UNDERSTANDING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIFFUSION IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE FOR A NON-MONOLITHIC

APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONS
Authors:
Corresponding Author: Prof. Jorge Mascarenhas Lasmar
Professor of International Relations and Head of the Department of International
Relations at PUC Minas (Brazil)
Address: R. Joao Antonio Azeredo, 320, ap 401
Belvedere
BH, MG
Brazil
30320-610
Phone: (+5531) 9129-9266
Prof. Danny Zahreddine
Professor of Geopolitics at PUC Minas (Brazil)
Address: R. Santa Rita Durao, 700, ap 602
Savassi
BH, MG
Brazil
30140-111
Phone: (+5531) 88171562
Delber Andrade Gribel Lage
International Law Lecturer at PUC Minas (Brazil) and Director of the International
Law Centre, CEDIN
Address: R. Sao Joao Evangelista, 198, ap 102
Santo Antonio
BH, MG
Brazil
30330-140
Phone: (+5531)92024773
ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to map the reach of key universal norms and rules of Human
Rights Law in international society while also mapping, at the same time, specific
regional interpretations and practices of such norms. By mapping the normative
architecture of the primary institution of international law through its key Human
Rights universal norms and rules it is possible to undertake a geographic analysis
of its diffusion and density through out international society. Hence, it is also
possible to visually assess the reach of norms we take for granted as being
universal. On the other hand, the mapping of regional interpretations and
practices of global norms allows identifying if these regionalisms do construct
coexistent regional clusters of different international normative systems within
the system-level institution governing international society. This mapping exercise
hopes to contribute to the English School research agenda and its discussions of
regions by trying to trace a clearer picture of the normative and institutional
borders within international society and thus provide an additional tool to
understand how regional norms and practice constitute, interact and redefine the
global international society.
KEYWORDS:
English School, Regions, Regionalism, Human Rights, International Law, Norms,
Institutions

Understanding Regional and Global Diffusion in International Law: The Case

for a Non-Monolithic Approach to Institutions1
Jorge M. Lasmar2
Danny Zahreddine3
Delber Andrade Gribel Lage4

Introduction
It is beyond doubt that the regional is increasingly gaining importance in global
politics. Nevertheless, the concept and idea of regions are still under-theorised in
International Relations. In this paper, we start a discussion of an even less theorised
aspect of regions, i.e. the idea of regionalisation. Starting from the English School
framework we develop the idea that some norms, principles and values of the
international society that are taken for granted as being universal are in fact subject
to specific regional interpretations. As a consequence, these different interpretations
and/or applications of supposedly global norms generate distinct localised clusters of
patterned practices. These regional interpretation/application of global norms can
therefore construct new regionalised meanings that deviate from the original global
meaning. Hence, this phenomenon essentially creates new regional systems of
norms within the global primary institution without them losing identity as systemlevel norms.
To illustrate this idea, this article will also attempt to empirically test the idea of
regionalization by mapping the reach of supposedly key universal rules of human
rights in international society. Even though this first mapping exercise is not by any
stretch a definitive mapping of the human rights practices and norms in international
society and should be considered just as a preliminary attempt, it does reveals
interesting aspects about the geography of human rights norms that are normally
considered to be at least formally - universally accepted. By mapping the normative
1 This paper has benefited from discussions with Barry Buzan, Kevork
Oskanian and Laust Schouenborg. We are grateful for their input and our
vigorous debate on the issue. Of course all shortcomings remain our own.
2 Professor of International Relations and Head of the Department of
International Relations at PUC Minas (Brazil).
3 Professor of Geopolitics at PUC Minas (Brazil).
4 International Law Lecturer at PUC Minas (Brazil) and Director of the
International Law Centre, CEDIN.
2

architecture of the main international human rights treaties, their reservations and the
consent to international human rights enforcement bodies it is possible to undertake
a spatial visual analysis of its diffusion and density through out international society.
Hence, it is also possible to visually assess the reach of norms we take for granted
as being universal. Additionally, we hope that the mapping of regional interpretations
and practices of global norms will allow us to identify whether these normative
regionalisms do construct coexistent regional clusters of different international
normative systems within the system-level institutions governing international society.
This mapping exercise hopes to contribute to the English School research agenda by
trying to trace a clearer picture of the normative and institutional borders within
international society, thus providing an additional tool for understanding how regional
norms and practice constitute, interact and redefine the global international society.

Re-thinking Regions in English School

Notwithstanding the recent emerging interest in the study of regions within the
English School thinking, it still remains fairly underdeveloped. As previously argued
by Hurrell, regions feature most heavily either in the English Schools historical
narratives on the expansion of international society or in limited, ad hoc applications
of the Schools conceptual framework within freely defined geographical areas
(2007). The expansion of International Society has, for instance, been narrated as
the universalisation of European norms and practices (Bull and Watson, 1984).
According to this view, regionally specific factors were mostly assumed to have been
either suppressed or assimilated by the centuries of colonial rule resulting in one
more or less undifferentiated second-order society constituted by a wide-reaching set
of primary institutions. Thus, several distinct International Societies were absorbed
and became amalgamated into one (i.e. the European International Society) through
the processes of colonisation and decolonisation. A similar argument is contained in
Buzan and Littles work on historical, pre-modern international systems: separate
civilizational areas with merely linear (limited, occasional and one-dimensional)
interactions between them (Buzan and Little, 2000). This contrasts with the global,
multi-ordinate international society of today.
Nevertheless, there is a body of English School scholarship that recognises the
importance of studying the regional and accepts the fact that the institutions of
international society can vary strongly across the globe. However, the English School
3

approach of regions remains mostly issue-specific and theoretically diverse.

