Contents
Abstract
.............................................................................................................................
2
Introduction
......................................................................................................................
3
What
Were
the
Wonder
Weapons?
...................................................................................
4
The
Scope
of
this
Paper
..............................................................................................................
6
Wonder
Weapons
on
the
Battlefield
.................................................................................
6
Measurement
of
the
Effectiveness
of
the
Weapons
....................................................................
6
The
V-weapons;
1
&
2
................................................................................................................
7
The
Jets:
Messerschmitt
Me-262,
Me-163,
and
Arado
Ar-234
....................................................
13
The
Wonder
Weapons-
Effects
and
Opportunity
Cost
......................................................
18
Measurement
of
the
Effects
of
the
Weapons
............................................................................
18
The
V-1
......................................................................................................................................
19
The
V-2
......................................................................................................................................
21
The
V-3:
A
Cost
with
No
Benefit
................................................................................................
23
The
Jets
.....................................................................................................................................
24
Conclusions
.....................................................................................................................
26
The
V-weapons:
........................................................................................................................
26
The
Jets
.....................................................................................................................................
28
Final
conclusion
...............................................................................................................
30
Bibliography
....................................................................................................................
33
Books:
.......................................................................................................................................
33
Internet:
....................................................................................................................................
35
Documentaries:
.........................................................................................................................
38
Abstract
This
paper
endeavours
to
determine
how
far
Germanys
development
of
wonder
weapons
in
World
War
Two
helped
or
hindered
their
war
effort.
To
do
this,
a
precise
definition
of
the
wonder
weapons
is
provided,
by
compiling
a
set
of
characteristics
common
to
the
wonder
weapons
mentioned
in
existing
sources.
By
these
criteria,
five
main
weapons
are
selected
for
closer
analysis.
The
first
section
of
the
paper
assesses
the
wonder
weapons
performance
on
the
battlefield:
how
far
did
they
contribute
to
the
German
pursuit
of
victory?
This
is
determined
through
statistics
for
example
the
number
of
casualties
caused
by
the
v-weapons,
or
the
number
of
combat
kills
made
by
the
jets-
as
well
as
by
the
effects
of
the
weapons
on
morale.
By
both
measures,
the
weapons
are
found
to
have
made
minimal
contributions
to
the
war
effort,
proving
ineffective
on
the
battlefield.
The
second
section
analyses
in
detail
the
wonder
weapons
secondary
effects
on
the
conflict.
This
is
done
by
collating
and
combining
relevant
facts
and
data,
placing
in
perspective
the
weapons
positive
and
negative
effects
on
the
German
war
effort.
Through
this
the
paper
discusses
whether
the
wonder
weapons
proved
more
of
a
hindrance
than
a
help
to
the
war
effort,
and
the
extent
of
this
help
or
hindrance.
One
way
in
which
this
judgement
is
made
is
though
the
comparison
of
the
relative
costs
to
the
Allies
and
Axis
of
undertaking
or
countering
a
programme,
thereby
determining
which
side
lost
the
most
men
and
resources
to
the
wonder
weapons.
This
section
also
examines
the
wonder
weapons
opportunity
cost.
It
aims
to
quantify
it
and
so
state
what
the
wonder
weapons
programmes
may
have
caused
Germany
to
forfeit.
It
aims
to
answer
how
far
the
decision
to
develop
the
wonder
weapons
was
a
wise
one.
The
size
of
the
weapons
opportunity
cost
is
essential
towards
determining
the
extent
of
any
hindrance
they
may
have
had
on
the
German
war
effort.
The
paper
concludes
that
the
wonder
weapons
help
to
the
German
pursuit
of
victory
was
far
exceeded
by
their
hindrance.
This
is
based
on
the
fact
that
they
proved
ineffective
in
combat,
yet
caused
Germany
to
incur
massive
costs
developing
them.
These
costs
were
not
offset
by
Allied
expenditure
against
the
weapons,
and
Germanys
development
of
radical
technology
ultimately
proved
futile.
Introduction
A
neighbour
of
mine,
who
by
now
must
be
well
into
his
90s,
is
an
unassuming
man.
He
is
also
in
excellent
shape
for
his
age.
I
would
never
have
dreamt
that
he
lived
through
the
Second
World
War.
Far
less
that
he
had
served
in
the
Royal
Engineers,
working
for
years
on
top-secret
radar
emplacements.
So
highly
classified
was
his
work
that
to
this
day
he
is
reluctant
to
talk
of
its
details.
One
story
he
did
tell
is
of
how
his
unit
faced
the
task
of
trying
to
counter
one
of
Germany's
wonder
weapons-
the
V-2
rocket.
Tracking
this
Mach-three,
twelve-tonne
monstrosity
of
a
missile
to
me
seemed
an
exercise
in
futility.
Certainly,
he
agreed,
we
never
shot
down
any.
The
best
that
could
be
hoped
for
was
to
predict
a
V-2s
trajectory,
and
somehow
warn
those
in
its
path.
It
must
have
been
a
blow
to
him
when
on
November
25th
1944,
168
people
died
when
a
V-2
annihilated
a
Woolworths
in
New
Cross.1
It
was
the
worst
single
bombing
of
London
of
the
war.
My
war-serving
neighbour
also
told
me
of
some
local
history.
On
a
wall
around
the
corner
from
my
house
stands
a
discreet
plaque.
It
commemorates
an
incident
in
July
1944,
when
a
V-1
flying
bomb
hit
our
street.
Seventy-seven
people
were
killed,
and
the
land
on
which
my
house
now
stands
was
reduced
to
rubble.
The
V-1
and
2
were
just
two
of
several
radical
weapons
deployed
by
Germany
in
the
wars
final
years.
As
rockets
struck
London,
Allied
pilots
over
Europe
found
themselves
confronted
with
jet
aircraft
a
hundred
miles
an
hour
faster
than
their
newest
fighters.
In
1944
alone,
the
Third
Reich
debuted
the
ballistic
missile,
the
jet
fighter
and
jet
bomber,
and
the
only
rocket-powered
aircraft
ever
to
see
combat.
The
wonder
weapons
Wunderwaffen,
as
they
were
known
to
their
inventors
-
struck
fear
into
the
hearts
of
all
those
who
encountered
them,
and
are
remembered
for
this.
But
World
War
Two
saw
countless
tragedies.
In
the
context
of
the
entire
war,
which
saw
casualties
of
over
twenty
thousand
a
day2
did
the
Wunderwaffen
actually
prove
significant?
Evidently,
they
were
not
enough
to
prevent
the
British
Empire,
buoyed
by
Churchill
and
aided
by
its
Allies,
from
crushing
its
Nazi
adversaries.
But
how
far
did
they
hinder,
or
even
help,
this
eventuality?
And
what
if
they
had
not
been
developed?
Could
the
same
resources
have
been
used
to
better
effect,
perhaps
even
prolonging
the
war?
Could
Germany
actually
have
been
better
off
without
the
wonder
weapons?
Through
research,
collation
and
analysis,
I
endeavour
to
answer
these
questions,
and
deliver
a
verdict
on
these
fascinating
weapons.
Wunderwaffen
was
a
term
coined
by
the
Propaganda
Ministry
of
the
Third
Reich.3
It
was
used
to
describe
a
number
of
weapons
intended
to
reverse
the
German
war
efforts
disastrous
course
since
the
failure
of
Operation
Barbarossa
in
1941-3.
It
translates
literally
as
wonder
weapons.
Since
then,
this
term
has
been
used
by
historians
in
reference
to
a
great
many
weapons,
but,
while
it
is
often
used,
it
is
never
explicitly
defined.
Walter
J.
Boyne
for
example,
in
his
book
Clash
of
Wings,
refers
to
several
aircraft
type
as
longbows
in
the
German
wonder
weapon
arsenal4,
while
Adam
Tooze
compares
problems
with
a
new
variant
of
U-boat
to
those
experienced
with
all
of
Germanys
wonder
weapons5.
Similarly,
Danny
S.
Parker
refers
to
a
jet
aircraft
as
the
most
palpable
of
Hitlers
promises
of
Wonder
Weapons.6
No
author
seems
to
have
asked
or
answered
the
obvious
question
-
what
exactly
were
the
wonder
weapons?
As
such,
there
is
no
agreed
list
or
definition
of
them.
Based
on
characteristics
that
are
shared
by
almost
all
of
the
examples
given,
I
shall
attempt
to
avoid
the
vagueness
of
previous
discussion,
and
provide
an
answer
in
this
paper.
The
first
and
most
obvious
criterion
for
a
wonder
weapon
is
the
achievement
of
something
completely
new
and
different.
The
wonder
weapons
were
technological
marvels,
causing
both
the
enemy
and
those
on
their
side
to
look
on
in
wonder.
In
this
spirit,
The
V-1
was
the
world's
first
cruise
missile.
The
V-2
was
the
first
ballistic
missile.
The
Me-163
was
the
first
rocket-
powered
combat
aircraft.
The
Messerschmitt-262
was
the
first
jet
fighter,
while
the
Arado
234
was
the
first
jet
bomber.
The
wonder
weapons
were
neither
improvements
upon
nor
modifications
of
earlier
designs,
or
even
similar
to
any
previous
designs
at
all.
The
fact
that
after
his
first
flight
in
the
Me-262,
test
pilot
Adolf
Galland
reported
feeling
as
though
an
angel
was
pushing7
demonstrates
the
separation
of
these
weapons
from
anything
before.
As
well
as
inspiring
wonder,
the
weapons
were
surrounded
by
an
aura
of
fear
and
terror.
The
wonder
weapons
were
intended
to
exact
revenge
on
the
Allies
for
German
losses,
and
reassure
the
public
with
promises
of
victory.
In
his
book
To
Win
the
Winter
Sky,
Danny
S.
Parker
exemplifies
this:
After
the
catastrophic
bombing
of
Hamburg
in
1943,
Josef
Goebbels
took
to
the
airwaves
telling
of
a
recent
visit
to
a
Reich
factory,
where
he
had
seen
"weapons
that
froze
him
to
the
marrow."8
They
were
intended
to
demoralise
and
terrify
those
who
they
were
used
against.
This
is
clearly
evident
in
the
very
names
of
the
V-1
and
V-2:
The
V
prefix
bequeathed
on
them
by
the
propaganda
ministry
in
June
1944
stood
for
Vergeltungswaffe
vengeance
weapon.
Leaflets9
dropped
on
Allied
soldiers
showed
a
town
on
fire,
with
terrified
civilians
fleeing
collapsing
buildings.
3
Imposed
on
the
gap
where
a
building
once
stood
is
a
white
V1,
seemingly
about
to
crush
the
civilians
below.
The
fact
that
the
launch
ramps
of
the
first
V-1
sites
that
were
found
were
facing
directly
towards
London10
leaves
no
doubt
as
to
their
purpose.
A
third
important
characteristic
is
that
the
Wunderwaffen
were
largely
weapons
deployed
in
desperation.
It
is
clear
now
and
was
clear
then
that,
after
the
failure
to
defeat
the
Soviet
Union,
a
German
victory
was
impossible.
Though
they
would
have
been
shot
for
saying
so,
most
German
officials
realised
that
the
failure
of
Operation
Barbarossa
had
condemned
hope
of
an
outright
German
victory
to
fantasy.
The
best
that
could
be
expected
was
to
extend
the
war,
and
attempt
to
elicit
a
more
favourable
settlement
in
exchange
for
peace.
11
This
was
the
exact
opposite
of
what
Germany
had
prepared
for.
The
Nazi
leadership
were
confident
that
a
short
Blitzkrieg
War
would
make
the
development
of
radical
weapons
unnecessary.
So
confident
were
they,
that
in
spring
1940,
Hermann
Goering
ordered
the
cessation
of
all
weapons
programmes
scheduled
to
take
more
than
a
year12.
This
handicapped
amongst
others
the
German
jet
engine
development
program.
Germany
would
come
to
regret
this
decision.
While
France
and
much
of
Europe
were
conquered
at
astounding
speed,
the
German
war
effort
soon
stumbled
with
the
invasion
of
Russia.
