Fulton County Superior Court

***EFILED***NE

Date: 1012612015 4.41:51 PM

Cathelene Robinson, Clerk

IN T[{E S{JPERIOR" COUB'T *s F{]I-T'ON CS[jI1{T'Y

ATLANTA JUSICNAX, CTRCUTT
S'TATS SF'GEOR.GIA
THE CITY OF ATLANTA, a municipal )
Corporation and political suhdivisiofl of the )
State af Georgia, acting by and through its )
fuIay*r anil City Coun*il,
Petitioner,
V.

AT'LANTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL

SYSTEM, a politieal suirdivision af the
State of Ceorgia. acting by and througl"r
its duly elected Board,

CIVIL ACTIOh] FILE

N{}.2015CV258510

Respondent,

FULTON COUr\TY SCHOOL DISTRICT.

a political subdivisir:n r:f the State of
Georgia acting lry and througll its duly
Elected Board,

Irtervenor-Respondent.

)
)

]
)

)
)

F{NAr- ORDE& ph{ PilNSIF-lG zuiOTlO$S

The above styled actjon com.es befure this Court on ilre fullurviirg rtotions: t|) Atlanta
lndepsendent Schrsol.$uranr 's fu{otirsnJbr .ludgnrcnt on the Pleudings, {21 Fultan Cot*tl.y St:hool

District's Motion to Dismi.ss PetitionJbt'Declarutory,ludgment, and (3) Citt;

oJ

-Atlunta's Motiort

.fbr Suntmary Judgrnent. l{aving considered the entire record in this rn&tter and argument

of

counsel, the Court HEREBY DENIES Fetitioner City of Atlanta's Motion for Sutntnary
Judgment, CRANTS Respondent Atlanta lndependent Schortl System's Motiort fbr Juclgment r:n
the Pleadings. and ORANTS Fulton County School District's fuIotian to Disiniss Petiti*n for

Declaratory Judgment, findirig as fr:llows:

STATE]VIENT OF FACTS
In this action Petitioner City of,Atlanta seeks a declaratcry judg:nent purstrant to

O.C.C.A. $$ 9-4-l e{ seq- that it rrray annex property rvithin Fulton Ci:unt,v into the City of
Atlanta's rnunicipal boundaries r,yithout sin:ultaneously expanriing the bouudaries of the Atlanta
lndepenrlent School Systern ("APS") and that the City rnay exercise its rielegated authority

tcl

selectively rietennine r,vhether an annexation extends APS' bounclalies.l

The material fircts of'this case are not disputed. In i950. the Ceneral Assembly passed
local constitutional amencimcnt (tlie " 1950 LCA") to the Ceorgia Constitutron
was subsequentiy ratifieci by voters. The 1950

of

I 9''15,

r.vhich

LCr\ provided in rclevant paft:

fW]hen the corpcirate lirnits of the City of Atlanta are extenrlsd into Fulton
County, the territory embraced therein shall becoms a part of r/re tnd*pendent
school sltstunt o.f the City r{Atlunta and shall cease to bs a pa:t of the schor:l
system of the county. The school prr:perly located within *re area embraced in the
extension sirall bccome the propefiy of tlre Citi; of ,Atlant*.
Ser Ca.

L. iq50.

pp. 458r59 (emphasis added). Thus, under thr- 1950 LCA ( 1) wlLenever the

City of Atlanta annexed ten-itory in Fultc;n CoL]ilty, APS' boundaries automatically and
cotenninr:usly expandecl to encompass the nervly annexecl tenitory, and (2) a:ry "school
property" located within that area rvor-rld hecome the property ot'the City of Atlanta" Id. In 1960,
ar:.other local constitutional amendrtent was enacted providing

fbr the City to assume ileflirin

debt of the Fulton County Schocl District ("FCSD") ii: retnmr for schr:ol properlies transtbn'ed by
annexation. Sec Ga. L. 1960, pp. l44l-44.

At the tirne ths General Asseurbly

passed the {950

LCA, the City's independeirt scirool

systeffi tvas not a separate $or?orate entity but ralher tire school sy'i;tem serving the City fonned
part of the City of Aflanta's municipalgovernment. as authorized by the 1945 Constitution.
Ca. Const. of 1945, Art.

VIII, $VIt,1 I. Hoivever, in

City of Atlanta"s Fetitior: tbr

De

1973, the Ceneral Assembly separated thc

claratory Judgment. liil 1, 45

2

Scre

City of Atlanta fi"onr the City's school system and education functions, creating two separale
corporate entities by enacting separate charters ftrr the City and rvhat was to becoms APS

tlrruughCa.L, 1973,1t.2188(Cityol'AtiantaCharteroi'1973)anclCa"L"
Clrarter ot'1973). respectively. See alsa Ca. Const. Ai1.

iq73"p.2167(APS

VIIL r\V, 1lli I and 11.

The 1945 Ceor:gia Constitution rvas replaced by rhe 1976 Constitution, rvhich tvas in trtrn
rcplaccd bythe 1983 Constitution. cffectivc Jul. 1. t983.Sec Ga. Const.. Art. XI,

$1,

llvI.

1983 Constitution prohibited the enactment of {irrther local constitutionai aitendr:rents

Sce Ca. Const.,

Art. X, $ I, lfl ("Arnendments to this Constitution or

a ne\.v

Thc

("LCA").

Co*stitution nray be

proposeri by the Ceneral Assernbly or by a constitutior:al conveittion. as provided in this ar"tic1e.

Only arnendmeftts,,vhich are olgeneral and unifonn applicability throughout the state shall be
proposed, passed, or subnritted to the people"). Eristing LCAs rvould rcmain in efl'ect ftrr a IoLrr
year

period-until July t.

1987. See Ga. Const,,

Att. XI, $l.1llv. If the Ceneral Assernbly did

not expressiy readopt an LCA "withotil amendment" by tirat date, it would be repealed. Id.
(Eraphasis added).

In 1986. the Cenerai Assembly passed Fir:use Bill 1620 ("1{B I620"), r,vhich provided iri
relevanl part:
That constitntional atnendment fthe 1q50 LCAJ providing that, upr:n the
extension of t1"re corporate lirnits of the City 61611unta into Fultan Cortnty,
the additional territory and school property locateci in the annexed area
become a part of the Ctty of Atl*nta independent sclr*al system (Res. Act
No" 73; HR 181-q69j; Ga. L. 1950, p.'t58) s&aIJ not he r*pealed ot
1987, as pad of the Constitution of the State of Ceorgia
tleleted on July
bttt is speciJicatly continued in force ontl efibct o* and aftct' tlrat dats as
u pwt af the C*nstitutiln af the Stnte of 6e*rgia-

l,

See

FIB 1620, Ga. L. I986, pp. 48 12*13 (ernpirasis added)-

While HB I630 sought to expressly readopt and, thus. contiirue in effect the 1950 LCA,
in this actiorr the City of Atlanta arguos that HB 1620 in fact purported to amend the 1950 LCA

and misrepresenterJ tire contents of the 1950

void. "lhqs, t'he City urges the 1950 LCA

LCA, making the legislatio* uncr:ustitutional and

r,vas repealed

by operation of Art.

Xl, rsl,l[V

because

the Ceneral Assembly failed to enact valid legislation contiuuing the 1950 LCA fbllorving
acloption and ratification of the 1983 Constitution such that amtexation by the City within Fulton

County does not automalically and coterminously extcnrl the boundaries of APS.

ln 2015, thres coinmuniti*s in unineorporaled Fulton County sutrr:ritted atrnexalioir

petitions tc join the City of'Atlanta.2 Fur"ther. the City or,vns real prop*rty located ir:
unincorporated Fulton County at 0 Fulton Industri*l Bculel,ard, N.V/., (the "Fultou lndurstdal
Parcel") r,vhich the City r:f Atlanta has propr:sert to arurex.] The City contenris that

it is

"uncsrtain ahout what school options are available to unincorpornted ccmtnunities lrecartse of the
existelce of the 1950 LCA, as well as wirat actions Atlanta or othel's may take in that regartl""+
Becausc of uncefiainty rsgarding lvhether the 1950 LCA rernains in

etltct and its impact otl the

tbregoing proposed annexations, on Mar. 18" 2015 the City of Atlanta ljled the present action
agailrst APS, seeking il declarati:ry judgment that "the 195fi Schcols LCA is no longer eff.cctive
and thus that an

apexation by Atlanta within Fulton County wauld not auton:latically extencl the

Petirion fbr Deulararory Judgn:enr. YJi{ 4-5, ;15: Cit-v- of Atlanta's li4otion lbr Sunrur*r1, Judgnlenl, 8. Exhibit
D*'-N{egan Mid<lletor Aff., filI 6,
r
Peritir:r lor Dectaratory Judgrneru. lill 3.44,48-49; Ciry of Atlarrta's lvlotion lbr Summary Judgment, 8.
Exhibit D--Megat Middleton Atf., iill 2-3, 6. In l97l), tlre Georgia Ceneral Assembly passed an LCA to thc 1976
Consritutio6 {the "19?t LCA") creating tlie Fultou Industrial District, ivtrich prohibitsd anne.lation or incorporatitxt

rvithinthatareaexceptbyconsritutional amenclment.,SaeCa.L t979,pp. l?97-99.Follor'vingadoptiorrofth.-198i