Examples of regional approaches within the English School include, among others,
European integration (Fei, 2005), the specific influence of rising or established Great
Powers (Russia, China) on parts of international society (MacFarlane, 2003, Paami,
2007, Zhang, 2001), the role of religion (specifically Islam) in the international order
(Piscatori, 2003), the Middle East (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2009) and the
varying practices of sovereignty or human rights in international society (Jackson
Preece, 1997, Jackson, 1990, Jackson, 1998). Thus, even though these works
undoubtedly represent a great contribution to the debate on regions, they tend to
analyse specific regions as a single case study and thereby treat the region almost
as a minor-scale international society. Questions about the relation and dynamics
between the regional and the global still remain largely understudied.
In fact, the possibility that there is a degree of normative interaction amongst the
international and regional societies primary institutions highlights the likelihood of
another complementary side to the study of regions. Regions are usually defined by
a set of intrinsic geographic and institutional characteristics that construct a certain
common identity that both form the idea of region at the same time as
distinguishing/differentiating it from both other regions as well as the global.
Nevertheless, as identities are mutually constructed within international and regional
societies, then the problem can also be approached from the point of view of a
system level international society. It is this latter possibility that is the focus of this
article, i.e. namely that the different interpretations and application of global norms by
states can also construct regional sets of what are essentially common patterns of
practices that, in turn, construct normative regions within the primary institutions of
international society (regionalism).
International Societys Varying Norms and Institutions

As suggested above, we posit the existence of spatially distinct deviations from the
global-level normative structure of International Society. Regional variations emerge
through territorially bounded, local applications and interpretations of the institutions
of an international society that displays variations in the application of its global
normative fabric, without necessarily obviating its coherence at the global level.
There are at least two possible causes for this spatial variation of norms and primary
institutions. The first, and more obvious, lies in differences in the interpretation and

practical application of the shared norms and values of international society. The
second, and far less obvious, relates to the intrinsically dynamic nature of the
normative structure of interstate society as contained within its primary institutions.
In this section, we shall consider these two forms of regional variations in global
norms.
Regional variations in the Operationalisation of the Norms of Primary Institutions
Differences in how global norms are, in fact, interpreted, applied and followed (or not)
can occur due to dissimilarities in how actors understand, interpret, and apply
institutional norms. Different societies/regions can have diverse approaches and
worldviews that affect how they interact: they can be informed by contrasting
interaction cultures, they can possess different interaction capacity and can be
limited by varying interaction technologies. In fact, March and Olsen demonstrate that
institutions are created through a social process of institutionalisation that involves
the development of practices and rules in the context of using them (1998:948). This
distinction is relevant since it focuses our attention upon the pragmatic, performative
dimension of normative communication.
Much of the literature on norms that is associated with communication theory takes a
step in the right direction by linking norms and interactions to the construction of
identities. Having said that, it is not only necessary to incorporate subjective
intervening variables, such as interpretation(s) and performance(s) into norm
literature, but also to account for the fact the communication/ transmission of
meaning is not necessarily always clear and without noise. 5 This is crucial because
the same norm or rule can be interpreted and/or operationalised differently across
interstate society. This causes not only a single rule to become a series of different
norms across time and space but also to acquire regional particularities. In short, the
existence of spatial variations in the operationalisation of rules must be accounted for
as this directly impacts norms. In other words, such variations can deeply affect how
we conceptualise and understand the study of regions in international relations.

5 The concept of noise in communication theory was introduced by Shannon and Weaver SHANNON,
C. E. & WEAVER, W. 1949. The mathematical theory of communication, Urbana, University of Illinois
Press. and refers to any barrier to communication that may weaken or destroy a message that is trying
to be relayed UNISON. 2010. Using Effective Communications to Create Direction. The Times 100:
Case Study 100 [Online]. Available: http://www.thetimes100.co.uk/studies/file-download--38-253713.php [Accessed 20th September 2010]..

Thus, it is necessary to understand that in most cases, even rules that are formally
similar can be applied differently according to the particular institutional context in
which these norms operate (Kratochwil, 1989:25-28, Reus-Smit, 1997:556).
Positivists such as Hart and Austin, try to explain this phenomenon exclusively by
showing the material differences that exist between norms and rules (Dworkin,
1967:19). Nevertheless, studies focusing on the empirical application of norms and
rules demonstrate that even rules that are formally similar tend to be operationalised
differently across distinct societies or different periods of time. This is so because
institutions are also formed by the culture-specific principles and values that shape
their creation, interpretation and application (i.e. their normative architecture). In the
same vein, the existence of regionally specific culturally or historically-informed
systems of value can be another reason for a regional variation in the application and
interpretation of global norms.
According to Buzan, a conventional understanding of values in the social sense is:
the moral principles and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social group
(2004b:164). Taken as moral principles or accepted standards, values can thus be
considered as personal or collective cognitive considerations that affect the weight
each actor gives to the possible course of actions available to him/her in order to
achieve a specific objective. In short, as personal or collective cognitive
considerations, values do not necessarily constitute a rational option. Instead we
believe that values can constitute, and can also be defined as, the cognitive
framework that not only guides an actor in his/her rational choice in concrete
situations but that also influences his/her perception of the circumstances/reality. In
this sense, in contrast to principles, values have a strong emotional (cathectic) 6
component

(Kratochwil,

1989:64).

It

is

therefore

values

that

attribute

appropriateness or inappropriateness factor to social norms and rules.

This is important because values can be abstract7 and consequently can easily
traverse state or institutional boundaries and become regional in the contemporary
context. Thus, values hold a great cognitive spillover capacity inter-penetrating from
one state to another or indeed from one primary institution to another. Such an inter6 The Webster dictionary defines cathectic as invested with mental or emotional energy.
7 It is worth noting that values can become less abstract as they are institutionalised into norms or rules
or act as principles. For further discussion see Canotilho CANOTILHO, J. J. 1998. Direito Constitucional
e Teoria da Constituio, Coimbra, Almedina.; Dworkin DWORKIN, R. M. 1967. The Model of Rules.
The University of Chicago Law Review, 35, 14-46. and Miranda MIRANDA, J. 1996. Manual de Direito
Constitucional, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora..