With
its
troops
freezing
and
starving
on
the
Eastern
front,
Germany
suddenly
felt
a
need
for
wonder
weapons.
The
V-1,
which
according
to
historian
Steven
Zaloga13
had
previously
been
rejected
by
the
Luftwaffe
as
technically
dubious
and
uninteresting
from
the
tactical
viewpoint,
was
approved
for
production
only
fourteen
days
after
the
concept
was
resubmitted
in
June
1942.
In
December
of
that
year,
armaments
minister
Albert
Speer
received
approval
from
Hitler
to
mass-produce
the
V-2,
despite
it
having
performed
exceedingly
poorly
in
almost
all
previous
tests14.
On
May
26th
1943,
a
convention
ordered
by
Hitler
to
decide
between
the
V-1
and
V-2
resulted
in
both
programmes
being
funded.15
The
Nazi
regime
had
well
and
truly
sold
itself
on
the
wonder
weapons.
In
summary,
the
wonder
weapons
were:
1. Technologically
new
and
radical
2. Weapons
of
terror
3. Deployed
in
desperation
10
In
light
of
the
above
characteristics,
and
limited
in
scope
by
the
restrictions
in
length
and
timeframe
of
an
extended
project,
this
paper
will
focus
on
the
weapons
that
fit
the
three
defined
criteria
for
wonder
weapons.
Some
weapons,
such
as
the
Type
XXI
U-boat
and
King
Tiger
tank,
have
been
considered
by
historians
to
fit
into
the
nebulous
area
of
wonder
weapons.
Adam
Tooze
cites
the
revolutionary
U-boat
as
an
example
of
a
wonder
weapon,16
while
the
King
Tiger
is
mentioned
along
with
several
other
miracle
weapons
in
Roger
Fords
German
Secret
Weapons
of
World
War
Two.17
However,
these
weapons
do
not
fit
this
papers
more
precise
definition
of
the
term.
The
U-boat
for
example,
did
utilise
new
technology,
but
was
not
ostensibly
a
terror-
causing
weapon
(any
more
so
than
other
submarines).
The
King
Tiger,
while
remarkable
as
a
piece
of
engineering,
was
essentially
an
improvement
on
a
previous
tank
model,
and
as
such
does
not
meet
the
entirely
new
technology
criterion.
This
also
excludes
several
rifles
and
propeller-powered
aircraft,
leaving
a
shorter
and
more
united
list
of
weapons
to
analyse
in
detail.
This
careful
selection
of
wonder
weapons
according
to
a
definition
enables
this
paper
to
have
a
clear
focus.
The
five
main
weapons
that
will
be
discussed
are
listed
below:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Despite
never
having
come
to
fruition,
the
V-3
cannon
still
imposed
significant
opportunity
cost
and
effects
on
the
German
war
effort.
Therefore
it
is
reviewed
briefly
in
this
paper.
17
and
compared
to
other
weapons),
and
their
impact
on
the
enemys
morale.
By
measuring
the
weapons
impact
against
these
objective
criteria,
rather
than
being
subjectively
impressed
by
their
ingenuity
or
appalled
by
their
horror,
we
can
determine
how
far
they
contributed
to
Germanys
war
effort.
Introduction
The
V-1
and
V-2
Vengeance
weapons
are
probably
the
most
infamous
of
the
Wunderwaffen.
The
first
of
these,
the
V-1
flying
bomb,
made
its
combat
debut
on
June
13th
1944,
a
week
after
D-Day.
Alex
Savidge,
then
an
eighteen-year-old
engineer,
remembered
the
seconds
of
terror
at
the
staccato
throb
of
the
unknown
missile's
engine18.
It
would
go
on
to
kill
six
people
in
Londons
Grove
Road.19
Essentially
a
bomb
with
wings
and
an
engine
attached,
the
V-1
was
guided
by
a
gyroscopic
autopilot.
The
primitive
pulsejet
engines
led
to
them
being
dubbed
Buzz
bombs,
or
doodlebugs20
-
the
fuel
mixture
exploding
inside
the
engine
over
forty
times
a
second
meant
it
could
be
heard
long
before
it
was
seen
-
particularly
terrifying
if
an
attack
was
at
night.
A
small
propeller
at
the
front
recorded
the
distance
travelled,
and,
when
it
was
calculated
to
be
over
England,
the
autopilot
plunged
the
bomb
into
a
steep
dive.
This
would
often
overstress
and
cut
out
the
engine
-
a
V-1s
imminent
impact
came
to
be
forewarned
by
the
onset
of
a
sudden
silence.
The
bombs
continued
to
land
on
London
for
over
a
year,
with
the
last
one
hitting
Swanscombe
on
March
29th
194521.
In
the
midst
of
the
panic,
the
government
evacuated
some
360,000
women
and
children
from
London22.
Over
5,500
people
were
killed,
and
23,000
homes
destroyed
in
England23.
Much
of
my
own
street,
Sloane
Court
East,
was
destroyed.
The
V-1
was
a
terrifying
weapon,
but
it
paled
in
comparison
to
the
next
Vergeltungswaffe.
The
A-4
rocket,
known
as
the
V-2,
was
to
provide
the
basis
for
missile
design
for
the
forthcoming
Cold
War,
and
prove
its
revolutionary
technology
in
the
1969
moon
landing.
(The
Saturn
V
rocket
used
in
the
Apollo
missions
was
a
descendant
of
the
V-2)24.
While
the
V-1
could
be
shot
down
by
a
well-placed
(or
lucky)
machine
gun
burst,
the
fifty-foot
V-2
was
impossible
to
detect,
and
impossible
to
intercept.
Once
airborne
and
travelling
at
over
3,500
miles
an
hour25,
the
worlds
first
ballistic
missile
was
unstoppable.
Its
supersonic
speed
meant
that
its
onetonne
18
BBC
TV
-
WW2
Peoples
War.
Submission
V1
Number
One,
June
13,
1944.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/40/a1078940.shtml
(accessed
03/03/15)
19
FlyingbombsandRockets.com:
The
first
V1
to
hit
London:
http://www.flyingbombsandrockets.com/V1_maintxt.html,
(accessed
01/01/15)
20
FlyingbombsandRockets.com:
V-1
Flying
Bomb:
http://www.flyingbombsandrockets.com/V1_into.html
21
http://www.flyingbombsandrockets.com/Timeline.html
(accessed
03/02/15)
22
Zaloga
2005
pp19
23
Boyne
1997
pp351
24
Marshall
Space
Flight
centre
website:
http://history.msfc.nasa.gov/saturn_apollo/first_saturn_rocket.html;
(accessed
03/02/15)
25
V2rocket.com:
A-4/V-2
Makeup
-
Tech
Data
&
Markings
http://www.v2rocket.com/start/makeup/design.html
(accessed
11/02/15)
warhead
was
never
heard
approaching.
A
Chelsea
resident
wrote
how
the
V-2
was
far
more
alarming
than
the
V-1
the
missiles
unforeseeable
nature
meant
that
one
finds
oneself
waiting
for
it,
never
knowing
if
sudden
death
is
only
seconds
away.26
The
first
struck
London
on
September
8th
1944.
In
total,
1,054
hit
England,
with
another
1,675
landing
in
continental
Europe.27
Effectiveness
The
V-1
The
V-1
caused
terror
when
it
struck,
but
its
combat
debut
came
over
six
months
late.
Plagued
by
continuing
technical
problems,
only
four
of
the
first
ten
launched
actually
hit
England.28
Later
attempts
were
more
successful,
with
one
attack
on
June
15th
hitting
London
with
seventeen
missiles.
Despite
this,
the
programme
never
approached
the
scale
intended.
The
German
leadership
had
dreamed
of
hordes
of
V-1s
raining
from
the
sky,
reaping
the
vengeance
of
their
name
on
the
Allied
homelands.
In
one
instance,
Luftwaffe
commander
Hermann
Goering
demanded
that
fifty
thousand
V-1s
be
made
each
month.
In
reality,
the
rate
of
launch
never
really
exceeded
a
trickle.
In
the
course
of
almost
300
days29,
a
total
of
8,617
V-1s
were
launched
at
England30:
a
rate
of
just
under
thirty
per
day.
A
later
phase
in
the
programme
saw
another
11,988
V-1s
launched
at
Belgium,
at
an
overall
fire
rate
of
110
per
day.31
Despite
the
deaths
of
thousands
of
Belgian
civilians,
this
too
proved
unsuccessful.
The
key
target
of
Antwerps
port
survived
largely
unscathed.
In
order
to
launch
the
missiles,
the
Germans
had
decided
that
four
large
and
96
small
launch
sites
should
be
built
by
May
1944.
Within
two
months,
the
Allies
had
identified
all
of
the
sites,
and
soon
after
reduced
them
to
rubble.
In
response,
the
Germans
started
construction
of
better-concealed,
smaller
sites,
which
would
eventually
launch
most
of
the
missiles.
This
came
too
late.
Just
a
week
before
the
first
launch,
D-day
had
forced
the
abandonment
of
over
forty
newly
constructed,
unused
sites.32
As
the
Allies
continued
their
advance,
more
fell
into
their
hands.
Even
when
under
German
control
the
sites
were
unreliable.
Of
the
72
built,
only
around
half
were
operational
at
any
one
time.
While
the
large
sites
were
each
intended
to
fire
480
missiles
a
day
at
England,
the
most
ever
launched
in
a
day
was
316.33
Even
this
was
far
in
excess
of
the
daily
average.
Germany
could
not
overcome
their
technical
problems
quickly
enough,
or
compete
against
the
sheer
volume
of
Allied
power.
The
tonnage
of
Allied
bombs
dropped
on
the
launch
sites
alone
26
was
greater
than
the
total
tonnage
of
V-1s
launched
at
England
-
by
a
factor
of
four34.
It
was
not
only
the
launch
sites
themselves
being
hit
-
strikes
on
German
manufacturing
had
an
even
more
disastrous
effect35,
ensuring
that
the
V-1
programme
was
cut
down
from
its
early
stages.
Even
the
flying
bombs
that
were
successfully
launched
did
not
always
contribute
effectively
to
the
Wehrmacht.
Of
those
launched
at
England,
only
twenty-five
percent
hit
their
targets.
The
rest
were
either
lost
due
to
navigational
errors,
fighter
interceptors,
barrage
balloons,
or
anti-
aircraft
guns.
Technical
problems
led
to
the
V-1
having
to
cruise
at
4,500
feet,
half
what
was
originally
intended.
This
allowed
flak
gunners
to
shoot
them
down
even
more
effectively.
In
August
1944,
the
V-1
shoot-down
rate
reached
over
eighty
percent.
A
disastrous
German
attempt
to
launch
V-1s
from
bombers
was
abandoned
with
a
success
rate
of
only
four
percent.36
Interestingly,
the
V-1s
overall
accuracy
of
twenty-five
percent
was
actually
greater
than
the
average
Allied
precision
bombing
accuracy.
According
to
the
September
1945
United
States
Strategic
Bombing
Survey,
this
averaged
only
twenty
percent
for
the
entire
war37,
suggesting
that
the
V-1
had
the
capacity
to
greatly
help
the
German
war
effort.
Nonetheless,
the
scale,
or
rather
lack
of
scale,
of
the
V-1
programme
cannot
be
ignored.
Defensive
measures
and
low
launch
rates
meant
that
statistically,
the
threat
to
Londoners
from
the
V-1
became
almost
non-existent.
In
terms
of
both
casualties
and
morale,
they
were
achieving
nearly
nothing
for
the
German
war
effort.
The
V-2
Whilst
the
V-2
may
have
been
immune
once
in
the
air,
(aside
from
one
remarkable
incident
where
the
crew
of
an
American
bomber
were
alleged
have
shot
one
down
with
a
gun
as
it
was
lifting
off38),
its
ground
sites
were
just
as
vulnerable
as
the
V-1s.
The
Allies
quickly
exploited
this
weakness.
