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Facts: Petitioner was born and registered

as male. He admitted that he is a male

transsexual, that is, anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female
and that he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone
treatment, breast augmentation and sex
reassignment surgery. From then on,
petitioner lived as female and was in fact
engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely,
and his sex from male to female. The trial
court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru
the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is

entitled to change his name and sex in
his birth certificate.

Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code

provides that no person can change his
name or surname without judicial
authority which was amended by RA 9048
Clerical Error Law which does not
sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Before a
person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change. In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name. In
this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer
as a result of using his true and official
name. Article 412 of the Civil Code

provides that no entry in the civil register

shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order. The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to
his first name and sex, were all correct.
Hence, no correction is necessary. Article
413 of the Civil Code provides that all
other matters pertaining to the
registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws. However, there
is no such special law in the Philippines
governing sex reassignment and its
effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a
birth certificate is a historical record of
the facts as they existed at the time of
birth. Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife)
by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a persons sex made at
the time of his or her birth, if not
attended by error is immutable

For these reasons, while petitioner may

have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his
birth certificate. The remedies petitioner
seeks involve questions of public policy to
be addressed solely by the legislature,
not by the courts. Hence, petition is
v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

CIVIL LAW: validity of marriage
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American
citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced
by a Certificate of Marriage. On December 6,
2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer, alleging that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really
had any intention of entering into a married
state or complying with any of their essential
marital obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September
13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for
pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the
pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio.
The RTC opined that the parties married each
other for convenience only. Albios stated that
she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship
and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to
pay him the sum of $2,000.00. However, she
did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the
latter never processed her petition for
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The
CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contracted
for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship void ab initio on the ground of lack
of consent?
HELD: The marriage between the parties is

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v.

Immigration and Naturalization Service,
established the principal test for determining the
presence of marriage fraud in immigration
cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the
bride and groom did not intend to establish a
life together at the time they were married.This
standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of
1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to
instead demonstrate that the marriage was not
ntered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States.The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the
intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading
immigration laws. It must be noted, however,
that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to
rule on the legal validity or existence of a
In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,
which declared as valid a marriage entered into
solely for the husband to gain entry to the
United States, stating that a valid marriage
could not be avoided erely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose.The 1980 immigration case of Matter
of McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent
or sham marriage was intrinsically different from
a nonsubsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent
to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A
reely givenconsent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense
that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles 45

and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud,

force, intimidation, and undue influence.
Consent must also be conscious or intelligent,
in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking
between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was
real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do
so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application
for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be

created between them, since it was that precise

legal tie which was necessary to accomplish
their goal.

Francisco Hermosisima vs. Court of

Facts: Complainant Soledad Cagigas then a
teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School
in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten
(10) years younger than she, used to go around
together and were regarded as engaged,
although he had made no promise of marriage
prior thereto. She gave up teaching and opt to
become a life insurance underwriter in Cebu
City where the relationship of him and petitioner
and that they have sexual relations. The
petitioner promised to marry Cagigas and that
they have borne a child Chris Hermosisima.
Subsequently on July 24, 1954, Francisco
married Romanita Perez.
Issue: Whether or not mere breach of promise
to marry is actionable?
Held: It has been ruled for many cases that
promise to marry is not actionable. The Civil
Code does not provide for such. The decision of
the RTC was eliminated by the SC.