POSSESSION

1.

Republic v. Imperial Credit Corp. (Types of

Possession)

FACTS:
Respondent Imperial Credit Corp. purchased from a certain
Jose Tajon a parcel of land situated in Barrio Colaique (now
Barangay San Roque), Antipolo City, Rizal for the sum of
P17,986.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Mortgage.
Upon full payment of the balance through judicial consignation,
ownership of the property was consolidated in the name of
respondent and the mortgage was released. The property was
thereafter privately surveyed under PSU-178075 and was
approved. Thereafter, respondent filed at the RTC a petition for
the registration of a parcel of land, it alleged in its petition that
respondent subrogated former owner Jose Tajon, who has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the parcel of land, being a part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, by virtue of
Deed of Sale with Mortgage executed on 07 March 1966. The
RTC then issued an order of general default against the whole
world. Respondents attorney-in-fact and caretaker had
testified that except for some trespassers, no one else had laid
possessory claim on theproperty. The evidence submitted are
the following: 1993 tax declaration, tracing cloth, survey
description, a certification from the Land Management Sector
in lieu of the geodetic engineers certificate and the report by
the CENRO that the property falls within the alienable and
disposable zone.
RTC- granted respondents application for registration
CA- affirmed RTCs decision, respondent obtained title to the
property through extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent should be granted the application
for registration.
RULING:
No. It is doctrinally settled that a person who seeks
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete tutle of a piece of
land on the basis of possession by himself snd his
predecessors-in-interest shoulders the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence. The CENRO certification

evidence is the alienability of the land and not the open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by the
respondent or its predecessor-in-interest for the period
prescribe by law. Respondents evidence on its alleged open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation falls short of the requirements under the law.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not cladestine; it is continuous when interrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional, exclusive when
the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the
land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit, and
notorious when it is so conspicious that it is generally known
and talked off by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
The openness and notoriety of respondents occupation could
have been persuasively established by the owners of the lands
adjacent to the subject property. The submission of one tax
declaration belatedly by the respondent did not strengthen his
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, although while a
tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it
may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession. If
respondent had filed the tax declaration on time it may have
been a sufficient basis.
Carlos vs. Republic
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter, Teresita
Carlos Victoria, filed an application for registration and
confirmation of title over a parcel of land. Petitioner alleged,
among others, that she is the owner of said parcel of land
which she openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and
occupied since July 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide claim
of ownership; that there is no mortgage or encumbrance
affecting said property, nor is it part of any military or naval
reservation; that the property is being used for industrial
purposes; and that there are no tenants or lessees on the
property. Petitioner further claimed that she has been in
possession of the subject land in the concept of an owner; that
her possession has been peaceful, public, uninterrupted and
continuous since 1948 or earlier; and tacking her possession
with that of her predecessors-in-interest, petitioner has been in
possession of the land for more than 50 years.
RTC granted the application of the petitioner based on the
factual and meritorious grounds, and considering that the
applicant acquired the property under registration through
Page 1 of 26
POSSESSION

inheritance from her father, Jose Carlos, and

considering further that her possession thereof, tacked
with that of her predecessor-in-interest, is open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and undisturbed,
under claim of ownership since time immemorial up to
the present time; and considering further that the
subject parcel of land is part of the disposable and
alienable land (Tsn, July 3, 2002, p.6) and considering
further that the realty taxes due thereon have been
religiously paid (Exhs. "HH," "II," "JJ," and "JJ-1"), and
considering finally that the subject parcel of land
belong[s] to the applicant and that she possess[es] a
perfect title.
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court on the ground that the time she filed her
application for registration of title was no longer in
possession and occupation of the land in question
since on October 16, 1996, the applicants mother and
predecessor-in-interest sold the subject land to Ususan
Development Corporation.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner is in possession at the time she filed
the application.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner has met the first requirement but not the
second.
The Court that the applicant must show that he is
in actual possession of the property at the time of the
application, thus, The law speaks of possession and
occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction ["]and["], the clear intention of the law is not
to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is
broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds
the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the allencompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession
must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it
of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise
over his own property.

It is clear in the case at bar that the applicant, Maria

Carlos, no longer had possession of the property at the
time of the application for the issuance of a certificate of
title. The application was filed in court on December 19,
2001. Teresita Carlos Victoria, the daughter of Maria
Carlos, admitted during the hearing that her mother had
sold the property to Ususan Development Corporation
in 1996. They also presented as evidence the deed of
absolute sale executed by and between Maria Carlos
and Ususan Development Corporation on October 16,
1996.
Heirs of M. Cabal vs. Sps Cabal
FACTS:
Marcelino built his house on the disputed
property (portion of Lot G, now the
southernmost portion of Lot 1-E) in 1949 with
the consent of his father. Marcelino has been
in possession of the disputed lot since then
with the knowledge of his co-heirs, such that
even before his father died in 1954, when the
co-ownership was created, his inheritance or
share in the co-ownership was already
particularly
designated
or
physically
segregated. Thus, even before Lot G was
subdivided in 1976, Marcelino already
occupied
the
disputed
portion.
On January 13, 1982, a land survey was
conducted on Lot 1 designating the shares of
Carmelita, Marcela, Francia, spouses Marete
and Clarita Ebue, Anacleto and Lorenzo as
Lots 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E.
Since the subdivision plan revealed that
Marcelino and his son occupied and built their
houses on area located on southermost
portion of Lot1-E and not the adjacent lot
designated as Lot G1 the spouses Lorenzo
and Rosita Cabal confronted Marcelino on this
matter which resulted to an agreement on
March 1, 1989 to re-survey and swapping of
lots for the purpose of reconstruction of land
titles. However, the agreed resurvey and
swapping of lots did not materialize.
Page 2 of 26
POSSESSION

Hence, on August 10, 1994, respondents filed

a complint for RECOVERY OF POSSESSION
WITH DAMAGES against Marcelino before
the MTC of Iba, Zambales. They aledge that
Marcelion introduced improvements in bad
faith on their land with knowledge that the
adjacent lot is titled in his name.
Marcelino filed his Answer with Counterclaim,
contending that respondents have no cause of
action against him because he has been in
possession in good faith since 1949 with
respondent's knowledge and acquiescene. He
further avers that acquisitive prescription has
set
in.
MTC- prescription or the length of time by
which Marcelion has held or possessed the
property has barred the respondents from
filing
a
claim.
RTC- Marcelino's possession was in concept
of co-owner and therefore prescription does
not run in his favor; that his possession, which
was tolerated by his co-owners , does not
ripen
into
possession.
CA- Marcelino's occuption in good faith
diminished after Lot G was surveyed when he
was apprised of the fact that the portion he
was occupying was not the same as the
portion titled to him; that from the tenor of the
petition for review Marcelino would like to hold
on to both the lot he occupies and Lot G-1,
which cannot be allowed since it will double
his inheritance and detriment of his brother
Lorenzo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marcelino is a possessor in
good
faith?
HELD:
Marcelino's possession of the disputed lot was
based on a mistake belief that Lot G-1 is the

same lot on which he has built his house with

the consent of his father. There is no evidence,
other than bare allegations, that Marcelino
was aware that he intruded on resoondents'
property when he continued to occupy and
possess the disputed lot after partition was
affected
in
1976.
Marcelino is deemed builder in good faith at
least until the time he was informed by
respondents of his encroachment on their
property.
Article 528. Possession acquired in good faith
does not lose this character except in the case
and from the moment facts exist which show
that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
Article 448. The owner of the land on which
anything has been built, sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate
as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose
to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.

PRINCIPLE of POSSESSION IN GOOD

FAITH
It has been said that good faith is always
presumed, and upon him who alleges bad
faith on the part of the possessor rests the
burden of proof. Good faith is an intangible
and abstract quality with no technical meaning
Page 3 of 26
POSSESSION

or statutory definition, and it encompasses,

among other things, an honest belief, the
absence of malice and the absence of design
to defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage. An individuals personal good faith
is a concept of his own mind and, therefore,
may not conclusively be determined by his
protestations alone. It implies honesty of
intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder
upon inquiry.The essence of good faith lies in
an honest belief in the validity of ones right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another. Applied to
possession, one is considered in good faith if
he is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates
it.

4.