Coltstirution (including its prohibition against future l,CAs and repeal of exi*ting [*CAs unless rvithin lbur yeius ar
').
LCA lvm expressly contiuuerl by Iegislative act). in lAB3 the General Assembly passed l{ouse Bil} 85 ("LiB 35
r.r,hereby the Legislature purported to continue in force and etfect {he 1979 LCA. 'See Ga. L. 19$3. p.4077. In a
ssparate declaratory action t'rted by tire Cif-v of Atl*nta against Fuiton County iri the Superior Court o1' Fulton
County. tlre City sought a declaratory judgment declaring l-lB S5 unconstitutional such that the Cit-v could properly
aljrex propr;rry within the Fulto* Industrial Districl into its municipal boundaries. 5'c* City of Atlania v. Fultort
Counry. Superior Court of Fulton Cr:urrty. Civil Actior lrile No. 3015CV358507. tn thar case (during the pendency
ofl the instant action), the l,Ionorable Gail S" Tusan foun<i the 1979 i-CA to be vokl nb lrritio becanse it violated
Georgia's Singte Subjecr Rule (prohibiting conrbirring unrelated measures in tlte satne legislative act. constitutiorrai
unrencfunent, or rrfrrenclum)" ar:ci also found ]113 E5 void such tirat the 1979 LCA rvas repealtd by operation of
Article XI ol'rhe l grYl Cgnstiruriorr. Ser Petkas:Jirlza4ry!. 15? Ca. 104, 108 ( 1984) i"[A] trial court mal' take
judicial cognizanue . . , ofrecords on filc in its oun courC').
''
City crf Atlalrta's lvlotion fur Summary Judgment 9.

boundaries of APS."5 Thc City aiso requests that the Court declare that either the Ceneral
o'delegated
Assembly or the City of Atlauta (through its
[iegislative] authority") may cletennine

wlll:ther any annexation by the City wilhin Fuiton County extentls the bounrlaries of APS.6
Thereafter the Court grar:ted FCSD's trzlotion to Intenr'ene as a Respondent. The instanl motions
fallorved.
POSTLJRE AND STANDARD OF'REVIEW

This mattei' came before the Court tirr a status and schedulitrg conference on May 18,
2015, al rvliich all pailies were in attendanse through their respective counsel.7 Thereatter. the

Cogrl enterecl a Case Management Orcler setling deadlines for the subrnission of "dispositive
motir:ns" ancl responses and replies thereto. Cerlain deadlines were extended via Consent OrcJer
i:n Jul. 8, 2015. The parties each sLrbmitted dispositive motions, although each filed ir ditTerent

motion seeking tinal disposition of this case.

Fursuant to O.C.G.A. s\9-11-56. summary judgment is appropriate

"if

the pleadings,

depositions. allswers to inteffogatories, and admissions cn flle, together ivith the aflidavits,
any, show that there is

r"ro

if

genuine issue as to airy rnaterial fact and that the moving parly is

entitled to a jticlgrneni as a matter of law." O.C.G.A. $9- l I -56. See also Hqme Builders Ass'n

of

Savannah, Inc. v- Chatham Cnty., 276 Ga. 243-?44 (2003) ("Tti pr-evail at sumnrarrl judgnrent

under fO.C.C.A.l $ 9-l l-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of'

'
"

City olAt)anta"s lvlr:tion lbr Summary Judgment. 3'

Petition for Declarutory Juclgment. 2 ancl Prayer fbr l(eliel City of Atlanta's Motion lbr Sun:mary
Judgment, 3. It appears tl-re Cir,v of Atlanta l:rrst atternpted to rrs,rlle issues raised in thi* action by introdrrcing
Iiouse Bill 638 in the General r\s*eu'rbly, a bill expressly seeking to repeal the 1950 I-CA" i-Iorv*ver. [lB 6]8 did not
pass
dur-igg the 3015 session. ,*re FCSD's Motion to Disrniss Petition fbt l)eclaratory Judgrnent, 3 and Exhibit B'
'Seca{saO.C.G.A,
l?4-2-22A {Georgiacourtsmaytakejudicial noticeoi. iilterultu."all lawsandresolutionsof thc

Geaeral Asserublyandthejoumalsol'eaclrbranchthereofaspublishedbyauthority").Act:ordT oUp:p]ru

C]reatharn, 24-,t Ca. l l 7. I l8 {19?9)l $J:*rpi:-y. .I,-.orr'e, 214 C4" 511, 5 18 ( 1958}At the staru$ c-onlbrqnce, the parties indicated they dc not trelieve discovery is necessar-v in this nratter' Ser:
Case il4anagenienr Order arrd Order Granting Fultan County School District'* lvJotio* to loterveile, 2.

matcriid tact and that the irndisputed tacts, r,,iewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
par1y, warant judgment aii a msttsr of

law").

A mation for judgment on the pl*adings may be liled

are closed but

withiir such tin:e

as not to delay the

at any time "[a]11er the pleadings

trial." O.C.C.A. $ 9-11-12{c). Sucit shouid be

granterl "where the undisputed facts th*t appear from the pleadings establish that the movaut is
entitlecl to ju<lgment as a rnatfer of law." IYpvare.Srp," Inc. v. Sa;it, 290 Ga. 186, 191 (201 1)'
"A11 well-pleaded fa*ts are to be accepted as true- Howet er, the triai court is not reqr-rireci to

adopl a pady's legal conclusions based *lr thr:se fucts""

on a motion ior

judglent

Ic1. S'ee

a/so O.C.G.A. $ 9- I l- t?(r:J

{"If,

on the plearlings. matters outside the pleading$ are presefited to and not

exclucled by the courl, the motion shall be treated as one tirr sumrnary judgr:nent and disposed
as providerl

of

in Code Sectiou 9- I l-56, and all parties shall be given reasonable c,pportunity to

prefisnt atl material made pertinent to $uch

A motion to disnriss will

&

rnolion by Cocle $ection 9- 1 1-56."

be gra*ted'*lvllere a complaint shorvs rvith certainty that tlie

plaintitTr.voulcl not be entitled to relief r:nder any sttte trf facts thai cor:ld be proven in support
the ciairn." Pep't of Transp. v^ Jackson. 229 Ca. App. 331. 322 i1997)" Sec trlso O.C.G'A.
11r13

of

* 9-

("It, on a motion to dismiss ftrr lailure of th.e plearling to state a claim upon which relief

can tre granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and nai exch.rded by the court. the

motir:n slrall be treated as one tbr summary judgment and disposed of as provided ir: Code
Sr:ction q-11-56, irrrd all p*r1ies shall be given reasonable opportrrnity to present all material
rnade pertinent to such a motion by Code Section q-11-56")'

Here, insot-ar as ail parties have been on notice that matters outside of"the pleadings were
submitted regarding thr; instant motions and have had arnple opporturiity

t* obtain

and submtt

rnaterials regarding ths same, the Court fincls it may properly consider those materials to the

extent they are othenvise adrnissible and treat the pending motions as

if tbr

itlinnifield v. Wells Fargo Bank. N.A.,331 Ca. App.5l2,5i5 (2015).

Sec

Cordele v. Turtq+'s, 163 Ca. App. 327. 329 { 198?)

ease

summary jurtgrnent.

See

ttlso Citvof

("lt is the <luty of *ach party to present

his

in flill on the hearing ot"the motion fbr summary judgment"); Bd. of Regents-of Univ:. Sys.

of Ceorgia v. Brooks.324 Ca. App. 15. 16 (2013) ("A motion to disnriss on sovereigtr imrnunity
grounds is based upon the

rial

court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. and as a rcsult, a trial

court is entitled to make factr.ral findings nec*ssary to resolve the jurisdietionai issi-te").

AhIALYSIS
The parties' motions and the responses lhereto largely center uprrn three prirnary issues:

(1) whether sovereign immur:ity immunizes llespondents t}om this declar-atory judgrnent actioni
(?) whether this matter is ripe and pr"oper for declaratory relief; and (3) the constitr.rtionality of

HB I 6?0 and, consequently, the ougoing vali<lity of the 1950 LCA.

l.

Sovereign lmrnuniQ'
Under tlie doctrine of sovereign irnm'unity. tho state carutot be sued
rvithout its cousent. It is an established principle afjurispr-urlence
iri ali civilized nations that the s<ivereign cannol be sued in its own
couils. or iu any other, without its consent and pa'ruission; but it
may. if it rhinks proper! waive this privileg$. and pen:iit itself to be
made a defendant in a suit by individuals, or another State, AIrd as
this pennission is altogether vr:luntary r:n the pari of the
soversigpty, it foliows that it rnay prescribe the terms and
conditions on lvhich it cc':nsents tc be sued, and the manner in
r,vhicir the suit shall be conducted, and rnay withdrarl' its consent
whenever it rnay suppose that justice tcr the public requires it'

State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 2{:3 Ca. "+39, 430 ( 1993) (citations and punctuation omitted).