penetration of values frequently pressures states or institutions (albeit in different

ways and to varying degrees) to consolidate norms and create rules aimed at
securing either the originally existing or the newly introduced values/ideas. As a
consequence, the consolidation of values specific to a certain region can impact
shared notions of what is appropriate and what is not, or even how a norm or rule
should be interpreted and applied within or in relation to that specific region. As such,
values are a major analytical variable for the study of regionalisation, as regional and
sub-global changes in shared values that orient the interpretation and application of,
norms, rules and institutions of a community can generate quite significant shifts in
the meaning of a global norm. Thus, identifying which and how shared values are
institutionalised regionally/sub-globally and scrutinising their relation with global
values is an important mechanism for studying spatial variations in the institutions of
international society.
Understanding that institutional norms can vary regionally due to regional differences
in their operationalisation also helps to solve two problems common in most IR
approaches to the study of norms. For one, most theories presuppose that the
communication between the content of the norm and its recipient(s) is
straightforward. However, subjective and contextual interpretations can change the
meaning of a norm even if the formal substantive content of the norm remains the
same. This means that a single global norm can, in fact, mutate into several
substantially deviating interpretations of that norm. Another hitherto neglected factor
is how regional differences in the operationalisation and institutionalisation of norms
into rules (for example through reservations in treaties or through the domestic
adaptation of international law) can also engender disparities between the individual
and regional interpretations of norms on the one hand and the original intended
meaning of international rules on the other.
An interesting example is the global institutionalisation of a series of rules countering
the financing of terrorism and terror-related activities with the Global War on Terror
(GWoT). These rules consolidated the fight against financing terrorism as a legal
obligation in interstate society and in this process institutionalised the financial
monitoring and sanction systems. There was an overall acceptance and
institutionalisation of these new rules by a significant number of actors in interstate
society. Amongst various actors that have accepted these new rules one can identify
both states, the most important international organisations involved with the financial
markets, as well as an increasing number of private financial actors. As these norms
7

are becoming almost universally internalised within interstate society, they are
inevitably provoking a degree of change in the operationalisation of financial flows.
Thus, at first glance, it appears that the GWoT has triggered a norm cascade within
the primary institution of finance. Yet, at the same time, both the reach and the
normative meaning of this process of generalisation and symbolisation should not be
overestimated.
The institutionalisation - and consequently the operationalisation - of these rules is
not a homogeneous process. These rules were introduced in interstate society by
international organisations mostly in the form of general resolutions and
recommendations that established broad principles but left the implementation and
institutionalisation of these rules to the discretion of individual states and private
financial agents. What has resulted is the institutionalisation of rules that share the
same set of basic principles but with very distinctive normative content. This process
of implementation and institutionalisation has thus culminated in the co-existence of
complex, inconsistent and sometimes even contradictory sets of regional, national
and corporate regulatory regimes. This complexity is further aggravated by the
rapidly changing government guidelines that set the parameters of all these
regulatory regimes.
For example, in October 2007 the American government quintupled the number of
situations that were up to that moment categorised as legal violations. Less than a
year later, the US once again substantially altered the guidelines regulating the
measures for combating the financing of terrorism and introduced, a month later, a
new roll of prohibited transactions (Deloitte, 2009:6). The American freeze list alone
currently contains over 9,000 names of individuals, charities, organisations and
companies (Deloitte, 2009:8). At the same time, both the European Union and the
United Nations also simultaneously maintain their own lists (though recent efforts
have been made to harmonise all these freeze lists). To complicate matters even
more, regional legal regimes also influence how these freeze lists and government
guidelines are implemented. Recently, for instance, the European Court of Justice
declared that the UN sanctions lists were illegal within the jurisdiction of the
European Union.8 In short, to reiterate, the institutionalisation of these norms is so
heterogeneous that empirical evidence demonstrates that their application and
implementation leads to rules with very different, and sometimes contradictory,
normative content. So much so that even within the same banking organisation or
8 See the Kadi case.
8

financial agency different regional rules are adopted in order to comply with (often)
contrasting local legal or administrative requirements.9
Thus, the main values of the fight against financing terrorism have been
institutionalised as rules with broadly similar principles in interstate society. In
practice however, the resulting rules do not share a single, unified normative content.
In other words, the GWoT undoubtedly figures as a tipping point in that it triggers a
norm cascade of rules countering the financing of terrorism. Nevertheless, upon
closer inspection, this norm cascade is one of form rather than of content. This is
because while formally, the normative content of the norms is roughly the same, the
individual and regional substantive interpretation and operationalisation of these
norms are so diverse that, in practice, they constitute different rules sharing likeprinciples and addressing a common problem. This is very clearly a case of a primary
institution accommodating multiple normative solutions for mediating the same social
fact (Kawaguchi, 2003).
Variations in the normative architecture of global primary institutions
In the English School literature, the term international institutions is noticeably
aligned to a broad pattern of norms, principles and rules that constrain and guide an
actors behaviour. According to this usage, institutions are not actor-like
establishments but rather normative bodies with a structure-like role. 10 Institutions in
this sense are much more heterogeneous, complex and enduring than mere
organisations or associations. Sovereignty, international law, markets, great power
management, war, diplomacy and environmental stewardship can all be counted as
examples of institutions falling within this understanding. Within English School, both
the terms international and institutions acquire a special significance. Institutions
are usually associated with Bulls concept of order, i.e., a pattern of activity that
sustains the elementary goals of the society of states or international society

9 These results confirm the importance of contrasting the existing substantive content of a norm, rule or
value with how they are, in fact, operationalised in interstate society. This is because norms can acquire
a completely different meaning in their application. This has been a specific gap in most IR literature
addressing rules and norms, as most works tend to presuppose that specific norms or rules have a
continuous and homogeneous meaning and, as such, do not change their content across time and
space.

10 In fact, looking at Hayek and Menger, Onuf shows that in economic theory the market was initially
treated as a structure and gradually became treated as a complex institution ONUF, N. G. 2002.
Institutions, Intentions and International Relations. Review of International Studies, 28, 211-228..