Dizon v. Hon. Rodriguez (ART. 526)

FACTS:
Hacienda Calatagan owned by Alfonso and Jacobo
Zobel covered by TCT No. T-722. The Hacienda
constructed a pier, "Santiago Landing," about 600 m
long from the shore into the navigable waters of the
Pagaspas Bay, to be used by vessels loading sugar
produced by the Hacienda sugar mill. When the sugar
mill ceased its operation, the owners converted the pier
into a fishpond dike and built additional strong dikes
enclosing an area of about 30 hectares (of the Bay) and
converted the same into a fishpond. The Hacienda
owners also enclosed a similar area of about 37
hectares of the Bay on the other side of the pier, which
was also converted into a fishpond. A subdivision plan
was prepared and subsequently approved by the
Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds issued
TCTs, wherein fishpond No. 1 was referred to as Lot
No. 1 and fishpond No. 2 was referred to as Lot No. 2.
Zobel sold to Dizon Lot No. 49 and Lot No. 1 was
purchased by Goco, who, sold one-half to Sy-Juco.
Tolentino applied for ordinary fishpond permit or lease
for Lot No. 49 and Lot No. 1 by her daughter. The
petitioners herein protested claiming that the properties
are private lands, which are covered by a certificate of
title. The Director of Fisheries found the areas applied

for are outside the boundaries of Haciend Calatagan

and that a committee created by the Sec. of Agriculture
and natural Resources found that the disputed lots are
not originally included within the boundaries of
hacienda. Petitioners filed before the CFI an action to
quiet their titles.
CFI- the subdivision plan disregarded the technical
description of TCT No. T-722; the certificate of title
obtained by the petitioners are not subject to
registration because they are null and void; lots 1 and
49 declared properties of the public domain.
CA- affirmed; but since petitioners relied on the efficacy
of their certificates of title, cannot be considered
possessors in bad faith until after the legality of their
said titles has been finally determined. Appellants were
thus declared entitled to retention of the properties until
they are reimbursed by the landowner
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners are possessors in good faith.
RULING:
Petitioners are possessors in good faith. There is no
showing that plaintiffs are not purchasers in good faith
and for value. As such title-holders, they have reason to
rely on the indefeasible character of their certificates.
"The concept of possessor in good faith given in Art.
526 of the Civil Code and when said possession loses
this character under Art. 528, needs to be reconciled
with the doctrine of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
Such reconciliation can only be achieved by holding
that the possessor with a Torrens Title is not aware of
any flaw in his title which invalidates it until his Torrens
Title is declared null and void by final judgment of the
Courts. such occupants in good faith, plaintiffs have the
right to the retention of the property until they are
reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the
lands.
5.

De Vera vs. CA (Article 526)

FACTS:
On January 14, 1983, private respondent Ricardo
Ramos filed a Complaint[5] against the herein petitioners
Page 4 of 26
POSSESSION

for recovery of property with damages. As stated in the

said complaint, the plaintiff is the legal and absolute
owner of a certain parcel of land known as Lot 2, H-461. The defendants are occupying a triangular portion
of the above-described property containing an area of
22 square meters, more or less hat the plaintiff has
demanded that the defendants remove their
improvement
thereon
and
vacate
the said
portion, ... but the defendants have refused and failed,
without any just or lawful cause to do so.
In the answer filed by the petitioners, they
theorized, inter alia, that they have been in possession
not only of 22 square meters but 70 square meters of
land through their predecessor-in-interest, Teodoro de
la Cruz (husband of defendant-appellant Agueda De
Vera and father of the rest of the defendantsappellants) and subsequently by themselves, as
owners, before 1956; that said 70 square meter area
occupied by them is a portion of Lot 7005, Cad 211,
over which their predecessor-in-interest, Teodoro de la
Cruz, had, during his lifetime, a pending Miscellaneous
Sales Application which was given due course and
favorably recommended by the District Land Officer for
Isabela to the Director of Lands; that Teodoro de la
Cruz also declared the said land for taxation purposes
and after his death, by his heirs, and that plaintiffappellees cause of action is already barred by
prescription and/or laches.
RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff-appellant and ordered
that the defendants, their agents, representatives, or
any person or persons acting on their authority, to
vacate the same and to deliver the possession thereof
to the plaintiff.

invalidates his acquisition of the thing. Good faith

consists in the possessors belief that the person from
whom he received a thing was the owner of the same
and could convey his title. It consists in an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another, and is the opposite of
fraud. Since good faith is a state of the mind, and is not
a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, it
can only be determined by outward acts and proven
conduct. It implies freedom from knowledge and
circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry.
Further, the court reiterated also that Records disclose
that prior to the construction in 1983 of petitioners
house on the land under controversy (Portions B
and C), a demand letter dated April 27, 1981 was
sent by private respondent to the petitioners, informing
them that the land they were possessing and occupying
is within his (private respondents) titled property.
In the same letter, the private respondent gave
petitioner Agueda de Vera the option to either pay him
the value of the property or lease the same on a yearly
or monthly basis. However, the contending parties
failed to reach a compromise agreement. The lower
court
found,
that
the
defendants (herein
petitioners) are occupying ... an area of 22 square
meters (Portions B and C),..., in which land,
defendants constructed a house of strong materials
in 1983 after dismantling heir (sic) previous building
erected thereon on or about January or February,
1970.

CA- Affirmed with modifications.

The facts and circumstances

are outward
acts
and
conduct indicating bad faith of
as possessor and builder.

ISSUES:

6.

W/N petitioners were not possessors in bad faith of the

portions b and c of the disputed property.

FACTS:

HELD:

The records show that respondent spouses Pieda

(PIEDAS) are the registered owners of a parcel of
land (Lot 11-14-1-14) situated at barangay Astorga
Dumarao, Capiz covered by Homestead Patent No.
0844 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1930.

NO. In distinguishing good faith and bad faith

possession, the Code refers to the manner of
acquisition in general. A possessor in good faith is one
who is unaware that there exists a flaw which

aforestated
proven
petitioners

DBP vs. CA

Page 5 of 26
POSSESSION

On March 7, 1972, the PIEDAS mortgaged the above

described parcel of land to petitioner, Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to secure their
agricultural loan in the amount of P20,000.00.
The PIEDAS failed to comply with the terms and
conditions of the mortgage compelling DBP to
extrajudicially foreclose on February 2, 1977.
In the foreclosure sale, DBP was the highest bidder and
a Sheriff Certificate of Sale was executed in its favor. In
the corresponding Certificate of Sale, the sheriff
indicated that This property is sold subject to the
redemption within five (5) years from the date of
registration of this instrument and in the manner
provided for by law applicable to this case.
On March 10, 1978, after the expiration of the one-year
redemption period provided for under Section 6, ACT
3135, DBP consolidated its title over the foreclosed
property by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1930 was cancelled and TCT No. T-15559 was
issued in the name of DBP. Thereafter, DBP took
possession of the foreclosed property and appropriated
the produce thereof.
On July 5, 1978, the Ministry of Justice issued Opinion
No. 92, Series of 1978which declared that lands
covered by P.D. No. 27,like the herein subject property,
may not be the object of foreclosure proceedings after
the promulgation of said decree on Oct. 21, 1972.
On August 24, 1981, the PIEDAS offered to redeem
the foreclosed property by offering P10,000.00 as
partial redemption payment. This amount was
accepted by DBP who issued O.R. No. 1665719 and
through a letter, conditionally approved the offer of
redemption considering the P10,000.00 as down
payment.
However, on November 11, 1981, DBP sent the
PIEDAS another letter informing them that pursuant to
P.D. 27, their offer to redeem and/or repurchase the
subject property could not be favorably considered for
the reason that said property was tenanted.

Meanwhile, on December 21, 1981, the PIEDAS filed

the instant complaint against DBP for cancellation of
certificate of title and/or specific performance,
accounting and damages with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction averring that DBP, in
evident bad faith, caused the consolidation of its title to
the parcel of land in question in spite of the fact that the
5-year redemption period expressly stated in the
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale had not yet lapsed and that
their offer to redeem the foreclosed property was made
well within said period of redemption
RTC- DBP violated the stipulation in the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale which provided that the redemption
period is five (5) years from the registration thereof in
consonance with Section 119[9] of CA No. 141[10].
DBP should therefore assume liability for the fruits that
said property produced from said land considering that
it prematurely took possession thereof.
CA- since DBP was in evident bad faith when it
unlawfully took possession of the property subject of
the dispute and defied what was written on the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale, the PIEDAS were entitled to
recover the fruits produced by the property or its
equivalent valued at P72,000.00 per annum or a total of
P216,000.00 for the three-year period.
ISSUE:
Whether DBP was in bad faith when it took possession
of the disputed lot.?
HELD:
We rule in the negative.
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw,
which invalidates it. Good faith is always presumed,
and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a
possessor rests the burden of proof.It was therefore
incumbent on the PIEDAS to prove that DBP was
aware of the flaw in its title i.e. the nullity of the
foreclosure. This, they failed to do.
If no redemption is made within one year, the purchaser
is entitled as a matter of right to consolidate and to
possess the property.Accordingly, DBPs act of
Page 6 of 26
POSSESSION

consolidating its title and taking possession of the

subject property after the expiration of the period of
redemption was in accordance with law.
In the case of Maneclang vs. Baun, we held that when
a contract of sale is void, the possessor is entitled to
keep the fruits during the period for which it held the
property in good faith. Good faith of the possessor
ceases when an action to recover possession of the
property is filed against him and he is served summons
therefore.
In the present case, DBP was served summons on
June 30, 1982.By that time, it was no longer in
possession of the disputed land as possession thereof
was given back to the PIEDAS after the foreclosure of
DBP was declared null and void on February 22, 1982.
Therefore, any income collected by DBP after it
consolidated its title and took possession of the
property on May 30, 1978 up to February 22, 1982
belongs to DBP as a possessor in good faith since its
possession was never legally interrupted.

7.

