College of Mechanical and Transportation Engineering, China University of Petroleum, Beijing, 102249, China
Petrol China Beijing Gas Pipeline Co. Ltd., Beijing, China
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 8 January 2015
Received in revised form
20 April 2015
Accepted 21 April 2015
Available online 15 May 2015
Leakage from natural gas pipelines causes severe economic loss and signicantly affects social security
considering the gas' combustibility and the difculties in detecting leakage. This study proposes a
comprehensive risk evaluation method by combining a risk matrix with a bow-tie model. First, a bow-tie
model is built, considering the risk factors that may lead to an accident using a fault tree; the consequences of unwanted events are then described in an event tree. Second, a fuzzy method is used to
calculate the failure probabilities. Third, the severity of an accident is evaluated through an index system
that includes personal casualties, economic losses and environmental disruptions. Finally, a risk matrix
consisting of a probability ranking criterion and a consequence ranking criterion is proposed to reach an
integrated quantitative conclusion of a bow-tie model. A case study of an underwater pipeline carrying
natural gas has been investigated to validate the utility of the proposed method.
2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Bow-tie model
Risk matrix
Fuzzy method
Natural gas pipeline
1. Introduction
Leakage from natural gas pipelines can cause devastating accidents due to the ammability of the gas, which is transported at
high pressures. In recent years, accidents in natural gas pipelines
have occurred too often and have drawn signicant public attention. Thus, the implementation of safety measures followed by a
comprehensive risk evaluation is critical to maintain a level of risk
below the acceptable criteria. The risk evaluation of pipelines
currently includes a quantitative risk analysis (QRA) and an accident consequence analysis (ACA).
In a QRA, Muhlbauer (2004) proposed an integrated and
continuously improving risk evaluation framework for pipelines
that has become the guideline for pipeline risk assessment. The
purpose of this framework is to evaluate a pipeline's risk exposure
to the public and to identify ways to effectively manage that risk.
Ma et al. (2013a) used geographical information systems (GIS) to
calculate the quantitative risk of urban natural gas pipeline networks. The proposed QRA process incorporated an assessment of
the failure rates of integrated pipeline networks, a quantitative
analysis model of accident consequences, and assessments of individual and societal risks. Jo and Ahn (2005) also used GIS to assess
the quantitative risk of natural gas pipelines. Han and Weng (2010)
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: lulinlin1211@163.com, lw@cup.edu.cn (W. Liang).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jngse.2015.04.029
1875-5100/ 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
125
in Fig. 1 and consists of a risk analysis and a consequence assessment in terms of a building fault tree and an event tree, respectively. In the risk analysis, a fuzzy method is applied to convert a
natural linguistic expression into a failure probability. In the
consequence assessment, an index system is introduced to further
assess the consequence in terms of environmental cost, personal
injury and economic loss. In the end, to reach a comprehensive
conclusion, the risk matrix method is applied to combine the results of the risk analysis and the consequence assessment.
2.1. Construction of a bow-tie model
A bow-tie model is widely applied in risk analyses, including
probability calculations (Khakzad et al., 2013), human error risk
analysis (Deacon et al., 2010, 2013), dynamic risk analysis (Khakzad
et al., 2012), etc. A bow-tie model is comprised of a fault tree, which
represents the risk factors of a failure, and an event tree, which
represents the consequences of a failure. Both the fault tree and the
event tree are effective graphical methods and are widely used in
safety analyses of complex systems; this makes a bow-tie model to
have signicant potential in this eld. Fig. 2 shows the basic
structure of a bow-tie model. X, E and T are the primary, intermediate and top events of the fault tree, respectively, and I and C stand
for the ignition (or safety barrier) and the accident consequence in
an event tree, respectively.
