenitisnotboundby
thisrule.CountryBscitizens,theninpursuanceofthenonbindingnatureofthecustomary
lawruleonitscountry,venturesintocountryCsterritorialwaterstofish.CountryCcan
arrestthesefishermenandprosecutetheminaccordancewithitsdomesticlaws.CountryB
doesnothaveanactionablecausebeforeaninternationalcourtbecausecountryCsaction
wastoenforceacustomarylawright.
(2)Theotherargumentisthatpersistentobjectioncannotaffectorlooktoabsolvethestates
obligationsofjuscogensnorms.Forexample,astatecannotsaidtohavearightorescape
fromtheprohibitionoftorturesimplybecauseithadbeenapersistentobjector.Thiswouldbe
consistentwiththepositionintreatylawstatescannotmaketreatiesortreatyreservations
thatconflictwithjuscogensnorms.
Butwhataboutotherfundamentalnormsthatfallshortofthejuscogensstatusconsiderfor
examplehumanrightsobligationsthatdonotformjuscogensnorms.Forexample,inthe
hypothetical scenario that a state objected initially and persistently to the freedom of
expression or religion, would the state, then, be excused if it violated peoples rights to
freedomandreligion?Orwouldwesaythatthesepeopledidnothavetherightsbecausethe
statechosethepathofapersistentobjector?
(3)Whatiftherulethatthepersistentobjectorobjectedtowasanobligation?Assumefor
example,thehuntingofacertainendangeredanimalisprohibitedundertreatyandcustomary
law.AssumethatstateBhadconsistentlyobjectedtothisprohibitionandcontinuestohunt
thatanimalevenaftertheprohibitionbecomesacustomarylawright.Doesthismeanthat
state B is now absolved from the prohibition and can continue to hunt regardless of the
customarylawban?
Inviewoftheabove,itmaybemoreprudentandpracticaltoarguethatastatecanonlybea
persistentobjectorandhavethebenefitsofbeingapersistentobjectoratthetimeofthe

formationofthecustomarylaw.Thisisalsoconsistentwiththefactthatexistingcustomary
lawbindsnewstatesandthattheycannotwithdrawfromcustomarylawaftertheyattain
statehood.
-

Subsequentobjector
Suffice to say, the consequences of a subsequent objector one who objects after the
formationofthecustomarylawruleisclear.Thestatethatobjectscontinuestobeboundby
thecustomarylaw.Ifitactsincontrarytothelaw,itviolatesthelaw.Thestatecanbeheld
responsiblefortheviolationunderinternationallaw.
Ifanumberofstatesagreetothedeviationthenthesestatescouldcreateanothercustomary
lawrule,eitherasalocalcustomor,ifasufficientnumberofaffectedstatesparticipate,a
generalcustom.
Forasubsequentobjectortodevelopanewcustomarylawruleanexistingnormmustbe
broken.Astatewishingtochangecustomarylawmusteither(1)violatethelawandhope
otherstateswouldacquiescetoit(andif,anduntilsuchtimethestatewouldbeinbreachofa
customaryinternationallaw);or(2)withoutviolatingtheexistinglawthestatemust(a)geta
sufficientnumberofstatestoacceptthatanewcustomarylawhaddevelopedbeforechoosing
to adopt its state practice accordingly or (2) use the existing framework and creative
interpretations to bring the violation within the existing law. In time, this creative
interpretationwouldallowfortheformationofnewlaworitwouldberejectedbystates
preventingsuchformation.

LegalityoftheUsebyaStateofNuclearWeaponsinArmedConflict
AdvisoryOpinion(Jurisprudence&CustomaryLaw)
TheinitialrequestforanadvisoryopinionbytheICJwaspresentedbythe WorldHealthOrganization
(WHO)on3September1993,buttheICJdidnotrenderanopiniononthisrequestbecausetheWHO
was ultravires,oractingoutsideitslegal capacity.Anotherrequest waspresentedbythe United
NationsGeneralAssembly inDecember1994andacceptedbytheCourtinJanuary1995.TheICJ
handed down an advisory opinion on 8 July 1996 the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons case. Thedecisionprovidesoneofthefewauthoritativejudicialdecisionsconcerningthe
legalityunderinternationallawoftheuseorthethreateneduseofnuclearweapons.
Overview:
The General Assembly and World Health Organization requested advisory opinions from the
InternationalCourtofJusticeregardingthelegalityofnuclearweapons.
Issue:
MaytheInternationalCourtofJusticegiveanadvisoryopiniononanylegalquestionattherequestof
whateverbodymaybeauthorizedbyorinaccordancewiththeCharteroftheUnitedNationstomake
sucharequest?
Rule:
theICJmaygiveanadvisoryopiniononanylegalquestionattherequestofwhateverbodymaybe
authorizedbyorinaccordancewiththecharteroftheUNtomakesucharequest.
Analysis:
TheCourtalsorejectedargumentsthatitshouldrefrainfromrenderinganadvisoryopiniononthe
basisthatsuchareplymightnegativelyaffectdisarmamentnegotiations,andthattheCourtwouldbe
exceedingitsauthorityandactinginalawmakingcapacity.TheCourtrejectedthelatterargumenton
thebasisthatitsimplystatestheexistinglawanddoesnotlegislate,evenifitsometimesmustspecify
thescopeandapplicationofsuchlaw.
Outcome:

Yes.TheInternationalCourtofJusticemaygiveanadvisoryopiniononanylegalquestionatthe
requestofwhateverbodymaybeauthorizedbyorinaccordancewiththeCharteroftheUnitedNations
tomakesucharequest.Onlycompellingreasonsarejustifiedforarefusaltograntsuchanadvisory
opinion.TheCharteroftheUnitedNationsauthorizestheGeneralAssemblytomakesucharequest;
however,theCourtlacksthejurisdictiontograntsuchanopiniontotheWorldHealthOrganization.
Court'sanalysisofillegalityofnuclearweapons
Deterrenceand"threat"
Thecourtconsideredthematterofdeterrence,whichinvolvesathreattousenuclearweaponsunder
certaincircumstancesonapotentialenemyoranenemy.Wassuchathreatillegal?Thecourtdecided,
with some judges dissenting, that, if a threatened retaliatory strike was consistent with military
necessityandproportionality,itwouldnotnecessarilybeillegal.(Judgementparagraphs3750)
Thelegalityofthepossessionofnuclearweapons
Thecourtthenconsideredthelegalityofthepossession,asopposedtoactualuse,ofnuclearweapons.
TheCourtlookedatvarious treaties,includingthe UNCharter,andfoundnotreatylanguagethat
specificallyforbadethepossessionofnuclearweaponsinacategoricalway.
TheUNCharterwasexaminedinparagraphs3750(paragraph37:"TheCourtwillnowaddressthe
questionofthelegalityorillegalityofrecoursetonuclearweaponsinthelightoftheprovisionsofthe
Charterrelatingtothethreatoruseofforce").Paragraph39mentions:"Theseprovisions[i.e.thoseof
theCharter]donotrefertospecificweapons.Theyapplytoanyuseofforce,regardlessoftheweapons
employed. The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific weapon,
includingnuclearweapons.Aweaponthatisalreadyunlawful perse,whetherbytreatyorcustom,
doesnotbecomelawfulbyreasonofitsbeingusedforalegitimatepurposeundertheCharter."
Treatieswereexaminedinparagraphs5363(paragraph53:"TheCourtmustthereforenowexamine
whetherthereisanyprohibitionofrecoursetonuclearweaponsassuch;itwillfirstascertainwhether
thereisaconventionalprescriptiontothiseffect"),aspartofthelawapplicableinsituationsofarmed
conflict(paragraph51,firstsentence:"HavingdealtwiththeCharterprovisionsrelatingtothethreator
use of force, the Court will now turn to the law applicable in situations of armed conflict"). In
particular,withrespectto"theargument[that]hasbeenadvancedthatnuclearweaponsshouldbe
treatedinthesamewayaspoisonedweapons",theCourtconcludedthat"itdoesnotseemtotheCourt
thattheuseofnuclearweaponscanberegardedasspecificallyprohibitedonthebasisofthe[...]
provisions of the Second Hague Declaration of 1899, the Regulations annexed to the Hague
ConventionIVof1907orthe1925Protocol"(paragraphs54and56)".Itwasalsoarguedbysomethat
theHagueConventionsconcerningtheuseofbacteriologicalorchemicalweaponswouldalsoapplyto
nuclearweapons,buttheCourtwasunabletoadoptthisargument("TheCourtdoesnotfindany
specificprohibitionofrecoursetonuclearweaponsintreatiesexpresslyprohibitingtheuseofcertain
weaponsofmassdestruction",paragraph57infine).
With respect to treaties that "deal [...] exclusively with acquisition, manufacture, possession,
deploymentandtestingofnuclearweapons,withoutspecificallyaddressingtheirthreatoruse,"the
Courtnotesthatthosetreaties"certainlypointtoanincreasingconcernintheinternationalcommunity
with these weapons; the Court concludes from this that these treaties could therefore be seen as
foreshadowingafuturegeneralprohibitionoftheuseofsuchweapons,buttheydonotconstitutesuch
aprohibitionbythemselves"(paragraph62).Also,regarding regional treatiesprohibitingresource,
namelythoseofTlatelolco(LatinAmerica)andRarotonga(SouthPacific)theCourtnotesthatwhile
those "testify to a growing awareness of the need to liberate the community of States and the
internationalpublicfromthedangersresultingfromtheexistenceofnuclearweapons","[i]t[i.e.the
Court] does not, however, view these elements as amounting to a comprehensive and universal
conventionalprohibitionontheuse,orthethreatofuse,ofthoseweaponsassuch."(paragraph63).
Customary international law also provided insufficient evidence that the possession of nuclear
weaponshadcometobeuniversallyregardedasillegal.
Ultimately,thecourtwasunabletofindanopiniojuris(thatis,legalconsensus)thatnuclearweapons
areillegaltopossess.(paragraph65)However,inpractice,nuclearweaponshavenotbeenusedinwar
since 1945 and there have been numerous UN resolutions condemning their use (however, such
resolutionsarenotuniversallysupportedmostnotably,thenuclearpowersobjecttothem).(paragraph
6873)TheICJdidnotfindthatthesefactsdemonstratedanewandclearcustomarylawabsolutely
forbiddingnuclearweapons.
However,therearemanyuniversalhumanitarianlawsapplyingtowar.Forinstance,itisillegalfora

combatant specifically to target civilians and certain types of weapons that cause indiscriminate
damagearecategoricallyoutlawed.Allstatesseem toobservetheserules,makingthemapartof
customaryinternationallaw,sothecourtruledthattheselawswouldalsoapplytotheuseofnuclear
weapons.(paragraph86)TheCourt decidednottopronounceonthematterofwhethertheuseof
nuclearweaponsmightpossiblybelegal,ifexercisedasalastresortinextremecircumstances(suchas
iftheveryexistenceofthestatewasinjeopardy).(paragraph97)
Decision
Thecourtundertooksevenseparatevotes,allofwhichwerepassed.
Thecourtdecidedtocomplywiththerequestforanadvisoryopinion;
Thecourtrepliedthat"Thereisinneithercustomarynorconventionalinternationallawanyspecific
authorizationofthethreatoruseofnuclearweapons";
The court replied that "There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any
comprehensiveanduniversalprohibitionofthethreatoruseofnuclearweaponsassuch";
Thecourtrepliedthat"AthreatoruseofforcebymeansofnuclearweaponsthatiscontrarytoArticle
2,paragraph4,oftheUnitedNationsCharterandthatfailstomeetalltherequirementsofArticle51,is
unlawful";
The court replied that "A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the
requirementsoftheinternationallawapplicableinarmedconflict,particularlythoseoftheprinciples
andrulesofhumanitarianlaw,aswellaswithspecificobligationsundertreatiesandotherundertakings
whichexpresslydealwithnuclearweapons"
Thecourtrepliedthat"thethreatoruseofnuclearweaponswouldgenerallybecontrarytotherulesof
internationallawapplicableinarmedconflict,andinparticulartheprinciplesandrulesofhumanitarian
law; However,inviewofthecurrentstateofinternational law,andoftheelementsoffactatits
disposal,theCourtcannotconcludedefinitivelywhetherthethreatoruseofnuclearweaponswouldbe
lawfulorunlawfulinanextremecircumstanceofselfdefence,inwhichtheverysurvivalofaState
wouldbeatstake"
Thecourtrepliedthat"Thereexistsanobligationtopursueingoodfaithandbringtoaconclusion
negotiationsleadingtonucleardisarmamentinallitsaspectsunderstrictandeffectiveinternational
control".
TheCourtreachedthisconclusionafterathoroughexaminationbothoftherelevantframeworksof
internationallawandoftheinterplaybetweenthem.Itsthresholddecisionthatthelawsofwarwould
determinenuclearweaponsuseleftitwithessentiallytwoquestionstoanswer:
(1)Couldthedecisiontousenuclearweaponsbelegalunderjusadbellum?
(2)Couldtheuseofnuclearweaponsevercomplywithjusinbello?
The Courts determination that nuclearweapons might,underexceptional circumstances,meet the
demands of both doctrines compelled its refusal to find the use of nuclear weapons categorically
unlawful.
Turningtothefirstquestion, jusadbellum determinesthelegalityofdecisionstouseforce,andits
precepts serve as a foundation of the United Nations Charter. The Charter creates a presumption
againstthelegalityofdecisionstouseforcebydemandingthatStatesrefrainintheirinternational
relationsfromthethreatoruseofforce.TheCharteralso,however,createsexceptionstothisrule,
explicitlypermittinganydecisiontouseforceauthorizedbytheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,and
notingthattheCharterdoesnotimpairtheinherentrightofindividualorcollectiveselfdefenseifan
armedattackoccursagainstaState.Thus,anydecisiontouseforcepursuanttoSecurityCouncil
authorizationortodefendagainstanarmedattackispresumptivelylegal,whereasanyotheruseof
forceispresumptivelyillegal.
Applying this doctrine todetermine the legalityof nuclear weapons use, the Court sets aside the
questionoftheSecurityCouncilauthorization(theSecurityCouncil,intheory,mayauthorizetheuse
ofanysortofforceitdeemsnecessarytomaintainorrestorepeaceandsecurity)andinsteadfocuseson
thelegalityofanuclearstrikelaunchedinselfdefense.Althoughusesofforceinselfdefenseare
presumptively legal, the Court notes that attacks carried out in selfdefense must conform to the
requirementsofnecessityandproportionalitytoqualifyaslegal.
ThoughtheCourtrecognizesfullytheimpossibilityofcontainingthedestructivepowerofnuclear
weaponsineitherspaceortime,andnotesthatsuchweaponshavethepotentialtodestroyall
civilizationandtheentireecosystemoftheplanet,itrefusestofindthatanypossibleauthorizationofa
defensivenuclearstrikewouldviolatetheprincipleofproportionality. Anuclearstrikelaunchedto
defend against a nuclear strike, or against a sufficiently potent bombardment with conventional

weapons, would qualify as proportional and thus satisfy the demands of jus ad bellum. (This
correspondstotheextremecircumstanceofselfdefencelanguageintheCourtsultimateholding
quotedabove.)
TheCourtthenlookstowhether jusinbelloorinternationalhumanitarianlaw,whichgovernsthe
conductofwarfarewouldeverpermittheuseofanuclearweapon.TheCourtfocusesitsinquiryon
threeprinciplesofIHL: theprohibitionagainstunnecessarysuffering, thecommandthat weapons
distinguishbetweencombatantsandcivilians,andtherequirementthatattacksbeproportional.
TheCourtstatesthat,giventheirtremendousdestructivepower,theuseofnuclearweaponsinfact
seemsscarcelyreconcilablewithrespectfortherequirementsagainstunnecessarysufferingandthe
requirementofdistinction.However,notingthelackofadiscretefactualscenariobeforeit,theCourt
wentontofindthatitcouldnot concludewithcertaintythattheuseofnuclearweaponswould
necessary be at variance with the principles and rules of lawapplicable inarmed conflict inany
circumstance.
TheCourtmorecarefullyscrutinizestheprincipleofproportionality,articulatedinIHLasaprohibition
againstattacksexpectedtocauseincidentallossofcivilianlife,injurytocivilians,damagetocivilian
objects,oracombinationthereof, whichwouldbeexcessiveinrelationtotheconcreteanddirect
militaryadvantageanticipated.TheitalicizedclausedirectsaStatetoweightheexpecteddamageto
civiliansandcivilianobjectsnotagainstafixedcounterweightbutagainstthemilitaryadvantageofthe
attack.Moreconcretely,aStatewhoseverysurvivalhingedonanuclearattackagainstthecivilian
filledcityofanopponentwouldweightheexpectedlossofcivilianlifenotagainstanyobjective
standard,butagainstthemilitaryadvantageitanticipatesinthiscase,survival.Giventhisfeatureof
IHL, the Court found that it could not construe IHL to categorically prohibit the use of nuclear
weapons.(ThiscorrespondstotheinwhichtheverysurvivalofaStatewouldbeatstakelanguage
intheCourtsultimateholdingquotedabove.)
AngloNorwegianFisheriesCase(
UKv.Norway)
(LawofSea&CustomaryNotes)
The FisheriesCase(UnitedKingdomv.Norway) wastheculminationofadispute,originatingin
1933,overhowlargeanareaofwatersurroundingNorwaywasNorwegianwaters(thatNorwaythus
hadexclusivefishingrightsto)andhowmuchwas'highseas'(thattheUKcouldthusfish).
In1949,theUKrequestedthattheInternationalCourtofJusticedeterminehowfarNorway'sterritorial
claimextendedtosea,andtoawardtheUKdamagesincompensationforNorwegianinterferencewith
UKfishingvesselsinthedisputedwaters,claimingthatNorway'sclaimtosuchanextentofwaters
wasagainstinternationallaw.
TheICJdecidedthat Norway'sclaimstothewaterswerenot inconsistentwithinternational laws
concerningtheownershipoflocalseaspace.
TheUnitedKingdomrequestedthecourttodecideifNorwayhadusedalegallyacceptablemethod
indrawingthebaselinefromwhichitmeasureditsterritorialsea.TheUnitedKingdomarguedthat
customaryinternationallawdidnotallowthelengthofabaselinedrawnacrossabaytobelongerthan
ten miles. Norway argued that its delimitation method was consistent with general principles of
internationallaw.