(1977:8).11 More precisely, Bull states that [b]y an institution we do not necessarily
imply an organization or administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and
practices towards the realization of common goals (1977:74). He uses diplomacy,
war, balance of power, great power management, the state and international law all
as examples. In accordance with this use, Holsti defines international institutions as
the context within which the games of international politics are played. They
represent patterned (typical) actions and interactions of states, the norms, rules, and
principles that guide (or fail to guide) them, and the major ideas and beliefs of a
historical era (2004:16). Holsti gives the examples of trade, diplomacy, war,
international law, the state, sovereignty, territoriality and colonialism while
simultaneously underscoring that this is by no means an exhaustive list. Buzan, in
turn, draws attention to the fact that although the English School authors use different
definitions of institutions, a general agreement on certain key features and roles can
be identified, namely:

that they [institutions] are relatively fundamental and durable practices, that
are evolved more than designed; and

that they [institutions] are constitutive of actors and their patterns of

legitimate activity in relation to each other (2004b:167).

In seeking to both consolidate the conceptual clarity in the study of institutions

(Buzan, 2004b:175) and to contribute to the English Schools research programme,
we adopt the term primary institutions to denote relatively fundamental and durable
practices that are constitutive of actors and their patterns of activity in relation to each
other. Likewise, the term secondary institutions will be used to designate an
organisation or establishment founded for a specific purpose (Buzan, 2004b:164) or
even implicit or explicit principles, norms [,values] and decision-making procedures
around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations
(Krasner, 1983:2).
Primary institutions are more than just mere conglomerations of norms. Different
primary institutions have distinct functions, goals and roles. Each specific primary
institution is composed of a unique system of norms and values that give shape to
equally unique patterns of interaction. In fact, as Finnemore and Sikkink observe,
while the idea of norm isolates single standards of behaviour, the concept of
11 These goals are security, sanctity of agreements, and protection of property rights BULL, H. 1977.
The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York, Palgrave..

10

institutions emphasize[s] the way in which behavioural rules are structured together
and interrelate (1998:891). Thus, primary institutions are brought into being by the
consolidation

of

systematic

architecture

of

norms,

rules

and

values. 12

Characterising this architecture as systematic indicates that an institutions cognitive

identity is formed and determined not only by its normative content but also by the
shape of its specific normative architecture. By architecture we mean the particular
distribution of attributed meaning, the operational procedures and values involved in
an institution in a given time and social-space. In other words, the way these norms
are organised and the manner in which they interrelate with each other within an
institution holds a special meaning and helps to shape the institutions own identity.13
Therefore, norms and institutions work as symbolic structures that mediate different
motivations and delineate patterns of behaviour. These patterns, in turn, construct
and become part of an actors perception(s) of reality and consequently constitutive
of their very identity. Since social reality is ever-changing, institutional norms are
bound to transform as institutions tend to adapt their norms in order to preserve their
functional objectives/goals. In turn, these transformations can have positive or
negative consequences as the shifts can either increase or a decrease the capacity
of the norm and institution to mediate social reality. Moreover, changes in the norms
and values of primary institutions can occur at multiple levels as social changes can
impact different normative levels of the same institution in many different ways.
At the most fundamental level, the fact the primary institutions vary their normative
architecture to adapt to regional social reality poses some interesting, and pertinent,
questions to the English Schools way of thinking. If regional characteristics can
engender significant changes in primary institutions of interstate society, what does
this tell us about how useful and/or stable primary institutions are as a concept? Even
12 Note that the architecture can be both consciously constructed and socially evolved.
13 Some examples in the legal context can help to illustrate how institutional architecture matters.
Imagine that the Brazilian constitution specifies certain rules about private property. Imagine that
another country with a similar legal system has the exact same rules in its legal system but not in its
constitution. Would it make any difference? The answer is yes. Brazilian rules would be subject to a
series of procedural instances that are only applicable to constitutional law. Now imagine that the other
country also has the same private property rules in its constitution. Would it be applied likewise? The
answer is probably not. The Brazilian constitution in its preamble states that human rights are a guiding
principle for domestic law. Thus, the private property laws have to be understood and applied by judges
as being part of the human rights law. They would have to comply with procedures applied to the socalled social function of property. In this case, a persons home is protected from being confiscated as
all the property law is subjected to some features applicable to human rights rules (non revocable,
immediate application, etc). The same applies to labour law. But what if the other country has the same
guiding principle? Would the law then be applied the same way? Once again the answer is probably not.
What is understood by social function would inevitably differ from country to country, from social context
to social context.

11

more significantly, if regional interpretation/application of norms can transform and

inform primary institutions, does this mean that the primary institution of international
society are in essence a patchwork of regional social structures and, if so, does it
really qualify as structure? Is there such a thing as an (global) international society?
Thus, it is important to consider regional variances as a component of the shape of
the normative architecture of global primary institutions; the interpretation and local
application of global norms; and the non-linearity of norm life-cycles, all of which help
explain the phenomenon of normative change and geographic differentiation in
interstate society. Taking these considerations into account is also the first step
towards a non-monolithic approach to primary institutions by defining the overall
normative structure of such institutions as a nebula of norms composed by both
hard and soft aspects in its structural quality. This approach enables us to rethink
our understanding of the relationships between normative change, regional and subglobal normative variations and the interstate social structure. It also helps
accounting for the regional variations of global norms advancing our understanding of
both primary institutions and normative regionalism in general.
Taking a cue from Lakatos discussion about research programmes, it is possible to
imagine that the norms, values, rules, principles and procedures of primary
institutions are constructed and organised not only as a central normative core but
also around such a core. Thus, core sets of values and norms would be those that
determine the functional requisites/goals and form the normative identity of the
primary institution. Being defined by these core rules, the primary institution would
protect its capacity to mediate social reality and achieve its functions/goals through
a peripheral set of norms arranged around this core that, functioning as a protective
belt, would adapt not only to new social realities but also be sensitive to
accommodate regional variations.
Such a conceptualisation can provide an analytical and theoretical tool for helping
English School studies focus upon the regional variances of global-level primary
institutions, both in terms of variations in the operationalisation of a given norm, as
well as in terms of understanding how a single institution can have different
normative densities across geographical regions. In other words, how a single norm
or primary institution of international society can be more or less internalised across
regions or how different norms and values of a single primary institution can reflect
different degrees of internalisation and hence exhibit regional variations. Although
12

such an approach would definitely increase the complexity of analysis related to

primary institutions, it can also have a deep impact upon how the English School
understands not only the normative limits/borders of, but also membership in,
international society.
These tools can help drawing an even more systematic picture of the nature and
complexity of primary institutions and assist not only in identifying and characterising
different social aspects of regional interstate societies, but also their transformations,
as well as their geographic (regional or sub-global) variations.