V-2
development
had
been
taking
place
under
the
eye
of
rocket
scientist
Wernher
Von
Braun,
at
a
supposedly
secret
base
at
Peenemunde,
a
small
town
on
the
Baltic
Sea.
Allied
intelligence
though,
had
long
held
suspicions
that
Peenemunde
was
home
to
something
more
sinister
than
fishing
boats.39
Consequently,
on
the
night
of
August
17th
1943,
an
armada
of
over
34
36,200
tonnes
of
bombs
were
expended
solely
on
V-1
launch
sites.
(Boog/Krebs/Vogel
pp449;
Zaloga
2007
pp37).
The
tonnage
of
the
explosives
delivered
by
the
8.617
V-1s
launched
at
England
amounts
to7324.45
tonnes.
(0.85
x
8,617).
If
we
compare
the
total
tonnage
expenditure
of
Operation
Crossbow
(122,133
tonnes)
(Zaloga
2005
pp15),
to
the
total
tonnage
of
V-1s
and
V-2s
launched,
(23742
tonnes)
(24,200
x
0.85)
+(3,172
x
1)
(both
figures
from
Zaloga
2007
pp7),
then
the
Allied
bombs
expended
on
the
V-weapons
amounted
to
a
tonnage
over
five
times
greater
than
that
of
all
the
V-weapons
that
were
launched.
35
Boog/Krebs/Vogel
2005
pp449
36
Zaloga
2005
pp23
37
THE
UNITED
STATES
STRATEGIC
BOMBING
SURVEY
Summary
Report:
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm
(accessed
01/02/15)
38
Stocker,
Jeremy
Missile
Defence
Then
and
Now:
http://web.archive.org/web/20090326041549/http://www.cdiss.co.uk/Documents/Uploaded/Missile%20Defe
nce%20-%20Then%20and%20Now.pdf
(accessed
04/11/14)
39
An
English
investigation,
Bodyline,
headed
by
MP
Duncan
Sandys,
had
been
established
in
April
1943
to
analyse
the
threat
from
new
German
rockets
and
weapons.
In
light
of
photographic
evidence
(Levine
1992
pp447-8)
of
Peenemunde,
along
with
intelligence
from
sources
such
as
the
1939
Oslo
report,
and
more
recent
six
hundred
British
aircraft
was
dispatched
to
bomb
Peenemunde.
1,875
tons
of
explosives
were
dropped40,
and
V-2
development
was
set
back
by
two
months.41
This
was
not
the
V-2s
greatest
problem.
The
program
proved
more
adept
at
delaying
itself
than
the
Allies
were
at
delaying
it.
The
1919
treaty
of
Versailles
had
forbidden
Germany
from
developing
artillery,
but
did
not
mention
the
then
unheard-of
field
of
rocketry.
As
a
result,
much
German
interwar
scientific
research
had
focused
on
this
new
technology42,
and
when
the
Nazis
came
to
power
funding
was
officially
granted
to
rocket
development.
Yet,
despite
having
been
in
some
form
of
development
since
the
early
1930s,
innumerable
problems
meant
that
the
V-2
was
not
ready
for
combat
until
September
1944,
over
a
year
behind
schedule.43
While
the
V-2s
early
roots
arguably
made
it
less
of
a
weapon
of
desperation
than
some
of
the
other
wonder
weapons,
it
was
still
only
after
the
complete
failure
of
the
offensive
in
Russia
that
the
programme
took
on
a
new
scale.
Steven
Zaloga
writes
that
with
Hitler
demoralised
by
the
disaster
in
Russia,
he
began
to
see
the
rockets-
at
first
a
comparatively
minor
project-
as
a
panacea
for
their
strategic
failures,
dreaming
that
they
could
decisively
influence
the
conduct
of
the
war.
In
line
with
this,
he
gave
official
approval
to
the
project
in
December
1942.
As
the
war
s
outlook
grew
worse
for
Germany,
V-2
development,
which
had
previously
been
ordered
halted,
intensified.
Progressively
higher
priorities
were
granted
to
the
program44,
and
expenses
mounted
commensurately.
This
culminated
in
the
September
1943
founding
of
the
Mittelwerk,
or
metalwork
company,
which
was
to
fulfil
an
order
for
twelve
thousand
V-2
rockets.45
With
the
raid
on
Peenemunde
having
convinced
the
Germans
that
sites
above
ground
were
insecure,
work
began
on
a
huge
subterranean
factory.
Sixty
thousand
slave
labourers
were
forced
to
work
on
the
plants
construction,
a
third
of
who
died
from
mistreatment
and
exhaustion.
The
Nazis
decision
to
use
slave
labour
to
construct
the
V-2
may
have
reduced
costs,
but
it
severely
impacted
the
quality
of
the
weapons
that
were
produced.
Combined
with
the
fact
that
poor
production
techniques
meant
that
parts
were
non-interchangeable
between
rockets,
this
meant
that
it
took
until
spring
1944
for
the
plant
to
reach
even
half
its
intended
production
of
nine
hundred
rockets
per
month.46
In
total,
6,422
were
completed
by
the
wars
end.47
Fuelling
the
rockets
would
prove
to
be
an
even
greater
challenge
than
building
them.
Unlike
the
V-1,
which
used
conventional
fuel,
the
V-2
required
expensive
and
unstable
liquid
oxygen.
To
provide
this,
construction
had
begun
on
three
new
liquid
oxygen
plants
in
December
1942.
Against
the
advice
of
his
generals,
Hitler
insisted
upon
coupling
these
with
large
V-2
launching
sites,
and
Allied
bombing
raids
throughout
1943
and
1944
led
to
their
rapid
destruction.48
accounts
of
rocket
development
from
Polish
and
Danish
labourers
and
scientists,
(Zaloga
2007
pp7),
Churchill
approved
the
bombing
of
Peenemunde
on
June
29
1943.
40
Levine
1992
pp64;
Zaloga
2007
pp7
41
Levine
1992
pp64
42
Ford
2013
pp99
43
Zaloga
2007
pp13
44
Ford
2013
pp102
45
V2rocket.com:
The
Mittelwerk/Mittelbau/Camp
Dora:
http://www.v2rocket.com/start/chapters/mittel.html
(accessed
15/02/15)
46
Zaloga
2007
pp9
47
Zaloga
2007
pp9
48
Zaloga
2007
pp10
10
Steven
Zaloga
estimates
that
even
if
the
entire
European
supply
of
liquid
oxygen
had
been
devoted
to
the
V-2
in
summer
1944,
there
would
only
ever
have
been
enough
fuel
for
thirty
launches
per
day.
In
reality,
Allied
bombing
and
evaporation
of
the
fuel
meant
that
even
thirty
was
unachievable.
Zaloga
describes
the
programs
contribution
to
the
war
effort
as
being
hamstrung
by
this
critical
shortage.49
Even
if
V-2
production
had
somehow
reached
the
desired
rate,
there
would
have
been
no
way
of
launching
them.
Launches
of
V-2s
against
England
finally
began
in
late
1944.
The
first
strike
on
London
was
on
September
8th,
killing
three
civilians.
On
November
25th,
a
direct
hit
to
a
Woolworths
caused
168
deaths.50
One
of
the
worst
attacks
happened
a
month
later,
when
561
people
were
killed
in
an
Antwerp
cinema.
In
total,
3,172
V-2s
were
launched,
slightly
under
half
of
the
total
built.
These
were
aimed
mainly
at
London
and
Antwerp.51
The
V-2
launch
sites
averaged
a
firing
rate
of
sixteen
per
day
(just
over
half
of
Zalogas
maximum
estimate),
achieving
a
success
rate
of
38%.
Ultimately,
the
rockets
caused
2,754
casualties
in
England52,
along
with
several
thousand
in
Belgium.
After
Germany's
surrender,
Wernher
Von
Braun,
the
V-2s
designer,
had
his
weapons
crimes
ignored,
and
was
spirited
away
by
the
USA
to
work
for
NASA.53
Like
its
inventor,
the
V-2
went
into
a
peaceful
post-war
career,
ultimately
proving
vitally
important
in
the
development
of
the
Saturn
V
rocket.
In
1969,
it
was
to
land
Neil
Armstrong
on
the
moon.
Ironically,
the
V-2
achieved
far
more
for
the
American
space
programme
than
it
ever
did
for
Germanys
war
effort.
11
Dresden
alone.
It
would
be
unrealistic
to
conceive
that
the
deaths
of
a
few
thousand
civilians
in
London
could
have
had
an
effect
on
the
outcome
of
the
war.
The
German
leadership,
Hitler
in
particular55,
had
hoped
that
their
campaign
of
terror
would
undermine
the
Allies
morale,
forcing
them
into
suing
for
peace.
This
turned
out
to
be
a
false
hope.
Whilst
it
is
nearly
impossible
to
know
for
certain
the
general
publics
subjective
feelings
about
the
V-weapon
attacks,
there
is
little
evidence
to
suggest
that
there
was
ever-serious
public
demand
for
giving
into
German
demands
as
a
result.
Inevitably
there
was
anguish
from
those
most
closely
affected
Norman
Longmate
writes
of
women
praying
in
the
streets
for
them
to
stop
the
war,
and
that
public
confidence
reached
a
new
low
point
after
the
V-2
attacks.
56
But
a
large-scale
movement
never
developed,
and
Steven
Zalogas
conclusion
that
the
V-weapons
had
no
profound
impact
on
morale57
seems
more
supported
by
the
wars
outcome.
Certainly,
further
research
into
the
opinions
of
the
time,
of
both
troops
and
civilians,
as
well
as
into
the
governments
handling
of
the
attacks
would
be
highly
useful
towards
more
fully
understanding
the
V-weapons
impact
on
morale.
From
existing
evidence,
there
seems
little
reason
for
the
Germans
to
have
expected
the
V-
weapons
to
have
a
war-changing
impact
on
morale.
Nazi
propaganda
minister
Josef
Goebbels
himself
announced
in
a
speech
to
the
German
public
that
enemy
air
terror
is
the
university
of
community
spirit.58
James
P.
Duffy
claims
that
Hitler
himself
also
should
have
known
this
from
experience
in
his
own
country;
he
writes
that
The
Allied
bombing
of
Germanys
cities
did
not
break
the
morale
of
the
German
civilian
population;
instead
it
served
to
strengthen
their
resolve
to
fight
back.59
It
would
be
logical
to
apply
this
theory
on
the
effects
of
bombing
to
any
population
-
Londons
included.
Whilst
both
the
books
and
the
speechs
claims
are
unsubstantiated
by
their
authors,
the
outcome
of
the
war
suggests
that
they
hold
true.
The
V-
weapons
were
of
little
if
any
help
to
the
German
hopes
of
crushing
Allied
morale.
Even
compared
with
Germanys
other
offensive
efforts
the
V-weapons
failed
to
make
a
significant
impact.
The
V-weapons
caused
just
over
8,700
deaths
in
London
over
a
period
of
one
year,
two
months
and
nineteen
days.60
The
Blitz,
which
lasted
only
eight
months,
one
week
and
two
days,
saw
casualties
of
over
forty
thousand.
For
all
their
technology,
the
V-1
and
V-2
caused
but
a
drop
in
the
red
ocean
of
war
casualties.
They
were
not
enough
to
make
the
Allies
want
to
bargain
for
peace,
which
had
been
the
only
hope
for
their
German
adversaries.
Given
that
the
war
saw
the
deaths
of
320,000
British
soldiers,
it
would
be
unthinkable
that
Churchill's
mind
could
be
swayed
by
such
figures.
On
the
battlefield,
the
V-weapons
may
have
given
the
German
leaders
a
feeling
of
vengeance,
but
not
victory.
55
12
The
Jets:
Messerschmitt
Me-262,
Me-163,
and
Arado
Ar-234
Introduction
Messerschmitt
262
Transporting
a
human
at
one
hundred
miles
an
hour
is
an
exceptional
feat.
In
World
War
One,
this
was
faster
than
almost
anything
in
the
sky.
Only
a
few
years
later,
this
was
not
the
top
speed
of
the
Messerschmitt
262,
but
the
speed
advantage
it
had
over
its
closest
Allied
competitor,
the
P-51
Mustang.