ThejudgmentwasrenderedinfavorofNorwayonthe18thDecember1951.By10votesto2thecourt
heldthatthemethodemployedinthedelimitationofthefisherieszonebytheRoyalNorwegiandecree
isnotcontrarytointernationallaw.
By8votesto4votesthecourtalsoheldthatthebaselinesfixedbythisdecreeinapplicationarenot
contrarytointernationallaw.Howeverthereareseparateopinionsanddissentingopinionsfromthe
judgesinthecourt.
Judge Hackworth declared that he concurred with the operative part of the judgment because he
consideredthattheNorwegiangovernmenthadproved theexistenceofhistorictitle ofthedisputed
areasofwater.
JudgeAlvarezfromChilereliedontheevolvingprinciplesofthelawofnationsapplicabletothelaw
ofthesea.
Stateshavetherighttomodifytheextentoftheoftheirterritorialsea
Anystatedirectlyconcernedmayobjecttoanotherstate'sdecisionastotheextentofitsterritorialsea
Internationalstatusofbaysandstraitsmustbedeterminedbythecoastalstatedirectlyconcernedwith
dueregardtothegeneralinterestand
Historicrightsandconceptofprescriptionininternationallaw.

Formationofcustomarylaw
Thecourtconsistentlyreferredtopositive(1)statepracticeand(2)lackofobjectionsofotherstateson
thatpracticeasaconfirmationofanexistingruleofcustomaryinternationallaw(seep.17and18).
Therewasnomentionofopiniojurisinthisearlyjudgment.
In the following passage, the court considered that expressed state dissent regarding a particular
practicewasdetrimentaltotheexistenceofanallegedgeneralrule.Itdidnotelaboratewhetherthese
statesadoptedacontrarypracticebecauseitwasclaiminganexceptiontotherule(seetheNicaragua
jurisprudence)orbecauseitbelievedthatthesaidruledidnotpossessthecharacterofcustomarylaw.
InthesecircumstancestheCourtdeemsitnecessarytopointoutthatalthoughthetenmilerulehas
beenadoptedbycertainStatesbothintheirnationallawandintheirtreatiesandconventions,and
althoughcertainarbitraldecisionshaveapplieditasbetweentheseStates,otherStateshaveadopteda
differentlimit. Consequently,thetenmilerule hasnotacquiredtheauthorityofageneralruleof
internationallaw.
Persistentobjectorrule
Thecourtinitsjudgmentheldthatevenifacustomarylawruleexistedonthetenmilerule,
thetenmilerulewouldappeartobeinapplicableasagainstNorwayinasmuchasshehasalways
opposedanyattempttoapplyittotheNorwegiancoast.
Inthiscase,thecourtappearstosupporttheideathatanexistingcustomarylawrulewouldnotapply
toastateifitobjectedtoanyoutsideattemptstoapplytheruletoitself,attheinitialstagesandina
consistentmanner,andifotherstatesdidnotobjecttoherresistance. Inthismanner,theAnglo
Norwegianfisheriescasejoinedtheasylumcase(PeruvsColombia)inarticulatingwhatwenowcall
thepersistentobjectorrule.
Initialobjection
Inthepresentcase,thecourtpointedoutthattheNorwegianMinisterofForeignAffairs,in1870,
statedthat,inspiteoftheadoptioninsometreatiesofthequitearbitrarydistanceof10seamiles,this
distancewouldnotappeartometohaveacquiredtheforceofinternationallaw.Stilllesswouldit
appeartohaveanyfoundationinreality
ThecourtheldthatLanguageofthiskindcanonlybeconstruedastheconsideredexpressionofa
legalconceptionregardedbytheNorwegianGovernmentascompatiblewithinternationallaw.The
courtheldthatNorwayhadrefusedtoaccepttheruleasregardstoitby1870.
Sustainedobjection
ThecourtalsowentontoholdthatNorwayfollowedtheprinciplesofdelimitationthatitconsidersa
partofitssysteminaconsistentanduninterruptedmannerfrom1869untilthetimeofthedispute.In
establishingconsistentpractice,thecourtheldthattoomuchimportanceneednotbeattachedtothe
fewuncertaintiesorcontradictions,realorapparent,whichtheUnitedKingdomGovernmentclaimsto
havediscoveredinNorwegianpractice.
Noobjection
Afterthecourtheldthatthe10mileruledidnotformapartofthegenerallawand,inanyevent,could
not bind Norway because of its objections, the court inquired whether the Norwegian system of
delimitation,itself,wascontrarytointernationallaw.Todoso,thecourtreferredtostatepracticeonce
more.
ThegeneraltolerationofforeignStateswithregardtotheNorwegianpracticeisanunchallengedfact.
ForaperiodofmorethansixtyyearstheUnitedKingdomGovernmentitselfinnowaycontestedit
TheCourtnotesthatinrespectofasituationwhichcouldonlybestrengthenedwiththepassageof
time,theUnitedKingdomGovernmentrefrainedfromformulatingreservations.
Contrarypractice
Inthiscase,Norwayadoptedacontrarypracticeapracticethatwasthesubjectoflitigation.
However,interestingly,Norwaywasclearthatitwasnotclaiminganexceptiontotherule(i.e.thatits
practicewasnotcontrarytointernationallaw)butratheritclaimedthatitspracticewasinconformity
withinternationallaw(seepage21).
Inits(Norways)view,theserulesofinternationallawtakeintoaccountthediversityoffactsand,
therefore,concedethatthedrawingofbaselinesmustbeadaptedtothespecialconditionsobtainingin
differentregions.Initsview,thesystemofdelimitationappliedin1935,asystemcharacterizedbythe
useofstraightlines,doesnotthereforeinfringethegenerallaw;itisanadaptationrenderednecessary
bylocalconditions.
Conclusion
Thecourtheldthatthefactthat thisconsistentandsufficientlylongpracticetookplacewithoutany

objection tothe practicefrom otherstates (until the time ofdispute)indicatedthat states didnot
considertheNorwegiansystemtobecontrarytointernationallaw.
The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the international community, Great Britains
positionintheNorthSea,herowninterestinthequestion,andherprolongedabstentionwouldinany
casewarrantNorwaysenforcementofhersystemagainsttheUnitedKingdom.TheCourtisthusled
toconcludethatthemethodofstraightlines,establishedintheNorwegiansystem,wasimposedbythe
peculiargeographyoftheNorwegiancoast;thatevenbeforethedisputearose,thismethodhadbeen
consolidated by a consistent and sufficiently long practice, in the face of which the attitude of
governmentsbearswitnesstothefactthattheydidnotconsiderittobecontrarytointernationallaw.
Relationshipbetweeninternationalandnationallaw
Thecourtalludedtotherelationshipbetweennationalandinternationallawindelimitationofmaritime
boundaries.Indelimitationcases,statesmustbeallowedthelatitudenecessaryinordertobeableto
adaptitsdelimitationtopracticalneedsandlocalrequirementsThecourtwouldalsoconsider
certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of which are clearly
evidencedbyalongusage.However,whiletheactofdelimitationcanbeundertakenbytheState,its
legalvaliditydependsoninternationallaw.
Thedelimitationofseaareashasalwaysaninternationalaspect;itcannotbedependentmerelyupon
thewillofthecoastalStateasexpressedinitsmunicipallaw. Althoughitistruethattheactof
delimitationisnecessarilyaunilateralact,becauseonlythecoastalStateiscompetenttoundertakeit,
thevalidityofthedelimitationwithregardtootherStatesdependsuponinternationallaw.(p.20)
IslandofPalmasCase(UnitedStatesv.TheNetherlands)
ProceduralHistory:
Arbitrationofterritorialdispute.
Palmas(Miangas)isanislandoflittleeconomicvalueorstrategiclocation.Itistwomilesinlength,
threequartersofamileinwidth,andhadapopulationofabout750in1932,whenthecasewas
decided.Palmasliesbetween Mindanao,thesouthernmostpart ofthe Philippines,andtheNanusa
Islands,thenorthernmostpartofIndonesiaotherthanPalmas.
In1898,SpaincededthePhilippinestotheUnitedStatesintheTreatyofParis(1898)andPalmaslay
within the boundaries of that cession to the U.S. In 1906, the United States discovered that the
Netherlandsalsoclaimedsovereigntyovertheisland,andthetwopartiesagreedtosubmittobinding
arbitrationbythePermanentCourtofArbitration.On23January1925,thetwogovernmentssignedan
agreementtothateffect.RatificationswereexchangedinWashingtonon1April1925.Theagreement
wasregisteredinLeagueofNationsTreatySerieson19May1925.[1]Thearbitratorinthecasewas
MaxHuber,aSwisslawyer.
ThequestionbeforethearbitratorwaswhethertheIslandofPalmas(Miangas),initsentirety,wasa
partoftheterritoryoftheUnitedStatesortheNetherlands.
Thelegalissuepresentedwaswhetheraterritorybelongstothefirstdiscoverer,eveniftheydonot
exercise authority over the territory, or whether it belongs to the state which actually exercises
sovereigntyoverit.
Overview:
The United States (P) claimed that the Island of Palmas was part of the Philippines but the
Netherlands(D)claimedtitleaswell.
TheUnitedStates(P)claimedtheIslandofPalmaswaspartofthePhilippinesandhadbeencededby
SpainbytheTreatyofParisin1898.
TheUnitedStates(P),assuccessortotherightsofSpainoverthePhilippines,baseditsclaimoftitle
inthefirstplaceondiscovery.TheNetherlands(D)claimedthatithadpossessedandexercisedrights
ofsovereigntyovertheislandfrom1677orearliertothepresent.
Issue:
Can an inchoate title prevail over a definite title founded on continuous and peaceful display of
sovereignty?
Rule:

Aninchoatetitlecannotprevailoveradefinitetitlefoundoncontinuousandpeacefuldisplayof
sovereignty.
Analysis:
ThearbitratorexaminedevidenceofcontractsmadebytheEastIndiaCompanyandtheNetherlands
(D).TheNetherlands(D)alsobaseditsclaimsonconventionsithadwiththeprincesandnative
chieftainsoftheislands.Spainwasfoundnottohavehaddominionovertheislandatthetimeofthe
TreatyofParisin1898.
Outcome:
Aninchoatetitlecannotprevailoveradefinitetitlefoundedoncontinuousandpeacefuldisplayof
sovereignty. The continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty is as good as title.
Discoveryalone,withoutanysubsequentact,cannotsufficetoprovesovereigntyovertheisland.There
isnopositiveruleofinternationallawthatislandssituatedoutsideterritorialwatersshouldbelongtoa
statewhoseterritoryformsthenearestcontinent orlargeisland.Noonecontestedtheexerciseof
territorialrightsbytheNetherlands(D)from1700to1906.Thetitleofdiscovery,atbestaninchoate
title,doesnotprevailovertheNetherlands,(D)claimofsovereignty.
DETAILEDANALYSES
Rightbydiscovery
Inthefirstofitstwoarguments,theUnitedStatesarguedthatitheldtheislandbecauseithadreceived
actualtitlethroughlegitimatetreatiesfromtheoriginal"discoverer"oftheisland,Spain.TheUnited
StatesarguedthatSpainacquiredtitletoPalmaswhenSpaindiscoveredtheislandandtheislandwas
terranullius.Spain'stitletotheisland,becauseitwasapartofthePhilippines,wasthencededtothe
UnitedStatesintheTreatyofParis(1898)afterSpain'sdefeatintheSpanishAmericanWar.The
arbitratornotedthatnonewinternationallawinvalidatedthelegaltransferofterritoryviacession.
However,thearbitratornotedthatSpaincouldnotlegallygrantwhatitdidnotholdandtheTreatyof
Pariscouldnotgrant PalmastotheUnitedStatesifSpainhadnoactualtitletoit.Thearbitrator
concludedthatSpainheldaninchoatetitlewhenSpaindiscoveredPalmas.However,forasovereign
tomaintainitsinitialtitleviadiscovery,thearbitratorsaidthatthediscovererhadtoactuallyexercise
authority,evenifitwereassimpleanactasplantingaflagonthebeach.Inthiscase,Spaindidnot
exerciseauthorityovertheislandaftermakinganinitialclaimafterdiscoveryandsotheAmerican
claimwasbasedonrelativelyweakgrounds.
ThedisputewasregardingthesovereigntyovertheislandofPalmas.Thisislandwashandedovertothe
USbythetreatyofpeacebySpan.TheirargumentwasthatSpaincededPhilippinestotheUnited
States.However,NetherlandsbelievedthatitwaspartoftheirterritoryintheeastIndies.
Contiguity
TheUnitedStatesalsoarguedthatPalmaswasAmericanterritorybecausetheislandwasclosertothe
PhilippinesthantotheNetherlandsEastIndies.Thearbitratorsaidtherewasnopositiveinternational
lawwhichfavoredtheUnitedStatesapproachofterrafirma,wherethenearestcontinentorislandof
considerablesizegivestitletothelandindispute.Thearbitratorheldthatmereproximitywasnotan
adequateclaim tolandnotedthatiftheinternational communityfollowedtheproposedAmerican
approach,itwouldleadtoarbitraryresults.
Continuousandpeacefuldisplayofsovereignty
TheNetherlands'primarycontentionwasthatitheldactualtitlebecausetheNetherlandshadexercised
authorityontheislandsince1677.Thearbitratornotedthat theUnitedStateshadfailedtoshow
documentationprovingSpanishsovereigntyontheislandexceptthosedocumentsthat specifically
mentionedtheisland'sdiscovery.Additionally,therewasnoevidencethatPalmaswasapartofthe
judicialoradministrativeorganizationoftheSpanishgovernmentofthePhilippines.However,the
NetherlandsshowedthattheDutchEastIndiaCompanyhadnegotiatedtreatieswiththelocalprinces
of the island since the 17th century and had exercised sovereignty, including a requirement of
Protestantismandthedenialofothernationalsontheisland.ThearbitratorpointedoutthatifSpain
hadactuallyexercisedauthority,thentherewouldhavebeenconflictsbetweenthetwocountriesbut

noneareprovidedintheevidence.