Regionalising Tendencies in International Society: The Diffusion of Human

Rights Conventions

If we understand the primary institution of international law in such a non-monolithic

systemic cluster of norms composed of a core and a periphery nebula, then by
establishing what are the main core and periphery norms of this institutions it might
be possible to geographically map its cognitive reach using a geographic information
system software (GIS). Thus, in order to map supposedly universal norms and
identify any possible traces of regionalism, we now turn to the main regional and
international human rights conventions in an attempt to visualise how the consent
with these norms are distributed in international society. It is important to note,
however, that what we term human rights differs from the broader cosmopolitan
conception of human rights or humanitarian law as a value, idea or philosophy.
Instead, for this study it refers specifically to the legal system of rules known as
human rights, and as such, constitutes a subset within international law.
We hope this mapping will provide an insight of how deeply/shallowly different states
and regions internalize these universal norms. Of course, any mapping would provide
but an imperfect image as not only it is impossible to empirically establish and
quantify all the norms of a primary institution, but also the choice of which norms to
map and their placement in the core or periphery of the institution can be subject to
discussion. Additionally, this analysis would also require a very careful investigation
of the states practice regarding that specific norm. However, we take this as a first
step and believe that this is a very valuable exercise that can further develop our
understanding about the institutional shape and dynamics of international society and

13

possibly even eventually lead to a map of solidarity/pluralism in interstate society. If

nothing else, the present mapping draws a clear picture of the normative density of
shared universal human rights conventions.
We started by identifying on map 1 what are the main (core) international treaties on
the subject. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, ten treaties of human rights can be considered as core: those
conventions of the International Bill of Human Rights (i.e., the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights 194814, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1966, and the international Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
1966) plus the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against
Women, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Convention on the Rights of the Child, International
Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Other important core indicators that were also considered as to give a clue of the
degree of internalization of international human rights norms by states included the
consent to additional protocols to those treaties (as they represent the states
acceptance to be monitored by the respective treaty monitoring bodies), and the
states consent to be subjected to the international human rights courts. This is
shown on maps 2 and 3, which encompass the ratification of regional human right
treaties that includes mechanisms of enforcement, and map 4 that shows the
ratification of additional protocols. To make the model more accurate, one would
need to add regionalization factors as intervening variables, such as state
reservations on those treaties and/or normative modifications that affect the treaty in
the process of incorporating it into domestic law. Reservations can also be an
important indicator of regionalization of global norms because, by definition, their
function is to bend how the norms of a treaty are applied to the state that ratified it. A
general overview of the number of reservations on the core treaties of human rights
that impact their normative content is shown in map 7.
14 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is actually not a treaty but a resolution of the United
Nations General Assembly.

14

As such, it is possible to map the formal consent with universal human rights rules in
international society by attributing each of the above-mentioned factors a different
weight as a variable. The variation on each attributed weight aimed to reflect where
(in either the core or periphery) that specific norm or practice is situated in the
normative nebulae. This was then empirically applied to each state. By feeding this
data into GIS software, we could draw a picture of both the universal/regional
character of human rights as well as map the density of these norms throughout
international society. The maps below show the preliminary results.
In the first map, we considered the combined ratification of the 10 main universal
human rights treaties by states.
FIGURE 1
At first sight, map 1 seems to suggest that there is a near universal acceptance of the
international human rights instruments. In fact, 142 countries ratified 70% of the ten
main international human rights treaties. That is to say that 73.5% of the members of
the United Nations agreed to the legislation in question. The size and vast spatial
distribution of the spheres shown in the map as well as the intensity of the shaded
grey area reveals an apparently homogeneous diffusion of these norms even though
there is a higher density in Europe and Latin America.
FIGURE 2
This higher density in Europe and Latin America becomes more apparent when we
consider the international regional human rights instruments. Although regional by
nature, the compliance with existing international regional human rights norms is very
significant for two important reasons. First, it not only reveals a near lack of regional
human rights instruments in the Middle East, Asia and Oceania but also pinpoints the
patently low adherence of the United States. Second, and most importantly, the
regional instruments are considered key in implementing regional human rights
courts. The consent to these courts jurisdiction can be an important indicator of the
degree to which states internalise human rights norms as key regional human rights
treaties create regional courts with binding powers as a mechanism of enforcement,
compliance and control.
It is also crucial to recognize that there are important qualitative differences amongst
15

the regional human rights systems that also reinforce the idea of regionalism in the
application and practice of human rights in international society. For example, The
European Court of Human Rights is the only regional system in which individuals
have direct access to the court (after the protocols 9 and 11). Another interesting
example is the case of the African Human Rights instruments that are, unlike the
general debate on human rights, centred on the rights of peoples rather than on the
rights of individuals in order to be better suited to mediate the specifically African
social reality.
FIGURE 3
As we sum up the consent to both regional and main universal human rights
conventions in map 3, a normative fracture become clear in the spatial diffusion of
these norms in international society. Map 3 reveals a pattern of significant
concentration in Europe and Latin America and, to a lesser degree Africa. A time
series analysis of ratification offers a possible explanation for the high normative
density in Latin America: the urge of many countries to be seen as democratic and
playing according to the rules of the game after an extended period of military
dictatorships in order to be fully accepted as members of international society.
FIGURE 4
In an attempt to also observe the more practical commitment of states to the above
instruments, we also mapped states ratification of additional protocols. The
importance of these protocols lies in the fact that they create enforcement
mechanisms within the United Nations system. These maps are revealing as they
clearly illustrate the limited compliance to instruments that supposedly increase the
commitment of states with universal human rights norms (also reflected on map 3).
On map 4, we can observe the ratification of three core additional protocols and four
non-core additional protocols. It is interesting to note that the upper map shows a
heterogeneous distribution in both the spatial diffusion as well as in the normative
density again with a greater concentration in Europe and Latin America. The lower
map does have a more homogeneous distribution, which suggests that states are
more prone to consent with less central enforcement mechanisms than with core
ones.
FIGURE 5
16