Any
modern
jetliner
still
owes
something
to
the
technology
of
this
remarkable
aircraft.
Described
by
Walter
J.
Boyne61
as
easily
the
best
fighter
of
the
war62,
it
reached
speeds
of
up
to
540
mph
in
combat,
with
one
pilot
even
claiming
to
have
broken
the
sound
barrier
in
a
dive.63
The
Me-262
impressed
from
its
first
flight,
with
chief
test
pilot
Adolf
Galland
recounting
that
flying
the
jet
was
as
though
an
angel
was
pushing.64
What
was
actually
pushing
him
was
a
pair
of
Junkers
Jumo
004
jet
engines,
state
of
the
art
in
1942.
They
were
what
gave
the
aircraft
its
speed
and
rate
of
climb,
essential
for
shooting
down
the
Allied
bombers
that
were
paralysing
Germanys
infrastructure.
This,
unlike
the
uncontrollable
V-1
and
V-2,
was
a
weapon
that
could
be
highly
effective
on
the
battlefield65.
Hitler
attempted
to
interfere
with
the
project
by
insisting
that
the
aircraft
be
used
as
a
bomber
-
another
revenge
weapon
against
England
-
but
was
persuaded
otherwise
before
it
entered
service.
66
Given
that
Germanys
air
force
was
vastly
outnumbered
by
1944,
the
Messerschmitt
had
to
work
on
a
principle
of
quality
over
quantity,
destroying
multiple
Allied
aircraft
for
each
loss.
Adolf
Galland
realised
that
'If
at
all,
the
German
Luftwaffe
can
triumph
over
its
British
American
opponent
in
the
air
only
by
means
of
superiority
in
the
excellence
of
its
armament'.67
The
Messerschmitt
was
certainly
superior
to
its
Allied
counterparts,
but
to
have
a
significant
impact
on
the
war,
it
would
still
have
to
be
produced
in
significant
numbers.
The
Me-262
was
not
the
only,
nor
even
the
most
radical
aircraft
that
Germany
was
developing.
Perhaps
the
most
outlandish
of
these
to
see
combat
was
the
Me-163
Komet.
Unique
amongst
61
Walter
J.
Boyne
is
a
respected
military
historian.
After
serving
in
the
Air
Force
himself,
he
later
became
director
of
the
National
Air
and
Space
Museum,
and
has
published
over
50
books.
Clash
of
Wings,
cited
in
this
dissertation,
was
published
in
1997
and
was
very
well
received,
being
called
the
definitive,
comprehensive
history
of
air
power
in
World
War
II.
62
Boyne
1997
pp348
63
aerospaceweb.org,
Me-262
and
the
Sound
Barrier:
http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/history/q0198c.shtml
(accessed
03/01/15)
64
Ford
2013
pp17
65
Parker
1994
pp87
66
Duffy
2005
pp127
67
Boog/Krebs/Vogel
2005
pp338
13
any
fighter
before
or
since,
the
Komet
was
powered
by
a
rocket
engine.
This
enabled
it
to
reach
speeds
of
nearly
six
hundred
miles
an
hour,
and
climb
at
an
unparalleled
16,000
feet
per
minute.68
The
Komets
would
take
off
from
a
German
airbase,
then
climb
rapidly
to
intercept
and
destroy
Allied
bombers
with
its
two
30mm
Cannons.
There
was
little
that
the
Allied
pilots
could
do
in
response
to
an
aircraft
over
three
hundred
miles
an
hour
faster
than
their
bombers.
Only
slightly
more
conventional
was
the
Arado
Ar-234,
the
Worlds
first
jet
bomber.
Powered
by
two
underwing
Junkers
jet
engines,
it
could
reach
speeds
of
over
450
miles
per
hour
as
a
bomber,
and
was
even
faster
as
a
reconnaissance
platform.
69
In
comparison,
the
American
B-17
bomber
had
a
maximum
speed
of
287
miles
per
hour,
and
cruised
at
only
15070.
Allied
aircraft
had
almost
no
chance
of
intercepting
the
Arado.71
It
presented
a
unique
opportunity
for
the
war
effort.
The
aircraft
had
the
ability
to
spy
virtually
unimpeded
on
Allied
territory,
feeding
back
vital
intelligence
on
what
the
Germans
were
facing.
As
a
bomber,
it
could
reach
targets
with
minimal
resistance
and
risk
to
the
aircraft.
On
a
one-to-one
basis,
the
most
advanced
German
aircraft
were
technologically
superior
to
the
most
advanced
Allied
ones.
But
against
the
Axis
was
the
far
greater
scale
of
the
Allied
war
machine
and
resource
base.
To
overcome
this
challenge,
the
Germans
would
have
not
only
to
develop
superior
technology,
but
also
apply
it
effectively
on
a
scale
commensurate
with
the
wars.
National
Museum
of
the
U.S
Air
Force
website:
Messerschmitt
Me
163B
Komet:
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=508
(accessed
09/03/15)
69
Ford
2013
pp21
70
Boeing
Website:
B-17
Flying
Fortress:
http://www.boeing.com/boeing/history/boeing/b17.page
(accessed
11/11/14)
71
Hogg
1998
pp60
72
Hogg
1998
pp58
73
Hogg
1998
pp58
74
Ford
2013
pp17-18
14
projects
taking
longer
than
a
year
was
a
dead
number.75
Previously
uninterested,
the
Luftwaffe
suddenly
demanded
a
thousand
Junkers
powered
Messerschmitt
Me-262s
to
be
built
a
month,
starting
from
Autumn
1943.
76
In
August
1944,
the
Me-262
finally
entered
service,
and
JG
7,
the
worlds
first
dedicated
jet
squadron,
began
operations.
The
aircraft
however,
would
prove
to
be
a
constant
source
of
trouble.
In
their
operational
form,
the
jet
engines
had
an
impractically
short
lifespan,
rarely
exceeding
twenty-five
hours.
Even
in
autumn
1944,
the
average
endurance
was
a
pitiful
eight
hours.77
Replacing
them
took
another
eight
hours,
ensuring
that
the
aircraft
spent
much
of
its
time
on
the
ground.78
The
only
reason
that
Hitlers
meddling
did
not
actually
have
any
effect
is
because
the
engines
were
so
unreliable
that
the
programme
was
delayed
anyway.
Historians
Boog,
Krebs
and
Vogel
conclude
that
the
late
entry
into
service
was
due
quite
generally
to
the
technical
difficulties
inherent
in
all
new
developments
of
this
kind.79
Walter
J.
Boyne
agrees
that
the
262
was
delayed
because
of
the
difficulty
in
producing
a
satisfactory
number
of
the
radical
new
jet
engines.80
In
1944,
Germany
produced
a
total
of
44,000
aircraft.81
Total
Me-262
production
equates
to
only
three
percent
of
this
figure.
By
the
end
of
the
year,
German
officials
had
increased
their
demands
to
2,500
Me-262s
a
month,
but
in
reality
production
barely
reached
one
hundred
per
month.82
A
huge
underground
bunker
to
produce
more
was
under
construction
at
the
wars
end,
but
never
actually
contributed
anything.
Even
of
the
1,433
aircraft
that
were
ultimately
produced,
only
three
hundred
ever
saw
combat.83
There
the
Germans
were
confronted
by
another
problem:
finding
pilots
who
could
fly
them.
Of
the
few
German
aces
still
alive,
fewer
still
had
experience
on
jets,
and
any
new
pilot
would
find
himself
hopelessly
out
of
his
depth.
Ultimately,
the
Me-262
claimed
upwards
of
500
kills
(The
high
estimate
is
735)
for
around
one
hundred
losses.84
Although
this
kill
ratio
was
undoubtedly
impressive,
its
overall
scale
was
minute.
In
1944,
England,
Russia
and
the
USA
produced
a
combined
total
of
163,000
aircraft,
and
this
sheer
force
was
to
make
the
overwhelming
of
the
Me-262s
inevitable.
What
Max
Hastings
referred
to
as
a
calmative85
lack
of
German
pilots
also
meant
that
some
of
the
Allies
most
adroit
airmen
could
sometimes
even
outfly
the
German
jets.
In
an
amazing
display
of
flying
skill,
a
Tuskegee
airman
describes
shooting
down
an
aircraft
far
superior
to
his
own
P-51,
saving
the
bomber
he
was
escorting:
I
went
down
under
the
bombers,
made
a
hard
75
15
right
turn,
and
I
caught
one
of
the
jets,
just
as
he
was
coming
to
shoot
down
the
B-17.
86
Allied
pilots
would
also
often
target
the
jets
on
their
landing
runs,
when
they
were
slowest
and
most
susceptible
to
attack.87
Even
if
more
Me-262s
had
been
produced,
the
lack
of
skilled
pilots
would
likely
have
made
them
far
easier
prey
than
intended.
The
Me-163
Komet
was
the
brainchild
of
German
scientist
Dr
Alexander
Lippisch.
It
had
flown
as
a
glider
in
1941,
but
technical
problems
delayed
the
first
powered
flight
until
August
1943,
and
operations
did
not
begin
until
July
1944.
Just
over
three
hundred
were
built,
276
of
which
were
delivered.88
In
2014,
I
was
lucky
enough
to
meet
Captain
Eric
Winkle
Brown,
a
British
test
pilot
who
flew
a
captured
Me-163
after
the
war.
When
I
asked
him
what
Germanys
most
advanced
creation
was
like
to
fly,
he
simply
laughed
and
replied
scary.
This
was
for
good
reason.
The
aircraft
had
several
fatal
flaws.
Its
fuel,
a
mixture
of
two
substances
known
as
T-stoff
and
C-stoff,
was
so
volatile
that
it
could
dissolve
a
pilot
in
an
accident.89
The
rocket
engine,
while
powerful,
could
only
operate
for
seven
and
a
half
minutes
(450
seconds)
before
running
out
of
fuel.90
The
pilot
then
had
to
glide
back
to
an
airbase
to
land,
open
to
attack.
Unsurprisingly,
this
resulted
in
an
appalling
accident
rate
and
very
little
success
in
combat.91
The
entire
Me-163
fleet
made
only
nine
kills.92
Danny
S.
Parker
describes
a
mission
where
all
three
dispatched
aircraft
were
lost:
one
in
a
take-off
accident,
and
the
other
two
being
shot
down
after
exhausting
their
fuel.93
Given
the
Me-163s
overall
track
record,
it
is
unlikely
that
this
mission
was
unique
in
its
failure.
The
Me-163
made
almost
no
contribution
to
the
German
war
effort.
The
Arado
234
began
life
in
response
to
a
1940
request
for
a
reconnaissance
aircraft.
Able
to
outfly
any
intercepting
aircraft,
the
jet-powered
Blitz
would
gather
vital
intelligence
with
minimal
risk.
But
development
was
not
easy.
The
government
was
reluctant
to
pursue
jets
early
in
the
war,
and
by
the
time
the
first
airframe
was
completed
in
1942
all
available
engines
were
allocated
to
the
Me-262
fighter
instead.94
The
air
ministry
then
gave
orders
that
the
Arado
be
converted
from
its
reconnaissance
role
into
an
offensive
bomber.
It
was
not
until
July
1943
that
the
reconnaissance
aircraft
(designated
B1)
first
flew,
and
the
bomber
(B2)
was
not
ready
until
March
1944.
In
total,
274
aircraft
left
the
production
line.95
86
Nazi
Jets
(Me262)
shot
down
by
Red
Tails
(Tuskegee
Airmen):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8AcGJNkkuc
(accessed
12/12/14)
87
Winchester
2010
pp14-15
88
National
Museum
of
the
U.S
Air
Force
website:
Messerschmitt
Me
163B
Komet:
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=508
(accessed
09/03/15)
89
Boyne
1997
pp350
90
National
Museum
of
the
U.S
Air
Force
website:
Messerschmitt
Me
163B
Komet:
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=508
(accessed
09/03/15)
91
Ford
2013
pp51
92
Boyne
1997
pp350
93
Parker
1994
pp94
94
Smithsonian
National
Air
and
Space
Museum
Website:
Arado
Ar
234
B-2
Blitz
(Lightning):
http://airandspace.si.edu/collections/artifact.cfm?object=nasm_A19600312000
(accessed
08/03/15)
95
Aviation-history.com:
Arado
Ar
234
Blitz:
http://www.aviation-history.com/arado/234.html
(accessed
10/03/15)
16
On
August
2nd
1944,
the
jet
flew
its
first
reconnaissance
mission.