Conclusion
UnderthePalmasdecision,threeimportantrulesforresolvingislandterritorialdisputesweredecided:
Firstly,titlebasedoncontiguity(thestateofbordering)hasnostandingininternationallaw.
Secondly,titlebydiscoveryisonlyaninchoatetitle.
Finally,ifanothersovereignbeginstoexercisecontinuousandactualsovereignty,(andthearbitrator
requiredthattheclaimhadtobeopenandpublicandwithgoodtitle),andthediscovererdoesnot
contestthisclaim,theclaimbythesovereignthatexercisesauthorityisgreaterthanatitlebasedon
merediscovery.
TheCaseoftheS.S.Lotus(Francev.Turkey
)
(JurisdictionandCustomaryLaw)

AcollisionoccurredonthehighseasbetweenaFrenchvesselandaTurkishvessel.Victimswere
TurkishnationalsandtheallegedoffenderwasFrench.CouldTurkeyexerciseitsjurisdictionoverthe
Frenchnationalunderinternationallaw?
AFrenchship(theS.S.Lotus),collidedwithaTurkishshipininternationalwaters,killingsome
Turkishsailors.TheFrenchshipthendockedinTurkey.TurkeyattemptedtotrytheFrenchofficerin
chargeoftheLotusfornegligence.Theyfoundhimguiltyandsentencedhimto80daysinjail.
FrancewenttothePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice(P.C.I.J.)andarguedthatTurkeydidnot
havejurisdictiontotrytheFrenchofficers,becausetheywereonaFrenchboatininternationalwaters
atthetimeoftheaccident.
Turkeyarguedthatsincetheirnationalswerekilled,theyhadjurisdictiontotrythoseresponsiblefor
thedeaths.
Francearguedthat asamatterofcustomaryinternationallaw,theflagofthevessel(inthiscase
France)hasexclusivejurisdiction.
ThePCIJfoundthatTurkeydidhavetherighttotrytheFrenchsailors.
The PCIJ basically found that since the two ships were involved in the same accident, that both
countrieshadconcurrentjurisdictionovertheaccident.
The PCIJfound that customaryinternational law gaveFrance jurisdiction,but it didn't give them
exclusivejurisdiction.
ThiscaseledtotheLotusPrinciple(akatheLotusApproach),whichsaysthatsovereignstatesmayact
inanywaytheywishsolongastheydonotcontraveneanexplicitprohibition."Underinternational
law,everythingthatisn'tprohibitedispermitted."
TheLotusPrinciplewaslateroverruledbythe1958HighSeasConvention.
Article11(1)saysthatonlytheflagStateortheStateofwhichtheallegedoffenderwasanationalhas
jurisdictionoversailorsregardingincidentsoccurringinhighseas.
QuestionsbeforetheCourt:
Did Turkey violate international law when Turkish courts exercised jurisdiction over a crime
committedbyaFrenchnational,outsideTurkey?Ifyes,shouldTurkeypaycompensationtoFrance?
TheCourtsDecision:
Turkey,byinstitutingcriminalproceedingsagainstDemons,didnotviolateinternationallaw.
RelevantFindingsoftheCourt:
EstablishingJurisdiction:DoesTurkeyneedtosupportitsassertionofjurisdictionusinganexisting
rule of international law or is the mere absence of a prohibition preventing the exercise of
jurisdictionenough?
ThefirstprincipleoftheLotuscasesaidthatjurisdictionisterritorial:AStatecannotexerciseits
jurisdiction outsideitsterritory unlessaninternationaltreatyorcustomarylawpermitsittodoso.
ThisiswhatwecalledthefirstLotusPrinciple.
ThesecondprincipleoftheLotuscase:Withinitsterritory,aStatemayexerciseitsjurisdiction,on
any matter, even if there is no specific rule of international law permitting it to do so. In these

instances,Stateshaveawidemeasureofdiscretion,whichisonlylimitedbytheprohibitiverulesof
internationallaw.
Thisappliedtocivilandcriminalcases.
France alleged thatthe flag State of a vessel would have exclusive jurisdiction over offences
committedonboardtheshipinhighseas.ThePCIJdisagreed.ItheldthatFrance,astheflagState,did
not enjoy exclusive territorial jurisdiction in the high seas in respect of a collision witha vessel
carryingtheflagofanotherState(paras7184).TheCourtheldthatTurkeyandFrancebothhave
jurisdictioninrespectofthewholeincident:i.e.thereisconcurrentjurisdiction.
ThePCIJheldthatashipinthehighseasisassimilatedtotheterritoryoftheflagState.ThisStatemay
exerciseitsjurisdictionovertheship,inthesamewayasitexercisesitsjurisdictionoveritsland,tothe
exclusionofallotherStates.Inthiscase,theCourtequatedtheTurkishvesseltoTurkishterritory.In
this case, the PCIJheld that the offence produced its effects on the Turkish vessel and
consequentlyinaplaceassimilatedtoTurkishterritoryinwhichtheapplicationofTurkishcriminal
lawcannotbechallenged,eveninregardtooffencescommittedtherebyforeigners.Turkeyhad
jurisdictionoverthiscase.
TheLotusCasewasalsosignificantinthatthePCIJsaidthataStatewouldhaveterritorialjurisdiction,
evenifthecrimewascommittedoutsideitsterritory,solongasaconstitutiveelementofthecrimewas
committedinthatState.Today,wecallthissubjectiveterritorialjurisdiction.Inorderforsubjective
territorialjurisdictiontobeestablished,onemustprovethattheelementofthecrimeandtheactual
crimeareentirelyinseparable;i.e.,iftheconstituentelementwasabsentthecrimewouldnothave
happened.
The offence for which Lieutenant Demons appears to have been prosecutedwas an act of
negligenceorimprudencehavingitsoriginonboardtheLotus,whilstitseffectsmadethemselvesfelt
onboardtheBozKourt.Thesetwoelementsare,legally,entirelyinseparable,somuchsothattheir
separationrenderstheoffencenonexistentItisonlynaturalthateachshouldbe abletoexercise
jurisdictionandtodosoinrespectoftheincidentasawhole.Itisthereforeacaseofconcurrent
jurisdiction.
CustomaryInternationalLaw
TheLotuscasegivesanimportantdictumoncreatingcustomaryinternationallaw.Franceallegedthat
jurisdictionalquestionsoncollisioncasesarerarelyheardincriminalcasesbecauseStatestendto
prosecuteonlybeforetheflagState.Francearguedthatthisabsenceofprosecutionspointstoapositive
ruleincustomarylawon collisions.The Courtheldthatthis wouldmerelyshowthatStateshad
often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized
themselvesasbeingobligedtodoso;foronlyifsuchabstentionwerebased ontheirbeingconscious
ofhavingadutytoabstainwoulditbepossibletospeakofaninternationalcustom.Theallegedfact
doesnotallowonetoinferthatStateshavebeenconsciousofhavingsuchaduty;ontheotherhand,
as will presently be seen, there are other circumstances calculated to show that the contrary is
true.Inotherwords,opiniojurisisreflectedinactsofStates(NicaraguaCase)orinomissions(Lotus
case)insofarasthoseactsoromissionsaredonefollowingabeliefthatthesaidStateisobligatedby
lawtoactorrefrainfromactinginaparticularway.

MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinNicaraguaCase
(UseofForce&CustomaryLaw)
ICJcasewhereNicaraguabroughtsuitagainstUSforfundingofContrasinNicaragua.
WascontraconductattributabletotheUnitedStates?
Standardapplied?Article11ofILCDraftArticles
TheICJfoundthattherewasnotenoughdirectionorcontrolfromtheUStothecontrastomakethe
actsofthecontrasattributabletotheUS
Fortheretobeenoughdirection,theUSwouldhavehadtohaveeffectivecontrolofthemilitaryor
paramilitaryoperationsinthecourseofwhichtheallegedviolationswerecommitted
However,theUSviolateinternationallawonothergrounds:itssupportofthecontraswasauseof
forceagainstNicaragua
USwasheldresponsibleforitsownconduct,butnotfortheconductofthecontras.
FactsoftheCase:

InJuly1979theGovernmentofPresidentSomozacollapsedfollowinganarmedoppositionledbythe
FrenteSandinistadeLiberacibnNacional(FSLN).ThenewgovernmentinstalledbyFSLNbegan
tomeetarmedoppositionfromsupportersoftheformerSomozaGovernmentandexmembersofthe
NationalGuard.TheUSinitiallysupportiveofthenewgovernmentchangeditsattitudewhen,
accordingtotheUnitedStates,itfoundthatNicaraguawasprovidinglogisticalsupportandweaponsto
guerrillasinElSalvador.InApril1981itterminatedUnitedStatesaidtoNicaraguaandinSeptember
1981,accordingtoNicaragua,theUnitedStatesdecidedtoplanandundertakeactivitiesdirected
againstNicaragua.
The armed opposition to the new Government was conducted mainly by (1)
FuerzaDemocraticaNicaragense(FDN), which operated alongthe border withHonduras,and (2)
AlianzaRevolucionariaDemocratica(ARDE),whichoperatedalongtheborderwithCostaRica,(see
mapoftheregion).InitialUSsupporttothesegroupsfightingagainsttheNicaraguanGovernment
(called contras) was covert. Later, the United Statesofficially acknowledged its support (for
example:In1983budgetarylegislationenactedbytheUnitedStatesCongressmadespecificprovision
for funds to be used by United States intelligence agencies for supporting directly or indirectly
militaryorparamilitaryoperationsinNicaragua).
Nicaragua also alleged that the United Statesis effectively in control of the contras, the United
Statesdevised their strategy and directed their tactics and that they were paidfor and directly
controlledbyUnitedStatespersonal.Nicaraguaalsoallegedthatsomeattackswerecarriedoutby
UnitedStatesmilitarywiththeaim tooverthrowtheGovernment ofNicaragua.Attacksagainst
NicaraguaincludedtheminingofNicaraguanportsandattacksonports,oilinstallationsandanaval
base.NicaraguaallegedthataircraftsbelongingtotheUnitedStatesflewoverNicaraguanterritoryto
gatherintelligence,supplytothecontrasinthefieldandtointimidatethepopulation.
TheUnitedStatesdidnotappearbeforetheICJatthemeritstages,afterrefusingtoaccepttheICJs
jurisdictiontodecidethecase.TheUnitedStatesatthejurisdictionalphaseofthehearing,however,
statedthatit reliedonaninherent rightofcollectiveselfdefenceguaranteedinA.51oftheUN
Charter by providing, upon request, proportionate and appropriate assistance to Costa Rica,
HondurasandElSalvadorinresponsetoNicaraguasallegedactsaggressionagainstthosecountries
(paras.126,128).
QuestionsbeforetheCourt:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

DidtheUnitedStatesbreachitscustomaryinternationallawobligationnottointerveneintheaffairs
ofanotherStatewhenittrained,armed,equippedandfinancedthecontraforcesorencouraged,
supportedandaidedthemilitaryandparamilitaryactivitiesagainstNicaragua?
Didthe United Statesbreach itscustomaryinternational lawobligationnot touseforce against
anotherStatewhenitdirectlyattackedNicaraguain19831984andwhenitsactivitiesinbullet
point1aboveresultedintheuseofforce?
If so, can the military and paramilitary activities that the United Statesundertook in and against
Nicaraguabejustifiedascollectiveselfdefence?
DidtheUnitedStatesbreachitscustomaryinternationallawobligationnottoviolatethesovereignty
ofanotherStatewhenitdirectedorauthorizeditsaircraftstoflyoverNicaraguanterritoryandby
actsreferredtoinbulletpoint2above?
DidtheUnitedStatesbreachitscustomaryinternationallawobligationsnottoviolatethesovereignty
ofanotherState,nottointerveneinitsaffairs,nottouseforceagainstanotherStateandnottointerrupt
peacefulmaritimecommercewhenitlaidminesintheinternalwatersandtheterritorialseaof
Nicaragua?
ICJdecision:
TheUnitedStatesviolatedcustomaryinternationallawinrelationtobulletpoints1,2,4and5above.
Onbulletpoint3,theCourtfoundthattheUnitedStatescouldnotrelyoncollectiveselfdefenceto
justifyitsuseofforceagainstNicaragua.
ThecourtheldthattheUnitedStatesbreacheditscustomaryinternationallawobligationnot
touseforceagainstanotherState:(1)whenitdirectlyattackedNicaraguain19831984;and(2)
whenitsactivitieswiththecontraforcesresultedinthethreatoruseofforce
TheCourtheldthat:
The prohibitionontheuseofforce isfoundin Article2(4)oftheUNCharter andincustomary

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

internationallaw.
Inacontroversialfindingthecourtsubclassifiedtheuseofforceas:(1)themostgraveformsofthe
useofforce(i.e.thosethatconstituteanarmedattack)and(2)thelessgraveform(i.e.organizing,
instigating,assistingorparticipatinginactsofcivilstrifeandterroristactsinanotherStatewhenthe
actsreferredtoinvolveathreatoruseofforcenotamountingtoanarmedattack).
TheUnitedStatesviolatedthecustomaryinternationallawprohibitionontheuseofforcewhenitlaid
mines in Nicaraguan ports. It violated this prohibition when it attacked Nicaraguan ports, oil
installationsandanavalbase(seebelow).TheUnitedStatescouldjustifyitsactiononcollectiveself
defence,ifcertaincriteriaweremetthisaspectisdiscussedbelow.
TheUnitedStatesviolatedthecustomaryinternationallawprohibitionontheuseofforcewhenit
assisted the contras by organizingor encouraging the organization ofirregular forces and armed
bandsforincursionintotheterritoryofanotherstateandparticipatedinactsofcivilstrifein
anotherStatewhentheseactsinvolvedthethreatoruseofforce.
Thesupplyoffundstothecontrasdidnotviolatetheprohibitionontheuseofforce.Nicaraguaargued
thatthetimingoftheoffensivesagainstitwasdeterminedbytheUnitedStates:i.e.anoffensivecould
notbelauncheduntiltherequisitefundswereavailable.TheCourtheldthatitdoesnotfollowthat
eachprovisionoffundsbytheUnitedStateswasmadetosetinmotionaparticularoffensive,andthat
thatoffensivewasplannedbytheUnitedStates.TheCourtheldfurtherthatwhilethearmingand
trainingofthecontrasinvolvedthethreatoruseofforceagainstNicaragua,thesupplyoffunds,init
self,onlyamountedtoan actofinterventionintheinternalaffairsofNicaragua(para227)this
aspectisdiscussedbelow.
Whatisanarmedattack?
AcontroversialbutinterestingaspectoftheCourtsjudgementwasitsdefinitionofanarmedattack.
TheCourtheldthatanarmedattackincluded:
actionbyregulararmedforcesacrossaninternationalborder;and
thesendingbyoronbehalfofaStateofarmedbands,groups,irregularsormercenaries,whichcarry
outactsofarmedforceagainstanotherStateofsuchgravityastoamountto(interalia)anactualarmed
attackconductedbyregularforces,orits(theStates)substantialinvolvementtherein
Merefrontierincidentsarenotconsideredasanarmedattackunlessbecauseofitsscaleandeffectsit
wouldhavebeenclassifiedasanarmedattackifitwascarriedoutbyregularforces.
Assistancetorebelsintheformofprovisionofweaponsorlogisticalsupportdidnotconstitute an
armedattackitcanberegardedasathreatoruseofforce,oraninterventionintheinternalor
externalaffairsofotherStates.
> In the Palestine wall case, the ICJ upheld the definition of armed attack proposed in the
Nicaraguacase.
2.TheCourtheldthattheUnitedStatescouldnotjustifyitsmilitaryandparamilitaryactivities
onthebasisofcollectiveselfdefence.