Bomedco (Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc)

v. CA (ART. 529)

FACTS:
Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein private
respondents purchased from Santillan a parcel of
unregistered land covered by Tax Declaration No. 3935
with an area of one hectare, 34 ares and 16 centares,
located in Barrio Dayhagon, Medellin, Cebu. He took
possession of the property and declared it for tax
purposes in his name. Prior to the sale, the lot was
already traversed in the middle by railroad tracks
owned by petitioner Bomedco. The tracks were used for
hauling sugar cane from the fields to petitioners sugar
mill. When Magdaleno Valdez, Sr died, pricate
respondents inherited to the land. Unknown to the
private respondents, Bomedco was able to have the
disputed middle lot which was occupied by the railroad
tracks placed in its name in the Cadastral Survey of
Medellin, Cebu. The entire subject land was divided into
three, namely, Cadastral Lot Nos. 953, 954 and 955.
Lot Nos. 953 and 955 remained in the name of private

respondents. However, Lot No. 954, the narrow lot

where the railroad tracks lay, was claimed by Bomedco
as its own and was declared for tax purposes in its
name. It was only after 41 years that they discovered
such claim from Bomedco. Respondent heirs filed a
"Complaint for Payment of Compensation and/or
Recovery of Possession of Real Property and
Damages
with
Application
for
Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction" against Bomedco before
the RTC. The respondent heirs alleged that, Santillan
granted Bomedco, in 1929, a railroad right of way for a
period of 30 years. The right of way expired sometime
in 1959 but respondent heirs allowed Bomedco to
continue using the land because one of them was then
an employee of the company. They presented an
original copy of the deed of sale written in Spanish to
evidence the sale of the land to Magdaleno Valdez, Sr.
and several original estate tax receipts. Bomedcos
defense was that it was the owner and possessor of
Cadastral Lot No. 954, having allegedly bought the
same from Feliciana Santillan, prior to the sale of the
property by the latter to Magdaleno Valdez, Sr.
Bomedco submitted in evidence a Deed of Sale and
seven real estate tax receipts a 1929 Survey Plan of
private land for Bogo-Medellin Milling Company; a
Survey Notification Card; Lot Data Computation; a
Cadastral Map for Medellin Cadastre as well as the
testimonies of the Geodetic Engineer and the property
custodian for Bomedco, and the Chief of the Land
Management Services of the DENR.
RTC- rejected Bomedcos defense on the basis of a
prior sale, citing that its evidence a xerox copy of the
Deed of Sale was inadmissible and had no probative
value; Bomedco had been in possession of Cadastral
Lot No. 954 in good faith for more than 10 years, thus,
it had already acquired ownership of the property
through acquisitive prescription under Article 620 of the
Civil Code
CA- reversed; Bomedco only acquired an easement of
right of way by unopposed and continuous use of the
land, but not ownership, under Article 620 of the Civil
Code. Its possession being in bad faith, the applicable
prescriptive period in order to acquire ownership over
the land was 30 years under Article 1137 of the Civil
Code.
Page 7 of 26
POSSESSION

ISSUE: W/N the expiration of the 30-year period of

easement converted petitioners possession into an
adverse one so as to apply his prescriptive right.
RULING:
There is no dispute that the controversial strip of land
has been in the continuous possession of petitioner
since 1929. But possession, to constitute the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession
under a claim of title, that is, it must be adverse. Unless
coupled with the element of hostility towards the true
owner, possession, however long, will not confer title by
prescription. The real estate taxreceipts showed that all
petitioner had was possession by virtue of the right of
way granted to it. Were it not so and petitioner really
owned the land, petitioner would not have consistently
used the phrases "central railroad right of way" and
"sugar central railroad right of way" in its tax
declarations until 1963. Certainly an owner would have
found no need for these phrases. A person cannot have
an easement on his own land, since all the uses of an
easement are fully comprehended in his general right of
ownership. While it is true that, together with a persons
actual and adverse possession of the land, tax
declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of
the land occupied by him, this legal precept does not
apply in cases where the property is declared to be a
mere easement of right of way. Having held the
property by virtue of an easement, petitioner cannot
now assert that its occupancy since 1929 was in the
concept of an owner. Neither can it declare that the 30year period of extraordinary acquisitive prescription
started from that year. The mere expiration of the
period of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioners
possession into an adverse one. Mere material
possession of land is not adverse possession as
against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless
such possession is accompanied by the intent to
possess as an owner.
8.

Villarico vs. Sarmiento

FACTS:
The petitioner is the owner of a lot in La Huerta,
Paraaque City, Metro Manila with an area of sixty-six
(66) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate

of Title (T.C.T.) No. 95453 issued by the Registry of

Deeds, same city.
Petitioners lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino
Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging to the
government. As this highway was elevated by four (4)
meters and therefore higher than the adjoining areas,
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
constructed stairways at several portions of this strip of
public land to enable the people to have access to the
highway.
Sometime in 1991, the respondents had a building
constructed on a portion of said government land. In
November that same year, a part thereof was occupied
by Andoks Litson Corporation and Marites Carinderia,
also impleaded as respondents.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real
Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30 square meter
portion of the same area owned by the government.
In 1995, petitioner filed a complaint for accion
publiciana against the respondents. He alleged inter
alia that respondents structures on the government
land closed his "right of way" to the Ninoy Aquino
Avenue; and encroached on a portion of his lot covered
by T.C.T. No. 74430.
Respondents, in their answer, specifically denied
petitioners allegations, claiming that they have been
issued licenses and permits by Paraaque City to
construct their buildings on the area; and that petitioner
has no right over the subject property as it belongs to
the government.
RTC-the petitioner has never been in possession of any
portion of the public land in question. The dependants
are the ones who have actual possession of the area.
Further, it stated that the petitioner was not deprived of
his right of way.
CA- AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the petitioners has acquired a right of
way over the disputed land of the government
which is between his property and the Ninoy
Aquino Avenue; and
Page 8 of 26
POSSESSION

2. W/N the petitioners have a better right of

possession over the subject land.
HELD:
The SC ruled the first issue in the negative.
The court reiterated that a lot on which stairways were
built for the use of the people as passageway to the
highway is property of public dominion; Public use is
use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is
open to the indefinite public.
Further, the second issue was answered by
the court stating that considering that the lot
Considering that the lot on which the stairways were
constructed is a property of public dominion, it cannot
be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in
favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is
by mere tolerance of the government through the
DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself.
Verily, he cannot claim any right of possession over it.
This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which
provides: Only things and rights which are susceptible
of being appropriated may be the object of possession."
9.

Asset Privatization vs. TJ Enterprises

FACTS:
Petitioner Asset Privatization Trust[5] (petitioner) was a
government entity created for the purpose to conserve,
to provisionally manage and to dispose assets of
government institutions.[6] Petitioner had acquired from
the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) assets
consisting of machinery and refrigeration equipment
which were then stored at Golden City compound,
Pasay City. The compound was then leased to and in
the physical possession of Creative Lines, Inc.,
(Creative Lines). These assets were being sold on an
as-is-where-is
basis.

On 7 November 1990, petitioner and respondent

entered into an absolute deed of sale over certain
machinery and refrigeration equipment identified as
Lots Nos. 2, 3 and 5. After two (2) days, respondent
demanded the delivery of the machinery it had

purchased. Sometime in March 1991, petitioner issued

Gate Pass No. 4955. Respondent was able to pull out
from the compound the properties designated as Lots
Nos. 3 and 5. However, during the hauling of Lot No. 2
consisting of sixteen (16) items, only nine (9) items
were pulled out by respondent. Creative Lines
employees prevented respondent from hauling the
remaining
machinery
and
equipment.
Respondent filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages against petitioner and Creative
Lines.During the pendency of the case, respondent was
able to pull out the remaining machinery and
equipment. However, upon inspection it was discovered
that the machinery and equipment were damaged and
had
missing
parts.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a constructive delivery of the
machinery and equipment upon the execution of the
deed of absolute sale between petitioner and
respondent.
HELD:
The ownership of a thing sold shall be transferred to the
vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery
thereof.The thing sold shall be understood as delivered
when it is placed in the control and possession of the
vendee.
As a general rule, when the sale is made through a
public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary
does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. And with
regard to movable property, its delivery may also be
made by the delivery of the keys of the place or
depository where it is stored or kept.In order for the
execution of a public instrument to effect tradition, the
purchaser must be placed in control of the thing sold.
However, the execution of a public instrument only
gives rise to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such
presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not
effected because of a legal impediment.It is necessary
that the vendor shall have control over the thing sold
Page 9 of 26
POSSESSION

that, at the moment of sale, its material delivery could

have been made. Thus, a person who does not have
actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer
constructive possession by the execution and delivery
of
a
public
instrument.
In this case, there was no constructive delivery of
the machinery and equipment upon the execution of the
deed of absolute sale or upon the issuance of the gate
pass since it was not petitioner but Creative Lines
which had actual possession of the property. The
presumption of constructive delivery is not applicable
as it has to yield to the reality that the purchaser was
not placed in possession and control of the property.
10.