The
aircraft
performed
beautifully.
Pilot
Eric
Sommer
encountered
no
resistance,
and
was
able
to
successfully
photograph
an
Allied
artificial
Harbour
at
Arromanches,
in
North-western
France.96
Most
following
missions
went
similarly
smoothly
and
uninterrupted.
Walter
J.
Boyne
writes
that
the
aircraft
was
a
German
engineering
triumph97,
flying
several
successful
reconnaissance
flights.
Yet
in
total,
only
one
hundred
Arados
ever
entered
service,
fewer
than
half
the
number
built.98
Although
they
did
perform
well,
the
scale
of
their
operations
was
tiny,
and
their
entry
into
service
came
too
late
for
the
intelligence
they
provided
to
greatly
affect
the
war.
The
bomber
variant
saw
even
less
success.
Only
one
Ar-234
bomber
squadron
(KG
76)
ever
saw
action,
and
only
began
operations
from
December
1944.
Never
intended
as
a
bomber,
the
234
could
carry
only
two
tonne
payload.99
In
comparison,
the
British
Lancaster
could
carry
over
six
tonnes.
The
aircraft
achieved
only
minor
success
in
its
1945
missions
to
stall
Allied
advances
across
the
Rhine.
So
desperate
was
the
German
situation
that
the
Arados
took
part
in
what
Roger
Ford
describes
as
suicidal
attacks
on
bridges,
alongside
Me-262s.100
Most
aircraft
that
did
not
succumb
to
enemy
fire
were
later
destroyed
by
their
own
crew
to
prevent
them
from
falling
into
Allied
hands.
Despite
their
technical
brilliance,
the
jets
came
too
late
and
in
too
small
a
number
to
significantly
contribute
to
the
German
war
effort.
They
terrified
those
who
encountered
them,
but
these
encounters
represented
only
a
fraction
of
the
air
war.
The
jets
accounted
for
a
total
of
less
than
five
percent
of
Germanys
1944
aircraft
production,
and
achieved
fewer
than
eight
hundred
combat
kills.
101
Had
the
jets
been
introduced
earlier,
it
is
certain
that
the
job
of
an
Allied
bomber
pilot
over
Europe
would
have
been
made
harder,102
but
we
can
only
speculate
by
how
much.
There
is
certainly
support
for
the
idea
that
the
jets,
particularly
the
Me-262,
could
have
had
a
significant
impact.
Walter
J.
Boyne
claims
that
the
air
war
over
Europe
would
have
been
vastly
different103,
whilst
Ian
V.
Hogg
writes
that
the
new
aircraft
were
virtually
unstoppable104
in
combat.
But
the
jets
never
came
close
to
making
the
Allies
change
their
minds,
and
any
opinion
on
how
they
could
have
affected
the
combat
is
almost
purely
speculative.
96
17
In
reality,
German
jet
production
was
on
too
small
a
scale
to
affect
such
a
large
force
of
Allied
conventional
aircraft.
The
earlier
naivety
of
the
German
leaders,
followed
by
a
sudden
eagerness
to
rush
as
many
programmes
as
possible
into
development105
meant
that
a
previously
world-leading
research
programme
was
abandoned
in
hubris,
then
picked
up
again
in
desperation.
By
then
it
was
too
late
to
overcome
the
vast
technical
challenges
of
developing
the
jet
engine
technology106,
and
production
never
approached
the
levels
demanded
by
the
Luftwaffes
leaders.107
The
Jets
contribution
to
the
German
war
effort
ultimately
proved
minimal.
They
were
rendered
an
impressive,
but
hopelessly
outnumbered
force
in
the
air.
We
shall
never
surrender,
declared
Churchill
in
1940.
These
weapons
would
give
him
no
reason
to
act
otherwise.
Introduction
As
discussed
earlier,
the
wonder
weapons
considered
here
ultimately
failed
to
prove
effective
in
combat.
Though
marvellous
as
scientific
and
technological
achievements,
they
came
too
late
and
too
few
to
save
the
German
war
effort.
An
unconditional
surrender
was
signed
on
May
7th
1945.
However,
to
say
they
were
ineffective
as
weapons
is
certainly
not
to
say
that
they
had
no
effect
on
the
conflict.
This
section
explores
the
possibility
that
the
wonder
weapons
were
to
seriously
impact
the
German
war
effort.
18
question
of
how
effective
the
V-1
was,
but
does
not
fully
cover
its
effects
on
the
war
effort,
or
this
papers
aim
of
finding
their
effect
on
the
German
pursuit
of
victory.
This
second
area
also
includes
analysis
of
the
weapons
opportunity
cost:
how
much
money
was
sunk
into
the
programmes?
And
could
it
have
been
spent
more
effectively
elsewhere?
If
so,
exactly
how
great
was
the
toll
on
the
German
war
effort?
By
answering
these
questions,
it
can
be
determined
whether
or
not
the
decision
to
develop
the
wonder
weapons
was
a
wise
one:
did
they
help
or
hinder
a
German
victory?
Opportunity
cost
is
a
crucial
concept
to
understand.
It
is
natural
to
think
that
spending
money
on
any
weapons
programmes
will
help
a
country
to
wage
war
more
effectively,
but
this
is
overly
simplistic.
If
money
is
sunk
into
unwise
and
ineffective
programmes,
which
do
not
cost
the
enemy
at
least
as
much
as
is
spent
developing
them,
then
a
weapon
has
imposed
a
negative
cost
on
its
developer.
Even
if
it
does
prove
somewhat
useful,
the
benefits
of
spending
the
money
more
wisely
are
forgone.
In
economics,
opportunity
cost
is
defined
as
the
benefit
that
could
have
been
gained
from
an
alternative
use
of
the
same
resource.
If
the
government
uses
money
to
build
a
road,
then
the
opportunity
cost
of
this
may
be
a
school
that
could
have
been
built
for
the
same
price.
In
a
war,
much
the
same
principles
apply.
If
for
example,
resources
are
spent
on
building
ships
for
a
war
that
is
fought
almost
exclusively
in
the
air,
then
the
opportunity
cost
of
those
ships
is
the
production
of
more
aircraft
instead,
which
would
have
been
more
effective.
Even
if
the
ships
do
play
some
role
in
the
combat,
the
resources
still
would
have
been
better
used
elsewhere,
and
their
overall
effect
is
a
negative
one.
In
an
economy,
opportunity
cost
leads
to
inefficiency
and
reduced
incomes.
In
the
case
of
World
War
II
though,
it
was
not
so
much
an
end
of
month
balance
sheet
that
was
at
stake,
but
the
future
of
the
free
world.
There
was
little
room
for
not
always
choosing
the
best
option.
Existing
secondary
works
contain
relevant
facts
and
a
wealth
of
primary
data
on
the
wonder
weapons.
Synthesis
and
analysis
of
these
allows
exploration
of
how
wise
of
an
option
the
wonder
weapons
were.
The
V-1
The
V-1
was
undoubtedly
a
flawed
weapon.
The
Germans
wasted
precious
time
and
money
on
building
ski
launch
sites
that
were
never
used.
Many
of
the
new
sites
were
bombed
or
overrun
before
they
ever
saw
action.
In
combat,
the
V-1s
relatively
low
speed
and
reduced
cruising
altitude
made
it
vulnerable
to
interception,
and
the
damage
caused
when
it
did
strike
paled
in
comparison
to
the
Blitz
of
four
years
earlier.
This
however,
is
where
the
V-1s
effects
on
the
war
take
an
interesting
turn.
Its
fallibility
actually
proved
to
be
one
of
its
greatest
assets.
To
protect
Londons
civilians
from
the
terrifying
prospect
of
a
V-1
hitting
their
house,
expensive
gun
and
barrage
balloon
defences
were
installed,109
and
all
thirty
of
the
fastest
fighter
aircraft
in
British
service
-
the
Hawker
Typhoon
-
were
dedicated
to
intercepting
the
robot
bombs,
as
they
had
been
dubbed
by
the
press.
In
all,
twelve
squadrons
of
Mosquitos,
Typhoons,
Tempests,
and
Spitfires
were
kept
ready
to
intercept
the
V-1s,
along
with
376
heavy
and
1,1356
light
guns.110
The
RAF
had
to
be
seen
to
be
doing
all
it
could
to
protect
its
people
from
the
terror
weapons.
109
110
19
Far
more
profound
than
the
efforts
of
intercepting
the
V-1
in
the
air
were
the
costs
of
trying
to
destroy
it
on
the
ground.
Greatly
overestimating
its
capabilities,111
the
Allies
set
out
on
an
immense
bombing
campaign.
On
June
16th
1944,
General
Eisenhower
gave
Operation
Crossbow,
as
the
offensive
was
known,
higher
priority
than
everything
but
the
immediate
requirements
of
the
battle
in
France.112
Vital
targets,
including
rail
lines,
airfields,
and
factories
were
spared
bombing
as
a
result.113
Allied
records
show
that,
in
1944,
a
total
of
44,723
tonnes
of
bombs
were
dropped
on
V-weapons
sites.
In
the
year
from
August
1943,
the
Allies
redirected
almost
fifteen
percent
of
their
heavy
bomber
missions,
with
the
Germans
barely
having
to
fire
a
shot.114
Alan
Levine
notes
that
in
the
crucial
months
of
July
and
August
1944,
a
quarter
of
the
tonnage
of
bombs
dropped
by
the
Eighth
Air
Force
and
Bomber
Command
was
on
the
V-
weapon
sites.
Largely
from
missions
aimed
at
destroying
the
redundant
ski
V-1
launch
sites,
the
Allies
lost
over
700
men,
and
154
aircraft.115
The
German
V-1
launching
unit
suffered
not
a
single
loss.
The
greatest
effect
that
Allied
bombing
had
on
the
V-weapons
was
not
even
from
these
direct
raids,116
but
from
the
very
attacks
on
general
infrastructure
that
the
Allies
had
curtailed
to
pursue
the
rockets.
Made
of
inexpensive
materials,
the
V-1
was
very
cheap
to
produce
-
imposing
minimal
opportunity
cost
on
the
German
economy.
It
cost
only
around
5,000
Reichsmarks,117
which
as
Steven
Zaloga
points
out
is
only
two
percent
of
the
cost
of
a
heavy
bomber.
As
a
result,
David
Irving118
estimates
that
whilst
they
may
have
cost
the
Germans
12,600,670
to
develop,
they
caused
the
Allies
to
expend
47,635,100
against
them
-
almost
four
times
their
cost.119
The
ratio
of
Axis
to
Allied
spending
on
the
V-1
was
1:
3.78.
The
ratio
of
GDP
in
1944-5,
weighted
to
each
year
for
the
amount
of
V-1s
built
that
year,
was
1:
3.52120
-
a
small,
but
certain
difference.
A
study
by
Lieutenant
Colonel
L.C
Helfers,
a
definitive
source
of
information
for
many
modern
writers
on
the
V-weapons,
comes
to
similar
conclusions,
albeit
less
extreme
ones.
In
his
post-
war
report
entitled
The
Employment
of
V-weapons
by
the
Germans
during
World
War
II,
he
surmises
that
although
an
exact
figure
could
not
be
known,
the
cost
of
the
V-1's
development
came
to
around
200
million
U.S.
dollars.121
At
1944
exchange
rates,
this
was
equivalent
to
49.6
111
For
figures
relating
to
the
development
costs
of
the
V-weapons,
I
have
quoted
data
from
The
Mares
Nest
by
David
J.
Irving.