"UndeL Ceorgia law, soveteign irnrnunity is an imnrunity flom suit, rather than
def"ense to

liability,

an<l, theretbrc, rvhether a

a mere

govsrffnental detendant has waived its sovereign

irnmunity is a threshold issue." McCobb v. Claytr:n Cnty., 309 Ca. App. ?17. 217-18 (301 i)"

Sovrreign immunity extends to the State's "departments and agencies" and includes
Responilents, both politi*at subclivisions of the Stats"E See Ga. Const.,

Art. [, $ II.lilX{e) and

Art. Vlli. $V, $. S*e alsa Cofl'ee Cnty. Sch. Di-st. v. Snipes,2l6 Ca. App. 293.29a (i995);
Birnria v- Ben I{i11 Cntlv. Sch. Dist., 320 Ca. App. 433, 424 {2A13). Tire party seeking to benefit

fiorn the waiver of sovereign imrnunity beers the buriien of establishing

Cnt.v*" Sch.

sLrcl-r

r.vaiver. DeKallt

Dist. v" Gold, 318 Ca. App.633, 635-36 (2012)l Bonner v. Peterso:r. 30i Ga. App.

443. 443" (2009). Thus, the Court must {irst consider lvhether sot ereign immunity bars thjs
action"
Respondents argue that there is no statutory rvaiver that

penlits the City o1'Atlanta to

Lrring this declaratcry action against them- The Ciry cou*ters that sovereign imntunity does not

bar declaratory relief for its constituti+nal1y based claims. [n recent tlecisions the Ceorgia
Supreme Court has expressly deciined to address whether dectrarxtory aclions brought against the
State are barecl under the d*ctrins of savereign immrurity. See, e.g., SJN Pr*peities. LLC vFr-rlton Cnty.-Bd. of Asscssors, 196 Ga. 793, 802 {2015) ("We have prcviously

left unresolved

the question of *,hether sovereign immunity generally bars claims against the State fur

tleclaratory relief . . . Because this significalit legal issue has received little atiention in these
proceeclings anrl because thesc claims can be disposed of on other grounds . . . lYe decline to

clefinitively resolve it here")q Soulhem LNC. Iuc. v. MacCinnitie ,29A fra. 2G4, 205*06 (201 1)

{"Tiris is not to say that rleclaratory actions ag*inst the State at'e rlecessarily ban-ed by sovcre igrr
immunity. We siinply decline to adclress the question whetiler a declaratory action against the
State to determine one's rights with respect to the applicability of a statutc is barred by sovereign

immunity"). Nevertheless. liaving consitiered the facis and circurnstanees of the

case sub

iudice

City of Arlarta'$ Stalenxent ol'Undisputed fuIalerial Facts. fl l-3: AliS" and FCSD's Joinl Response to the
City of Arlanta's Sratement of Undisputed lv{aterial Facts and Supp}emeot*1 Statement *f Undisputed Ulaterial lra{rs
qi$ 7-'l

an<i Georgia

law ,,vith respect to sovereig;rt imuunity, the Court finds it does not btr the City's

clairn for declaratr:ry reiief rvith respe*t to the constitutionality of HB 1620 and ongcling validity
of the 1950 LCA.

i1 1784, Georgia

acloptecl the comrnon law doctr:ine of'sovereign immunity- r'vhicl't

generally protects the State tiom unconsenterl-to legal a*tions" Gilberlv..Ri{rhardson,264 Ga.
744,745 {19q4}. The doctrine rvas giveir constitutional status in Georgia
Section 1I, Paragraph

IX of Ceorgia's current Constitu{ion

in 197'{. lcl. Article

I"

addresses the State's sr:vereign

imrnunity ancl witivcr thereof, and provides in part:

E.xcept as specifically provided in this Paragf,aph. sovereigtr
imrnunity extend.s tr:r the state and all of its clepartrnents and
agencies. The sovereign irnrnunity of the state and its depattlnents
and agencies can only be rvaived Lry an Act of the ceirsral

essenibly which specitically provicles that sr:vereign imrnuriity is

theretry lvaived and the extent of such lvaiver.
Oa. Const.,

Afi. I, $li, 111X. However,

tire Constitutir:n alsr: provides that "[1]egislative acts in

violation of tlris Constifution or the Constitution of the LJnited States are void, and tlte iuditi*ry

shsll sa declare tfuem." Ca. Const.. Art. i, $H.1iV (ernphasis added). Thus" Ger:rgia's
Constitutior: expressly contemplates thar questions regarding the constit*tionality of legislative
acts are proper tbr declaratory relif'

Recently in Ceorqia Dep't of Natural Res" v. Ctr'. tor a Sustairrable CoaSt. Ins., 29'l Ca.
5S3 (2014), the Georgia Supreme Court, after providing an exhaustive history of the State's

evolving colstitutional provisions

lvi*

respect to sovereign immunity, concluded that sovercigtt

irnmunity barred irlunctive relief against the State at common }aw. ?he Coutl found, inler alia.
that ths'oclear language of our Corrstitution authorizes
sovereig,n

CIn1y

the General Asserirbly to waivc

immunity". the Cqnstitution does not provide for an exception to the legislature 's

had previor"rsly
excir-rsive aulhority to waive the State's immu:"rity, and that Ceorgia coutls

"mischaracterizecl a waiver of sovereign immunity as an excsption to sovereign itnmunitv"' Iei. at

597.

Ho;over, in Ctr. for a Sustainahle Coast" inc" our high coufi also acknolviedged that
sovereign irninunity may be properly waived pulsuant to *ther Constitutional pruvi.sions- Citing

City of Thomasr.ille v. Shank. 263 fra" 624(l) (1q93), the Couit noted ttrat it had previousiy
recognized a "fluisance exc*ption" to sovereigrr immurrity and in so doing had "reaffinn[edl the
iongstanciing principie that a municipality is liable lor creating or maintalting a nuisance tvhich

constitutes either a danger to life and health or a taking of proper"ty"" Ctr, for a Sustainable Coast.

Inc,, 294 Ca. at 600 iquoting Shank, 263 Ca. at {:25). Alth*ugh described in $lrank as an
"exception" to sovereign immunity, tl're Court reasoned that the rationale behind pen::itting suit
under a nuisance theory is conxtitutinnal/y based:
ooexception" in Shanl;, tlte rationale
Thougtr rienominated as an
behind it is rooted in the concept that the govenunent may rrot take
or damage private properiy tbr public purposes withriut just and
adequate corrlpensation, ?61 Ca. at 624-625.437 S.E.?d 306. See
Ca. Const., Art. l, Scc. III, Par. I(a) (emincnt dornain); Colurubiu
Cauntv t'. Doolittlc,2l0 Ca- 49()( l), 512 S.E.2d 236 ( lq99)
(explaining that the eminerit d*main prex,'ision of the Georgia
Cor:rstirution .,r'aivss sovereign irnmunity in an i*verse
condemnation action, and therefore, a county nray be suerl ttlr
damages and enjoined fi:r creating or maintaining a nuisance);
lluttterfbrel.,*. DtKalb dtountv,287 Ga' App. 366(2), 651 S'E.?d
'771
QA07) (noting that a coutlty may be liable through inverse
condeinnatign when a nuisance {iinollnts to a taking nfpruperty t-nr
public purposes because sovereign immunity is waived by the
State Constitution's emirent dornain provision)' Thus, the
*onuisance exception" recognized in Shanlr was nr:t an exceptiot at
all, hut itt*tuad, $ propsr roeognttiort that the Constitution itse
requires just carfipensfltion.f*r takings and cuxttttl, thereJ'*re , be
understpod t* *fford irumttnity in such cs.s?s.

lf

Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast.Jnc" ,294 Ca. at 600 (emphasis adderi). Ser:, e.g., Coh-rmbia County
v. Doolittle,77A Ga.490

(lqqqi (explaining lhat the eminent domain provision of the Georgia

l{l

Canstilutiorr rvaives sovereign imrnunity in an inverse c<lndemnation action, and therefore, a

ccunty may be suecl for darnages and enjoined f'or cresting or maintaining a nuisance)l
Rutlrerf'ord v. DeKalb Colnty, 28'l Ga- App. 366 (2007) (noting that a caunty may be liable
thrnugh inverse ci:nderanatioir wher a nuisance amoufits l<i

taking of property for public

pur?o$es bectruse sovereign irnruunity is waived hy the State Constitlttiuil's eminent rjomain

provisian). See alsrt Druq_y, 263 Ga. at 430 (*'Since the tecovery ofjust and adequate
compensation for private prope$y which is trken for public pllrposeii is

tonstitutional fight"sovereign imrnunity is not

a viable bar to an

itstlf *n

s-Wre$-s

*clion to enforce that right")