As we amalgamate the ratification of both blocks of additional protocols, a belt of low

normative density is clearly formed linking the countries of Southeast and South Asia,
passing through the Middle East and finishing up at the United States of America in
a zone somewhat similar to Mackinders Inner crescent or Spykmans Rimland.
This normative architecture brings into question the idea of a homogeneous
widespread universality of the international human rights legal instruments.
FIGURE 6
Map 6, in its turn, exhibits the clear difference between the ratification of universal
human rights conventions and the acceptance of enforcement mechanisms that
would increase the commitment of states. The dark circles represent the ratification
of universal human rights conventions and the size of the circles indicate the number
of ratifications. The light circles represent the ratification of additional protocols that
create mechanisms of enforcement and their size also indicates the number of
ratifications. Hence, in the cases in which the dark circles predominate over the light
ones, there are proportionally a greater number of ratifications of universal human
rights conventions than additional protocols. On the other hand, in the cases where
the light colour predominates, it indicates the ratification of both universal
conventions and additional protocols. We can see the clear existence of regional
differences in the patterns of ratification of both types of instruments. Map 6
highlights that two of the strongest economic powers, i.e. the United States of
America and China, present a clear gap between the consent to universal
conventions of human rights and the near zero consent to additional protocols or
mechanisms of enforcement.
Another interesting spatial pattern revealed is, once again, the belt of low ratification
of additional protocols that is formed along the above-mentioned Rimland. This once
again confirms the existence of a low-density normative belt. It is also hard not to
note that this is an area that has been historically marked by a great number of sociopolitical conflicts. Thus, this map suggests that the dissemination of human rights
values, norms and rules in international society are still influenced by political issues
and considerations and even more so in the case of the above mentioned belt.
FIGURE 7

17

Finally, the United Nations Guide to Practice on Reservations define reservation as

a unilateral statement [] to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions
of the treaty in their application to that state or international organisation (UNILC,
2011:2). Thus, reservations can also provide important signs of regionalisation of
international norms. Hence, when cataloguing the reservations made by states on all
main international human rights treaties we classified them under two categories:
procedural (those which did not directly affect the normative content of the treaty)
and material reservations (those which did affect the normative content of the treaty).
In map 7, we only considered material reservations as they change the normative
content of the treaties in a specific way. What map 7 reveals then is a high
percentage of reservations per treaties in both Europe as well as in the case of states
that ratified fewer treaties. In the former case, this result may be explained by the
high complexity of the Communitarian (European) Legal system and the consequent
need to make these international instruments compatible with both European and
domestic law. In the latter case, states that ratified less human rights treaties
proportionally implemented more material reservations thereby inversely following
the normative fracture line and bolstering the hypothesis that these states had a
lower de facto commitment to these norms.
As a whole, these maps corroborates the results of the qualitative analyse of
differences in the regional compliance and deviations of the universal norms. At this
stage we considered the state ratifications of other universal and regional human
rights treaties; contents of reservations; measures to internalize and implement the
international conventions as domestic law; public declarations; alongside with the
number of complaints against the state in both the international courts and monitoring
bodies as indicators for the periphery norms of Human Rights. Both qualitative and
visual data seems to suggest that while the rules and legal procedures of what can
be seen as solidarist international law may formally have a near universal reach and
thus legally apply to all, the overall de facto internalization of solidarist values in the
international society still remains shallow. More significantly, we can infer that the de
facto internalisation of solidarist international law has an irregular geography
suggesting that the primary institutions of international society can display important
regional variances in their global norms, values and rules. In the case of human
rights, this is because while the legal procedures, treaties and other formal aspects of
solidarist international law are almost universally accepted, there are striking
differences in the degree to which states internalize and comply with the values
underlying these legal aspects. Solidarist international law values operate with
18

strongly internalisation mainly within European international society where they are
broadly accepted, but they are still contested or not fully internalised beyond that
group even though these values are innately cosmopolitan and have a strong
solidarist appeal.
Such contestation partially exists because some states/cultures not only do not
recognise the universalist claims of (European) solidarist international law but also
may see them as vanguardist/imperialist. But this contestation can also be explained
by the fact that although these values are innately cosmopolitan and have a solidarist
appeal they are in tension with a somewhat pluralist creational environment even
within Western international society. Solidarist international law can pull states
equally in the direction of either solidarist or pluralist projects in interstate society.
This is because the solidarism in solidarist international law is still thin and lacks an
efficient enforcement system. Not only are the rules of solidarist international law
constantly breached by states but also states have deliberately designed a normative
system that lacks efficient mechanisms of coercion and enforcement, which serves to
further undermine the credibility of these values. In short, only a few legal
mechanisms of enforcing solidarist international law exist in reality. Moreover, there
are very few legal bodies that individuals can turn to in order to legally challenge a
violation of their solidarist legal rights in the international realm. The European Court
of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (through the
mediation of the Human Rights Commission) are presently the only two such
international tribunals active as the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights
Court remains very limited in its practice.
Within the scope of the United Nations (UN), although the Security Council (SC) can
address human rights violations when they represent a threat to international peace
and security, human right issues have been mainly addressed by UN human rights
bodies and so-called treaty bodies which consist of a committee of independent
experts that monitor compliance by the state parties [along] with the obligations they
assumed by ratifying [universal human rights] conventions (Buergenthal, 2006:789).
However, these UN human rights bodies and treaty commissions have no binding
powers and compliance is monitored through the submission of state reports and
specialist recommendations. As such, mechanisms of control are limited to the
publication of these findings in order to mobilise public opinion and exercise the
power of embarrassment, so as to pressure states into altering their behaviour.
Furthermore, a great weakness of the UN system, particularly its Charter-based
19