Once
greatly
respected,
Irvings
reputation
was
destroyed
when
allegations
of
him
denying
the
Holocaust
emerged.
However,
although
he
may
personally
have
been
discredited,
the
research
behind
this
particular
book
is
still
accepted
as
accurate.
Steven
J.
Dick,
a
former
chief
NASA
historian,
says
in
his
book
Remembering
the
space
age:
Proceedings
of
the
50th
Anniversary
Conference,
that
despite
his
loss
of
reputation,
Irving
provided
the
most
complete
and
accurate
account
on
both
Allied
and
German
sides
of
the
V-weapons
campaign
in
The
Mares
Nest.
(Dick
2008
pp81)
119
20
million
pounds.122
Although
this
is
still
slightly
higher
than
the
figure
Irving
quoted
for
the
Allies
having
spent
countering
them,
Helfers
holds
that
"one
may
admit
that
perhaps
the
V-l
was
worth
the
cost
and
effort
spent
on
it."
Alan
Levine,
a
respected
World
War
Two
historian,
accords:
his
opinion
being
that
the
V-1
more
than
paid
for
itself123
by
its
draining
of
Allied
resources.
Given
the
statistics
available,
this
seems
a
perfectly
reasonable
conclusion
to
draw.
Though
is
difficult
to
agree
the
that
V-1
was
as
much
of
an
astounding
success
as
claimed
by
Irving,
it
was
certainly
far
from
the
disaster
that
the
wonder
weapons
are
often
portrayed
as
being.
Even
if
accidentally
so,
it
did
assuredly
contribute
to
the
German
pursuit
of
victory.
The
blame
for
its
countrys
ultimate
failure
must
be
placed
elsewhere.
The
V-2
The
V-1
was
an
error,
but
one
that
managed
to
turn
in
Germanys
favour.
The
Nazi
leadership
made
a
mistake
in
believing
that
it
would
prove
effective
as
a
weapon.
As
discussed
in
the
first
section
of
this
essay,
it
did
not.
It
just
so
happened
that
this
mistake
was
largely
offset
by
the
Allies
making
an
even
greater
one
in
response.
Determined
to
protect
civilians,
the
Allies
vastly
overestimated
the
threat
the
V-weapons
posed,
and
overspent
in
proportion.
It
cost
valuable
bombs,
time,
and
lives.
The
V-1s
were
excellent
at
absorbing
Allied
resources,
both
bombs
and
fighter
aircraft,
which
would
otherwise
have
been
directed
at
German
cities
and
industry.
Its
low
costs
were
offset
by
the
great
expenses
the
Allies
incurred
countering
it.
Though
it
may
not
have
been
an
effective
weapon,
its
overall
effect
on
the
war
was
in
favour
of
its
creator.
The
V-2
is
a
very
different
story.
As
a
weapon,
the
V-2
must
have
appeared
almost
perfect.
Completely
immune
to
interception,
the
Allies
could
do
little
but
watch
as
it
obliterated
anything
in
its
path.
V-2
production
though,
never
reached
significant
amounts,
and
the
threat
it
posed
came
to
pass.
Whilst
the
Allies
had
spent
money
on
barrage
balloons
and
gun
emplacements
to
intercept
the
older,
slower,
V-1s,
the
V-2s
unstoppable
nature
meant
that
few
costs
were
incurred
trying
to
stop
it,124
at
least
on
the
home
front.
The
fact
that
the
Allies
did
not
spend
money
intercepting
them
may
not
have
mattered,
had
the
V-2
been
cheap
to
produce.
It
was
anything
but.
The
V-1
programs
low
cost
was
outweighed
by
Allied
bombing
efforts,
but
the
Allies
would
have
to
have
bombed
Germany
with
crates
of
hundred
dollar
bills
to
offset
the
cost
of
its
successor.
Whilst
of
course
the
Allies
did
bomb
V-2
as
well
as
V-1
sites,
the
widely
differing
budgets
of
the
two
V
programmes
meant
that
one
was
easily
offset,
whilst
the
other
imposed
massive
costs.
Steven
Zaloga
puts
the
unit
cost
of
the
V-2
at
a
full
twenty
five
times
that
of
its
predecessor,
making
it
more
than
100,000
Reichsmarks,
compared
to
just
over
5,000
for
the
V-1.
Factoring
in
costs
such
as
fuel
and
development,
Helfers
estimated
that
each
V-2
cost
a
more
conservative
ten
times
more
than
the
V-1,
though
this
still
amounted
to
500,000
U.S.
dollars
each.125
By
Zalogas
calculations,
which,
having
been
completed
more
recently
and
from
a
wider
array
of
sources,
are
likely
to
be
more
accurate,
the
122
21
V-2
cost
half
the
same
as
an
entire
medium
bomber.126
Given
that
the
Heinkel-111,
a
typical
German
bomber,
could
carry
a
payload
twice
that
of
the
V-2,
and
be
reused,
the
folly
of
the
German
ballistic
missile
is
plain
to
see.
The
V-2s
advanced
technology
would
in
the
war
serve
only
to
hasten
Germanys
demise.
Estimated
by
a
U.S.
enquiry
to
have
cost
as
much
as
two
billion
dollars
-
the
same
as
America
spent
on
the
Manhattan
project127-
the
V-2
was
a
colossal
drain
on
German
resources
when
they
were
needed
most.
Whilst
it
is
unrealistic
to
assume
that
Germany
could
have
developed
an
atomic
bomb
with
this
money,128
it
certainly
could
have
been
used
more
effectively
elsewhere.
The
German
armaments
minister
himself,
Albert
Speer,
later
said
that
the
V-2
had
been
"one
of
[his]
most
serious
mistakes."129
One
of
the
few
historians
to
come
out
in
the
V-2s
favour
is
Norman
Longmate.
In
his
1985
book
Hitlers
Rockets:
The
Story
of
the
V-2s,
he
concludes
that
the
V-2
was
incomparably
the
most
effective
weapon
so
far
devised,
causing
a
great
deal
of
damage
to
allied
infrastructure
and
morale.
He
attributes
this
to
the
fact
the
V-2
was
totally
unbeatable
in
combat,130
and
to
its
impact
on
the
morale
of
Londoners
exposed
to
it.
Yet
when
Longmate
makes
the
claim
that
the
V-2
could
have
become
a
war
winning
weapon131,
he
fails
to
consider
the
immense
opportunity
cost
of
the
programme,
or
to
place
its
effects
into
context.
A
large
proportion
of
his
book
is
dedicated
to
detailing
personal
reactions
of
horror
to
the
V-2,
and
his
conclusion
is
formed
largely
from
the
fact
that
a
number
of
people
found
the
attacks
on
London
distressing.
Yet
in
reality,
there
was
never
any
serious
movement
to
end
the
war.
It
would
appear
that
he
has
allowed
his
judgement
to
become
subjective,
being
influenced
by
the
personal
testimonies
of
the
few
people
most
closely
affected
by
the
V-2.
Longmate
is
keen
to
extoll
the
V-2s
virtues
as
a
weapon,
but
does
not
fully
consider
the
debilitating
effect
of
its
costs
on
the
German
war
effort.
The
money
and
material
spent
on
the
V-2
could
have
been
used
more
efficiently
in
numerous
ways.
Even
staying
with
weapons
that
had
already
been
proven,
instead
of
emotionally
trying
to
rush
radical
and
abstract
technology
into
the
war,
would
have
been
a
far
more
effective
strategy.
Vengeance
weapons
were
not
what
were
needed
for
Germany
to
continue
fighting.132
Just
one
example
of
something
that
was
is
tanks.
Adam
Tooze,
a
professor
of
German
History
at
Yale,
claims
in
his
book
The
Wages
of
Destruction,
that
there
can
be
no
doubt
that
the
Wehrmacht
needed
more
of
them.
This
claim
does
not
go
unsubstantiated.
In
January
1943,
(while
the
V-
weapons
were
under
development),
Germany
had
only
495
panzer
tanks
-
and
not
even
all
of
these
were
serviceable.133
In
1943
at
Kursk,
Russia,
the
German
panzer
divisions
2,451-strong
tank
force
was
outnumbered
more
than
two
to
one
by
the
Soviets.
The
Panzer
IV,
the
most
126
22
widely
produced
German
tank
of
the
war,
cost
approximately
103,000
Reichsmarks
to
build.134
For
the
cost
of
even
the
3,172
V-2s
that
were
actually
launched,
over
two
thousand
tanks
could
have
been
built.
The
Wehrmacht
had
been
prepared
to
gamble
away
even
more
than
this:
In
October
1943,
with
the
order
for
the
production
of
12,000
V-2s,
480
million
Reichsmarks135
were
signed
almost
into
oblivion.
While
this
may
have
had
the
merciful
effect
of
shortening
the
war,
its
service
to
the
German
pursuit
of
victory
was
only
to
further
condemn
it.
Still,
one
can
understand
why
the
Germans
may
have
acted
as
they
did.
Aware
of
their
inferior
resource
base,
the
German
leaders
must
have
realised
that
they
could
never
build
enough
conventional
weapons
to
win
the
war.
By
turning
to
radical
technology,
they
could
at
least
hope
that
they
could
somehow
overcome
the
Allies.
As
Adolf
Galland
said
in
defence
of
the
Me-262,
Germany
could
triumph
only
by
means
of
superiority
in
the
excellence
of
its
armament.136
The
concept
of
the
wonder
weapons
is
perhaps
not
as
flawed
as
one
might
initially
judge.
It
just
so
happened
that,
especially
in
the
case
of
the
V-weapons,
this
concept
was
implemented
disastrously,
and
the
German
war
effort
paid
the
price.
Lesser
known
that
its
V
siblings,
the
V-3
owes
its
relative
obscurity
to
the
fact
that
mercifully,
it
never
fired
a
shot
at
its
intended
target.
As
such,
it
is
not
included
in
the
effectiveness
section
of
this
paper.
Inspired
by
a
design
for
an
American
civil
war
gun,137
the
V-3
was
to
be
an
enormous
cannon,
capable
of
firing
140kg
shells
across
the
English
Channel
at
London.138
In
September
1943,
work
began
in
France
on
tunnels
for
the
150m
long
gun
barrels,
which
were
too
heavy
to
support
their
own
weight
above
ground.
After
only
a
demonstration
of
a
scale
model,
Hitler
ignored
the
advice
of
his
generals,
and
ordered
that
fifty
V-3s
be
constructed.139
Though
the
allies
were
informed
immediately
about
the
sites
construction,
the
decision
was
taken
to
wait
until
they
were
as
complete
as
possible
before
launching
air
raids.140
After
raids
with
conventional
bombers
reported
failure,
the
allies
embarked
on
Operation
Aphrodite,
a
radical
plan
to
destroy
the
launch
sites.
On
August
12
1944,
a
B-24
Liberator
took
off
from
England,
bound
for
the
V-3
site
in
Mimoyecques.
It
was
no
ordinary
bomber.
The
inside
had
been
completely
stripped
out
and
filled
with
explosives,
and
an
advanced
television
and
remote
control
system
had
been
fitted.
After
the
crew
parachuted
to
safety,
another
plane
behind
would
guide
the
Aphrodite
aircraft
directly
into
the
V-3
site.
The
mission
did
not
go
according
to
plan.
The
crew
armed
the
bombs
and
prepared
to
bail
out,
but
before
they
could
make
it
to
safety,
a
fault
detonated
all
of
the
explosives.
All
on
board
were
killed.
134
23
The
Jets
I
have
been
unable
to
find
from
research
any
exact
figures
for
the
development
costs
of
either
the
Me-262
or
the
other
German
Jets.
As
a
minimum,
we
know
that
fourteen
hundred
Me-
262s144,
three
hundred
Me-163s,145
and
two
hundred
and
twenty
Ar-234
bombers146
were
built.
For
all
this,
even
the
highest
estimates
place
their
total
combat
kills
at
fewer
than
eight
hundred,
almost
all
from
the
Me-262.
147
The
Me-262
performed
well
in
combat,
with
only
around
a
hundred
being
shot
down.