(ernpliasis adcled). Fufiher, in surnmarizing its reasoning f'or overruling precedent allowing tbr

jutiicially created "excepticns" to irnmunity, the C*url in Ctr. ttlr

a SLrstainable Coast. Inc., fbund

that "a bright line rule that onl-y the Caustitutitn itself or a specitic waiver by the Gerreral
Assembiy can abtogate sovereign immunity is mr:re workable than [the previous] scheme
ailowir:g jurlicially created exceptions-" Ctr. for a Sustainable Cr:ast. Inc., ?04 Ca. at 602
(eniplrosis added).
Further, our courts have noted thai althouglr sovereigtt imrnunity gen*rally appiies to
cleclaratory actions, Ceorgia iaw allows for declaratory relief against the State in some eofltexts:

Our Constitution and statutes dri not provide lbr a blar-iket rvaivsr
of sovereigl imrnunity in declaratr:ryjrldgment actious; and this
o'sovereign immunity is *pplic*ble to protect
Colul has ibund that
state agencies in declaratoryjudgmcnt actions"..." On the other
hand, as our Suprenre Court recently noted in outhern LNG, Inc.
v. fuIucGinnitie, declaratory aetions against thc Stats have
nevefiheiess been recognized ir cefiain contsxts. Accordirrgly. we
must decide whether, in the eontext of the case sub izttlire, the
State has waived its sr:vereign imrnunity to fplaintiiYs]

declaratory-j udgment claim.

tt

lt

DeKqlb Cnty. Sgh. Diqt. v. Gold,318 Ca. App. 633,63? (201?). See, e.g, o.c.G-A. $50-13-10

(provision under Georgia's Adtiinistrative Prrtcedure Act') provitling firr declaratory action to
challenge "[t]he validity of any rule, waiver, or vadance . . . when it is alleged that ihe rul*.

wftiver, or variance or its threatened application interferes with or impairs the legal rights of the
petitioner"); Drury, 263 Ga. 429 OgW) (declaratory rrli*f authorized to challenge validity of
agency rul15s); Unrlercotler v, C$ioniai Pipeline Co", I

l4 Ca. App. 739 ( 1q66"} (declaratory action

by property otvfler against State Rer.e:rue Commissioner as to acl valorein tax return l'cquirctlcnts
seekirrg to make annual *d valorern tax ret$ill to the Catnmissioner r';rther than the

loctl tax

ccrnmissioncr in each county in which property ownsr had property).

In Golcl, $tiprn, the plaintif

fls

(teachers of the DeKalir Cor.rnty School DisffictJ sued the

ciistrict and otlers challenging the district's suspension of its tax sheltered annuity plan lvhicil

plaintiffs alleged was an employee benefit plan established

as an alternalive t$ the t*ederal Social

Secgrity system. Cqld. 318 Ga. App. at 633. The piainfifts asserted claims fur declarittory

judg:nent, money ha<l arrcl received, unjust enrichment, protnissory estoppei, conversion, breach
ot'contract, and breacli of tire implied cr:venant of gorid fuith *nd fair dc'aling. Id' The trial courl
clenied def'epdants' mation to disrniss wherein they argued sovereign imnrunity baned each 01'

the plaintitlb' cl*ims. Id.

l-iillcling tfue defendants were imrxute ti'om suit rvitir respect to the plairrtiffs' declaratory

judgrnent claim, the Court of Appeals noted plaintitlt' argument that "sovereign irnmunity does
not bar cleclaratory relief in suits challengiirg the constitlltionality of legislative acts." Id' at 639,
Howf,ver, the court dirl not squarely address the issue, uliirnately finding, intsr alia, that altliouglr

plaintiffs invoked "cgnstitutional principles," they did not "presenl

facial chailenge to the

constitutionality of the [h]oarcits legislative acts." Id. Intercstingly, itt s* holding the cour"t cited
I{ereir,alier "APA"

t?

to Georgia Supreme Court prececient that suggesl deelaratory actions are an apprupriate
mecharism tc rlirectly challenge the constitlti+nality of Iegisiation:

l{igclon v. Li4,' aJ'Senoia,273 Ca.83, 85(l), 538 S'E'2d 39

(2000) (tjnding rhat "[a]n action for declaratory judgrlett is an
available rflnedy to test the constitutionality of a statute in a case
where an actual controversy exists with respect lhsreto"
(pBnctuation ornitterl)): tu{cDcmiel v. T"lzomas,248 Ga. 632. 633(l),
285 S.tr.?d 156 (1981) {r'evierving declaratory-juclgtnent clairn t}rat
the Stats's systern of financing public education violated equnlprotection plr:visions of the State constitution. noting that
"ft]uclicial revielv of legislative enactmeflts is central to our system
of colstituticnal government and deeply moteci in E:ur trtistory").
Sr..e

ld. at n. 35.
One of the fbregoing cases, McDjrniel v. Thorna*. rvas brcught by and r:n belialf

of

stuelents, parents, and the school boards of various coutrties against the Statr: Department

{rf

Education and its superinteldent, challertging tlte coustitutionality of the State's system for

financing pulrlic education. MgDgnlel, 348 Ca. 633, n. 1. Although the Georgia Supreme Court
r1id

lot directly

address soverei-$ immunity in that case, it did address a simiiar "th'eshold

issgs" raised by the defentiants that "the question of how public education can best be funded is

nonjusticiable" and is'lnore suitably l:andle<l by other branches of governnrent."lu id. at 613.
The Court finds our high court's holding on tliat point compelling and persuasive rvitl"r respect to
the case at bar:
Such an argumellt, in our vierv, misperceives the nature of this
dispute. Neither ths trial coud nor this court has been called upon
to clecide rvhetheq as a policy matter, a particllar tinancing scheme
is .obettsf' than another. lVe have heen asked ta cietermirre rvhether
the existing method r:f financing public educatirin in tl"ris state
meets constitutional requiremetts. Judicial review of Iegistative
enactments is central to our systm of'constitutional government
and deeply r'ooted in our history lMarbttv v. fuIttc{isrsrt,5 U.S. {1

rt'

Intleecl. a similar argument u.as made by Respcinrler:ts at the S*pt. 14. 2015 ireariug on the instant nrorious.
on Sept' 14
See Transcript of Declararory Jo<tg**ot lvleition Betbre lhe Hon. John J. Goger. Atlanta Judicial Circuit'
2015. !3,:4.

IJ

Cranclr) 137, 176,2 L.Ed. 60 (1.q03))- A sulrstantial nurnber of

courts h*v* been called upon to decide issues similar tr: those
presented in this case and have nr:t fourd the ditliculties associated
tlrerewitlr to be insurmountable. See, e.g., Nonhshore Schaol
Distritt tYo. 4t7 v. Kit"rnear', 84 Wash.Zd 685, 530 P,?d 178 (1974);
Sko./statt v. [{ollitts,l i0 Ariz. 88. 515 P.2d 590 (1973)' Indeed,
"f wle knorv of no sister Stato wirich has refused merits treatmeirt to
such issues, and we would regard our owrl refusal to adjudicate
plaintiffs' claim of ccr,stituti6rral infiingernent an abdication of our
cr:nstitutional duties.
Id.

Additinnally, the Court must note that while Respon<let:ts arglie there is no rvaiver of
sovereign immunity {or decl$ratory acti*ns challenging the cortstittttimalitlt of tegislativs {tcts,
the cases they cite are inapposite as they do not address thai issue. Sae. e.g.- Oivera r'- L]qiv' Sys-,

of Georsia's

Bc1.

of Regents" 331 Ca. App. 392 (2015), ceit, Eanted (June 15,2015) (petition fbr

declaration that beneficiaries of t'ederal Defened Action fbr Childhood Arrivals program are

eltitlecl to in-state tuition benetits and that Board

o{:

Regents' policy to the contrary is invatrid);

Ceorgia Dep't of NAUtgl,B.es. v. Ctr. fr:r a $ustainable Coast. Inc. .294 Ga.5q3 (2014) (suit by
enviroru:nental group to enjoin state tiom issuing letters of permission to third parties authorizing

land alterations to property within the jurisdiction of the Ceorgia Shore Prr:tection Act); Juilicial
Cour cil of Georsia v. Brorvn

& Gal1o. LLC, 288 Ca. 2q4 (2010) {declaratory action

r"rnder

APA

challenging validity of code oi'professiolal ethi*s far cor-rd reportir:g); Live Oak Consr.rltin$. lnc.
v" DeI:'t oi'CmtV.

ilea tb, ?81 Ca. App. 791 (2006) (declaratory action under APA challenging

Depafiment of Community Health's interpretation of its rules concenring scl,ool district's

requirerl contributions to the State's liealth insurance plan); Can:eron v. Lang ,27 4 Ga- 122
(?001) (claims arising from automobile accidents r.vith cars clriven by police oftjcers); Colfee

Cnty. Sch. DlS!. y. Snipes,216 Ca. App" 293 (1995) {tot claim against schr:oldistrict arising

fiom clrild's fhll while playing at school); Teston.y. Collins,2l7 *a. App. 829 (1995) (tort
t4

claims arising from altercation betlveen a siudent and a visitor to ths school); Ceorgia Dep't

of

v. Merrill
Hulrran-Res. v. tqss, 263 Ga. 347 (1993i, overrLrled on other trounds bv Hpdquist
Lynch* Pierce. FemretrL Snnith-[nq.,272 Qa.209 (3000) (clailns cf negligence against t]re
D*parhaent of i{uman Resources}.