Ong v. Republic (ART. 531)

FACTS:
Petitioner, in his behalf and as duly authorized
representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto
and Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of Title
over Lot 15911 situated in Barangay Anolid,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of 574 square
meters, more or less. They alleged that they are the coowners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their
exclusive property having acquired the same by
purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia
Villamil; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied;
and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of
the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than
30 years. Respondent, through the OSG, opposed the
application for registration of title. Neither applicants nor
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or
earlier; applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title
to prove their claims; the tax declaration does not
appear genuine and merely shows pretended
possession of recent vintage; the application was filed
beyond the period allowed; and that the subject lot is
part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of
private appropriation.
RTC- in favor of petitioner

CA- reversed; the subject lot is part of the alienable and

disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they possessed
the subject lot in the nature and for the duration
required by law. Petitioner failed to prove his adverse
possession in the concept of owner since June 12,
1945 or earlier because the earliest tax declaration
presented is dated 1971. Neither was petitioner able to
prove they actually occupied the subject lot prior to the
filing of the application.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner and his brothers have registrable
ownership over the real property subject matter of land
RULING:
The petitioner and his brothers have no registrable
ownership over the subject land. Possession alone is
not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the
public domain because the law requires possession
and occupation. And while tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute good
indicia of possession in the concept of owner and a
claim of title over the subject property. Even if we were
to tack petitioner's claim of ownership over the subject
lot to that of their alleged predecessors-in-interest in
1971, still this would fall short of the required
possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier. They also
failed to establish specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-ininterest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the
nature and duration required by law. They also admitted
that neither one of them actcually occupied the subject
lot and there were no improvements made thereon.
11.

Cequena vs. Bolante (Article 538)

FACTS:
Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared
for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to
Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. [Petitioners]
were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the
basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of
Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled
and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito
Page 10 of 26
POSSESSION

Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers.

Respondent is the present occupant of the land. Earlier,
on October 15, 1975, respondent and Miguel Mendoza,
another brother of petitioner, during the cadastral
survey had a dispute on the ownership of the land.

RULING:

ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners are the lawful owner and
possessor of the land subject of the case.
HELD:
NO. The respondent is the preferred
possessor under Article 538 of the Civil Code because,
benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the
subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession
thereof for a longer period. On the other hand,
petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in
1952.
The court explicitly discussed that possession
cannot be acquired through force or violence. To all
intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically
ousted is still deemed the legal possessor.

12.

Erickson Telecommunications Inc. vs. City

of Pasig

FACTS:
Ericsson Telecommunications, Inc. (petitioner), a
corporation with principal office in Pasig City, is
engaged in the design, engineering, and marketing of
telecommunication
facilities/system.
In an Assessment Notice issued by the City Treasurer
of Pasig City, petitioner was assessed a business tax
deficiency for the years 1998 and 1999 based on its
gross revenues as reported in its audited financial
statements for the years 1997 and 1998.
Petitioner filed a Protest claiming that the computation
of the local business tax should be based on gross
receipts
and
not
on
gross
revenue.
ISSUE:

the substantive issue in this case is whether the local

business tax on contractors should be based on gross
receipts
or
gross
revenue.

The law is clear. Gross receipts include money or its

equivalent actually or constructively received in
consideration of services rendered or articles sold,
exchanged or leased, whether actual or constructive.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bank of
Commerce,17 the Court interpreted gross receipts as
including those which were actually or constructively
received,
viz.:
Actual receipt of interest income is not limited to
physical receipt. Actual receipt may either be physical
receipt or constructive receipt. When the depository
bank withholds the final tax to pay the tax liability of the
lending bank, there is prior to the withholding a
constructive receipt by the lending bank of the amount
withheld. From the amount constructively received by
the lending bank, the depository bank deducts the final
withholding tax and remits it to the government for the
account of the lending bank. Thus, the interest income
actually received by the lending bank, both physically
and constructively, is the net interest plus the amount
withheld
as
final
tax.
The concept of a withholding tax on income obviously
and necessarily implies that the amount of the tax
withheld comes from the income earned by the
taxpayer. Since the amount of the tax withheld
constitutes income earned by the taxpayer, then that
amount manifestly forms part of the taxpayer's gross
receipts. Because the amount withheld belongs to the
taxpayer, he can transfer its ownership to the
government in payment of his tax liability. The amount
withheld indubitably comes from income of the
taxpayer, and thus forms part of his gross receipts.
(Emphasis
supplied)
Further elaboration was made by the Court in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bank of the
Philippine
Islands,18
in
this
wise:
Page 11 of 26
POSSESSION

Receipt of income may be actual or constructive. We

have held that the withholding process results in the
taxpayer's constructive receipt of the income withheld,
to
wit:
By analogy, we apply to the receipt of income the rules
on actual and constructive possession provided in
Articles 531 and 532 of our Civil Code.
Under

Article

531:

"Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a

thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is
subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts
and legal formalities established for acquiring such
right."
Article

532

In our withholding tax system, possession is acquired

by the payor as the withholding agent of the
government, because the taxpayer ratifies the very act
of possession for the government. There is thus
constructive receipt. The processes of bookkeeping and
accounting for interest on deposits and yield on deposit
substitutes that are subjected to FWT are indeedfor
legal purposestantamount to delivery, receipt or
remittance.19

states:

"Possession may be acquired by the same person who

is to enjoy it, by his legal representative, by his agent,
or by any person without any power whatever; but in
the last case, the possession shall not be considered
as acquired until the person in whose name the act of
possession was executed has ratified the same, without
prejudice to the juridical consequences of negotiorum
gestio
in
a
proper
case."
The last means of acquiring possession under Article
531 refers to juridical actsthe acquisition of
possession by sufficient titleto which the law gives
the force of acts of possession. Respondent argues
that only items of income actually received should be
included in its gross receipts. It claims that since the
amount had already been withheld at source, it did not
have
actual
receipt
thereof.
We clarify. Article 531 of the Civil Code clearly provides
that the acquisition of the right of possession is through
the proper acts and legal formalities established
therefor. The withholding process is one such act.
There may not be actual receipt of the income withheld;
however, as provided for in Article 532, possession by
any person without any power whatsoever shall be
considered as acquired when ratified by the person in
whose name the act of possession is executed.

Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005 dated September 1,

200520 defined and gave examples of "constructive
receipt",
to
wit:
SEC. 4. 108-4. Definition of Gross Receipts. -- x x x
"Constructive receipt" occurs when the money
consideration or its equivalent is placed at the control of
the person who rendered the service without
restrictions by the payor. The following are examples of
constructive
receipts:
(1) deposit in banks which are made available to the
seller
of
services
without
restrictions;
(2) issuance by the debtor of a notice to offset any debt
or obligation and acceptance thereof by the seller as
payment
for
services
rendered;
and
(3) transfer of the amounts retained by the payor to the
account
of
the
contractor.
There is, therefore, constructive receipt, when the
consideration for the articles sold, exchanged or
leased, or the services rendered has already been
placed under the control of the person who sold the
goods or rendered the services without any restriction
by
the
payor.
In contrast, gross revenue covers money or its
equivalent actually or constructively received, including
the value of services rendered or articles sold,
exchanged or leased, the payment of which is yet to be
received. This is in consonance with the International
Financial Reporting Standards,21 which defines
revenue as the gross inflow of economic benefits (cash,
Page 12 of 26
POSSESSION

receivables, and other assets) arising from the ordinary

operating activities of an enterprise (such as sales of
goods, sales of services, interest, royalties, and
dividends),22 which is measured at the fair value of the
consideration
received
or
receivable.23
As

aptly

stated

by

the

RTC:

"[R]evenue from services rendered is recognized when

services have been performed and are billable." It is
"recorded at the amount received or expected to be
received." (Section E [17] of the Statements of
Financial Accounting
Standards
No.
1).24

subsequently granted and the heirs voluntarily gave up

their possession. A complaint for recovery of damages
for the fruits of Lot No. 2749 was filed by Acuna
because according to him, Escritor (deceased)
effectuated the registration of the lot through fraud,
malice and misrepresentation.
CFI- The court dismissed the complaint, petitioners
enjoyed the fruits of the property, they were in good
faith possessing under a just title.
IAC- reversed; ordered the petitioners to pay Acuna the
value of the fruits they have received for 13 years.
ISSUE:

In petitioner's case, its audited financial statements

reflect income or revenue which accrued to it during the
taxable period although not yet actually or
constructively received or paid. This is because
petitioner uses the accrual method of accounting,
where income is reportable when all the events have
occurred that fix the taxpayer's right to receive the
income, and the amount can be determined with
reasonable accuracy; the right to receive income, and
not the actual receipt, determines when to include the
amount
in
gross
income.25
The imposition of local business tax based on
petitioner's gross revenue will inevitably result in the
constitutionally proscribed double taxation taxing of
the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the
same thing26 inasmuch as petitioner's revenue or
income for a taxable year will definitely include its gross
receipts already reported during the previous year and
for which local business tax has already been paid.
13.