126
8
1
>
>
>
<
0:2 x
fVL x
> 0:1
>
>
:
0
Fig. 2. Basic structure of a bow-tie model.
f x
8
0
>
>
>
>
xa
>
>
>
<b a
cx
>
>
>
>
>
c
b
>
>
:
0
8
0
>
>
>
>
x
a
>
>
>
>
>b a
>
<
1
f x
>
>
>
d
x
>
>
>
>
>
d
c
>
>
:
0
8
x 0:1
>
>
>
>
>
< 0:15
fL x 0:4 x
>
>
>
0:15
>
>
:
0
8
x 0:3
>
>
>
>
>
< 0:2
fM x 0:7 x
>
>
>
0:2
>
>
:
0
8
x 0:6
>
>
>
>
>
< 0:15
fH x 0:9 x
>
>
>
0:15
>
>
:
0
fVH x
8
x 0:8
>
>
>
< 0:1
>
>
>
:
0 < x 0:1
0:1 < x 0:2
otherwise
0:1 < x 0:25
0:25 < x 0:4
(6)
otherwise
0:8 < x 0:9
0:9 < x 1
otherwise
(7)
i
h
Al fx; x2R; fA lg al1 ; bl1
(1)
b<x<c
x>c
x>a
a<x b
(2)
c<x<d
x>d
(5)
otherwise
a<x b
b<x<c
(4)
otherwise
i
h
Bl fx; x2R; fB lg al2 ; bl2
x>a
(3)
as:
l
fVL
0; 0:2 0:1l;
fLl
fmax x
l
0:2l 0:3; 0:7 0:2l; fHl 0:15l 0:6; 0:9 0:15l;
fM
l
0:1l 0:8; 1
fVH
i
h
A B Al Bl al1 al2 ; bl1 bl2
i
h
A B Al Bl al1 al2 ; bl1 bl2
al1
0;
al2
fmin x
x
0
0x1
otherwise
1x
0
0x1
otherwise
(12)
(13)
The fuzzy possibility score can be converted to a failure probability by the empirical equation proposed by Onisawa (1988, 1990):
8
< 1
F 10k
:
0
k
i
h
A B Al Bl al1 al2 ; bl1 bl2
127
1 FM
FM
FM s0
(14)
FM 0
1=3
2:301
(15)
In this section, the natural linguistic expressions given by experts are expressed as fuzzy numbers. The operations of the fuzzy
numbers are expressed by the corresponding l-cuts operations.
This method transforms natural linguistic expressions into failure
probabilities.
0
i
h
AB Al Bl al1 bl2 ; bl1 al2
al1 0; al2 > 0
Generally, the consequence assessment system can be categorized into personal casualties, economic losses and environmental
disruptions. Personal casualties are always applied to evaluate the
consequence caused by combustion, explosion or poisoning, and
refers to the potential damage to surrounding persons (not only
workers but also residents). Accidents can damage equipment,
cause a loss of materials, produce delays or suspend production.
Economic losses consist of maintenance costs, reinstallation
charges for damaged equipment and direct losses due to production shutdown and are recorded in the relevant currency. Environmental disruptions consist of the amount of pollutants or the
expense applied to the removal of pollutants. Environmental disruptions also draw signicant attention from the media and the
public, and the resulting damage to a company's reputation is
typically much more important than the resulting economic losses.
The basic factors that should be considered in a consequence
assessment are shown in Table 1 (Yongji, 2004).
If an accident may result in three probable consequences, the
total loss of the accident is calculated using Table 2 and Eq. (16)
(Yongji, 2004). The total loss of an accident is dened as:
fi
n
X
wej Aij ;
i 1; 2; ; m; j 1; 2; ; n
(8)
j1
FM
FMR 1 FML
2
3
X
Pi Si Pi Ci Pi Ei
(16)
i1
(9)
where FMR and FML represent the right and left utility scores of the
fuzzy number, respectively; these values are dened as:
(10)
(11)
The symbol sup in Eq. (10) describes the y-value of the coordinates of the intersection point of fM with from the right side of
fmax. Similarly, in Eq. (11), sup describes the y-value of the coordinates of the intersection point of fM with from the left side of
fmax.
fmax(x) and fmin(x) represent the fuzzy maximizing and
The risk matrix used in this study can be categorized into two
categories: 2 2and 5 5. The 2 2 matrix is shown in Table 3, and
the 5 5 matrix is shown in Fig. 4. The failure probability can be
categorized into two levels in the 2 2 matrix: notable and
negligible. Similarly, the consequence can be categorized as either
acceptable or unacceptable. The risks are categorized into three
levels: high, medium and low. The failure probability and the
128
Table 1
Factors to be considered in a consequence assessment.