As i1<licated *fuove, '"[u]nder Georgia

1a,,v,

sovereign immmrity is an immunitit fforn

sr-tit,

ratlrer rharr a mere defensr to liability." Mgegbb, 309 Ga. App. at 217-18 (ernphasis added). The
Court fincls persuasive that the constitutionality of legisiative acts has been challenged through
declaratory actions without rliscussion of or r*ference to sovereign immnni$. Scc" e.g., Channell
r,. Houston, 287 Ga. 682 i2010) (affinning gr*nt of declaratory rclief to coutlty sheriff who

brought suit against county baatd c*'commission*rs seeking declaration that special tax district
established by b*ard was unronstitutional); Rsbur Cnty" High VoltaSe Line Const. Moratoriurn
Ordi.nance r,,..Georgia Transmission Cotp.,276 Ga. SI (2003) {affii'r,rirrg giant of declaratory

relief to electrical cooperative brought against ccunty, finding ordinance setting a moratoriurt on
the construction gf higli-voltage power

lir"res

violated home nrle provision iind uniflormity clause

of the Srate constitution); gigdon v. City of Senoia. 2?3 Ca. S3 (2000) itrnding a justiciable
cofltroversy propfir far declaratory relief'wirere the city rvas prevented &om annexing propefiy
under service rlelivery and dispute resolutiCIn st$trtes rvhich city alleged to be LlnconstitLrtional):

Bmck v. Cil_y of Temple, 240 Ga. 411 (i9?7) (reaching r:nerits of declaratory action challenging
the constitutionality of a local annexation act). See a/so

HffiSf:f-EgtgElg,2)S fra. 420" 412

(1g6qi ("A declaratory jurlgment action is an especially and particulady appropriate metirod of

detenninilg

a controversy

with respect tcl the constitutionality of an A*t of the legislature' An

action for a declaratory judgrnent has been ireld by this court to be an available remedy to test the
constitLrtionality of a statute in a case where an actual conffOversy exists rvith respect tliereto")'

lc
IJ

Here, the City asks the Coufi, [nrer alia. to dccli:le tliat the I950 LCA is no longer vaiid,
because

HB

Paragraph

1620 elid r:rr:t readopt

it without amendtnent

lV of the Cer:rgia Coi:stitutir:n

as required

by Arlicie XI. Seotion l,

and because I-lB 1620 vlolated our Coi:stitrttiou's

notice and ilistinct description requirements.ll Thus, the cq::rstitutionality ot- HB 1 6?0 and
resultanr validity of the i 9S0 LCA are the center point of this litigation. ffldeed. hers the Court is
facecl with

political sufudivisions of this State with patently ditfering views on n'hether

legislative act i$ constitutional. Civen allot'the abovs and insafar as "[1]egislative acts in

violation *f this Constitution or the Constituti<ln *f the Ur:ited States are void" and the judiciary

"'[]udicial revierv ol'legistative

lmust] so cleclare them" (Ca. Const.. Afi. I. $lI,IiV), and whereas
enlctments is central to our system of constitutionai governmenl and deeply roo{ecl in our

history" (McDaniel. 248 Ca. at 633)" the Conrt finds sovereigr irnmunity does not bar the City's
elaim for declaratory relief ivith respect to the cot'tstitutionality of HE I 620 anil thc 1950 LC.A.
Flowever. the City also seeks a cleclaration from this Court that "[e]ither t]re Ceneral
Assembly or Attanfa, acting through statutory trroile rule polver, may determine on a case-bycase basis 1,vhettrer annexation by Atlanta
flr.us lvhose

within Fuiton County extends APS' bourldaries,

ancl

educati*nal taxes shr:ultl be leviecl withir such annexed areas."i2 Such d0es not call

1or a judicial eleclaration regarding the constitutionaiity

of any legislativ* act' T}re City of Atlanta

having faile4 ta establish any specific constitutiorral or statutoty waiver abrogating the State's
sovereign irnmunity with respect to such a declaratory claim, it is barred.

Bonner, sltprttiCtr. lbr a Sustainable Coast. Ipc. , snp,t

''
'',r

Sere, e.9.,

Gold, sirprn:

.t3

City of Atlanta's Fetiliou tbr Declaraturl 'f udgnrent. 1i1l i5. i9, 42'
Clt1, olAtlanta's Perition tor l)eclaratory Judgrnenl. Prayer firr Relief-. CQunt ?(c).
tt * Couri tlnds rto nrerir to the City's argurnent the I]CSD in some way r,r'aived its sovereign irnrnunity try

afld it hfis
merely inlerv.ening in thix action. FCSD intervencd a.s * del'endiurt, not a$ a claimani seeking recovery.
FCISD" SevL:nth
crrnsistently. asserted irs sove.reigu iuununity" See, u"g., Ansn'er ancl Defbnses of Iotsrvenor
v' Dsp'l
AtIrrnali'e llejtnse; FCSD's ilotion to Dismiss lletition tbr Declaratory Judgnient, 7-8. Sec #l'eo I lilhurn
*6
20i0)'
3}'
Feb'
at
{D'N'J'
ot'Corr.. No.2:07-CV-0606't.20i0 WL 703101,

i6

fi.

Declaratory Relief
ApS aclvances the argument that the "proposecl" annr:xations at issue ir: the case at bar are

,'tuture corrtingencfies]" too thr removed fi'o*r occurring to bc considered an "'actual

controversy,, for which a cleciaratory jurlgment rvould be appropriate

lras alr-eatly acted pursuant to its annexation rights uncter O.C.C.A. $$

14

FCSD contends the City

l6-36-1 et seq. by

fonvarding its alurexatioil relluest firr the Fulton Inrlustrial Parcel to Fulton Ci:unty' Thus, FCSD
argues the City dr:es not risk taking "undirected acliotl" because

it iras alreacty acterl to arutex the

to
foregoipg parcel ancl there is no "future unceftainty" as to the course of conduct the City is

jointly by APS and

fbllo1v rg cqmplete the anne.tati<ln-r' In subsequent, supplemental fiiings filed
FCSD, they contend that until the City of Atlanta obtains legal authority to consunrnrate the
proposed annexations, the validity of tire 1950 LCA prfsents a pr.rely hypothetical question that
q-4-2,1{;
is lrot ripe for rsvierv under O.C"C.A. $

Ttre City of Atlanta, in tum, urges declaratory judgment$ are an appropdate meals

of

rssolvi,ng dispr-rtes between gr:vemment entities regarding the constitr-rtionality of statutes- Ses

Citv of Atlailra v. Hotels.cem-,L.P.,285 Ca. 231,234 (2009) ("lT]o state a olaim for declaratory
judgment, a party need only allege the existence of a justiciabie controversy in which future
conduct depends on resolution of uircefiain legai relations"), Thc City contends its governing

sixty
body srust proceerl to act on the petition antl vote to epplol'e rir deny the request within
days of verification

!y

thc City Cler* undsl' O.C.C.A" $$ 36-36-34,-37, and chnse to lbrego

tinalizing the petitians periding a<ljudication of this action so that it does not "'blunder tbrward in

Briei
la
ApS, Nlotion for Jucigment r:n the Pleadiugs and Men:oralrlunr olLalv ia Support, 3-4; Supplcrnenul
6Pleaelingr.
the
of APS' lvl<ltion tbr Judgrnent on
in Support
f - " Brief il Support of [:CSD;s N,lotion ro Disrniss Fetitiorr for Declaratory'Judgment. 5-7',
the l}leadings and FCSD'*
rr,
ApS, orA iisn'. Joinr Reply Brief in Support o{APIi' Motion ibr Judgurent ort
Motion to Dismisr. 12*lJ.

t7

the f'ace of uncertainty."rT Althr:ugh this case pre*ssnts a close questiorl. the Court finds thc matter

ripe and proper tbr declaratory reliet'"

In reviewing the p*rties' papers and the cass law cited therern rvith respect to deciaratory

actiols, the Court has not tbuntl them tr: btl particularty helptirl insofar

as ilone preserrts facts

persuasively similar to the case at trar. Rather, the clearest authority seems to come ftorn the
Declaratory Judgrnont r\ct itself. O.C,C.A. $9-4-1 provides: "The purpose ot'tl'Iis chapter is to
scttle and allbrcl relief frorn uncedainty and insscurity witli rsspect to rights, status, and other
lcgal relations; and this chapter is to be tiberatly cpnstraed aild adffiinistered." (Ernphasis
aci<iecl). Further,

O.C.G.A. :*L)-4-2 provi{es th*t superior courts of lhis state have the porver "to

declare rights anrJ other legal relations of

aly

interested pafiy petitinning fbr such cleclaratiotl"

it.r

"cases of actu*lly controversy" and to "clectars riglrts antl olher legal relations" of interestcd

paities petitioning for such relief "in any civil case in tvhich it appears to the court that the ends
aJ'iustice require that the declaration shsuld be ,nads." {Ernphnsis adtjed'}'
Further, the Cetirgia Suprenre Court has held:
For a controversy to justify the making of a declaration, it must
include a r:ight claimed by one party and denied by the other, and
not mereiy a question as to ths abstract urearring cr validity of a
statute. There can bs no justiciable contrclversy unless there are
interrsted parties asseriing adverse clairns upan a stats offacts
rvhich have accrued'

piigrjrn v. FirstNat. Bank of Roine, 235 Ca" 172,174 (1975) (citations omitted).
r,. Composite Slqte tsd. of Med.