Customaryinternationallawallowsforexceptionstotheprohibitionontheuseofforceincludingthe
righttoindividualorcollectiveselfdefence(foradifferencebetweenthetwoformsofselfdefence,
clickhere).TheUnitedStates,atanearlierstageoftheproceedings,hadassertedthattheCharteritself
acknowledgestheexistenceofthiscustomaryinternationallawrightwhenittalksoftheinherent
rightofaStateunderArticle51oftheCharter(para.193).
WhenaStateclaimsthatitusedforceincollectiveselfdefence,theCourtwouldlookintotwoaspects:
(1)whetherthecircumstancesrequiredfortheexerciseofselfdefenceexistedand
(2) whether the steps taken by the State, which was acting in selfdefence, corresponds to the
requirements of international law (i.e. did it comply with the principles of necessity and
proportionality).
SeveralcriteriamustbemetforaStatetoexercisetherightofindividualorcollectiveselfdefence:
(1)AStatemusthavebeenthevictimofanarmedattack;
(2)ThisStatemustdeclareitselfasavictimofanarmedattack;[NB:theassessmentwhetheranarmed
attacktookplaceornotisdonebythestatewhowassubjectedtotheattack.AthirdStatecannot
exercisearightofcollectiveselfdefencebasedits(thethirdStates)ownassessment];and
(3)InthecaseofcollectiveselfdefencethevictimStatemustrequestforassistance(thereisnorule
permittingtheexerciseofcollectiveselfdefenceintheabsenceofarequestbytheStatewhichregards

itselfasthevictimofanarmedattack).
(4)TheStatedoesnot,undercustomaryinternationallaw,havethesameobligationasunderArticle51
oftheUNChartertoreporttotheSecurityCouncilthatanarmedattackhappenedbuttheabsenceof
areportmaybeoneofthefactorsindicatingwhethertheStateinquestionwasitselfconvincedthatit
wasactinginselfdefence
TheCourtlookedextensivelyintotheconductofNicaragua,ElSalvador,CostaRicaandHondurasin
determiningwhetheranarmedattackwasundertakenbyNicaraguaagainstthethreecountrieswhich
inturnwouldnecessitateselfdefence(paras230236).TheCourtreferredtostatementsmadebyEl
Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and the United Statesbefore the Security Council. None of the
countrieswhowereallegedlysubjecttoanarmedattackbyNicaragua(1)declaredthemselvesasa
victimofanarmedattackorrequestassistancefromtheUnitedStatesinselfdefenceatthetime
whentheUnitedStateswasallegedlyactingincollectiveselfdefence;and(2)theUnitedStatesdidnot
claimthatitwasactingunderArticle51oftheUNCharteranditdidnotreportthatitwassoactingto
theSecurityCouncil.TheCourtconcludedthattheUnitedStatescannotjustifyitsuseofforceas
collectiveselfdefence.
Thecriteriawithregardtonecessityandproportionality,thatisnecessarywhenusingforceinself
defencewasalsonotfulfilled.
3.TheCourtheldthattheUnitedStatesbreacheditsCILobligationnottointerveneinthe
affairsofanotherStatewhenittrained,armed,equippedandfinancedthecontraforcesor
encouraged,supportedandaidedthemilitaryandparamilitaryactivitiesagainstNicaragua.
TheprincipleofnoninterventionmeansthateveryStatehasarighttoconductitsaffairswithout
outsideinterferencei.eitforbidsStatesorgroupsofStatestointervenedirectlyorindirectlyin
internalorexternalaffairsofotherStates..Thisisacorollaryoftheprincipleofsovereignequalityof
States.
AprohibitedinterventionmustaccordinglybeonebearingonmattersinwhicheachStateispermitted,
by the principle of State sovereignty to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political,
economic,socialandculturalsystem,andtheformulationofforeignpolicy.Interventioniswrongful
whenitusesmethodsofcoercioninregardtosuchchoices,whichmustremainfreeones.Theelement
of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is
particularlyobviousinthecaseofaninterventionwhichusesforce,eitherinthedirectformofmilitary
action,orintheindirectformofsupportforsubversiveorterroristarmedactivitieswithinanotherState
(para205).
Nicaragua stated that the activities of the United States were aimedto overthrow the government
ofNicaraguaandtosubstantiallydamagetheeconomyandweakenthepoliticalsystemtocoercethe
GovernmentofNicaraguatoacceptvariouspoliticaldemandsoftheUnitedStates.TheCourtheld:
first,thattheUnitedStatesintended,byitssupportofthecontras,tocoercetheGovernmentof
NicaraguainrespectofmattersinwhicheachStateispermitted,bytheprincipleofStatesovereignty,
todecidefreely(seeparagraph205above);andsecondlythattheintentionofthecontrasthemselves
wastooverthrowthepresentGovernmentofNicaraguaTheCourtconsidersthatininternational
law,ifoneState,withaviewtothecoercionofanotherState,supportsandassistsarmedbandsinthat
StatewhosepurposeistooverthrowthegovernmentofthatState,thatamountstoaninterventionby
theoneStateintheinternalaffairsoftheother,whetherornotthepoliticalobjectiveoftheStategiving
suchsupportandassistanceisequallyfarreaching.
The financial support, training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic support given by the
UnitedStatestothecontraswasabreachoftheprincipleofnoninterference.nosuchgeneralright
ofintervention,insupportofanoppositionwithinanotherState,existsincontemporaryinternational
law,evenifsucharequestforassistanceismadebyanoppositiongroupofthatState(seepara246
formore).
However,inacontroversialfinding,theCourtheldthattheUnitedStatesdidnotdevisethestrategy,
direct the tactics of the contras or exercise control on them in manner so as to make their acts
committed in violation of international law imputable to the United States (see in this respect
DeterminingUSresponsibilityforcontraoperationsunderinternational law81AMJIL86).The
Courtconcludedthatanumberofmilitaryandparamilitaryoperationsofthecontrasweredecided
andplanned,ifnotactuallybyUnitedStatesadvisers,thenatleastinclosecollaborationwiththem,
andonthebasisoftheintelligenceandlogisticsupportwhichtheUnitedStateswasabletooffer,
particularly the supply aircraft provided to the contras by the United States butnot all contra
operationsreflectedstrategyandtacticswhollydevisedbytheUnitedStates.

Insum,theevidenceavailabletotheCourtindicatesthatthevariousformsofassistanceprovidedto
thecontrasbytheUnitedStateshavebeencrucialtothepursuitoftheiractivities,butisinsufficientto
demonstratetheircompletedependenceonUnitedStatesaid.Ontheotherhand,itindicatesthatinthe
initialyearsofUnitedStatesassistancethecontraforcewassodependent.However,whetherthe
UnitedStatesGovernmentatanystagedevisedthestrategyanddirectedthetacticsofthecontras
dependsontheextenttowhichtheUnitedStatesmadeuseofthepotentialforcontrolinherentinthat
dependence.TheCourtalreadyindicatedthatithasinsufficientevidencetoreachafindingonthis
point.Itisafortioriunabletodeterminethatthecontraforcemaybeequatedforlegalpurposeswith
theforcesoftheUnitedStatesTheCourthastakentheview(paragraph110above)thatUnitedStates
participation,evenifpreponderantordecisive,inthefinancing,organizing,training,supplyingand
equippingofthecontras,theselectionofitsmilitaryorparamilitarytargets,andtheplanningofthe
wholeofitsoperation,isstillinsufficientinitself,onthebasisoftheevidenceinthepossessionofthe
Court,forthepurposeofattributingtotheUnitedStatestheactscommittedbythecontrasinthecourse
oftheirmilitaryorparamilitaryoperationsinNicaragua.AlltheformsofUnitedStatesparticipation
mentionedabove,andeventhegeneralcontrolbytherespondentStateoveraforcewithahighdegree
ofdependencyonit,wouldnotinthemselvesmean,withoutfurtherevidence,thattheUnitedStates
directedorenforcedtheperpetrationoftheactscontrarytohumanrightsandhumanitarianlawalleged
bytheapplicantState.Suchactscouldwellbecommittedbymembersofthecontraswithoutthe
controloftheUnitedStates.ForthisconducttogiverisetolegalresponsibilityoftheUnitedStates,it
would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or
paramilitary.
Interesting,however,theCourtalsoheldthatprovidinghumanitarianaidtopersonsorforcesin
another country, whatever their political affiliationsor objectives,cannot be regarded as unlawful
intervention,orasinanyotherwaycontrarytointernationallaw(para242).
IntheeventoneStateintervenesintheaffairsofanotherState,thevictimStatehasarighttointervene
inamannerthatisshortofanarmedattack(210).
Whileanarmedattackwouldgiverisetoanentitlementtocollectiveselfdefence,auseofforceofa
lesserdegreeofgravitycannotastheCourthasalreadyobserved(paragraph211above).produceany
entitlementtotakecollectivecountermeasuresinvolvingtheuseofforce.TheactsofwhichNicaragua
isaccused,evenassumingthemtohavebeenestablishedandimputabletothatState,couldonlyhave
justifiedproportionatecountermeasuresonthepartoftheStatewhichhadbeenthevictimofthese
acts,namelyElSalvador,HondurasorCostaRica.Theycouldnotjustifycountermeasurestakenbya
thirdState,theUnitedStates,andparticularlycouldnotjustifyinterventioninvolvingtheuseofforce.
4.TheUnitedStatesbreacheditscustomaryinternationallawobligationnottoviolatethe
sovereigntyofanotherStatewhenitdirectedorauthorizeditsaircraftstoflyoverNicaraguan
territoryandwhenitlaidminesintheinternalwatersofNicaraguaanditsterritorialsea.
TheICJexaminedevidenceandfoundthatinearly1984mineswerelaidinorclosetoportsofthe
territorialseaorinternalwatersofNicaraguabypersonsinthepayoractingiontheinstructionsof
theUnitedStatesandactingunderitssupervisionwithitslogisticalsupport.TheUnitedStatesdidnot
issueanywarningonthelocationorexistenceofminesandthisresultedininjuriesandincreasesin
maritimeinsurancerates.
The court found that the United Statesalso carried out highaltitude reconnaissance flights over
Nicaraguanterritoryandcertainlowaltitudeflights,complainedofascausingsonicbooms.
ThebasicconceptofStatesovereigntyincustomaryinternationallawisfoundinArticle2(1)ofthe
UNCharter.StatesovereigntyextendstoaStatesinternalwaters,itsterritorialseaandtheairspace
aboveitsterritory.TheUnitedStatesviolatedcustomaryinternationallawwhenitlaidminesinthe
territorialseaandinternalwatersofNicaraguaandwhenitcarriedoutunauthorisedoverflightsover
NicaraguanairspacebyaircraftsthatbelongtoorwasunderthecontroloftheUnitedStates.
IntheNicaraguacase,theICJdiscussed:
ThecompetenceoftheICJtogiveitsdeterminationbasedoncustomaryinternationallawinthefaceof
theVandenbergreservationoftheUnitedStates.
Therelationshipbetweentreatylawandcustomaryinternationallaw.
Elementsofcustomaryinternationallaw.
Theprohibitionontheuseofforceasajuscogensnorm.
Customaryinternationallawstatusoftheprincipleofnonintervention.
ThecompetenceoftheICJtogiveitsdeterminationbasedoncustomaryinternationallaw

1.TheUnitedStateswhenacceptingthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheICJ(underArticle36(2)ofthe
ICJ Statute) entered into the Vandenberg reservation. This reservation barredthe ICJ from using
certainmultilateraltreatiesintheadjudicationofthedispute.
2.TheUnitedStatesheldthatthisreservationbarredtheCourtfromdeterminingthecaseevenonthe
basisofcustomaryandgeneralprinciplesofinternationallawbecausecustomarylawprovisions,on
whichNicaraguareliedon,wereidenticaltoprovisionsintreatiessoughttobeexcluded.Becauseof
theidenticalcontent,theUnitedStatesargued,treatyprovisionssuperveneandsubsumetheparallel
customarylawprovision(seebelow).
3.TheCourtdisagreed.ItheldthatmultilateraltreatyreservationscouldnotprecludetheCourtfrom
determiningcasesrelyingcustomaryinternationallawbecausethelatterexistsindependentlyoftreaty
law.
Relationshipbetweentreatylawandcustomaryinternationallaw
4.Aswenotedbefore,theUnitedStatesarguedthatwhencustomaryinternationallawandtreatylaw
containthesamecontent;thetreatylawsubsumesandsupervenescustomaryinternationallaw.Inother
words,theexistenceofprinciplesintheUnitedNationsCharterprecludesthepossibilitythatsimilar
rulesmightexistindependentlyincustomaryinternationallaw,eitherbecauseexistingcustomaryrules
had been incorporated into the Charter, or because the Charter influenced the later adoption of
customaryruleswithacorrespondingcontent(para174).
5.Initsresponse,theCourtdistinguishedtwosituations:
(a)Situationswherethecustomarylawprincipleswereidenticaltotreatyprovisions;and
(b) Situationswherecustomarylawandtreatylawrightsandobligationsdifferedinrespectofthe
samesubjectmatter.
6.Insituationswherecustomarylawprincipleswereidenticaltotreatyprovisions(reflectedas(a)
above),theCourt,quitecorrectly,disagreedwiththeviewoftheUnitedStates.Itheldthatevenif
principlesofcustomaryinternationallawarecodifiedintotreaties,theformercontinuestoexistsideby
sidewiththelatter.Fortreatyparties,bothcustomaryandtreatylawapplyandif,forsomereason,the
treaty ceases to apply the identical customary law provision continues to apply between them
unaffected.
7.Thefactthatcustomaryinternationallawexistsalongsidetreatylawwasanargumentbroughtby
NorwayandDenmarkinthe NorthSeaContinentalShelfCases.Inthesecases,thetwocountries
havingfailedtoattributeanobligationunderArticle6oftheGenevaConventionsof1958toGermany,
soughttobindGermanyviacustomaryinternationallaw.InthiscasetheCourtdeterminedthatArticle
6neitherreflectedcustomarylawatthetimeofthecodification,norhaditattainedthatstatusatthe
timeofthedetermination.IntheNicaraguacase,theCourtreliedontheNorthSeaContinentalShelf
Casestosupporttheassertionthatprinciplesofcustomaryinternationallawcanexistsidebysidewith
identicaltreatylawprovisionsandthelatterdoesnotsupervenetheformerinamannerwherethe
formerceasestoexist.
TheCourtdiscussedsituationswherecustomaryinternationallawandtreatylawprovisionswerenot
identical(seepoint(b)above).Forexample,theCourtreferredtothefactthatconceptssuchand
necessityandproportionality,orthedefinitionofwhatconstitutesanarmedattack,arenotfoundunder
Article51,ortheUNCharter,butincustomarylaw.TheCourtconcludedthat(1)thisprovesthat
customaryinternationallawcontinuestoexistalongsidetreatylawandthat(2)areasgovernedbythe
twosourcesoflawdonot(always)overlapandtherulesdonot(always)havethesamecontent.
Incaseofadivergencebetweentreatylawandcustomaryinternationallaw,forthepartiestothetreaty,
amongstthemselves,thetreatyprovisionsapplyaslexspecialis.Thecourtssupportforthisprinciple
canbefoundinparas180and181.TheCourt,inconclusion,explainedtherelationshipbetweenthe
UNCharterandcustomaryinternationallawinthefollowingmanner:
However,sofarfrom havingconstitutedamarkeddeparturefrom acustomaryinternational law
whichstillexistsunmodified,theChartergaveexpressioninthisfield(ontheuseofforceandself
defence) to principles already present in customary international law, and that law has in the
subsequentfourdecadesdevelopedundertheinfluenceoftheCharter,tosuchanextentthatanumber
ofrulescontainedintheCharterhaveacquiredastatusindependentofit.Theessentialconsiderationis
thatboththeCharterandthecustomaryinternationallawflowfromacommonfundamentalprinciple
outlawingtheuseofforceininternationalrelations.Thedifferenceswhichmayexistbetweenthe
specificcontentofeacharenot,intheCourtsview,suchastocauseajudgmentconfinedtothefield
ofcustomaryinternationallawtobeineffectiveorinappropriate(tothepartiesoftheCharterwhoare
boundbytheCharter)