Personal casualty
Assessment system of combustion and explosion
The factors leading to personal
casualties may include combustion,
direct shock wave, indirect
shock wave, and indirect casualties.
Assessment of poisoning
The factors leading to personal casualties
may include leakage of toxic gas,
leakage of suffocating gas, and
impaction of pressurized uid.
Economic loss
Environmental disruption
Table 2
Total loss calculation for an event tree.
No.
1
2
3
P1
P2
P3
Sub index
Personal casualty
Economic loss
Environmental disruption
Personal casualty
Economic loss
Environmental disruption
S1
S2
S3
C1
C2
C3
E1
E2
E3
P 1 S1
P 2 S2
P 3 S3
P1 C1
P2 C2
P3 C3
P1 E1
P2 E2
P3 E3
Table 3
2 2 risk matrix.
Level of failure probability
Notable probability
P > 105 (Level 2, 3, 4, 5)
Medium risk
Strengthened detection and
monitoring are required to reduce risk.
Low risk
Check if the evaluated factors have
changed due to operational condition changes.
Acceptable consequence
(Very low)
Negligible probability
P < 105 (Level 1)
Level of consequence
High risk
Measurement that can reduce risk
should be conducted immediately.
Medium risk
Consider the possibility of conversion
from a low-probability event to a high-probability event.
Unacceptable consequence
(Low, Medium, High, Extremely high)
129
Table 4
Ranking criterion of failure probability.
Level
5
4
3
2
1
Explanation
Quantitative criterion
Qualitative criterion
>102
103~102
104~103
105~104
<105
Regarded as leakage
Extremely high risk of leakage
High risk of leakage
Low risk of leakage
No leakage
Table 5
Ranking criterion of consequence severity.
No.
Level
1
2
3
4
5
<1.6
1.6e16
16e160
160e1600
>1600
Very low
Low
Medium
High
Extremely high
P1 0.7 if m0 > 100 kg/s. For allocating the ignition probability, only
the net ow rates to the atmosphere must be considered.
3.2. Failure probability
To avoid the biased opinions of some experts, a multi-expert
scoring method and the AHP method are recommended and used
in this Section. The assessment index system for the experts' capabilities is shown in Fig. 8. A brief introduction of every expert
used in this study is shown in Table 7.
Using an AHP analysis to dene expert weights:
f x
8 x 0:14
>
>
>
> 0:12
>
>
>
<
1
>
0:45 x
>
>
>
>
> 0:15
>
:
0
Fig. 5. Field conditions of the pipeline before being submerged and after being submerged.
130
131
Table 6
Description of the primary events.
No.
Description
X3-1
X3-2
X3-3
X3-4
X5-1
X5-2
X6-1
X7-1
X9-1
X10-1
X10-2
X10-3
X11-1
X11-2
X12-1
X12-2
X14-1
X14-2
X15-1
X15-2
X15-3
X15-4
X17-1
X18-1
X18-2
X18-3
FM 0:3095
Finally, the fuzzy failure probability was calculated based on Eq.
(14) and Eq. (15):
F 0:00098
The failure probability of the primary event X3-1 was determined to be 0.00098. The linguistic expressions of the other primary events from the experts are shown in Table 8; their
probabilities were also calculated and are also shown in Table 8.
If the probabilities of all of the primary events have been
determined, the failure probability of the top event can be calculated based on the quantitative analysis technique of the fault tree;
Table 7
Introduction of the experts consulted in this case study.
No.
Expert
Expert
Expert
Expert
1
2
3
4
Education background
Job title
Service time(years)
Junior college
Bachelor
Doctor
Bachelor
Professor
Associate-professor
Professor
Associate-professor
22
8
18
30
132
Table 8
Probabilities of primary events.
5. Conclusion
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