Escritor v. IAC (ART. 534)

FACTS:
Lot No. 2749 was the subject of cadastral proceedings
in the CFI. Miguel Escritor, as claimant, declaring his
ownership over the lot alleging that he acquired it by
inheritance from his deceased father. The CFI rendered
a decision in favor of Escritor. Respondent Acuna filed
a petition for review contending that Escritor obtained
the lot through fraud and misrepresentation. Escritor
died during the proceedings of the review and his heirs
took possession of the lot. The petition was

W/N petitioners should be held liable for damages

RULING:
No. Escritor honestly believed that he is the legal owner
of the land. With this well-grounded belief of ownership,
he continued in his possession of Lot No. 2749. This
cannot be categorized as possession in bad faith. As
defined in the law, a possessor in bad faith is one in
possession of property knowing that his title thereto is
defective. In this case, there is no showing that Escritor
knew of any flaw in his title. Nor was it proved that
petitioners were aware that the title of their predecessor
had any defect. Assuming that claimant Escritor was a
possessor in bad faith, this should not prejudice his
successors-in-interest, petitioners herein, as the rule is
that only personal knowledge of the flaw in one's title or
mode of acquisition can make him a possessor in bad
faith, for bad faith is not transmissible from one person
to another, not even to an heir. As Article 534 of the
Civil Code explicitly provides, "one who succeeds by
hereditary title shall not suffer the consequences of the
wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is not shown
that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; ..." The
reason for this article is that bad faith is personal and
intransmissible. Its effects must, therefore, be suffered
only by the person who acted in bad faith; his heir
should not be saddled with such consequences.
A review of the records, does not indicate the existence
of any fraud. Lot No. 2749 was not awarded to Escritor
on the basis of machinations. Acuna failed to prove bad
faith. Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is
Page 13 of 26
POSSESSION

always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith

on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. If
no evidence is presented proving bad faith, like in this
case, the presumption of good faith remains.
14.

Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR

Facts:
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of
the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on
the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may
include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by
providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might
even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of
private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether
unconstitutional.

or

not

the

IPRA

law

Banes vs.
Philippines

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners were removed from the premises
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.

is
HELD:

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After

deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since
there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence,
ancestral domains may include public domain
somehow against the regalian doctrine.

15.

By virtue of said injunction, on August 13, 1993,herein

respondents, with the aid of certain members of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, the
Philippine National Police, and Sheriff Primo Alimurong
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila, tried to
dispossess petitioners, as previous clergymen and
occupants of the residential houses located at 4443 Old
Sta. Mesa Street, Manila, owned by LCP and form part
of the compound where the principal office of LCP is
located. Petitioners however refused to leave the
same. Thus, the main gate of the subject property was
padlocked by respondents, preventing the petitioners
and their families from going in and out of said place.
Security guards were also stationed at the premises
with an instruction not to allow petitioners entry and
exit.

Lutheran Church

of the

FACTS:
On August 16, 1990, certain members of the Lutheran
Church in the Philippines (LCP) filed an action against
its President, Thomas Batong, and six other members
of the Board of Directors,[3] before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), for accounting and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and
appointment of a management committee.

Clearly, the presence of such men in the subject

property restricting petitioners mobility constitutes force
contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.
It is true that petitioners Baes and Del Rosario wrote
LCP expressing their willingness to voluntarily vacate
the premises upon finding another place to live in, but
this is after respondents had padlocked the premises
and used armed men to prevent their coming to and
from the premises. Otherwise stated, said letters do
not negate the initial use of force by respondents which
constituted forcible entry. It is undisputed that
respondents owned the property occupied by
petitioners, still their use of force in evicting petitioners
therefrom
was
not
justified.
Indeed, regardless of the actual condition of the title to
the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or
terror.The owner who has title over the property cannot
take the law into his own hands to regain possession of
Page 14 of 26
POSSESSION

said

property.

He

must

go

to

court.

Respondents cannot justify their forcible entry in

the premises occupied by petitioners by claiming that
the latter have no valid right to the continued
possession of the property. Respondents should have
filed the appropriate unlawful detainer case against
them instead of forcing them out of the premises.
However, while we find that there was forcible
entry in this case, we cannot grant the prayer of
petitioners-spouses Baes that they be restored to the
subject premises. It is established that they stayed on
the property for free as privilege of petitioner Elmer
Baes as a clergyman of LCP and that after the initial
forcible entry of respondents, petitioner Elmer Baes
expressed, through his letter, his willingness to vacate
the property upon finding a new place to live in and
proposed that he stay in the Caloocan property of
respondent LCP. It is on record that the spouses
Baes are now staying in another property owned by
the LCP in Caloocan City without paying rent. It can be
said, therefore, that they have lost their cause of action
to ask for restitution having transferred, as they have
requested, to another property of LCP without paying
any
rentals.
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is
deprived of physical possession of land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
In such cases, the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the
prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry cases,
the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for
the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the
plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the
property, and second, he must also allege that he was
deprived of his possession by any of the means
provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
[48] It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what
is important is determining who is entitled to the
physical possession of the property.Indeed, any of the
parties who can prove prior possession de facto may
recover such possession even from the owner himself
since such cases proceed independently of any claim
of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove

prior possession de facto and undue deprivation

thereof.
In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible
entry case, the trespasser does not have to institute a
state of war. The act of going to the property and
excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property which is
all that is necessary and sufficient to show that the
action is based on the provisions of Section 1, Rule 70
of
the
Rules
of
Court.

16.

Serina v. Caballero (ART. 540)

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery
of possession, and damages against respondent
Caballero. When petitioner died, he was substiuted by
his children and they alleged that they are the absolute
owners and have been in actual and constructive
possession for thirty-five (35) years of a parcel of land.
Sometime in 1982, they discovered that respondent
was claiminh ownership over the said land and was
offering it for sale to 3rd parties and caretakers and
tenants have been occupying the land. Petitioners
bought the lot from Marbella who inherited it from her
father. They presented a deed of Sale and the Tax
Declaration. The respondet alleged that he is lawful
owner and had been in actual possession of the land
since time immemorial, the said land is originally owned
by his grandfather, Eustaqio Caballero.
The boundaries of Serinas lot:
The
boundaries
of
Caballeros lot:
North- Alejo Seria
North- Rustico Dablio
South- T. Sabornido
South- Victor Obsioma
East- A. Seria & T. Sabornido
East- J. Serina & T.
Saburnido
West- F. Caballero
West- Victorino Caballero
Page 15 of 26
POSSESSION

RTC- in favor of respondents; Caballero is the absolute

and lawful owner and possessor of the land in question.
It was not clearly shown that the land bought by Dr.
Seria from Marbella was the same land owned by
Victor Caballero, and that the petitioners failed to show
that Marbella bought the land from Eustaquio
Caballero, the original owner and cadastral claimant of
the land. It also noted that the deed of sale between
Marbella and Dr. Seria showed that the land had an
area of 5 hectares, whereas, the petitioners only
claimed 2.5 hectares. Furthermore, the boundaries of
the land stated in the complaint did not coincide with
what was stated in the Deed of Sale, or in Tax
Declaration No. 2442 in the name of Eustaquio
Caballero.
CA- affirmed
ISSUES: (1) W/N the petitioners were able to establish
the identityo of the disputed land (2) W/N the
acquisitive prescription should be appreciated in favor
of the petitioners.
RULING:
(1) No. The CA was correct in concluding that the
petitioners failed to establish that the parcel of land in
the possession of the respondents is the same as that
subject of their complaint. The CA noted that the land
subject of the complaint has boundaries different from
the land in possession of the respondents. In fact, the
land described in the complaint appears to be different
from the land described in the Deed of Sale which the
petitioners invoke as the basis of their ownership. The
complaintof the petitioners states that the property they
are claiming has an area of 2.5 hectares. On the other
hand, the Deed of Sale provides that the subject
property has an area of 5 hectares. The complaint
alleged that the property is located in Mantadiao, Opol,
Misamis Oriental, while the Deed of Sale shows that
the property purchased is located in Puntakon, Igpit,
Cagayan Or. Misamis.

The failure to establish the identity of the land is

obviously fatal to the petitioners case. Proof of
ownership coupled with identity of the land is the basic
rule.Corollarily, the rule is likewise well-settled that in

order that an action for recovery of possession may

prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the
action fully proves not only his ownership but also the
identity of the property claimed, by describing the
location, area and boundaries thereof. As the appellate
court succinctly stated, he who claims to have a better
right to the property must clearly show that the land
possessed by the other party is the very land that
belongs to him.
(2) No. CA ruled that inasmuch as the petitioners failed
to establish that the parcel of land in possession of the
respondents is the same as the subject of their
complaint, their claim of acquisitive prescription is
clearly untenable. Since the property has not been
clearly identified by the petitioners, their claim of
acquisitive prescription cannot be considered.
Insufficient identification of the portion of land claimed
in absolute ownership cannot ripen into ownership.
Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it
may be constructive, is not a mere fiction.
18. Beltran vs. Soriano
FACTS:
By a notarial instrument executed and ratified on
October 1911, Feliciano de la Rosa, the husband of
Rosario Lim, sold outright and in perpetuity a parcel of
mangrove swamp land, situated in the barrio of Santa
Cruz, pueblo of Lubao, Pampanga, the situation and
boundaries of which are set forth in the instrument, to
Doroteo Guintu and his wife Modesta Beltran, for the
sum of P2,000, the vendor transferring to the vendees
the dominion, possession and ownership of the said
land free of all charge and encumbrance, as shown by
the records of the property registry and of the Bureau of
Forestry. This instrument was presented in evidence as
Exhibit
A.
In the document Exhibit B it appears Feliciana Doriano,
the widow of the late Francisco de la Rosa, their
children Maria de la Rosa (accompanied by her
husband, Leonardo Fernandez) and Feliciano de la
Rosa, both of legal age, and Eugenio Fernandez,
guardian of the minor Ramon de la Rosa, have
declared that the said deceased, Francisco de la Rosa,
husband and father of the deponents, left at his death
Page 16 of 26
POSSESSION