Therelationshipbetweencustomaryinternationallawandjuscogens
13.The court cited material presentedbyNicaragua,theUnited States andtheInternational Law
CommissiontoarguethattheprohibitionontheuseofforcecontainedinArticle2(4)oftheUN
Charter has attained the status of a jus cogens norm. The Court found this to be A further
confirmationofthevalidityascustomaryinternationallawoftheprincipleoftheprohibitionoftheuse
offorceexpressedinArticle2,paragraph4,oftheCharteroftheUnitedNations(para190).
Thenecessaryelementstodeterminetheexistenceofcustomaryinternationallaw
14.TheCourt,similartotheNorthSeaContinentalShelfCase,consideredboththesubjectiveelement
(opiniojuris)andtheobjectiveelement(Statepractice)asessentialprerequisitestotheformationand
elucidationofacustomaryinternationallawnorm(para207).ThejurisprudenceoftheNicaraguacase
contained an important clarification inconsistent State practice does not affect the formation or
continuedexistenceofacustomaryprinciplesolongastheinconsistencyisjustifiedasabreachofthe
rule.
ItisnottobeexpectedthatinthepracticeofStatestheapplicationoftherulesinquestionshould
havebeenperfect,inthesensethatStatesshouldhaverefrained,withcompleteconsistency,fromthe
useofforceorfrominterventionineachothersinternalaffairs.
TheCourtdoesnotconsiderthat,foraruletobeestablishedascustomary,thecorrespondingpractice
mustbeinabsolutelyrigorousconformitywiththerule.Inordertodeducetheexistenceofcustomary
rules,theCourtdeemsitsufficientthattheconductofStatesshould,ingeneral,beconsistentwithsuch
rules,andthatinstancesofStateconductinconsistentwithagivenruleshouldgenerallyhavebeen
treatedasbreachesofthatrule,notasindicationsoftherecognitionofanewrule.
IfaStateactsinawayprimafacieincompatiblewitharecognizedrule,butdefendsitsconductby
appealingtoexceptionsorjustificationscontainedwithintheruleitself,thenwhetherornottheStates
conductisinfactjustifiableonthatbasis,thesignificanceofthatattitudeistoconfirmratherthanto
weakentherule.(para186)
15.TheNicaraguajurisprudenceexplainedhowonecoulddeductopiniojurisfromactsofState.The
Courtheldthatopiniojuriscouldbededucedfrom:
theattitudeofStatestowardscertainGeneralAssemblyresolutions.Forexample,theDeclaration
onPrinciplesofInternationalLawconcerningFriendlyRelations(hereaftercalledtheDeclaration
onFriendlyRelations).TheCourtheldthat:
The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot be understood as merely that of a
reiterationorelucidationofthetreatycommitmentundertakenintheCharter.Onthecontrary,itmay
beunderstoodasanacceptanceofthevalidityoftheruleorsetofrulesdeclaredbytheresolutionby
themselvesItwouldthereforeseemapparentthattheattitudereferredtoexpressesanopiniojuris
respecting such rule (or set of rules), to be thenceforth treated separately from the provisions,
especiallythoseofaninstitutionalkind,towhichitissubjectonthetreatylawplaneoftheCharter
StatementsbyStaterepresentatives.
Obligations undertaken by participating States in international forums (the Court provided the
exampleoftheConferenceonSecurityandCooperationinEurope,Helsinki)
TheInternationalLawCommissionsfindingsthataconceptamountstoacustomarylawprinciple.
Multilateralconventions.
NB:ThefactthattheCourtreliedonresolutionsoftheUnitedNationstodeductopiniojuriswas
subjecttocriticism.Asyouknow,opiniojurisisthesubjectiveelementnecessarytoformcustomary
law.OpiniojurisisreflectedininstanceswheretheStateundertakesaparticularpracticebecauseit
believesthatitislegallyboundtodoso.VotingpatternsintheUnitedNationsareoftenguidedby
policyconsiderationsoverlegalmerits.TheGeneralAssemblyssubjectmatterismorepolicyoriented
thanlegal(forwhichwehavethe6thCommittee).Forexample,whentheUnitedStatesvotedforthe
FriendlyRelationsDeclarationitstatedonrecorditsbeliefthattheDeclarationwas onlyastatement
ofpoliticalintentionandnotanexpressionofthelaw.ThisisnottosaythatprovisionsonGeneral
Assembly Resolutions that guide the international community to act in a certain way may not
eventuallybecomebindinginternationallaw(eitherbyattainingcustomarylawstatusorbecoming
codifiedintotreatylaw).Itcan,ifthereisadequateStatepracticeandopiniojuris.Theargumentisthat
opiniojuriscannotbesaidtoexistbasedmerelyonavoteinfavourofanonbindingresolutioninthe
absenceofanexaminationofsubsequentconsistentandgeneralStatepractice(which,inturn,reflects
orconfirmsopiniojuris).

Customaryinternationallawrelatingtoprinciplesofnonintervention
16.TheCourtheldthatPrinciplessuchasthoseofthenonuseofforce(para191),nonintervention
(para 192), respect for the independence and territorial integrity of States, right of collective self
defence (para 193) and the freedom of navigation, continue to be binding as part of customary
internationallaw,despitetheoperationofprovisionsofconventionallawinwhichtheyhavebeen
incorporated(textinbracketsadded).
17.TheCourtsfindingthatprincipleofnoninterventionformedapartofcustomaryinternationallaw
invited criticism from commentators, partly because they disagreed that the principle formed
customaryinternationallawandpartlybecauseoftheCourtsowncontradictionsincomingtoits
conclusions and inadequacy of analysis (see below). The Courts contradiction stems from this
statement:TheprincipleofnoninterventioninvolvestherightofeverysovereignStatetoconductits
affairs without outside interference; thoughexamples oftrespass against this principle are not
infrequent, the Courtconsiders that itis part and parcel of customary international
law(emphasisadded.Para202).
18.TheCourtbeganitsanalysiswithtwoquestions:Notwithstandingthemultiplicityofdeclarations
byStatesacceptingtheprincipleofnonintervention,thereremaintwoquestions:first,whatisthe
exactcontentoftheprinciplesoaccepted,andsecondly,isthepracticesufficientlyinconformitywith
itforthistobearuleofcustomaryinternationallaw?Thefirstquestionwasdiscussedinaprevious
postandwillnotbediscussedhere.
18.AlthoughthequestionseemedtodirecttheCourttowardsidentifyinganexistingcustom,inits
responsetheCourtseemedtohavealreadydeterminedthatthecustomarylawprohibitionofnon
interventionexisted.InthefollowingpassagetheCourtdeliberatesif,incontrast,acustomarylaw
righttointerventionhadevolved.
Therehavebeeninrecentyearsanumberofinstancesofforeigninterventionforthebenefitofforces
opposedtothegovernment ofanotherState.TheCourtisnothereconcernedwiththeprocessof
decolonisationIthastoconsiderwhethertheremightbeindicationsofapracticeillustrativeofbelief
inakindofgeneralrightforStatestointervene,directlyorindirectly,withorwithoutarmedforce,in
supportofaninternaloppositioninanotherState,whosecauseappearedparticularlyworthybyreason
ofthepoliticalandmoralvalueswithwhichitwasidentified.Forsuchageneralrighttocomeinto
existence would involve a fundamental modification of the customary law principle of non
intervention.(paras206,207).
19.TheCourtwentontohold,asbefore,thatforanewcustomaryruletobeformed,notonlymustthe
actsconcernedamounttoasettledpractice,buttheymustbeaccompaniedbytheopiniojurissive
necessitates.
ThesignificancefortheCourtofcasesofStateconductprimafacieinconsistentwiththeprincipleof
noninterventionliesinthenatureofthegroundofferedasjustification.ReliancebyaStateonanovel
rightoranunprecedentedexceptiontotheprinciplemight,ifsharedinprinciplebyotherStates,tend
towardsamodificationofcustomaryinternationallaw.InfacthowevertheCourtfindsthatStateshave
not justified their conduct by reference to a new right of intervention or a new exception to the
principleofitsprohibition.TheUnitedStatesauthoritieshaveonsomeoccasionsclearlystatedtheir
groundsforinterveningintheaffairsofaforeignStateforreasonsconnectedwith,forexample,the
domesticpoliciesofthatcountry,itsideology,thelevelofitsarmaments,orthedirectionofitsforeign
policy.Butthesewerestatementsofinternationalpolicy,andnotanassertionofrulesofexisting
internationallaw.
20.TheCourtalsonotedthattheUnitedStateshasnotsoughttojustifyitsinterventioninNicaragua
onlegalgrounds,buthadonlyjustifieditatapoliticallevel.TheUnitedStateshadnotassertedfor
itselflegalrightofinterventioninthesecircumstances.TheCourt,withoutfurtheranalysisintoState
practice,almostimmediatelyproceededtofindthatnosuchgeneralrightofintervention,insupport
ofanoppositionwithinanotherState,existsincontemporaryinternationallaw.TheCourtconcludes
thatactsconstitutingabreachofthecustomaryprincipleofnoninterventionwillalso,iftheydirectly
or indirectly involvethe use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of nonuse of force in
internationalrelations(para209).
Developmentofaparallelcustomaryinternationallaw?
Inadditiontothecommentsmadeaboveinitalics,anotherinterestingaspectofthejudgmentisthatit
soughttodivorcecustomaryinternationallawobligationfromtheidenticaltreatyobligationbecauseof
thejurisdictionalbartoconsidermultilateraltreaties.Initsconsiderationofcustomaryinternational

lawitdevelopedcertainprinciplesindependentlyofthetreaty.Forexample,Article2(4)oftheUN
Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against another State. The Court held that the same
prohibitionontheuseofforcecouldbefoundundercustomaryinternationallawandasajuscogens
norm.TheCourtthenwentontocategorizetheuseofforceundercustomarylawaseitheragraveuse
offorce(i.e.useofforceamountingtoanarmedattack)oralessgraveuseofforce(i.e.useofforce
thatfallsshortofanarmedattackforexample,thethreattouseforce).TheCourt,then,restrictedthe
rightofselfdefensetoasituationwheretherehadbeenagraveuseofforce(oranarmedattack,as
definedbytheCourt).IfoneweretoholdthattherelevantCharterprincipleswereclear,preciseand
unambiguous,onecouldsaythisdivorcedinterpretationcouldresultincustomarylawdevelopingina
mannerthatisnotinlinewiththeCharterandtherebycreatingseparaterights/regimesoflawthat
govern the same subject matter. This is because, then, the two regimes would be irreconcilable.
However,thefactremainsthattheCharterdoesleaveroomforinterpretationforexample,onthe
definitionofanarmedattackorontheuseofforce.Incasesofambiguity, Article31oftheVienna
ConventionontheLawofTreatiesdirectsustolookat,interalia,subsequentpracticeandanyrelevant
rulesofinternationallawthatmaybeapplicable.Inotherwords,atreatycanbeinterpretedwiththe
assistanceofcustomaryandgeneralprinciplesofinternationallaw.Inthiscase,thedevelopmentof
customary law would also mean a potential development of ambiguous treaty law and a
reconciliationoftreatyandcustomarylawprovisions.
NorthSeaContinentalShelfCase
(FederalRepublicOfGermany
v
DenmarkandvNetherlands)(Customarylaw&lawofsea)
Germany'sNorthSeacoastisconcave,whiletheNetherlands'andDenmark'scoastsareconvex.Ifthe
delimitationhadbeendeterminedbytheequidistancerule("drawingalineeachpointofwhichis
equallydistantfromeachshore"),Germanywouldhavereceivedasmallerportionoftheresourcerich
shelfrelativetothetwootherstates.ThusGermanyarguedthatthelengthofthecoastlinesbeusedto
determine the delimitation. Germany wanted the ICJ to apportion the Continental Shelf to the
proportionofthesizeofthestate'sadjacentlandandnotbytheruleofequidistance.
The Court ultimately urged the parties to "abat[e] the effects of an incidental special feature
[Germany's concave coast] from which an unjustifiable difference of treatment could result." In
subsequentnegotiations,thestatesgrantedtoGermanymostoftheadditionalshelfitsought.Thecases
areviewedasanexampleof"equitypraeterlegem"thatis,equity"beyondthelaw"whenajudge
supplementsthelawwithequitablerulesnecessarytodecidethecaseathand.
Facts
WestGermany,theNetherlandsandDenmarkwantedtodeterminewherethemaritimebordersoftheir
countrieswere.WestGermanywantedtousethejustandequitableideaandtheNetherlandsand
Denmark wanted to use the equidistance/special circumstances principals in the 1958 Geneva
ConventionontheContinentalShelf.Applyingtheequidistanceprinciplewouldcutoffoceanaccess
toWestGermanywhilegreatlyincreasingtheareaunderDanishandDutchcontrol.
ThecaseinvolvedthedelimitationofthecontinentalshelfareasintheNorthSeabetweenGermany
andDenmarkandGermanyandNetherlandsbeyondthepartialboundariespreviouslyagreeduponby
theseStates.
ThepartiesrequestedtheICJtodecidetheprinciplesandrulesofinternationallawthatareapplicable
totheabovedelimitation.
ThepartiesdisagreedontheapplicableprinciplesorrulesofdelimitationNetherlandsandDenmark
reliedontheprincipleofequidistance(themethodofdeterminingtheboundariesinsuchawaythat
everypointintheboundaryisequidistantfromthenearestpointsofthebaselinesfromwhichthe
breathoftheterritorialseaofeachStateismeasured).Germanysoughttogetadecisioninfavourof
thenotionthatthedelimitationoftherelevantcontinentalshelfisgovernedbytheprinciplethateach
coastal state is entitled to a just and equitable share (hereinafter called just and equitable
principle/method). Contrary to Denmark and Netherlands, Germany argued that the principle of

equidistance was neither a mandatory rule in delimitation of the continental shelf nor a rule of
customaryinternationallawthatwasnotbindingonGermany.
Thecourtwasnotaskedtodelimitthepartiesagreedtodelimitthecontinentalshelfasbetweentheir
countries,byagreement,afterthedeterminationoftheICJontheapplicableprinciples.
Issue
Whatprinciplesandrulesofinternationallawareapplicabletothedelimitationofthecontinentalshelf
intheNorthSeabetweentheparties?
Is Germany under a legal obligation to accept the equidistancespecial circumstances principle,
containedinArticle6oftheGenevaConvention,eitherasacustomaryinternationallawruleoronthe
basisoftheGenevaConvention?

Decision
Equidistanceprincipleisnotcustomarylaw,andthusthepartiesmustcometoanequitablesettlement
oftheappropriateboundaries.
Theuseoftheequidistancemethodhadnotcrystallisedintocustomarylawandwasisnotobligatory
forthedelimitationoftheareasintheNorthSearelatedtothepresentproceedings.
Reasons
Themajorityspentasignificantamountofthedecisionconsideringwhatconstitutesacustomaryrule
oflaw.Theyconsideredthreewaystheequidistancerulecouldbecustomarylaw:
therulepredatedtheConventionandwassimplycodified;
theConventioncrystallizedequidistanceasaruleofcustomarylaw;or
therulebecamecustominlightofsubsequentstatepractice.
Theyalsoidentifythreeelementsnecessaryforanelementtoconstituteacustomaryruleoflaw:
theprovisionmustbeofanormcreatingcharactersuchthatitcouldberegardedasformingthebasis
ofageneralruleoflaw;
theprovisionmustbeasettledpracticebasedontheactsofstateactors;and
theprovisionmustbesuch,orbecarriedoutinsuchaway,astobeevidenceofasubjectivebeliefthat
thispracticeisrenderedobligatorybytheexistenceofaruleoflawrequiringit,i.e.opiniojuris.
Applyingthisreasoningtothefacts,bothDenmarkandtheNetherlandshadadmittedatthehearing
thatthelawinthisareahadnotyetsettledatthetimeoftheConvention,buttheybothfeltthelawhad
crystallizedwhentheConventioncameintoforce.Article6oftheConventionstatedthatequidistance
wasthesecondarymethodtobeusedindelimitation,whichseemedtocontradicttheideaofitasa
generalruleoflaw,plustherewasafacilityformakingreservationstoArticle6,makingitdifficultto
concludeitwasnowcrystallizedbytheConvention.
Onsubsequentstatepractice,themajorityfoundfifteenexampleswhereequidistancewasused,more
thanhalfbetweenstatessubjecttotheConvention.Theystressedstrongly,however,thatevenwere
therefarmoreexamplesoftheuseofequidistance,thesubjectivebeliefthatthestatesweredoingso
outofobligationmustbepresent.
Findingthen that equidistance was not a rule of customary law, the majority ruled that equitable
principlesmustbeutilizedinnegotiationsbetweenthepartiestodelineatetheboundaries.
Ratio
Customaryrulesoflawaredifficulttoestablish;theremustbeasettledpracticeamongstatescarried
outsuchthattheactorshaveasubjectivebeliefthatthereisanobligationtocarryoutsuchapractice.
DETAILEDANALYSES
Natureofthetreatyobligation:Isthe1958GenevaConvention,andinparticularArticle6,bindingon
Germany?
1.Article6oftheGenevaConventionontheContinentalShelfstatesthatunlessthepartieshave
agreedonamethodfordelimitationorunlessspecialcircumstancesexist,theequidistancemethod
would apply (see Article 6). Germany has signed but not ratified the Geneva Convention, while
Netherlands and Denmark are parties to the Convention. The latter two States argue that while
GermanyisnotapartytotheConvention(nothavingratifiedit),sheisstillboundbyArticle6ofthe
Conventionbecause:
(1) byconduct,by public statementsand proclamations, and in other ways, the Republichas