system, is its susceptibility to politicization. Politicization has resulted in the frequent

condemnation of certain violators of human rights while others, some even more
blatant, escape criticism (Buergenthal, 2006:791). The contrasts in the UN approach
for the situations in former Yugoslavia and in Darfur are a striking example of this
discrepancy (Neuer, 2006:1). Thus, the United Nations timely intervention in
Yugoslavia sharply differs from its response in Darfur where the UN took nearly two
years before it reacted to what has been termed the greatest case of mass human
rights abuse (Neuer, 2006:1) in recent history. Unlike universal bodies such as the
UN, the regional human rights court and the ICC are exceptions when it comes to
exercising binding powers, but even so, their intentionally designed limited reach
restrict the powers they possess and employ in reality.
Furthermore, the system of sanctions exercised by both these bodies in the case of
non-compliance remains weak. The consolidation of solidarist international law was
achieved by careful normative design on part of states and lacks efficient
mechanisms of coercion/enforcement. Solidarist international law rules are limited by
both state interests and ideas of territorial sovereignty, as well as a deep fear of what
implications harder, more onerous, laws would have on both of these. To reiterate,
Suganami and Linklater (2006:132) argue that the absence of efficient mechanisms
of coercion/enforcement to protect solidarist values is, at least partially, rooted in the
deep-seated fear that relaxing pluralist principles would enable stronger states in the
international system to promote their own interests under the cover of protecting
solidarist international law. At the same time, stronger states in turn may fear that
strong solidarist international law rules would potentially limit their powers by
generating more onerous laws for international order. This attitude has therefore
fostered a calculated and careful institutionalisation of solidarist international law on
part of the states in international society. Thus, although enforcement is not a
necessary condition for solidarism (Buzan, 2004:152-154), the deliberate lack of
enforcement powers limits the effectiveness of solidarist international law rules and
may be seen as one of the main reasons why states agree to be bound by such rules
in the first place. Thus, the lack of willingness on part of states and entire regions to
implement effective mechanisms of coercion/enforcement in combination with the
selective application of solidarist rules may not only reflect a reasoned calculation
about costs, capabilities and/or responsibilities, but may also signify a lack of sincere
belief in those values by many states and regions. Either way, the internalisation of
solidarist international law follows an unequal geography amongst regions and
remains overall relatively shallow in international society.
20

Conclusion

This article starts by discussing how the theoretical study of regions is still
underdeveloped within the English School framework. While there are some
important studies about specific regional international societies and theories such as
Regional Security Complex Theory have, they remain disparate, developing in the
absence of clear conceptualisations of regions and specially of the interaction
between the regional and the global. Although important for the debate these
disconnected approaches have not yet provided the English School with the
necessary concepts and theoretical framework for developing this research agenda
in a scenario in which the regional specificities of international politics are becoming
ever more evident. With the study of the regional becoming an important trend in
International Relations, this leaves the English School with a considerable conceptual
blind spot. As pointed out by Buzan (2004a) and Hurrell (2007), there are strong
reasons to argue against an exclusively global, one world approach and the
necessity of bringing geography back into the English School. Additionally, vital
questions such as how to apply the concept of regions to central concepts of English
School such as International System, International Society and World Society (or
interhuman, interstate and transnational societies in Buzans approach) are still
largely unaddressed and represent an important omission or even a strange silence
(Zhang, 2002) in the historical narrative of this intellectual paradigm of IR.
However, this article focuses mainly on another aspect of the regions: regionalism.
The idea of regionalism rests upon the assumption that primary institutions are not
homogenous in their operation and normative design. Instead, we propose that the
normative design of a primary institution is somewhat similar to a nebulae: it contain
a relatively immutable and monolithic core that determines its function and role in
international society; but it is also constructed at its periphery by more variable
norms, values and principles that tend to protect and facilitate the application of the
core norms and values of the institution in practice. Moreover, this variable normative
periphery undergoes spatial patterning within international society, and it is this that
we term regionalism. By defining such geographically patterned frameworks, this
work takes the view that the practices, norms, principles and values of the institutions
governing international society are subject to specific applications and interpretations
that deviate from their global meaning in geographically defined regional ways.

21

Understanding the specificities of the non-monolithic normative architecture of

primary institutions and its regional variations also helps to answer some of the
questions about the structural/conceptual value of the primary institutions. If global
primary institutions can vary regionally, this raises key questions about the
usefulness/stability of the very concept of primary institutions and if social structure is
characteristically fluid. Moreover, if a social structure is characteristically and
permanently fluid as well as varies regionally, is it really structure? Throughout this
article, we found ample evidence that global primary institutions have the ability to
vary regionally without loosing their global level identity.
Thus, even though the regionalism undoubtedly impacts the primary institutions of
interstate society they tend to retain their normative identity. However, addition of
regional variations in global norms and institutions acts as a driving force to generate
a more complex interstate society. At the same time, primary institutions were found
to be stable in spite of possessing an inherent and permanent degree of normative
fluidity that is capable of accommodating regional differentiations. This is a key
finding of this work and is amply substantiated with empirical data. In short, despite
an inherent normative fluidity and regional variances, primary institutions can (and
do) still form, and function as, structure(s).
The core-periphery normative architecture of primary institutions offers an interesting
explanation for this phenomena: the structural and global property of primary
institutions and their normative identities are preserved by the continuity of their
normative core (hard aspect) which has its capacity to mediate reality protected by
the adaptability and variation of its peripheral norms (the protective belt) to both an
ever-changing social reality and regional social realities (fluid or soft peripheral
aspect). The changes and transformations of such nebula of norms (and perhaps
even of core norms) to adapt to new social or regional realities can, therefore
engender either a degenerative or a progressive process impacting both the
institutions capacity to influence actor behaviour and its overall authority within a
given international society. Clusters of differences/similarities in the operationalization
of norms of the soft normative belt of the primary institutions can come to delineate
relevant elements of the social identity of regional societies within the global
international society. Therefore, the regional can be a far more important component
of international society itself than previously thought.