property consisting mostly of mangrove swamp land

which has not yet been judicially petitioned; but in the
proceedings for the settlement of his estate, pending in
the court of that province, there was presented a
proposed partition which, up to the 30th of March,
1912, had not yet been approved, and which set forth
that there had been awarded to Maria de la Rosa, as
her share of the estate, the mangrove swamp land
situated in Gumi or Calangain, as specifically described
in the deed of sale executed by her on the same date in
behalf of Modesta Beltran and ratified before the notary
Esteban Victorio. In the same proposed partition there
was adjudicated to Feliciano de la Rosa, likewise as a
part of his share in the estate, another parcel of
mangrove swamp land, the description of which is
given in the deed of sale executed in turn by him in
behalf of the spouses Doroteo Guintu and Modesta
Beltran and ratified on October 6, 1911. The heirs of the
deceased De la Rosa agreed to recognize these sales
as valid and effective as though the hereditary property
had been judicially partitioned and the said lands legally
adjudicated to the vendors who alienated them and
they furthermore waived all the rights they might have
therein. The said deed was ratified before a notary by
the
makers
of
the
instrument.
By the mere fact of the death of the husband, his
children and heirs, together with their mother, by
operation, of law succeeded him in the dominion,
property and possession of the land and its
improvements, for, from the moment Doroteo Guintu
died, though survived by his widow, the rights to the
succession of their deceased father were thereby
transmitted to his children, since the latter, as his forced
heirs, succeeded him in all his rights and obligations.
(Arts.
657
and
661,
Civil
Code).
RULING:
There is no provisions of law whatever which prohibits
a co-heir from selling his share of the estate, or legal
portion, to a stranger, before the partition of the
hereditary property is approved by the court, for article
1067 of the Civil Code prescribes: "If any of the heirs
should sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
division, all or any of the co-heirs may subrogate
themselves in the place of the purchaser, reimbursing

him for the value of the purchase, provided they do so

within the period of a month, to be counted from the
time
they
were
informed
thereof."
.
Still more: section 762 of the Code of Civil Procedure
contains among others the following provisions: "Such
partition may be made although some of the original
heirs or devisees have conveyed their shares to other
persons; and such shares shall be set to the persons
holding the same as they would have been to the heirs
or
devisees."
.
In law, the rule governing property held by various coowners in common is analogous to that which obtains
where the estate of a deceased person is held pro
indiviso by several co-participants, for, pursuant to
article 450 of the Civil Code, "each one of the
participants in a thing possessed in common is
considered as having exclusively possessed the part
which may be alloted to him on the distribution for the
entire period during which there is no division." .
The provisions of this article appear to be confirmed by
that contained in article 1068 of the Civil Code.
Feliciano de la Rosa could, therefore, lawfully sell the
said land in question as a part of his share of the
estate, even before the approval of the proposed
partition of the property, which his father, Francisco de
la Rosa, left at his death and besides, apart from this,
the sale made by him appears to have been expressly
recognized by himself and his co-heirs as well as by his
mother, Feliciana Doriano, in Exhibit B.
As the defendants legally alienated the land by
absolute sale to the plaintiffs and received the price
thereof, they can never justify the seizure, made with
manifest bad faith, of the products of the said land
which
no
longer
belongs
to
them.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned
to the judgment appealed from are deemed to have
been refuted, and holding the said judgment to be in
conformity with law and the merits of the case, we
must, as we do hereby, affirm the same, with the costs
against the appellants. So ordered.
19. Arzadon-Crisolog v. Ranon (ART. 543)
Page 17 of 26
POSSESSION

FACTS:
According toRaon, her family had enjoyed continuous,
peaceful and uninterrupted possession and ownership
over the subject property since 1962, and had
religiously paid the taxes thereon. They had built a
house on the subject property where she and her family
had resided. Unfortunately, in 1986, when her family
was already residing in Metro Manila, fire razed and
destroyed the said house. Nonetheless, they continued
to visit the subject property, as well as pay the real
estate taxes thereon. However, in August of 1986, her
daughter, Zosie Raon, discovered that the subject
property was already in the name of the spouses
Montemayor under Tax Declaration No. 0010563 which
was purportedly issued in their favor by virtue of an
Affidavit of Ownership and Possession which the
spouses Montemayor executed themselves. The
Affidavit was alleged to have created a cloud of doubt
over Raons title and ownership over the subject
property.
The spouses Montemayor, for their part, alleged that
they acquired the subject lot by purchase from Leticia
del Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon who are the heirs of
its previous owners for a consideration of P100,000.00.
The Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo,
(represented by Leticia A. Crisologo del Rosario),
Mauricia Arzadon, and Bernardo Arzadon (petitioners)
filed an Answer in Intervention claiming, inter alia, that
they are the rightful owners of the subject property,
having acquired the same from their predecessors-ininterest. They averred that there existed no liens or
encumbrances on the subject property in favor of
Agrifina Raon; and that no person, other than they and
the spouses Montemayor, has an interest in the
property as owner or otherwise.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N the Notice of Adverse Claim filed by the
petitioners constitute an effective interruption since
1962 of respondents possession of the subject
property; and
(2)W/N the respondents had acquired ownership over
the subject property through uninterrupted and adverse

possession for 30 years, without need of title or of good

faith
RULING:
Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code
underscore the judicial character of civil interruption.
For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must
have received judicial summons. None appears in the
case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was
filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a
notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt
respondents possession.
The open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession by respondents of the subject property for a
period of more than 30 years in repudiation of
petitioners ownership had been established. During
such length of time, respondents had exercised acts of
dominion over the subject property, and paid taxes in
their name. Jurisprudence is clear that although tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they
are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession.They constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property.As is well
known, the payment of taxes coupled with actual
possession of the land covered by the tax declaration
strongly supports a claim of ownership.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a
man has to have his feet on every square meter of the
ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
(Ramos v. Dir. Of Lands)
Nothing was done by petitioners to claim possession
over the subject property from the time their
predecessors-in-interest had lost possession of the
property due to their deaths. Plainly, petitioners slept on
their rights. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura
subveniunt. The law comes to the succor only to aid the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
Respondents occupied without interruption the subject
property in the concept of an owner, thereby acquiring
ownership via extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
Page 18 of 26
POSSESSION

20.

Daclag vs. Macahilig-Decision (Articles 528

and 544)

FACTS:
This case pertains to the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration on the SCs decision dated July 28,
2008 where the court affirmed the Decision dated
October 17, 2001 and the Resolution dated August 7,
2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
48498.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners contend
that the 10-year period for reconveyance is applicable if
the action is based on an implied or a constructive trust;
that since respondents' action for reconveyance was
based on fraud, the action must be filed within four
years from the discovery of the fraud.
Petitioners next contend that they are possessors in
good faith, thus, the award of damages should not have
been imposed. They further contend that under Article
544, a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits
received before the possession is legally interrupted;
thus, if indeed petitioners are jointly and severally liable
to respondents for the produce of the subject land, the
liability should be reckoned only for 1991 and not 1984.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners are possessors in good faith.
HELD:
The Court find partial merit in the petitioners argument.
Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that possession
acquired in good faith does not lose this character,
except in a case and from the moment facts exist which
show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
Possession in good faith ceases from the moment
defects in the title are made known to the possessors,
by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the
property by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause
or the fact from which it can be deduced that the
possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or
mode of acquisition, it must be considered sufficient to
show bad faith. Such interruption takes place upon
service of summons.

Futher, the Court also cited Article 544 of the same

Code provides that a possessor in good faith is entitled
to the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally
interrupted. Records show that petitioners received a
summons together with respondents' complaint on
August 5, 1991, thus, petitioners' good faith ceased on
the day they received the summons. Consequently,
petitioners should pay respondents 10 cavans
of palay per annum beginning August 5, 1991 instead
of 1984.
21.

Daclag vs. Macahilig (Resolution)

Facts:
Records show that while the land was registered in the
name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, respondents
complaint for reconveyance was filed in 1991, which
was within the 10-year prescriptive period.
Petitioners contend that the 10-year period for
reconveyance is applicable if the action is based on an
implied or a constructive trust; that since respondents'
action for reconveyance was based on fraud, the action
must be filed within four years from the discovery of the
fraud
Petitioners next contend that they are possessors in
good faith, thus, the award of damages should not have
been imposed. They further contend that under Article
544, a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits
received before the possession is legally interrupted;
thus, if indeed petitioners are jointly and severally liable
to respondents for the produce of the subject land, the
liability should be reckoned only for 1991 and not
1984.
Finally, petitioner would like this Court to look into the
finding of the RTC that since Maxima died in October
1993, whatever charges and claims petitioners may
recover from her expired with her; and that the proper
person to be held liable for damages to be awarded to
respondents should be Maxima Divison or her estate,
since she misrepresented herself to be the true owner
of
the
subject
land.
RULING:
Page 19 of 26
POSSESSION

1.) In Caro v. Court of Appeals,[3] we have explicitly

held that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance
of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate
of
title
x
x
x.[4]
However, notwithstanding petitioners' unmeritorious
argument, the Court deems it necessary to make
certain clarifications. We have earlier ruled that
respondents' action for reconveyance had not
prescribed, since it was filed within the 10-year
prescriptive
period.
However, a review of the factual antecedents of the
case shows that respondents' action for reconveyance
was
not
even
subject
to
prescription.
2.) Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that
possession acquired in good faith does not lose this
character, except in a case and from the moment facts
exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that
he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
Possession in good faith ceases from the moment
defects in the title are made known to the possessors,
by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the
property by the true owner. Whatever may be the
cause or the fact from which it can be deduced that the
possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or
mode of acquisition, it must be considered sufficient to
show bad faith.[8] Such interruption takes place upon
service
of
summons.[9]

review. Thus, petitioners cannot raise the same in this

motion for reconsideration without offending the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process, specially
since Maxima was not substituted at all by her heirs
after the promulgation of the RTC Decision.
WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 28, 2008 is MODIFIED only with
respect to prescription as discussed in the text of herein
Resolution, and the dispositive portion of the Decision
is MODIFIED to the effect that petitioners are ordered
to pay respondents 10 cavans of palay per annum
beginning August 5, 1991 instead of 1984.