unilaterally assumed the obligations of the Convention; or has manifested its acceptance of the
conventional regime; or has recognized it as being generally applicable to the delimitation of
continentalshelfareas
(2)theFederalRepublichadhelditselfoutassoassuming,acceptingorrecognizing,insuchamanner
astocauseotherStates,andinparticularDenmarkandtheNetherlands,torelyontheattitudethus
takenup(thelatteriscalledtheprincipleofestoppel).
2.TheCourtrejectedthefirstargument.Itstatedthatonlyaverydefiniteveryconsistentcourseof
conductonthepartofaStatewouldallowthecourttopresumethataStatehadsomehowbecome
boundbyatreaty(byameansotherthaninaformalmanner:i.e.ratification)whentheStatewasatall
timesfullyableandentitledtoacceptthetreatycommitmentsinaformalmanner.TheCourtheld
that GermanyhadnotunilaterallyassumedobligationsundertheConvention.Thecourt alsotook
notice of the fact that even if Germany ratified the treaty, she had the option of entering into a
reservation on Article 6 following which that particular article would no longer be applicable to
Germany (i.e. even if one were to assume that Germany had intended to become a party to the
Convention,itdoesnotpresupposethatitwouldhavealsoundertakenthoseobligationscontainedin
Article6).
3.NB:TheViennaConventionontheLawofTreatiesof1969(VCLT),whichcameintoforcein
1980, discusses more fully the obligations of third States to treaties. It clearly stipulates that an
obligationarisesforathirdStatefromaprovisionofatreatyonlyif(1)thepartiestothetreatyintend
theprovisiontocreatethisobligationforthethirdStates;and(2)thethirdStateexpresslyacceptsthat
obligationinwriting(A.35oftheVCLT).TheVCLTwasnotinforcewhentheICJdeliberatedonthis
case. However, as seen above, the ICJs position was consistent the VCLT. (See the relevant
provisionsoftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties).
4.ThecourtheldthattheexistenceofasituationofestoppelwouldhaveallowedArticle6tobecome
bindingonGermanybutheldthatGermanysactiondidnotsupportanargumentforestoppel.The
courtalsoheldthatthemerefactthatGermanymaynothavespecificallyobjectedtotheequidistance
principleascontainedinArticle6isnotsufficienttostatethattheprincipleisnowbindinguponit.
5.Inconclusion,thecourtheldthatGermanyhadnotactedinanywaytoincurobligationscontained
inArticle6oftheGenevaConvention.Theequidistancespecialcircumstancesrulewasnotbinding
onGermanybywayoftreaty.
Natureofthecustomaryinternationallawobligation:IsGermanyboundbytheprovisionsofArticle6
oftheGenevaConventionbywayofcustomaryinternationallaw?
6. Netherlands and Denmark argued that Article 6 also reflected the accepted rule of general
internationallawonthesubjectofcontinentalshelfdelimitationandexistedindependentlyofthe
Convention.Therefore,theyargued,Germanyisboundbyitbywayofcustomaryinternationallaw.
7.TodecideiftheequidistanceprincipleboundGermanybywayofcustomaryinternationallaw,the
courtexamined(1)thestatusoftheprinciplecontainedinArticle6asitstoodwhentheConvention
wasbeingdrawnup(2)andafterthelattercameintoforce.
WhatwasthecustomarylawstatusofArticle6atthetimeofdraftingtheConvention?
8.Thecourtheldtheprincipleofequidistance,ascontainedinArticle6,didnotformapartofexisting
oremergingcustomaryinternationallawatthetimeofdraftingtheConvention.TheCourtsupported
thisfindingbasedon(1)thehesitationexpressedbythedraftersoftheConventionInternationalLaw
CommissionontheinclusionofArticle6(para.62)and(2)thefactreservationstoArticle6was
permissibleundertheConvention(Article12).Thecourtheld:
Article6isoneofthoseinrespectofwhich,underthereservationsarticleoftheConvention
(Article12)reservationsmaybemadebyanyStateonsigning,ratifyingoraccedingfor,speaking
generally,itisacharacteristicofpurelyconventionalrulesandobligationsthat,inregardtothem,
somefacultyofmakingunilateralreservationsmay,withincertainlimits,beadmitted;whereasthis
cannotbesointhecaseofgeneralorcustomarylawrulesandobligationswhich,bytheirverynature,
musthaveequalforceforallmembersoftheinternationalcommunity,andcannotthereforebethe
subjectofanyrightofunilateralexclusionexercisableatwillbyanyoneoftheminitsownfavor.
Thenormalinferencewouldthereforebethatanyarticlesthatdonotfigureamongthoseexcluded
from the faculty of reservation under Article 12, were not regarded as declaratory of previously
existing or emergent rules of law (see para 65 for a counter argument and the courts careful
differentiation)
DidtheprovisionsinArticle6ontheequidistanceprincipleattainthecustomarylawstatusafterthe
Conventioncameintoforce?

9.ThecourtthenexaminedwhethertherulecontainedinArticle6hadbecomecustomaryinternational
lawaftertheConventionenteredintoforceeitherduetheconventionitself(i.e.,ifenoughStateshad
ratifiedtheConventioninamannertofulfilthecriteriaspecifiedbelow),orbecauseofsubsequent
Statepractice(i.e.evenifadequatenumberofStateshadnotratifiedtheConventiononecouldfind
sufficientStatepracticetomeetthecriteriabelow).ThecourtheldthatArticle6oftheConventionhad
not attained acustomarylawstatus(comparethe1958Geneva Convention withthe fourGeneva
Conventions on 1949 in the field of international humanitarian law in terms of its authority as a
pronouncementofcustomaryinternationallaw).
10.Foracustomaryruletoemergethecourtheldthatitneeded:(1)verywidespreadandrepresentative
participation in the convention, including States whose interests were specially affected (i.e.
generality); and(2) virtually uniform practice (i.e. consistent and uniform usage) undertaken in a
mannerthatdemonstrates(3)ageneralrecognitionoftheruleoflaworlegalobligation(i.e.opinio
juries).IntheNorthSeaContinentalShelfcasesthecourtheldthatthepassageofaconsiderableperiod
oftimewasunnecessary(i.e.duration)fortheformationofacustomarylaw.
Widespreadandrepresentativeparticipation
11.Thecourtheldthatthefirstcriteriawasnotmet.Thenumberofratificationsandaccessionstothe
convention(39States)werenotadequatelyrepresentative(includingofcoastalStatesi.e.thoseStates
whoserightsareaffected)orwidespread.
Duration
12.Thecourtheldthatdurationtakenforthecustomarylawruletoemergeisnotasimportantas
widespreadandrepresentativeparticipation,uniformusageandtheexistenceofanopiniojuris.
Althoughthepassageofonlyashortperiodoftime(inthiscase,35years)isnotnecessarily,orof
itself,abartotheformationofanewruleofcustomaryinternationallawonthebasisofwhatwas
originallyapurelyconventionalrule,anindispensablerequirementwouldbethatwithintheperiodin
question,shortthoughitmightbe,Statepractice,includingthatofStateswhoseinterestsarespecially
affected,shouldhavebeenbothextensiveandvirtuallyuniforminthesenseoftheprovisioninvoked
andshouldmoreoverhaveoccurredinsuchawayastoshowageneralrecognitionthataruleoflawor
legalobligationisinvolved(textinbracketsadded).
Opiniojuris
13.OpiniojurisisreflectedinactsofStates(NicaraguaCase)orinomissions(Lotuscase)insofaras
thoseactsoromissionsaredonefollowingabeliefthatthesaidStateisobligatedbylawtoactor
refrainfromactinginaparticularway.(Formoreonopiniojurisclickhere).
14.TheCourtexamined15caseswhereStateshaddelimitedtheirboundariesusingtheequidistance
method,aftertheConventioncameintoforce(paras.7577).Thecourtconcluded,eveniftherewere
someStatepracticeinfavouroftheequidistanceprinciplethecourtcouldnotdeductthenecessary
opiniojurisfromthisStatepractice.TheNorthSeaContinentalShelfCasesconfirmedthatbothState
practice(theobjectiveelement)andopiniojuris(thesubjectiveelement)areessentialprerequisitesfor
theformationofacustomarylawrule.ThisisconsistentwithArticle38(1)(b)oftheStatuteofthe
ICJ.Thefollowingexplainstheconceptofopiniojurisandthedifferencebetweencustoms(i.e.habits)
andcustomarylaw:
Notonlymusttheactsconcernedamounttoasettledpractice,buttheymustalsobesuch,orbecarried
outinsuchaway,astobeevidenceofabeliefthatthispracticeisrenderedobligatorybytheexistence
ofaruleoflawrequiringit.Theneedforsuchabelief,i.e,theexistenceofasubjectiveelement,is
implicitintheverynotionoftheopiniojurissivenecessitatis.TheStatesconcernedmustthereforefeel
that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual
characteroftheactsisnotinitselfenough.Therearemanyinternationalacts,e.g.,inthefieldof
ceremonialandprotocol,whichareperformedalmostinvariably,butwhicharemotivatedonlyby
considerationsofcourtesy,convenienceortradition,andnotbyanysenseoflegalduty.
15.ThecourtconcludedthattheequidistanceprinciplewasnotbindingonGermanybywayoftreaty
or customary international law because, in the case of the latter, the principle had not attained a
customaryinternationallawstatusatthetimeoftheentryintoforceoftheGenevaConventionor
thereafter.Assuch,thecourtheldthattheuseoftheequidistancemethodisnotobligatoryforthe
delimitationoftheareasconcernedinthepresentproceedings.
VelasquezRodriguezCase,
InterAmericanCourtofHumanRights,
July29,1988(casesummary)

IntheVelasquezRodriguezCase,acaseinwhichtheInterAmericanCourtofHumanRightsheldthe
government ofHondurasresponsibleforthedisappearanceofthreepersonsandorderedittopay
compensationtothevictims'survivors.
AStheInterAmericanCourtonHumanRightsoftheOrganizationofAmericanStatesmadeclearin
theVelasquezRodriguezCase,underinternationallaweveryviolationofaninternationalobligation
thatresultsinharmcreatesadutytomakeadequatereparation.
IACHR'sseminalforceddisappearancecase,CasoVelsquezRodrguez,whicharoseoutofeventsin
Honduras. In Velsquez Rodrguez, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights presented
evidence to the IACHR on behalf of the applicant (the victim's father), suggesting the Honduran
government conducted, or at least tolerated, a pattern or practice of forced disappearance. Such
evidenceincludedtestimonyfromvictimsofarbitrarydetentionsduringtherelevantperiod,interviews
with family members whose relatives were disappeared, and general country reports produced by
independent,nongovernmentalorganizations.Fromthisevidence,theIACHRconcludedapatternor
practiceofforceddisappearanceexistedinHonduras.
Afterconcludingapatternorpracticeexistedandwas"supportedortolerated"bythegovernment,the
IACHR stated that if the applicant could link the disappearance of a particular individual to that
practice,thenthe"disappearanceof[a]particularindividual[could]beprovedthroughcircumstantial
orindirectevidenceorbylogicalinference."ThevalueoftheIACHR'sholdingissignificantbecauseit
lowerstheburdenofproofforanindividualtoestablishthataforceddisappearanceoccurred.This
loweringoftheevidentiaryburdenincreasesthelikelihoodofsuccessonthemerits.
TheRequisiteBurdenofProofforaViolationoftheRighttoLife
BasedontheIACHR'sfindingofapatternorpracticepresumption,asindicatedabove,theevidentiary
burdentoestablishaviolationoftherighttolifeislessthanproofbeyondareasonabledoubt,though
theIACHRhasnotarticulatedaparticularstandardforthislesserburden.Mostforceddisappearance
cases,however,ariseinthecontextofapatternorpractice.
InVelsquezRodrguez,theIACHRaddressedtheburdenofproofrequiredinforceddisappearance
caseswhereapatternorpracticewasestablished.Thediscussionfocusedonthefactthatincasesof
forced disappearances, the government involved likelywould "attempt to suppress all information
aboutthekidnappingorthewhereaboutsandfateofthevictim."Thegovernment'sconcealmentor
destructionofdirectevidence,namelyabody,rendersitvirtuallyimpossibletoproveaviolationofthe
righttolife.Thus,recognizingthatdirectevidencewouldalmostalwaysbeunavailabletoestablisha
violationoftherighttolife,theIACHRpermittedafindingofviolationoftherighttolifebased
exclusivelyoncircumstantialevidence,orevenlogicalinference.
InVelsquezRodrguez,theIACHRreliedoncircumstantialevidence,includinghearsaytestimonyby
thevictim'ssister,whotestifiedthat eyewitnessessawManfredoVelsquezkidnappedbymenin
civilianclothesinbroaddaylight.TheIACHRacknowledgedthatwhentheHondurangovernment
carriedoutortoleratedforceddisappearances,thepolicecustomarilyusethisformofkidnapping.
Consequently,theCourtpresumedVelsquezdisappearedatthe"handsoforwiththeacquiescenceof
thoseofficialswiththeframeworkofthatpractice."Moreover,thefactthatthegovernmentfailedto
investigateormakeanyinquiryintohisdisappearance,andthwartedattemptsbythevictim'sfamilyto
doso,stronglysuggestedthegovernment'sinvolvementinthedisappearance,eveniftherewasno
directevidenceindicatingthegovernmentkidnappedVelsquez.Finally,becauseVelsquezhadnot
beenseenforoversevenyears,theIACHRreasonablyconcludedthatVelsquezcouldbepresumed
dead.AlthoughtheIACHRdidnotnametheevidentiaryburdenforestablishingaviolationoftheright
to life, proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not required as indicated by the IACHR's use of
circumstantialorindirectevidence,aswellaslogicalinferences,toholdHondurasinviolationofthe
victim'srighttolife.
TheRighttobeFreefromTorture,Inhuman,orDegradingTreatment
ThereasoningtheIACHRemployedinVelsquezRodrguezontheissueoftheevidentiaryburden
requiredtoproveaviolationoftherighttolifeinforceddisappearancecasesisdirectlyapplicableto
claims of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under Article 5 of the American
Convention.Anapplicantcanestablishthevictimsufferedtorturebasedon"circumstantialorindirect
evidenceorevenbylogicalinference."
TheECHR'semploymentofproofbeyondareasonabledoubttoestablishaclaimoftortureraises
numerous concerns in light of the objectives of international human rights law, especially the
applicabilityofsuchlawinthecontextofforceddisappearances.Therearetwoconcernsthatwarrant