Exami

See

also Bt+$pn

,345 Ga. App. 587, 588 (2000) ("'Deciaratory

judgment will not be rendered basecl on a pr:ssihle or probahle future contingoncy' because sucl:
a

ruling would be 'an

e.n'oneoLrs aclvisory opiirionu")

210,215 (1999)). An actr:ai corlhoversy exists when

''

Cit_,

{quoting Balter v" Cit.v of Mg.rietta, ?71 Ga.

t1-re

need {br settlemettt is greater tl'lan the

of Atlaflta's Response to A.PS' Ivlotion for Judgmenl on the P1*adi[gs. l6'

i,8

desire to have

judgment *'stored au,ay in a flle tiorn rvlrich it enukl be ii{led if the occasion ever

arosetheref$r.,,e,78Ga.r\pp.666,68B(1949}.
lmportantly, as noterl i:r Fart l. supr"a, Georgia coufis h*vs held that "[a]n action fbr
declaratory judgment is an available remecly to test ths constitutionality of a statute in a cass
where an actual controversy exists r.vith rsspect thereto"" Higdcn v. City-qf Seir<iia, 273 Ga- 83,
v. Phillips.
85 (2000) (quotiqg Har?er v, Burgss-{, ??5 Ga. 4?A, 422 (1969)), See also Richardson
302 Ca. App. 305, 304 {2010) (""Ihe object of the declaratory judgment is tr: pennit

determination af a controvcrsy belbre obligations are repudiated or rights are violated- As many
times pqintert out by this [Clourt. its purpose is to pennit one who is walking in the dark

t<:

asceilain ryhere lie is anil where he is going, to turn o* tire light heJbre he steps rather than after
he has steppecl in a

hole") {citafions omitted; emphasis in original}.

Here, the City orvls the Fulton lndusrial Parcel locatr:d rvithin the Fulton Industrial

District

zurd

in a separate declaratory actiun this Superior Court has heiri that tand rnay properly

be annexed in aucordance lvith ancl subject ttt the provisions of O'C'G.4. 5rr 36-36-l et

Via letter

clatecl

seq.tB

Mar. 17. 2015. City of Atlanta Mayor idasirn Rsed suhmitted to the City Council

ihe City's Petition Reqr.resting Annexatiou of the Fuiton industrial Parcel- }'ioticrl <lf said
r,'ia leiter
annexation application lvas prr:videcl to the Fulton County Board of Commissioners

aiso dated Mar. 17,2015.

Adclitionally, residents of the Sandtown" Locl"r Lomond, and Souiiroaks cominunilies

have already submitteci annexation petitions to the City pursllanf to O.C.C'A. $ 36-36-3?.
Because of uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of

HB 1620 and validity oitlre 1950 LCA'

the City anclresidents are uncerlain about the edueatinnal and tax ramifications of the

communities' pending annexation petitions, and the City anrl Respondeirt scirCIol systems

't

Su" note 3, .suprrr.

t9

maintain diarretrieally opposed positiclns w*ith respect to the same. It appears qr.rite ohvious that
rvI:ere children

will go tii schoal and the tax ramitjcations upon

the consumnlafioil of the

proposed annexations at issue here are of paramount concelTl and inrpo(ance to the City and the
impactecl school systems as we[1 fls

tCI

the etl"ecteci students. families. and their comrrunities.

Accorclingly, the Courl finds annexation is not a mere hypothetical situatior:, and the City

3f Atlanta

cloes not seek a

judiciai cieclaratir:n to keep on fiie should it evcr need it. Rather, at

issue in this case ere contested rights lvith respect to pending but yet unconsumntated
annexations with t'.tr reaching rarnifications for all parties as lvell as the residents of the impacted
comrnunitir,.s. 'I'hus, the Court finds there exists the "'necessity lor a determination of the dispute
to guide aird prrrtect the plaintiff fi'onr uncerlainty and insecurity r.vith regard to the propriety

of

sonre future act or conduct. whiclr is properl-v incident to [its] alleged rights and w'hich if taken

without dirqction might reasonably jeopardizc [its] intel'qst." Eak-er v. Citv o{Martgl-tq,21
11A,214 (1999) (quoting tuIorg4n

of the above rnd insofar

as the

r.,. C-u-ar. F,iat.

Corrt

Ga.

(1997i). Civen all

-Con:B4*ies. 268 Ga. 343, 344

fii"lds the'oe.nds

ofjustice require that the declaratian sltrtuld

be maden" the Court {iircls this matter ripe and proper ttrr declaratory relief.le

HI"

Constitutionalitl. of Hts 16?0 antl Ongoing Yalidiry of the 1950 LCrt

The City of Atlanta alleges HB l610 purported io amend the 1950 LCA in violation
Ca. C6nst. Article

XI,

$1,

of

TIV(a) (provicling that an LCA would be repealecl unless "specifically

continued in force and etfe{rt witl'rout amendment") and vialated the Georgie Constitutiou's

notice and tlistinct description requirements.l0,!ae Ca. Const. Art.

lIl, $V,lJIilII. IV, ancl IX.

l'

The Court l'in<trs no merit to FCSD's argument that the Clty n:ray sot obtain declaratory relief under the
of
upclean hands. See llrief in SLrpport o{'FCSD's Motioa to Disnriss Petition fbr Declaratory Judgntent'
cloctrine

&-

9. An action seekirrg a declaratory jurlgrnent is an action at la*,thr which the equitable doctrine Qf unclean hands has
no application. .!ce Floln:res y. Hender, qn, ??4 Ga. 8, I (2001 ). citing Joae+ v. Dalt.elas Cflty' . ?.62 Ca. 31 7 ( 1992):
Clover: rt. Glor:ei:, l7?. Ca. App. 378, :79 (1984).
Ciry of Atlanta's Petition tbr Declaratory Judgn:eni. !i1i 35. 3S, 43'

:0

the i950
Thus, the City seeks a rieclarator;r judgrnent that LIE 1630 is unconstituti{'tnal, and t}:tt

Art' Xl,
LCA was. therefore, repealed by operationof law on Jul. I, 1987 pursuant to Ga. Const',
gt, IJIV(a).2

The Ccurt disagrees.

favor of the
When a legislativc act is corrstitutir:nally challenged, "all presumptions are in

constitutionally of an act of the legislature." Shadrick...v. Blerlsoe, 186 Ca. 345. 350 (1938)' "The
the larv and
Ceneral Assernhly is presumerl to enact laws with full knowledge of the condition of

with refbrer.rce tc il,

ar:cl the courts

will not presume that the legislature intended to enact

an

(2003)'
uncanstitutional lalv." Bd,.of Pub. EdFc,, ibr City of Savamrah v' Hair, ZlS fia.575, 576
(200q):
As sunmarized by the ceorgia supreme court in chase v. state. 285 Ga. 693

fw]hen we al's interpreting

a st0tute, we tnust prsume that the

General Assenbly hart iul1 knowlecige of the existing state of ths

iaw an<i enacted the statute with ret'srence to it. we ccnstrue
statutes "irr connectiun ancl iir hannony wilh the existifig law. and
as a part of a general ancl unifarm system ofjurisprudencs," and
.'their meaning and ettbct is to tre detennineel in connection. rot
orrly with the common tsw and the constitution. but also i'vith
r$t'erence to other statutes and the decisians of ttrre sourt:i,"
Id. at 695-96 (citations ornitted).

See

nl,so Cox v. Barber-275

Qx.415,416 {1002) (rvhen

construing statutes, Ceorgia corirts must "lnok diligently ti:r ths intention of thq Cetleral

Assel-rblf'giving tire ,,vords of

a statute "a teasonable and sensible interpretation to caffy out the

(l9qq)
legisiative intelt and render the statute valid'"); Brown v. Libertv Cntv- ,27 L Ga.634. 635
(,.1t is a basic rule

of construction that a statute or con$tittltional provisinn should be construed to

ea*h part, as it is rrot

make all its parls harmonize and to give a sensible and inteiliger:t effect to
presurned that the legislature intsnded tliat any part rvoultl be without meaning") (citation and

punctuated clmitted). Furth$r, when a statute can be constructed as either constitutional or

See
unconstitutional, it nrust be constnred to uphold its constiitttionality. Hair, 276 Ga. at 576.

cily

a|, Atlanta's Petirion tbr Deciaratory Judgment. Prayer for Re [ief.