22. Florentino v. Supervalue (ART. 546)

FACTS:

Article 544 of the same Code provides that a possessor

in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his
possession is not legally interrupted. Records show
that petitioners received a summons together with
respondents' complaint on August 5, 1991;[10] thus,
petitioners' good faith ceased on the day they received
the summons. Consequently, petitioners should pay
respondents 10 cavans of palay per annum beginning
August
5,
1991
instead
of
1984.

Petitioner is doing business under the business name

Empanada Royale, a sole proprietorship engaged in
the retail of empanada with outlets in different malls
and business establishments within Metro Manila.
While Respondent, on the other hand, is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of leasing stalls
and commercial store spaces located inside SM Malls
found all throughout the country. On 1999, they
executed 3 Contracts of Lease for cart- type stalls in
SM North Edsa and SM Southmall and a store space in
SM Megamall. The period of the contract is 4 months
and may be renewed upon their agreement. Petitioner
received two letters from the respondent, in the first
letter, was charged with violating the Contracts of
Lease by not opening their stalls and store space in two
days, selling a new variety of empanada called miniembutido and of increasing the price of her
merchandise without prior approval of the respondent
and also, that petitioner was frequently closing earlier
than the usual mall hours. While on the 2nd letter, it
informed the petitioner that it will no longer renew the
Contracts of Lease upon expiration.

3.) Notably, petitioners never raised this issue in their

appellants' brief or in their motion for reconsideration
filed before the CA. In fact, they never raised this
matter before us when they filed their petition for

Petitioner explained that the mini embutido is not a new

variety of empanada, only its size was reduced.
Notwithstanding petitioners explanation, respondent
took possession of the store space in SM Megamall
Page 20 of 26
POSSESSION

and confiscated the equipment and personal

belongings of the petitioner found therein after the
expiration of the lease contract. Petitioner demanded
the return of the seized equipment and personal
belongings and to return the security deposits.
Petitioner then filed an action for Specific Performance
against the respondent before the RTC.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent made verbal
representations that the Contracts of Lease will be
renewed from time to time and, through the said
representations, the petitioner was induced to introduce
improvements upon the store space at SM Megamall in
the sum of P200k. Respondent claimed that the seizure
of petitioners personal belongings and equipment was
in the exercise of its retaining lien, considering that the
petitioner failed to settle the said obligations up to the
time the complaint was filed.
RTC- in favor of petitioner; physical takeover and the
seizure of the equipment and personal belongings
withour prior notice was illegal.
CA- modified; the respondent was justified in forfeiting
the security deposits and was not liable to reimburse
the value of the improvements introduced; but
maintaned to return to petitioner her properties after
she has settled her obligations to the respondent.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent is liable to reimburse the petitioner for
the sum of the improvements she introduced in the
leased premises.
RULING:
No. The Contract of Lease executed by the parties, it
mandated that before the petitioner can introduce any
improvement on the leased premises, she should first
obtain respondents consent. In the case at bar, it was
not shown that petitioner previously secured the
consent of the respondent before she made the
improvements on the leased space in SM Megamall.
To be entitled to reimbursement for improvements
introduced on the property, the petitioner must be
considered a builder in good faith. Further, Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code, which allow full

reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of

the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only
to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on
land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. A
builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw
in his title to the land at the time he builds on it. In this
case, the petitioner cannot claim that she was not
aware of any flaw in her title or was under the belief
that she is the owner of the subject premises for it is a
settled fact that she is merely a lessee thereof.
Being mere lessees, the private
respondents knew that their occupation of
the premises would continue only for the
life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be
considered as possessors nor builders in
good faith.
In a plethora of cases, this Court has held
that Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation
to Article 546 of the same Code, which
allows full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made,
applies only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief
that he is the owner thereof. It does not
apply where one's only interest is that of a
lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it
would always be in the power of the tenant
to "improve" his landlord out of his property.
(Geminiano v. Court of Appeal)

23.

Ramel vs. Aquino (Articles 546 and 547)

FACTS:
Daniel Aquino is the registered owner of Lot No. 2080.
On October 21, 1975, Aquino mortgaged the property
to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). In
1983, the property was in danger of being foreclosed as
respondents had no means to pay for the loan. Thus,
on August 7, 1983, they offered to sell to petitioners
8.2030 hectares of the mortgaged property.
Petitioners agreed to purchase the property but the
agreement was not reduced into writing. Petitioners
Page 21 of 26
POSSESSION

were to buy the 8.2030 hectares at P13,500.00 per

hectare or at a total sum of around P110,700.00.
Petitioners would assume the remaining mortgage
obligation of respondents with DBP as of July 31, 1983
in the amount ofP85,543.00 and the balance of
about P25,000.00 shall be paid to respondents on
installment.

NO. The court ruled that it cannot order an offsetting of

the claims. The evidence show that both parties failed
to prove their respective claims. In the absence of
evidence from both parties on their claims, offsetting is
improper. The right to offset may exist but the question
of how much is to be offset is factual in nature and
needs to be proved by proper evidence.

Respondents also sold to petitioners 2,484 square

meters of the southern portion of the mortgaged
property for P2,700.00. Petitioners paid the full amount
on September 7, 1983. On even date, petitioners were
allowed by respondents to take possession of the
parcels of land sold. Since then, they allegedly
introduced improvements to the property, such as rice
paddies, drainage canal, fence and a house.

24.

RTC ruled that both parties failed to prove their claims

through any receipt or document. Despite the lack of
proof, the trial court ordered that whatever
improvements spent on the land shall be offset from the
fruits derived therefrom.

Cosio vs. Palileo

FACTS:
Plaintiff obtained from defendant a loan in the sum of
P12,000.
To secure the payment of the aforesaid loan, defendant
required plaintiff to sign a document known as
Conditional Sale of Residential Building, purporting to
convey to defendant, with right to repurchase, a twostory building of strong materials belonging to plaintiff.
This document did not express the true intention of the
parties which was merely to place said property as
security for the payment of the loan.

CA- Affirmed.
On appeal, the petitioners claim that the offsetting of
claims is erroneous citing Articles 546 and 547 of the
Civil Code. Under these provisions, petitioners argue
that as possessors in good faith and in the concept of
an owner, they are entitled to the fruits received before
possession was legally interrupted and they must be
reimbursed for their expenses or for the increase in the
value the subject property may have acquired by
reason thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a legal ground to order the
offsetting of the claim of improvements by petitioners to
the claim of fruits derived from the land by respondents.
HELD:

After the execution of the aforesaid document,

defendant insured the building against fire for the sum
of P15,000, the insurance policy having been issued in
the name of defendant. The building was partly
destroyed by fire and, after proper demand, defendant
collected from the insurance company an indemnity of
P13,107.00. Plaintiff demanded from defendant that
she be credited with the necessary amount to pay her
obligation out of the insurance proceeds but defendant
refused
to
do
so.
ISSUE: WON a mortgagor is entitled to the insurance
proceeds of the mortgaged property independently
insured by the mortgagee? What is the effect of the
insurance?
HELD: NO. The rule is that where a mortgagee,
independently of the mortgagor, insures the mortgaged
property in his own name and for his own interest, he is
entitled to the insurance proceeds in case of loss, but in
such case, he is not allowed to retain his claim against
the mortgagor, but is passed by subrogation to the
insurer to the extent of the money paid. (Vance on
Insurance, 2d ed., p. 654) Or, stated in another way,
Page 22 of 26
POSSESSION

the mortgagee may insure his interest in the property

independently of the mortgagor. In that event, upon the
destruction of the property the insurance money paid to
the mortgagee will not inure to the benefit of the
mortgagor, and the amount due under the mortgage
debt remains unchanged. The mortgagee, however, is
not allowed to retain his claim against the mortgagor,
but it passes by subrogation to the insurer, to the extent
of the insurance money paid.

that spouses Francisco only surrendered possession of

the property to the Castellanos during the period of the
loan, on the condition that upon extinguishment of the
obligation, possession shall revert back to spouses
Francisco.