attention.First,inforceddisappearancecases,asstatedbytheIACHRinVelsquezRodrguez,the
governmentlikelywillattempttoconcealordestroythepertinentevidence.Consequently,anydirect
evidenceofthevictim'sfatewillbesparse,thusrenderingitvirtuallyimpossibletoprovebeyonda
reasonabledoubtthattheauthoritiestorturedthevictim.
Second,astheIACHRemphasizedinVelsquezRodrguez,"internationalprotectionofhumanrights
shouldnotbeconfusedwithcriminaljustice."Aninternationalhumanrightsproceedingiscivilrather
than criminal in nature. The objective of international human rights law, as noted by Velsquez
Rodrguez,isnot"topunishthoseindividualswhoareguiltyofviolations,butrathertoprotectthe
victimsandtoprovideforreparationofdamagesresultingfromtheactsoftheStatesresponsible."
These objectives are identical to those in any civil proceeding. Therefore, the evidentiary burden
requiredinmostcivilclaimsproofbyapreponderanceoftheevidenceshouldbeutilizedinhuman
rightscourts.
AsstatedbytheIACHRinVelsquezRodrguez,"StatesdonotappearbeforetheCourtasdefendants
inacriminalaction."Thegoaloftheadjudicationistocompensatetheaggrievedpartyandnotto
punishtheindividual,therebyeliminatingtheneedtousetheevidentiaryburdenofproofbeyonda
reasonabledoubt.
TheAsylumCase
(CustomaryLaw)
The Colombian Ambassador in Lima, Per allowed Torre, head of the American People's
RevolutionaryAlliancesanctuaryafterhisfactionlostaonedaycivilwarinPeruon3October1948.
TheColombiangovernmentgrantedhimasylum,butthePeruviangovernmentrefusedtogranthim
safepassageoutofPeru.
PeruissuedanarrestwarrantagainstVictorRaulHayadelaTorreinrespectofthecrimeofmilitary
rebellionwhichtookplaceonOctober3,1949,inPeru.3monthsaftertherebellion,Torrefledtothe
ColombianEmbassyinLima,Peru.TheColombianAmbassadorconfirmedthatTorrewasgranted
diplomaticasyluminaccordancewithArticle2(2)oftheHavanaConventiononAsylumof1928and
requestedsafepassageforTorretoleavePeru.Subsequently,theAmbassadoralsostatedColombia
hadqualifiedTorreasapoliticalrefugeeinaccordancewithArticle2MontevideoConventionon
PoliticalAsylumof1933(notethetermrefugeeisnotthesameastheRefugeeConventionof1951).
Perurefusedtoaccepttheunilateralqualificationandrefusedtograntsafepassage.
TheCourtrejectedbothsubmissionsofColombia.ItwasnotfoundthatthecustomofAsylumwas
uniformlyorcontinuouslyexecutedsufficientlytodemonstratethatthecustomwasofagenerally
applicablecharacter.
QuestionsbeforetheCourt:
(1)IsColombiacompetent,asthecountrythatgrantsasylum,tounilaterallyqualifytheoffenceforthe
purposeofasylumundertreatylawandinternationallaw?
(2)Inthisspecificcase,wasPeru,astheterritorialState,boundtogiveaguaranteeofsafepassage?
(3)DidColombiaviolateArticle1and2(2)oftheConventiononAsylumof1928(hereinaftercalled
the Havana Convention) when it granted asylum and is thecontinued maintenance of asylum a
violationofthetreaty?
RelevantFindingsoftheCourt:
(1)IsColombiacompetent,asthecountrythatgrantsasylum,tounilaterallyqualifytheoffenceforthe
purposeofasylumundertreatylawandinternationallaw?
1.Thecourtstatedthatinthenormalcourseofgrantingdiplomaticasylumadiplomaticrepresentative
hasthecompetencetomakeaprovisional qualificationoftheoffence(forexample,asapolitical
offence)andtheterritorialStatehastherighttogiveconsenttothisqualification.IntheTorrescase,
Colombiahasasserted,astheStategrantingasylum,thatitiscompetenttoqualifythenatureofthe
offenceinaunilateralanddefinitivemannerthatisbindingonPeru.Thecourthadtodecideifsucha
decisionwasbindingonPerueitherbecauseoftreatylaw(inparticulartheHavanaConventionof1928
andtheMontevideoConventionof1933),otherprinciplesofinternationallaworbywayofregionalor
localcustom.
2.Thecourtheldthattherewasnoexpressedorimpliedrightofunilateralanddefinitivequalification
oftheStatethatgrantsasylumundertheHavanaConventionorrelevantprinciplesofinternationallaw
(p.12,13).TheMontevideoConventionof1933,whichacceptstherightofunilateralqualification,

andonwhichColombiareliedtojustifyitsunilateral qualification,wasnot ratifiedbyPeru.The

Convention,persay,wasnotbindingonPeruandconsideringthelownumbersofratificationsthe
provisionsofthelatterConventioncannotbesaidtoreflectcustomaryinternationallaw(p.15).
3.Colombiaalsoarguedthatregionalorlocalcustomssupportthequalification.Thecourtheldthatthe
burden of proof on the existence of an alleged customary law rests with the party making the
allegation:
ThePartywhichreliesonacustomofthiskindmustprovethatthiscustomisestablishedinsucha
mannerthatithasbecomebindingontheotherParty(that)itisinaccordancewitha (1)constant
anduniformusage(2)practicedbytheStatesinquestion,andthatthisusageis(3)theexpressionofa
rightappertainingtotheStategrantingasylum(Columbia)and(4)adutyincumbentontheterritorial
State(inthiscase,Peru). ThisfollowsfromArticle38oftheStatuteoftheCourt,whichrefersto
internationalcustomasevidenceofageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw(textinbracketsadded).
4.ThecourtheldthatColumbiadidnotestablishtheexistenceofaregionalcustombecauseitfailedto
proveconsistentanduniformusageoftheallegedcustombyrelevantStates.Thefluctuationsand
contradictionsinStatepracticedidnotallowfortheuniformusage(seealsoMendelson,1948andsee
alsoNicaraguacase,p.98,thelegalimpactoffluctuationsofStatepractice).Thecourtalsoreiterated
that thefact that aparticularStatepracticewasfollowedbecauseofpolitical expediencyandnot
becauseofabeliefthatthesaidpracticeisbindingontheStatebywayofalegalobligation(opinio
juris)isdetrimentaltotheformationofacustomarylaw(seeNorthSeaContinentalShelfCasesand
LotusCaseformoreonopiniojuris):
[T]heColombianGovernmenthasreferredtoalargenumberofparticularcasesinwhichdiplomatic
asylumwasinfactgrantedandrespected.Butithasnotshownthattheallegedruleofunilateraland
definitivequalificationwasinvokedorthatitwas,apartfromconventionalstipulations,exercised
bytheStatesgrantingasylumasarightappertainingtothemandrespectedbytheterritorialStatesasa
dutyincumbentonthemandnotmerelyforreasonsofpoliticalexpediency.Thefactsbroughttothe
knowledge of the Court disclose so much uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and
discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the official views expressed on various
occasions,therehasbeensomuchinconsistencyintherapidsuccessionofconventionsonasylum,
ratified by some States and rejected by others, and the practice has been so much influenced by
considerationsofpoliticalexpediencyinthevariouscases,thatitisnotpossibletodiscerninallthis
anyconstantanduniformusage,mutuallyacceptedaslaw,withregardtotheallegedruleofunilateral
anddefinitivequalificationoftheoffence.
5.ThecourtheldthatevenifColombiacouldprovethatsucharegionalcustomexisted,itwouldnot
bebindingonPeru,becausePerufarfromhavingbyitsattitudeadheredtoit,has,onthecontrary,
repudiateditbyrefrainingfromratifyingtheMontevideoConventionsof1933and1939,whichwere
thefirsttoincludearuleconcerningthequalificationoftheoffence[aspoliticalinnature]inmatters
ofdiplomaticasylum.(Seeinthisregard,thelessononpersistentobjectors.SimilarlyintheNorthSea
ContinentalShelfCasesthecourtheldinanyeventthe...rulewouldappeartobeinapplicableas
againstNorwayinasmuchasshehadalwaysopposedanyattempttoapplyittotheNorwegian
coast.)
6.ThecourtconcludedthatColumbia,astheStategrantingasylum,isnotcompetenttoqualifythe
offencebyaunilateralanddefinitivedecision,bindingonPeru.
(2)Inthisspecificcase,wasPeru,astheterritorialState,boundtogiveaguaranteeofsafepassage?
7.ThecourtheldthattherewasnolegalobligationonPerutograntsafepassageeitherbecauseofthe
HavanaConventionorcustomarylaw.InthecaseoftheHavanaConvention,aplainreadingofArticle
2resultsinanobligationontheterritorialstate(Peru)tograntsafepassageonlyafteritrequeststhe
asylum granting State (Columbia) tosend the person granted asylum outside its national territory
(Peru).InthiscasethePeruviangovernmenthadnotaskedthatTorreleavePeru.Onthecontrary,it
contestedthelegalityofasylumgrantedtohimandrefusedtograntsafeconduct.
8. The court looked at the possibility of a customary law emerging from State practice where
diplomatic agents have requested and been granted safe passage for asylum seekers, before the
territorialStatecouldrequestforhisdeparture.Oncemore,thecourtheldthatthesepracticeswerea
resultofaneedforexpediencyandotherpracticeconsiderationsoveranexistenceofabeliefthatthe
actamountstoalegalobligation(seeparagraph4above).
There exists undoubtedly a practice whereby the diplomatic representative who grants asylum
immediately requests a safe conduct without awaiting a request from the territorial state for the

departureoftherefugeebutthispracticedoesnotandcannotmeanthattheState,towhomsucha
requestforsafeconducthasbeenaddressed,islegallyboundtoaccedetoit.
(3)DidColombiaviolateArticle1and2(2)oftheHavanaConventionwhenitgrantedasylumandis
thecontinuedmaintenanceofasylumaviolationofthetreaty?
9.Article1oftheHavanaConventionstatesthatItisnotpermissibleforStatestograntasylumto
personsaccusedorcondemnedforcommoncrimes(suchpersons)shallbesurrendereduponrequest
ofthelocalgovernment.
10.Inotherwords,thepersonseekingasylummustnotbeaccusedofacommoncrime(forexample,
murderwouldconstituteacommoncrime,whileapoliticaloffencewouldnot).Theaccusationsthatare
relevant are those made before the granting of asylum.Torres accusation related to a military
rebellion,whichthecourtconcludedwasnotacommoncrimeandassuchthegrantingofasylum
compliedwithArticle1oftheConvention.
11. Article 2 (2) of the Havana Convention states thatAsylum granted to political offenders in
legations, warships, military camps or military aircraft, shall be respected to the extent in which
allowed,asarightorthroughhumanitariantoleration,bytheusages,theconventionsorthelawsofthe
countryinwhichgrantedandinaccordancewiththefollowingprovisions:First:Asylummaynotbe
grantedexceptinurgentcasesandfortheperiodoftimestrictlyindispensableforthepersonwhohas
soughtasylumtoensureinsomeotherwayhissafety.
12.Anessentialprerequisiteforthegrantingofasylumistheurgencyor,inotherwords,thepresence
ofanimminentorpersistenceofadangerforthepersonoftherefugee.Thecourtheldthatthefacts
ofthecase,includingthe3monthsthatpassedbetweentherebellionandthetimewhenasylumwas
sought,didnotestablishtheurgencycriteriainthiscase(pp.2023).Thecourtheld:
Inprinciple,itisinconceivablethattheHavanaConventioncouldhaveintendedthetermurgent
casestoincludethedangerofregularprosecutiontowhichthecitizensofanycountrylaythemselves
openbyattackingtheinstitutionsofthatcountryInprinciple,asylumcannotbeopposedtothe
operationofjustice.
13.Inotherwords,TorrewasaccusedofacrimebuthecouldnotbetriedinacourtbecauseColombia
grantedhimasylum.Thecourtheldthatprotectionfromtheoperationofregularlegalproceedings
wasnotjustifiedunderdiplomaticasylum.
14.Thecourtheld:
InthecaseofdiplomaticasylumtherefugeeiswithintheterritoryoftheState.Adecisiontogrant
diplomaticasyluminvolvesaderogationfromthesovereigntyofthatState.Itwithdrawstheoffender
from the jurisdiction of the territorial State and constitutes an intervention in matters which are
exclusivelywithinthecompetenceofthatState.Suchaderogationfromterritorialsovereigntycannot
berecognisedunlessitslegalbasisisestablishedineachparticularcase.
15.Asaresult,exceptionstothisrulearestrictlyregulatedunderinternationallaw.
Asylummaybegrantedonhumanitariangroundstoprotectpoliticalprisonersagainsttheviolentand
disorderlyactionofirresponsiblesectionsofthepopulation.(forexampleduringamobattackwhere
theterritorialStateisunabletoprotecttheoffender).Torrewasnotinsuchasituationatthetimewhen
hesoughtrefugeintheColombianEmbassyatLima.
17. The court concluded that the grant of asylum and reasons for its prolongation were not in
conformitywithArticle2(2)oftheHavanaConvention.
PinochetCase
(Immunity)
Aformerheadofstateonlyhasimmunitywithregardtohisactsasaheadofstatebutnotwithregard
toacts,whichfalloutsidehisroleasheadofstate.Aheadofstatemaybetreatedasthestateitselfand
entitledtothesameimmunities.
Aformerheadofstatecannothaveimmunityforactsofmurdercommittedoutsidehisownterritory.
International law recognizes crimes against humanity and the Torture Convention says that no
circumstancescanbeinvokedasjustificationfortorture.Thereforeitcannotbeapartofthefunction
ofaheadofstateunderinternationallawtocommitthosecrimes.Thereisgeneralagreementbetween
thepartiesastotherulesofstatutoryimmunityandtherationalewhichunderliesthem.
Theissueis whetherinternationallaw grants stateimmunity inrelation totheinternationalcrimeof
tortureand,ifso,whethertheRepublicofChileisentitledtoclaimsuchimmunityeventhoughChile,

SpainandtheUnitedKingdomareallpartiestotheTortureConventionandthereforecontractually
boundtogiveeffecttoitsprovisionsfrom8December1988atthelatest.
CURRENTHEADOFSTATE
Itisabasicprincipleofinternationallawthatonesovereignstate(theforumstate)doesnotadjudicate
on the conduct of a foreign state. The foreign state is entitled to procedural immunity from the
processes of the forum state. This immunity extends to both criminal and civil liability. State
immunityprobablygrewfromthehistoricalimmunityofthepersonofthemonarch. Inanyevent,
suchpersonalimmunityoftheheadofstatepersiststothepresentday:theheadofstateisentitledto
thesameimmunityasthestateitself.Thediplomaticrepresentativeoftheforeignstateintheforum
stateisalsoaffordedthesameimmunityinrecognitionofthedignityofthestatewhichherepresents.
Thisimmunityenjoyedbyaheadofstateinpowerandanambassadorinpostisacompleteimmunity
attachingtothepersonoftheheadofstateorambassadorandrenderinghimimmunefromallactions
orprosecutionswhetherornottheyrelatetomattersdoneforthebenefitofthestate.Suchimmunityis
saidtobegrantedrationepersonae.
FORMERHEADOFSTATE
Whatthenwhentheambassadorleaveshispostortheheadofstateisdeposed?Thepositionofthe
ambassadoriscoveredbytheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelations(1961).Afterprovidingfor
immunityfromarrest(article29)andfromcriminalandciviljurisdiction(article31),article39(1)
providesthattheambassadorsprivilegesshallbeenjoyedfromthemomenthetakesuppost;and
paragraph(2)provides:
When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to an end, such
privilegesandimmunitiesshallnormallyceaseatthemomentwhenheleavesthecountry,oronexpiry
ofareasonableperiodinwhichtodoso,butshallsubsistuntilthat time,evenincaseofarmed
conflict.However,withrespecttoactsperformedbysuchapersonintheexerciseofhisfunctionsasa
memberofthemission,immunityshallcontinuetosubsist.
Thecontinuingpartialimmunityoftheambassadorafterleavingpostisofadifferentkindfromthat
enjoyedrationepersonaewhilehewasinpost.Sinceheisnolongertherepresentativeoftheforeign
statehemeritsnoparticularprivilegesorimmunitiesasaperson.Howeverinordertopreservethe
integrityoftheactivitiesoftheforeignstateduringtheperiodwhenhewasambassador,itisnecessary
toprovidethatimmunityisaffordedtohisofficialactsduringhistenureinpost.Ifthiswerenotdone
the sovereign immunity of the state could be evaded by calling in question acts done during the
previousambassadorstime.Accordinglyunderarticle39(2)theambassador,likeanyotherofficialof
thestate,enjoysimmunityinrelationtohisofficialactsdonewhilehewasanofficial.Thislimited
immunity,rationemateriae,istobecontrastedwiththeformerimmunityrationepersonaewhichgave
completeimmunitytoallactivitieswhetherpublicorprivate.
Inmyjudgmentatcommonlawaformerheadofstateenjoyssimilarimmunities,rationemateriae,
onceheceasestobeheadofstate.Hetoolosesimmunityrationepersonaeonceasingtobeheadof
state.Theexheadofstatehecannotbesuedinrespectofactsperformedwhilstheadofstateinhis
publiccapacity.Thus,atcommonlaw,thepositionoftheformerambassadorandtheformerheadof
state appears to be much the same: both enjoy immunity for acts done in performance of their
respectivefunctionswhilstinoffice.
Thequestionthenwhichhastobeansweredis whethertheallegedorganisationofstatetortureby
SenatorPinochet(ifproved)wouldconstituteanactcommittedbySenatorPinochetaspartofhis
officialfunctionsasheadofstate.Itisnotenoughtosaythatitcannotbepartofthefunctionsofthe
headofstatetocommitacrime.Actions,whicharecriminalunderthelocallawcan,stillhavebeen
doneofficiallyandthereforegiverisetoimmunityrationemateriae.Thecaseneedstobeanalysed
moreclosely.
Canitbesaidthatthecommissionofacrime,whichisaninternationalcrimeagainsthumanityandjus
cogens,isanactdoneinanofficialcapacityonbehalfofthestate?Ibelievetheretobestrongground
forsayingthattheimplementationoftortureasdefinedbytheTortureConventioncannotbeastate
function.
Whilegenerallyinternationallawdoesnotdirectlyinvolveobligationsonindividualspersonally,
thatisnotalwaysappropriate,particularlyforactsofsuchseriousnessthattheyconstitutenotmerely
internationalwrongs(inthebroadsenseofacivilwrong)butratherinternationalcrimeswhichoffend
againstthepublicorderoftheinternationalcommunity. Statesareartificiallegalpersons:theycan
onlyactthroughtheinstitutionsandagenciesofthestate,whichmeans,ultimately,throughitsofficials