21

count

2.

also Ccr.rnrye].l v. Atlanta Tru_st Co. ,177 fra.303 {1933} {"Repeals by implicaiion are not favore<l.
In order for a lai,v to be repealed by implication, the existing act must be lvholly iner:oncilable
rvith the latter ilr orrler to r,vprk a repeal cf tfte fonner?']; Dev' Au!h' ot DeKalb Cnty'
?86 Ca.

i6,

v'

38 (200q) {"[B]ecause statutes are "presumed to be constitutional until the contrary

appears . . . the burelen is on the party alleging a statute to be unconstituti*nal ttr prove

I1Copelqnd

1,. State,

it")'

?68 Ca. 375 {1997), the Ger;rgia Supreme Conrt af}'irme<l the trial

court's <letermination that an L,CA. authorizing Henry County tr: levy

the county for watsr and sewage prrposes (the "Henry Carrnty

&

tax on all properly w:ithin

LCA") was vaiidly continued by

Iocal legislation in conftrrmity with Ga. Cr:nst. At"t. XI, $1, TIV.Specifirally, the Henry County

LCA pravided:
Proposing an amendment to tlie Constitution so as to authoiize the
gov*m.ing authorily of Henry county tc levy a tax nol to exceed
two mills per dollar on all taxable property lQcated therein for
r,vat$r or water and sswerage pulposes and ro gudrfrfttse pilyment,
in whale or itt part r$'tvater or watfi' a*d sewerago t"svsfl'4e
h*trds issued. ftom tirne t{) time, by the cCIuilty and the Henry
Cgulty Water Agthority rnd to otherrvise suppoll and maintain tl're
operations of a p.ater or water and sewerage system of Flenry
County; to provide that this amendment shall be self-eiracting and
that the General Assembly may grant additional powcrs not
inconsistent rvith the prouisions cf this amendrnent; to provide for
the snbrnission of this amendment lbr ratification or rejection; and

for otl"rer purposes.

,See

Ga. L. 1968, p, 1739. 11 1985,local legislation was enacted continuing in fbrce ancl eff'ect

the Fienry County LCA:

That constitutional amendment whir:h was prop{)sed by R"esolution

Act No. 338 iHouse Resolution Nci- 6??-1427) of the 1968 General

Assembly (Ga" L. 1958. p. 1739), and which was duly ratified at

the 1968 general election and which relates to autholizing the
g,lrre,11inf authnrity of Henry County tr: levy a tax not to exceed
two nri1ls per doilar ofl all taxalrle property located therein tr:r
watet or lvater and selverage purposes and ,a guarfrntee pflymefit
of reuertue bontls i.rstred hy the manty *nd the Hcrury Corut1y

w*ter Authoriqt shall nr:t be rspealerl or delcted on July 1, 1987,

as a pa$ of the Constitution r:f th* State of Ceorgiahut is
specifically c<lntiirued in force and effect cn and a1ler that date as a
part of the Constitutior: of the State of Ceorgi*'
.ser

ca. L. 1985. p, 3940 (the "Henrl County LCA Continuing Legislation").

be
l..lotably, while the l-{enry County LCA provided that the proptrly tax "sl"rall

wster attd
appropriated And used . . - to guaranty paymsnt, in whole or in pa*, a{ wster ar

Continuing Legislation
sewer&ge !.t:tlsfitt{ bon4sissued" by tire County, the Heru-y County LCA
a propctly tax
describe<lthe Henry County LCA as a local cernstitutional amendment authorizing
..1'or

issuerl by
u,ater or water anri sewerage purp$ses and to guarantee pa1'ment of revefiae bonds

LCA Continuiug
the county and the Flenry County Water Authority." Despite the Henry County
seu'erags
Legislation's rsference to "rsvsnuo bonds" generzrlly, reth$r tltan "water or watet'anel
reveflLie bonds" specifrcaily as pravided in the Henry County

LCA. the Ceorgia Supreme Court

and effect by thtl

.ecessarily concluded that the Henry county LCA was corLtinued in firll force

prirlicularly
Henry Coulty LCA Continuing Legislatir:n. Copelancl,268 Ca. at377-75. Srich is
Legislation
relevant given that a hyper-tecl"rnical reading of the Henry County LCA Conrinuing
case at bar) could s[ggest the continuing
{simiiar to that proposed by the City of Atlanta in the

LCA by
legislation unco:rstitutionally purportecl to amend and expand the Henry County
than
providing tor a property tax to gualanty the payment "revetlue boil'ds" generaliy rather

Flenry collnty
specifically fbr "rvater or lvater and sewerage revenue bond" as provided in the
Legislation
LCA. However, insteacl our high court found the Heruy County LCA Continuing
continued in tbrse and efTect tire Henry County LCA'
above, the
When applyirg the rules of statutory construction and case larv summarjzed
Courrt cannot iErore
Court fincis I-{B 1620 did nr:t unconstitutionally amen<l the 1950 ["CA. The

the passage of
that the express ancl unequivocal intent of the Cencral Assembly through
/.s

HB

1620

was that the 1950 LCA

"s*a/I

flot he repealed or dsleted an Jttly

l,

1987, a:r part of tlie

Constitution of the State of Geo rgia but is speciJically continued in force an$ effect on and
after thttt date as $ pnrt of the {anstituti*n

rf

the St*te of Georgia;'.See

}lB

1620, Ca'

L.

1986,

pp. 4813-13 {emphasis added).

With both pieces of legislati<tn, the General Assembly intsnded to and clid mnke tl:e City

.f

Atlasta's and APS' boundaries cotenninous upon annexatiorr of land into the City and

provideei that school property in annexecl areas wnuld go tr: th* entity operating the City's

schoois. The General Assernbly must be presumeci to have knorvn in 1986 that the City

of

Atlanta and the City's school system bccame distinct and separate *ntities as of 1973' When
re*4ir:g

rIB I620

and the 1950 LCA in the context of the eras in which they lvere aderpted, the

Cenerai Assembly did not pur?ofi to alter the nature and effect of the 1950 LCA. Rather HB
16?0 ref'lected the

reality rhat the Ceucral Assembly had already rnade the City's school system

ald the City of Atlanta tw6

separate ancl clistinct entities by a

ditlerent and uncontested piece of

legislation in 1973.

Civing due regard tbr the legisiative intent of HB 16?0, considering the language of HB
I620 anrl the 1950 LCA "in coruleftion arrrl in har-rnony with the existing lar,v" and presuming
that the Ceneral Assernbly had

flitl knon'leclge of the existing

1620 with reference to it. the Court dr:es not

state of the law and enacted HB

tind that HB 1620 purpomed to amend the 1950

LCA nor did so by implication. There is no irreconciiable contlict between HB 1620 and the
l g50

LCA insofar

as both

in substance inriicate that schr:*l propsrty located in areas of

unincorpgraterl Fuiton County that are annexed by the City sha1l pass to the entity then
responsible fbr the City's public schools. Ts eonstrue HB 16?0 as an uncoflstitutional
amendm*nt to the 1950 LCA as the Ciiy suggests r,vould require this Coud to ad*pt

74

a irf

i:er*

technical construction

rf HB 1620 in a historieal

vaclrum rvith no consideration t'or thc cxprcss

tvere
intent of the legislature or the cofitext and era in wliich HB 1620 and the 1950 LCA

ad.pteri. Rather than harmonizing all parts of HB 1620, such

tle

constluction woulel in fact vitiate

portions of HB I6?0 expressly providing tirat the i950 LCA "sha11 not be repealed or clrleted

on July

i, lgg7'but rather is "specifically continur:d in tbrce and etTect on and after lhat date as

r,vill not do. Haviilg cr:nsidered

a part of the Constitution of the State ot'GeErrgia." This tlre Court
1620 did
the record ancl applyiug Georgia's rules of statutory constructicln, the Court finds I-lB

not unooustitutionally amend the 1950 LCA.

r'vcrc
The City of Atlanta ftirther contentls that HB 16?0's text,litle, and public noticc

public on
misleacling, and vir:iatcrJ the Ceorgia Constitution in that HB 16?0 failed to put tire
notice that under the 1950 LCA, in the event of an annexation "scho(]l property'' wouid becomc
flre
property of tl-ie City of Atianta, and under FIB 1620 "school property" lvould becoine

property of APS. However, the Cclrut disagrees.