25. Castellano v. Francisco (ART. 555)

RULING:

FACTS:

Sps. Francisco did not abandon the land. The Court of

Appeals stated that abandonment requires (1) a clear
and absolute intention to renounce a right or a claim or
to abandon a right or property; and (2) an external act
by which that intention is expressed or carried into
effect. The intention to abandon implies a departure,
with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or
claiming the right and the interest that have been
abandoned.

Spouses (Sps.) Francisco had been in possession of

the disputed land herein since 1955. Pursuant to PD
No. 27, Respondent Francisco was issued a Certificate
of Land Transfer. Sps. Francisco borrowed P50k from
petitioner Castellano, in return, Castellano would
cultivate and possess the property until full payment of
the loan, and this agreement was not reduced in
writing. According to sps. Francisco, when they offered
to pay, petitioner refused to accept the payment. Sps.
Francisco later learned that Castellano was able to
secure an Emancipation Patent and a TCT in the name
of Erlaine, Castellano's son.
Sps. Francisco filed a petition for cancellation of
Erlaine's emancipation patent before the DARAB. Sps.
Francisco claimed that ownership of the lot was
transferred in Erlaine's name without their knowledge
and consent. In their answer, the Castellanos stated
that spouses Francisco later informed them that they
would no longer redeem the land.
Regional Adjudicator- in favor of Castellano, Sps.
Francisco committed a breach of obligation when they
sold their tenancy rights to the Castellanos. They
abandoned their land.
DARAB- affirmed; sps. Francisco surrendered their
possessory right over the land in exchange for P50k
and physically abandoned the land. With the issuance
of Erlaine's emancipation patent, Erlaine had a superior
right over spouses Francisco, who were mere holders
of a certificate of land transfer.
CA- reversed DARABs ruling; spouses Francisco did
not abandon the property. The Court of Appeals said

ISSUE:
W/N Sps. Francisco abandoned their rights over the
land.

In this case, there was no showing that spouses

Francisco had a clear, absolute or irrevocable intent to
abandon the land. Spouses Francisco's surrender of
possession did not amount to abandonment because
there was an obligation on the part of Eugenia to return
possession of the land to spouses Francisco upon full
payment of the loan.
26.
EDCA
Publishing
&
Distributing
Corporation vs. Sps Santos (Article 559)
FACTS:
EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor
Jose Cruz who ordered these by telephone, which was
agreed to be payable on delivery. The books were
subsequently delivered to him with the corresponding
invoice, and he paid with a personal check.
Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos
who asked for verification, and was then showed the
invoice for the books.
EDCA became suspicious when Cruz ordered another
set of books even before his check cleared. Upon
investigation, EDCA found that he wasnt the person he
claimed to be (Dean in DLSU). EDCA had the police
Page 23 of 26
POSSESSION

capture Cruz, as well as seize the books from Santos.

Santos demanded the return of the books.
RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment.
Subsequent dishonor of a check, which did not render
the contract of sale void does not amount to unlawful
deprivation of property. (There was a perfected contract
of sale so the proper remedy is specific performance)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the EDCA was unlawfully deprived of
the property?
HELD:
NO. With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not
unlawfully deprived of the property by mere failure of
consideration. There was already a perfected contract
of sale. Proof was even substantiated when EDCA
gave the invoice as proof of payment upon delivery of
the books. This did not amount to unlawful taking,
because by the delivery of EDCA to Cruz, ownership of
the books already transferred to him.
On the petitioners contention that the private
respondents have not established their ownership of
the disputed books because they have not even
produced a receipt to prove they had bought the stock.
The Supreme Court cited Article 559 of the Civil Code
which provides that possession of movable
property acquired in good faith is equivalent to title,
thus dispensing with further proof.
27.

Edu vs. Gomez

FACTS:
The car in question legally belongs to Lt. Walter A. Bala
under whose name it is originally registered at Angeles
City Land Transportation Commission Agency; that it
was stolen from him and, upon receipt by the Land
Transportation Commissioner of the report on the theft
case and that the car upon being recognized by the
agents of the ANCAR in the possession of private
respondent Lucila Abello, said agents seized the car
and
impounded
it
as
stolen
vehicle.
On February 15, 1971, herein private respondent Lucila

Abello filed a complaint for replevin with damages.

HELD:
There is no merit in the petition considering that the
acquirer or the purchaser in good faith of a chattel of
movable property is entitled to be respected and
protected in his possession as if he were the true owner
thereof until a competent court rules otherwise. In the
meantime, as the true owner, the possessor in good
faith cannot be compelled to surrender possession nor
to be required to institute an action for the recovery of
the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is issued
in his favor. The filing of an information charging that
the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa from its
true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor
does not warrant disturbing the possession of the
chattel against the will of the possessor.
Finally, the claim of petitioners that the Commission has
the right to seize and impound the car under Section 60
of
Republic
Act
4136
which
reads:
Sec. 60. The lien upon motor vehicles. Any balance of
fees for registration, re-registration or delinquent
registration of a motor vehicle, remaining unpaid and all
fines imposed upon any vehicle owner, shall constitute
a first lien upon the motor vehicle concerned.
is untenable. it is clear from the provision of said
Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 that the
Commissioner's right to seize and impound subject
property is only good for the proper enforcement of lien
upon motor vehicles. The Land Transportation
Commission may issue a warrant of constructive or
actual distraint against motor vehicle for collection of
unpaid fees for registration, re-registration or delinquent
registration
of
vehicles.
28.

Dizon- Pamintuan v. People (ART. 559)

FACTS:
A crime of robbery has been committed on February
12, 1988. The robbers took away jewelries and other
personal properties including cash. The owner,
Encarnacion, immediately reported the matter to the
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police. He was later told that some of the lost items

were in Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the
police had dispatched. That an entrapment would be
made with their participation, on February 14, 1988. As
such, they went to Camp Crame at around 9:00 a.m.
and arrived at the vicinity of 733 Florentino Torres
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at about 10:00 a.m.; that he is
with his wife posed as a buyer and were able to
recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the
stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan; the
pieces were: 1 earring and ring studded with diamonds
worth P75,000 bought from estimator Nancy Bacud
(Exh. "C-2"), 1 set of earring diamond worth P15,000
(Exh. "C-3") and 1 gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000
(Exh. "C-4").
ISSUE:
W/N Dizon-Pamintuan knew or should have known that
the items recovered frm her were the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft
RULING:
Yes. One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has
the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof,
or is aware of the existence of something, or has the
acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within
the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity.When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an
element of an offense, such knowledge is established if
a person is aware of a high probability of its existence
unless he actually believes that it does not exist.On the
other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact
that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence
would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to
another or would govern his conduct upon assumption
that such fact exists.Knowledge refers to a mental state
of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot
penetrate the mind of an accused and state with
certainty what is contained therein, it must determine
such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that
person. And given two equally plausible states of
cognition or mental awareness, the court should
choose the one which sustains the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides

that "[m]ere possession of any good, article, item,

object, or anything of value which has been the subject
of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of
fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to
have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her
possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The
presumption is reasonable for no other natural or
logical inference can arise from the established fact of
her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft.
29.

Rivera vs. Vargas (Articles 527 and 539)

FACTS:
Respondent Vargas filed a complaint against petitioner
and several John Does for the recovery of a 150 T/H
rock crushing plant located in Sariaya, Quezon. Vargas
claims ownership of the said equipment, having
purchased and imported the same directly from Hyun
Dae Trading Co. The equipment was allegedly
entrusted to petitioners husband, Jan T. Rivera, who
died sometime in late 2002, as caretaker of
respondents construction aggregates business in
Batangas. According to Vargas, petitioner failed to
return the said equipment after her husbands death
despite his repeated demands, thus forcing him to
resort to court action.The complaint was accompanied
by a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin and the
necessary bond amounting to P2,400,000.00.
The writ of replevin was served upon and signed by a
certain Joseph Rejumo, the security guard on duty in
petitioners crushing plant in Sariaya, Quezon on April
29, 2003, contrary to the sheriffs return stating that the
writ was served upon Rivera.
Petitioner countered that the rock-crushing plant was
ceded in favor of her husband as his share following
the dissolution of the partnership formed between Jan
Rivera and respondents wife, Iluminada Vargas
(Iluminada), on May 28, 1998, while the partnerships
second rock-crushing plant in Cagayan was ceded in
favor of Iluminada. She further averred that from the
time that the partnership was dissolved sometime in
2000 until Jan Riveras death in late 2002, it was
petitioners husband who exercised ownership over the
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said equipment
respondent.

without

any

disturbance

from

ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of replevin is improperly served.
HELD:
YES. Replevin is both a form of principal remedy and
of provisional relief. It may refer either to the action
itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels
being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another,
or to the provisional remedy that would allow the
plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the
action and to hold it pendente lite. The action is
primarily possessory in nature and generally
determines nothing more than the right of possession.

possessor in good faith. He is entitled to be

respected and protected in his possession as if he
were the true owner thereof until a competent court
rules otherwise. Before a final judgment, property
cannot be seized unless by virtue of some provision of
law. The Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes
such seizure in cases of replevin. However, a person
seeking a remedy in an action for replevin must follow
the course laid down in the statute, since the remedy is
penal in nature.34 When no attempt is made to comply
with the provisions of the law relating to seizure in this
kind of action, the writ or order allowing the seizure is
erroneous and may be set aside on motion by the
adverse party.

The law presumes that every possessor is a

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