Taking
a
conservative
estimate
of
them
achieving
five
hundred
kills,
this
gives
the
262
an
excellent
kill
to
loss
ratio
of
5:1.
But
this
is
superficially
high.
A
more
useful
figure
would
be
number
produced
to
number
of
kills.
This
accurately
reflects
the
return
on
the
Germans
investment,
showing
how
much
utility
they
got
from
each
aircraft
produced.
For
the
Me-262,
this
is
a
somewhat
less
141
24
impressive
2:1
half
a
kill
for
every
one
produced.
For
the
program
to
have
been
financially
in
Germanys
favour,
the
Me-262
would
have
to
have
a
had
a
unit
cost
less
than
half
that
of
the
allied
planes
it
shot
down.
In
reality,
the
jet
powered
Me-262
would
certainly
have
cost
far
more
per
unit
that
the
allied
propeller
aircraft.
It
is
almost
certain
that
the
programme
had
a
negative
effect
on
the
war
effort.
But
even
this
seems
a
good
investment
compared
to
the
Me-163
rocket
fighter.
It
achieved
a
comparatively
appalling
kill
to
production
number
ratio
of
33:1:
Only
0.03
kills
for
every
unit
produced.
If
one
normal
aircraft
had
been
constructed
instead
of
each
wonder
weapon
aircraft
(for
certain
a
gross
underestimation
of
what
could
be
done
with
the
jets
development
costs),
then
the
Luftwaffe
could
have
two
thousand
proven
aircraft
on
its
books.
But
this
is
an
oversimplification.
Even
if
more
conventional
aircraft
had
been
built
instead
of
the
jets,
they
would
surely
have
faced
the
same
pilot
shortages
that
crippled
the
Me-262.
Still,
the
resources
used
in
their
production
could
have
been
diverted
elsewhere,
and
the
money
invested
in
their
development
could
have
been
spent
more
productively.
Instead
of
rushed,
risky
and
late
investments
in
the
jets,
the
use
of
money
and
resources
in
an
area
where
a
return
is
all
but
guaranteed
(such
as
in
the
simpler
explosives
and
tank
production
industries,
which
were
facing
critical
shortages)148,
would
likely
have
made
a
greater
contribution
to
the
war
effort.
As
we
do
not
know
the
cost
of
the
jet
programme,
we
can
only
speculate
on
exactly
what
could
have
been
achieved
instead.
More
research
for
example
an
academically
authored
book
or
PHD-
is
needed
to
find
out
how
much
the
Germans
dedicated
to
the
jets.
Whether
for
a
simple
absence
of
interest,
or
a
lack
of
reliable
information,
it
appears
that
more
academic
attention
has
been
given
to
their
V-weapon
counterparts.
But
for
now,
given
the
combat
statistics,
it
is
almost
certain
that
the
decision
to
develop
radical
aircraft
had
a
worse
effect
on
the
German
war
effort
than
on
the
allied
one.
It
is
also
important
to
consider
another,
unquantifiable
opportunity
cost
of
the
jets:
the
time
of
Germanys
leading
scientific
minds,
much
of
which
must
have
been
devoted
to
the
development
of
these
desperate
weapons.
While
it
can
be
said
for
certain
that
the
development
of
the
jet
aircraft
impeded
the
German
pursuit
of
victory,
the
exact
extent
of
this
impediment
cannot
be
said
with
as
much
confidence
as
that
of
the
V-weapons.
148
25
Conclusions
The
V-weapons:
The
V-1
The
V-1s
overall
impact
on
the
war
is
an
area
open
to
interpretation.
It
was
ineffective
at
achieving
its
objectives
as
a
weapon,
but
had
an
overall
positive
effect
on
Germanys
war
effort.
David
Irving
and
Alan
Levine
claim
that
the
V-1
programme
paid
for
itself
by
causing
excessive
Allied
expenditures,
and
so
contend
that
it
was
a
wise
venture.
Steven
Zaloga
argues
against
this,
writing
that
even
if
the
allies
did
expend
more
money
and
material
overall,
they
could
afford
to
divert
resources
while
Germany
could
not,
making
the
programme
an
exercise
in
folly.149
In
its
favour,
V-1
was
very
cheap
to
produce,
imposing
far
less
opportunity
cost
than
the
V-2
on
the
German
economy.
Despite
technical
problems,
it
ultimately
achieved
a
success
rate
higher
than
that
of
Allied
precision
bombing.
It
was
a
weapon
that
was
practical,
and
could
be
deployed
with
minimum
risk
to
the
troops
operating
it.
Respected
historian
Walter
J.
Boyne
speculates
that,
had
it
been
deployed
in
larger
numbers,
it
could
have
had
a
tremendous
effect
on
the
Allies
invasion
of
Germany,150
and
this
view
is
echoed
in
other
books
on
the
subject.
The
first
V-1
though,
was
not
launched
until
the
week
after
D-day,
and
the
24,000
that
ultimately
were
launched151
carried
the
equivalent
of
a
tiny
fraction
of
the
explosives
that
were
dropped
by
the
Allies
on
Germany.
Crucially,
the
first
V-1s
were
launched
not
at
advancing
Allied
troops,
but
at
London.
Further
research
into
the
V-weapons
impact
on
morale
would
more
fully
determine
how
far
they
achieved
their
objective
of
terrifying
the
population,
and
civilians
who
lived
through
the
attacks
still
survive
to
facilitate
this.
But
the
fact
that
no
large
anti-war
movement
arose
suggests
that
Steven
Zaloga
is
likely
correct
his
assessment
that
the
V-1
had
no
profound
impact
on
morale.152
The
weapon
was
operated
under
the
flawed
principle
that
Britain
could
be
terrorised
into
negotiating.
As
a
result,
even
if
deployed
earlier
and
in
larger
quantities,
it
would
likely
not
have
achieved
its
objective
of
eliciting
a
peace
settlement.
It
appears
that
the
Germans
had
a
weapon
that
had
the
potential
to
be
effective,
but
deployed
it
ineffectually.
They
lacked
the
technology
to
deploy
the
V-1
widely
or
early
enough,
and
lacked
the
insight
to
deploy
it
most
effectively.
Yet
through
sheer
luck,
the
V-1
programme
still
succeeded
in
slowing
the
course
of
Germanys
defeat.
Its
diversion
of
Allied
resources
cost
the
Allies
materials
and
bought
Germany
time.
The
V-1
was
helping
the
war
effort,
but
not
in
the
way
that
it
was
intended
to.
Whilst
Steven
Zaloga
is
correct
in
his
realisation
that
the
Allies
could
afford
to
divert
resources
to
countering
the
V-
149
26
weapons,
this
also
implies
that
they
had
enough
resources
to
quell
any
other
threat
posed
by
Germany.
That
the
Germans
developed
a
weapon
which
diverted
so
much
Allied
attention
while
incurring
minimal
costs
and
casualties
themselves
indicates
that,
even
if
only
through
unintended
consequences,
the
V-1
did
prove
itself
a
small
but
relevant
help
to
the
German
war
effort.
While
certainly
not
enough
to
prevent
defeat,
the
V-1
did
keep
the
dream
of
victory
alive
for
a
short
but
precious
while
longer.
The
V2
The
V-2s
case
is
clearer
cut.
It
was
likely
the
most
terrifying
weapon
of
the
war.
As
historian
Norman
Longmate
wrote,
it
was
the
most
formidable
and
fearful
weapon
of
its
time.153
Its
killing
of
2,754
British
civilians
shocked
London,
while
fulfilling
the
Nazi
leaderships
quest
for
revenge.154
It
demonstrated
technology
not
years,
but
decades
ahead
of
its
time.
Yet
there
is
almost
unanimous
agreement
amongst
modern
historians
that
not
only
was
the
V-2
not
an
effective
weapon,
but
that
it
had
major
negative
effects
on
the
war
effort
-
It
was
a
significant
hindrance
to
the
German
pursuit
of
victory.
In
combat,
the
V-2
was
described
by
Alan
Levine
as
a
technological
marvel
but
a
bust
as
a
weapon.
155
Stephen
Zaloga
labels
the
programme
as
utter
folly.156
Where
effects
on
the
war
effort
are
mentioned,
comments
such
as
a
costly
drain
on
German
resources
(Alan
Levine)157,
or
an
absurdly
disproportionate
effort
to
manufacture
(Danny
S.
Parker)158,
abound.
Wolfgang
L.
Samuel
affirms
the
argument
that,
even
had
the
V-2
been
built
in
larger
quantities,
it
was
redundant
to
what
was
needed
to
stem
the
Allied
bomber
offensive
or
to
inflict
comparable
damage.159
It
was
not
the
weapon
that
Germany
should
have
placed
its
hopes
on.
My
research
has
revealed
little
reason
to
doubt
the
V-2s
failure.
The
facts
have
only
increased
its
clarity.
German
desperation
saw
the
missile,
a
concept
dismissed
by
Hitler
as
late
as
summer
1942
as
fanciful160,
placed
at
the
forefront
of
the
war
effort.
The
V-2
consumed
an
ever-greater
proportion
of
the
German
economys
resources.
This
would
eventually
amount
to
a
monetary
cost
of
over
two
billion
U.S.
Dollars.161
The
money
could
otherwise
have
been
spent
on
battle-
proven,
practical
weapons.
Two
billion
dollars
was
also
the
same
amount
that
the
United
Sates
spent
on
the
war-winning
Manhattan
project.162
Adam
Tooze
writes
that
it
became
the
single
biggest
armaments
project
of
the
Nazi
regime.163
To
quantify
this,
the
GDP
of
Germany
in
1944
was
around
sixty
billion
dollars.164
This
means
that
153
27
the
two
billion
dollars
spent
on
the
programme
equates
to
three
percent
of
German
GPD
for
the
year,165
a
massive
expenditure
for
any
single
project.
The
extent
of
the
V-2s
hindrance
to
the
war
effort
was
huge.
The
contribution
to
the
war
effort
of
the
V-2s
that
were
launched
(just
under
half
of
the
total
actually
built)
was
on
an
infinitesimal
scale,
far
offset
by
its
devouring
of
vital
German
resources.
It
is
likely
that
even
the
most
damming
of
reports
on
the
V-2
still
underestimate
the
true
extent
of
its
impediment
of
the
German
war
effort.
Existing
sources
have
only
estimated
as
best
as
is
possible
the
monetary
cost
of
the
programme.
In
reality,
not
only
did
the
programme
cost
an
inordinate
amount
of
money,
but
must
have
also
consumed
an
untold
amount
of
the
time
of
both
Germanys
scientists
and
military
leaders.
It
is
impossible
to
place
a
monetary
value
on
Wernher
Von
Brauns
or
Albert
Speers
time,
but
it
is
certain
that
both
gave
much
to
the
V-2.
The
programme
proved
a
waste
of
valuable
money
and
resources,
and
served
only
to
expedite
Germanys
inevitable
defeat.
The
Jets
In
concept,
the
V-weapons
are
largely
dismissed
as
retribution
redundant
to
the
war
effort.
The
jets
in
contrast,
are
seen
often
as
weapons
that
could
have
been
highly
effective
in
combat,
but
were
prevented
by
their
circumstances
from
doing
so.
Walter
J.
Boyne
writes
there
is
no
question
that
the
air
war
over
Europe
would
have
been
vastly
different166
had
jet
aircraft
been
given
more
priority
from
the
start
of
the
war.
But
despite
claims
by
historians
that
the
jets
could
have
contributed
significantly
to
the
war
effort
had
more
effort
been
invested
in
them
earlier,
we
can
never
be
sure.
What
Boog,
Krebs
and
Vogel
refer
to
as
the
technical
difficulties
inherent
in
all
new
developments
of
this
kind,167
as
well
as
countless
other
unknowns,
make
it
impossible
to
say
with
certainty
how
the
war
might
have
been
affected
had
jet
technology
been
pursued
earlier.
This
is
not
to
assert
that
the
decisions
made
by
the
German
leadership
were
the
right
ones.