Article III, Section v, Paragraph tv of the coirstitutior: provides:

No law or sectiorl of the Code shall be amendeci or repealed by mere retbrence to
its titis or to the numher of the section cf the Code; but flre amendirig or repealing
Act shall distilctly describe the lalv or Corle section to be atnended or repealed as
rvell as the alteration to l:e made'
Ga. Ccnst.,

provides:

Ari. iII, $V, flIV. Further, Article iIi, Section V, Paragriiph

,,No

bill shall

prevelt tiaud

Ceneral Asseqrbly) shouid

4rbpttt

of the Constitution

pass rvhich retbrs to nrore than one subjcct matter or contains matter

ditt"erent fiom rvhat is expressed in the title thereof.

474 (1g74) (..To

lil

fue

"

See

nlso Forlson v. Weeks ,232 Ga. 412.

an<I surprise, hor.v important

it is, that the members (of the

notitreil at ieast by the Title of the Act. of the subi*ct mattsr

whfuh they are tegisk*ing;at any rate, Ihat they should not bo misled by the Title")

(3008) (The "object

(empirasis addetl); Sheffian Concrete Pipe Co. v. Chinn, 283 Ga' 4{i8' 4?0

irut
fof Ca. Const., Art" IIl, Sec. V" Para. III . . . lvas not to pr*v$nt compreirensive,
surreptitious, legi slation").
As surrmarizeri by the Georgia Supreme Court in Mead Corp. v.-Collins, 258 Ca. 339
( r e88):

since 1798. the Georgia constitution has provided that "No bill
sha1l pass rr,hich ... contains n-ratter dift'er*nt ftonr what is
expressed ifi the title thereof" Ca. Const'1983, Art' lll, Sec' V,
Para. IiI: Ca' Const'1976, Ad. I11, Sec' VII, Para' lV; fia'
Const.1945, Afi. III. Sec. VII, Para. VIII. The pur:pose o'f,this
cor:stitutional provision requiring that the a$t's title tnust alefi the
re;r{er to the miitters containerl in its body is to protect against
surprise legislatior:r. But recalling the history of that prr:vision
ariiing fr<im the lTgB constit.rtion, tSis court stated in Ca;y rr.
Jarclinc,l85 Ca' 9, 10-1 1, 193 S'8. 86q {t937}: ""' recognizing
the wisdorn of ths provision, it inust flevefih{:less br: given a
reasonable inteqprstation, an<l applied in the same manner. lt lvas
never iirtended that the substance of the entire act should be set
forth i11 the caption, It,,vas not contemplated that every detail stated
in the b<;rly shoukl be rnentioned in tl:e capticn' l.{ *'hat.fbllov's
afier ths nactifig c{ause is tlefinitely relatetl to what is expressecl
in rhe *'tle, has a naXural corurcctian, and rel*tes to the main object
af legislation, rmd is not itt conflict theretvith, there. is ttrt
ittf iigamext o.{the constit:tttitsnal inkihition,* Cnd17, supra' also
stands tbr the proposition that "provisions genflans to the gerret'al
subject-matter embraced ir"r the title of an act. an<l which are
designed to c&rry into effect the purposes fbr wliich it rvas passed.
*.^., r.s corrstitutiorally enacted therein, thougli r-rot ref'e$ed to in
use.r the rv.r<ls 'and rtrr other
putposes.' " lcl' 185 Ga. at 1 1, 193 S'8. 869'

it;ifi;ilil;;;ffiuu',ir*

If!. at 239-40 (citations omitted; ernphasis in original)'

lnportantly,
1950 LCA. Rather,

as noted above

HB

1{120

diri not pupofi to and did not amend or repeal tire

HB 1620 expressly provided that the 1950 LCA would not

deleted but rather would be continued

in force and effect

as part

tre repealed or

of ttre Seorgin Constitutiofl'

,See

text
Bedinqfield v. parkeisot,ZlZ Ga.654" 658 (1956). Fwlher, insothr as HB 1620's title and

which
reasonably and sufTiciently apprised the General Assembly of the subjer;t matter about

?6

they rvere legislating and rvhereas tl're t*xt of HB 1620 "is detinitely related to what is expressed

in the title,las a natural connectiop, and relates to the maiu obje*t of legislation^ and is not in
conflict therer,vith," the Cor"rrt iinds neither the title nor text,,vere misleading or other-rvise
uncsnstitutional.?2
*'The Ceneral
Article III, Section V, Faragraph IX of the Constitution provides:

Assernbly shall prcvide by iaw for ttre ac{vertisement o{'notice of infention to itrtroduce local
hi11s."

flot
flT]his constitutionally inandated notice provision't'does
rmation as to tire law to be enacted than would be
ieqrire more
required in the captiorr of the bilt itself"" 225 Ga. at 16S, 166
s.E.2d 363. The Constitutiolr does not require specificity in the
notice, bgt dernands only that it he sufficient to infon:r the public
that "legislation atlesting a particular subject wi[l be intrr:duce<1."
q10
?39 Ga. 274,275,190 S'E'2d

in

Cuirtv. Ltmpkin Count-v,

(1q72). The purpose of this notice requirement is to "profect the
people against covert or suqprise iegislatian"' Braw'tt, supra, 2?5
6*. at 166, 166 S.E-2d 363'

Lom.ax r:. Lee, 261 Oa. 575,578-79 (1q91) (finding statute continuing a 1952 LCA did not

violate the Georgia Constitution's notice requirement despite "fail[ing] to identify eilher ihe
county or city affected try the constitutional amendinent").
Here, HB i620 containetl a drscription *t'and clirect citation to the 1S50 I-CA aild the
..was sutlicient to alert persons of ordinary intelligence as to the sribject niatter
Court finds it

of

under
the cr:nstitritional ainendnrent beiug continued. and thercfore paiiseii constitutio[.tl scrutiny

Afi. III,

Sec,

V, Fara. IX." Id. Accordingly" the 1950 LCA

rema:ins in

full force

and effect.

??

I6?0
.{s noted by Responclents in their papers, the stu*e$ cited by tlte Clty in support of its clainl t.trat FIB
the case *t bar'
konr
<listinguishable
eaclt
are
requiretnelts
description
distinci
violate<i the Georgia Constitutiog'r
ti,e Act. Crtmpart:
Urrlike tirose casei, tl.re title of IIB l6:0 did not specifically tiuril the matters to be inrluded in
(1948);
Sherman
317
315,
goa
Ga.
203
Poi$t,
(1g66)l bra-v v" citv of E.
Neison v. s. cuar. lni;. co., 221 Ga.

ffi,]8]Ga.46s,470i2o08j.rurilrer.,HI]16?0\va$nQlacrin.rirralstatutethat..niutitbe
to lwo corstructions.
*r-tr"-d ,r, r-r,* -l.the [cuseci ancl strictly against the State" ilit is "r,ea^sorrtibly subject Ga.
2f0
90- 94 (1964)'
of rvhich rvould make irr acr

crimiaal and one o-f which would not." Carsello v' Stflte.

27

or:e

CONCLU$ION
Given all of ths &bove, Fetitionerls Motion for Sutnmary Judgment is HERHBY
DENIED, Responilent Atlanta Independent School Systems" Motion for Judgment on the
pleadings is HEREBY CRANTED and Respondent Fulton county school Distriat's Motion to
Dismiss Fetition for Declaratory Judgment

i.s

HEREBY GRANTED. The Clerk of the Courf is

INSTRUCTED to mark this case CLOSED.

So ORDERED

this rN p;

daY

of

JOI{N
Judicial Circuit

I Distribution list on rftefollawf*gpage

?8

Di$tribltttrn

l.ietl

Hrnmet J. Bondurant
David G.H. Brackett
Robert L.,{shq IlI
BSNDURANT, MIXSSN & ELMORE, LLF
3900 One Atlantic Center
1201 W. Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
bqndffi*lll@*ml+ju&a$]
brackettftr;bm

ei a',v. co

tn

a;.hs&bmskeufim
Robert S. I-lighsrnith Jr.

HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP

1301 W. Feachtree Street, N.W,
suirc 3000
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
rp b.s*."hi gh sm-i g!-QlkJ

1y, c.r:

Joseph D. Youug

JOSEPH F" YOUNG II"C.

1266 W. Paces Ferry Road

suite 167
Atlanta, Georgia 30327
j o r sp-h.Is utH(#p easl t gr: v - qP rn

Riclrard H- $inkfield

Phillip S, McKlnney
Timothy J. Fitz.rnaurice
ROSERS & HATT}IN LLP
2700 Intemational Tower, Peaehtree Center
?29 Feachtree $h'set, l''1.8.
Atlantq Georgia 30303
-}aw. c* m
nm ck i n n ey(#;rh- I aur-eq:1

rsi.nk
r

{"EJ cl @rh

{itArT auri cg.&,f h- I alv.gg,p

Christine

Mast

*tr*H,3 #ffiHtt

,'{ACKS*N & Y*uN*, LLP

303 Peachtr,ee Street, N.E"

Suite 4000
Atlanta, Ceorgia 30308

ana$I@hp-ryI4w{sm
kSt$te1gQhpt v I aw. cou.t