22

In this model, it is possible to argue for the existence of both close interactions, as
well as different levels of relationships, between the global international society and
regional international societies. The global international society can be thought of as
being comprised of a core set of practices, values and norms that construct the
normative identity of global primary institutions. These core norms of the global
primary institutions also mediate social reality through a peripheral set of norms. As
these peripheral norms can accommodate regional variations and differences, it is
within this intersection i.e., between the peripheral global norms and regional
particularities, that significant normative interactions between regional and global
practices happen in international society. However, regions evolve not only in
response to their regional or internal dynamics but also due to their interaction(s) with
other regional and global international societies. With these interactions, regional
norms and practices can become incorporated, amalgamated and transformed
within, or indeed even be rejected by, global institutions and its normative core.
Needless to say, these interactions are not necessarily smooth and frequently also
(co)exist in a state of tension with - and can even challenge - what are assumed to
be core global norms and practices.

Thus, regional variances of global norms are important in shaping the normative
architecture of global primary institutions. Thus to reiterate, global and regional
societies can, and do, co-exist though not always in a straightforward or harmonious
manner. This means that regional international society can be either supportive or in
dispute with international society. In other words, global international society can
either allow the development of regional international societies or prevent them. The
possibility of a strong normative clash between contradicting regional or global
practices and institutions is ever present. Additionally, although the normative
architecture of primary institutions and its norms are mostly evolved, it can also be
deliberately designed. Consequently, as instances of colonialism and imperialism
throughout history made clear, it is equally plausible that in certain circumstances
states attempt to portray particular regional values, norms or practices as being
universal and endeavor to frame them as core universal norms and institutions.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the existence of tensions does not mean that
regional international societies undermine global international society. On the
contrary, the strength of international society is at least partially founded upon its

23

capacity to accommodate and co-exist with regional societies without loosing its
identity, even in the face of increasing regionalization. Being global is not exactly the
same as being homogeneous. Much of the strength of global norms depends on the
states internalization of these norms and values. It also depends on the expansion of
the cognitive borders of these norms, which occurs by offering new elements of
identity that may attract actors who did not previously share this identity or
expectation. In this process of expansion, it is possible to engender a consolidation
(i.e. deeper internalisation, a thickening of values and rules, a broader acceptance,
etc) of the global norm in question. Furthermore, the capacity of global norms to
adapt, accommodate and accept regional particularities while preserving their core
identity can constitute a great attraction for actors that are deeply embedded in
regional practices.
Of course given this interaction between the global and regional, a key question that
emerges and must be tackled is whether regions exist prior to the acceptance and
application of norms by a group of states or if the acceptance and application of
norms by a group of states is the defining element of a region. As mentioned above,
regions are usually defined by a set of intrinsic geographic and institutional
characteristics that construct a certain common identity that both forms the idea of a
region at the same time as distinguishing/differentiating it from both other regions as
well as the global. Hence regions can exist prior to the acceptance and application of
norms by a given group of states. Their previous existence can in fact be responsible
for the occurrence of regionally shared values, which create a patterned common
interpretation of global norms. However, even though this study focuses on the
phenomena of regionalism rather than regions, it demonstrates that common
institutions, norms, practices and values are as important a component of regions as
are geographic characteristics. Thus, as identities are mutually constructed within
international and regional societies, the application of norms by a group of states can
also become a defining element of regionalism and eventually evolve into a region. In
defining a region the sense of identity becomes as important, if not more significant,
than the geographical element. This understanding also opens up the theoretical
possibility to think about normative regions which would, in turn, allow one to
consider regions within transnational society. Different interpretations and application
of global norms by states can construct regional sets of what are essentially common
patterns of practices that, in turn, can eventually construct normative regions within
the primary institutions of international society (regionalism).

24

Finally, the ultimate purpose of this article was to be a first step in widening the
English Schools research agenda on regions one involving the comprehensive
mapping of the institutions of international society using the flexible toolbox
elaborated above. As such, this article should be seen as just the first step in a far
longer and more complex journey.

25

Annex 1: Regional Conventions used in Map 2

American Convention on Human Rights Pact of San Jos, Costa Rica

Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rigths "Protocol of San Salvador"
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication
of Violence Against Women Convention of Belm do Par
Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women
Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities
Inter-American Convention against Racism, Racial Discrimination and Related Forms of Intolerance
Inter-American Convention against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance
Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of
Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa
Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Protocol to the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
European Social Charter
Protocol n. 2 to the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, conferring upon the
European Court of Human Rights competence to give advisory opinions
Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
European Social Charter (revised)
Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances

26

Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women

and domestic violence
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Annex 2 Universal and Regional Conventions Used in Map 3

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Convention on the Rights of the Child
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
American Convention on Human Rights Pact of San Jos, Costa Rica
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rigths "Protocol of San Salvador"
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence

27

Against Women Convention of Belm do Par

Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women
Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Persons with Disabilities
Inter-American Convention against Racism, Racial Discrimination and Related Forms of Intolerance
Inter-American Convention against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance
Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa
Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Protocol to the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
European Social Charter
Protocol n. 2 to the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
conferring upon the European Court of Human Rights competence to give advisory opinions
Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
European Social Charter (revised)
Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances
Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women
and domestic violence
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

28

Annex 3 Additional Protocols Used in Map 5

Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of
Children, Child prostitution and Child Pornography
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Annex 4 Conventions Used in Map 6

A) Core Human Rights Conventions

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Convention on the Rights of the Child
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

B) Main Additional Protocols

Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

29

aiming at the abolition of the death penalty

30

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