At
first
blinkered
by
the
illusion
of
a
short
war,
the
Germans
only
really
appeared
to
show
interest
in
the
jets
after
seeing
them
as
yet
another
terror
weapon
against
the
Allies.
This
appears
evident
in
both
Hitlers
orders
for
the
Me-262
to
be
converted
into
a
bomber
role,
and
the
Air
Ministrys
similar
request
for
the
Ar-234.
More
radical
and
desperate
programmes
were
under
way
at
the
wars
end,
including
a
reusable
plywood
fighter
that
killed
its
pilot
on
its
first
and
Dollartimes.com:
inflation
Calculator:
http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm
(accessed
27/02/15)
165
To
find
this
figure,
I
found
tables
detailing
the
GPD
of
Germany
in
1944.
(USD
437
Billion).
The
source
is
the
above
cited
Onwar
article,
which
is
in
turn
cited
from
a
reliable
book
on
the
subject.
(Mark
Harrisons
"The
Economics
of
World
War
II:
an
Overview.)
This
figure
was
in
1990
dollars,
so
I
used
a
currency
converter
(also
cited
above)
to
find
what
this
would
have
been
worth
in
1944.
This
was
around
sixty
billion
dollars
(60.3
billion).
Two
billion
(the
cost
of
the
V-2
in
1944
dollars),
is
just
over
three
percent
of
sixty
billion.
166
Boyne
1997
pp349
167
Boog/Krebs/Vogel
2005,
p338
28
only
test
flight.168
Still,
we
can
only
make
educated
guesses
at
the
exact
motivation
behind
the
German
mindset
and
decisions.
What
is
certain
is
that,
from
a
numerical
standpoint,
the
jets
did
not
prove
themselves
effective
in
combat.
As
discussed
earlier,
the
achievement
of
eight
hundred
kills
and
minor
successes
against
Allied
bridges
was
barely
a
ripple
in
the
air
war.
To
put
their
futility
in
perspective,
England,
Russia
and
the
USA
produced
a
combined
total
of
163,000
aircraft
in
1944.
Germany
produced
44,000.169
In
their
combined
production
total,
the
jets
account
for
only
4.5
percent
of
German
production.170
To
prove
effective,
they
would
have
to
shoot
down
a
far
greater
proportion
of
the
Allied
air
forces.
But
the
kills
the
jets
achieved
equate
to
less
than
0.5%
of
the
Allied
planes
produced
in
1944
alone.
171
From
the
standpoint
of
effects
on
the
war,
it
seems
inconceivable
that
the
kills
and
damage
achieved
by
the
jets
would
have
cost
the
Allies
more
than
it
did
the
Germans.
Even
of
the
jets
that
were
built,
only
a
small
proportion
ever
saw
combat,
making
it
all
the
more
difficult
for
the
Germans
to
recoup
their
costs.
Future
research
into
German
archives
would
be
invaluable
to
more
fully
determining
the
jets
impact
on
the
economy.
This
would
allow
their
opportunity
cost
to
be
more
precisely
quantified.
But
for
now,
it
appears
evident
that
they
did
not
prove
to
be
worth
the
investment
in
their
development.
The
jets
help
to
the
war
effort
was
greatly
exceeded
by
the
hindrance
of
their
costs,
but
by
exactly
how
much
we
cannot
be
certain.
168
29
Final
conclusion
In
1939,
Germany
was
supremely
confident
in
its
Blitzkrieg
strategy.
But
as
the
war
turned
against
the
Reich,
its
leaders
were
forced
to
accept
that
their
adversaries
resource
base
would
remain
superior.
By
1944,
Axis
GDP
was
only
a
third
that
of
the
Allies.172
Strategic
victory
was
almost
impossible.
In
response
to
their
ever-more
desperate
situation,
the
Germans
turned
to
technology.
The
hope
behind
the
resulting
wonder
weapons
was
that
a
smaller
number
of
new
and
radical
weapons
would
overcome
the
vast
scale
of
the
Allied
war
effort,
or
cause
it
unacceptable
losses.
As
early
as
1942,
the
Reich
Propaganda
Ministry
had
adopted
the
slogan
the
best
weapons
bring
victory.
173
Adolf
Galland,
the
test
pilot
largely
responsible
for
the
decision
to
order
the
Me-262
jet,
proclaimed
that
If
at
all,
the
German
Luftwaffe
can
triumph
over
its
British
American
opponent
in
the
air
only
by
means
of
superiority
in
the
excellence
of
its
armament.174
As
historians
Vogel,
Boog
and
Krebs
write,
he
would
sooner
have
one
Me-262
than
five
Me-
109s.175
The
other
hope
behind
the
Wunderwaffen
was
that
terror
weapons
would
crush
the
morale
of
civilians
and
soldiers,
forcing
the
Allies
to
sue
for
peace.
Hitler
gave
or
approved
numerous
orders
for
the
construction
of
weapons
for
the
killing
of
civilians.
Both
the
V-1
and
V-2
were
pushed
into
service
in
1944,
despite
a
conference
held
a
year
earlier
to
decide
between
them.176
Hitler
personally
demanded
that
fifty
V-3
cannons
be
built
to
hurl
shells
across
the
English
Channel.
177
All
of
this
is
well
known.
But
historians
have
not
properly
defined
the
wonder
weapons,
and
without
knowing
exactly
what
they
were,
it
is
not
possible
to
say
how
far
they
fulfilled
the
hopes
pinned
on
them.
By
compiling
a
list
and
definition,
their
overall
effect
on
the
German
pursuit
of
victory
can
be
determined.
By
analysing
both
their
effectiveness
and
their
effects
on
the
war,
their
contribution
or
detraction
can
be
placed
into
context.
As
a
result
of
their
late
focus,
the
amount
of
time
that
Germany
had
to
develop
its
weapons
was
severely
limited.
The
first
of
them
to
see
combat,
the
V-1,
came
a
week
after
D-day,
and
even
then
was
six
months
behind
schedule.
Political
infighting
meant
that
the
Germans
did
not
focus
their
development
efforts,
and
set
desperately
unachievable
production
targets.
Much
manufacturing
was
undertaken
by
SS-brutalised
slaves
working
in
appalling
conditions,
and
the
quality
of
production
suffered
alongside
the
workers.178
The
country
developed
what
Ian
V.
172
30
Hogg
labels
a
disastrous
habit
of
asking
for
too
much179
too
late.
The
wonder
weapons
performance
in
combat
reflects
this.
By
measure
of
both
damage
and
impact
on
morale,
their
help
to
the
German
pursuit
of
victory
proved
statistically
minute.
From
the
combat
statistics,
it
would
be
easy
to
arrive
at
the
conclusion
reached
by
Wolfgang
L.
Samuel
that
German
science
(and
therefore
the
wonder
weapons)
had
little
impact
on
either
the
course
or
the
outcome
of
the
war.180
But
solely
looking
at
the
wonder
weapons
in
combat
does
not
fully
address
their
effect
on
the
German
pursuit
of
victory.
The
main
way
in
which
they
would
influence
the
war
was
not
through
their
performance
in
battle,
but
through
their
secondary
effects
on
the
conflict.
The
wonder
weapons
proved
similarly
ineffective
in
combat,
but
their
effects
on
the
war
are
considerably
more
varied.
These
effects
can
be
found
by
analysing
the
cost
to
the
Allied
war
effort,
as
well
as
their
opportunity
cost
to
the
Germans.
By
combining
these
figures,
this
paper
can
more
fully
answer
the
question
of
how
far
the
decision
to
develop
the
wonder
weapons
proved
wise.
The
V-1
is
the
one
wonder
weapon
that
appears
to
have
helped
the
German
pursuit
of
victory.
Cheap
to
produce,
its
lack
of
success
in
combat
was
countered
by
the
vast
efforts
made
by
the
Allies
to
defeat
it.
Alan
J.
Levine
writes
that
in
this
the
flying
bomb
more
than
paid
for
itself.181
In
1944,
before
the
war
had
even
ended,
a
senior
U.S.
Army
Air
Force
officer,
Clayton
Bissel,
published
a
report
extolling
the
virtues
of
the
V-1s
over
conventional
bombers.182
Yet
this
view
is
not
unanimous.
In
his
2005
V-1
Flying
Bomb,
Steven
Zaloga
still
asserts
that
the
doodlebug
achieved
almost
nothing
for
the
German
war
effort.183
But
when
looking
at
the
overall
impact
of
the
wonder
weapons
on
the
war,
whether
or
not
the
V-1
proved
beneficial
to
the
German
pursuit
of
victory
becomes
almost
irrelevant.
Even
if,
as
Alan
Levine
claims,
the
V-1
did
pay
for
itself,
it
comes
nowhere
near
to
paying
for
Germanys
other
mistakes.
There
is
no
case
for
the
V-1
being
anywhere
near
as
spectacular
a
success
as
the
V-2
was
a
failure.
The
V-1
programme
cost
around
200
million
US
dollars.184
By
my
calculations
on
page
24,
the
V-1
programme
would
have
cost
the
Allies
the
same
percentage
of
their
1944
GDP
as
it
did
the
Germans-
around
0.3
percent.185
The
V-2
cost
the
Germans
ten
times
that
amount:
three
percent
of
the
entire
countrys
GDP.
Given
that
most
of
the
Allied
anti-
V-weapons
campaign
focused
on
the
V-1,
the
Allied
effort
expended
on
the
V-2
certainly
could
not
have
offset
its
costs.
The
V-2s
cost
casts
into
shadow
any
achievements
the
V-1
may
have
made.
While
it
is
uncertain
if
the
resources
spent
on
the
V-1
would
have
been
more
effectively
used
elsewhere,
there
is
no
question
that
money
poured
into
the
V-2
programme
was
all
but
burned.
179
31
At
a
minimum,
significant
quantities
of
tanks
or
other
conventional
weapons
could
have
been
produced
with
the
V-2s
two
billion
dollar
budget.
Danny
S.
Parker
claims
that
surface-to-air
missiles
under
design
by
Dr
Alexander
Lippisch
could
have
been
developed
instead,186
but
this
is
almost
purely
speculative.
His
point
is
also
based
largely
on
quotes
from
Lippisch
himself-
not
the
most
impartial
source
on
the
quality
of
his
own
work.
Still,
the
V-weapons
overall
detraction
from
the
war
effort
is
statistically
undeniable.
Steven
Zaloga
mentions
one
particularly
compelling
statistic:
that
the
warheads
for
the
V-weapons
used
an
amount
of
explosives
equivalent
to
Germanys
entire
output
in
autumn
1944.187
Effectively
a
quarter
years
output
was
expended
for
little
significant
damage
to
the
enemy.188
His
conclusion
that
the
V-weapons
were
utter
folly189
is
well
corroborated.
By
collating
the
data
available,
and
looking
at
each
weapon
in
proportion,
the
real
extent
of
the
wonder
weapons
detraction
from
the
war
effort
can
be
seen.
The
three
percent
of
GDP
consumed
by
the
V-2
is
a
minimum
figure
for
the
wonder
weapons
hindrance
to
the
war
effort.
Add
to
this
the
unquantified
but
certain
opportunity
cost
of
the
jet
aircraft
which
also
achieved
minimal
gains
for
their
cost-
and
the
total
detraction
only
grows.
Fruitless
programmes
such
as
the
V-3
cannon
imposed
further
costs
while
contributing
nothing
at
all.
This
paper
has
collated
and
combined
existing
sources
on
the
newly
defined
wonder
weapons.
It
has
drawn
on
and
put
into
new
perspectives
both
secondary
and
primary
material.
It
has
endeavoured
to
more
fully
assess
the
impact
of
the
wonder
weapons
on
the
German
war
effort
than
previous
work.
Its
conclusion
can
be
put
simply:
the
evidence
suggests
overwhelmingly
that
despite
their
technical
brilliance,
the
wonder
weapons
burdens
far
eclipsed
their
benefits:
They
hindered
the
German
war
effort
far
more
than
they
helped
it.
As
tools
for
the
German
pursuit
of
victory,
the
Wunderwaffen
proved
wondrous
only
in
their
failure.
186
32
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