andotherindividualsactingonbehalfofthestate.Forinternationalconductwhichissoseriousasto
betaintedwithcriminalitytoberegardedasattributableonlytotheimpersonalstateandnottothe
individuals who ordered or perpetrated it is both unrealistic and offensive to common notions of
justice.Theideathatindividualswhocommitinternationalcrimesareinternationallyaccountablefor
themhasnowbecomeanacceptedpartofinternationallaw.Problemsinthisareasuchasthenon
existenceofanystandinginternationaltribunaltohavejurisdictionoversuchcrimes,andthelackof
agreementastowhatactsareinternationallycriminalforthispurposehavenotaffectedthegeneral
acceptanceoftheprincipleofindividualresponsibilityforinternationalcriminalconduct.
Laterhesaid,atp.84:Itcannolongerbedoubtedthatasamatterofgeneralcustomaryinternational
lawaheadofstatewillpersonallybeliabletobecalledtoaccountifthereissufficientevidencethathe
authorisedorperpetratedsuchseriousinternationalcrimes.
ItcanbeobjectedthatSirArthurwaslookingatthosecaseswheretheinternationalcommunityhas
establishedaninternationaltribunalinrelationtowhichtheregulatingdocumentexpresslymakesthe
headofstatesubjecttothetribunalsjurisdiction:see,forexample,theNurembergCharter,article7;
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia; the Statute of the
InternationalCriminalTribunalforRwandaandtheStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt.Itis
truethatinthesecasesitisexpresslysaidthattheheadofstateorformerheadofstateissubjecttothe
courtsjurisdiction.Butthosearecasesinwhichanewcourtwithnoexistingjurisdictionisbeing
established.ThejurisdictionbeingestablishedbytheTortureConventionandtheHostagesConvention
isonewhereexistingdomesticcourtsofallthecountriesarebeingauthorisedandrequiredtotake
jurisdictioninternationally.Thequestioniswhether,inthisnewtypeofjurisdiction,theonlypossible
viewisthatthosemadesubjecttothejurisdictionofeachofthestatecourtsoftheworldinrelationto
torturearenotentitledtoclaimimmunity.
Ihavedoubtswhether,beforethecomingintoforceoftheTortureConvention,theexistenceofthe
internationalcrimeoftortureasjuscogenswasenoughtojustifytheconclusionthattheorganisationof
statetorturecouldnotrankforimmunitypurposesasperformanceofanofficialfunction.Atthatstage
therewasnointernationaltribunaltopunishtortureandnogeneraljurisdictiontopermitorrequireits
punishment in domestic courts. Not until there was some form of universal jurisdiction for the
punishmentofthecrimeoftorturecoulditreallybetalkedaboutasafullyconstitutedinternational
crime.Butinmyjudgment[*205]theTortureConventiondidprovidewhatwasmissing:aworldwide
universaljurisdiction.Further,itrequiredallmemberstatestobanandoutlawtorture:article2.How
canitbeforinternationallawpurposesanofficialfunctiontodosomethingwhichinternationallaw
itselfprohibitsandcriminalises?Thirdly,anessentialfeatureoftheinternationalcrimeoftortureisthat
itmustbecommittedbyorwiththeacquiesenceofapublicofficialorotherpersonactinginan
officialcapacity.Asaresultalldefendantsintorturecaseswillbestateofficials.Yet,iftheformer
headofstatehasimmunity,themanmostresponsiblewillescapeliabilitywhilehisinferiors(the
chiefsofpolice,juniorarmyofficers)whocarriedouthisorderswillbeliable.Ifinditimpossibleto
acceptthatthiswastheintention.
Finally,andtomyminddecisively, iftheimplementationofatortureregimeisapublicfunction
giving rise to immunity ratione materiae, this produces bizarre results. Immunity ratione materiae
appliesnot onlytoexheadsofstateandexambassadorsbut toall stateofficialswhohavebeen
involvedincarryingoutthefunctionsofthestate.Suchimmunityisnecessaryinordertopreventstate
immunitybeingcircumventedbyprosecutingorsuingtheofficialwho,forexample,actuallycarried
outthetorturewhenaclaimagainsttheheadofstatewouldbeprecludedbythedoctrineofimmunity.
Ifthatappliedtothepresentcase,andiftheimplementationofthetortureregimeistobetreatedas
officialbusinesssufficienttofoundanimmunityfortheformerheadofstate,itmustalsobeofficial
business sufficient to justify immunity for his inferiors who actually did the torturing. Under the
Conventiontheinternationalcrimeoftorturecanonlybecommittedbyanofficialorsomeoneinan
officialcapacity.Theywouldallbeentitledtoimmunity.Itwouldfollowthattherecanbenocase
outsideChileinwhichasuccessfulprosecutionfortorturecanbebroughtunlesstheStateofChileis
prepared to waive its right to its officials immunity. Therefore the whole elaborate structure of
universaljurisdictionovertorturecommittedbyofficialsisrenderedabortiveandoneofthemain
objectivesoftheTortureConventiontoprovideasystemunderwhichthereisnosafehavenfor
torturerswillhavebeenfrustrated.Inmyjudgmentallthesefactorstogetherdemonstratethatthe
notionofcontinuedimmunityforexheadsofstateisinconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheTorture
Convention.
Forthesereasonsinmyjudgmentif,asalleged,SenatorPinochetorganisedandauthorisedtortureafter

8December1988,hewasnotactinginanycapacitywhichgivesrisetoimmunityrationemateriae
becausesuchactionswerecontrarytointernationallaw,Chilehadagreedtooutlawsuchconductand
ChilehadagreedwiththeotherpartiestotheTortureConventionthatallsignatorystatesshouldhave
jurisdictiontotryofficialtorture(asdefinedintheConvention)evenifsuchtorturewerecommittedin
Chile.
Astothechargesofmurderandconspiracytomurder,noonehasadvancedanyreasonwhythe
ordinaryrulesofimmunityshouldnotapplyandSenatorPinochetisentitledtosuchimmunity.
Forthesereasons,Iwouldallowtheappealsoastopermittheextraditionproceedingstoproceedon
theallegationthattortureinpursuanceofaconspiracytocommittorture,includingthesingleactof
torturewhichisallegedincharge30,wasbeingcommittedbySenatorPinochetafter8December1988
whenhelosthisimmunity.

1.

Whatarethemaintenetsofthefeministcritiqueofinternationallaw? Outlinesomeofthevarious
feministcritiquespresentedbyChinkinandCharlesworth. DoyouthinkPILignorestheviewsof
women?
Thefeministcritiqueofinternationallawisbuildontwomainnotions,theinnateignoranceofwomen
duringthelawmakingprocessintheinternationallegalsystemandontheinherenttendencyofthe
lawtoinclinetowardsthemalegender.
Chinkin and Charlesworth believe that this has thus resulted in "a narrow and inadequate
jurisprudence". Theyemphasizedonfourcritiquesofinternationallaw,whichisleadingtomale
dominance of women. Firstly, they pointed the absence of women in international legal
institutions.ThelackofrepresentationofwomenasheadofStatesorininternationalinstitutionslike
theUNclearlyemphasizesthisnotion.Secondly,theyemphasizedonhowwomenwereexcludedby
theinternationaldocumentsbythecontinuedusageofthegenericmalepronoun.Liberalfeministare
againstthistypedofsexedlaws. Theyassertequalitybetweenmenandwomen. Theybelievethat
onlybadlawistheproblem,notthelawasawhole.Theybelievethatthereisaninherentflawofbias
inthemethodology,whenmenproduceitbyobservingothermen.Menwrotemosttheinternational
literature.Thirdly,theyhighlighthowcertainneutralprinciplesandrulesofInternationallaware
seentooperatedifferentlywithrespecttowomenandmen.Inthe21stcentury,inhumancrimessuch
asslavery,racialdiscriminationetcareconsideredasjuscogens,however,theinternationallawdoes
notconsidertraffickingwomen,prostitutionetcasaperemptorynorm. Fourthly,theyrevealhow
certainbasicconceptsofinternationallawrevealsasexedandgenderednature.Whenthelawtalks
abouttheStateprotectingthepeople,theStateoverherewouldbereferringtomenprotectingthe
weakerpeoplei.e.thewomen. TheCulturalFeminists(anotherschooloffeminism)describesthis
voiceasthedifferentvoice.Thisschooloffeminismstresses,onhowthisdifferentvoiceisnot
equallyrespectedandvaluedifitisconsideredawomansvoice.Theauthorsalsocommentonthe
conceptofessentialism.Theybelievethatthiswouldposeasaliabilityforrestructuringpoliticaland
sociallifeasitstereotypesthecharacteristicsortheessenceofwomen.
Yes,Ibelievethatpublicinternationallawignorestheviewsofwomen.Itisclearlyseenfromthe
abovediscussionofthefeministcritiquethattheinternationallawignoreswomenintheprocessoflaw
makingandisinherentlybiasedtowardsmen.ThoughInternational lawessentiallydealswiththe
variousStates,theselawsareframedbythesubjects,togovernthevariousaspectsrelatingtothe
States,which theyarepart of. Therefore,the individualsof the statesarethe indirect partiesof
internationallaws. Thus,itrequirestheadequaterepresentationofeveryonesinterest,whicheven
includestheignoredwomen.

2.

WhattriggeredtheemergenceofTWAIL?DidTWAILIIidentifythelacunaeofTWAILIcorrectly?
IfyouwereaTWAILscholar,howwouldyouamendTWAILI?
TWAILwasmainlytheproductoftwoattributes.Thefirstbeingtheinclinationtodefythenotion,
proclaimed by the western scholars, of international law being a product of European Christian

civilizationandthesecondwastheneedtorevive,revitalizeandrestructuretheinternationallaw,soas
to reciprocate to the needs of the third world people, which would also include the Indians. The
restructuring aimed at addressing the third worlds interest in an international system and thereby
incorporating these interests while formulating new international policies or laws. These factors
coupledwith theworksofvariousscholarssuchasC.H.Alexandrowicz,R.P.Anandamongothers,
triggeredtheemergenceofTWAIL.
TWAILIIdididentifymostofthelacunaeofTWAILI.TWAILfailedtograspthetrueconceptof
imperialism. Duetotheoversimplificationoftheconceptofimperialism,byassociatingit with
colonisation,theyfailedtooverseethecolonialistortheneocolonialistapproachesadopted,practiced
andcontinuedbytheseglobalcapitalists.TWAILIpresupposedtheinternationallawtobeneutral.
TheyexpectedtheInternationallawtoacceptandtransformaccordingtotheircommands.TWAILI
furtherfailedtoappreciatetheindeterminacyinvolvedinthestructureofInternationallaw,anhence
failedinaddressingtheclass,genderandethnicdivides.TWAILIwasineffectiveinestablishingthe
internationalinstitutionsastheproperforumforaddresstheneedsofthestates.TWAILIeludeditself
frominterdisciplinaryinquires.EventhoughTWAILIclaimedtoenvisionanegalitarianandjust
internationallaw,itwasstillignorantoftheconcernsofthepeoplefromthethirdworld.
IfIwereaTWAILscholar,Iwouldfirsttrytoidentifytheadvantagesofmycountryandtapintothat
resource.Byoptimallyexploitingthisresource,Iwouldtrytofindavoiceformycountryinthe
international community and later use this power to amend the international laws to address my
countrysinternalproblemssuchasmalnourishment,poverty,securityetcbeforeaddressingitinthe
internationalsystem.ThesimpledefiancetotheEuropeanlawsorclaimswillnotgetusanywhere.
3.

Whatarethesourcesofinternationallaw? Aremunicipallegalsystemsobligedtorecognizethese
sourceswhileexercisinga)domesticjurisdiction,b)extraterritorialjurisdiction?Elucidatewithcase
lawsandexamples.
Overtheyears,thesourcesofinternationallawhavebeendividedintoprimaryandsecondarysources.
BothsourcesfindtheiroriginsinArticle38(1)oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,
whichisheldtobethemostauthoritativeandcompletestatementastothesourcesofInternational
Law.Theinternationalconventions,customsandgeneralprinciplesoflawareconsideredtheprimary
source,whichispartofthelawcreatingprocesses.Thesecondarysources,whichareconsideredthe
lawdeterminingagenciescompriseofjudicialdecisionsandacademicwritings.Besidesthesesources,
theinternationallawalsorecognisesjuscogensorperemptorynorms,whichare,acceptedprinciplesof
internationallaw.Generally,nooneispermittedtodigressfromthesenorms.Examplesofjuscogens
wouldbeslavery,

1) Custom
Ageneral practice,whichisacceptedandfollowedasalaw,wouldbeacustom. Thus,there2
elementswhichcompriseacustomarethematerialfacti.e.theactualbehaviourofstatesandthe
opinionjurisi.e.thepsychologicalorsubjectivebeliefthatsuchbehaviourislaw.Accordingtothe
InternationalCourtofJustice,tobeamaterialfactofacustom,thecustomaryrulehadtobeaconstant
anduniformusagepracticedbythestate.TheAngloNorwegianFisheriescase,establishedacustom
toberecognizedasalawifsomedegreeofuniformityamongststatepracticescouldbeestablished.
However,inNicaraguav.UnitedStates,thecourtdifferedfromitsstandofuniformstatepracticeas
prescribedinthe AngloNorwegianFisheriescase, andheldthatthereneednotbeabsoluterigorous
conformitytotheuniformstatepractice.
Withrespecttothesubjectivebeliefofacustom,theCourtofInternationalJusticeintheLotuscase
heldthatastatepracticewouldconstitutecustomarylawifithadtheessentialingredientofobligation,
i.e.ifitcastsanobligationonthepartyinvolved. Alternativelyitwouldbeamerepracticeanda
customarylaw.
2)InternationalConventions

Internationalconventionsarelegallybindingwrittenstatements,whichestablisharelationbetweenthe
states.Theprinciplesofagreementsarebindingorpactasuntservandaobligatesthepartiesinvolved
toactaccordingtothepredeterminedconditionsandarrangements. Lawmakingtreatiesandtreaty
contractsarethetwotypesofInternationalconventions.Theformerestablishesnewlaws,rulesand
guidelinestobefollowedbyallthememberstotheconvention,whereasthelatterisbetweenalimited
numberofpartiesandarenotconsideredtobealawmakinginstrument.Theyaremorelikeacontract.
3)GeneralPrinciplesofLaw
Whenthereexistsalacunainlaw,rulesareconstruedbythejudgebydrawinganinferencefromthe
preexistinglaws;thesearecalledtheGeneralPrinciplesofLawandareusedtoguidethelegalsystem.
Whileexercisingdomesticjurisdiction,themunicipallegalsystemsareobligedtotakeintoaccount
thesesourcesoflaw. Earlierthereusedtobeanassumptionofindependencewithinthedomestic
jurisdiction because of the sovereign nature of the states, however, after the AngloNorwegian
Fisheriescase,ithasbeenheldthatthevalidityofastatesactionwithrespecttootherstateshaveto
basedoninternationallaw.Thisimpliesthatthesourcesoftheinternationallawhavetobeconsidered
forvalidatingastatesactionwhiledealingwithotherstatesevenwithintheirdomesticjurisdiction.
Whileexercisingextraterritorial jurisdiction,themunicipal legal systemsareobligedtotakeinto
accountjuscogensi.e.whencrimesofuniversalconcernarecommitted,eachstateinvolvedhasthe
righttoprosecutethecrime,however,thevalidityofextraterritorialjurisdictionisderivedfromjus
cogens.ThisrulecanbeinferredfromthePinochetcasewhereuniversaljurisdictionwasinvokedfor
prosecutingtheheadofChileforthetorturecommittedbyhim.Nevertheless,thereisanexceptionto
thisruleofuniversaljurisdictionandthatisdiplomaticimmunity.IntheBelgianArrestWarrantcase,
theICJwithdrewanarrestwarrantissuedagainsttheforeignministerofCongoforincitingracial
hatred.Theywereoftheopinionthatthisarrestwouldpreventhimfromexercisinghisduties.